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When seeking to analyse Anglo-papal relations in the early sixteenth century, a lack of 
relevant research becomes quickly apparent. While a wide range of studies refer at times to 
this subject in terms of the grand narrative of English or papal foreign policy, few consider the 
relationship of temporal heads of state with the papacy or focus more directly upon elements 
of contacts between England and Rome during this period.1 To address this area, a broad 
assessment of the English crown’s relationship with the Apostolic See for the earlier part of 
Henry VIII’s reign was planned, a time when England was still undeniably loyal to Rome. 
Preliminary research made it apparent that the nature of this intercourse was frequently 
affected by the dynamics of and tensions inherent between the temporal and spiritual roles of 
the papacy. It was gradually realised, however, that the constraints presented by a study of 
this kind permitted only one aspect of this relationship to be examined here. As a result, 
consultation of the published primary sources available, particularly correspondence and 
documents contained in the likes of the Letters and Papers, highlighted a valid opportunity 
for more focused research, specifically the need for consideration of how the English crown 
related with the papacy in its role as a territorial prince and an assessment of the extent to 
which England’s temporal concerns affected aspects of its broader relationship with the 
Apostolic See.2 This opportunity was further emphasised when it was realised that this dual 
role of the papacy, while long recognised in historiography, has only since the 1960s begun to 
                                                 
1 Often, a narrower focus on Anglo-papal relations occurs only from when Henry’s marriage to Catherine of 
Aragon failed. This will be demonstrated in the brief historiographical survey outlined below; pp.8ff. 
2 For the sake of this study, the ‘temporal’ role that is being referred to is the princely function fulfilled by the 
popes by virtue of their contemporary territorial possessions, largely the lands known as the Papal States. This is 
distinct from earlier papal claims to universal temporal power within Christendom over all other secular princes 
(even the emperor). For this latter idea, see R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages 
(1970), pp.143-150. While the Anglo-centricity of this thesis may not be to all tastes, it will become apparent in 
the survey of relevant historical research below that no exclusive study has ever been made to address the 
English perspective. An attempt is being made, therefore, to begin to fill a gap in academic research; M. Harvey, 
England, Rome and the Papacy 1417-1464: the Story of a Relationship (1993), p.1; pp.8ff. 
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receive direct attention from writers.3 Further refinement of this topic was enabled when it 
became clear that a central preoccupation with France constantly manifested itself in the 
Anglo-papal political relationship; each party perceiving the other as a potentially valuable 
ally against this ‘superpower’. Concern with French power also emerged in the English 
crown’s perception of its own role vis-à-vis Rome; Henry VIII sought to protect the Church 
from the influence of the Most Christian King(s), whose presence in Italy during this period 
posed a great threat to papal political ‘independence’, as far as England and its interests were 
concerned.4 
The overall intention is, therefore, to establish that the crown recognised the need to 
relate with Rome throughout this period on a predominantly temporal level concerning 
France, albeit within the context of this dual framework, when navigating its political course 
in relation to the ‘barque of St Peter’, with a constant eye on the successful pursuit of its own 
interests. It will be seen that this resulted in problems and tensions within the Anglo-papal 
relationship, as popes equally needed to act in their own political interests as temporal 
princes, as well as within their spiritual role as universal ordinary and were, as the English 
feared, frequently under strong political pressure from France, which could affect their 
                                                 
3 Particularly the likes of P. Partner, P. Prodi and (for the thirteenth century) D. Waley; pp.14-15. 
4 This idea will be examined more fully in a subsequent chapter. Suffice it to say for now that the English crown 
most feared the prospect of a ‘French’ papacy which, on account of the traditional rivalry and xenophobia 
between England and France, it expected would have negative repercussions on its relationship with Rome in 
both temporal and spiritual spheres; pp.76ff. Focus could also have been made on the Anglo-papal relationship 
as affected by Scotland, albeit the dynamic with Rome was somewhat different. While Henry VIII and the 
papacy had a mutually direct relationship with and concern for France, Scotland’s distance from the Papal States 
meant that only the English king had a similar interest in this northern state. The papacy simply did not have a 
concern for Scottish power that would give rise to situations whereby English support would be sought, as was 
the case in its experiences with Louis XII and Francis I. In turn, this means that Henry VIII never really 
envisaged a need to ‘defend the faith’ from Scotland in the same way that he did France. Henry, on the other 
hand, sought papal support for his own political interests with Scotland. This was demonstrated vis-à-vis Rome, 
for instance, particularly after the Battle of Flodden (9 September 1513) when, trying to enforce English claims 
to overlordship of Scotland, Henry attempted to gain control of appointments to the Scottish episcopate, although 
one could tentatively posit that Leo X’s lack of direct interest in the kingdom (and lack of desire to offend 
Scotland’s powerful ally, France), contributed to the ultimate failure of this move. Due to the necessary 
limitations of this study, further comment, analysis and justification of Scotland’s role in the Anglo-papal 
relationship is not feasible, although it will occasionally arise, albeit in the context of the broader anti-French 
agenda which remains the principal focus of this thesis; pp.450-452. 
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decisions. Consequently, it will be demonstrated that the English crown made (foreign) policy 
decisions on subjects concerning Rome which recognised the politicisation of the papacy by 
virtue of the temporal demands imposed by its ownership of the Papal States. In this context, 
it will be the contention of this thesis that the English crown under Henry VIII, for all its 
recognition of the spiritual supremacy of the Vicar of Christ, was able to discriminate whether 
the pope was acting either wholly or partly in his temporal role (as a territorial prince in an 
extremely volatile corner of Christendom), and adjusted its approaches and responses 
accordingly to treat the pontiff in virtue of his motives and English foreign policy interests. 
Moreover, in this light, it will be found that the English crown’s perception of itself in its 
political relations with Rome, as well as those links themselves, were affected markedly by 
the crown’s concern with France, the latter’s ambitions in Italy and how these could affect 
English interests with regard to the papacy. Henry visualised himself, it will be seen, as the 
defender or protector of Rome from France. 
In determining the chronology of this study, it has already been mentioned that writers 
concentrating on Anglo-papal relations involving Henry VIII have largely focused on his 
marriage dispute onwards, through the Reformation and beyond. As the original intention of 
this study was to research Henry’s formative relations with Rome as a ‘most devoted son’ of 
the Church, a distinct period was therefore sought during the earlier part of his reign.5 Once 
his preoccupation with France and his desire to ‘defend’ the papacy, politically speaking, 
from the French was identified, a succinct period of study emerged. Beginning at Henry 
VIII’s accession, this underlying theme can be confidently plotted up to the end of 1521, 
culminating in Leo X’s recognition of this function when he awarded him the title ‘fidei 
                                                 
5 Henry tended to end his letters to the pope with this phrase; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the 
Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50 (1983), p.185. 
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defensor’ and followed shortly after by this pontiff’s death.6 As will be seen in the narrative, 
this end date also represents Henry VIII’s strategies to ‘defend’ Rome having come full circle; 
he began his reign in 1509 eager to attack France (at least partly) to this end and ended in 
1521 committed to the same course. Finally, the period encapsulates a time before Henry’s 
marital issues and repercussions from the Lutheran controversy affected the relationship with 
Rome. 
 
To demonstrate this anti-French focus underlying the English crown’s relationship 
with Rome, it became increasingly apparent that direct research was required on the political 
dimension of these contacts and how this affected broader relations between them. To achieve 
this, a number of stages need to be reached before such a discussion can take place. In the first 
place, one needs to define the two parties involved: the crown, as the governmental institution 
that acted on behalf of the kingdom of England, and the papacy, particularly in terms of how 
the heir of St Peter was perceived from an English perspective. Secondly, the means by which 
the English crown related with Rome in the political sphere requires some elaboration. The 
distance between the two powers necessarily impeded their relationship, although this period 
coincided with the beginnings of permanent resident diplomacy. This outline will provide 
some necessary context that will contribute to an increased understanding of the relationship 
as it existed. 
The next stage of this study is a detailed narrative that focuses on the crown-papal 
relationship that was conducted and developed 1509-1522. This provides an integral 
contextual basis for the analysis of this thesis although, for reasons of space, it will be 
                                                 
6 While the title was awarded in direct recognition of Henry VIII’s book, Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, the 
king had pursued this honour in recognition of his actions by the sword for some years; pp.151-173. 
 4
incorporated as an appendix.7 While there are plenty of accounts of Henrician foreign policy, 
as well as those on the political directions of the papacy and other heads of state, none is 
sufficiently detailed to test the underlying thesis; that a significant focus of the English modus 
operandi with Rome was to prevent French dominance of the papacy.8 Secondly, the lack of 
any directly Anglo-papal narrative makes it doubly difficult to draw an accurate picture of this 
relationship. To address these deficiencies, therefore, it has been necessary to reappraise the 
available sources from which Henry VIII’s foreign policy has been reconstructed; particularly 
diplomatic and other correspondence. To make this narrative more manageable, the period 
1509-1522 was divided into three phases. Each demonstrated the different approaches taken 
by the English crown in its attempts to shield Rome from French attempts to achieve 
hegemony in Italy (implicit in which was the crown’s pursuit of its own interests). They also 
highlight a papacy that largely encouraged Henry VIII to perform this role, although there 
were times when the weight of French influence on Rome or when the papacy was negotiating 
with France meant that it could not voice this sentiment publicly. In the first phase, 1509-
1514, direct aggression was sought and employed to support a (largely) collusive papacy, 
which culminated in the English invasion of France in 1513. This was largely successful, 
although the papacy pressured Henry towards peace in 1514. In the second period, 1514-
1518, a flawed Anglo-French peace allowed Francis I to act in Italy and the English crown 
backed indirect military support for a pontiff whose political independence of action was 
severely limited by the French king’s victory at the Battle of Marignano (1515). This failed, 
as did subsequent attempts to galvanise an anti-French coalition ‘in defence of the Church’. 
This forced Henry VIII to look to an alternative solution (and implicitly recognise French 
gains in Italy up to that point), which was found by Wolsey’s combining French peace 
                                                 
7 See pp.358-756. 
8 See pp.8ff. 
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overtures with papal crusading overtures, emerging with a universal peace agreement (Treaty 
of London, 1518). This diplomatic success intended to restrain France from further 
interference in Italy by virtue of its offensive focus on the Ottoman threat and by its defensive 
commitment to the security of all adherents. In the third phase, 1518-1521, one finds Henry 
VIII and Wolsey attempting to implement this restraining policy, although this became 
increasingly untenable, as the rivalry between Charles V and Francis I escalated from the 
Imperial election (1519) onwards. As France and the Holy Roman Empire headed towards 
full-scale war Henry VIII, by virtue of the universal peace agreement, had the excuse he 
needed to ‘defend’ the papacy robustly once more and Wolsey formalised this with Charles V 
at Bruges during 1521. The period ends with Henry committed to war, while the anti-French 
coalition (minus any English contribution) expelled the French from Milan shortly before Leo 
X’s death, thereby causing French influence in Italy and, by implication over the papacy, to 
drop to pre-1515 levels (before the Battle of Marignano). 
The reconstructed narrative background has facilitated the principal focus of this study 
that analyses the political underpinning of aspects of the English crown’s relationship with the 
papacy. The main crux of the argument will be that Henry and his advisors both sought papal 
support for their own designs against France and feared for papal security and ‘independence’ 
in the face of the French threat. This, it will be argued, was central to Henry VIII’s perception 
of his own political role in relation to Rome. It will become apparent that England portrayed 
itself and, in many cases, acted as the ‘defender’ of the institution, particularly as a territorial 
principate. Finally, this study will be drawn together with an analysis of the effects that this 
perception had on aspects largely peculiar to the Anglo-papal relationship that often 
incorporated the latter’s spiritual role. The elements to be focused on are papal honorary 
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awards, papal censures, conclaves and appointments to the Sacred College.9 Here it will be 
found that the English crown hoped to gain or influence these processes both in its own 
political interest, as well as to the detriment of France. It will also be seen that the papacy 
recognised the political leverage that this gave it over England and employed it to further the 
anti-French agenda. Finally, some tentative conclusions will be possible concerning this 
aspect of England’s relationship with Rome. Despite the overall focus being on the crown’s 
interaction with the temporal role of the papal institution, it must be emphasised that the 
latter’s wider, universal, spiritual pretensions cannot be detached entirely, as both roles 
overlapped, so reference to and consideration of spiritual elements of the relationship will be 
made, but mainly when they were affected profoundly by temporal causes (as far as these can 
be identified).10 
 
The research for this study has been enabled by and derived from a considerable 
volume of printed primary sources. The most relevant have been the Letters and Papers, 
Foreign and Domestic, of Henry VIII, the State Papers, and the Calendars of State Papers 
relating to Henry VIII, Milan, Spain and Venice.11 Similar correspondence can also be found 
in Martene and Durand’s Veterum Scriptorum et Monumentorum, Ellis’ Original Letters and 
Rymer’s Foedera. Each of these collections adds considerable detail to the general political 
picture gleaned from modern historiography and contributed to the need felt to plot a new 
narrative with the main focus on England and Rome. Also, with reference to the papacy, 
                                                 
9 Focus could also easily be made on appointments to benefices, jurisdiction, taxation and the crusade, aspects of 
which preliminary research revealed to have a direct impact on England’s political relationship with Rome, vis-
à-vis France. Time and space, however, have forced any consideration of these to be deferred for another time. 
10 While the temporal relationship is the aspect to be considered for the most part here, the spiritual sphere is 
taken into account but, as will be demonstrated, political considerations quite often affected spiritual contacts 
between the two parties, sometimes taking precedence over the pontiff’s ecclesiastical role as leader of the 
Church. In any case, the likes of Partner and Hay have increasingly demonstrated that such a focus is a justifiable 
pursuit; M. Harvey, England, Rome and the Papacy, p.1; also see pp.10-11. 
11 While most of these have been mined by historians, they have not yet been exhausted as primary sources. 
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various bishops’ registers occasionally shed light on relations, as well as the latest Calendars 
of Papal Registers.12 Reliance on diplomatic sources, such as the despatches of Venetian 
envoys, has been questioned for lulling readers into believing that they provide an insightful 
portrayal of events within, say, the English Court, while, in fact, providing just a superficial 
idea of what actually happened.13 While the accuracy of diplomatic correspondence can often 
be superseded by seemingly more factual primary sources, such as financial documents, in 
explaining what actually happened, they inadequately illustrate the opinions and beliefs of 
contemporaries making the decisions that led to such statistics. Indeed, the pitfalls of such 
sources notwithstanding, diplomatic evidence can still be reliable and useful, particularly if 
their contents cross-reference with other sources and correspondence. Often, however, it is the 
only source for opinions and events, particularly among the English, so appropriate caution 
must be exercised. Equal care had to be taken given that the format of most printed sources 
consulted is largely in abstract form. While potentially useful material may still await 
discovery, the sheer volume of consulted sources that reiterate the main argument of this 
study validate the approach taken and has faciliated access to sources that may otherwise 
prove inaccessible. 
 
In terms of the gap in secondary materials that helps to justify and support this study, 
it again ought to be stressed that little material covers Anglo-papal relations per se, let alone 
their political dimension and the importance attached by the English crown to its 
consideration of the pope’s temporal role in these contacts. Among the works available, one 
can identify four relevant types of writing. Firstly, there are those that include Anglo-Roman 
relations as part of their ‘grand narrative’, particularly works on the activities of the main 
                                                 
12 For example, Reg. de Castello; Reg Mayew; Reg. Wolsey; CPLXIX, XX. 
13 Critics include P. Partner, ‘Papal Financial Policy in the Renaissance and Counter-Reformation’, P&P, 88 
(August 1980), p.39. 
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protagonists (mainly in the political sphere). Among these are biographies of Henry VIII, 
Thomas Wolsey, Julius II and Leo X which are usually quite generalised and are often driven 
by narrative. As a result of their principal focus on the ‘great person’ of their titles, there are 
only occasional references to Anglo-papal relations, as and when their remits dictate.14 One 
exception to this rule is A.F. Pollard who, in part of his study of Wolsey, developed a 
paradigm concerning the papacy to explain the direction of Wolsey’s (rather than Henry’s) 
foreign policy. He envisaged Wolsey as having aligned England politically with the papacy 
throughout the period of his ascendancy, ostensibly in a bid to secure the papal tiara for 
himself.15 While this theory, widely held for a number of years, has fallen out of favour, it 
does see Pollard attempting to focus upon the English crown’s temporal relationship with 
Rome.16 This text is relevant and useful, therefore, but does not adequately survey crown-
papal relations in the sense intended for this study. Rather it tries to fit English foreign policy 
into the temporal direction taken by the papacy during Wolsey’s ascendancy, not always 
successfully. 
A second type of study that sometimes impinges on this subject is that which aims at a 
thematic consideration of English foreign policy. While the likes of an essay on foreign policy 
by Potter and a collection of articles by Doran and Richardson provide valuable context for 
                                                 
14 The chief examples of this genre that have been utilised in this study are Scarisbrick’s biography of Henry 
VIII, those of Pollard and Gwyn for Wolsey, Shaw’s study of Julius II, Roscoe’s on Leo X, as well as the 
Creighton and Pastor histories of the papacy; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (1968); C. Shaw, Julius II: The 
Warrior Pope (1996); W. Roscoe, The Life and Pontificate of Leo the Tenth, 2 vols. (1853); A.F. Pollard, Wolsey 
(1929); P.J. Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal: the Rise and Fall of Thomas Wolsey (1990); M. Creighton, A History 
of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome, vols. v-vi (1903); L. Pastor, The History of the Popes 
from the Close of the Middle Ages Drawn from the Secret Archives of the Vatican and Other Original Sources, 
vols. vi-ix (1908-1923). In the index to Scarisbrick’s study of Henry VIII, for example, there are only 10 
references apiece to Julius II and Leo X (if one excludes references to Julius II’s brief and bull relating to Henry 
VIII’s marriage, all of which are cited during the dispute that came after this period). In Shaw’s biography of 
Julius II, on the other hand, reference is made to Henry VIII in the index on only 11 occasions. While this is only 
an extremely rough indication of the discussion of crown-papal relations in these pieces, it does still give an idea 
of the gap in historical research; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII , pp.555-556; C. Shaw, Julius II , p.352. 
15 A.F. Pollard, Wolsey (1929), pp.16-17, 121-123 and, more generally, pp.99-164. 
16 The implications of this theory on the debate as to who controlled English foreign policy during this period 
will be raised later; pp.15-17. 
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England’s relationship with its fellow-states in Christendom, they rarely address how this 
affected political contacts with Rome, implying the need for a more direct study on this 
subject.17 Similarly, there are also several articles that analyse particular moments in 
‘Wolsey’s’ foreign policy, such as the Treaty of London of 1518 and his subsequent 
interactions with the Holy Roman Empire at the conferences of Calais and Bruges during 
1521 which, again, are useful more in terms of the context that they provide than in their 
focus on the Anglo-papal relationship.18 Of the few texts that focus on papal foreign policy, 
notably Chambers’ study on papal involvement in warfare, these demonstrate parallel 
limitations.19  
 A third genre of secondary work relevant to this study is that which analyses papal 
relations with other states or England generally. Of the few texts that consider the former 
directly, J.A.F. Thomson’s Popes and Princes is probably the most prominent. While 
Thomson covers most of the period under study and sheds an invaluable light on these 
dynamics from the papal perspective, he leaves a lot of shade concerning relations with 
England in the early sixteenth century, principally because his remit covers contact with all 
(Christian) princes.20 In terms of its overall theme, perhaps the closest self-contained study to 
                                                 
17 C.S.L. Davies, ‘The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century’, in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse 
(eds.), Britain and the Netherlands, vol.vi, War and Society: Papers Delivered to the 6th Anglo-Dutch Historical 
Conference (1977), pp.1-18; S. Doran and G. Richardson (eds.), Tudor England and its Neighbours (2005), 
especially J.M. Currin, ‘England’s International Relations 1485-1509: Continuities Amidst Change’, pp.14-43, 
G. Richardson ‘Eternal Peace, Occasional War: Anglo-French Relations under Henry VIII’, pp.44-73, and G. 
Richardson and S. Doran, ‘Tudor Monarchs and Their Neighbours’, pp.1-13; D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy’, in D. 
MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII: Politics, Policy and Piety (1995), pp.101-277. There is also an 
insightful study of English foreign policy by Wernham, that covers the early years of Henry VIII and beyond, 
although this is largely constructed as a narrative and, once again, has limited consideration of contacts with 
Rome; R.B. Wernham, Before the Armada: the Growth of English Foreign Policy 1485-1558 (1966), pp.62-106.  
18 P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: the Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered’, HJ, 23 (1980), 
pp.755-772; G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Non-Aggression Pact’, JMH, 10 (1938), pp.1-30. 
19 D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War: the Military Church in Renaissance and Early Modern Europe 
(2006). 
20 Chronologically, Thomson ends his analysis in 1517. Also, to put the lack of consideration of England into 
some sort of perspective, Thomson’s index only cites references to Henry VIII on five occasions; J.A.F. 
Thomson, Popes and Princes 1417-1517: Politics and Polity in the Late Medieval Church, 1417-1517 (1980), 
p.251. 
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the intended subject of this thesis is that of Harvey, who focuses on England and Rome during 
the period 1417-1464 but, in addition to the chronological limitation, she places more stress 
on the spiritual role of the papacy and has placed ‘high politics’ in the background.21 In 
Prodi’s text concerning the dual roles of the papacy, there lies a significant section on the 
papacy’s exercise of foreign policy and relations with other secular states, but this surveys a 
much longer period than that under study and his brief focus on England only considers the 
post-Reformation situation.22 In addition, there are other broad texts that do take some time to 
consider the English crown’s relationship with Rome specifically, but these focus mainly on 
an ecclesiastical perspective, according to the remit of their titles.23 
Finally, perhaps the most relevant texts to this study are those that focus on specific 
elements of the Anglo-papal relationship and incorporate the period 1509-1522. Among these, 
one can particularly cite the usefulness of works by Chambers, Wilkie, Lunt, Burns and 
Jensen. Covering subjects such as Wolsey’s alleged desire to be elected pope, the diplomatic 
and fiscal relationship between England and Rome, these provide invaluable context and 
detail on single topics on which this study can be based but, again, highlight a lack of material 
on the political links between two parties and further justify the need for a study in this area.24 
                                                 
21 M. Harvey, England, Rome and the Papacy. In addition, Harvey has more recently published an insightful 
article concerning perceptions of the papacy in the later Middle Ages but again, while extremely useful, it does 
not limit itself to England, nor does it focus greatly on the earlier part of Henry VIII’s reign; M. Harvey, ‘Unity 
and Diversity: Perceptions of the Papacy in the Later Middle Ages’, in R.N. Swanson (ed.), Unity and Diversity 
in the Church, Studies in Church History 32 (1996), pp.145-169. 
22 P. Prodi and S. Haskins (trans.), The Papal Prince, One Body and Two Souls: the Papal Monarchy in Early 
Modern Europe (1987), pp.157-181. 
23 For example, R.N. Swanson, Church and Society in Late Medieval England (1989), pp.11-16; J.A.F. 
Thomson, Early Tudor Church and Society, 1485-1529 (1993), pp.28-39. Thomson does delve briefly into 
political links, but not in much depth. 
24 D.S. Chambers has probably published the most relevant work relating to the Anglo-papal relationship, 
concerning Wolsey’s candidacy for the throne of St Peter. There is also a group of studies that have shed light on 
the diplomatic relationship between England and Rome (including political contacts); D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal 
Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38 (1965), pp.20-30. Chambers’ research on Cardinal Bainbridge and his 
career at Rome, for example, has been particularly enlightening in terms of the business conducted between the 
English crown and papacy in Rome, albeit for a very limited period (1509-1514). Similarly, Wilkie’s 
examination of the development of Cardinal Protectors within the framework of Anglo-papal diplomacy has also 
provided an important background to the diplomatic relationship between the two parties, but in this case 
 11
 In addition to identifying a gap in historiography concerning the English crown’s 
political relations with Rome, one also needs to briefly assess the attitude of historians to the 
object of this study, (the English relationship with) the temporal role of the papacy. Up until 
the 1960’s-1970’s, this aspect of papal power, as distinct from the spiritual function, received 
relatively little focus from researchers. While there appears to have been a longstanding 
consensus about the duality inherent in the nature of the pontifical institution, at least as far 
back as the early twentieth century,25 the main problem (for this study) has been that there has 
rarely been much of an attempt to distinguish between these two roles in the actions of 
pontiffs (apart from when attributing military actions to purely temporal motives, often in a 
condemnatory manner), nor much effort to analyse the English crown’s (or any other 
prince’s) perception/s of this dichotomy in its relations with Rome. No attempt has been made 
to plot, for example, what actions or policies (particularly in the spiritual domain) were 
motivated principally by the temporal responsibilities of pontiffs, nor has there been any 
                                                                                                                                                        
covered the whole period in question. Another useful article on the diplomatic side of the relationship was that 
penned by Behrens, attempting to outline the rise of the crown’s resident diplomacy in Rome. In addition, two 
articles concerning the English Hospice of St Thomas in Rome also sheds light on crown relations with the Holy 
See and other Englishmen there; B. Behrens, ‘Origins of the Office of English Resident Ambassador’, EHR, 49 
(1934), pp.640-656; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge in the Court of Rome 1509 to 1514 (1965); B. Newns, 
‘The Hospice of St Thomas and the English Crown 1474-1538’, in The English Hospice in Rome (2005), pp.145-
192; G.B. Parks, ‘The Reformation and the Hospice 1514-1559’, in The English Hospice in Rome (2005), 
pp.193-217; W.E. Wilkie, The Cardinal Protectors of England: Rome and the Tudors Before the Reformation 
(1974). In the fiscal field, the extensive work of Lunt has provided a fairly comprehensive picture of economic 
contacts between England and Rome, albeit concentrating on ‘spiritual’ revenues. An article by Jensen on the 
history of the papal imposition, Peter’s Pence, in England, has also been of use; O. Jensen, ‘The “Denarius 
Sancti Petri” in England’, TRHS, 19 (1905), pp.209-277; W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with 
England 1327-1534, ii (1962); W.E. Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, i-ii (1965). Finally, there are also 
miscellaneous articles on Anglo-papal links, such as Burns’ short essay on the gifts and honours that were 
bestowed by popes on the early Tudors, that will provide some background to a section considering how 
temporal concerns dominated the English crown’s pursuit and receipt of these. Similarly, Mitchell’s work on 
Rome as a source of artwork for the English crown during the reign of Henry VIII has been of use; C.H. Burns, 
‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.173-197; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome 
for Henry VIII. A Study of Anglo-Papal Relations as Reflected in Papal Gifts to the English King’, JWC, 34 
(1971), pp.178-203. 
25 See, for example, M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vols. v-vi, passim.; F. Gregorovius and A. Hamilton 
(trans.), History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages, vol.viii part i, (1902), pp.68, 70-71, 102-103, 116-118; 
L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vols. vi-ix (1908-1923), passim. A similar discrimination can be identified in W. 
Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.381-382. 
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concerted assessment of the reactions of temporal rulers in light of these. On the whole, 
whenever any distinction has been made between the two duties, it has usually been in the 
form of a generalisation that observes the pontiffs of this period (and the Renaissance at large) 
to be primarily wielding the (often frowned upon) temporal sword rather than concentrating 
upon its (more virtuous) spiritual role; choosing to act more as a Renaissance prince than as 
universal ordinary.26 Indeed, this does reflect the attitude of some contemporaries.27 
Furthermore, much of the writing that has transmitted this view has largely done so by 
weighting such temporal functions in a distinctly hostile light, particularly in order to 
demonstrate the contemporary decadence of the institution. Therefore, the traditional view of 
Popes Julius II and Leo X has portrayed them as being more interested in the temporal aspects 
of their office rather than the spiritual, thus bringing, implied or otherwise, moral 
condemnation on both them and their pontificates.28 Such criticism was frequently shaded 
with allusion to the Reformation (across Europe), whereby Catholic or Protestant sympathies 
have long coloured interpretations.29 In light of this traditional bias against the temporal role 
                                                 
26 See, for instance, B. Mitchell, Rome in the High Renaissance: the Age of Leo X (1973), p.22. Vaughan is more 
implicit in his criticism of Leo X, but attributes the Medici pontiff’s devotion to secular pursuits as justifying his 
‘being reckoned amongst the evil Pontiffs of the secular Papacy’; H.M. Vaughan, The Medici Popes (1908), 
pp.283-284. 
27 One of the most high-profile examples from the north of Europe was Erasmus. For his views on this issue, see 
the difference between his ‘public’ views from Praise of Folly (written in England in 1509 and published in 
Paris during 1511), compared to those that he issued anonymously in the Julius Exclusus (written probably in 
England shortly after Julius II’s death in 1513 and published in print during 1517); L.F. Dean (ed.), Erasmus, 
The Praise of Folly (1946), pp.154-165; P. Pascal (trans.) and J. Kelly (ed.), The Julius Exclusus of Erasmus 
(1968), pp.50-51, 55-56, 57-60, 80-89. 
28 Indeed, Prodi attributes the origin of moral condemnation of papal temporal power among historians to the 
likes of Guicciardini and Machiavelli who, notably, railed against it; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.3-5. 
29 In commenting on the papacy wielding both swords, Roscoe opined: ‘when schemes of ambition and 
aggrandizement were to be pursued, the pope, as a temporal prince, could enter into alliances, raise supplies, and 
furnish his contingent of troops, so as effectually to carry on an offensive war; but no sooner was he endangered 
by defeat, and alarmed for the safety of his own dominions, than he resorted for shelter to his pontifical robes, 
and loudly called upon all Christendom to defend from violation the head of the holy church’; W. Roscoe, Leo 
the Tenth, i (1853), p.6. Pastor, a Catholic, distinctly makes no moral judgements on the exercise of temporal 
power by Julius II and, instead, defends the papacy’s right to possess and wield it in the context of the period; L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.216-217, 449-454. However, Creighton, a Church of England bishop in his 
time, did not adopt a partisan view on this subject and, despite citing contemporary criticism of the papacy’s 
possession of temporal power, also defended it in the context of the time and suggested that it had no bearing on 
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(and towards the spiritual role) of the papacy, more recent studies have modified (and 
moderated) views of these functions, particularly the temporal, not in terms of the former role 
dominating Renaissance pontificates in a negative sense, but rather that it was a necessary 
feature of the period and provided the papacy with its best (and possibly only) chance of 
institutional independence.30 Such a viewpoint resulted from a move away from the Catholic-
Protestant axis of thought for or against the papacy, towards a more empirical look at the 
institution that existed in its contemporary context. Partner, falling into the latter camp, 
envisages that the temporal power of the papacy should be viewed in a broader context than 
just a decadent feature of Renaissance pontificates, its having been a fundamental 
characteristic of the institution since the eighth century.31 This view that the temporal role of 
the papacy predated the Renaissance (by some centuries) certainly stands up to initial scrutiny 
and is confirmed as a view held among some contemporaries at least by the writings of 
Guicciardini, who was in papal service and, in general, a critic of papal temporal power.32 
Another shift in historiography concerning the roles played by the papacy has been the 
consideration of the temporal component as an almost separate element that warrants 
individual study. This was pioneered by the likes of Partner, although he was careful not to 
advocate the complete isolation of the papacy’s temporal function from its spiritual role, 
rightly believing them to be symbiotic.33 More recently, Chambers has focused on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
the subsequent Reformation, rather it aided the Apostolic See in the defence of its position; M. Creighton, 
History of the Papacy, v, pp.189-194. 
30 As will become apparent, this theme was recognised by the English crown during this period and contributed 
to its perception of and relations with the papacy. 
31 P. Partner, The Papal State under Martin V: the Administration and Government of the Temporal Power in the 
Fifteenth Century (1958), p.v. Also, see P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.3-5. 
32 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini (1969), pp.140-151.  
33 P. Partner, The Papal State under Martin V ; P. Partner, The Lands of St Peter (1972). Also see D. Waley, The 
Papal State in the Thirteenth Century (1961). Almost independently of these trends, some relevant material 
concerning papal temporal power is contained in the writings on cities and ruling families that came within the 
sphere of influence of the Papal States, notably Bologna and Florence. While, Florence was never technically a 
part of the Papal States, it may, to all intents and purposes, be treated as such for the pontificates of Leo X and, 
later, Clement VII; C.M. Ady, The Bentivoglio of Bologna: a Study in Despotism (1937); H.C. Butters, 
Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, 1502-1519 (1985); P.J. Jones, ‘The Vicariate 
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papacy’s involvement in military affairs.34 Perhaps most significantly, Prodi has devoted a 
whole text to the study of the temporal role in comparison to the spiritual.35 For the period 
covered by the early years of Henry VIII’s reign, Shaw’s biography of Julius II is invaluable 
in this sense, as it elaborates on the temporal and spiritual roles of the papacy as separate 
(albeit inter-related) functions. Throughout, Shaw emphasises the distinct roles exercised by 
this pope that shaped his pontificate.36 Overall, these trends have led historians to moderate 
views on the temporal role of the papacy and adopt a similar stance to the likes of Prodi and 
Partner, particularly in terms of the move away from a ‘moral’ judgement of this function and 
assessing it more in its context, as well as in terms of according it individual significance in 
helping further understanding about the papacy.37 
 
Existing historical research also highlights a number of relevant historical debates that 
will demand consideration. Given that the study concentrates on the English perspective, such 
topics concern the English crown: namely, theories of English foreign policy and 
disagreement over the relative control of this by Henry VIII and Wolsey. Firstly, a number of 
great over-arching theories have been ascribed by authors to English foreign policy during 
Henry VIII’s reign. On initial survey, the preponderance of these paradigms tends to muddy 
the waters of any examination of Henry VIII’s relations with external powers. Some have 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the Malatesta of Rimini’, EHR, lxvii (1952), pp.321-51; J.N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic 
1512-1530 (1983). 
34 D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War (2006). 
35 P. Prodi, The Papal Prince. 
36 Admittedly, Shaw does not overtly separate Julius’ wielding of the two swords, but this is prevented by the 
largely narrative nature of her work; C. Shaw, Julius II, passim, but especially pp.1-8. 
37 Southern, writing in 1970, spoke briefly of the popes of this period as having temporal political interests 
distinct from its spiritual concerns, but not in great detail; R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Church in the 
Middle Ages, p.150. For general indications of this movement in historical thinking, see M. Harvey, ‘Unity and 
Diversity: Perceptions of the Papacy in the Later Middle Ages’, in R.N. Swanson (ed.), Unity and Diversity in 
the Church, Studies in Church History, 32 (1996), pp.161-164; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome (1985), 
esp. pp.10-12, 96-106; R.N. Swanson, ‘The Pre-Reformation World’, in A Pettegree (ed), The Reformation 
World (2000), pp.9-30, especially pp.11-12. 
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claimed that the English crown was driven by the aim to maintain a ‘balance of power’ within 
Europe in order to prevent any single state achieving hegemony and to ensure that England 
remained on the stronger side.38 Others have asserted that the English crown tried to imitate 
papal policy wherever possible, chiefly so that Wolsey could gain favours and rewards from 
Rome, with the ultimate aim to attain the papal tiara.39 Another view has been postulated that 
English foreign policy was motivated principally by dynasticism, particularly at the end of the 
period in this study, when the lack of a son is argued to have preyed seriously on the minds of 
Henry and his advisors.40 Others again have claimed that the main motivator for the direction 
of English foreign policy during this period was (Wolsey’s) desire for peace whereby, in a 
return to the ‘balance of power’ idea, England allied with the strongest of the main powers in 
order to make war pointless.41 While each of these has been held as the orthodox view for a 
time (in the aforementioned order) and each can be argued to hold some validity, they all 
possess enough weaknesses for it to be argued that they do not describe English foreign 
policy per se, nor that of 1509-1522.42 However, it is enough for now to put these models to 
                                                 
38 On the eighteenth-century origins of this model suggested by the likes of Rymer and Fiddes, as well as of 
criticisms of it, see A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp.3-4, 118-121. For an example of a later proponent of the theory, see 
G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy (1955), p.155. Belief in the validity of the ‘balance of power’ model for 
English foreign policy has regained some currency in recent years; for example, D. Potter, ‘Foreign Policy’, in 
D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.114-118. 
39 A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp.121-132, 161-164. Also, see P. Hughes, The Reformation in England, i (1956), p.113 
and the implied support of this theory in J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, 1485-1558 (1952), pp.267, 287, 290. 
This idea has been roundly criticised by the likes of Chambers, Elton, Guy, Scarisbrick and Wernham; D.S. 
Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, pp.20-30; G.R. Elton, ‘Introduction’, in A.F. 
Pollard, Wolsey, pp.xix-xx; J. Guy, Tudor England (1988), p.104; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.46-48; R.B. 
Wernham, Before the Armada, p.98. 
40 Wernham, in particular, argues that the lack of heir for Henry was a growing concern from 1519 and 
increasingly affected the direction of English foreign policy; G.R. Elton, Reform and Reformation: 1509-1558 
(1972), pp.85-86; G.R. Elton, ‘Introduction’, in A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp.xix-xx; R.B. Wernham, Before the 
Armada, pp.98-102. 
41 The first proponent of this theory (which alludes the ‘balance of power’ model) was J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry 
VIII, pp.48-50 and passim. Also, see J. Guy, Tudor England, p.87. 
42 See C.S.L. Davies’ failure to find evidence for the English crown pursuing either a ‘balance of power’ or a 
peace policy; C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism 1450-1558 (1976), pp.160-163. Starkey also 
recognises the search to ascribe a general foreign policy to the English crown in this period, but does not himself 
attempt to do this, instead generally describing the complex relationship that existed between king and ministers 
in the formation of such policies (in the context of the rise of Wolsey); D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII: 
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one side and bear them in mind in the following study. One caveat that needs to be made here 
is that, by focusing on England and Rome, there is the danger that this study may be accused 
of returning to the old Pollard paradigm, which has been condemned in some quarters.43 It 
needs to be stressed, however, that the attempt here is to focus on Anglo-papal relations which 
may re-emphasise elements of his ideas, but is not aiming to bestow prime importance on the 
papacy in determining English foreign policy. Rome was only one of a number of 
considerations taken into account when such decisions were made by the crown, as will 
become apparent. 
A second major historical debate that is revealed in research for this study is partially 
linked to the aforementioned issue. This is the Henry/Wolsey debate where, for generations, 
the issue of who actually ‘ruled’ England up to 1529 (including in terms of foreign policy) has 
been disputed. In terms of king and cardinal, the prominence of the latter in the government of 
England for most of (and beyond) the period in question is without doubt. The debate 
essentially turns on the personalities of both Henry and Wolsey, and their contributions to 
government; was Henry a strong king who deliberately allowed his minister to form and 
implement a great deal policy, or did Wolsey seduce and manipulate his king? This idea 
occupied and tended to polarise historians for much of the twentieth century.44 Currently, 
most subscribe to the view that Henry was at least a relatively ‘strong’ king who managed his 
ministers well, often allowing them enough space to pursue their own ends while he indulged 
in more leisurely pursuits, but always reining them in when he needed to. Although these 
historians admit that Henry could be weak and indecisive, this was unusual. On the other 
hand, there still exists a strong belief among some that Henry was not a ‘strong’ king, rather 
                                                                                                                                                        
Politics and Personalities (1985), pp.59-67. For a broad comment on the chronology in which these views were 
held by historians, see K. Randell, Henry VIII and the Government of England (1991), pp.34-35. 
43 For rebuttals of the Pollard paradigm, see D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, 
pp.20-30; G.R. Elton, ‘Introduction’ in A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp.xix-xx. 
44 K. Randell, Henry VIII and the Government of England, pp.6-7. 
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that he was susceptible to pressure from his ministers, particularly Wolsey in this period, 
although occasionally he did assert his authority over them.45 Broadly speaking, there seems 
to be little tangible difference between the two opinions now.46 Moreover, it is even possible 
to argue that there was little difference in the stances adopted by historians on this subject 
over the longer-term. On the one hand, most of those consulted agree that Wolsey 
accumulated an unprecedented degree of power for a minister and held an overriding 
influence with the king during this period. On the other hand, none dispute that Wolsey was 
always subject to the king’s authority (who could intervene at a moment’s notice) and needed 
                                                 
45 K. Randell, Henry VIII and the Government of England, pp.19-20. Among those who see Henry as the 
dominant party, Creighton (1888) views Wolsey’s rise as purely down to Henry’s favour (M. Creighton, Wolsey 
[1888], p.30). Pickthorn (1934) admits that Wolsey was extremely powerful, but reasons that his position was 
entirely dependent on the whim of the king ( K. Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government: Henry VIII [1934], pp.8-
11). Bindoff (1950) sees Wolsey as a general manager of the Crown, in control from 1512, although he always 
remained dependent on Henry (S.T. Bindoff, Tudor England [1950], p.74). Mackie (1963) reasons that, while 
outsiders viewed Wolsey as in control, Henry was ‘never at any time a mere figure-head’, rather that he was ‘the 
hidden power which lies behind the bright action’ (J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, pp.286-287) Scarisbrick 
(1968) argues Henry’s ascendancy on the basis that Wolsey would not hold his prominent that position if the 
king had not wanted him to be his leading servant (J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.43-45). C.S.L. Davies (1977), 
maintains that Wolsey’s appearance of control was illusory, as ‘the final decision was always the king’s, and 
Henry was always liable to listen to others’ (C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism, pp.158-159). Guy 
(1988) views Wolsey as having enjoyed ‘ministerial’ ascendancy’, though not on the scale often ascribed to him; 
rather, he was the controller of policy once it had been decided. He emphasises ease of access to the king’s 
presence, making him aware of political developments, as well as the daily or twice daily communications with 
London and Wesminster whilst he was absent from Court. The only reason that Wolsey appeared to be alter rex 
was because the king was satisfied with his work (J. Guy, Tudor England, pp.82-83. Also, see J. Guy, ‘Wolsey 
and the Tudor Polity’, in S.J. Gunn and P.G. Lindley (eds.), Cardinal Wolsey: Church, State and Art [1991], 
pp.61-62 and, especially, J. Guy, Cardinal Wolsey [1998], pp.6-12). Finally, D. Starkey (1991), similar to 
Bindoff forty years earlier, views Henry as having established ‘a managerial style’ (D. Starkey, The Reign of 
Henry VIII, p.9). On the Wolsey side of the debate, Robinson (1927) saw the minister as all-powerful and doing 
all the governmental work (C.E. Robinson, A History of England: the Tudors and the Stuarts 1485-1688 [1927], 
pp.12-13). Furthermore, Pollard (1929) described Wolsey as the ‘despotic authority in the state’, but he still 
admits that the minister’s dependence on the king as ‘absolute’ (K. Randell, Henry VIII and the Government of 
England, p.62; A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, pp.99-100). Similarly, Hackett (1946) portrayed the cardinal as almost 
feigning subservience to his king, while behaving (as far as outsiders were concerned) as if he owned Henry and 
England (F. Hackett, Henry the Eighth [1946], pp.140-141, 172-173). Elton (1955) is less clear-cut in his 
distinction and, whereas, he argues that it was Wolsey who ‘ruled’, he does concede that Henry ‘never 
surrendered ultimate control over affairs’ and had the ability to assert his himself over his minister (G.R. Elton, 
England Under the Tudors [1962], p.75). Finally, one historian that seems to come down in the middle of this 
debate, without veering too far from the largely pro-Henry consensus that now exists is Gwyn (1990), who likens 
Henry to a ‘chairman of the board’ and Wolsey as a ‘managing director’, portraying their relationship as ‘a 
genuine partnership’ (P. Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal [1990], pp.4-5, 208-211). John Guy has since echoed this 
language of a ‘partnership’ (J. Guy, Cardinal Wolsey, p.11). 
46 J. Guy, Cardinal Wolsey, p.9. Indeed, Pickthorn, as far back as 1934, argued on this basis that it does not 
really matter whether the period usually ‘called the Wolsey period was Wolsey's or Henry's’; K. Pickthorn, Early 
Tudor Government, p.9. 
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to retain Henry’s confidence if he was to stay in the ascendancy.47 Indeed, the overall 
impression emerges of a partnership, that experienced little apparent disagreement (1509-
1522, at least).48 In the context of this study, was English foreign policy and the direction of 
political relations with the papacy that resulted from this, attributable (more) to Henry or 
Wolsey? This issue will receive greater consideration later below. 
 
 To further set the context for any study of the English crown’s political relationship 
with the papacy, working definitions of the two principal parties ought to be clarified, as well 
as their means of communication. In particular, those within the ‘English crown’ who 
formulated policy concerning Rome should be identified and distinguished from those who 
implemented it. Again, the Henry-Wolsey debate will receive attention. In terms of the 
‘papacy’, the focus will be upon those identified in crown circles as the axis of papal political 
power; those who could affect or be influenced in matters relevant to England. Finally, the 
means by which Henry VIII and his ministers conducted diplomacy with Rome will be 
identified, with emphasis made on the effect that distance had on such communications. To 
begin with, when looking to establish who was responsible for the English crown’s political 
relationship with the papacy, one looks naturally to Henry VIII in the first instance, an erudite 
and able king who actively engaged in foreign policy throughout the period.49 Indeed, it was 
                                                 
47 See pp.27-28. 
48 In particular, see P. Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal, pp.207-211. The other great biographers of Wolsey and 
Henry VIII, respectively, Pollard and Scarisbrick, agree that Wolsey was the architect of English foreign policy 
during this period. The former argued that the cardinal, for the purpose of its author’s own ambition, directed 
England in the same direction as the papacy, while the latter posited that he pursued peace. C.S.L. Davies, on the 
other hand, attributed English foreign policy more so to Henry; ‘in the general direction of foreign affairs…the 
king’s prejudices were decisive’; C.S.L. Davies, Peace, Print and Protestantism, pp.160-163, esp. p.163; A.F. 
Pollard, Wolsey, pp.111-128; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.47-50. Indeed, the increasing belief that Henry 
played a greater role in foreign policy than has hitherto been believed, has contributed to the arguments of those 
seeking to restore Wolsey’s reputation; J. Guy, Cardinal Wolsey, pp.8-10. 
49 England was a personal monarchy, whereby the person of the king was supreme, both on account of the 
perceived spiritual justification of their role, as well as their de facto possession of power within the realm. All 
crown authority derived from him and he was ultimately responsible for decision-making at all levels. Elton 
quotes Sir Thomas Smith, writing in 1565: ‘To be short, the prince is the life, the head and the authority of all 
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in Henry’s name that correspondence was sent to and equally received from Rome.50 Foreign 
ambassadors, including papal nuncios, identified him as a pivotal figure, with whom they 
                                                                                                                                                        
things that be done in the realm of England’; G.R. Elton (ed.), The Tudor Constitution: Documents and 
Commentary (1960), pp.12,14; D. Loades, Power in Tudor England (1997), pp.8-9. It is widely accepted that 
Henry had received a good quality education and possessed the intellectual ability to take a lead in government. 
With relevance to foreign policy, he was multilingual: he was fluent in Latin and French, knew some Spanish 
and also understood Italian. These skills enabled him to take a direct role in foreign policy, particularly in 
reading correspondence for himself, sometimes without the aid of translators, and conversing with ambassadors 
in other languages, as and when he saw fit; LPIIIi, 402 (calendared end July 1519, relation of Giustinian’s visit 
to England); LPIi, 1484 (Sp.ii, 72; 19 November 1512, [de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London); R. Brown (trans.), 
Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. Despatches of Sebastian Giustinian, i (1854), pp.78-79 (Ven.ii, 624; 
LPIIi, 410; Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, 3 May 1515), 86 (LPIIi, 395; 30 April 1515, Pet. Pasqualigo to -, 
London), 100-106 (LPIIi, 652; Ven.ii, 633; 3 July 1515, Giustinian and Badoer to the Signory, London), 192-197 
(Ven.ii, 699; LPIIi, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 655 (16 October 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see J.S. Brewer (ed.), LPI, p.xxiii; D. Loades, Power in 
Tudor England, pp.107-108; J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.234; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, pp.22-24; J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.5-6; D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII, p.13.  
50 It ought to be noted that Henry largely did not write letters himself nor did he often read the full contents of 
those that he received. A sense of the volume of correspondence that he had to deal with is provided by Richard 
Pace on 17 November 1521, who acknowledged from Wolsey two of his letters (one in English and one in 
Latin), along with two missives from Lorenzo Campeggio, an extract of John Clerk’s letters and a copy of a 
letter written to Rome by Cardinal de’ Medici’s secretary. Of these, Pace remarked that Henry read Wolsey’s 
letters read ‘w[ord] by wo[rd] his self’, but does not comment on the others. Given the volume, it is likely that 
the other correspondence was verbally presented to the king; LPIIIii, 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to 
Wolsey], Windsor). Indeed, Henry VIII had three crown secretaries who dealt with his correspondence, whether 
that be writing it on his behalf or summarising that received to present to him. These were the principal secretary 
(initially Thomas Ruthal, but later Richard Pace), the Latin secretary (Andrew Ammonius for most of this 
period) and the French secretary (John Meautys). They also presented summaries of incoming correspondence to 
the king; JS Brewer (ed.), LPI, p.xciv. There were occasions when he did write in his own hand, usually short 
missives to other princes, but these were relatively unusual; LPIIIii, 1424 (calendared 20 July 1521, Wolsey to 
Henry, Westminster), 1425 (20 July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor). Also see secret correspondence to 
Wolsey; LPIIii, 4279 (calendared beginning July 1518, Henry to Wolsey); LPIIIi, 1 (calendared beginning 
January 1519, Henry to Wolsey). Despite this lack of authorship, Henry did sign his letters and there is reason to 
believe that he was aware of and, indeed, had approved what was being written in his name (including papal 
communications); LPIIi, 2631 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, [Henry] to [Wolsey]); LPIIii, 2963 (24 February 
1517, Wolsey to [HVIII], Westminster), 4053 (calendared end March 1518, Wolsey to Pace); LPIIIii, 1449 
(calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, ‘At my place bes[ide Westminster]’), 1459 (3 August 1521, Pace 
to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry], Bruges), 1713 (29 October 1521, Pace to 
Wolsey, Windsor). Furthermore, there are indications that Henry did personally read at least some of 
correspondence that was addressed to him (or his ministers). On 18 April 1518, for instance, Pace notifiied 
Wolsey the arrival of correspondence and advised the cardinal that he ‘needs not move the king to read the 
letters from Spain, for he reads every word of all the letters sent under Wolsey’s packet’; LPIIii, 4089 (18 April 
1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock); LPIIIii, 1673 (13 October 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor). One genre of 
correspondence that Henry did tend to read personally was that sent or handwritten by other heads of state. 
Towards the end of October 1513, for instance, Henry notified Leo X that he had ‘read his exhortations to 
conclude peace with great veneration’. Also, in 1521, Henry was noted to have read ‘every word’ of a recently 
arrived papal brief instructing the burning of Lutheran texts, which he showed to Ruthal and Warham after 
dinner. It is worth noting, however, that he did not read the accompanying bull, which he wanted examined by 
others before it was published; Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo); LPIIIi, 1233 (16 April 
1521, [Pace] to Wolsey). For other examples of Henry personally reading direct communications from other 
princes, see Sp.ii, 23 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 125 (22 July 1513, Henry to Ferdinand, 
‘from the camp near – ’); LPIi, 809 (6 July 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Valence), 1215 
(calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian); LPIii, 3018 (LPI, 5173; Gerard de Pleine and John Colla to 
Maximilian, London), 3268 (LPI, 5407; 14 September 1514, Jacques de Caestres to [Margaret of Savoy], 
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sought audience to discuss their affairs.51 Advising him, particularly in foreign affairs and 
papal matters, was a small but powerful coterie of advisors within the broader Council, often 
known as the ‘inner circle’ or something similar.52 Papal affairs were conducted by an 
                                                                                                                                                        
London); LPIIi, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise of France, London), 2705 (27 December 
1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Hagenow); LPIIIi, 1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to 
Henry]); LPIIIii, 1439 (25 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.168-
169 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIIi, 1421; 21 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). There are also various 
instances of Wolsey forwarding Henry correspondence for him to read and asking him to return it, as well as of 
the king reading the cardinal’s letters particularly in relation to foreign affairs. There is also an example, during 
April 1521, of the king sending Wolsey his instructions on the basis of foreign correspondence which he ‘desires 
Wolsey diligently to ponder’; LPIIii, 4058 (4 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon); LPIIIi, 1213 (calendared 
end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]); LPIIIii, 1192 (7 March 1521, Wolsey to [Henry], ‘From your house of 
Hampton Court’), 1220 (Cal. Carew 13; 7 April 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1426 (20 July 1521, Wolsey 
to Henry, Westminster), 1429 (21 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1439 (25 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, 
Westminster), 1536 (2 September 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Guildford), 1594 (20 September 1521, [Pace to 
Wolsey]). 
 Another means of presenting correspondence to Henry was verbally, although in March 1516, he may 
have read ‘a very brief Latin compendium’ compiled by Giustinian, ‘made, that they might prove less tedious to 
him’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.192 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIIi, 1653; 11 March 1516, Badoer and Giustinian to 
the Signory, London). For verbal summaries of correspondence given to Henry by foreign ambassadors, see 
Ven.ii, 132. (LPIi, 960; 26 November 1511, Signory to Badoer); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.301 (Ven.ii, 
786; LPIIi, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). The inherent problem with the king 
receiving information in this way was that that presented could quite easily be selective. Indeed, during October 
1521, Wolsey accused Pace of ‘reading his letters directed to the king “diminutely”’. Denying this accusation, 
Pace claimed that ‘I never rehearsed your grace’s letters, diminutely or fully, but by the King’s express 
commandment, who readeth all your letters with great diligence, and my answers, not by device, but by his 
instructions’. He further described how Henry dictated to Pace what he wanted written, read the letter several 
times and marked it for further editing; LPIIIii, 1713 (29 October 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor). 
51 During 1514, for instance, Henry negotiated with Gianpietro Caraffa concerning Leo X’s desire for an Anglo-
French peace. Lodovico Canossa also held talks with the king to the same end while conducting shuttle 
diplomacy between England and France. Similarly, towards the end of this period, Henry notified the pope that 
he had spoken with Girolamo Ghinucci ‘upon certain matters of great importance’; LPIii, 2084 (LPI, 5048; 7 
May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich); Ven.ii, 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome); LPIIIi, 1137 (21 
January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). For Henry being approached for audiences by ambassadors and giving 
the impression that he had a good command of foreign affairs, see for instance R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, 
pp.168-171 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIIi, 1495; 6 February 1516, Giustinian to the Council of Ten, London), 192-197 
(Ven.ii, 699; LPIIi, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to the Council of Ten, London); ibid., ii, 157-165 (LPIIi, 
3976; Ven.ii, 1010; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
52 While the Council was traditionally the principal advisory body to English kings, it was not a formal body and 
its role varied between monarchs. Its remit could include foreign policy, but it has been convincingly suggested 
that it was limited mostly to ceremonial, legal and administrative business during this period, as it was too large 
and unwieldy to govern on a day-to-day basis. The only times found when it was consulted as a wider body was 
when the king wanted to go to war; W.H. Dunham Jr., ‘Wolsey’s Rule of the King’s Whole Council’, American 
History Review, xlix (1944), p.645; G.R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government (1960), pp.61-62; G.R. 
Elton, ‘Tudor Government: the Points of Contact’, in, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government, III 
Papers and Reviews 1973-1981 (1983), p.23; J.A. Guy, ‘Wolsey, the Council and the Council Courts’, EHR, 91 
(1976), pp.481-484; D. Starkey, The Reign of Henry VIII, p.18. For examples of the Council requiring 
consultation when the king wanted to go to war with France, 1515-1516, see D. Hay (ed.), The Anglica Historia 
of Polydore Vergil, Camden Society 3rd series, 74 (1950), p.235; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.262-264 
(Ven.ii, 753; LPIIi, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 307-309 (LPIIi, 2464; Ven.ii, 791; 
20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 325-327 (LPIIi, 2500; Ven.ii, 801; 1 November 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). For Giustinian’s opinion that the Council could only rubber-stamp Wolsey’s 
decisions later in the period, however, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years at the Court of Henry VIII. Despatches 
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ecclesiastical layer, led by a powerful principal minister who enjoyed the ear of the king and 
was often cited by Venetian ambassadors to be ‘alter rex’.53 The chief ministers for this 
period, Richard Fox and Thomas Wolsey, were both ecclesiastics and were integral to the 
Anglo-papal relationship as, other than the king himself, they were largely the only officials 
to correspond directly with the papacy.54 Fox enjoyed dominance, supported particularly by 
                                                                                                                                                        
of Sebastian Giustinian, ii (1854), pp.155-157 (LPIIi, 3954; Ven.ii, 1009; 17 February 1518, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 215-218 (LPIIi, 4438; Ven.ii, 1072; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
The nature and role of the ‘inner circle’ is unclear because of the lack of source material (much of its business 
probably having been conducted verbally), a lack of subsequent studies on this, as well as confusing terminology 
used by contemporaries and historians alike. Dunham Jr. tried to identify this group as the ‘Privy Council’, in 
advance of the formal institution of this body from the late 1530s on. He was unable, however, to get away from 
the idea that this was part of a long process of transformation from a loose ‘council attendant’ to the Privy 
Council, as Elton disputed. In spite of this lack of clarity, most historians seems to recognise the influence during 
Henry VIII’s reign of an ‘inner ring’ or ‘inner circle’; W.H. Dunham Jr., ‘Henry VIII’s Whole council and its 
Parts’, Huntingdon Library Quarterly, 7 (1943-1944), pp.7-46; W.H. Dunham Jr., ‘Wolsey’s Rule of the King’s 
Whole council’, AHR, 49 (1944), pp.644-662; W.H. Dunham Jr., ‘The Ellesmere Extracts from the “Acta 
Consilii” of King Henry VIII’, EHR, 58 (1942-1943), pp.301-318; G.R. Elton, The Tudor Constitution, pp.87 
n.1, 89; G.R. Elton, The Tudor Revolution in Government, pp.59-63; G.R. Elton, ‘Why the History of the Early-
Tudor Council Remains Unwritten’, in G.R. Elton (ed.), Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government I, 
Tudor Politics, Tudor Government (1974), pp.308-310, 320; G.R. Elton, ‘Tudor Government: the Points of 
Contact’, in, Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government, III, pp.21-22; J.A. Guy, ‘Wolsey, the Council 
and the Council Courts’, EHR, 91, p.481; D. Loades, Power in Tudor England, p.52; E. Ives, ‘Henry VIII: the 
Political Perspective’, in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, p.23; K. Pickthorn, Early Tudor 
Government, p.12; A.F. Pollard, ‘Council, Star Chamber, and Privy Council under the Tudors’, EHR, 37 (1922), 
pp.338-341, 355-357, 529; A.F. Pollard, Wolsey (1929), p.111. The existence of an inner ring of councillors is 
inherited from Henry VII’s reign (and, in turn, from Edward IV’s time); R.L. Storey, The Reign of Henry VII 
(1968), pp.96-98. 
53 An indication of Richard Fox’s prominence in the early years of the reign came when Wolsey reported to him 
a minor dispute among those around the king over which candidate the English crown should support in a 
conclave that was reported to be imminent. Wolsey told Fox, who was then absent from Court, ‘Yf yowr 
lordship war here, thys matter wold be sone browgth to yowr purposse’; P.S. Allen and H.M. Allen (eds.), 
Letters of Richard Fox 1486-1527 (1929), 35 (LPIi 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). 
Similarly, Fox’s pre-eminence in papal affairs was suggested in June 1514, when the English ambassador in 
Rome, Bainbridge, complained of Hadrian de Castello’s attempts to convince Leo X that he had the ear of the 
king’s principal minister. The English cardinal cited de Castello’s claim ‘that no-one had true tidings from 
England, except himself, by reason of his factor there, “named Polydorus, who, he said, was body and soul to my 
Lord of Winchester”’; LPIi, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). For Fox’s identification as 
‘alter rex’ and other observations of his prominence in foreign policy, see Ven.ii, 64 (LPIi, 430; 15 [April] 1510, 
Badoer to the Signory), 332 (20 September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of Carpi, Tournai); Sp.ii, 44 
(LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). 
54 Prior to his sharing power with Wolsey from 1513-1514, Fox was the only person other than the king to 
exchange correspondence with the papacy on crown business, although direct letters to Rome in his name seem 
to have been rare and to have been sent in the king’s name. For reference to one exception, see Ven.ii, 45 (LPIi, 
383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer). For wider indications that Fox controlled the king’s correspondence 
abroad, including that to the papacy, see LPIi, 568 (9 September 1510, Thomas Spinelly to Sir Gilbert Talbot, 
Brussels), 1314 (LPI, 3346; [31] July 1512, [Henry to James IV]); P.S. Allen and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard 
Fox, 45 (LPIi, 1960; LPI, 5757; 4 June 1513, Fox to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 63 (LPIi, 434; 20 April 1510, Badoer to the 
Signory, London). 
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Thomas Ruthal, up to the end of 1513.55 At this point, Fox began to share power with Wolsey 
in papal affairs, as correspondence started to be issued jointly in their name and to be 
addressed to them by both Leo X and English diplomats in Rome.56 While Fox did not 
                                                 
55 For an indication of Fox and Ruthal’s early seniority, see Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to 
Ferdinand, London); Ven.ii, 67 (LPIi, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). Ven.ii, 132 (LPIi, 
960; 26 November 1511, Signory to Badoer). For Ruthal’s secretarial involvement in correspondence to and 
from Rome, arranging couriers and drawing up diplomatic commissions prior to his becoming Lord Privy Seal in 
1516, see for instance LPIi, 190:33 (LPI, 520; 24 September 1509), 354 (LPI, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to 
Bainbridge); LPIIi, 542 (calendared end May 1515, John Baptista Boerius to Ruthal), 1044 (18 October 1515, 
Dacre and Magnus to Henry, Harbottle); LPIIii, p.1453. Ruthal’s involvement in the Anglo-papal relationship as 
a direct correspondent, however, seems to have been rare. One exception seems to have been Leo X’s missive of 
17 December 1514, when the pope urged him (and other English ecclesiastics deemed to be prominent) to 
convince Henry towards peace with France, although the apparent lack of reply caused the pope not to follow 
this up. Leo seems to have approached Ruthal (via de Giglis) again during September 1515, concerning his 
desire for Henry to permit the levy of a clerical tenth. Again, the pope seems to have been using prominent 
crown ministers to pressure the king (he wrote to Wolsey in the same regard); EP 551 (17 December 1514, Leo 
to Ruthal, Rome); LPIIi, 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1312 (21 December 1515). Ruthal also 
seems to have been contacted occasionally by English diplomats in Rome. Bainbridge wrote during the summer 
of 1513, but this may have been because he was to be the crown ‘contact’ in England, while Fox (and Wolsey) 
were occupied with the English campaign in France; LPIii, 2077 (LPI, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, 
Rome). Ruthal also seems to have been in direct contact with the papacy in seeking an indulgence for the 
restoration of Norham Castle, within his diocese, which had been destroyed by the Scots. He does not seem to 
have pursued this on his own, however. Rather he availed himself of support from Henry and Wolsey; LPIii, 
2636 (LPI, 4724; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); LPIIi, 108 (3 February 1515, [Giulio de’ Medici] to 
Henry, Rome), 109 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 110 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], 
Rome); EP, 351 (8 February 1514). 
56 This axis became clear to Leo X and the English ambassador in Rome, Silvester de Giglis, from late 1513. 
During December, the pope wrote to influential English bishops, Warham, Fox and Ruthal at least, requesting 
that they lobby Henry towards peace with France. The reply via de Giglis, however, came from Fox and Wolsey 
and Leo subsequently recognised the overriding influence of these ministers with the king in ‘papal’ matters. 
This elevation of Wolsey may have been aided by the secrecy surrounding England’s receptiveness to papal 
peace overtures; LPIii, 2513 (EP, 251; 17 December 1513, Leo to Warham, Ruthal and Fox), 2611 (LPI, 4598; 
January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis), 2559 (EP, 316; 4 January 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2560 (EP, 
317; 4 January 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2611 (LPI, 4598; January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis), 
2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2658 (EP, 364; 19 February 1514, Leo to [Caraffa], 
Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2660 (EP, 362; 19 February 1514, Leo to Wolsey, 
Rome), 2783 (LPI, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2821 (EP, 409; 20 April 1514, Leo to Fox, 
Rome), 2822 (EP, 408 (20 April 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2928 (LPI, 5353, [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey), 
3019 (LPI, 5174; EP, 445; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to 
Wolsey and Fox, R[ome]), 3362 (LPI, 5496, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome); EP, 438 (16 June 1514, Leo 
to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 500 (7 September 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome). For the secrecy 
surrounding Anglo-papal-French peace negotiations, see pp.420-422, 429-432. Wolsey also became a sole 
correspondent with de Giglis from around April 1513, although he initially seems to have been passing on crown 
requests in ‘spiritual’ matters, as well as pursuing a plurality dispensation for himself. This may have arisen from 
Fox’s preoccupation with preparations for the imminent invasion of France. One can also observe Wolsey 
corresponding with de Giglis in early 1514 on personal issues, particularly concerning the remission of services 
taxes due on his promotion to Lincoln; LPIii, 1857 (LPI, 4039; 10 May 1513, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2644 
(LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 2783 (LPI, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to 
Wolsey, Rome. One can trace the rise of Wolsey back to the summer recess of 1511, when Fox apparently 
entrusted him to act as his eyes and ears at the Court while he was absent, the importance of which he later 
stressed in 1516. Wolsey reprised the same role in the summer of 1512. Wolsey’s role in papal affairs at this 
point was limited. In 1511, he competed with other ministers present to convince the king to support a candidate 
for a prospective conclave, but recognised that he might have overstepped his remit. In 1512, he forwarded to 
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officially retire until May 1516, he retreated from involvement in the Anglo-papal relationship 
around June 1515, after which Wolsey assumed sole responsibility in this sphere.57 During 
Wolsey’s ascendancy, Ruthal seems to have continued his supporting role and Richard Pace 
became prominent in the later part of this period, after his return from his Swiss embassy 
towards the end of 1518.58 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fox letters of thanks for Hadrian de Castello, presumably seeking Fox’s signature and/or approval. Similarly, 
during June 1513, Fox acknowledged receipt from Wolsey of a letter to be sent to Silvester de Giglis, probably 
requiring similar approval or correction; P.S. Allen and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox (1929), 35 (LPIi 880; 
LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]), 37 (LPIi, 1356; LPI, 3388; 26 August 1512, Wolsey to [Fox], 
Farnham), 45 (LPIi, 1960; LPI, 5757; 4 June 1513, Fox to Wolsey), 52-55 (LPIIi, 1814; 23 April 1516, [Fox] to 
Wolsey). During the summer recesses, around June to October (generally from the end of Trinity term until the 
beginning of Michaelmas term), the king was often on progress and occupied by various pastimes, and was 
accompanied by a skeleton staff of counsel, if any, see N. Samman, ‘The Progresses of Henry VIII, 1509-1529’ 
in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.59-73, especially p.62; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by 
Edward Hall, i (1904), pp.19-20, 147. 
57 For Fox’s continued involvement alongside Wolsey into 1515 and until around June, see for instance LPIIi, 
109 (3 February 1515, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 312 (11 April 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey, Westminster), 374 
(25 April 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 493 (calendared 22 May 1515, [de Giglis to -]), 574 (12 June 1515, 
de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). While some historians have 
cited a falling out between Wolsey and Fox, resulting in the latter’s withdrawal from politics and retirement from 
the office of Lord Privy Seal, sources do not point towards this. Indeed, Wolsey seems to have called upon Fox 
for advice from time to time; P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-55 (LPIIi, 1814; 23 April 1516, 
[Fox] to Wolsey), 121-122 (LPIIIi, 14 August 1519, Fox to Wolsey, ‘Suthwyk’). Furthermore, Fox did not 
entirely renounce his involvement in papal affairs. At the beginning of December 1516, for instance, (around the 
time of his brief recall to Court), Fox allegedly intervened in Wolsey’s dispute with the apostolic nuncio 
Chieregato, whom Wolsey believed to have conspired with the French. While Wolsey was reported to have ‘laid 
hands on him’ and had him imprisoned and threatened, the nuncio was released only after Fox’s intervention; R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.17-19 (LPIIi, 2643; Ven.ii, 823; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). For Fox giving up the Privy Seal, see C.S.L. Davies, ‘Fox , Richard (1447/8–1528)’, DNB (2004). 
58 For a general comment that English foreign policy was conducted secretly by just two or three individuals 
during 1518, see Ven.ii, 1066 (1 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Following Fox’s 
withdrawal from frontline politics, Ruthal was appointed Lord Privy Seal (May 1516) and came to fulfil the 
same senior but supporting role with Wolsey as he had done with the bishop of Winchester. This drew 
unflattering comments from contemporaries. During a Council meeting in late 1515, for instance, Vergil 
portrayed Ruthal backing up Wolsey’s arguments ‘lest he should be soundly lashed for doing other wise, because 
for a long time he had devoted himself to Wolsey and therefore depended entirely on the latter’s pleasure’. 
Similarly, in July 1516, Giustinian described him as ‘singing treble to the Cardinal’s base’, whereas when he 
failed to gain access to Wolsey during May 1517, he visited Ruthal instead, ‘as he is one and the same thing as 
the right reverend Cardinal’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.260 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii, pp.88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; LPIIii, 3287; 26 May 1517, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.235; M. Johnson, ‘Ruthall, Thomas (d.1523)’, DNB. Also 
see, for example, Ruthal continuing to act as Wolsey’s secretary; LPIIIi, 1259 (calendared April 1521, [Wolsey] 
to -); LPIIIii, 1383 (calendared beginning of July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster) and passim. For other 
references to Ruthal’s political seniority (just beneath Wolsey), see for instance LPIIi, 1893 (16 May 1516, Sir 
Richard Sacheverell to the earl of Shrewsbury, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.252 (Ven.ii, 750; 
LPIIi, 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 759 (13 August, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). For Ruthal’s continued secretarial involvement in correspondence to and from Rome after his 
appointment as Lord Privy Seal, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; 26 May 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). It is difficult to 
get a sense of Ruthal’s actual role in papal affairs, other than that he was noted to have direct contact with papal 
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  Given that the aforementioned debate over the relationship between Henry VIII and 
his principal ministers, particularly Wolsey, this deserves comment in light of the English 
                                                                                                                                                        
diplomats, was au fait with papal affairs, albeit he was always aligned with Wolsey; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i, pp.245-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIIi, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 274 (Ven.ii, 
758; LPIIi, 2264; 11 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIIii, 1518 (calendared 28-29 August 
1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). 
Richard Pace was employed as Wolsey’s secretary immediately on his return from Rome around March 
1515 Given his curial experience and fluency in Italian, this may well have been envisaged to assist Wolsey in 
his increasing influence in papal affairs; C. Curtis, ‘Pace, Richard (1483?-1536)’, DNB; LPIIi, 273 (29 March 
1515, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Paris); Ven.ii, 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], 
Tournai). For Pace’s linguistic skills, see for instance LPIIi, 2008 (6 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Augsburg). 
Indeed, Pace was instructed to call upon his curial experience by establishing contact with papal representatives 
while on embassies in the Swiss Cantons (1516-1518) and in Germany (1519) and even with the pope himself in 
the former; LPIIi, 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace), 1224 (calendared end 
November 1515, Pace to Wolsey); LPIIii, 4068 (10 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace); LPIIIi, 241 (calendared 20 
May 1519, Pace’s instructions). On his return from a lengthy Swiss embassy in October 1517, Pace assumed for 
the first time his office of principal secretary, managing Henry’s correspondence. He was also, from this time, 
Wolsey’s agent in attendance on the king and acted as his intermediary with Henry for the rest of this period 
(with brief interruptions in 1519 and from December 1521); see, for example, LPIIii, 3747 (15 October 1517, 
Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Richmond); LPIIIi, 412 (11 August 1519, 
Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst); LPIIIii, 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to Wolsey]). From the same time, Pace’s 
prominence in the ‘inner circle’ of English councillors was also recognised by observers. Giustinian, for 
instance, reported that he occupied ‘the third place in the secret council’ and he now became a figure to be 
lobbied by foreign diplomats. Giulio de’ Medici also offered his congratulations; Ven.ii, 1000 (LPIIii, 3885; 16 
January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.146-150 (Ven.ii, 1002; 
LPIIii, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 259-262 (Ven.ii, 1180; LPIIIi, 133; 22 March 
1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); LPIIii, 4020 (20 March 1518, Giulio de’ Medici to Pace). In terms of 
Pace’s role in the crown’s papal policy, he seems to have been pivotal, positioned between Henry and Wolsey. 
He had access to all correspondence going to and from Rome and seems to have been involved in discussions 
between king and cardinal about the appropriate course to take. He was also observed by Giustinian to be au fait 
with papal affairs. Despite Pace being clearly involved and having experience of Rome, however, his actual 
contribution to Henry’s and Wolsey’s decisions is uncertain; LPIIii, 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 
4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4053 (calendared end March 1518, Wolsey to Pace), 4082 
(14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon), 4680 (24 December 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Greenwich); LPIIIi, 
412 (11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst), 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1425 (20 
July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okin]ge’), 1519 (29 August 
1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford), 1709 (27 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1739 (4 November 
1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1759 (13 November 1521, Pace to [Wolsey]), 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace 
to Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.146-150 (Ven.ii, 1002; LPIIii, 3896; 24 January 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). With respect to Pace’s direct interaction with the papacy, he seems to have 
been identified shortly after his return to England in late 1517 as a potential contact for the papacy by Giulio de’ 
Medici. Silvester de Giglis also contacted him during April 1518 in an attempt to resolve papal complaints at 
communication difficulties with England. Ostensibly, he advised that Wolsey allow Peter Vannes to assume the 
central role that Ammonius used to play and, at the same time, attempted to conduct papal business with Pace 
himself. As these were apparently isolated communications, perhaps Pace was not permitted to become a direct 
contact for Anglo-papal correspondence; LPIIii, 4020 (20 March 1518, Giulio de’ Medici to Pace), 4068 (10 
April 1518, de Giglis to Pace), 4084 (15 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace, Rome). There a few other pieces of direct 
correspondence between Pace and Rome, but these seem to relate to some sort of personal request to the pope; 
LPIIIi, 1204 (29 March 1521, de Giglis to Pace, Rome), 1275 (12 May 1521, Pace to Leo, London). Finally, 
Pace seems to have been in contact with the nuncio Ghinucci during June 1521, shortly before Wolsey was due 
to cross to Calais to mediate between Charles V and Francis I; LPIIIi, 1370 (27 June 1521, Pace to [Jerome 
Ghinucci], Windsor). 
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political relationship with Rome that has been researched here. While the impression gained 
of Henry has been of a king confident in his monarchical authority and foreign policy 
direction from the outset, particularly against France, his principal ministers (supported by the 
‘inner circle’) seem to have been incredibly influential with him albeit, one must stress, not 
independent.59 An example of this from the early years of the reign can be seen with Henry 
VIII’s belligerent desire to go to war against France, while the likes of Fox and Ruthal 
‘imposed’ a number of conditions upon him before he could do so. These included the need to 
build up a network of allies, ideally in a formal coalition, the need to provide an heir if he 
intended to lead an invasion himself, as well as the allowance of time (at least a year) to 
prepare. It is unclear how firm these stipulations were but, by 1511, when only some had been 
met, a compromise seems to have emerged, in the form of two minor military expeditions, not 
led by Henry, that saw the English sabre-rattling against the French, not attacking them 
directly. As the military imperative to defend the Church increased following the fall of 
Bologna to the French, so the conditions slipped (albeit a broad-based coalition was 
established) and Henry VIII was supported by his councillors in commitments to invade 
France jointly with the Spanish in 1512 (which failed) and without them in 1513 (with some 
success). Rather than subscribing to the traditional interpretation of a battle between the 
‘peace’ and ‘war’ parties within crown circles during this time, it seems that Henry’s ‘inner 
circle’, led by Fox, were agreed; they did support the war but, in accordance with their role as 
advisors, counselled caution at the outset, instead helping Henry to implement his chosen 
policy when conditions were more suitable.60 
                                                 
59 For Henry’s confidence from the outset, see pp.362-364. Wolsey also had access to the king’s correspondence. 
On 24 March 1517, for instance, he mentions having read de Giglis’ letters both to him and Henry; LPIIii, 3945 
(24 March 1517, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). 
60 See pp.379-381, 385-387. For the king’s ultimate power over his ministers, one only has to look to the 
beginning of the reign when one of Henry VIII’s first actions was to sacrifice two of his father’s closest, though 
most unpopular, ministers; Empson and Dudley; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, p.1. Also, see 
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 When Wolsey became ministerially ascendant, it seems that the dynamic between 
Henry and the guidance of his ‘inner circle’ might have altered. While Fox may have 
preferred (or had little choice but) to work with a broader body when advising the king, 
Wolsey was more clearly the hub of counsel on which Henry relied. Indeed, the nuncio 
Chieregato wrote in 1517 that Wolsey, ‘by reason of his vast ability, rules everything’.61 
Similarly, Leo X was quoted as saying in 1518 that he had conceded a legatine commission to 
Wolsey on account of him being practically king.62 Perhaps the dynamic between Henry and 
Wolsey is best summarised by Wolsey himself in late August 1521 when he described Henry 
as putting ‘burden of his affairs on Wolsey’s shoulders’.63 While this alludes to the de facto 
authority invested in Wolsey, it does not reveal Henry’s role in this process. Indeed, some 
foreign observers were under the impression that Wolsey led Henry in foreign policy. 
Giustinian, for instance, believed in 1519 that Henry did not ‘depart in the least from the 
opinion and counsel of’ Wolsey. His counterpart at the Imperial Court later advised that the 
cardinal ‘rules the entire kingdom, and may be considered King so far as its administration is 
concerned’.64 One must remember, however, that these opinions came from oustiders, who 
were not privy to the Henry-Wolsey relationship conducted ‘behind closed doors’. Some light 
is shed on this dynamic by correspondence between Richard Pace and Wolsey, 1518-1521, at 
                                                                                                                                                        
K. Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government, p.6; R.L. Storey, The Reign of Henry VII, p.208. For Julius II 
recognising the ability of some of Henry VIII’s senior councillors to restrain him from heading towards war with 
France in early 1510, albeit not entirely accurately, see C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.240-241. 
61 Ven.ii, 878 (1 May 1517, Chieregato to Vigo da Campo San Pietro, London). 
62 Ven.ii, 1031 (12 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Following Fox’s withdrawal, 
Wolsey was repeatedly assessed by observers, particularly Venetian representatives, as ‘alter rex’ or something 
similar; Ven.ii, 732 (23 May 1516, statement made to the Venetian government on behalf of Richard Pace), 1296 
(9 November 1519, Surian to the Signory, London); Ven.iii, 1 (calendared January 1520, Surian to the Signory, 
London), 18 (25 February 1520), 101 (10 July 1520, doge to Wolsey), 278 (3 August 1521, Surian to the 
Signory, Calais), 302 (19 August 1521, Venetian ambassador at the Imperial Court to the Signory, Bruges); R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.294-295 (LPIIIi, 397; Ven.ii, 1262; 26 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the 
Signory, Lambeth). 
63 LPIIIii, 1515 (28 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Gravelines). 
64 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.294-295 (LPIIIi, 397; Ven.ii, 1262; 26 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian 
to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.iii, 232 (6 June 1521), 402 (calendared end July 1519). Also see R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.298-300 (Ven.ii, 781; LPIIi, 2414; 3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). 
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a time when sweating sickness and Wolsey’s foreign diplomacy kept king and cardinal apart 
for long periods. If this stream of communications is representative, it seems that Wolsey 
diligently kept the king informed, by forwarding him relevant correspondence and seeking 
signatures and approval. There also seems to have been a genuine sense of deliberation 
between the two, with the cardinal supplying his advice and although this was usually 
accepted, Henry ultimately made the decision and Wolsey implemented it. During March 
1518, for instance, at a time when England had decided to opt for peace negotiations with 
France, but was still overtly anti-French as far as the papacy was concerned, one finds Henry 
approving Wolsey’s advice to deceive Leo X ‘with good words, “non obstante matrimonio 
contracto cum Gallis”’. He also accepted the cardinal’s recommendation to send de Giglis an 
extremely limited commission in response to the pope’s crusade proposal.65 
 
                                                 
65 LPIIii, 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4053 
(calendared end March 1518, Wolsey to Pace), 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon), 4335 (24 
July 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Enfield), 4680 (24 December 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Greenwich); LPIIIi, 412 (11 
August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst), 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1425 (20 July 
1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okin]ge’), 1519 (29 August 1521, 
Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford), 1709 (27 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1739 (4 November 1521, 
Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1759 (13 November 1521, Pace to [Wolsey]), 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to 
Wolsey]). For Henry deciding to resist the papal desire to send a legate a latere to England in 1518, but being 
talked around by Wolsey, when the cardinal argued that they insist upon legatine powers being limited and that 
he also be commissioned in such a role, see ibid., 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4073 (11 
April 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). For Henry and Wolsey disagreeing over who to promote to the See of 
St Asaph in 1518 and the king’s choice winning the day, see ibid., 4070 (11 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, 
Abingdon), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4083 (14 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 
4089 (18 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock). An indication of this dynamic in broader foreign policy can 
be seen in Henry’s reaction to Francis’ intrigues during the Imperial election in June 1518; he wanted measures 
taken against Francis’ ambition and left it to Wolsey ‘to devise’; ibid., 4266 (28 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, 
Woodstock). For other indications of Henry VIII’s active input and his deliberation with Wolsey, see LPIIi, 2631 
(calendared 4-5 December 1516, [Henry] to [Wolsey]); LPIIii, 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, 
Richmond), 4058 (4 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon) 4071 (11 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 
4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abing[don]) 4085 (16 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4257 
(24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey]); LPIIIi, 302 (13 June 1519, John Clerk to Wolsey, Windsor), 504 (9 
November 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich), 490 (31 October 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich). For an 
example of Henry and Wolsey deliberately giving out the same message about foreign policy to the Venetian 
orator, thereby perhaps giving the impression that the cardinal was leading the king, see R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i, pp.160-164 (Ven.ii, 673; LPIIi, 1386; 5 January 1516, Giustinian to the Council of Ten, London). For 
an indication of Henry and Wolsey disagreeing and the king pulling rank, see LPIIIii, 1544 (4 September 1521, 
[Wolsey to Henry], Calais), 1611 (calendared 28-29 September 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1630 (4 October 1521, 
Pace to Wolsey, Windsor). 
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In terms of defining the ‘papacy’ for this study, the emphasis ought to be placed on 
whom Henry VIII and his principal ministers believed they were dealing with when they 
communicated with Rome on political matters. For the most part, this was the popes 
themselves, Julius II and Leo X, as this was with whom they corresponded.66 That it was 
ultimately the pontiffs who were understood to form papal foreign policy was confirmed by 
the various English diplomats in Rome during this period, who were employed to identify this 
and influence its direction in the English ‘interest’.67 Thus, one finds the likes of Bainbridge 
and de Giglis seeking and gaining audiences with the popes for this purpose and, likewise, the 
popes using them as conduits for communicating their opinion back to England.68 It is 
difficult to identify, on the other hand, instances where English diplomats in Rome attempted 
to influence papal advisors or ministers in a bid to further the crown’s political affairs. That is 
not to say that this did not occur, rather that this could not have been identified as an effective 
means to address the popes. Consequently, one finds that Henry and his principal ministers 
                                                 
66 For examples of direct correspondence to the pope from the king, of which there are many throughout the 
period, see for instance LPIii, 2310 (LPI, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2674 (LPI, 4819; 
26 February 1514, Henry to Leo, Westminster), 3140 (LPI, 5318; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich); 
LPIIi, 1546 (16 February 1516, Henry to Leo); LPIIIi, 427 (18 August 1519, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 432 
(calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo), 600 (20 January 1520, Henry to Leo, Tower of London), 1137 
(21 January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 1297 (21 May 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
67 For the role of all ambassadors to identify those holding the reins of powers, see for example Ven.ii, 132 (LPIi, 
960; Signory to Badoer). 
68 For examples of Bainbridge and de Giglis being instructed to gain audience with and to discuss political 
matters with the pope, as well as their subsequently doing so, see Ven.ii, 169 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to 
Bainbridge), 177 (LPIi, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 212 (LPIi, 1521; December 1512, Henry to 
Julius); LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London), 2069 (LPI, 4323, 
calendared July 1513, Spinelly to [Bainbridge]), 2800 (LPI, 4955; 10 April 1514, Richard Wingfield and others 
to the king’s ambassadors at Rome, Mechelin), 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); 
LPIii, 2928 (LPI, 5353; 20 May 1514, [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey]); LPIIi, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis 
to Wolsey]), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). For the same orators transmitting papal 
messages back to England on behalf of both Leo X and Giulio de’ Medici; LPIii, 2890 (LPI, 5054; 9 May 1514, 
Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 3019 (LPI, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry), 3241 (LPI, 5382; 4 
September 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to 
[Ammonius]); LPIIi, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo 
to Wolsey, Florence), 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Florence), 1452 (28 January 1516, 
Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence), 1667 (13 March 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3658 (31 August 
1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3828 (10 December 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
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rarely communicated with anyone other than the pope in Rome, on political matters at least.69 
The notable exception to this rule was Giulio de’ Medici, cousin to Leo X, who was this 
pope’s principal minister throughout the pontificate. As Guicciardini commented on de’ 
Medici’s authority, Leo had placed ‘all the important business of the pontificate in his 
hand….he seemed, indeed to be the Pope’s second self…’.70 This cousin of the pope 
forwarded himself to the English as an access point to the pope in September 1513, straight 
after his elevation to the Sacred College, and subsequently engaged in regular communication 
with both Henry and Wolsey.71 It was indicative of de’ Medici’s perceived significance as a 
papal minister that he was made cardinal protector of English affairs in January 1514, a 
position that had previously been given to papal ‘favourites’, presumably expecting access to 
and influence with the pope himself, albeit with limited success.72 
                                                 
69 There were occasional exchanges with particular cardinals, but these were usually on specific matters that 
were not largely political in nature, for example; LPIi, 101 (8 July 1509, Henry to Cardinal della Rovere, 
Greenwich), 138 (LPI, 405; 5 August 1509, Cardinal Alidosi to [Henry], Milan), 426 (LPI, 982; 9 April 1510, 
Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome); LPIii, 2518 (LPI, 4610; 20 December 1513, Cardinal del Monte to Henry, 
Rome), 3509 (LPI, 5665, 2 December 1514, Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome); LPI, 5349, 22 August 1514, 
Cardinal Remolines to Henry, Rome); LPIIi, 971 (calendared end September 1515, Cardinal Colonna to 
Wolsey), 2362 (14 September 1516, Cardinal [Carvajal] to Henry, Rome). One exception was the approach from 
the cardinals involved in the Council of Pisa-Milan during 1510-1511, attempting to enlist Henry’s support. 
While this was a political matter for Henry, it may have been deemed a more spiritual issue for the cardinals 
involved; LPIi, 625 (LPI, 1353; 25 November 1510, the cardinals at Pavia to Henry), 732 (LPI, 1581; 2 April 
1511, the cardinals at Milan to Henry). For the Sacred College’s relative lack of power as an advisory body to 
the pope, including in the temporal sphere, see G. Fragnito, ‘Cardinals’ Courts in Sixteenth-Century Rome’, The 
Journal of Modern History, 65 (1993), pp.36-37; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy: the Life 
and Career of Cardinal Francesco Soderini (1453-1524) (1993), p.47; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men:the Papal 
Civil Service in the Renaissance (1990), pp.35-37, 211; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-83, 88; C. Shaw, 
Julius II, pp.179, 180-182. 
70 He further suggested that ‘many people think that Leo was ruled by Giulio,’ on account of Leo’s enjoyment of 
the pleasures of life, which is suspiciously close to allegations that have often been made about Wolsey vis-à-vis 
Henry. Perhaps this perception was common to principal ministers; S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by 
Francesco Guicciardini, p.362. For a similar assessment from Stephen Poncher, writing to Wolsey, see LPIIIi, 
912 (13 July 1520, [Poncher] to Wolsey, St Germain). 
71 LPIi, 2320 (LPI, 4471; 30 September 1513, [Giulio] de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2343 (LPI, 4491; 7 October 
1513, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). 
72 De’ Medici’s prominence was recognised in this way during January 1514; LPIii, 2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 
1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2640 (EP, 352; 8 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 
1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 
2653 (LPI, 4786; calendared 18-19 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 
February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2838 (23 April 1514). For de’ Medici’s subsequent prominence in Anglo-
papal affairs as cardinal protector, see W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.85-103 and passim. Prior to this, the 
chronology of incumbents in the protectorship are unclear, although two cardinals close to the pope seem to have 
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 To implement crown policy vis-à-vis the papacy, Henry VIII and his principal 
ministers relied on a burgeoning diplomatic network to communicate and conduct business 
with the papacy on their behalf.73 After an initial dearth of representation at the Curia, Henry 
first used an Englishman as orator from late 1509, Christopher Bainbridge, who was sent to 
Rome specifically to facilitate the king’s desire to ‘defend’ the papacy from France.74 
Following Bainbridge’s death in 1514, Henry reverted to his father’s tendency to employ 
Italian curials for most of this period.75 Silvester de Giglis returned to English service in 
                                                                                                                                                        
acted in this role at some point. First was Julius II’s relative, Sisto della Rovere di Franciotti, who was possibly 
deemed of insufficient calibre to continue and secondly Francesco Alidosi, a favourite whose alleged pro-French 
sympathies contributed to his death at the hands of the pope’s nephew Francesco Maria della Rovere in 1511. It 
was probably not difficult for English diplomats in Rome to identify these intimates, as they usually lodged 
within the Vatican; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp. 174-175, 178, 187-188, 277; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, 
pp.36-37, 41. For Alidosi, see LPIi, 111 (LPI, 300; 15 July 1509, Alidosi to [Henry], Milan), 354 (LPI, 1457; 29 
January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge). The only other papal minister that arises in English correspondence and 
diplomacy during Leo X’s pontificate was Cardinal Bibbiena. Originally sent as legate to Maximilian’s army 
that was to expel the French from Italy in early 1516, he was subsequently the English crown’s indirect papal 
contact in trying to revive this project following its failure during March-April of that year, when Leo X was 
reluctant to make his anti-French intentions public; LPIIi, 1457 (29 January 1516, Bibbiena to Wolsey, 
Florence), 1833 (28 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry], Trent), 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence 
from Italy), 1892 (calendared 15 May 1516, extracts of letters from Galeazzo Visconti), 1924 (21 May 1516, 
Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1983 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Wolsey]), 1984 (2 June 1516, [Filonardi] to 
Pace, [Zurich]), 2009 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -, Zurich), 2011 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to his 
son [Anchises], Zurich), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.154; W. 
Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.50, 52. Bibbiena received a red hat at the same time as de’ Medici and was known to 
de Giglis as an intimate of the pope; LPIi, 2320 (LPI, 4471; 30 September 1513, [Giulio] de’ Medici to Henry, 
Rome); LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
73 This period coincided with an increasing trend towards permanent resident diplomacy that had been adopted 
firstly by the Italian powers in the latter half of the fifteenth century, before it began to spread across Europe. 
England began to follow suit from the reign of Henry VII, but it was only under Henry VIII that this was really 
adopted. In Rome, the role of English proctor evolved to include diplomatic business during the fifteenth century 
and a permanent diplomatic presence was maintained from the 1470s. Gradually, the proctorship became 
subsumed within the broader role of ambassador under Christopher Bainbridge; B. Behrens, ‘Origins of the 
Office of English Resident Ambassador in Rome’, EHR, 49, pp.640-645, 649-650; G. Mattingly, Renaissance 
Diplomacy, pp.146-153. 
74 The principal English diplomat in Rome 1508-1509 was Christopher Fisher, the ‘King’s solicitor’, but Henry 
VIII appears to have made little attempt to engage with him, as Fisher was wary about job security as late as 
September 1509. Girolamo Bonvisi was also ‘solicitor’ around this time, but the only activity of his that has been 
found is the sending of newsletters to England; LPIi, 165 (LPI, 880; 12 September 1509, [Fisher] to my lord [-], 
Bacano); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.11-12. For an implied admission that English representation 
was poor at this time, see Sp.ii, 25-26 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Ferdinand to Henry). For Bainbridge’s 
commission, see LPIi, 175, 190:33 (LPI, 520; 24 September 1509); also see pp.48-49. 
75 These Italians already were already au fait with the machinery of papal government, they would have known 
when, where and how to approach the pope and his ministers, indeed they would have been well-placed to 
identify the latter. They would have ready-made networks on which to call. Linguistically speaking, they were 
better equipped than most English diplomats to interact with an increasingly ‘Italian’ papacy. Furthermore, they 
were well rewarded for their service, de Castello and de Giglis being bishop of Bath and Wells and Worcester, 
respectively; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.7; C.H. Clough, ‘Gigli, Silvestro (1463-1521)’, DNB; T.F. 
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Rome in 1512 and this overlapped with Bainbridge’s work there. While they initially worked 
together, the two diplomats soon fell out, as Fox and Wolsey secretly commissioned the 
Italian to start peace negotiations in January 1514, to the exclusion of the English cardinal.76 
De Giglis remained in English service until his death in 1521, although he seems to have lost 
the confidence of Leo X by May 1520.77 Another Italian curial of longstanding service to 
England, Hadrian de Castello, returned to Rome from exile in 1513 (following the death of 
Julius II).78 While he was occasionally employed by Wolsey, he too fell out with de Giglis as 
well as with Bainbridge and never really regained favour in England.79 In fact, Wolsey was 
behind attempts to have him sacked from the English collectorship from 1514 on and, 
eventually, his expulsion from the Sacred College and from his see of Bath and Wells in 
1518.80 De Giglis’ role was taken by John Clerk, who coincidentally arrived in Rome shortly 
after the Italian’s death and was to stay there until beyond the end of this period.81 He was 
supported by Lorenzo Campeggio, who seems to have fulfilled some sort of supporting 
                                                                                                                                                        
Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano (c.1461-1521), DNB; M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen and the King’s Mother: 
or, the Rise and Fall of Adriano Castellesi’, in B. Thompson (ed.), The Reign of Henry VII, Proceedings of the 
1993 Harlaxton Symposium (Harlaxton Medieval Studies V; 1995), pp.65-81. For Bonvisi rather hopefully 
seeking similar reward at the beginning of this period, see LPIi, 100 (LPI, 267; 6 July 1509, Julius II to Henry, 
Rome), 111 (LPI, 300; 15 July 1509, Cardinal [Alidosi] to [Henry], Milan). For the employment of Italian 
curials as an old-fashioned concept that was increasingly supplanted by resident diplomats from the states that 
they represented, see P. Partner, Renaissance Rome 1500-1559 (1976), p.52. 
76 LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis), 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, 
Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); also see p.112. 
77 LPIIIi, 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 853 (calendared end May 1520; [‘de Medici to --]), 
1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). 
78 T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano’, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.33-34. 
79 Bainbridge objected to de Castello’s attempts to assert himself as the principal English representative in Rome 
as early as June 1513; LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome), 2077 (LPI, 4327; 7 
July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome). When de Giglis was accused of murder following Bainbridge’s death in 
July 1514, the bishop believed that de Castello may have encouraged the allegations and subsequently briefed 
Wolsey against him. This may not have been the beginning of their enmity, however, as Chambers traces it back 
to 1505; LPIii, 3203 (LPI, 5356; 28 August 1514, [William Burbank] to Henry, Florence), 3302 (LPI, 5449; 
[Ammonius] to Wolsey, Westminster); LPIIi, 2194 (19 July 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius); D.S. Chambers, 
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.9. 
80 As a result of his implication in the Petrucci Plot against the pope, Wolsey was able to force the deprivation of 
de Castello in combination with his denying entry into England of Lorenzo Campeggio as legate a latere; LPIIii, 
3493 (19 July 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Venice); T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, 
Cardinal Protectors, pp.106-110. 
81 Clerk arrived in Rome in July 1521 and remained there until summer 1522; LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk 
to [Wolsey], Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.147. 
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diplomatic role after ending his legatine commission in England in August 1519.82 The 
‘English’ representatives, particularly de Giglis, seem to have been central to Anglo-papal 
political communication as not only did they present crown business to the pope, they also 
referred papal requests back to England.83 
 Henry VIII also conducted his relationship with the papacy through the latter’s own 
diplomats sent to England. The most common of these was the nuncio, a title that had come to 
describe envoys from Rome with commissions for specific business in the areas they were 
sent to. These commissions were limited in both breadth and duration. Nuncios could not act 
on their own without papal instructions, although they could convey messages, negotiate and 
persuade, arrange and conclude accords, but only within the limits set by the pontiff.84 By this 
period, one can distinguish between two broad types of nuncios at work in England: the 
nuncius et orator and the nuncius et collector. The former, the nuncio-orator was sent by 
popes on missions usually of a limited diplomatic nature (in both time and scope), while the 
latter, as implied by the title, was a permanently resident envoy, whose duties, in addition to 
their traditional fiscal function (the role of Collector of Peter’s Pence and other dues), had 
more recently developed to include a diplomatic role, the latter which had come to 
overshadow the former by this time. It was probably deemed common sense by the papacy to 
                                                 
82 Campeggio was eventually rewarded with the bishopric of Salisbury in 1524; T.F. Mayer, ‘Campeggi, 
Lorenzo (1471/2-1539)’, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.112. For his working for England with de 
Giglis as well as in his own capacity from December 1519, see LPIIIi, 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to 
Wolsey, Rome), 557 (19 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 845 (28 May 1520, Campeggio and de 
Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome), 1123 (calendared 2-6 January 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey]), 1767 (15 November 
1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1879 (17 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). It must also be 
stressed that temporary ambassadors were still sent to Rome to complement their permanent counterparts, such 
as Richard Pace in response to Leo X’s death in December 1521; LPIIIii, 1876 (16 December 1521, Charles to 
de Mesa, Ghent); C. Curtis, ‘Pace, Richard’, DNB. Similarly, Polydore Vergil visited Rome briefly in spring 
1514, pushing for the elevation of Wolsey to the Sacred College; LPIii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; 21 May 1514, 
Po[lydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]); W.J. Connell, ‘Vergil, Polydore (c.1470–1555)’, DNB. 
83 See above n.68. 
84 For an exploration of the status of the nuncio, see G. Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, pp.28-29. For the 
nuncio in an earlier medieval context and a comment on how, while there were differences in status between 
nuncios, that between legate and nuncio could be blurred, see R.A. Schmuts, ‘Medieval Papal Representatives: 
Legates, Nuncios and Judges-Delegate’, Studia Gratiana, 15 (1972), pp.457-460. 
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employ existing officials with a revenue stream, as it evolved towards the then current 
tendency to maintain permanent diplomatic representation. While orator-collectors were 
usually (non-English) curial officials of relatively insignificant socio-political status (holding 
minor bishoprics or canonries, and so on), it has been observed that there was a tendency to 
employ candidates of higher rank, as the diplomatic component of their role increased. This 
can be best seen in Cardinal Hadrian de Castello’s (troubled) tenure of the post from 1489.85 
It ought to be noted, however, that while there was always an English collector during the 
period 1509-1522, they were not always resident in England and, in such cases, they largely 
exercised their office through deputies or sub-collectors.86 The other type of papal diplomat 
that visited England was the legatus a latere whose commission elevated a given cardinal to 
become the ‘alter ego’ of the pope and gave him the corresponding powers to act as a quasi-
pope wherever he went, with the ability to override the local ordinary. It also ought to be 
noted that a legate was always a cardinal commissioned by the pope and his authority was 
usually limited in purpose and longevity.87 While a stream of nuncios came to England during 
this period, as well as two legates (one of whom was Wolsey), their role in Anglo-papal 
                                                 
85 The financial aspect, while much diminished, was still an active element of the collector’s role during this 
period; O. Jensen, ‘The “Denarius Sancti Petri” in England’, TRHS, 19, pp.233, 238; R.N. Swanson, ‘Nuncio’, 
in J.R. Strayer (ed.), Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol.9 (1987), p.200; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, 
pp.31, 103-104; CPL XIV, pp.54-55. For an outline of the collectorship during the first half of the fourteenth 
century, see M. Harvey, England, Rome and the Papacy, pp.74-77. 
86 While de Castello was the absentee collector up to 1518, his deputies varied between Peter Griphus, Polydore 
Vergil and Andrew Ammonius. De Castello faced a battle with Andrew Ammonius and de Giglis to retain the 
office from 1514 on, but managed to hang on to it until his implication in the Petrucci plot in 1517. De Giglis 
replaced him by the end of August and Silvester Darius was appointed as his deputy; C.H. Clough, ‘Gigli, 
Silvestro’, DNB; T.F. Mayer, ‘Castellesi, Adriano’, DNB; J.A.F. Thomson, Early Tudor Church and Society, 
p.31; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.106-107. 
87 In terms of appearance, the legate a latere’s ‘papal’ authority was indicated by his attire and insignia, for 
instance he rode a white horse and wore a red mantle and hat. Also, upon his arrival at a city, for example, he 
was entitled to be met by the assembled clergy and the people, to be accompanied by them as he entered, 
possibly while proceeding under a baldachin. He would then go to the main church where a ceremony would be 
performed, the legate would issue blessings and indulgences. The legate would bring with him a miniature 
version of the papal administration that existed in Rome, dispensing the same privileges and hearing judicial 
causes wherever they went; R.A. Schmuts, ‘Medieval Papal Representatives: Legates, Nuncios and Judges-
Delegate’, Studia Gratiana, 15, pp.453-455; R.N. Swanson, ‘Legate’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), Dictionary of the 
Middle Ages, vol.7 (1986), pp.534-535; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth-Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal 
“Legatus a Latere”’, Traditio, 14 (1958), pp.296-311, 315-321. 
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political relations is less clear than that of the English network in Rome, not least because 
little correspondence to and from them can be found.88 In terms of the nuncios, that is not to 
say that they were not active diplomatically. Peter Griphus, for instance, is known to have 
kept Julius II informed with news during 1511.89 Caraffa met with Henry in 1514.90 There is 
record of Chieregato’s involvement in the conclusion of an anti-French treaty in 1516 and his 
passing on of correspondence to and having audiences with Henry and Wolsey during 1517.91 
Furthermore, Silvester Darius was sent to England as sub-collector in the same year charged 
with managing correspondence between there and Rome.92 There is no indication, however, 
that any of these nuncios played a similar role to that fulfilled by the English diplomats in 
Rome. The one exception to this rule seems to have been Girolamo Ghinucci who, on account 
a perceived paucity of communication between England and Rome and a loss of faith on the 
part of the pope in de Giglis, was proposed as a secret intermediary between Wolsey and 
Giulio de’ Medici in May 1520. De’ Medici advised that they communicate through him 
verbally as well as in writing, a proposal that Wolsey accepted. 93 Subsequently, private 
political negotiations flowed through this channel to the apparent exclusion of the English 
network in Rome.94 In terms of the legates a latere, the fact that one of them was Wolsey 
helped ensure that the other, Lorenzo Campeggio played a subordinate role. Indeed, it will be 
                                                 
88 De Giglis was in England between 1505 and 1512, for instance, but little is known of his activities; D.S. 
Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.9. 
89 Ven.ii, 127 (LPIi, 923; 8 November 1511, note from the Venetian secretary at Rome). 
90 LPIii, 2084 (LPI, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
91 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIIi, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London); Ven.ii, 875 (18 April 1517, Chieregato to the marquis of Mantua, London), 888 (19 May 
1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 915 (Leo to Henry, 2 July 1517, Rome), 942 (1 August 1517, 
Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). Of all the nuncios who visited England during this period, 
Chieregato is probably the best documented, although the correspondence found largely relating to a subsidiary 
role he performed as the representative of Mantua; ibid., 741, 762, 875, 878, 887, 894, 918-919, 945. 
92 LPIIii, 3689 (17 September 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
93 LPIIIi, 853 (calendared end May 1520; [de’ Medici to --]), 897 (2 July 1520, de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
94 LPIIIi, 1006. (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1080 (calendared end 
November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]), 1210 
(calendared end March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]), 1370 (27 June 1521, Pace to [Ghinucco], Windsor), 1410 (12 
July 1521, Ghinucci to Wolsey, London), 1411 (12 July 1521, [Ghinucci to Wolsey]), 1916 (30 December 1521, 
Girolamo [Ghinucci] to Wolsey, Eltham). 
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found that Campeggio was largely excluded from negotiations in England towards a treaty of 
universal peace, although he did appear ceremonially.95 
 Finally, a few words ought to be said about a factor that had a major influence on the 
political relationship between England and Rome: distance and its effect on the speed of 
communication. Couriers took one of two routes to travel the roughly 1,200 miles to Rome: 
either via France or Germany, depending on the prevailing political situation.96 Polydore 
Vergil considered through France to be ‘the best road’, but at times of Anglo-French hostility, 
that would have been inadvisable due to the risk of interception.97 Much post between 
England and Rome was therefore relayed through the Holy Roman Empire during this period. 
Regardless of the route, the journey was widely deemed to be arduous. Thomas Alen when, 
complaining to the earl of Shrewsbury in November 1517 about the difficult he was 
experiencing in getting a reply to the earl’s correspondence from Wolsey, retorted that he 
would ‘rather be commanded to Ro[me] than deliver letters to him [Wolsey], and wait for an 
                                                 
95 See pp.638-641. 
96 G.B. Parks, The English Traveler to Italy, vol.i The Middle Ages (to 1525) (1954), p.497. For de Giglis 
sending despatches through Lyon during October 1515 when England was formally at peace with France; LPIIi, 
1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). For the same ambassador forwarding letters through Germany at 
a time when the English crown was trying to galvanize a league against the French to expel them from Italy, see 
ibid., 2241 (2 August 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). For Bainbridge forwarding correspondence through 
Germany in 1513, see LPIi, 1594 (LPI, 3678; 26 January 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). For John Clerk 
weighing up the expense involved in both routes, see LPIIIii, 1431 (21 July 1521, John Clerk to Brian Tuke, 
Rome). Thomas Spinelly, resident in the Low Countries for much of this period, seems to have been the hub of 
most crown communication regardless of route. For his forwarding of correspondence from Bainbridge to Henry 
among other despatches from Rome for instance, see LPIii, 2672 (LPI, 4810; 25 February 1514, Thomas 
Spinelly, Mechelin), 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry). Also see LPIIi, 1317 (21 December 1515, 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1610 (1 March 1516, 
Stile to Henry). Spinelly was probably used to engage the services of the Imperial and French postal systems, as 
the English network only went as far as Calais at this stage; P. Beale, A History of the Post in England from the 
Romans to the Stuarts (1998), pp.115-117, 130-131, 170; B. Behrens, ‘The Office of the English Resident 
Ambassador: its Evolution as Illustrated by the Career of Sir Thomas Spinelly, 1509-22’, TRHS, 4th series, 16 
(1933), pp.170-172; H. Robinson, Carrying British Mails Overseas (1964), pp.15-16. 
97 Ven.ii, 129 (LPIi, 941; 15 November 1511, Vergil to the marquis of Mantua, London). For the danger to 
English couriers and correspondence when England was on hostile terms with France, see LPIIi, 1581 (23 
February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1600 (27 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1610 (1 
March 1516, Stile to Henry). For the risk of interception through Germany as well; ibid., 1794 (20 April 1516, 
de Giglis to Ammonius, Rome). Equally, the English were not innocent of intercepting French correspondence; 
ibid., 1855 (5 May 1516, Mountjoy to Henry, Tournai). To ensure security of correspondence, the English took 
precuationary measures such as encryption; ibid., 2193 (19 July 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2241 (2 
August 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
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answer’.98 The distance and dangers, therefore, had an effect on the speed of communication 
between England and Rome. Even sending a message to Rome via the relatively new, albeit 
expensive, system of stage posts would take at least 13, if not up to 18 days, which meant a 
round trip of around four weeks upwards.99 While it will be found that this had implications 
for events such as papal conclaves and the creation of cardinals, as it limited Henry VIII’s 
ability to issue any response, it also affected the degree to which England and Rome could 
cooperate in foreign policy, particularly when the receipt of other contradictory intelligence 
was added to the equation. One such occasion occurred in the wake of the French victory 
against papal and Swiss forces at the Battle of Marignano (13-14 September 1515), which 
precipitated a period of French dominance in Italy. The varied nature of reports that reached 
England about this engagement meant that Henry VIII may not have known the true result 
until late October. At a time when England had committed to supporting the Church against 
France, the delay meant that Leo X would not hear from his ally for some time which, along 
with other factors, hastened his submission to the French.100 
 
98 LPIIii, 3807 (25 November 1517, Thomas Alen to the earl of Shrewsbury). Also see LPIIi, 183 (23 February 
1515. Clarencieux to [Somerset], Paris). 
99 Around 1500, the carriage of correspondence had undergone a minor revolution, whereby relays were set up to 
divide journies into planned stages, which roughly halved postal times. It ought to be borne in mind, however, 
that travel times could still be affected by the weather and by the risk of interception by hostile powers; P. Beale, 
A History of the Post in England, p.133; G.B. Parks, The English Traveller to Italy i, pp.497-498; P. Partner, 
Renaissance Rome, pp.51-52. Brief consultation of contemporary sources does reveal quicker carriage times, 
although 11 days seems to have been the quickest. News of Henry VII’s death may have arrived in Rome within 
11-12 days, de Giglis, writing in 1513, expected a messenger to make the round trip within 22 days and during 
1515 claimed to have received a missive from Wolsey in 11 days; Ven.i, 942 (LPIi 17; 3-4 April 1509, letters 
from Rome to the Signory); LPIii, 2353 (LPI, 4500; 11 October 1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); LPIIi, 1111 (6 
November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). It ought to be stressed, however, that the lack of English postal system 
across Europe meant that crown correspondence was not apparently carried between England and Rome in any 
standardised way. While a single courier could carry it all the way, it could also be conveyed through multiple 
messengers through the Imperial network, through another state’s postal system, such as Venice’s, or even by an 
individual who happened to be going to Rome, such as the physician Boerius; Ven.ii, 156 (LPIi, 1179; 4 May 
1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 168 (LPIi, 1183; 25 May 1512, arrival in Venice of a 
crown courier), 172 (LPIi, 1223; 31 May and 1 June 1512, letters from Friar Angelo, Rome); LPIii, 2074 (LPI, 
4326; 6 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge, Brussels); LPIIi, 542 (calendared end May 1515, John Baptista 
Boerius to Ruthal). 
100 See pp.490-492. 
1 
‘DEFENDING THE FAITH’ FROM FRANCE: HENRY VIII’S PERCEPTION OF 
HIS POLITICAL ROLE VIS-À-VIS THE PAPACY 
 
On 11 October 1521, Leo X finally bestowed an honorary title on Henry VIII as king of 
England; a title that, notionally at least, reflected his fidelity to the Church (or, more specifically, 
the papacy) and confirmed his place among the principal secular leaders of Christendom.1 All 
three of the contemporary ‘superpowers’ possessed some such title, in addition to a few other 
states. The Holy Roman Emperor had long been deemed ‘Protector of the Church’.2 Indeed, 
during May 1512 Henry VIII, explaining to Maximilian why he was going to war with France, 
hoped for the emperor’s tacit support at least in his role as ‘supreme protector of the Church’.3 
The description of French monarchs as ‘Most Christian’ dated back at least to the twelfth 
                                                 
1 LPIIIii, 1659 (11 October 1521). 
2 In its imperial context, this title (and duty) had been bestowed on each emperor upon their coronation by the pope 
since Charlemagne became head of the reconstituted ‘(Western) Roman Empire’ in 800. Preceding this, however, 
Pippin III (king of the Franks, 751-768), had become the protector and defender of the Church (particularly of its 
temporal lands, as specified in the Donation of Constantine), based on his position as ‘patrician of the Romans’, 
replacing the emperor of the Eastern Roman Empire in this role; E. James, ‘The Northern World in the Dark Ages 
400-900’, in G. Holmes (ed.), The Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe (1988), p.99; P. Partner, The Lands 
of St Peter, pp.18-20, 38-40; R.W. Southern, Western Society and the Chuch in the Middle Ages, pp.59-60; W. 
Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government in the Middle Ages: a Study in  the Ideological Relation of Clerical 
to Lay Power, (1962), pp.64-69, 107, 152, 157-160, 197, 214, 260. One must remember, however, that not all 
‘emperors’ were crowned by the papacy and thus, technically, remained king of the Romans or ‘emperor elect’. 
Maximilian I is a case in point, but it does not seem to seem to have affected recognition, including by Henry VIII, 
that he at least fulfilled this responsibility (see n.3). 
3 LPIi, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian]). A similar letter, apparently written the same month, 
has Henry begging Maximilian ‘as principal protector of the Holy Roman Church’ to join the holy league against 
France. Also, in instructions to Cardinal Bainbridge, around 29 May 1512, Henry rehearsed the aforementioned 
approach to the emperor, ‘it appertaining especially to his office to the defend the Church’. There is also evidence of 
Charles V referring to himself and Germany as ‘defenders of the Catholic faith’ (against Luther) in April 1521. 
Finally, the Spanish ambassador in Rome referred to Charles as ‘the natural protector of the Church’ in December 
1521; Ven.ii, 177 (LPIi, 1214; 29 May or 26 June 1512; Henry to Bainbridge), 178 (LPIi, 1215; calendared end May 
1512, Henry to Maximilian); LPIIIi, 1237 (19 April 1521, Charles to the people of Germany); Sp.ii, 368 (11 
December 1521, Juan Manuel to Charles). 
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century.4 More recently, the king of Spain had become ‘Catholic’, a label gained by Ferdinand 
(and Isabella) from Alexander VI in 1494,5 and the Swiss had gained a title, ‘Protectors of the 
Liberty of the Church’, from Julius II on 6 July 1512 for their role in the expulsion of the French 
from Lombardy.6 Even James IV of Scotland may have benefited in this sense, perhaps becoming 
‘Protector of the Christian Faith’ in spring 1507.7 The serious nature of such titles among 
contemporary heads of state, particularly linked with protection of the papacy, was indicated by 
James IV during March 1512, when he wrote to Ferdinand of Aragon, recognising how the 
Spaniard had ‘been summoned by the Pope, under his new title of The Catholic, to protect the 
Church, and by virtue of that office had entered the league and invited the Scot to do the same’.8 
In the continental arena, therefore, Henry VIII interacted with other heads of state with honorary 
                                                 
4 Some (including Guicciardini) consider this title to have been derived from the efforts of Charlemagne and his 
father (Pippin III) to oust the Lombards from Italy and their bestowal of lands upon the papacy, that marked the 
beginnings of the Papal States. While Thomson ascribes the title to the twelfth century, it seems that Charles V 
(1364-1380) or Charles VI (1380-1422) was the first to use it in earnest, although it was not recognised as a de facto 
description of French monarchs by Rome until Pope Paul II (1464-1471) began to refer to Louis IX (1461-1483) as 
such when addressing him in correspondence; S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, 
p.144; A.D. Hedeman, ‘Pierre Salmon’s Advice for a King’, Gesta, 32 (1993), pp.115-116; G. Small, Late Medieval 
France (2009), pp.8-11; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, p.35.  
5 Ferdinand and Isabella were awarded the title of the Catholic Kings by Alexander VI in 1494, in recognition of 
their expulsion of the Moors from Granada. Charles of Castile was confirmed in this title in 1517 (albeit over greater 
areas, on account of his inherited lands in the Low Countries and Germany as well); T.J. Dandelet, Spanish Rome 
1500-1700 (2001), pp.28, 35; J.H. Elliot, Imperial Spain 1469-1716 (1963), p.65; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
p.257; C. Pendrill, Spain 1474-1700: the Triumphs and Tribulations of Empire (2002), pp.16, 29. For a reference to 
this title being fairly novel, see LPIi, 1108 (LPI, 3081; 20 March 1512, James IV to Ferdinand, Edinburgh), 1215 
(calendared end May 1512 or 26 June 1512; Henry to Maximilian).  
6 The Swiss achieved this victory within a few weeks of their active participation in the Holy League. They were also 
named ‘Protectors of Religious Liberty’ in 22 February 1515; LPIi, 1312 (LPI, 3341), 1344 (LPI, 3377; 17 August 
1512, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels); Sp.ii, 209 (22 February 1515, Leo X to all persons, Rome); M. Creighton, 
History of the Papacy, v, p.236; T.E. Mommsen, ‘The Accession of the Helvetian Federation to the Holy League: An 
Unpublished Bull of Pope Julius II of March 17, 1512’, JMH, 20 (1948), p.130. 
7 In addition to being awarded the cap and sword, Julius II labelled the Scottish king ‘Christianae fidei protector’, 
although the evidence on this is unclear; A.J.S. Brook, ‘Notice of the Sword-Belt of the Sword of State of Scotland, 
Restored in 1892 to the Scottish Regalia by the Rev. Samuel Ogilvy Baker’, Proceedings of the Society of 
Antiquaries of Scotland, Season 1893-1894, 28 (1894), p.280; T.G. Chalmers, ‘James IV (1473–1513)’, DNB; R.K. 
Hannay, The Letters of James IV (1953), p.xxvii; J.D. Mackie, The Earlier Tudors, p.271; K.M. Setton, The Papacy 
and the Levant, 1204-1571, vol.iii (1984), p.50; G.G. Smith, The Days of James IV, 1488-1513 (1890), p.105; K. 
Stevenson, Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland, 1424-1513 (2006), p.109. 
8 The Scottish king was imploring Ferdinand to turn his efforts towards peace; LPIi, 1108 (LPI, 3081; 20 March 
1512, James IV to Ferdinand, Edinburgh). 
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titles, including his greatest political rival, Louis XII, as well as his father-in-law Ferdinand. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that Henry sought to be recognised by Rome in a similar manner. Indeed, 
it is possible that the title awarded to the Swiss, combined with failed attempts to secure papal 
briefs recognising the transfer of the French king’s titles (around 1512-1513) may have inspired 
the English king’s approaches to the papacy in this respect, particularly given his own 
commitment to the papacy against France at that time (and later).9 While the eventual title, fidei 
defensor, was awarded in response to Henry’s literary attack on Luther, the Assertio Septem 
Sacramentorum, it was in fact the culmination of at least seven years of lobbying on the part of 
the English crown to have its wider political role vis-à-vis the papacy recognised.10 The issue of 
the book, along with the demand for the title, also coincided with the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Bruges in August 1521, sealing English commitment to war against France once more, with the 
declared intention that Henry and Charles act as ‘protectors’ of the papacy.11 In this light, it will 
be demonstrated here that Henry VIII and his principal advisors envisaged him as ‘defender’ of 
papal political, territorial and, consequently, spiritual independence, against the French. While 
this did not involve direct action by Henry in Italy and it did not entail him acting alone, the aim 
to counterbalance French interests in Italy in order to achieve this can be identified as a central 
tenet of English foreign policy for this period at least.  
The idea that the papacy needed some sort of protector in practice (from internal and 
external threats) seems to have been of long standing and, as mentioned, dated back to the reign 
of Charlemagne and earlier.12 Many parties had fulfilled this role over the centuries, usually 
                                                 
9 See below pp.144-151. 
10 See below pp.151-172. 
11 See below p.741. 
12 See n.2. 
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protecting the pontiff in a military sense in Italy, ranging from emperors and kings of France to 
Norman rulers of Sicily.13 The emperor was still recognised as the principal ‘protector’, although 
the Swiss’ recently gained title incorporated this description. It also seems as if Henry VIII 
himself sought the word ‘protector’ somewhere in his title, but the eventual label of ‘defender’ 
was deemed a worthy enough substitute.14 In the event, it seems that Henry and Wolsey chose 
that epithet from a number proposed in Rome around June 1521.15 Admittedly, Henry had 
already styled himself in his book by a more wordy equivalent, ‘very Defender of the Catholic 
Faith [of] Christ’s Church, which he has truly deserved of the See Apostolic’, but Wolsey also 
sent a list of favoured labels with annotations to John Clerk on 25 August 1521.16 
The claim of secular rulers to protect the Church was also common in a domestic context, 
particularly as a means by which princes asserted their royal authority over the ecclesiastical 
community within their states.17 For Henry VIII, this was justified in theoretical terms as an idea 
integral to his coronation. During the ceremony, English kings received the sword (symbolic of 
secular power) ‘ordained for the defence of the holy church of God’ and the ring (the emblem of 
religious faith) by which he should be ‘a founder and protector of Christianity and the Christian 
faith’.18 While this claim vis-à-vis the ecclesia anglicana is irrelevant here, the broader 
interpretation afforded by this notion could easily include the universal Church as a whole and 
                                                 
13 See, for example, P. Denley, ‘The Mediterranean in the Age of the Renaissance, 1200-1500’, in G. Holmes (ed.), 
Oxford Illustrated History of Medieval Europe, pp.235-243; W. Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government, 
pp.64-69, 229-232, 248-249, 269. 
14 For an approach to the pope by the English orator in this regard during September 1515, see LPIIi, 887 (7 
September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
15 No real advance in the choice of titles seems to have been made since 1515-1516, as Campeggio reported that 
‘Apostolic’ and ‘Protector’ were put forward; LPIIIi, 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome); LPIIIii, 
1411 (12 July 15121, [Ghinucci to Wolsey]). 
16 LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). 
17 J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.51-52. 
18 R.N. Swanson, Church and Society, p.96. For a broader comment on this role among kings in general, see W. 
Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government, p.294-295. 
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makes it more understandable why Henry VIII may have deemed it his duty to act in pursuit of 
this ideal in his foreign policy. It also links in with the widely accepted idea that the papacy held 
the spiritual ‘sword’, while secular leaders wielded the temporal.19 It has further been claimed 
that allusions to defending the Church had been made by previous English monarchs, including 
Richard II, Henry IV and Henry VI. It has also been tied in with contemporary chivalric beliefs, 
particularly that, during the investiture of knights into the Order of the Garter, an admonition was 
given to the candidate, that he ‘shed his blood for Christ’s faith and the liberties of the Church’. 
As head of the order, therefore, the king was the defender of the faith.20 Given Henry VIII’s 
widely accepted commitment to the order, knighthood and chivalry more generally, it is entirely 
feasible that he took this responsibility seriously. 
To test this idea that Henry VIII perceived himself as the papacy’s temporal defender or 
protector against France, it will first be established that this was the guiding principle of 
England’s political relations with Rome during this period.21 Secondly, the reasons why France 
was the focus of this ‘defence’ will be identified, exploring the prejudice held against that 
kingdom and the reasons for this, as well as how these manifested themselves vis-à-vis the 
papacy. Thirdly, other reasons why the king and his advisors believed the papacy needed to be 
‘defended’ will be explored; and, finally, the nature of this role will be explored; how it 
manifested itself 1509-1522. 
To begin with, then, it must be established that the guiding principle in the English 
political relationship with Rome was that the former perceived the need to ‘defend’ the latter 
                                                 
19 D. Loades, Tudor Government: Structures of Authority in the Sixteenth Century (1997), p.ix. 
20 T.E. Bridgett, ‘Defender of the Faith’, Dublin Review, 96 (1885), p.246. 
21 It ought to be noted that English attempts to defend the papacy may not have been consistent nor successful, but 
rather a guiding principle to which it constantly returned. 
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from the might of France. While this is illustrated throughout the narrative, it can most obviously 
be detected in the various offensive and defensive confederacies of which England was a regular 
member during this time. In the first phase of anti-French aggression, up to August 1514, all of 
the alliances that Henry VIII joined had the defence of the Church (or the recovery of its 
territories) as their overt principal aim. Firstly, he joined the Holy League for the recovery of 
Bologna and other areas of the Papal States lost to the French, originally concluded on 4 October 
1511.22 Henry VIII voiced his adhesion to this on 13 November and promised ‘on the word of a 
King to observe the [Holy] League and confederacy, and to peril everything for the recovery of 
Bologna and other towns of the Church, occupied by a tyrant (sic), and for the defence of each of 
the confederates…’.23 In commissioning his ambassadors to negotiate an alliance with Ferdinand 
to support this league, on 10 November, Henry specifically cites the purpose as ‘the defence of 
Holy Church and the recovery of Bologna, and preservation of the Pope’s authority’.24 The 
subsequent supplementary alliance that resulted on 17 November, similarly stated its purpose was 
to defend the Church from France.25 Similarly, another offensive alliance concluded with Spain 
to run alongside the Holy League, ratified by Henry on 9 February 1512, specified that it was ‘for 
defence of the Church’.26 On 5 April 1513, a renewed Holy League was concluded, this time 
including Maximilian, although the aim was still to defend the Church against the French; again, 
                                                 
22 Ven.ii, 1345-1346 (Sp.ii, 56; LPIi, 889; LPI, 1880-1881; 4 October 1511). 
23 This letter was read out at the second session of the Lateran Council in May 1512; ibid., 165-166 (LPIi, 1204; 21 
May 1512, letters received in Venice from Friar Angelo, Rome). Henry ratified the league on 13 November; Sp.ii, 58 
(LPIi, 939, 969:40; LPI, 1967; Ven.ii, 128; 13 November 1511). 
24 LPIi, 969:29 (LPI, 1955, 3513; Sp.ii, 57; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster). 
Also see Sp.ii, 71 (LPIi, 995; LPI, 2033; 20 December 1511). 
25 Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). 
26 LPIi, 1054 (LPI, 2094; Sp.ii, 63-64; 9 February 1511). An additional treaty between the two kingdoms, concluded 
on 16 March 1512, specified that both kings were obliged to combine ‘in the defence of the Holy Church against 
France’ in addition to the recovery of Aquitaine for England; Sp.ii, 65 (LPIi, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512). 
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Henry confirmed this.27 Official commitment to this line was further indicated by the 
appointment of one of the king’s most senior councillors, Thomas Howard earl of Surrey, to be 
commander-in-chief of the English forces intended ‘for relief of the Holy See’.28 Once more, a 
complementary treaty between Henry and Ferdinand, dated 9 May 1513, intended ‘for the 
recovery of Aquitaine, the defence of the Pope and the Lateran Council’.29 
Similarly, Henry VIII formulated a league in defence of the Church on 29 October 1516, 
along with the Empire and Spain. It was hoped that the pope would join and lead the 
confederacy.30 Faced with procrastination and defection from its allies, the English crown failed 
to gain papal adhesion, although this was once again anticipated when the 1516 agreement was 
renegotiated in July 1517 as a ‘league for defence of the Church’.31 Finally, on 25 August 1521, a 
‘secret’ alliance was concluded between Henry VIII and Charles V at Bruges, the protection of 
the papacy and the Medici was explicit.32 This was extended to include Leo X on 24 November 
1521.33  
                                                 
27 Sp.ii, 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513). 
28 LPIii 1948:12-13 (LPI, 3997; 4 May 1513). 
29 LPIi, 1657 (LPI, 4038; February 1513). 
30 LPIIi, 2462 (20 October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516). This appears to be 
the same treaty as that said to have been concluded on 15 November 1516 and confirmed by Henry VIII on 5 July 
1517; Sp.ii, 253-254 (15 November 1516); LPIIii, 3437 (5 July 1517). The pope also joined a league to defend Milan 
against the French threat in February 1515 but, even though this stipulated an approach to Henry VIII, Anglo-papal 
communications seem to have been at cross-purposes for some months. It was only from around May 1515 on that 
Wolsey indicated that the king was prepared to join the league, in return for a cardinal’s hat. As negotiations for this 
played out, news of the English desire this league did not reach Rome until early September, by which time it was 
too late, as the Battle of Marignano was only weeks away. The 1516 agreement came in the wake of this; see below 
pp.475ff. 
31 LPIIii, 3437 (5 July 1517). This was to be a defensive coalition against France which, in addition to providing for 
military operations, envisaged the pope wielding spiritual weapons; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.93-95 
(Ven.ii, 913; LPIIii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see below pp.546-547. 
32 This was to be achieved by the adherents’ commitment to expel the French from Italy. The pope was not yet a 
member, although nuncios were privy to the conclusion; LPIIIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). Also see below 
pp.741-742. 
33 LPIIIii, 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais). 
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One can also detect attempts by Henry VIII to ‘defend’ the papacy from France in some 
of its peace treaties with this kingdom. In that of 7 August 1514, for instance, Henry described 
how the treaty included ‘the Holy See and Bologna by name’. He also tried ‘to have the Duke of 
Milan included, but could not prevail’. The peace was to be confirmed by the pope and 
ecclesiastical penalties to be imposed on any transgressors.34 England’s priority, therefore, was 
the safety of the papacy; that of Milan would have been a strategic bonus, but the crown was 
unable to procure this.35 In the months following this peace, which was, it should be added, 
forced by Rome, Leo X urged Wolsey to foster an agreement between Louis XII and the duke of 
Milan, but to no avail.36 Similarly, the Treaty of London of 2 October 1518 was, it has been 
argued, intended to act as a straitjacket on French ambitions in Italy. As a treaty of universal 
peace, it bound all parties to refrain from any aggression towards each other. As the pope was to 
become its head and ‘the house of the Medici’ and ‘the Florentines’ were specifically 
comprehended, Francis I was therefore bound not to act militarily against any lands claimed by 
the papacy and thus not extend his political influence in Italy any further. If he did, he would be 
open to accusations that he was obstructing a crusade and would incur ecclesiastical censure. It 
cannot have been any coincidence that the defence and protection of the papacy was mentioned in 
                                                 
34 Maximilian and Charles of Castile were also to be incorporated; LPIii, 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 
1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). Also see Sp.ii, 183-185 (LPIii, 3129; LPI, 5305; 7 August 1514). Henry also 
included Leo X in the confirmation of this agreement that occurred in April 1515, as a result of Francis I’s accession, 
but Milan was again notably absent; Ven.ii, 598 (5 April 1515). 
35 For the strategic importance of Milan to the English ‘defence’ of the Papal States from France, see below pp.460 
ff. 
36 See below pp.460-462. 
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the treaty, a concept which had hitherto been included in English treaties that intended aggression 
against France.37 
This agenda was also expressed explicitly by crown sources through its correspondence. 
Henry VIII asserted this most clearly in connection with the presentation of the Assertio in 1521 
when he referred to his ‘having already defended the Church with his sword’.38 Henry VIII 
himself apparently first publicly revealed such intentions during April 1512, when he sent 
Lancaster Herald to the French court to declare to Louis XII that he felt ‘bound to defend the 
Church’ in a military sense.39 He echoed these sentiments in more detail in May, when he 
justified his aggression against France to Maximilian, on account of Louis XII’s invasion of papal 
cities, as a result of which, he (and Ferdinand) decided ‘to take up arms in defence of the 
Church’.40 Writing around the same time to Bainbridge in Rome, Henry urged him ‘to inform the 
pope that he [the king] is ready to risk his goods, life, and kingdom for the maintenance of his 
Holiness and of the Church’ (against France).41 Even in the face of an apparently comprehensive 
defeat of the Holy League at Ravenna, Henry continued to voice his commitment to this end. 
Writing to the same ambassador on 31 May 1512, still uncertain of the outcome of this 
engagement, the king claimed that he had ‘never in the midst of this mishap, and of these 
contradictory stories, changed his intention of defending the Church and protecting the pope’, 
before outlining the departure of his troops for the joint Anglo-Spanish enterprise into 
                                                 
37 LPIIii, 4467 (1 October 1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469 (Ven.ii, 1083; 2 October 1518), 4470-
4471 (2 October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518), 4475-4477 (4 October 1518); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518); G. 
Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10 (1938), pp.7, 12. 
38 LPIIIii, 1656 (calendared October 1521, John Clerk’s speech in Consistory on presenting the king’s book). 
39 LPIi, 1169 (LPI, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission). 
40 LPIi, 1215 (Ven.ii, 178; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian).  
41 This letter is calendared at 26 June and 29 May 1512, respectively; Ven.ii, 177 (LPIi, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry 
to Bainbridge). 
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Aquitaine.42 This commitment even bridged over into the next pontificate. Again writing to the 
Bainbridge, on 12 April 1513, Henry was glad to hear that Leo X ‘sanctions the league for the 
defence of the Church, and has joined it’. He also hoped that the pope would support his 
forthcoming invasion of France, ‘undertaken for the liberation of the Church’.43 In appointing 
Queen Catherine regent and governess of England while he was in France, on 6 June, Henry 
termed the expedition as ‘for the preservation of the Catholic religion, and recovery of his 
rights’.44 Catherine herself, writing to Wolsey on 26 July 1513, hoped that the pope would work 
towards ‘an honourable peace’ for Henry (in light of his loss of Spain as an active ally and Leo 
X’s inclination towards peace), particularly given ‘that all the business that the King hath was 
first the cause of the Church’.45 Finally, in announcing the eventual Anglo-French peace of 
August 1514, Henry VIII, also referred to the war just ended which ‘he entered for the sake of the 
papacy’.46  
Understanding the increasing French threat to Italy in late 1514, Henry tentatively 
approached the pope perhaps in December with a view to protecting him from a prospective 
French enterprise. He initially urged Leo to resist the French and to ‘free Italy and extend his own 
authority’, although this was rejected.47 Shortly after, de Giglis again approached the pope, this 
                                                 
42 Ven.ii, 169 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). 
43 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). This sense was reiterated in 
other quarters. A commission of February 1513 to the English ambassadors in Spain stated explicitly that ‘England 
has entered upon this war, to its great cost, in defence of his Holiness and of all Italy’. Also, during March, Henry 
VIII wrote to Poynings, his ambassador negotiating with Imperial representatives, claiming that all of his 
‘endeavours having been for the defence of the Church’; ibid., 1659 (LPI, 4055; calendared February 1513, draft of a 
commission from Henry to his ambassadors in Spain), 1723 (LPI, 4085; calendared end March 1513, Henry to 
[Poynings and others]). 
44 LPIi, 2055:46 (LPI, 4179; calendared 6 June 1513). 
45 LPIii, 2120 (LPI, 4365; 26 July 1513, Catherine of Aragon to Wolsey, R[ichmond]). 
46 Ibid., 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
47 LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
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time proposing a coalition against France, but this was again dismissed.48 Eventually, during 
1515, Leo X did engage England to join such an anti-Gallic league, in response to which Wolsey 
advised the pope that Henry was ‘a better friend to the Church than all other Princes’. The 
context of this certainly suggested that this referred to Henry’s protection of Rome.49 
Furthermore, when Wolsey notified Rome of Henry’s having signed the treaty, he advised that 
the king was now ‘ready to expose his person and goods to support the honour and safety of the 
Holy See’. At the same time, he expected Henry to gain an honorary title in recognition of this.50 
While the English acted too late to prevent Francis I achieving a decisive victory against anti-
Gallic forces in September, they envisaged a swift response when they sent Richard Pace to hire 
the Swiss. In late October, Wolsey advised the pope that this embassy was intended ‘for the 
Pope’s defence’ and may have sought Leo’s participation.51 While the resulting Imperial-Swiss 
expedition failed from March 1516, Henry tried to ensure its continuation, in pursuit of which he 
approached Leo to agree to the ‘methods of security’ that he had recommended to him, most 
likely an early reaction to Maximilian’s retreat from Milan.52 Wolsey reiterated Henry’s 
commitment to defend the Church in late May 1516, but emphasised that his advisors had 
insisted that England’s allies be ready first.53 Consequently, the English failed to secure a firm 
papal commitment as first Charles and then Maximilian and the Swiss defected to the French.54 
In spite of this, the Empire and Spain continued to negotiate with England and, when it became 
                                                 
48 Ibid., 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
49 Ibid., 648 (calendared end June 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis], ‘From my place beside Westminster’). Also see 
below pp.478-480. 
50 LPIIi, 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). 
51 This message was conveyed perhaps secretly via Ammonius; ibid., 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to 
Ammonius]), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]).  
52 The ‘methods’ cited are unclear; ibid., 1788 (20 April 1516, Henry to Leo, Eltham). 
53 Ibid., 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’). 
54 See below pp.536-538. 
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apparent that papal adhesion was not forthcoming, a league ‘for defence of the Church’ was 
concluded in London anyway on 29 October 1516, with the hope that Leo would join later.55 The 
lack of celebration, however, suggested that this may not have been deemed likely.56 
As Henry and Wolsey continued to struggle to gain firm papal backing from Rome for a 
coalition to protect it from 1517, English declarations of commitment to this course seem to have 
quietened, as they began to adopt a reconciliation strategy vis-à-vis France, with a view to 
constraining Francis I’s Italian ambitions.57 While the provision for the defence of Rome in the 
consequent Treaty of London has already been cited, there were also indications that the English 
crown still actively envisaged its defence of the papacy. During the Imperial election of 1519, for 
instance, Wolsey declared to the pope England’s intention to oppose Francis I’s candidacy on the 
basis that his victory would ‘endanger the independence of the Holy See’.58  
While from 1520 on, the English crown became increasingly receptive to Charles V’s 
overtures to align against France, particularly with a view to defending the papacy against 
France, it seems to have been cautious about voicing its desire to fulfil this role, perhaps not 
being confident of papal (or Imperial) intentions around this time.59 Even by May-June 1521, 
English representatives in Rome voiced this doubt to Leo X himself.60 Nevertheless, some sort of 
secret declaration of intent had already been made as, on 21 May, Henry told the pope that ‘he 
was ready to defend the Church, not only with his arms, but with the resources of his mind’.61 By 
                                                 
55 LPIIi, 2462 (20 October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516).  
56 See below p.539. 
57 See below pp.596-600. 
58 LPIIIi, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). For the Treaty of London, see above pp.45-46. 
59 See below pp.678-679, 691, 702-705. 
60 LPIIIi, 1325 (calendared beginning June 1521, [de’ Medici to -]). 
61 Giulio de’ Medici acknowledged this around 7-8 June and its secrecy is implied by the cardinal’s replying through 
a diplomatic back-channel, the nuncio Ghinucci; ibid., 432 (calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo), 1333 
(calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to the bishop of Ascoli]). 
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this time, Wolsey intended to ally Henry with Charles against France, under cover of the peace 
conference of Calais, and planned to use the king’s book against Luther as leverage to gain an 
honorary title for him.62 Furthermore, on the eve of these talks, Wolsey held a secret meeting 
with the nuncio Ghinucci ‘concerning his Holiness’ affairs against the Frenchmen’. Given the 
pope’s later reaction, this probably reiterated England’s desire to protect him.63 Subsequently, 
following the conclusion of the Treaty of Bruges (25 August 1521), Wolsey instructed John Clerk 
secretly to notify Leo of the nature of this agreement, in addition to the imminent presentation of 
the Assertio, ‘declaring the King’s resolution to support the Church, and extinguish heresy by the 
sword and pen’.64  
 
Henry VIII envisaged this defensive role as an obligation incumbent on him as a king. 
One can interpret Henry’s comments to the pope of May 1521 in this context. In a letter that 
effectively requested an honorary title, he emphasised that ‘nothing is more the duty of a 
Christian Prince than to preserve the Christian religion against its enemies’.65 He may been 
convinced quite early on of this by Ferdinand of Aragon during June 1510, who argued, ‘should 
the King of France really depose the pope, such an insult to the common church of all Christian 
people and to all princes of Christendom would be even a greater offence to them than an attack 
on their dominions, and they would be bound to oppose France with all their might’.66 This sense 
of duty was subsequently reflected in Henry’s commissions to the earls of Surrey and 
                                                 
62 See below pp.688-689. 
63 LPIIIii, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
64 Ibid., 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges), 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome).  
65 While Henry refers directly to Luther as the ‘enemy’ in question, his talk of also using arms to defend the Church 
implies that he also meant Francis I, against whom he was about to commit in alliance with the emperor; LPIIIi, 432 
(calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo). 
66 Sp.ii, 50 (LPIi, 483). Also, see ibid., 48 (calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to Hieronymo de Vich in Rome). 
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Shrewsbury in November 1511 to negotiate an alliance with Spain against France, which state 
that (in the face of French aggression) he was, ‘as a Christian prince, obliged to help the Church 
in her tribulations, and to obey as his faithful son the orders of the pope, who by letters and 
memoirs has asked him for aid’.67 This sentiment was repeated in Henry’s instructions to his 
herald when issuing his declaration of war to Louis XII during April 1512. He intended to attack 
France because Louis had given the pope (and Ferdinand) ‘occasion to ask Henry’s help for the 
Church’, which Henry felt duty-bound to give.68 
This idea that Henry VIII was or could be a ‘defender’ of the Church was also fostered by 
the papacy itself, at times when English support was sought against France. Again, this role can 
also be identified in direct correspondence. If the Venetians are to be believed, Julius II first 
approached Henry VIII to defend him from France around June-July 1510, having perceived ‘the 
extreme ill will of the French not only towards all Italy, but chiefly against the Apostolic See’.69 
Subsequently, around October 1511, Julius II formally requested that Henry VIII join a league 
‘against Louis XII, who had disposed of ecclesiastical preferments on his sole authority, and done 
other acts in contravention of the Papal authority, especially in besieging Bologna, and refused 
conditions of reconciliation which the Pope offered…’.70 The pope made a further request to 
Henry to come to ‘the defence of the Apostolic See’ on 14 March 1512.71 Reference to these 
approaches by Rome for protection were subsequently repeated in various commissions and the 
                                                 
67 Sp.ii, 57 (LPI, 934; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster). 
68 Lancaster Herald visited Louis XII to convey this; LPIi, 1169 (LPI, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster 
Herald’s mission). 
69 Ven.ii, 71 (LPIi, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
70 LPIi, 1065 (LPI, 2010; calendared 20 February 1512, Julius to Henry, Rome). 
71 Ibid., 1096 (LPI, 3068; 14 March 1512, Julius to Henry). 
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April 1512 declaration of war against France.72 Finally, in announcing the August 1514 Anglo-
French peace, Henry VIII, claimed that it was mainly the pope who persuaded him to agree to 
going to war in the first place.73 
Leo X again invoked Henry VIII’s role as ‘defender’ during July 1515, following the 
latter’s agreement to join a coalition earlier formed to resist and expel Francis I from Italy, in 
respect of which Leo wanted ‘the King to be considered its [the Holy See’s] patron and 
protector’.74 This was a clear allusion to Henry’s self-perceived role and the title with which he 
wished this to be recognised. It seems that the king took this bait and began to push for a formal 
title to recognise his position. Consequently, in early September, de Giglis told Wolsey how he 
had spoken to Leo X about some title for Henry, ‘as protector of the Holy See’ and this led to 
failed attempts to secure such an honour that were effectively extinguished by the anti-French 
league’s defeat at the Battle of Marignano (September 1515).75 During 1517, Giulio de’ Medici 
approached Henry to help ‘succour the Church’ financially against its enemies, also mentioning 
previous occasions when the king had rescued two pontiffs ‘from danger’.76 While this money 
was intended for the Urbino conflict, in which Leo was embroiled against the exiled duke 
Francesco Maria della Rovere, the pope had already stressed his conviction that della Rovere was 
backed by France (and Venice). Given that Henry, at the time, still laboured for an anti-French 
league to move against Francis I in Italy, it seems that the papacy was playing on Henry VIII’s 
                                                 
72 Sp.ii, 57 (LPI, 934; 10 November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster); LPIi, 1169 (LPI, 3986; 
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self-perceived role as ‘protector’.77 In 1519, the papacy appealed to England to ‘defend’ it in a 
different way, by helping it to influence the Imperial election. During March, Leo X declared 
that, while he opposed the candidacies of both Charles and Francis, he envisaged the latter as ‘the 
less evil’ and asked Wolsey for his advice.78 Quite predictably, the English crown objected to the 
French king first and foremost.79 Subsequently, when England and Rome failed to cooperate on 
the ground in Germany and both sides exchanged recriminations, Leo regretted ‘that Henry gave 
no attention to a project which would have made him a near, instead of a distant neighbour of the 
papal states’.80 Leo clearly implied (perhaps insincerely) that, had Henry facilitated his own 
election, he would be able to defend the papacy more directly, as he would then possess 
territories (and claims) in Italy, in addition to the traditional Imperial role as supreme ‘protector’ 
of the Church. Finally, the papacy appealed for English ‘protection’ in 1521 as, allied with 
Charles, it turned against France. Approaching Wolsey initially via Giulio de’ Medici, Leo was 
said to have ‘resolved to liberate himself at all hazards from this intolerable slavery, and hopes 
that Henry will show the same good mind towards the Pope and his confederates that he has 
always done’. It was to be further emphasised to Wolsey that this policy was not just intended 
‘for the liberation of the Holy See, but of Italy, from the fangs of the wolf’.81 After publicly 
declaring himself against France in late June 1521, the pope approached England directly to come 
to his protection. A request through Clerk was made on 9 July and on the 21st, the orator reported 
that Leo repeatedly urged him to write to England ‘for help and assistance against the 
                                                 
77 See below pp.578 ff. 
78 LPIIIi, 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
79 See below p.125. 
80 LPIIii, 393 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1301-1303; calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey). 
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Frenchmen’.82 Similarly, around the middle of the month, Ghinucci appeared before Wolsey, 
along with his Imperial counterpart, to deliver letters from the pope which presumably urged the 
same course, now that an Imperial-papal axis was in place.83 
 
There is also evidence to suggest that other states appealed to Henry VIII’s self-
perception as ‘defender’ of the Church to induce English support against France. During 
December 1511, for instance, Ferdinand of Aragon proposed to Henry VIII (through the Spanish 
ambassador in England), that some arrangement needed to be made concerning the relative 
precedence of their representatives at the forthcoming Lateran Council, so that, ‘as defenders of 
the Church, they should appear united against the King of France, her declared enemy’.84 
Similarly, in January 1512, Ferdinand wrote to his son-in-law of his satisfaction with the current 
negotiations for an alliance against France: ‘the world shall know that the King of England and 
he will not permit anyone to trample the Church under foot’.85 Around the beginning of April 
1512, the Venetian orator Badoer received instructions to urge Henry VIII to attack France, ‘a 
power waging war on the Church’.86 Also, on 20 November 1513, the duke of Milan replied to 
Henry, acknowledged the latter’s recent conquest of Thérouanne and Tournai and believed that 
this would ‘bridle the power of this enemy of the Church; without it he could have found no 
security in Italy’.87 Even towards the end of March 1514, the Swiss cardinal Matthew Schiner 
still referred to the French as ‘enemies of the Church’ in correspondence to Christopher 
Bainbridge, at a time when he believed that Henry would relaunch his attack on France that 
                                                 
82 LPIIIii, 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
83 Ven.iii, 263 (18 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). 
84 Sp.ii, 61 (LPIi, 1006; calendared end December 1511, Ferdinand to Luis Caroz). 
85 Ibid., 62 (LPIi, 1011; LPI, 3638; 3 January 1512, Ferdinand to Henry, Burgos). 
86 Ven.ii, 155 (LPIi, 1128; 1-7 April 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
87 LPIii, (LPI, 4751; 20 November 1513, Maximilian Sforza to Henry, ‘Ex arce Portae Jovis Mediolani’). 
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year.88 The emperor himself continued to push this line to Henry VIII merely days after England 
had come to peace with France in August 1514. On the 13th, Sir Robert Wingfield reported to his 
king that Imperial intelligence understood that an offensive Franco-Spanish alliance had been 
arranged against the pope and Italy, which they (the Empire and England) ought to resist.89 The 
following year, Ferdinand of Aragon attempted to induce English support against Francis I’s 
descent into Italy by asking Henry ‘to invade France and to succour the Holy Father’.90 Similarly, 
after the Battle of Marignano (September 1515), the Swiss Cardinal Schiner pledged himself to 
further the English plan for a swift reaction ‘against the French, who have dared to rend the unity 
of the Church’.91 Finally, an instance of third-party pressure on England to fulfil this role at the 
end of this period came from Charles V during July 1521 when, lobbying Henry to join the 
recently published Imperial-papal axis against Francis I. He described him ‘as one who had been 
a special defender of the Holy Church’.92 
 
The most obvious question deriving from the clear policy to ‘defend’ the pope from 
France is ‘why France?’ Both of the other ‘superpowers’, the Empire and Spain, had active 
interests in Italy and, indeed, the latter held considerable power in the peninsula with its 
possession of the kingdom of Naples. Erasmus commented roughly on this apparent contradiction 
to his friend, the king’s Latin secretary, Andrew Ammonius, on 26 November 1511, shortly after 
the first anti-French league of this period was concluded: ‘but pray suppose the French are driven 
out of Italy, and then reflect, please, whether you prefer to have the Spaniards as your masters, or 
                                                 
88 Ibid., 2752 (LPI, 4916; 26 March 1514, Cardinal Schiner to Bainbridge, ‘Ex Viglo’). 
89 Ibid., 3150 (LPI, 5323; 13 August 1514, Robert Wingfield to [Henry]). 
90 Sp.ii, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
91 LPIIi, 1146 (13 November 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck). 
92 LPIIIii, 1415 (13 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp). 
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the Venetians, whose rule is intolerable to their own countrymen’.93 There had to be some 
powerful reasons, therefore, why Henry VIII and his advisors sought to pursue this course as part 
of English foreign policy. It will, therefore, be established that there was in England a general 
antipathy towards foreigners, foremost of which was a prejudice against the French. While it will 
be seen that this was a general feeling, the king and his principal advisors shared this outlook, to 
varying extents. This anti-French xenophobia was rooted, partly at least, in the Hundred Years 
War and continued to fuel this rivalry during the period 1509-1522. Finally, it will be 
demonstrated that a tangible fear of French political dominance over the papacy therefore shaped 
the English crown’s relationship with Rome into a ‘defensive’ policy against its neighbour’s 
influence in Italy. This fear was sometimes voiced by those in crown circles in two distinct lights; 
that the French king sought to be ‘monarch of the world’ (or some similar label) and that they 
were the Christian equivalent to the Turkish threat. It was also linked to a fear that France might 
turn the papacy against England. 
Before demonstrating a widespread and deep-seated English xenophobia against the 
French, it ought to be emphasised that this was underpinned by a broader insular antipathy 
towards foreigners and outsiders per se. Slightly predating this period, for instance, a Venetian 
diplomat’s summary of his time in England circa 1500 reported that ‘the English are great lovers 
of themselves and of everything belonging to them; they think that there are no other men than 
themselves, and no other world but England…They have an antipathy to foreigners’.94 The 
English people’s more general xenophobic feelings could at times be voiced more tangibly, for 
                                                 
93 R.A.B. Mynors and D.F.S. Thomson (trans.), The Correspondence of Erasmus, ii, Letters 142-297, 1501-1514 
(1975), 245 (LPIi, 958; LPI, 1997; 26 November 1511, Erasmus to Ammonius, Cambridge). 
94 C.A. Sneyd (ed.), A Relation, or Rather a True Account, of the Island of England, Camden Series 37 (1847), 
pp.21-22, 23-24; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, p.43. 
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example during the ‘Evil May Day’ riots of 1517 in London and possibly Southampton against 
alien merchants, on account of a conviction that the latter ‘not only deprived them [the English] 
of their industry, and of the emoluments derivable thence, but disgraced their dwellings, taking 
their wives and daughters…’. Even after the arrest of the principal perpetrators, it was alleged 
that this sentiment continued to be voiced ‘by their women, who evince immense hatred to all 
strangers’.95  
That a prejudice against outsiders was felt across Christendom generally is also indicated 
by the prevalence of negative ‘national’ stereotypes in writings of the period. During June 1515, 
for instance, Thomas Colman wrote to his patron, Wolsey, from Bologna, opining that all such 
traits were true. Justifying, for instance, that ‘the Germans are tipplers’, he commented on the 
behaviour of Maximilian; ‘he tipples up wine and he tipples up all the money he can get’ (from 
England). On Scottish perfidy, he claimed that they ‘are perfidious to the King of England, to 
whom they owe obedience, and the Archbishop of York, who is their patriarch’.96 These 
demonstrate a degree of insularity among contemporaries. Similarly, this negative identification 
with outsiders was fuelled by self-perceived generalisations that one’s own people possessed this 
or that trait. Again, according to Erasmus, the English claimed to have ‘the most handsome 
women’, to be ‘the most accomplished in the skill of music’ and to keep ‘the best tables’. By way 
                                                 
95 This line of argument, that can still be seen today, was reported by the Venetian ambassador Giustinian; R. Brown, 
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.69 (LPIIii, 3204; 5 May 1517, Giustinian to the doge), 76 (Ven.ii, 881; LPIIii, 3218; 9 
May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Richmond); LPIIii, 3259 (19 May 1517, Nich. Sagudino to Alvise Foscari). For 
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96 Colman also considers the Spanish to be ‘thieves’; LPIIi, 606 (22 June 1515, [Thomas Colman] to Wolsey, 
Bologna). 
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of comparison, the scholar reported that ‘the French think themselves remarkable for 
complaisance and good breeding’.97 
While the antagonism towards outsiders may have been a widespread feeling among the 
people of the kingdom who rarely, if ever, had contact with people from other states, that is not to 
say that those in governmental circles, who encountered foreign diplomats and merchants, 
necessarily or completely shared this view. Cordial enough relations were maintained between 
England and other states (even France at times) throughout the period, indicating that such 
antipathies could be tempered and did not automatically induce an isolationist foreign policy. 
Indeed, Venetian and papal sources, in addition to Richard Fox, reported a firm response to the 
aforementioned May Day riots of 1517 by Henry and Wolsey.98 A convincing idea that has been 
put forward is that those at governmental level clearly identified this feeling (and that to be 
outlined vis-à-vis the French) as a potentially useful tool for encouraging war.99 This is 
confirmed by Erasmus in his Querela Pacis (1521), who, after outlining a number of ‘national’ 
rivalries, alleged that kings cunningly and deliberately manipulated these notions to create a 
pretext for conflict.100 As vague and intangible as this notion seems, therefore, particularly in 
light of the kingdom’s multifarious diplomatic and mercantile connections with other states, not 
to mention the collective, universal, religious identity shared by western Christendom, the 
existence of this attitude does provide some context in which the English relationship with France 
                                                 
97 Erasmus goes on to outline other self-perceived ‘national traits; L.F. Dean, Erasmus, The Praise of Folly, pp.91-
92. 
98 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.69 (LPIIii, 3204; 5 May 1517, Giustinian to the doge), 76 (LPIIii, 3218; 9 
May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Richmond); LPIIii, 3259 (19 May 1517, Nich. Sagudino to Alvise Foscari); 
Ven.ii, 887 (19 May 1517, Chieregato to Vigo da Campo San Pietro); P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 
58 (LP Addendum, 185; 10 May 1517, Fox to Wolsey, ‘St Cross beside Winchester’). 
99 Hale identifies the frequency of negative national stereotypes that were voiced during wartime, but these were not 
exclusive to England; J. Hale, The Civilisation of Europe in the Renaissance (1993), p.57. 
100 T. Paynell (ed.), The Complaint of Peace translated from the Querela Pacis (A.D. 1521) of Erasmus (1917), 
pp.57-58. 
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was set.101 While it is difficult to isolate anything more than a general antagonism towards 
outsiders in England, it provides a broad context from which one can begin to understand the 
strong prejudice that was more tangibly held against the French. Not only was this widely held 
among the English people, but also among the higher echelons of society, notably the king 
himself, in addition to many of his advisors, despite their willingness to accept lucrative French 
pensions during times of peace.102 
 
In the first place, the existence of a ‘national’ rivalry or enmity between the English and 
French
existed throughout the period, it is particularly highlighted in correspondence at times when 
                                                
 was commonly believed among contemporaries.103 Again, Erasmus confirmed this in his 
Querela Pacis (1521), when arguing against such ‘nationalistic’ feelings: ‘an Englishman they 
say, is the natural enemy of a Frenchman, because he is a Frenchman’.104 Similarly, Polydore 
Vergil, in his account of the Hundred Years War in his Anglica Historia, commented that ‘it 
cannot be brought to passe by any meane that a Frenche man borne will much love an Englishe 
man, or, contrary, that an English will love a Frenche man; such is the hatred that hath spronge of 
contention for honor and empire’.105 While this sense of ‘national’ rivalry was believed to have 
 
101 Hale also mentions the cross-pollination of scholars, artists and mercenaries as instances where prejudices were 
not always as straightforward as they initially seemed; J. Hale, The Civilisation of Europe in the Renaissance, p.57. 
102 S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, p.29. 
n 
y grace’; T. 
103 For this rivalry predating the period under study, see J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, p.43, n.18. 
104 Erasmus is critical of such antagonisms and shortly after goes on to argue that ‘a little gut of sea divides the 
English from the French; but if the whole Atlantic ocean rolled between them, it could not disjoin them as me
united by nature; and, while they mutually retain the christian religion, still more indissolubly cemented b
Paynell (ed.), The Complaint of Peace translated from the Querela Pacis (A.D. 1521) of Erasmus, pp.57-59. He also 
mentioned this particular regional hostility in his Enchiridion Militis Christiani (1504), while criticising the lack of 
Christian unity; K. Wilson and J. van der Dussen (eds.), The History of the Idea of Europe (1995), p.36. Hale also 
quotes Erasmus as writing ‘practically every Angle hates the Gaul, and every Gaul the Angle, for no other reason 
than that he is an Angle’; J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe 1450-1620 (1985), pp.42-43. 
105 J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, p.43. Also see S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) 
The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, p.34. For an instance of the perceived reciprocality of this xenophobia, 
see LPIIi, 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras). 
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England was either desirous of, committed to or at war with France. During September 1509, for 
instance, the Venetians tried to induce English support against the French by emphasising the 
need to ‘humble his [Louis XII’s] present haughtiness’ and referring to the French as ‘his 
[Henry’s] most natural enemies’.106 In May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo, Venetian consul in 
England, commented that ‘foreigners remain here in great fear, and keep their tongue within their 
teeth, for they dare not speak ill of the [Holy] League [against France]; but if they do give 
utterance, it is to abuse France, perhaps unwillingly, as were they to do otherwise, their heads 
would be well broken’.107 Similarly, around 15 September 1515, Giustinian understood that 
recent French victories in Italy were not welcomed, ‘owing to the natural feeling existing 
between the two nations’ and repeated this sentiment on a number of occasions. 108 More directly, 
Richard Pace in December 1515, seeking to recruit the Swiss to react to Francis’ victories in 
Italy, described the French as ‘the enemies of his country’, despite England still formally being at 
peace with France.109 Even in April 1518, again at a time when England was not at war with 
France and was negotiating towards a peace agreement, Henry was quoted as referring to the 
French king as his enemy.110 It ought to be noted, therefore, that the English understanding that 
the French were their enemies even extended into ‘peacetime’. This can be further emphasised in 
the wake of the Treaty of London (October 1518), some of the terms of which were said to be 
unpalatable to many English, including the restoration of Tournai to France and the plan for 
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107 Ibid., 174 (LPIi, 1216; 27-29 May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brother
108 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.126-127 (Ven.ii, 649; LPIIi, 912; 15 September 15
to the Signory, London). Also see ibid., 197-199 (Ven.ii, 700; LPIIi, 1654; 12 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). For comments on this rivalry or xenophobia, from other observers, see Sp.ii, 246 (8 March 1516, bishop of 
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Henry to meet Francis I.111 While reported discontent with these concessions indicates broader 
English antipathy towards France, the king and cardinal’s involvement does not necessarily 
indicate the absence of underlying anti-Gallic sentiment.112 During May 1519, for instance, it was 
rumoured that Wolsey removed a number of Henry’s courtiers on account of their French 
sympathies. 113 Later, in the summer, Richard Pace warned the king that two English 
ambassadors in Rome ‘undoubtedly were corruptide bi the Frenche Kyng’.114 Finally, by the time 
England was once again aligned against France, anti-French sentiments became publicly 
acceptable once again. As the Imperial orator noted in December 1521, news of victories against 
Francis at Milan and Tournai caused much rejoicing: ‘they sang songs about it in the streets, and 
in the court, even those who commonly lean to France’. Henry also conveyed his 
congratulations.115 
English prejudices against France could even be so intense that to describe someone as a 
Frenchman could be a term of abuse. During June 1510, Christopher Fisher, recently replaced as 
the English representative in Rome by Bainbridge, apparently described his successor as ‘a 
French
                                                
man at heart’.116 Later, during July 1513, Bainbridge himself, when describing the 
onetime English orator Hadrian de Castello to Thomas Ruthal, commented that the Italian ‘is as 
 
111 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.253-255 (Ven.ii, 1173; LPIIIi, 117; 10 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, 
Lambeth); LPIIIi, 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London). 
112 See below pp.688-692. 
PIIIi, 235; 18 May 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, 
ber 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
 perhaps a broader insult by Fisher to his replacement; 
k, Henry VIII, p.25; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal 
113 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.269-273 (Ven.ii, 1220; L
Lambeth). Also see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.117-118. 
114 Ellis, p.78 (LPIIIi, 412; 11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst). 
115 LPIIIii, 1858 (12 Decem
116 LPIi, 493 (Ven.ii, 73; 8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). As the archbishop cannot really be termed 
anything other than anti-French, one can only interpret this as
D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp. 23 and passim; J.J. Scarisbric
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parciall a Francheman as I hame a Ynglisman. I pray God geve hymme evyll triste’.117 It is 
notable here that both sources had direct contact with the king and his inner circle.  
 
‘Negative’ national stereotypes about the French that contributed to and perpetuated the 
nglish prejudice were also widely held.118 Within personal correspondence that reached the 
highest
Henry’s money was intended for ‘those who were more Frenchmen than Christians’.122 
E
 governmental levels, it has already been mentioned how, on 22 June 1515, Wolsey’s 
protégé, Thomas Colman, cited a number of such stereotypes. Concerning the French, he opined 
to Wolsey that they were ‘unchaste’ and illustrated this by arguing that history bore ‘testimony to 
the flattery and frauds of the French, of which Francis is a proof in the way he has acted touching 
the dowry of Mary the French Queen’.119 Also, during his struggle to enter possession of the 
disputed see of Tournai during 1515, Wolsey’s vicar-general Sampson hoped that his superior 
would ‘find the Frenchmen more faithful than people expect’.120 Similarly, during November 
1515, the English orator in Rome, de Giglis in describing French plans for the forthcoming 
meeting with the pope at Bologna, stated, ‘it is the nature of Frenchmen that they can never hold 
their tongue upon what they do, say or think’.121 While emanating from an Italian, albeit one who 
had been in English service for some time, this opinion was intended to be acceptable to its 
intended governmental audience. Furthermore, Richard Pace, writing during the collapse of the 
English-funded campaign to expel the French from Italy in April 1516, advised that some of 
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121 Ibid., 1105 (calendared 1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to A
122 Ibid., 1817 (23 April 1516, Pace to Burbank, Bergamo). 
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One particular ‘French’ characteristic that was raised repeatedly by the English was an 
alleged arrogance and pride, particularly in the context of their Italian ambitions, and the English 
consequently expected to take them down a peg or two. Around March 1514, Henry VIII is 
reporte
                                                
d to have retorted angrily to his father-in-law’s truce with Louis XII, lamenting that ‘such 
an opportunity had been lost for crippling the pride of France’.123 Similarly, during October 
1515, William Knight, ambassador to Charles of Castile (resident in the Low Countries) 
recommended an alliance with the Swiss against France, believing that such a league would ‘be a 
scourge for the pride of France’.124 Also, around August 1516, Wolsey talked of measures taken 
by Charles of Castile ‘to counteract the pride of France’, in spite of his recently having allied 
with him in the Treaty of Noyon.125 Foreign states also identified this perceived French arrogance 
and pride as a means to stir up the English. In March 1510, for example, the Venetian envoys in 
Rome were instructed to go with Bainbridge to the pope to promote a coalition which would have 
‘the benefit of indubitably repressing the haughtiness and pride of the French’.126 Similarly, 
around June 1510, Ferdinand recommended a broad league by which ‘they will be better enabled 
to find means for putting down the arrogance and the tyranny of the French’.127 Furthermore, 
during November 1511, while trying to induce the final adherence of Henry VIII to the Holy 
League against France, Venice begged that he ‘humble the intense pride and arrogance of the 
French’.128 Finally and most pertinently, Leo X, in appealing to Henry VIII to defend the Church 
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against France in July 1521, stressed ‘that now is high time to punish their [the French] pride and 
insolvency’.129 
 
Given the clear existence of a strong English xenophobia towards France, the form that 
is took within English foreign policy ought to be considered, particularly that voiced by Henry 
VIII an
his coronation, he was said to have pledged that he would attack Louis 
XII.131 
                                                
th
d his principal advisors. It will be argued here that, while those in power possessed the 
political pragmatism to suppress their anti-French prejudices when it suited English (and/or their 
own) interests, such as for the peace of August 1514, the prejudice against France was never far 
beneath the surface, particularly given the latter’s ambitions in Italy had the potential to affect 
Anglo-papal relations.130 
The reign began with Henry VIII’s vocal declarations of enmity towards France and, 
indeed, immediately after 
Contemporaries generally agreed with this analysis, Guicciardini writing that, from the 
beginning of his reign, Henry was ‘incited by the innate hatred of the kings and people of 
England against the French, as well as by his youth and the great sums of money he had inherited 
from his father’.132 While many historians have pointed towards subsequent tensions between a 
‘war party’, consisting particularly of young lay nobles and a ‘peace party’, containing the 
 
129 LPIIIii, 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
130 Personal interests were served particularly with the lucrative pensions that accompanied peace treaties with 
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 Guicciardini, pp.233, 287. 
France (said to be worth ₤5-
induced their recipients to act in the French interests, or ind
by the donor; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in Early Modern 
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131 See below p.362. 
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leading ecclesiastics in his confidence, an alternative interpretation has been found in this 
study.133 While the existence of such debate in crown circles is not disputed, it has been posited 
that the ‘inner circle’, who guided Henry in foreign policy, imposed a number of conditions that 
needed to be fulfilled before they would back the king’s desire to invade France. Among these 
was the need to break up the League of Cambrai and to form a coalition against Louis XII, to 
include the pope. Time was also required for preparation.134 While Henry pursued these vis-à-vis 
Rome through the Bainbridge embassy and approached his father-in-law, Ferdinand, warning of 
‘the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes’, that would threaten the Spaniard’s (Italian) 
possessions, an interim Anglo-French peace was confirmed in March 1510 which contradicted all 
other anti-French signals up to that point.135 In spite of initial papal anger at this, the ‘peace’ was 
merely a renewal of that already existing with France. Moreover, it formed part of a broader 
policy at the beginning of the reign to reconfirm England’s agreements with other states and also 
guaranteed Henry VIII’s continued receipt of lucrative French pensions.136 As a consequence, 
England only began to move indirectly against France in 1511 and only then in minor expeditions 
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that did little more than sabre-rattle.137 Given the general understanding that Henry was ‘an 
enemy of the French’, he must have been complicit in approving his ministers’ advice to take this 
cautious course.138 If he had wanted to overrule his ministers, he could have done. Also, Henry’s 
advisors did not seek to prevent him from going to war, they merely sought to create the right 
conditions for him to do so. Henry’s initial anti-French sentiments expressed in 1509 culminated, 
therefore, in the direct military action that was attempted in 1512 and 1513.139 
Following the modest successes of the 1513 invasion of France, Henry and his ministers 
began to restrain their anti-French impulses from the close of the campaign. While they remained 
publicl
                                                
y committed to relaunching the offensive in 1514, they had been forced to undertake the 
1513 expedition with little support from their allies and so began to respond to papal peace 
overtures from late September onwards.140 Anti-French rhetoric, while still active in terms of its 
use as diplomatic leverage, tapered off and ceased by the peace of 7 August 1514.141 Following 
Louis XII’s death in January 1515, the English crown chose to renew this agreement with Francis 
 
137 See pp.385-386. 
 act against France that year, he could expect this to occur during 1511, reasoning ‘that King 
dise himself is not for our benefit’. Similarly, on 25 March 1511, William Warham, also often 
d Darcy, then intending to crusade against the Moors of North 
g from Henry in early 1514 may have been 
138 Ven.i, 941 (28 April 1509, the Signory to Badoer). 
139 See below pp.379-380. Two of those usually cited as members the ‘peace’ party, Fox and Warham, can be seen to 
have agreed with Henry’s anti-French policy. Fox reportedly told the Venetian ambassador in May 1510 that, while 
England would not
Lewis should aggran
cited as an opponent of war with France, wrote to Lor
Africa, lamenting that he and his archers had not been sent to the pope, ‘to strength [sic.] him against the enemies of 
the Church, which be little better than infidels’; Ven.ii, 64 (LPIi, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory); LPIi, 
725 (LPI, 5740; 25 March 1511, Warham to Lord Darcy, Canterbury). 
140 See pp.429-430. For Henry reportedly informing the pope that he had agreed a peace because of his lack of allies 
against France, see LPIii, 3482 (LPI, 5642; 27 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Lud. Furtado, Valladolid). Some 
historians have indicated their scepticism of Henry’s xenophobia on the basis of the 1514 peace agreement. Gunn, 
for instance, argued that Henry justified his tough stance in negotiations through the anti-French sentiment prevalent 
in England. Similarly, Wilkie considers that the war rhetoric emanatin
intended to add weight to the English diplomatic position during peace talks, as he could not afford another invasion. 
While both arguments are correct, they do not indicate that Henry was not anti-French, rather that he (and his 
advisors) recognised when they ought to exercise pragmatism and temper this stance. The lack of allies, the financial 
burden and the desire of the pope to withdraw justification from the war made peace a sensible option at this stage; 
S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, pp.28, 34; 
W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.45. 
141 See below pp.456-457. 
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I, despite its discomfort with the prospect of him descending into Italy.142 An indication of the 
insincerity of this and the underlying anti-French disposition of Henry VIII can be detected at the 
beginning of March 1515, when he commented to the Venetian ambassador that Francis I ‘was 
indeed a worthy and honest sovereign, but nevertheless a Frenchman, and not to be trusted’.143 
Furthermore, in spite of confirming the Anglo-French peace with Francis in April 1515, Henry 
was already in negotiation with Rome to join an existing league to defend Milan from the French. 
Before he could formally join, however, Francis won a decisive victory against the coalition at 
Marignano (in September).144 In reaction to this French success, Henry VIII’s anti-French 
disposition immediately resurfaced as he attempted to organise the defence of Italy against 
further French successes. This resulted in a failed Imperial-Swiss expedition to Italy and various 
aborted leagues against France during 1516-1517.145 While Henry and Wolsey attempted to keep 
their anti-French strategy secret until around May-June 1516, after this they freely voiced anti-
Gallic rhetoric. Towards the beginning of August 1516, for instance, Giustinian, following an 
audience with Wolsey and Ruthal, described them ‘abusing the King of France without 
reserve’.146  
The failure of the English crown to galvanise its allies against France led to a change of 
strategy against France from 1517 on, one of apparent reconciliation which led to the Treaty of 
London in 1518. From this point, anti-French sentiments were reined in at governmental level, 
although they were present. This can be seen particularly in Henry VIII’s staunch opposition to 
                                                 
142 See below pp.464-465. 
143 Ven.ii, 594 (6 March 1515, Badoer to the Signory, London). Henry repeated this belief to the Venetian 
own (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.265-270 (Ven.ii, 757; LPIIi, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the 
ambassadors in July; R. Br
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
144 See p.489. 
145 See below pp.489-593. 
146 R. Brown 
Signory). 
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Francis I’s candidacy in the Imperial election of 1519, albeit while publicly claiming to back 
him.147 It can also be seen in the great demonstration of Anglo-French ‘amity’ that was the Field 
of Clot
 
                                  
h of Gold in 1520. Henry and Wolsey undertook this meeting in spite of its unpopularity 
‘with all the nobility and people of England’. Shortly after this occurred, a conversation was 
overheard by the Venetian ambassador in which one English noble said to another, ‘If I had a 
drop of French blood in my body I would cut myself open to get rid of it;’ and the other replied, 
‘And so would I’.148 While Henry reportedly made a public show of arresting the two, this does 
not take into account the continued anti-Gallic agenda that underlay the summit and 
contemporaneous meetings with Charles V.149 In addition to using it as a way to divert Francis 
from Italy, Henry was also beginning to entertain anti-French overtures from Charles V and, to 
disguise these, went to great lengths to give the illusion that England’s strongest amity was with 
France.150 Governmental xenophobia directed against France, therefore, may have been a guiding 
principle, but it was by no means unconditional. There were times when peace was entertained 
with apparent enthusiasm and cordial relations ensued. These were, on the other hand, times 
when France was not furthering its ambitions in Italy and, it is argued, when they did, relations 
between England and France took a turn for the worse. It is unsurprising, therefore, that, despite 
the pragmatism inherent in the cut and thrust of international politics, ‘national’ stereotypes 
occasionally arose, betraying the deep-seated feelings of those in and around crown circles.  
               
147 See below pp.653-673. 
148 LPIIIi, 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London); Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, 
Calais). 
149 See below pp.688-694. 
150 That Henry was at this point successful in giving this impression was also noted by Surian, who reported 
(incorrectly) that no agreement had been made with Charles at their second meeting, as Henry ‘chooses to be 
French’; Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Also see below pp.688-689. 
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As to the motives for this xenophobia that underlay crown attempts to ‘defend’ the papacy 
from France, the most obvious derive from a combination of geography, history and a 
commitment to chivalry. The largely fractious relationship that evolved between these states was 
not assisted by the long-term development of rival claims to territories and titles as a result of 
conquest and marriages.151 With perhaps the possible exception of Scotland, France had certainly 
been England’s greatest and most frequent rival on the European stage. This had most recently 
anifested itself during the Hundred Years War, which still remained relatively fresh in the 
English
m
 memory and added an historic aspect to the Anglo-French rivalry. The principal elements 
of this dispute (or disputes) that were still prominent included the continued claim of English 
monarchs to the French throne,152 the reduction of English controlled territory to the enclave in 
and around Calais,153 and the relatively recent memory of glorious English victories by the likes 
of Henry V.154 Focus on the latter was particularly fuelled by the king’s commitment to 
knighthood and chivalry. A particularly significant feature of Henry’s chivalric commitment was 
his desire to achieve honour on the battlefield, which is often given as an explanation of the 
king’s bellicosity in this earlier part of his reign, from which this idea of defending the papacy 
                                                 
151 See J. le Patourel, ‘The Origins of the War’, in K. Fowler (ed.), The Hundred Years War (1971), pp.28-50. 
 This claim to the French throne was also enshrined in the English monarchs’ formal title that always began ‘Rex 
Angliae et Franciae’; see, for instance, LPIIi, 1226 (calendared end November 1515, [English ambassadors] to the 
152
Lords of the League of Upper Almain). For the resurfacing of an active claim by Henry VIII to the French crown, see 
below pp.70 ff. 
153 The limited territory held by English kings in France was a matter of fact, a daily reminder to Henry VIII of his 
unfulfilled claims there. 
154 In seeking role models and precedents for his chivalric ideals (to be mentioned below), Henry VIII was naturally 
cused 
in Early Modern Europe, pp.36-37; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.23. For Henry’s other role-
 (ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, p.108.  
drawn to the Hundred Years War for England’s last ‘glorious’ achievements (against the French). Henry fo
particularly (but not exclusively) on Henry V; under this king’s instructions, for instance, Livius’ biography of Henry 
V was translated; C.S.L. Davies, ‘The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century’, in A.C. Duke and 
C.A. Tamse (eds.), Britan and the Netherlands, p.14; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) 
The Origins of War 
models, historic and contemporary (including French monarchs), see S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early 
Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo
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was probably in part drawn.155 A chivalric ethos was also strongly held by a significant element 
of those with whom Henry chose to surround himself, young lay nobles who are often argued to 
have exacerbated Henry VIII’s warlike temperament in this period.156 
These factors ensured that the legacy of the Hundred Years War remained an open wound 
that could contribute to the prejudice felt towards France, particularly within crown circles. 
Whether contrived or not, it does not take much to envisage, therefore, that combined with a 
wider anti-Gallic prejudice, Henry VIII would want to imitate the victories of his predecessors by 
attempt
papal nuncio in England to urge Henry to take ‘the opportunity he has of increasing his honour 
ing to make good his titular and territorial claims there.157 Therefore, it becomes 
increasingly demonstrative of an anti-French prejudice when English claims to French territory 
and titles are raised during this period, particularly when they coincide with Henry VIII’s drive to 
defend the papacy from France. A strong indication that this was a genuine feeling came during 
September 1510, when the English ambassador in Rome, Bainbridge, apparently instructed a 
and of obtaining great advantages. The right moment has come….for the King of England to 
                                                 
155 S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo (ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, 
pp.107-128, but esp. 108, 124; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in 
Early Modern Europe, p.35; M.E. James, ‘English Politics and the Concept of Honour, 1485-1642’, in M.E. James 
(ed.), Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England (1986), pp.308-415. Also indicative of the role 
n de Chantrezac to M. d’Aumont). 
he implications of the Hundred Years War were 
of chivalry for Henry VIII was his commitment to the Order of the Garter, indulging in knightly pursuits such as 
jousting and his commissioning Lord Berners’ translation of Froissart’s Chronicles (around 1523); S. Gunn, ‘The 
French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, p.34; S Gunn, ‘Chivalry 
and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo (ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, pp.109-111; J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.23. 
156 See for example D. Baker-Smith, ‘“Inglorious Glory”: 1513 and the Humanist Attack on Chivalry’, in S. Anglo 
(ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, pp.135-136; S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, in 
ibid., pp.123-124. For allusions to these advisors, see Sp.ii, 45 (LPIi, 477; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand); 
LPIi, 1201 (20 May 1512, Alai
157 Historians remained divided over whether ‘regaining’ the crown of France was a genuine aim of Henry VIII (and 
his advisors). For example, while C.S.L. Davies does not believe that this was ever a serious intention, Potter asserts 
that it was enthusiastically raised when the opportunity arose. While this is a valid consideration, it falls out of the 
remit of this study, as here it is merely being demonstrated that t
indicative of a continued xenophobia towards France; C.S.L. Davies, ‘The English People and War in the Early 
Sixteenth Century’, in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (ed.), Britan and the Netherlands, p.17; D. Potter, ‘Foreign 
Policy’, in D. MacCulloch (ed.), The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.108-109. 
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recover all that belongs to him’.158 Contemporary chroniclers also identified the existence of this 
motivation. Polydore Vergil, in his Anglica Historia commissioned by the English crown, refers 
to ‘Normandy, Aquitaine and some other places which by hereditary right belong to the king of 
England’.159 He also refers to Henry VIII’s desire in 1513 ‘not merely to equal but indeed to 
exceed the glorious deeds of his ancestors’.160 Guicciardini, a papal official during this period, in 
writing about Henry VIII and his conflicts with France, again alluded to the motivation of the 
Hundred Years War. In commenting on the build-up to Henry’s invasion of France in 1513, he 
stated that the English king had ‘a great desire to renew the glory of his ancestors, who, entitling 
themselves kings of France and at various times having vexed that kingdom with great wars from 
which they emerged victorious’. Guicciardini also mentioned Henry V by name and his near-
conquest of France.161  
In terms of the formal voicing of this historic rivalry in English alliances of the period, 
this first appears in the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 17 November 1511, intended to support the 
broader Holy League. The focus of these two powers was to be on Aquitaine ‘which province 
belongs by right to the King of England’.162 Similarly, in the build-up to the full-scale invasion of 
France in 1513, the appointment of Catherine of Aragon as ‘Regent and Governess of England’ 
                                                 
n ence came from his French hosts, who had intercepted this letter and released its 
contents to the Spanish ambassador there. The Spaniard comments on how curious it was that Bainbridge was 
communicating through a nuncio, but could not give a reason for this; Sp.ii, 52 (10 September 1510, Hieronymo de 
Cabanillas to Ferdinand, Tours). 
lementary treaty between the two states, they 
he recovery of Aquitaine as its main strategic objective, along with the defence of 
was to 
om both the north and the south; LPIi, 1657 (LPI, 4038; February 1513); LPIii, 2377 (Sp.ii, 138-139; 
158 Unfortunately, this i tellig
159 It ought to be noted that Vergil was resident in England at this time; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.195. 
160 Ibid., p.197. 
161 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.233, 287. 
162 Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). In the supp
‘bind themselves to assist one another in the defence of the Holy Church against France, and to aid the common 
attempts to be made to recover those provinces which by right belong to the crown of England, but are occupied by 
the King of France’; ibid., 65 (LPIi, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512). The renewed treaty between England and 
Spain of 9 May 1513 again had t
the Church, as did the next renewal of the alliance on 17 October 1513. For the latter, however, the intention 
invade France fr
LPI, 4511; 17 October 1513). 
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on 6 Ju
n. While this 
was to 
of Cambrai, appealed to Henry VIII, to effect a league against France, as a result of which ‘the 
ne was revealing, insomuch that it referred to ‘the King’s absence in his expedition against 
France, for the preservation of the Catholic religion, and recovery of his rights’.163  
Possibly more significant in demonstrating the strength of Henry VIII’s feeling against 
France in this sense was his formal attempt to wrest the kingdom and its titles from Louis XII via 
the pope, 1512-1514. It was widely understood that a pope could depose and legitimise the 
appointment of monarchs.164 The pope drew up a brief for this on 20 March 1512, promising to 
invest Henry with Louis XII’s rights as king of France and sanctioning his coronatio
remain secret, Cardinal Bainbridge lobbied hard albeit unsuccessfully in Rome to have 
this brief published, as the papacy was adamant that this was not to occur until Henry VIII gained 
de facto control of France. This plan came to naught, even after Julius II’s death, when 
Bainbridge actually obtained the brief. In terms of the Anglo-French rivalry, Julius II clearly 
recognised that, by offering the French throne as an inducement to help justify the conflict, this 
could ensure that the English actually went to war. Henry, for his part, seized the opportunity to 
realise his historic claim.165 
During this early period, foreign states also recognised the resonance that the English 
claim to the French throne could have in lobbying Henry towards war with France. This occured 
for the first time in September 1509, when Venice, on the verge of being destroyed by the League 
                                                 
163 LPIi, 2055:46 (LPI, 4179; calendared 6 June 1513). 
164 A recent precedent of papal recognition of a disputed territorial claim came in July 1510, when Julius II 
recognised Ferdinand of Aragon’s claim to Naples, at the expense of Louis XII, by investing him with this kingdom; 
L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.321. 
165 See below pp.144-151. In notifying Leo X, on 12 October 1513, of the English victory at Flodden, the king wrote 
his, along with Henry’s attempt to act as ‘king of France’ in 
 Tournai). 
as ‘Rex Franciae et Angliae et Dominus Hiberniae’. T
Tournai, may well have been partly intended as pressure for the pope to confirm the transfer of titles and rights; 
C.S.L. Davies, ‘Tournai and the English Crown, 1513-1519’, HJ, 41 (1998), pp.6-7, 14; LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; 
Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo,
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King could never have a finer opportunity for conquering France, like King Henry of glorious 
memory, and revenging himself on his most natural enemies’.166 Similarly, the Imperial 
chambe
Knight used the same language a few months 
later w
rlain de Berghes told the English representative in Burgundy, during summer 1513, that 
he had been commissioned to persuade Henry VIII to go to Rheims, where Maximilian would 
meet him for his coronation as king of France.167  
Henry VIII’s claim to the French throne was next raised during 1515, as English adhesion 
was sought to a league to defend Milan from Francis I. Leo X alluded to this in a conversation 
with de Giglis during May, commenting that he now agreed with Julius II ‘that the King of 
England was a young man of great power and would easily conquer France’.168 Henry himself 
referred to France as ‘the ancient enemy of England’ in a letter to Knight, his ambassador in the 
Low Countries, during August of the same year. 
hen urging that England respond to the French victory at Marignano.169 Also from August 
onwards, Sir Robert Wingfield, resident in Germany, advised and passed on Maximilian’s view 
                                                 
166 Ven.ii, 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). Venice wrote in a similar vein on 21 
December 1509, instructing Andrea Badoer ‘to exhort the King not to neglect so great an opportunity for the 
conquest of a crown whose title he bears, assuring him that, should he undertake this expedition against his capital 
and natural enemy the King of France, they will so straiten the latter in Italy, that he [Henry] will find it very easy to 
obtain what they propose, and gain as much praise and glory as have ever fallen to the lot of any other King of 
England’; ibid., 24 (LPIi, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer). Among other instances of this, on 12 January 
1510, the same Italian state instructed its ambassador, among other things, to urge Henry VIII ‘to conquer France, 
that he may be the true king and lord of that country, and not merely to bear an empty title’. Similarly, duuring May 
1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo, Venetian consul in England, implicitly referred to the Hundred Years War when he 
extolled to his brothers ‘that "with God's assistance the English will make these French dogs cry mercy, as they have 
done many times of yore”’. Finally, on 6 October 1512, a letter was composed from the doge to Henry VIII, 
congratulating him on his victories against the French ‘which will recover for him his hereditary right’ (although this 
does not seem to have been sent); ibid., 33 (LPIi, 330; 12 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 174 (LPIi, 1216; 27-29 
May 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 196 (6 October 1512, doge to Henry). 
167 LPIii, 2106 (LPI, 4355; 19 July 1514, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). Also, during September 1513, the emperor 
advised that Tournai surrender to Henry as king of France and that subsequent oaths should be sworn according to 
this title; C.S.L. Davies, ‘Tournai and the English Crown, 1513-1519’, HJ, 41 (1998), pp.6-7. 
168 LPIIi, 493 (calendared 22 May 1515, [de Giglis to -]). 
169 Ibid., 798 (12 August 1515, Henry to Knight, ‘From our Monastery of Chertsey’), 1003 (8 October 1515, Knight 
to Wolsey, Brussels). 
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that, through English involvement in the current conflict, Henry could become king of France.170 
The English crown responded positively to this encouragements and, among instructions to 
Richard Pace in October 1515, commissioned him to form a league with the Swiss both to expel 
the French from Italy and to recover Henry’s rights in France.171 Even after the failure of the 
Imperial-Swiss expedition in March-April 1516, sustained pressure came from Germany for 
Henry to realise his ancestors’ claim to France.172 
During the English ‘reconciliation strategy’ of 1517-1521, no reference to Henry’s claim 
to the French throne has been found. To convince Francis I of the veracity of their amity during 
and after negotiations, this would have been prudent. However, one awkward moment occurred 
when Henry’s title was read out at the Field of Cloth of Gold in 1520, at which point Henry tried 
to play it down. The titles, he claimed, were ‘good for nothing’. Francis replied diplomatically, 
albeit reserving his and his successors’ right to the French throne.173 As Henry became receptive 
to Imp
                                                
erial overtures towards an alliance against France, the English claim to France soon 
resurfaced as a war aim. Charles V apparently proposed this at his second meeting with Henry at 
Calais during August 1520. While this was disclosed to Francis, Henry and Wolsey were trying 
to double bluff the French by demonstrating their commitment to the Anglo-French amity.174 
That the English did seek this as a war aim was subsequently indicated in instructions given to 
 
170 Ibid., 838 (22 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 982 (2 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], 
to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’), 1399 (12 January 1516, 
t Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg). Cardinal Schiner reiterated this; ibid., 1483 (calendared 
Innsbruck), 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield 
Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1413 
(18 January 1516, Rober
4 February 1516, abstract of Cardinal Schiner’s letters). 
171 Ibid., 1095 (calendared end October 1515, instructions from Wolsey to Pace). Pace further spoke of ‘England’s 
right to France’ in December 1515; ibid., 1244 (calendared 3-4 December 1515, Pace to Wolsey). 
172 Ibid., 1902 (17 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, [Galeazzo 
Visconti] to [Anchises Visconti]). 
173 Ven.iii, 60 (3-8 June 1520); S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black (ed.) The Origins of War in 
Early Modern Europe, p.37. 
174 LPIIIi, 936 (calendared beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, 
ambassadors to Francis). 
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Tunstal, sent to negotiate an alliance with Charles, around January 1521.175 Furthermore, during 
July 1521, Henry and Wolsey spoke with Imperial diplomats about the time being right for the 
recovery of France, which Charles V later encouraged.176 This active claim to the French throne 
was indicated right up to the end of this period when, at the dinner to celebrate the receipt of the 
bull bestowing ‘fidei defensor’ on the king, heralds cried ‘Henricus dei gratia rex Angliae, et 
Franciae, defensor fidei, et dominus Hiberniae…’.177 Overall, the underlying xenophobia felt by 
Henry VIII against France was motivated and exacerbated by the king ‘feeling the hand of history 
on his shoulder’ vis-à-vis France, particularly his chivalric outlook looking back to the Hundred 
Years War. This was shared by at least some of his younger advisors, who were similarly 
committed to the arts of war enshrined in knighthood and chivalry. 
 
Given the anti-French attitudes held in England throughout this period, it becomes 
increasingly understandable that Henry VIII and his advisors would oppose French political and 
territorial ambitions in Italy. If they did not, the worst-case scenario would be a peninsula and a 
papacy influenced heavily by the French crown. While in 1509, this situation was speculative, 
such a fear was not new to the English crown; it was strongly felt during the late fourteenth and 
arly fifteenth centuries, during the ‘Babylonish captivity’ of the papacy at Avignon and 
particularly during the Great Schism, when it influenced English support of the ‘Roman’ line of 
popes.178 Most notably, these ‘memories’ were contemporaneous with those of the Hundred 
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. DuBoulay, ‘The Fifteenth Century’, in C.H. Lawrence (ed.), The English Church and the Papacy in the 
 Century’, in ibid., p.197-200. Also, see G. Mollat, 
175 Ibid., 1150 (calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to 
Henry). 
176 LPIIIii, 1395 (6 July 1521, de Mesa and Haneton to Charles), 1433 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, 
Ghent). 
177 C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.235-236. 
178 F.R.H
Middle Ages (1999), pp.160- 163; W.A. Pantin, ‘The Fourteenth
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Years War. In this context, therefore, the attraction to Henry VIII of defending the papacy against 
his neighbour becomes clearer. This is more marked when one considers France’s recent 
ambitions in Italy and how the English crown interpreted them vis-à-vis the papacy. While the 
Papal States and Italy had long been vulnerable to ultramontane powers competing for hegemony 
in the peninsula, the most recent trend for French monarchs to expand into Italy and make good 
their territorial claims only slightly predated Henry VIII’s reign.179 Some of the king’s senior 
advisors, such as Fox, would have been able to remember Charles VIII’s initial incursion into the 
peninsula in 1494.180 It has been argued that prior to 1494, wars were broadly of a different 
character, ‘chiefly a matter of domestic housekeeping’; that the nature of warfare changed after 
this point, particularly in terms of French expansionism, which had a bearing on English 
intervention in continental affairs.181 It is to be argued here that Henry VIII and his advisors 
interpreted French ambitions in Italy principally in terms of the bearing they had on the (temporal 
and, therefore, wider) independence of the papacy. Given the deep-seated antagonism borne 
towards France and claim to its throne, Louis XII or Francis I’s domination of the peninsula was 
unacceptable to English interests. To establish that the English crown did fear the consequences 
for the papacy of French hegemony in Italy, general indications of its fear for this outcome will 
                                                                                                                                                              
The Popes at Avignon 1305-1378 (1963), pp.xiii-xv, 249-256, 263, 267; Y. Renouard, The Avignon Papacy 1305-
1403 (1970), pp.128-129, 131. Note Mollat’s argument that the Avignon papacy was not subservient to French 
interests, but this does not mean that it was not perceived as such from England. Furthermore, it seems that many 
Italians perceived the papacy as ‘French’ during its sojourn at Avignon; D. Waley, Later Medieval Europe (1985), 
pp.98-99. 
179 French interests had been pursued in Italy for most of the fifteenth century up to the 1480s; D. Hay, ‘Italy and 
S.L. Davies, ‘Fox [Foxe], Richard’, 
. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, p.13. 
Barbarian Europe’, in E.F. Jacob (ed.) Italian Renaissance Studies (1966), p.52. 
180 Also, Thomas Ruthal and Thomas Howard (earl of Surrey), among others; C.




be explored first, then two distinct lights in which the French monarchs were portrayed, as 
attempting to become ‘monarchs of the world’ and as the ‘Christian Turk’. 
An initial indication that Henry VIII (and his ‘inner circle’) indeed feared the 
consequences for the papacy of French hegemony in Italy is that the king followed his father’s 
lead in (tacitly) opposing the League of Cambrai’s attack on Venice. While this coalition 
included the Empire, Spain, even the papacy itself, the English were only really concerned about 
the implications that the league’s victories would have for French influence over Julius II. The 
first tacit indication of this fear for the papacy emerges in a letter to Ferdinand of Aragon, during 
November 1509, when he approached his father-in-law to cease hostilities against Venice and to 
turn ag
                                                
ainst France: ‘if Venice were conquered and destroyed,’ he argued, ‘the other states of 
Italy would be unable to withstand the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes’.182 In 
reply, Ferdinand agreed ‘that the destruction of Venice would be unjust as well as very dangerous 
to the other princes of Christendom’.183 It does not take much to see that the root cause of 
Henry’s opposition to the continued attacks on Venice (probably the most powerful, independent 
Italian state at that time) lay in the potential political threat to the papacy if the republic fell. 
Following Henry VIII’s initial approaches to Ferdinand, the latter continued to fuel his son-in-
law’s idea of the French threat to Italy. On 11 January 1510, the English orator in Spain, John 
Stile, conveyed the Catholic King’s wish for a league to be concluded quickly, so ‘that the 
Freynsche kyng schal not nor maye not atayne unto hys cruel purpose for to dysstroye al the 
 
182 Henry also emphasises Venice’s essential role as ‘a wall against the Turks and other infidels’, but, as will be 
refront of Henry’s concerns; Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 outlined later, it was the French not the Ottomans at the fo
November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand). Curiously, a very similar letter from Henry to Ferdinand of the same date has 
almost identical contents, but neglects any mention of Italy’s potential vulnerability if Venice fell; ibid., 25-26 (LPIi, 
221; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand). 
183 Ferdinand replied through his daughter, Catherine of Aragon; ibid., 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, 
Ferdinand to Catherine). 
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cuntrays of the Ytaly, and for to subdwe theym’.184 Also during January 1510, Henry VIII played 
on this fear in his approaching the emperor to break from the League of Cambrai and join a new 
anti-French confederacy. Negotiating through Margaret of Savoy, the English king advised that 
they ought ‘to consider the danger accruing from the aggrandisement of the French if it be not 
politicly prevented’.185 Again, the implication that a ‘French’ papacy may result is not difficult to 
interpret. Notably, the threat to Rome as perceived from England was not cited directly at this 
point. Was this because Henry had not yet envisaged himself as the defender of the papacy, or 
was it because the papacy was still technically an ally of France at that point? Probably the latter, 
as Henry could not realistically present himself in this role against Louis XII when Julius II was, 
formally at least, still on good terms with the French King. Indeed, it will be seen later that overt 
claims by England to ‘defend the Church’ dissipated when it could not count upon public papal 
support against France. 
The turning point for Henry VIII’s public, political role vis-à-vis the papacy came, 
according to Venetian sources, around June-July 1510, when Julius II wrote to Henry VIII, 
requesting his help in resisting ‘the extreme ill will of the French not only towards all Italy, but 
chiefly against the Apostolic See’, continuing that it was ‘certain that his Majesty will not allow 
the Apostolic See to be harassed by the machinations of his natural enemies, but will assist and 
maintain the papacy’.186 The pope was clearly hoping to play on existing prejudices held in 
England towards the French and gave Henry the ‘green light’ to develop his self-perception as 
defender of the papacy.  This was reiterated in May 1511 when a papal envoy in Germany 
conveyed to Sir Robert Wingfield the pope’s hope that Henry VIII (and Ferdinand) ‘would not 
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suffer t
                                                
he French King to oppress him and the Church’.187 By 1512, Henry VIII was referring 
directly to the consequences of French power in Italy vis-à-vis the papacy. Writing directly to 
Maximilian on 8 May 1512, justifying his decision to go to war with France, Henry reflected on 
the holy league’s recent loss at Ravenna, ‘which threatens to place Naples, Italy, and Sicily at the 
mercy of their enemies, and indeed the whole of Christendom’.188 A similar letter from Henry to 
Maximilian, probably also from the same month, more explicitly answers the emperor’s call for 
peace and crusade in this sense, on the basis that ‘they who should be the foremost to defend the 
Church and preserve its unity with all their might,- who moreover, choose to be styled “most 
Christian”,- then lacerated the seamless garment of our Lord Jesus Christ, snatched St Peter's 
patrimony, took the cities of the holy Roman Church, and fostered petty tyrants in them, 
threatening chains, dungeons, and everything most atrocious to the pope himself’. On account of 
this, he (and Ferdinand) decided ‘to take up arms in defence of the Church’.189 Now a full 
member of the Holy League, Henry wrote along the same lines to Bainbridge, perhaps on 29 May 
1512, referring in particular to Louis XII’s plans ‘to take revenge on those who hindered him 
from obtaining his wish and desire against the Church of God, and from persecuting the pope’, to 
resist which he as English king was committed.190 Similarly in April 1513, following Leo X’s 
election and admitting an uncertainty about the new pontiff’s intended political direction, Henry 
appealing for him to ‘follow the example of his predecessor in sanctioning this expedition 
undertaken for the liberation of the Church’.191 
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When the English arranged a peace with France during 1514, this was at least partially 
due to Leo X’s attempts to withdraw papal justification of the war.192 During negotiations, Henry 
and Wolsey attempted to secure Rome against any renewed French threat both by having the 
papacy and, specifically, Bologna, named in the agreement and by also including the strategically 
significant city of Milan. While they were successful with the former they failed to achieve the 
latter.193 As a consequence of Milan’s exclusion, Louis XII’s and, then, Francis I’s Italian 
ambitions were revived.194 During February 1515, Thomas Colman, a scholar in Bologna, 
reported to Wolsey that the Italians were ‘delighted to hear of the death of Louis XII, but 
apprehensive of the warlike disposition of Francis I’. In consequence of this, the duke of Milan 
had reportedly entrusted his duchy to the Swiss, Bologna was astir with plots and Colman 
expected ‘to hear of great disturbances’.195 For some months, however, English concerns were 
unable to manifest themselves, as there was no clear indication that the papacy wanted to be 
‘defended’ from the French threat, and England was initially unaware of papal membership of a 
league to protect Milan.196 It was perhaps on account of the lack of a clear invitation to join this 
league that the English crown procrastinated when the pope did make overtures towards the end 
of May. Subsequently, Wolsey engaged in some brinksmanship, demanding a cardinal’s hat, 
among other concessions, in return for Henry VIII’s adhesion.197 Recognising the danger to papal 
security, Wolsey warned that if he failed to secure England as an ally, Leo would be ‘in greater 
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danger on this day two year than ever was Pope J[ulius]’.198 Nevertheless, England probably 
would not have abandoned the papacy and crown circles were noted to be strongly opposed to the 
imminent French expedition. Indeed, Henry and his ministers voiced their objections to this in 
early July, as they were ‘dreading the increase of his [Francis’] power’. In spite of this, the king 
claimed to be able to affect whether this would occur and which side the pope would choose.199 
While Henry did ultimately agree to join the coalition, it was too late and the French made swift 
inroads into Italy, culminating in a major victory at Marignano (13-14 September 1515). 200 News 
of initial French advances caused concern in England ‘owing to the natural feeling existing 
between the two nations’.201 Furthermore, there was said to be ‘no want of persons daily 
exhorting King Henry to violate the [Anglo-French] Treaty’.202 
The months following the Marignano defeat probably saw Henry VIII’s greatest concern 
for the prospects of a ‘French’ pope. When firm news of this victory reached a ‘much vexed’ 
Henry, he voiced his concern for the papacy, particularly if Francis now intended to march 
through the Papal States to take Naples. Henry also enquired whether the pope had been forced 
into accepting terms.203 In addition to resolving on a swift military response, the king may have 
issued a knee-jerk ultimatum to Francis I demanding that he desist from attacking the pope, 
perhaps in early to mid-October. That this may not have been sanctioned by Wolsey or Fox is 
suggested by the French king’s interpretation that the ultimatum, if not observed, would result in 
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an English attack, which Wolsey subsequently denied.204 Despite papal attempts to allay English 
fears about negotiations with Francis, claiming they would not be to Henry’s prejudice and that 
Leo wo
                                                
uld turn against France when the opportunity arose,205 Wolsey swiftly warned the pope 
against coming to terms, stressing the king’s displeasure and how much Leo owed England.206 In 
reply, the pope justified the Franco-papal agreement on account of his lack of allies and that it 
only affected Milan.207 English concern was further heightened when the crown began hearing of 
a meeting to be held at Bologna between the pope and French king in December. As a result, the 
English ambassador in Germany reported the emperor’s despair that they could no longer count 
on Leo, now that he appeared to favour the French.208 There were also warnings from de Giglis 
that Francis would attempt to gain leverage over Leo by means of this summit, although the 
orator opined that the pontiff would never become ‘French’.209 Wolsey’s reply in December was 
relatively reassurring. He reported that Henry was satisfied with Leo’s intentions for the 
conference, but hoped that the papacy would ‘retain its dignity’. He did, however, fear that 
Francis I would feel encouraged by Marignano to further destabilise Christendom. Nevertheless, 
Henry would not oppose any arrangement made between France and the papacy, on condition 
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that it was ‘satisfactory’ (whatever that meant).210 In essence, the English recognised that Leo X 
had little choice in this matter, but still stressed their concerns for French dominance.211 English 
concern continued, however, as Leo was forced to meet with Francis at Bologna during 
December 1515. While the pope attempted to reassure the English about what was transacted and 
of his intentions, this in itself betrays the reception that he was expecting the meeting to receive 
in England. Indeed, Henry does seem to have protested about the outcome of the meeting, to 
which Leo responded that he had acted in the best intentions for Christendom.212 At this point, 
however, it still seems to have been recognised, as Spinelly reported, that ‘the Pope’s words can 
be no better than they be’ due to the strength of French power in Italy.213 At the same time, 
however, Richard Pace was working with papal representatives in the Swiss Confederacy to raise 
troops for an offensive to oppose this.214  
Following the failure of the English-funded expedition to expel the French from Italy 
during 1516, Henry VIII did continue to lobby the papacy towards this cause and, while he 
received broadly positive responses, he found it difficult to gain any commitment, on account of 
Francis’ influence in the peninsula.215 Nevertheless, Henry continued to baulk at Francis having 
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‘Italy and the Pope at his pleasure’.216 It was becoming clear that Marignano had led to the worst-
case scenario for England, a ‘French’ papacy. During the summer of 1516, negotiatiations 
towards a ‘holy league’ were conducted, in which papal nuncios were actively involved. Wolsey 
was so
Rome to induce this.221 An indication of Wolsey’s frustration with the papacy occurred in early 
 confident of Leo X’s intentions by 9 August that, when challenged whether he believed 
that Leo wished the French to be chased out of Italy, the cardinal responded, ‘so long as the King 
of France is in Italy, the Pope considers himself his chaplain’.217 The likelihood of papal 
involvement receded, however, when Charles of Castile defected to France by the Treaty of 
Noyon on 13 August.218 In light of this, Henry and Wolsey reassured Leo of their continued 
hostility towards France and to sought to sound out his reaction. In reply (on 4 October), while 
confident that Noyon would not last, Leo confirmed that he could not do anything until an Anglo-
Spanish treaty was concluded. In the meantime, he could not afford to ‘irritate the French’, 
fearing the loss of various papal territories. The pope claimed that he was caught ‘between the 
French molars’ until a suitable opportunity arose to resist.219 As a result, the English delayed no 
longer and a league ‘for defence of the Church’ was concluded in England on 29 October 1516. 
Initally, this comprised Henry, Maximilian and Charles and the pope would hopefully become its 
head.220 A copy was then sent for Leo to ratify and Cardinal Schiner was secretly despatched to 
December when, having discovered that the Schiner mission had been leaked, he assaulted the 
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nuncio Chieregato, demanding to know what he had written to the King of France and 
threatening him with torture. He also searched the nuncio’s correspondence.222 In spite of this 
league, the papal reluctance to commit was further cemented by Maximilian’s adhesion to the 
Treaty of Noyon and the defection of the Swiss in a separate agreement. Henry VIII voiced his 
concern that the Swiss volte-face would permit Francis to return to Italy, by which ‘the Pope be 
imperiled’.223 In response to Wolsey’s warnings of French intrigues among the Cantons, the pope 
was unsurprised given Francis’ ‘wish to dictate to all Christendom’ and offered his services 
against the French. The pontiff was also said to be opposed to any subsequent plans for a Franco-
Swiss offensive against Naples as, if this succeeded, ‘he would then be no better than their 
chaplain’. Leo was also reportedly unhappy with the Franco-Imperial arrangement. Finally, vis-à-
vis Spain’s continued adhesion to Noyon, the pope advised Wolsey to ignore Charles’ 
‘lukewarmness’ and to forge a closer alliance with Spain.224 The implication, therefore, was that 
the pope would be more amenable if he was sure of Spanish support. At around the same time, 
both Leo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were positive towards English overtures apparently linked to 
the Schiner mission, probably relating to the proposal for the papal nephew’s endowment with 
territories in central Italy and a marriage alliance.225  
During February 1517, when the English were still struggling to assemble their coalition 
against France, in spite of their allies’ defection, Wolsey warned the Venetians, as allies of 
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France: ‘I pray you do not molest the Church;- touch not the hem of Christ’s garment’.226 
Similarly, the diplomat William Knight, advocating that England abandon its anti-French 
strategy, reasoned that ‘the Pope is French, and all from Rome to Calais’.227 Continued English 
concern at the French threat to papal ‘independence’ would have been further raised by reports 
that Francesco Maria della Rovere’s attempt to seize back the duchy of Urbino from the pope’s 
nephew Lorenzo was backed by the Franco-Venetian axis. Indeed, around 8 February 1517, Leo 
informed the English crown that he was sure of this and that the underlying intention was ‘to 
bring the Pope to their feet’ and to ‘have him for their vassal’.228 Therefore, when the pope 
approached England for financial support against the enemies of the Church in June 1517, he was 
almost certainly playing on Henry’s fear of the French.229 Further indication of papal 
vulnerability to French influence appeared in relation to the anti-Gallic league. Leo advised that, 
if Maximilian failed to win Charles’ commitment to this, he ‘must fall into the hands of the 
French, and then he can do nothing for England’.230 The English gained papal adhesion to the 
league in defence of the Church during May 1517, as Charles committed and Henry had agreed to 
a papal loan for the Urbino war.231 In spite of appearances, however, this does not appear to have 
represented a solid papal commitment and this continued to be sought from Rome.232 While Leo 
did confirm the league during August (perhaps on the 11th), this was withheld from de Giglis for 
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a week and, even then, it was to remain secret.233 Further papal procrastination meant that Leo 
did not release his ratification until November and continued to request that this remain 
undisclosed.234 By this time, the English crown seems to have long admitted the failure of the 
league, as it had been involved in peace negotiations with France for some months.235 
 
It was probably because of the difficulty encountered persuading the pope to accept 
English ‘protection’ against France that Henry and Wolsey chose ‘reconciliation’ as a strategy to 
restrain the French from Italy, largely to the exclusion of the papacy.236 The eventual Treaty of 
London (2 October 1518) was clearly negotiated with this in mind, providing for the defence and 
protection of Rome, Florence and the Medici.237 By usurping the papal crusading initiative, 
Wolsey also avoided the risk that the pope’s truce proposal could be adapted by Francis I as a 
ruse to conquer Naples and thereby further dominate Italy and Rome.238 By virtue of the 
greement, therefore, one can perhaps interpret Wolsey’s hope that it would ‘promote the peace 
of Chri
a
stendom’, as actually referring to Italy.239 In this regard, England began to divert Francis 
from Italy and thereby the papacy by the resumption of an old proposal; a personal meeting with 
Henry.240 During the interruption provided by the death of the emperor Maximilian in January 
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1519, Henry VIII’s fear of French hegemony in the peninsula, particularly its consequences for 
papal ‘independence’ caused him to re-engage with Leo X to prevent this.241 While they agreed 
this strategy in principle and Francis’ candidacy was unsuccessful, they did not ultimately 
cooperate on the ground in Germany. Indeed, Wolsey seems to have suspected the French were 
bringing pressure to bear on the pope and asked de Giglis to take care when divulging English 
thoughts and to observe his reactions.242  
After Charles V won the ballot, the dynamic of the English policy of ‘defence’ by 
distraction changed, as the new emperor became increasingly likely to visit Italy to be 
crowned.243 This marked the beginning of the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry, in which Henry now 
assumed a balancing role, albeit secretly biased against France. As mediator between the two, he 
publicly discouraged both princes from their Italian ambitions and reinforced this by reviving the 
prospect of a summit with Francis. He also negotiated to meet Charles.244 Between May and July 
1520, Henry met the two monarchs and, while he made a great show of being seen to lean 
toward
upon him the protection of the Italis against such as might intend to [disturb] the peace or quiet 
s Francis, he secretly began to entertain anti-French overtures from Charles. This 
culminated with an insincere ultimatum given to the emperor at their second meeting at Calais, 
whereby Henry threatened to side with France if Charles crossed the Alps.245 Overall, the ruse 
appears to have worked and Francis was convinced by Henry VIII’s claims to oppose Charles’ 
going to Italy; at one stage, he was even quoted as saying that his English counterpart ‘had taken 
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thereof’.246 Francis, however, declared his intention to return to Italy almost as soon as the Field 
of Cloth of Gold ended.247 The English crown subsequently demonstrated its concern for this 
through repeated embassies and pleas from Wolsey to Francis that he refrain from this course.248 
Wolsey continued to be concerned about this prospect up to March 1521.249 Unsure of the 
papacy’s stance at this time, Wolsey wrote to Leo in a ‘neutral’ capacity in November 1520, 
asking him to advise Francis I against any Italian enterprise, perhaps emphasising its financial 
implications.250  
Around the time of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Henry VIII’s fears of French intentions to 
dominate Rome were confirmed when Francis I approached him to jointly facilitate this. Francis 
proposed that, between them, they ‘should handle the pope’. By doing this and by ensuring that 
they always offered him support, ‘as obeisant children of the Church, he would not be of fear 
inclined to be hasty in acceding to the requests of the King Catholic’ and they would be better 
placed to prevent Charles V gaining political control over Rome if and when he went there to be 
crowned.251  
While continuing to publicly advocate a peaceful policy towards France, in order to 
restrain Francis from Italy, Henry had already begun to lean back secretly towards a belligerent 
policy to achieve this end. An agreement between Henry and Charles in July 1520 at the Calais-
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Graveli
ed to protect Rome from the French danger by means of the Calais Conference. 
While t
                                                
nes meetings marked the beginning of negotiations that were to continue into 1521, 
although they had reached a stalemate by February.252 Again, the papacy was not involved and 
deliberately so. Indeed, in early 1521, Henry revealed his perception of Leo X’s weakness as an 
ally, when he warned Charles V against conflict with France in the short-term. The pope, he 
advised was ‘so brittle, and variable, to be led into wars for the sake of one or other’.253 As the 
Hapsburg-Valois rivalry descended into conflict in early 1521, including in Italy, the English 
crown resolv
he French were intended to see this as a peace summit, the Imperialists understood that it 
was to provide cover for the conclusion of an Anglo-Imperial alliance.254 This conference may 
have been partly in response to several papal communications that began to cite the French threat. 
In late February, Giulio de’ Medici declared that ‘the French had proceeded to their dishonest 
craft’ and had tried to take the papal city of Reggio, under pretext of arresting the Milanese exiles 
there, but had failed. 255 A month later, the cardinal asserted that, as the French could not 
negotiate an alignment with the pope, they tried to achieve this through intimidation instead; ‘this 
insolence must be chastised’. De’ Medici further warned against English attempts to arbitrate 
‘inter Caesarem et G[allum]’, as they will ‘only encourage Francis, who ought to be restrained, 
as he has often disturbed the peace of Christendom’ and requested Henry’s backing as Leo tried 
to ‘liberate himself at all hazards from this intolerable slavery’.256 In spite of these declarations, 
the English crown kept the papacy at arms length until the last minute. It only formally informed 
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Leo of the Calais Conference on 20 June and then only to assert its purpose to mediate.257 The 
pope’s response was distinctly anti-Gallic: Leo argued that Henry ‘knew little “what presumption 
and insolency the Frenchmen had us[ed] with his Holiness lately”’. He declared that it was ‘high 
time to punish the insolence of France, he will spend his blood to drive them out of Italy’.258 
However, it was only when reports reached England of Leo X’s open declaration of his alliance 
with Charles V that the English crown began to incorporate him into the anti-Gallic agenda of the 
Calais Conference.259 Hearing of this papal commitment at the Imperial Court, Spinelly’s reply 
was said to be ‘very violent’, stating that Henry would react to this within a few days. ‘These 
Frenchmen want to rule the universe,’ he added.260 Furthermore, on 19 July, Henry himself was 
said to have defended the pope’s actions against complaints by a pair of French envoys. They 
claimed that Leo had made military preparations against Genoa long before Francis moved 
against Reggio (which was correct). The English king replied that this may well have been the 
case, but Francis ‘had before that put him [Leo] in such fear and extreme subjection, that he was 
compelled to do as he had done’.261 Consequently, Ghunicci had a secret meeting with Wolsey 
immediately prior to the cardinal’s departure for Calais.262 Following the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Bruges (25 August 1521), Wolsey formally revealed the English strategy up to that 
point: that Henry wished for ‘some sure knot of alliance’ with Charles V and, so, the Calais 
conference in pursuit of a truce ‘was only a colour to deceive the French King’.263 While Wolsey 
also worked towards a truce at Calais, as a means to play for time before England was plunged 
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into war, he further betrayed his fear for papal security when he rejected proposals that such a 
cessation only apply north of the Alps as ‘he thought this would be worse still, as all the French 
forces would be turned against the Pope’.264 Finally, in late 1521, Henry and Wolsey would have 
been concerned that, as a result of the lack of leadership in Rome arising from Leo X’s death, the 
recent victories against the French in Italy, particularly the taking of Milan, would be reversed. 
English orators in the Low Countries, for instance, warned Wolsey on 18 December that this may 
‘force the Pope [sic] to yield to the French’.265 Similarly, when the non-resident Adrian VI was 
elected in January 1522, these concerns would not have been lifted, particularly when Cardinal 
de’ Medici stressed the need for the pope to reside in Rome ‘for the conservation of the lands of 
the Church’.266 
The English fear of a French-controlled papacy was also cultivated by those powers 
seeking Henry VIII’s support against the Most Christian King. Venice, for instance, wrote to its 
ambassador in Rome during July 1510 of its certainty that Henry ‘will not allow the Apostolic 
See to be harassed by the machinations of his natural enemies, but will assist and maintain the 
papacy’.267 Even after the initial expulsion of the French in 1512, following the battle of 
Ravenna, the Venetians acknowledged the English role in this, doge Loredano affirming that ‘it is 
confessedly to his Majesty that she [Venice and Italy] is indebted for being in great measure freed 
from French oppression’.268 Furthermore, if the English king needed any more reason to fear 
er Julius II, Ferdinand of Aragon co ence’ to be passed on Louis XII’s influence ov nveyed ‘intellig
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to Hen
s on his behalf, Henry stated that it was in response to the pope having written to him 
‘that ce
                                                
ry during June 1510, alleging that, by intending to replace the pope, the French king was 
attempting to become ‘spiritual and temporal lord of Italy’, in which case ‘no resistance to him 
will be possible in Christendom’.269 Ferdinand again tried to invoke Henry VIII’s fear of French 
hegemony in Italy after the battle of Ravenna. On 20 July 1512, when empowering his 
ambassador in England to conclude a new league in defence of the Church, Ferdinand alleged 
that Louis XII threatened ‘to return once more to Italy, and to conquer the states of the 
Church’.270 
Fear of a ‘French’ papacy was also implicitly voiced in the leagues formed and adhered to 
by England to counter this. In particular, the territorial integrity of the Papal States was cited as, 
for instance, in the first holy league formed on 4 October 1511, where the preamble stated that ‘as 
the city of Bologna and other towns, castles, &c, undoubtedly belonging to the Holy Father, are 
invaded by tyrants and oppressors of the people, it is the object of this league to reconquer those 
portions of the Papal States which are wrested from the See of St Peter by force and intrigues’.271 
In England, Henry VIII’s adherence to this confederacy was to be supplemented by a specific 
Anglo-Spanish accord. In the king’s commission to the earls of Surrey and Shrewbury to 
negotiate thi
rtain enemies of the Christian faith have deprived the Church of Christ of the city and 
territory of Bologna, which from olden times have always belonged to the Apostolic See. These 
enemies, not satisfied with what they have stolen, intend to pursue their wicked plans, and to 
divide among them even the "tunic of our Lord"’. In reply to the pope’s requests for aid, 
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therefore, Henry proposed to join Spain ‘to defend the Church against any further aggression, and 
to reconquer for her Bologna and its territory’.272 This idea is repeated in the preamble to the 
actual treaty, that refers to Louis XII’s ‘nefarious project of robbing the Church of her 
property’.273 The supplementary treaty between the two states (March 1512) binds them ‘to assist 
one another in the defence of the Holy Church against France, and to aid the common attempts to 
be made to recover those provinces which by right belong to the crown of England, but are 
occupied by the King of France’.274 
 
One can also highlight two other ways in which Henry VIII (and his advisors) voiced their 
concerns for French ambitions in Italy. The first of these was in terms of Louis XII or Francis I’s 
desire to ‘rule’ Italy, ‘the world’ or something similar. While this idea has wider implications 
than merely influence over the papacy, its manifestation in crown sources primarily related to the 
way in which the English crown envisaged French control of (northern) Italy and, thereby, 
domination of Rome. While this idea was not exclusive to England, its manifestation in English 
sources was linked to the fear for English interests if the papacy lost its ‘independence’. In the 
initial conflict with France, that ended in the peace of August 1514, one can see Henry writing 
irectly to Maximilian on 8 May 1512, justifying his decision to go to war with France, as the 
recent 
the argument that crown circles envisaged this idea in terms of a potential ‘French’ papacy, 
d
loss by the holy league at Ravenna, ‘threatens to place Naples, Italy, and Sicily at the 
mercy of their enemies, and indeed the whole of Christendom’.275 More explicitly supportive of 
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Henry VIII, writing to Bainbridge on 12 April 1514, but actually addressing the new pope, Leo X 
(and possibly replying to the latter’s initial approaches for peace), justified the war by stating that 
‘France has no other object in view except to trample on the Pope and all the potentates of 
Europe’.276 Similarly, Henry received pressure in this direction from his representatives abroad. 
In a wider context, during April 1514, for instance, when Thomas Spinelly reported from the 
Low Countries on the growing French influence there, he commented that ‘unless the King looks 
to it all these countries will be ruled by the French’.277  
English fear of French influence over the ‘world’ was next voiced most starkly after the 
battle of Marignano, 13-14 September 1515. In mid-December, Wolsey reported the king being 
‘afraid that the French will be too much elated by this victory at Milan, and trouble the whole of 
Christendom’.278 Similarly, during April and May 1516, when the English were attempting to 
rally the anti-French powers after the collapse of the Imperial-Swiss expedition, Wolsey referred 
to Francis’ aim to achieve ‘the sovereignty of Italy’ and later justified English opposition as 
preventing Francis ‘from giving law to the universe should he be victorious’.279 A few months 
later, the cardinal again mentioned the French king’s ambition to attain ‘the sovereignty of 
Christendom’.280 In recognition of English efforts to prevent this, therefore, Pace predicted 
during September 1516, that the league being created to counter this would ‘bridle the “ambitious 
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appet[ites of the] French King” and give peace to all Christendom’.281 During the Imperial 
election of 1519, this concept was raised again, as Sir Thomas Boleyn relayed Francis’ desire for 
English support ‘as in the new Emperor there will really be vested the monarchy of 
Christendom’282 Even if this was interpreted more broadly than the hegemony of Italy, the danger 
was not lost on Henry VIII, who subsequently opposed Francis’ candidacy before all others.283 
Similarly, this idea was used by other opponents to French expansionism when trying to 
engage English support. During August 1509, for instance, Andrea Badoer was to notify the 
English that Louis XII was ‘doing all he can to make himself Lord of Italy, and then - as 
frequently stated by them - of the universe’.284 In June 1511, the apostolic nuncio Jerome 
Bonvisi, spying for the French crown, reported that the Spanish ambassador ‘continually 
animates this King and Council against you [France] by saying that the King of France wishes to 
make himself lord of all’.285 Again, the July 1512 commission for the intended new Venetian 
ambass
XII’s seizure of papal cities and territories. In terms of French support for the Council of Pisa, 
ador for England instructed him ‘to praise the King for having joined the [Holy] League, 
and for his operation in its favour, to which were due the release not only of Italy, but of the 
whole of Christendom’.286 Most importantly, the idea that the French posed a direct threat to the 
Papal States was encouraged by the papacy itself, which used evocative terms to describe this. In 
a bull of excommunication of July 1512 which was sent to England, Julius II referred to Louis 
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moreover, the pope alleged that the French king was ‘cutting in pieces thereby the tunic of our 
Lord, and dishonouring his bride, the Roman Catholic Church’.287 Similarly, this fear was 
reported to have emanated from the pope by Richard Pace on 23 April 1516, then 
(unsuccessfully) managing an English-subsidised Imperial-Swiss offensive in Italy. He reported 
Leo X’s dread of ‘the French King becoming monarch of the whole world’.288 
 
The other form of rhetoric employed by Henry VIII and his advisors when alluding to the 
French threat to Rome (and Christendom) invoked crusading terminology. At worst, the French 
kings or their subjects could be overtly or implicitly referred to as ‘the Christian Turk’. The 
Ottoman Turks, at this time, were universally considered to be the principal enemy of 
Christendom, who perpetrated atrocities and other ‘evils’, in battle and over those within their 
power (particularly Christians) during peacetime.289 By implication, therefore, the ‘Christian 
Turk’ would be deemed to share many of these characteristics, threatening the very wellbeing of 
hristendom and, furthermore, preventing concerted action being taken against the Ottomans. In 
other w
crusading ideas and rhetoric into their pursuit of this policy. In the first place, the English crown 
                                                
C
ords, France was portrayed by the English crown (and others) as a significantly more 
serious threat to the Church and Christendom than the Turks, traditionally Catholic Europe’s 
principal enemy. Before exploring the employment of such descriptions by crown sources, a little 
needs to be said about the ‘crusading’ context of the English defence of the papacy against 
France. There are a number of indications that Henry VIII and his advisors were eager to draw 
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(in addition to its confederates) portrayed France as obstructing universal peace which, in turn, 
impeded a crusade being launched against the Turks.290 In particular, the leagues for the defence 
of the Church of which England became a member mostly tended to state, as their ultimate 
intention, an eventual expedition against them.291 It was a natural extension, therefore, that the 
state(s) preventing universal peace, the essential precursor to such an expedition, be directly 
associated with this cause. This provided a ‘just’ casus belli for England, particularly 
strengthened by support from the Church. One should also remember that, in terms of the king’s 
commitment to chivalry, enthusiasm for a quasi-crusading character to war with France was 
consistent with the knightly belief that crusading was the most laudable form of warfare.292 It is 
unsurprising then that Henry VIII sought and apparently succeeded in gaining an indulgence for 
those who fought for this ‘just’ cause in 1512.293 In addition, the utilisation of crusading ideas 
also enabled England to resist calls from other powers, often the allies of France (and at times the 
papacy itself), for universal peace and a subsequent expedition to the East.294 While such appeals 
were believed in England to be ploys sponsored by the French crown, Henry VIII could not be 
seen to reject such proposals out of hand. Having crusading justification for his own cause, 
however, did enable him to ‘legitimately’ reject such calls and still portray himself as a pious 
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supporter of the crusade.295 In such terms, therefore, it is not surprising that the English fear of 
French influence over the papacy came to be voiced in powerful rhetoric that invoked the 
crusade. 
In terms of broad English allusions to the ‘Christian Turk’, Wolsey most strongly and 
directly alluded to this idea around 29 March 1518 when, in response to the Venetian 
ambassador’s intelligence concerning an Ottoman naval threat, he warned him, ‘guard yourselves 
more against the Christian Turk than the real Turk’. This was interpreted as clearly referring to 
Francis I and intended to provoke Giustinian, Venice being an ally of France.296 The first 
allusions from the English crown of this idea, however, came in the spring of 1512, when 
England was committed to a joint invasion of Aquitaine with Spain. Writing to Cardinal 
Bainbridge in Rome on 31 May 1512, Henry VIII himself referred to the French as ‘Turks, 
heretics
Countries, who referred to ‘Henry’s enterprise against the enemies of the Church’.299 From this 
description, it is not much of a step to describe them as ‘Christian Turks’. Sir Robert Wingfield 
                                                
 and Infidels’, in response to reports of the recent French ‘victory’ at Ravenna.297 
Similarly, in the same May or June, he also wrote to Maximilian of his commitment to defend the 
Church against the French as if he ‘actually fought against the Turks or Saracens’.298 Such 
evocative language also emanated, during July 1513, from Thomas Spinelly, in the Low 
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similarly referred to the French as ‘the enemies of Christendom’ in January 1516, when England 
next fostered conflict with France.300 This language was further mirrored by foreign sources 
writing to England. In November 1513, for instance, Maximilian Sforza, writing to Henry, 
referred to the French as the ‘enemy of the Church’.301 Also, on 5 May 1514, Matthew Schiner, 
in a letter to Henry VIII, referred to the Swiss having ‘been most active in expelling the French 
and heretics from Italy’.302 
By virtue of viewing France as the ‘Christian Turk’, the English crown was also able to 
justify war against France above and before the need to address the Ottoman threat. This can be 
seen during 1521 in Wolsey’s reaction to Hungarian overtures for aid while he was at the 
Conference of Calais. At this time Belgrade was under siege and in serious danger of falling.303 
Initially, he was able to reject these advances, probably because he had heard from Rome that 
Leo X had already indicated that he would not divert from his project against France; he might 
‘spend his mitre, but he will have them [the French] out of Italy’.304 In the same way, Charles V, 
while not dismissing the worthiness of the Hungarian cause, notified Wolsey on 17 September 
that he was unable to do anything until the French issue had been dealt with.305 Consequently, 
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Wolsey could easily sidestep the Hungarian approach for aid. Addressing Louis II’s orator on the 
26th (in the presence of the Imperial chancellor Gattinara at least), Wolsey argued that Henry VIII 
could provide little aid without the ‘the other chief princes’ doing the same and that these same 
princes would not act during the current war. The implication was, however, that if Wolsey could 
achieve the truce that he sought, thoughts could then turn towards the Turks.306 The problem was, 
however, that the Turkish threat was very real to Hungary and the fall of Belgrade on 28-29 
August sent a stern warning to advocates of the crusading movement. Early indications of this 
would have reached Wolsey perhaps around 11-12 September, but were not accepted by Henry 
VIII until mid-October.307 In reaction, it seems that Henry’s allies, Leo and Charles had a change 
of heart. Charles V had decided to act by the end of September 1521 and notified Wolsey of 
this.308 John Clerk notified Wolsey of papal concern on 10 October, claiming there was much 
fear for Hungary (as a result of Belgrade) and that if there were to be war in Hungary, Italy and 
France, ‘the earth will be well satiated with Christian blood’.309 From this, it could easily be 
inferred that the papal focus on France may be wavering. At this watershed moment, it appears 
that Wolsey opportunistically used Belgrade to pursue his own preferred policy, a truce (with a 
view to a future war against France). Sending two pairs of envoys to lobby Francis and Charles 
respectively, the English cardinal instructed at least one set to emphasise the need to resist the 
                                                                                                                                                              
Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey]), 1561 (10 September 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, 
sels). 
d an attack on his own island stronghold; ibid., 
s). 
Brussels), 1586 (17 September 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Brus
306 Ibid., 1609 (27 September 1521, Gattinara and others to Charles, Calais). 
307 Ibid., 1561 (10 September 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1680 (15 October 1521, 
Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor). 
308 Ibid., 1616 (30 September 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais, ‘Bins’), 1620 (calendared end September 
1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais). 
309 Ibid., 1654 (10 October 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). In addition, the grand master of Rhodes who, describing 
the ‘great cruelty’ inflicted by the Turks in taking Belgrade, feare
1741 (4 November 1521, Philippe Villiers de L’Isle-Adam to Wolsey, Rhode
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Ottoman threat in Hungary.310 By the end of the year, however, when his truce strategy had failed 
and he had returned to England, Wolsey again rejected the Hungarian appeal for aid, asserting 
that ‘nothing can be done against the Turks until the French King is subdued’.311 
Linked to the English crown idea that France was akin to the ‘Christian Turk’ was its 
allegation that the French fought worse than the Turks, committing various atrocities, particularly 
against the Church, women and children.312 Henry VIII himself cited such ‘war crimes’ in his 
letter to Bainbridge of May 1512. Concerning the battle of Ravenna, the king claimed to have 
been ‘informed of the great slaughter effected there, including that of the French commanders, 
about the captives, and also of the other cruelties committed by the French’.313 Around the same 
time, Henry VIII also responded to Maximilian’s pleas for peace and crusade by claiming that 
French actions ‘showed a worse than Turkish cruelty, shedding blood, plundering and burning 
universally, slaughtering aged men women and infants; violating virgins consecrated to God and, 
what th
impiety and nefarious villainy’.314 Such allusions also emanated from the reports of English 
diplomats abroad. For instance, Henry VIII’s representative in the Low Countries, Thomas 
        
e Gentiles of old and the most barbarous of men were wont most scrupulously to spare, 
profaning churches and altars with innocent blood…. In short, they omitted no act of cruel 
                                         
ce of this factor; the Venetian orator at Courtrai acquainted them with 
ly to further the truce negotiations; 
 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). 
). 
310 Wolsey certainly instructed those going to Francis to employ this argument (among others). Furthermore, those 
sent to Charles also recognised the importan
Turkish news and noted that they appeared to hold this ‘in great account’ and that they considered that ‘that the 
discord among Christians was the cause of this misfortune which had befallen Christendom’. Boleyn and Docwra 
then urged Contarini to send copies of this correspondence to Calais, presumab
ibid., 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles), 1695 (20 October 1521, [Wolsey] to Francis, Calais), 
1696 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Francis); Ven.iii, 350 (25 October 1521, Contarini to the Signory, 
‘Courtray’). 
311 LPIIIii, 1858 (12 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
312 For the common, contemporary belief that the Turks committed ‘evil acts’ against Christians in both war and 
peacetime, see K. De Vries, ‘The Lack of a Western European Military Response to the Ottoman Invasions of 
Eastern Europe’, The Journal of Military History, 63, pp.550-554. 
313 Ven.ii, 169
314 Ibid., 178 (LPIi, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian
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Spinelly, reported such occurrences in March 1512: ‘letters have been received stating that the 
French in Brescia [had committed great] disorders. There were killed 14,000, and both secular 
and spiritual persons pillaged; none were spared, and children over 8 yrs old were all made 
prisoners and put to ransom’.315 
This idea that the French were more cruel than the Ottomans in warfare probably 
originated from those on the receiving end of French aggression, but it is likely that the English 
readily accepted such claims and adopted them in pursuit of English interests. During September 
1509, for instance, while facing a powerful coalition of states intent on its destruction, Venice 
appealed in these terms to Henry VIII, instructing its ambassador to report that confederacy 
forces were ‘perpetrating against Christians such cruelties that greater could not be committed by 
Infidels’.316 Similarly, during August 1511, Venice advised the pope that similar atrocities had 
recently occurred, including ‘the violation and murder of women on the altars of churches’, 
hoping that he would write to Henry VIII (along with Ferdinand and Maximilian), ‘so that such 
unheard of iniquities may no longer be perpetrated in Christendom’.317 Subsequently, on the 26th, 
the state advised Badoer in England that Franco-Imperial forces had perpetrated ‘rapine, arson, 
violenc
                                                
e and slaughter, even in the churches and at the altar of the Virgin, sparing neither sex nor 
age, that the like was never heard’.318 Also, there is evidence that such language came from the 
 
315 LPIi, 1101 (LPI, 3077; 17 March 1512, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). Polydore Vergil later recorded the sack in 
similar terms: ‘the savage enemy charged on the wretched citizens and slew the unarmed crowd without respect for 
in addition to the French, but it would have been 
d to French atrocities. Indeed, the author of this letter 
en.ii, 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 
ssion. 
age or sex. Entering the churches they perpetrated a massacre there; and so terrible was the slaughter that rivers of 
blood flowed from these churches through the town’; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.167. 
316 Admittedly, the Venetians mention papal and Ferrarese forces 
known by the authors that the English crown would only respon
alleges that Louis XII was the cause of Julius II’s enmity towards Venice; V
1509, Signory to Badoer). 
317 Ibid., 111 (LPIi, 844; 15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
318 Ibid., 117 (LPIi, 851; 26 August 1511, Signory to Badoer). The delay was perhaps intended to give chance for the 
papal letter to be sent, to ensure the greatest impact by their arrival together or in quick succe
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pope himself. On 2 June 1512, Julius II wrote to Louis XII, protesting that ‘[the battle of] 
Ravenna has witnessed horrible cruelties perpetrated by French soldiers worse even than the 
Turks’.319 If the pope was addressing his enemy in these terms, it is equally likely that he also 
wrote in similar terms to his allies, including England.320 Finally, Cardinal Schiner described the 
French in this vein when reporting to Wolsey after the Battle of Marignano in 1515. In making 
overtures to England to hire the Swiss in response, he reported that the Cantons were ‘anxious to 
take vengeance on the French for their cruelty to the wounded who had taken shelter in the 
churches at Milan’.321 
 
A final related consideration concerning the English desire to associate the crusade with 
its defence of the papacy from France was the fear that a ‘French’ papacy would be able to 
invoke the same notions against England. Indeed, this could be posited to explain why Henry 
VIII was reluctant to respond to papal overtures towards universal peace after 1515. That Henry 
was well aware of such ‘spiritual’ backing the papacy could give a conflict was clear at the 
beginning of his reign. In communication with Julius II during January 1510, he proposed a 
coalition against France with universal peace and a subsequent crusade as its main aims ‘to 
which, if other princes refuse to accede, they must be considered as a common enemy’.322 If the 
papacy was under French political influence, however, and such sentiments were voiced, it would 
            
at the very least preclude Henry from acting against France or, at worst, cause him to be targeted 
                                     
, 1224 (LPI, 3283; 2 June 
rwarded these to 
ardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck). 
-28. 
319 It is later stated that ‘they [the French] have treated Ravenna worse than Turks’; LPIi
1512, Julius II to Louis XII, Rome). 
320 Indeed, that copies of this letter survive in English archives suggests that Julius II may have fo
his confederates. 
321 LPIIi, 1146 (13 November 1515, C
322 LPIi, 354 (LPI, 1457; calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
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as an obstacle to crusade. The first time that this would have been cause for concern for the 
English would have been following the Franco-papal settlement after Leo’s defeat at the Battle of 
arignano in late 1515 when reports emanated from Rome that the pope would now pursue 
univers
M
al peace in combination with Francis I recognised as the principal protector of the 
Church.323 In the first instance, this threatened the continued efforts of the anti-French coalition 
and, in particular, Henry VIII’s attempts to back an Imperial-Swiss expedition.324 It may have 
been in response to this ‘pro-French’ call for universal peace that the English made overtures to 
Rome for an ‘anti-French’ equivalent to be enshrined in a coalition, in later December 1515. 
Although the pope rejected this, he did give Henry the impression that he tacitly supported his 
actions.325 In terms of the ‘French’ crusade, the pope made moves in December to send out 
delegates to urge the princes in this direction. Notably for England, a nuncio was sent, rather than 
a legate a latere, who took four months to reach England. Even then, Chieregato seemed to have 
a hidden agenda, linked to tacit papal support of English attempts to resist Francis I in Italy.326 In 
response to hearing of a legate addressing Maximilian on this, Henry recommended that the 
emperor reject papal ‘incantations’, as Leo ‘is easily misled to believe what he most desires’, but 
will be deceived by Francis and will instead join their own (anti-Gallic) league.327 As the English 
                                                 
 This was to be part of the Franco-papal peace settlement and was to be discussed at the Bologna meeting in 
December 1515; LPIIi, 994 (7 October 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Viterbo), 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to 
323
Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.146 (Ven.ii, 665; LPIIi, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). 
324 See below pp.499 ff. 
325 LPIIi, 1416 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Henry, Florence), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1418 
(19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius), 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, Florence), 1450 (28 January 1516, 
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 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Florence), 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to 
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Leo to Wolsey, Florence). Reflecting the pope’s vague, non-committal res
answered the same overture by asserting Leo’s aim for universal peace, although he failed to specify which version; 
ibid., 1451 (28 January
Wolsey, Florence). 
326 As England was notoriously reluctant about entertaining legates a latere, Leo X could have forced a rupture. 
Indeed, a legate was sent to Germany; see below p.511. 
327 LPIIi, 1446 (28 J
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crown was able to gain confidence from tacit papal support for its anti-French measures, leading 
up to the Imperial-Swiss incursion into Italy during early 1516, the threat of a French-led 
universal peace initiative declined.328 
While there were a number of subsequent occasions when the English crown sought to 
avoid papal calls to crusade (via universal peace) because it was sceptical that Leo X could retain 
control over it, that of 1517-1518 is probably the most notable, on account of Henry’s and 
Wolsey’s reaction and subsequent developments. It has already been noted that the eventual 
agreement, the Treaty of London (2 October 1518) was at least partly designed to restrain Francis 
I from interfering in Italy.329 While this was a remarkable enough adaptation of the crusading 
ideal, the process by which Wolsey hijacked the papacy’s attempt to impose a five year truce was 
even more so. Immediately before developing this strategy, Wolsey advocated a ‘water-tight’ 
universal peace to the pope that would not allow the French the opportunity to adapt to their own 
purposes.330 His fears for Francis I’s interference apparently lay in a prospective Franco-papal 
marriage, involving Lorenzo de’ Medici, which the English crown had been unable to prevent. As 
Henry 
again be invoked as cover for this. Intelligence from France in December 1517, outlined an 
 the papal call for crusade, although the source warned that the 
was informed, if the agreement occurred, the French king would be able to make his final 
move to achieve hegemony in Italy by seizing Naples.331 Furthermore, Henry and Wolsey were 
also concerned about potential French attacks on English interests and that the crusade would 
enthusiastic French response to
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329 See above pp.45-46. 
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money would be diverted for use against England.332 It is unsurprising, therefore, that Wolsey 
took three months to answer the pope’s crusade appeal of December 1517, at which point he 
advised that universal peace was a necessary prerequisite, although he added that this would 
already exist, if it had not been for ‘the immoderate ambition of certain Princes’, which ought to 
be addressed.333 Wolsey emphasised that the English priority was the French before the Turkish 
threat. Before the cardinal’s proposal could have reached Rome, Leo X moved to force the hands 
of Christian princes towards the crusade by proclaiming a five year truce across Christendom, in 
pursuit of which legates were to be despatched, including one to England. 334 This gave Wolsey 
the opportunity to seize control of the initiative. On the arrival of the papal proposal, Wolsey 
gained Henry’s agreement that he become a second legate a latere to control events.335 The 
English had already been involved in peace negotiations with France since the previous June and 
an earlier proposal by the English cardinal for a marriage accord had already been agreed.336 By 
the time Lorenzo Campeggio was allowed entry to England in August 1518, his co-legate, 
Wolsey, had already reached the final stages of negotiating a universal peace agreement with 
France.337 In subsequent talks, Campeggio played little part, perhaps understanding them to be a 
separate matter to the five year truce and a matter for the English and French to discuss.338 
Wolsey further imbued proceedings with his legatine authority by assuming a senior role over 
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Campeggio, despite having no apparent authority to do so.339 Wolsey did not notify the papacy of 
his true intentions until September, which drew a strong response from Giulio de’ Medici. The 
cardinal wrote that ‘with great displeasure has His Holiness learned that Wolsey has set aside the 
proposal of a five years’ truce, because he does not wish to leave the final position of affairs in 
the hands of the Pope. No Christian – far less a Cardinal – should venture to express himself in 
that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many honours and favours from the Holy 
Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the Pope have to expect from the English 
Chancellor’.340 The papacy apparently felt cheated by Wolsey, having finally realised that the 
English had seized control of the crusading strategy. For Wolsey, however, this marked the 
successful prevention of a feared French-led universal peace and the beginning of a period when 
the English could restrain France by more peaceful means.341  
 
So far, it has been found that the English crown clearly opposed and feared the general 
prospect of French hegemony in Italy and of the consequential loss of papal political 
independence that would result. This fear was gradually realised, 1515-1517, as Henry and 
Wolsey struggled to gain papal backing for their anti-Gallic agenda and this manifested itself 
particularly in their concern for a suspected French-led universal peace that they countered by 
Wolsey’s facilitating of the Treaty of London in 1518. It also ought to be stressed that the English 
crown’s fear for the implications of a ‘French’ papacy was not limited to the crusade. In such 
situations, it also expected the French king to be able to lever concessions out of the pontiff, as 
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well as induce him to obstruct English requests from Rome. While it is the aim of subsequent 
chapters to examine how the English crown related with the papacy in light of some of these 
issues, particularly in terms of papal honours, censures, conclaves and promotions to the Sacred 
College, a few examples can be highlighted here. Firstly, following the initial blow to papal 
ndependence’ engendered by the Battle of Marignano in September 1515, Wolsey’s request for 
a legati
                                                
‘i
ne commission was almost immediately rejected by Leo ‘from dread of France demanding 
the same’.342 Similarly, at the Bologna meeting between Leo and Francis in December of that 
year, Francis levered one red hat from Leo and, while the pope claimed to have resisted pressure 
for a further three, the English probably deemed this a worrying omen. 343 While the papacy 
indicated to England during this time that it was still anti-French at heart, this trend continued 
and, during September 1516, de Giglis cited ‘the influence of the French’ and ‘the prosperity of 
France’ as causing difficulties in gaining amended briefs concerning the disputed see of Tournai 
and a legatine commission for Wolsey.344 This difficulty evidently continued as, in early 
February 1517, de Giglis defended the pope’s recent actions in upholding the French claim to 
Tournai by outlining the political obstacles encountered due to French influence. The orator 
claimed that ‘divers times I have seen him [Leo] holding up his [hands] towards the heaven, 
saying those words, “O Almighty God, ut[inam] ille rex Angliae war somewhat nerer to us for to 
have this f[avor] and succor in our occurrents. Then the Holy Church would be in more….and 
surety under the protection, umbre and chadow, of the said m[ost] virtuous King”’. Once French 
 
342 LPIIi, 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de 
Giglis to Ammonius]). 
343 Ibid., 1281(14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1282 (14 December 1515, Leo to Henry, 
516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
Bologna), 1283 (14 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Bologna), 1284. (14 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, 
Bologna); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.139. 
344 LPIIi, 2394 (27 September 1
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fortunes changed, he continued, Leo would uphold Wolsey’s claim.345 Even in June 1517, de 
Giglis continued to report that his efforts to have Wolsey restored as administrator of Tournai 
would be unsuccessful until the pope was ‘safe from the French shears’.346 Finally, during April 
1518, while Wolsey was informed that the pope had followed his advice in not elevating a 
‘French’ nominee to the Sacred College, Leo had backed down because Francis could ‘kindle a 
fire’ at any time in the Papal States.347 
 
Before exploring how Henry VIII’s role as ‘defender’ of the papacy against France 
manifested itself during this time, it should be stressed that the king and his advisors envisaged a 
number of limitations to this role, in a military sense at least. In particular, they did not envisage a 
direct or unilateral defence of the papacy against France. They were pragmatic enough to 
recognise their limitations: distance and an inability to confront France alone. In the first place, 
England was too far from Italy to be directly involved in resisting French ambitions there. 
Around 25 June 1510, in response to Venetian pleas for assistance following their loss of Vicenza 
(to the emperor), Henry VIII and his ministers told the republic’s ambassador that they were 
reluctant to break the peace at this point; ‘we are at a distance; another year something will be 
done’.348 Similarly, announcing English adhesion to the Holy League in defence of the Church on 
13 November 1511, Henry asserted that he did not bind ‘himself to bring an army into Italy, from 
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difficulties in Urbino; ibid., 3331 (1 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent). 
347 The nominee was the archbishop of Mainz, an Imperial elector whose vote Francis was trying to ‘win’; ibid., 4133 
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its distance and by reason of other impediments, but being pledged to wage war in every other 
quarter where expedient’.349 Again, an article of the Anglo-Spanish treaty of 17 November 1511, 
 support the broader holy league against France, stated that ‘as it would be difficult for the King 
of Engl
                                                
to
and to send an army to Italy, he promises to succour the Church by making war upon the 
French from another side’. In this case, he and Ferdinand would harass France from their 
frontiers, particularly in Aquitaine.350 Secondly, England could not act alone as the Church’s 
defender against France. Indeed, England could not act alone in a military capacity on the 
Continent. As will be seen, the Italian wars meant that it could either cause diversions or could 
subsidise conflicts.351 Richard Fox indicated that England was not powerful enough to act 
unilaterally during May 1513 when, faced with launching an invasion with little support from 
England’s allies, he hoped that the French retained a presence in Italy, ‘for soo shall the Frenche 
poway<re / be devided, and the lesse shall it be vppon vs’.352 Henry VIII indicated a similar 
sentiment in instructions to Christopher Bainbridge of 29 January 1510. During negotiations to 
form a league against Louis XII, he stated that he was only prepared to join such a confederacy if 
the Empire and Spain did the same.353 This may well have been linked with his ministers 
imposing this condition on Henry before they backed his plan to attack France.354 Even at the end 
of this period, Henry and Wolsey demanded an alignment with Charles V in 1521, before they 
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would even consider an alliance with Rome.355 Equally, it does not seem as if foreign powers, 
including the papacy, expected England to act alone against France. When the Venetians 
appealed to Henry to ‘defend’ Christendom in September 1509, they urged him to effect a league 
with the Empire and them against France. Consequently, Venice envisaged English action in 
France and Imperial-Venetian manoeuvres in Italy.356 Again, in December 1509, Venice 
recommended that Henry VIII form a multi-state coalition against France, involving the Empire, 
Venice and Spain.357 Another apparent condition of English protection of the papacy was that it 
needed time to prepare for interventions on the continent. With the exception of his reaction to 
the Battle of Marignano, Henry VIII did not launch headlong into conflict on receipt of a papal 
call to arms.358 This was probably attributable to his inability to effect any direct moves in Italy, 
again on account of the distance, therefore necessitating provision for the peninsula in some sort 
of league. Time also gave the English chances to form such a coalition and to assess the 
commitment of its allies in following through with their pledges. Again, the apparent conditions 
placed on Henry VIII’s desire to invade France during 1509-1510 included the need for time to 
prepare. In response to Venetian pleas for aid, Fox reportedly replied in April 1510, ‘another year 
something will be done…Let this year glide by’.359 During 1518, Richard Fox also suggested that 
time was needed because of a general lack of forethought given to such actions: ‘Our manner is 
never to prepare for the war to our enemies be light at our doors’.360 Finally, Wolsey insisted that 
                                                 
355 LPIIIi, 1150 (calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal 
to Henry). 
356 Ven.ii, 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
357 Ibid., 24 (LPIi, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
358 In reaction to Marignano, the Imperial-Swiss expedition of early 1516 was enabled by the English contribution 
l. It did not involve any overt declaration against France and English intrigues were kept as 
4 (LPIi, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory). 
being solely financia
secret as possible; see below pp.492-499. 
359 Ven.ii, 6
360 LPIIii, 3952 (15 February 1518, Fox to Wolsey, St Cross). 
 112
the Treaty of Bruges at the end of this period stipulated that the English crown would not go to 
war until 1523. John Clerk, when instructed to divulge the conclusion of this agreement to the 
pope was directed to tell him that this was to gain time to prepare for the conflict.361 
 
In spite of these military limitations, Henry VIII was well aware of his strengths in the 
military sphere to protect the papacy from France. The most readily available of the king’s 
options was a direct attack, which could range from a full-scale invasion, to involvement in 
indirect conflicts on the borders and even to the funding of enterprises against French interests in 
Italy. These were envisaged to be enough to disrupt the French king’s plans for Italy or even 
induce him to withdraw troops from the peninsula. To the same end, the English crown was also 
known to ‘sabre-rattle’. This idea that England could affect the French military presence in Italy 
was the corner-stone of the English crown’s temporal relations with the papacy for the period 
under study. That this was perceived as a genuine capability is supported by foreign 
commentators; generally speaking, a Venetian diplomat, writing around 1500, recorded that the 
English ‘have a very high reputation in arms; and from the great fear the French entertain of 
them, one must believe it to be justly acquired’.362 Furthermore, Henry VIII apparently did 
elieve he had the ability to affect whether a French descent into Italy took place. In early July 
1515, f
                                                
b
or instance, Henry reportedly stated, ‘my belief is, that if I choose, he [Francis] will not 
cross the Alps, and if I choose he will cross’.363 While such military strategies featured 
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throughout the period in the English crown’s approach to defending the papacy, there was a time, 
particularly from around 1517 on, when Henry VIII also developed peaceful means to the same 
end, namely reconciliation with Francis I with a view to restraining his Italian ambitions.  
 
The most effective way in which the English crown could ‘defend’ the papacy, given its 
distance from Italy, was by a direct attack on France itself. Henry VIII reportedly declared this to 
be his intention from the moment of his accession and this strategy was developed in subsequent 
years up to the failed Anglo-Spanish enterprise into Aquitaine in 1512 and the actual invasion of 
1513.364 In terms of English intentions, these were intended to help the pope recover Bologna and 
other territories by diversionary actions. While the 1512 invasion was unsuccessful as a military 
operation, it may well have been instrumental in contributing to the expulsion of the French from 
Italy following the Battle of Ravenna (11 April 1512). The inability of his forces to recover from 
their losses at the battle and follow-up what was actually their victory in the battle may have been 
partly due to Louis XII either diverting troops from Italy or failing to send reinforcements 
because of the Anglo-Spanish threat to Normandy. 
English preparations for the Guienne expedition and the concurrent harrying of the Breton 
oast seem to have had a tangible effect on French troop numbers in Italy. In March 1512, 
Venetia
c
n sources reported that England had declared war on France and that, on account of the 
alarm that this had caused, the latter’s (presumably military) movements had been affected.365 
                                                                                                                                                              
case, Henry was correct; Francis’ subsequent enterprise was enabled by the renewed Anglo-French peace of April 
1515, which guaranteed the security of northern France in his absence; see below pp.458-466. 
364 See below pp.392-396, 402-405, 415-419. 
365 Ven.ii, 149 (LPIi, 1102; 17 March 1512, reports among the French in Lombardy, Verona). 
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Certainly the pope was reported to expect such a diversion in mid-April.366 Again, a Friar 
Angelo, reporting from Rome during May 1512, forwarded a ‘report that 100 French spears had 
recrossed the Alps to succour France, as the King of England had attacked her’.367 By 22 May 
1512, Venice was reporting to its ambassador in Rome that ‘400 spears’ had been recalled from 
Italy by Louis XII to face the Anglo-Spanish threat.368 Furthermore, towards the end of the 
month, Henry VIII was said to be taking direct credit for the result at Ravenna: ‘had it not been 
for the apprehension of my power entertained by the King of France, he would at least have sent 
into Italy the 1,000 spears and 12,000 infantry who he keeps at Asti; and had they taken the field 
before the march of the Switzers, he would have been victorious.’369 This role was recognised by 
the Venetian doge in late August when, following the expulsion of French forces from the 
peninsula, he affirmed that ‘it is confessedly to his Majesty that she [Venice and Italy] is indebted 
for being in great measure freed from French oppression’.370 Furthermore, Henry may have 
gained further satisfaction from intelligence that his feint in northern France had also kept Louis 
XII in Blois ‘till he knows the determination of the English, whether they will carry the war into 
Normandy or Guienne’.371 In other words, he was not concentrating on Italy. By his actions, 
therefore, Henry VIII could legitimately claim to be working in defence of the papacy. Henry’s 
own belief in his ability to affect French troop movements merely by threatening to attack France 
was demonstrated. 
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In spite of the Holy League having fulfilled its immediate aims in terms of protecting the 
papacy during 1512, Henry VIII continued to follow through with the full-scale invasion of 
1513.372 This was enshrined in the Anglo-Spanish alliance ‘for the recovery of Aquitaine, the 
defence of the Pope and the Lateran Council’, which specified England’s contribution to be an 
expedition to northern France.373 While no full-scale engagement occurred between English and 
French forces during this campaign, it is notable that Louis XII did not attempt to act in Italy 
during that year. Also, the presence of French troops close to English operations suggests that 
Henry VIII had successfully diverted his focus north.374  
England intended to continue the invasion during 1514, but by this time, Henry VIII could 
no longer legitimately claim that he was defending the papacy.375 On 17 October 1513, a treaty 
was concluded between England, the Empire and Spain, against France, which provided for a 
two-pronged invasion of France in the following year but, notably, the (defence of the) Church is 
not mentioned.376 Henry was experiencing sustained pressure from Leo X to come to terms with 
France at this time, thus removing formal justification for his aggression. While the English king 
was unable to cite the Italian issue as a reason for his continued belligerence, this does not mean 
that Henry did not envisage that his continued invasion had ceased to be in defence of the papacy, 
albeit a papacy that was mistakenly calling for peace.377 Furthermore, one could argue that 
Henry’s declared intention to continue this course kept Louis XII away from Italy during 1514. 
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Indeed,
June 1511, to help Ferdinand crusade in North Africa. A secret agenda for this English force that 
 this is supported by the fact that rumours of Louis’ intention to cross the Alps increased, 
particularly after the conclusion of the Anglo-French peace of August 1514 and, indeed, the 
French king then began to declare this intention to his English counterpart.378 While the 1513 
campaign was the only full-scale invasion conducted by England during this period, others were 
planned. From 1515, for instance, Henry VIII planned to attack France in combination with other 
powers following an enterprise that expelled the French from Italy.379 Later, according to the 
Treaty of Bruges of 1521, Henry committed himself to invading France alongside Charles V, 
while Charles and Leo X would expel the French from Italy.380 Given that this agreement 
remained a secret (theoretically at least), it cannot be said to have had effect on the French 
removal from Milan in mid-November and Henry could not take any credit for affecting this. 381 
 
In addition to full-scale invasions, England could act to defend Rome through smaller-
scale expeditions on France’s coast or borders. Henry VIII appears to have recognised the 
validity of this strategy during June 1510 when, in response to Venetian pleas for assistance 
following their loss of Vicenza (to the emperor), he stated that he ‘would make a diversion 
willingly’, but was ‘averse to breaking the peace’ at that point.382 Two such minor military 
expeditions were launched by Henry VIII during 1511, as part of the build-up towards a full-scale 
invasion in support of the Church.383 Firstly, Lord Darcy led 1,000 archers to Spain during May-
would sail to northern Spain seems to have been suspected by the French orator in England and 
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this may have been correct, as the French crown was later informed that the crusade had been 
abandoned and Ferdinand had diverted troops to Naples. The English contingent sailed home, 
however.384 Secondly Sir Edward Poynings commanded a similar sized force to help the 
emperor’s grandson in the Low Countries against the French-backed duke of Guelders. While 
this seems to have been an attempt to induce Maximilian’s support against France, the Venetians 
certainly interpreted it as a diversionary attack on France, intended to affect Louis XII’s forces in 
Italy.385 While the effect of these minor expeditions on the French focus on Italy is uncertain, it is 
feasible that they did draw some of Louis XII’s resources north, to the benefit of the papal cause. 
 
Another strategy pursued by England to defend the papacy against French aggression in 
Italy was its funding of anti-French forces to cross the Alps. This was a feature of English foreign 
policy from 1515 onwards, coinciding with Wolsey’s ascent to sole prominence in Anglo-papal 
affairs.386 This option was prompted by approaches from the duke of Milan and the Swiss 
Cardinal Schiner following the defeat of anti-French forces at Marignano during September of 
this year and the despatch of Pace to organise this was immediate.387 English confidence would 
have been raised when, in advance of his arrival in the Cantons, Pace informed Wolsey of 
intelligence in October 1515 that Francis I was returning home, fearing a Swiss descent into 
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Italy.388 Furthermore, de Giglis reported from the Bologna meeting between Leo and Francis in 
December that the Pace mission caused the French to be ‘much in fear of England’, given the 
omplaints that they were making.389 A few months later, as the Imperial-Swiss invasion was 
mobilis
                                                
c
ing, the secretary reported that Francis I ‘fears England more than hell, as appears by his 
promising the pope recompence for “breaking his faith in soliciting the Scotch against us”’.390 A 
few days later, he reported hearing that Francis had left Italy on hearing of this expedition and 
intended to detach from Venice and come to terms with the pope.391 While Francis is known to 
have left Milan for France on 8 January 1516, it is not known if the impending invasion affected 
this.392 In terms of winning over the papacy, it seems that the expedition nearly persuaded Leo to 
publicly side with the anti-French powers, but the emperor’s sudden withdrawal from Milan in 
March effectively ended that prospect.393 During 1516 and 1517, the English crown continued to 
envisage papal assistance in the recruitment of the Swiss for the relaunch of the operation to 
expel the French from Italy and, indeed, their services were envisaged to be central to the ‘league 
for defence of the Church’ concluded in late October 1516.394 This coalition never gained the 
appropriate commitment from any of the other parties for it to have been put into practice and for 
the Swiss to have been retained.395 The only other (if immeasurable) effect that these attempts to 
recruit the Swiss had on England’s bid to protect the pope was financial: from the moment that 
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Pace reached the Cantons, he reported Francis I laying out great sums of money in counter-offers 
to retain their services.396 Whether this affected England’s role vis-à-vis the papacy, however, is 
unclear. 
 
Given that English attacks on France and French interests were expensive and time 
consuming, part of England’s ‘defence’ of the papacy also lay in the latent threat to France. This 
was recognised as a means to stop or prevent French interference in the peninsula. In benefiting 
papal security, this can be seen from the start of Henry VIII’s reign beginning with his vocal 
belligerence towards Louis XII.397 Even though it later becomes apparent that England was 
unable to act before 1511, the French king’s uncertainty about the Englishman’s intentions 
apparently caused him to remain out of Italy (and in the north of France), at least until a peace 
agreement was arranged with England.398 This would benefit the papacy by reducing the military 
opposition, if it was at war with France, or by ensuring a weaker French presence in Italy overall, 
that may enable greater freedom of (political) movement for the pontiff. That the English were 
nderstood to be capable of this was indicated in summer 1509, when a Venetian source in Rome 
wrote o
mandy from fear of the English’.400 The implication was that this was benefiting 
10, Venice believed that Louis XII’s contribution to the League 
u
f a rumour that an Anglo-Scottish offensive against France had caused Louis XII to return 
across the Alps.399 Also, in December of the same year, a Venetian orator reported intelligence 
from Flanders that, while Louis XII was mustering a force to cross the Alps, he was also ‘sending 
troops into Nor
Italy. Furthermore, in January 15
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of Cambrai could be ended by calling on ‘the King of England to make a demonstration and 
military preparations in those parts’.401 Even the French themselves appear to have recognised 
this English strategic intention. Imperial representatives in France reported to Margaret of Savoy, 
on 14 January 1510, that Henry ‘makes a show of arming so as to draw off some of the French 
forces now against the Venetians’.402  
Similarly, Wolsey apparently employed this strategy in response to news of French (and 
Venetian) progress in Italy during September 1515. In condemning contemporaneous French 
actions to stir up Scotland, he complained that, by Henry’s observance of the Anglo-French 
peace, he was ‘losing so great an opportunity for invading France, whilst the King is in Italy with 
the princes and military, there remaining in his own realms but women and property; whereas, 
ships being in readiness, in eight days, he [Henry VIII] could have sent an infinite number of 
troops across, to conquer and lay waste as far as their march might extend; and he said, “Believe 
me, sir ambassadors! this most serene King, and the kingdom, will not brook such an 
outrage”’.403 Wolsey issued a similar threat a few months later, when the French were worried 
about the English reaction to the Battle of Marignano (also during September 1515). On 6 
November 1515, the French ambassador in England reported that ‘Henry was making a show of 
warlike preparations to please his subjects, who wished him in reality to make war on Francis in 
his absence, but that he was desirous of peace’. In a bid to discover England’s real intentions, he 
then exhibited a missive from Francis, claiming that, if he ‘had not left his frontier well guarded it 
was because he never thought that Henry would make war on him in his absence, considering the 
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f peace and friendship between them’. Wolsey swore that ‘neither the King, his Council, 
nor himself had ever thought of such a thing; and that the ships and the great galley were only 
built to please his Queen and his sister Mary, and that they and the Council had dined there on 
Thursday last. They were not built to make war on either France or Scotland, but merely to be in 
readiness for anything that might happen; still, if the Duke of Albany did not abstain from and 
make reparation for his injuries to Margaret and her children, Henry would make him do so’. 
Wolsey was, therefore, extremely politic in his answer; he denied intending to threaten France, 
but made it clear that such threats could easily materialise. The French orator, moreover, added 
his own opinion ‘that if Francis had been unfortunate in Italy, Henry would have invaded 
France’.404 It is unlikely, however, that this threat had any effect on the French threat to the 
papacy, as the pope had already submitted to Francis and would shortly meet him in Bologna.405 
A final instance of the purported effect of England’s latent threat to France affecting Italy came 
in June 1516: when the English crown began to publicly declare its opposition to the French 
presence there, Sir Robert Wingfield reported hearing that news of this had reached Francis I’s 
army in the peninsula and may have caused its recall.406 
 
In addition to the belligerent strategies pursued to prevent French dominance of the 
papacy, the English crown also had more peaceful methods at its disposal, particularly by 
attempting to tie French kings down in peace agreements that precluded this possibility and by 
distracting them from any planned enterprise to the peninsula. While these did appear 
sporadically and to a lesser extent in the first half of this period, they increasingly featured in the 
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second half, as Henry and Wolsey realised that the papacy was too frightened of France to 
commit definitively to an anti-Gallic course. This perceived weakness of a ‘French’ papacy 
caused the English crown to adopt a wholesale ‘reconciliation’ policy with France from 1517 on, 
largely to the exclusion of Rome, underlying which was a concern for the ‘defence’ of the papacy 
from French political influence. This ‘reconciliation’ ploy persisted in public from 1520 onwards 
while, in private, Henry VIII turned back towards belligerent solutions, again without involving 
the papacy until the last possible moment. 
Up to 1515, English attempts to protect Rome via reconciliation with France were only 
occasional and ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, Henry and his ministers may not have been 
ware of their position of strength in this regard during 1509-1510, as uncertainty about Henry 
VIII’s 
                                                
a
anti-French rhetoric may have caused Louis XII to abandon any personal intervention in 
Italy. The subsequent renewal of the Treaty of Etaples in March 1510, however, gave the French 
king free rein to act (albeit he did not return to Italy in person).407 Similarly, following the Anglo-
French peace of August 1514, there were a number of efforts to keep Louis out of Italy and away 
from the papacy. These included an attempt to ‘distract’ him by proposing an Anglo-French 
attack on Navarre, as well as a personal meeting with Henry. These were bound for failure, 
however, on account of an inherent problem with the peace agreement. England’s failure to have 
the strategic ‘bulwark’ of Milan included in the treaty, despite its best efforts, opened the way for 
Louis XII to revive his Italian ambitions without fearing an attack from the north and the French 
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king would not be distracted from this course.408 This course continued with the accession of 
Francis I from January 1515. Francis was intent on crossing the Alps and managed to renew the 
Anglo-
                                                
French peace, still excluding Milan, in April. In spite of this, Henry VIII still attempted to 
sideline his French counterpart with the offer of a meeting, but to no avail.409 
Following Francis I’s decisive success during 1515, particularly his conquest of Milan, 
the English crown found it difficult to obtain any open papal commitment to the anti-French 
agenda and was frequently uncertain whether Leo X actually shared this sentiment at all, given 
various reports of negotiations and agreements with France.410 Perhaps the final straw for 
England’s decision to no longer rely on papal support in the protection policy was its failure to 
gain papal adhesion to the league ‘in defence of the Church’ because of Leo X’s fear of France. 
The treaty, originally concluded on 29 October 1516 was not fully and publicly confirmed by 
Rome.411 Henry VIII eventually levered papal membership in return for a loan to help Leo pay 
for the Urbino war with Francesco Maria della Rovere.412 While this was sworn to in London by 
5 July 1517, papal adhesion was still left wanting.413 Leo did ratify in August, but did not release 
this bull to de Giglis until mid-November and stipulated that it remain private.414 By this point, 
however, the English crown had already been engaged in peace negotiations with France for 
some months and was increasingly resolved in this direction.415 
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The first stage of this reconciliation and distraction policy towards France was the 
negotiation of a treaty of universal peace on 2 October 1518 which, as already described, both 
excluded the papacy for the most part (until the last moment) and intended to keep Francis I out 
of Italy.416 In the months following this, Henry and Wolsey attempted to further this policy by 
seeking to arrange the personal meeting with Francis that was stipulated in the agreement.417 
The progress of this strategy with little papal involvement was interrupted by the death of 
Maximilian in 1519, at which point Henry VIII sought to protect the papacy from France by 
preventing Francis from being elected emperor. While this was consistent with the reconciliation 
strategy, insomuch that Francis was given the impression that Henry supported his candidacy, the 
English king tentatively approached the pope to oppose this prospect during March. Wolsey 
advised that, as Francis ‘is straining every nerve, by art or cunning, to obtain the election and 
succeed in his unbridled desires, England thinks it expedient that every obstacle should be thrown 
in his way; for if he were successful he would revive many obsolete pretensions, and endanger 
the ind
king was paramount, the pope envisaged Francis as the lesser of two evils (compared to Charles) 
but, at length, they reached a consensus that they would align to back a third party. As the 
English crown understood, this third party was to be Henry himself, if possible, and Richard Pace 
ependence of the Holy See’.418 By becoming emperor, Francis would enter into territorial 
rights and claims in Italy that would make his dominance over the papacy both more likely and 
potentially more complete. During the election campaign, while English opposition to the French 
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was despatched to Germany to facilitate this.419 When there, however, Pace was unable to align 
with the papal representatives, who worked against Charles’ candidacy and towards Francis’, 
until th
                                                
ey switched to support Charles at the very last moment.420 
The nature of this reconciliation and distraction policy towards France altered after the 
Imperial election on account of the vast increase in power of Charles V, as well as his declared 
intention to be crowned in Italy, both of which Francis I opposed. Henry VIII and Wolsey 
increasingly became arbiters between the two and this was reflected in how they continued to 
pursue the underlying anti-French agenda by keeping Francis away from the peninsula.421 For 
this purpose, both princes were discouraged from Italian expeditions and personal meetings with 
them were also fostered.422 Again, the pope was not party to negotiations and complained about 
not being informed. This was perhaps emphasised when Leo sought Henry’s approval to send a 
nuncio to the summits as late as mid-March.423 On 4 May, Henry and Wolsey replied to papal 
complaints of the previous month and assured Leo that nothing would be negotiated ‘to the 
prejudice of the Church’.424 As the meetings were imminent, however, the pope just had to take 
their word for it. In the subsequent meetings, the English continued to publicly display their 
‘neutrality’, although they began to concur with Charles towards an anti-French alignment, 
negotiations for which began afterwards.425 However, Francis I immediately declared his 
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intentio
           
n to return to Italy, prompting sustained English correspondence and embassies in a bid to 
prevent this.426  
As both Henry VIII and Francis I gradually turned away from their rapprochement, the 
former attempted to negotiate with Charles towards an anti-French alliance. The English king 
explicitly demanded that the papacy be excluded at present from the strategy being developed for 
its own protection. He was adamant that he would not agree to any defensive league with Rome 
before the Anglo-Imperial axis was in place. The reasons for this seem to be that they were not 
yet sure of the pope and that, in any case, he was ‘so brittle, and variable’.427 In other words, 
Henry did not trust Leo X to support them in their bid to defend him. Consequently, the pope 
remained excluded from the next stage of the English policy purporting to advocate 
‘reconciliation’, while really seeking to restrain France: the peace conference at Calais.428 The 
English only began to disclose their real intentions when reports began arriving of the pontiff’s 
open publication of his alliance with the emperor.429 Just before the beginning of the conference, 
at the end of July 1521, Wolsey took Ghinucci into his confidence.430 Wolsey then notified the 
pope of the Treaty of Bruges on the day of its conclusion (25 August) and swore him to secrecy. 
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 English objections also seem to have been based around the Imperial insistence of a marriage dispensation for the 
prospective match between Charles and Mary. Henry feared being beholden to the papacy for such a grace, which 
426 For e
427
the French might be able to obstruct; ibid., 1149 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1150 
(calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to Henry), 1214 
(calendared end March 1521, Wolsey to Tunstal, Hampton Court). 
p.107; L.Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.35-36, 42-43; LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, 
t was fully briefed by Ghinucci in England, the latter ‘who takes part in all the 
is 
pacy’s hope that the peace conference would fail and that Henry would subsequently ally 
428 See below pp.731-734. 
429 R.J. Knecht, Francis I, 
Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
430 LPIIIii, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). According to Contarini, the Venetian ambassador with 
Charles, his papal counterpart in Ghen
present consultations and is acquainted with everything’. Caracciolo also understood that negotiations were afoot for 
an Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance, although it is unclear whether he received this intelligence from Ghinucci. Th
nuncio also revealed the pa
with the papacy; Ven.iii, 274 (29 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Ghent). 
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The price of English support, however, was to be an honorary title, ‘fidei defensor’.431 Back in 
Calais, an extended Treaty of Bruges was then negotiated, which was concluded on 24 
November, finally marking a return to full engagement with Rome on its security against 
France.432 
                                                 
431 LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). Also see ibid., 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to 
), p.769. Sicca also believed that this 
[Henry]), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford). The timing of this was evidently stage-managed by 
Wolsey, as he had reminded Henry to sign and send him the relevant letters to the pope concerning the book shortly 
before he crossed for Calais; ibid., 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry). 
432 The English also expected Leo X to lay France under interdict and further named Cardinal de’ Medici to be 
protected under the treaty’s terms. Ghinucci concluded on Leo’s behalf; ibid., 1796 (22 November 1521), 1802 (24 
November 1521, Calais); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24 (1980
revised treaty provided for Wolsey to be the joint Anglo-Imperial candidate for the next conclave, with de’ Medici to 
be second choice, although nothing has been found to support this; C.M. Sicca, ‘Consumption and Trade of Art 
between Italy and England in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century: the London House of the Bardi and Cavalcanti 
Company’, Renaissance Studies, 16 (2002), p.173. 
2 
HONORARY PAPAL AWARDS AS INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR  
HENRY VIII’S ‘DEFENCE’ OF ROME FROM FRANCE 
 
 Given that Henry VIII clearly wished to act to protect the papacy’s political 
‘independence’ against French interests (albeit to his own ends), it is natural that he sought 
recognition from Rome of his performing this role. One way to achieve this was by recourse to 
the ‘armoury’ of honorary awards in the latter’s gift that were invariably bestowed upon princes 
for political reasons.1 These could be awarded in recognition for political ‘services’ rendered or 
in anticipation of that yet to be given. Some were issued without being requested from Rome as a 
form of recognition of ‘loyalty’ to the Church. Others were actively sought by secular princes, 
particularly in a bid to gain a public display of papal support in the political sphere. These awards 
can broadly be divided into three categories. Firstly, there were annual gifts, such as the golden 
rose and the blessed sword and hat, bestowed on secular leaders, usually as some sort of political 
gesture from the papacy.2 While not worth much in material terms, intended principally as 
spiritual honours, they had a subsidiary benefit insomuch that they bestowed papal favour upon 
the recipient. Each of these honours was accorded to Henry VIII during this period, both linked to 
the recognition of his role as a protector of the papacy against France. The English king had good 
reason to expect to receive them, as he would have at least seen the sword and hat awarded to his 
                                                 
1 Such awards comprised just one dimension of the concessions that the English crown sought from Rome to ‘buy’ 
.109; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, p.50. 
its political backing (against France) and that the papacy offered as inducements to the same end. At a politically 
opportune moment, the king and his ministers might seek a number of grants from Rome in order to guarantee 
English support (usually for war). In addition to the papal honours focused on in this section, the crown might also 
seek other favours and concessions. 
2 LPIIi, 492 (22 May 1515, Leo to Henry); Ven.ii, 1069 (4 September 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome); L. Pastor, 
History of the Popes, vii, p.244; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, p.46 n.; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.256, 295; K. Stevenson, 
Chivalry and Knighthood in Scotland, 1424-1513, p
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father and perhaps witnesed their reception in 1505.3 Secondly popes, as universal ordinaries, 
claimed in, the 
invocation of suc sts although, as 
ne might expect, it was rarely invoked given the difficulty of enforcement. Nevertheless, such a 
                                                
 the authority to entitle leaders to and depose them from territorial states.4 Aga
h ‘power’ was invariably linked to the papacy’s political intere
o
papal award featured once in the Anglo-papal relationship during this time and, again, was linked 
to Henry VIII’s political defence of papal interests against the king of France. Finally, the papacy 
was also able to bestow honorary titles that recognised rulers’ loyalty and devotion to the Church 
to the same political ends. These already existed for the Holy Roman Emperor, kings of France, 
as well as, more recently, kings of Spain and possibly Scotland. The Swiss also gained such a 
label during this period. 5 It should be unsurprising, therefore, that Henry VIII sought similar 
papal recognition for most of this period, culminating in his recognition as ‘fidei defensor’ in 
1521. While this award was bestowed in response to the English king’s written defence of Rome 
against Luther’s On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520), it will be seen that Henry had 
sought this in connection with his physical defence of Rome against the French and this title was 
also intended, in part, to recognise this. 
 
 Firstly, tackling the political significance to the English crown of those ‘spiritual’ honours 
awarded annually by the papacy, Henry VIII does not appear to have actively sought these, but 
was an enthusiastic recipient nonetheless, particularly as they either sought or acknowledged his 
 
enry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57 (1900), pp.185-193, 196-197. 
3 Henry VII received the sword and hat in 1488, 1496 and 1505. Henry VII was also awarded with blessed candles 
by Julius II in February 1508 which, given the date, may well have been awarded in connection with the pope’s 
desire to assemble a coalition against Venice. Among other English kings to receive the sword and hat was Edward 
IV; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.177-185; J. Wickham Legg, ‘The 
Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to H
4 For the longstanding papal claim to such authority, see W. Ullmann, The Growth of the Papal Government in the 
Middle Ages, pp.283, 301-303, 450. 
5 See above pp.38-39. 
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political role in defending Rome from the French crown. The papacy, on the other hand, under 
both Julius II and Leo X, deployed such inducements to ‘persuade’ the English crown to follow 
its favoured political course vis-à-vis France. 
 
Golden Rose, 1510 
 The Golden Rose was a gift of papal favour awarded annually on the fourth Sunday of 
Lent to heads of state, among others, but had not been bestowed on an English king since Henry 
VI in 1444. In material form, it was ‘a spray of roses made of gold and embellished with 
diamonds and sapphires’.6 In Henry VIII’s case, the pope blessed the rose on 24 March 1510, but 
did not bestow it publicly on the English king through Christopher Bainbridge until 1 April.7 The 
political context of this award was blatant. The papacy at this time sought English participation in 
a notional league against France; Julius II had recently reconciled himself with Venice (the target 
of the League of Cambrai), under pressure from England, with a view to assuming an anti-Gallic 
course. While there were various indicators that the English crown still desired an offensive 
against Louis XII (including the presence of Christopher Bainbridge), the pontiff had been aware, 
nce January 1510, that Henry was entertaining French peace overtures; this caused much 
                                                
si
uncertainty in Rome.8 By early March, the increasing likelihood of an Anglo-French accord 
 
1521 (1979), p.85; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, p.50. 
(7 August 
rom Rome for Henry VIII’ JWC, 34, p.179; L. Wooding, Henry VIII (2009), 
6 C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.174-175, 186; J. O’Malley, Praise and 
Blame in Renaissance Rome: Rhetoric, Doctrine, and Reformation in the Sacred Orators of the Papal Court, 1450-
7 Henry VIII received the rose again in 1524, although this falls outside the remit of this study; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal 
Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.186-187. 
8 See below pp.365-380. A number of historians broadly agree that this gift was politically motivated and Mitchell, 
in particular, links this to papal gifts of wines and cheeses to England in 1511 to the same end, carried on a papal 
galley. Guicciardini stresses that the visit of a papal ship to England was incredibly unusual; LPIi, 842 
1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to Signory); S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, 
p.243; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art f
p.68. 
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caused Julius II and Bainbridge to discuss the forestalling of this agreement and, by the 12th, it 
was decided that Christopher Fisher (hitherto, English ‘solicitor’ in Rome) be sent to England 
post-haste to this end, carrying a secret brief which presumably urged Henry VIII to break off the 
eace talks. The sensitive nature of its contents was later indicated by Bainbridge, who divulged 
terpart that he would conceal it in the cover of a book, so that the French 
                                                
p
to his Venetian coun
would not discover it. The mission seems to have been delayed around 15 March, however, at the 
pope’s behest, as he had the idea of masking the real intention of the mission by awarding the 
Golden Rose to Henry VIII at Easter. This plan seems to have been finalised by the 22nd and the 
gift was blessed two days later.9 The Golden Rose was then awarded to Bainbridge for Fisher to 
depart with it (and the brief) on 8 April.10  
The mission was doomed to failure, however, as an Anglo-French compact was 
concluded on 23 March 1510.11 Julius II apparently discovered this within a week of Fisher’s 
departure by letters from his sub-collector in England, Peter Griphus, as well as from French 
correspondence.12 In response to the awkward diplomatic situation, Bainbridge went hunting 
because, according to the Venetian ambassador, ‘he was ashamed’, although it is more likely that 
he found it expedient to keep a low profile. When he did finally go in person to the pope to deny 
any knowledge of the treaty (by 12 April), Julius II angrily replied ‘You are all rascals’.13 This 
 
9 Ven. ii, 52 (LPIii, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); LPIii, 413 (30 March 1510, Donato to the 
510), 54 (LPIi, 417, 3 April 1510, Donato to the 
s to Henry, Rome); C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and 
 although it would be surprising if this correspondence had contained such intelligence. Bainbridge may have 
Signory, Rome). 
10 Ven. ii, 49 (LPIi, 402; 17 March 1510, doge and senate to Donato), 52 (LPIi, 407; 23 March 1510, doge and senate 
to Donato), 53 (LPIi, 413; Donato to the Signory, 30 March 1
Signory, Rome); LPIi, 418 (LPI, 976; 5 April 1510, Julius to Warham, Rome), 426 (LPI, 982; 9 April 1510, Cardinal 
Riario to Henry, Rome), 427 (983; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Isvalie
Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.186-187; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.29-31.  
11 LPIi 406 (LPI, 962-963,974; Sp.ii, 36; 23 March 1510). 
12 Ven.ii, 56 (LPIi, 432; 8, 10, 11, 12 April 1510, letters from Rome to the Venetian Signory), 58 (LPIi, 432; 15 April 
1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome). 
13 The ambassador received letters from England on 12 April which, he asserted, contained no notification of this 
event,
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anger probably stemmed from the realisation that any Anglo-French treaty ruled out any 
hostilities between Henry VIII and Louis XII for the present campaigning season, at least until 
1511, thus allowing the French monarch to concentrate solely on Italy.14 Publicly, Bainbridge did 
not celebrate the treaty as his French counterparts did. To mark its conclusion, the French are 
reported to have invited Bainbridge to celebrate a Mass, but the archbishop reportedly refused 
even to attend. However, perhaps in begrudging recognition of the agreement, the English envoy 
mirrored his French counterparts by having bonfires burnt in front of his residence and making 
wine available to passers-by.15 In subsequent days and weeks, Julius II became increasingly 
reassured that, despite the negative implications of the treaty, it amounted to nothing more than a 
re-confirmation of Henry VII’s 1492 agreement with the French (which was part of a broader 
renewal of his father’s accords with England’s neighbours) and that Henry VIII remained 
committed to the anti-French cause in the longer term.16 
 While the Fisher mission, carrying the golden rose, had become futile in its aim to prevent 
the Anglo-French agreement, there was no apparent attempt to recall it. The pope probably 
shared the Venetians’ initial reaction that, in spite of the setback, ‘it cannot be but advantageous, 
as it will at least serve to give umbrage to the King of France’.17 Indeed, in subequent months, 
the pope applied further diplomatic pressure to induce an English declaration against the 
                                                                                                                                                              
had some forewarning of an Anglo-French accord, as on 23 March he intimated to a Venetian representative that 
t time, in a 
i, 64 (LPIi, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory). 
there would be no conflict between Henry and Louis that year; LPIi 354 (LPI 1457; 29 January 1510, [Henry to 
Bainbridge]); Ven. ii 56 (LPIi, 432; 8, 10, 11, 12 April 1510, letters from Rome to Venice); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.72-73. For the Venetian orator writing of the Anglo-French rapprochement, see Ven.ii, 59 (LPIi, 421; 
6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 61 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London).  
14 The suggestion that England would be prepared to act against France in 1511 was made, not for the firs
report by the Venetian ambassador in late May 1510; Ven.i
15 Ven.ii, 57 (LPIi, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Porzil to Zuan Badoer, Rome), 58 (LPIi, 432; 15 April 1510, 
Donato to the Signory, Rome). 
16 See below pp.380-383. 
17 Ven.ii, 60 (LPIi, 433; 19 April 1510, doge and senate to Donato). 
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French.18 Fisher eventually arrived in England and presented the rose to Henry VIII by 8 June.19 
That it took him two months to get there suggests that the originally hasty nature of his 
commission might have been revoked. It is also curious that there seems to be no record of any 
celebratory Mass to bestow the gift on the king, in spite of papal instructions to Archbishop 
Warham to hold such a ceremony.20 Nor does there appear to be any other record of the formal 
receipt of this papal gift in England, or evidence that Henry VIII thanked the pope for it.21 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to argue that the pope did not seek to reward the English king with this 
honour in a bid to induce his ‘defence’ of the papacy against France. 
 
 
Blessed Sword and Hat, 1513-1514 
The cap and sword (also known as the cap and sword of maintenance or the blessed sword 
                                                
and hat) was another honorary gift bestowed annually by the papacy on a favoured prince. They 
were blessed by the pope in his chapel on Christmas Day and later sent to their recipients. The 
sword seems to have been intended to recognise actions in defence of the Church, while the cap 
symbolised obedience, presumably to the Holy See.22 By Henry VIII’s time, this tradition was 
 
18 For diplomatic pressure applied through direct letters, through Bainbridge and via an embassy sent to England 
during June-July 1510, see below pp.384-386. 
time 
 as a papal gift back to the eighth century, when Paul I (757-767) sent such an award 
ile Mitchell demonstrates the origins of the sword as a symbol of protection in Imperial 
rks of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, 
19 Ven.ii, 73 (8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
20 LPIi, 418 (LPI, 976; 5 April 1510, Julius to Warham, Rome). Contemporaries such as Hall and Vergil fail to 
mention the award, despite the former citing Henry’s later gaining the blessed cap and sword; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica 
Historia; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, p.121. 
21 The ceremony for the 1524 award of the rose by Clement VII is also not mentioned in sources, although this 
there is evidence that Henry thanked the pope; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 
50, pp.187, 193-194.  
22 J. Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to Henry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57, pp.193-195. 
Wickham Legg traces the sword
to Pepin III (751-767), wh
elections and the cap as an indicator of obedience; M. Mitchell, ‘Wo
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well-established and Henry VII had been the beneficiary of such gifts on three occasions, 1488, 
1496 and 1505. Stow records the latter to have been recognition that he was a ‘defender of the 
Church’.23 Given this regularity, Henry VIII may therefore have been optimistic that he would 
become a recipient at some point, if he supported Rome in some aspect of foreign policy. Indeed, 
the fact that James IV received it in 1507 for political reasons, in anticipation of the Scot’s 
desired support against France (possibly along with an honorary title), may have spurred him 
further.24 Again, these were an indication of political favour from the papacy and, in Henry 
VIII’s case were was intended as a form of inducement to comply with the pontiff’s political 
wishes.  
 Henry VIII was the beneficiary of the cap and sword during 1513-1514. The pope blessed 
em on 24 December 1513 and they were presented to de Giglis on 7 January 1514, in front of 
nusually, it was claimed, the cap and sword were then 
carried
th
cardinals, ambassadors and others. U
 in procession to de Giglis’ house.25 Leonard Spinelly (brother to the longstanding 
Florentine diplomat in English service, Thomas) was employed to convey the gifts to England, 
which he reached during May.26 Leo X was explicit in explaining the reason for these awards to 
Henry VIII in a brief of 1 March, which recognised his role as ‘propugnator adversus inimicos 
fidei’ and in protecting the Church (against France). This would have pushed all the right buttons 
                                                                                                                                                              
p.180; W. Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages, pp.68 n.5, 157-160, 164, 197-198; J. 
nry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57, p.196. 
e Sword of State of Scotland’ Proceedings of the 
ember 1513, Rome), 2530 (LPI, 4621; 31 December 1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). 
Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to He
23 See above n.3; J. Stow, Annales (1632), p.484. 
24 Julius II sought to detach James IV from his alliance with Louis XII and induce him to support the expulsion of the 
French from Italy; A.J.S. Brook, ‘Notice of the Sword-Belt of th
Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, 28 (1894), p.280; also see above p.39. 
25 The English orator took credit for the honours being awarded to Henry; LPIii, 2527 (Ven.ii, 361; Vetor Lipomano 
to the Signory, 27 Dec
26 The pope did not issue a letter of credence for Spinelly until 20 February and only despatched him on 1 March; 
ibid., 2644 (20 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); Fiddes, c.11-12 (LPIii, Iii 2688; LPI, 4835; 1 March 1514, Leo 
to Henry, Rome). 
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in England, given the king’s perception of himself as fulfilling this responsibility up to this point 
(and beyond). The brief further hoped that Henry would now turn his arms against the Ottomans, 
for which peace with Louis XII would need to be concluded.27 This indicates the papacy’s real 
reason for its recognition of the English king as a ‘protector’. 
Underlying this gift was sustained papal pressure to come to terms with France. Official 
papal support of the 1513 campaign notwithstanding, Leo X had been seeking to bring about 
peace with France, albeit unsuccessfully, since his election in March 1513.28 The pope’s decision 
to offer some sort of inducement to Henry to draw him into peace negotiations may have derived 
om th
also interpret an implicit threat in these honours? The impetus for the cap and sword may have 
fr e king’s warning, around 9 November 1513, that Leo ought not to come to terms with 
Louis XII on the back of English victories, arguing that a premature peace may cause even more 
war. Apparently in response to this and most contemporaneous to the awarding of the cap and 
sword to Henry, Leo had replied around mid-December, hoping that the king would now respond 
to his peace overtures, given that his ‘holy purpose’ (the recovery of papal territories) had been 
achieved.29 This was surely a hint at papal recognition of Henry VIII’s ‘defensive’ role vis-à-vis 
the Church. Furthermore, by recognising Henry VIII as a ‘protector’ of the Church, the pope 
implied that the king had been supported in his war against France on this basis but, now that the 
papacy no longer needed to be ‘defended’, the king ought to heed Leo’s peace overtures. Can one 
been inspired by Henry VIII himself who, when he wrote from Tournai on 28 September to 
reiterate his congratulations to Leo on his election, also voiced his support for the pontiff’s 
                                                 
27 C. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, p.189; Fiddes, c.11-12 (LPIii, Iii 2688; LPI, 
4835; 1 March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
28 See below pp.412-428. 
29 See below pp.415-437. For support of the idea that Leo intended these awards as an inducement to English support 
of his peace initiative, see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.53. 
 137
intention to organise a crusade, provided that ‘affairs were [at] once settled in Christendom.30 
This gesture was made effectively at the end of that year’s hostilities and, through this, Henry 
‘opened the door’ to ongoing papal peace proposals. Indeed, this indication of Henry’s potential 
compli
realise this award in late 1513. While the orator faced obstacles from Cardinal Vigerio, in whose 
ance with Leo X’s political aims appears to have inspired a determined increase in 
diplomatic pressure from Rome, of which the cap and sword was only one element. In terms of 
the universal peace initiative, Leo was struggling to gain admission to England for a legate a 
latere to negotiate.31 Perhaps anticipating at least further difficulty in this, Leo X despatched a 
nuncio to England instead, to perform the same task; Gianpietro Caraffa arrived by early 
February 1514 and was subsequently involved in Anglo-French peace negotiations. A second 
nuncio, Balthazar Stuerd, passed through England on his way to Scotland around the same time; 
his mission, it seems, was to bring both states to terms in the wake of Flodden.32 Indeed, also 
around the time of the cap and sword, the pontiff may also have considered offering Henry the 
governance of Scotland in return for his compliance.33 The presence of both papal diplomats 
seems to indicate that Leo believed that England was open to the idea of peace. 
A further motivation for the pope to award the cap and sword to Henry VIII was perhaps 
Leo’s reluctance to honour the 1512 promise of his predecessor to invest the king with France 
(and its associated titles), particularly given his own peace with the French. While Julius II 
probably never intended to make good this grant himself and Henry had not met the condition 
that he gain de facto control over France first, this did not stop Christopher Bainbridge seeking to 
                                                 
30 LPIii, 2310 (LPI, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). 
9 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
Lippomano?] to the Signory). 
31 Ibid., 2517 (LPI, 4608; 1
32 See below pp.437-440. 
33 Ven.ii, 366 (5-8 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome [
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hands the brief was placed, he does appear to have gained a pledge from the pope that the 
investiture would be confirmed, although Leo was probably disengenuous in making this 
promise. In this light, therefore, the award of the cap and sword around this time was perhaps 
offered as an alternative.34 
 While the official reason for not despatching the cap and sword to England immediately 
was the harsh winter, the delay could have been largely politically motivated, given the 
underlying hope of Leo X to bring about peace between Henry VIII and Louis XII.35 It is surely 
no coincidence that, prior to Spinelly’s departure, Silvester de Giglis would have received a 
commission to treat secretly with the pope and French representatives. This seems to have been 
an immediate response to the arrival of nuncio Caraffa in England around 7 February.36 Around 
the same time, it was heard in Rome that the English king rewarded the pope personally by 
making Giulio de’ Medici (Leo’s cousin and chief advisor) cardinal protector of England and 
Giuliano de’ Medici (Leo’s brother) became a knight of the Garter.37 It is possible, therefore, that 
the pope had awaited firm indications of good faith from the English king before he released the 
promis
                                                
ed awards and these arrived in Rome by March 1514. 
 Spinelly arrived in England with the cap and sword in mid-May; he entered London on 
the 19th, escorted by bishops from his disembarkation. He was met at Blackheath by the duke of 
Suffolk and others, before processing to St Paul’s Cathedral. The ceremonial Mass to award the 
honours to Henry VIII then took place on the 21st and was followed by a banquet. It was also 
significant in a political sense that these events were observed by the duke of Longueville (a 
 
34 See below, pp.147-150. 
ntinued to expound England’s public policy of 
s France in 1514; see below pp.431-432. 
35 See above n.26. 
36 This commission was kept secret even from Bainbridge and he co
continued hostility toward
37 See below pp.442-443. 
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prisoner from the 1513 campaign) and perhaps a French envoy sent to negotiate peace.38 These 
attendees would have clearly understood that the papacy was recognising the English role in 
protecting it from France. Indeed, in Spinelly’s address at the presentation ceremony, the papal 
delegate outlined how the gifts were traditionally awarded to Christian Kings who defended the 
hile the blessed hat and sword may 
                                                
Church and went on to praise Henry’s adoption of this role (implicitly against Louis XII). It is 
also worth noting that, in this oration, Spinelly also reasoned that the cap and sword were also 
intended to recognise the English king’s zeal for peace.39 This was doubtless intended by Leo X 
as a reminder as to the ‘real’ reason for these honours. 
 That this award was linked to Henry VIII’s receptiveness to papal peace overtures can be 
further stressed, given the arrival of a third papal nuncio to pursue the initiative, shortly after 
Spinelly. The pope must have understood negotiations to be quite advanced, albeit still secret, as 
Lodovico Canossa entered the kingdom ‘in great haste, and incognito’ and it was believed that he 
would remain indoors until he heard the final agreement of an Anglo-French peace, at which 
point he would leave. The nuncios were subsequently integral to Anglo-French negotiations 
which eventually led to an accord on 10 August 1514.40 W
have been perceived as a means to ‘buy’ English compliance to the papacy’s desire for peace, the 
crown envisaged additional concessions. Of these, Henry and his ministers were successful in 
 
(LPIii, 3003; 15 June 1514, Nicolo di Favri to -, London); C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, p.121. 
placed on his head, comically covering his face, but this whole ceremony seems to have mirrored that which took 
place with Henry VII in 1488 (and, one might presume, in 1496 and 1505); Ven.ii, 445 (LPIii, 3003; 15 June 1514, 
ndon); J. Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to Henry VII’, 
rnal, 57, pp.185-191. 
present were Gianpietro Caraffa and Balthazar 
40; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.53-54. 
38 Hall mistakenly claimed that the honours were sent by Julius II; LPIii,2929 (LPI, 5111; 21 May 1514); Ven.ii, 445 
Louis d’Orléans had been captured at the Battle of the Spurs (16 August 1513); A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.64; J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (1968), p.36. Oddly, considering he was a papal representative, Polydore Vergil did not 
mention this award in his Anglica Historia (nor did he cite the bestowal of the golden rose); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica 
Historia. Historians have often commented on Nicolo di Favri’s description of Henry having the oversized cap 
Nicolo di Favri to -, Lo
Archaeological Jou
39 J. Wickham Legg, ‘The Gift of the Papal Cap and Sword to Henry VII’, Archaeological Journal, 57, p.193. 
40 Lodovico Canossa arrived around 17 June. The other nuncios 
Stuerd; see below pp.438-4
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gaining an unusual indulgence to help rebuild Norham Castle (which had been destroyed by the 
Scots) and permission to retain clerical contributions for the aborted 1514 expedition. They also 
gained papal agreement, at least initially, to the replacement of the apostolic collector, Hadrian de 
Castello, with the Latin secretary, Andrew Ammonius, although this struggle still had some years 
to run (until 1517). For Wolsey specifically, a reduction of the consistorial taxes due on his 
provision to Lincoln was eventually won, although the papacy put up significant resistance, and 
his promotion to the see of Tournai was agreed. Finally, the possibility of Wolsey’s entry to the 
Sacred College was also floated at this time, although the pontiff procrastinated until ‘a suitable 
me’ a
                                                
ti rose.41 
 In keeping with the political nature of papal awards, Henry VIII rewarded the courier, 
Leonard Spinelly, with a benefice reputedly worth 200 ducats per annum: Cottingham in the 
diocese of York.42 However, Cottingham was already held by a Scottish prelate, Andrew 
Forman, who had received it from Henry VII in 1498 for his role in arranging an Anglo-Scottish 
truce.43 The benefice was probably selected in a bid to recover Cottingham from the Scot because 
of his recent hostile diplomatic activities.44 The opportunity to reclaim Cottingham from Forman 
 
Spinelly until 29 June; Ven.ii, 445 (LPIii, 3003; 15 June 1514, Nicolo di Favri to -, London); LPIii, 3049:38 (LPI, 
 to Cardinal Riario, Edinburgh), 2355 (LPI, 4502; 12 October 1513, Henry 
ed end 
lendared end July 1515, James to Leo and the 
41 See below pp.446-456. 
42 The appointment was described by a Venetian diplomat on the 15th, but Cottingham was not formally bestowed on 
5198). 
43 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.75. For instances of Cottingham included in Forman’s title, see LPIi, 114 
(19 July 1509), 129 (LPI, 369; 30 July 1509, James IV to Henry, ‘Abbay of Haly Croce beside Edingburgh’). For the 
relatively insignificant value of the benefice, see Valor Ecclesiasticus Temp. Henry VIII Auctoritate Regia Institutus, 
v (1825), p.127. 
44 J.D. Mackie, A History of Scotland (1964), pp.130-131; C.A. McGladdery, ‘Forman, Andrew (c.1465–1521)’, 
DNB. Henry was simultaneously trying to perform a similar manoeuvre with the priory of Coldingham; previously a 
cell subject to the monastery of Durham, but annexed by the Scottish (with papal approval) in 1509. This was a long 
running dispute that was not solved at this point; LPIii, 299 (LPI, 774; calendared 1509, James IV to Julius II), 1077 
(calendared end February 1512, James IV
to Leo, Tournai), 2443 (LPI, 4556; 13 November 1513, Dacre to Henry, Harbottle), 2552 (LPI, 4627; calendar
1513, James V to Leo); LPIii, 3119 (5 August 1514, James to Leo, Perth), 3616 (29 May 1514), 3616 (13 November 
1514); LPIIi, 707 (calendared 14 July 1515, Albany to Leo), 777 (ca
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had already been identified from July 1513, when he was promoted by Louis XII to the 
archbishopric of Bourges. To retain his existing livings in commendam, Forman would require 
new or amended papal dispensations. Bainbridge used this angle in his opposition to both 
Forman’s appointment to the French see and his ‘Retencon of his late benefice of Cottyngham’, 
although he admitted defeat in both respects by September 1513.45 This all coincided with other 
English actions, vis-à-vis Scotland, in the wake of Flodden: Henry VIII had sought to realise his 
claim to overlordship over Scotland and, in relation to this, approached the papacy to approve 
nominations to Scottish bishoprics from him.46 This eventually failed and Forman was admitted 
by Leo to the archiepiscopal see of St Andrew’s in November 1514. The regaining of Cottingham 
ay ha
its revenues, particularly as a non-resident. He was stuck in the middle of a political game; he had 
m ve been intended as a warning to Forman not to oppose the English candidate for the 
Scottish archbishopric. By bestowing Cottingham on Spinelly, Henry was perhaps trying to force 
the pope’s hand politically; if Leo wanted his chamberlain to benefit from this rectory, he would 
at least have to snub Forman’s candidacy for St Andrew’s, if not recognise English authority over 
the Church in Scotland.47  
 While the benefice was disputed, Leonard Spinelly would find it difficult to benefit from 
been rewarded by Henry VIII, but he would have to rely on Leo X to help him realise this. In late 
                                                                                                                                                              
Cardinals), 778 (calendared end July 1515, [Albany] to Leo, Edinburgh); LPIIIii, 1642 (7 October 1521, Clerk to 
, The Scottish Historical Review, 46 (1967), pp.1-25; W.K. Hunter, The Priory of Coldingham 
[Wolsey], Rome); A.A. Carr, History of Coldingham Priory (1836), pp.23, 306-310; I.B. Cowan and D.E. Easson, 
Medieval Religious Houses: Scotland With an Appendix on the Houses in the Isle of Man (1976), pp.55-57; R.B. 
Dobson, ‘The Last English Monks on Scottish Soil: the Severance of Coldingham Priory from the Monastery of 
Durham 1461-78
(1858), pp.38-39; N. Macdougall, ‘Hume family (per. 1424–1516)’, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.97. 
45 LPIii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, Bainbridge and de Giglis to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.75-76. Leo X approved the new archbishop to retain his existing benefices, including Cottingham, on 
15 July. Forman also held the see of Moray, two monasteries and had access to another religious house; LPIii 3617 
(15 July 1513). 
46 In addition to seeking to control nominations to the Scottish episcopate, Henry VIII also sought to reduce St 
Andrew’s from an archbishopric to its earlier status as a suffragan see to York; see below pp.450-452. 
47 See below pp.450-452. 
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November 1514, his brother Thomas, a longstanding diplomat in English service, requested that 
Henry VIII grant Leonard an alternative English benefice, specifically that of Herman Tulman of 
Utrecht who had recently died.48 By this date, Leonard’s prospect of gaining possession of 
Cottingham had taken a turn for the worse in Rome: Forman, had been provided to St Andrew’s 
on the 13th, part of a deal to placate a member of the pope’s family, Innocent Cibo, who gained 
Bourges as a result.49 Leonard Spinelly’s subsequent hopes for gaining the rectory lay in the 
possibility that Leo would withhold a dispensation for Forman to hold it in commendam, but the 
envoy informed Wolsey on 2 January 1515 (having recently arrived in Rome), that the Scot had 
been permitted to retain Cottingham as part of the deal for Bourges.50 The records consulted fail 
to mention any English response to this; it seems that, in spite of Spinelly being the courier of 
papal honours that recognised Henry VIII’s ‘protection’ of the papacy against France, it was not 
felt imperative to follow-up and realise the controversial reward bestowed on him as a result. Leo 
X had not been forthcoming with the various English demands to control the Church in Scotland, 
so why should Henry VIII follow-up on Cottingham? Correspondence on this subject continued 
until 1516, with Leonard Spinelly continuing to use the influence of his brother in England and 
have the pope intercede on his behalf, but the outcome is unclear.51 
 
                                                 
48 LPIii, 3473 (LPI, 5632; 25 November 1514, Thomas Spinelly to Henry). 
49 See below p.452. 
50 LPIIi, 7 (2 January 1515, Leonard Spinelly to Wolsey, Rome). 
51 Ibid., 818 (17 August 1515, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Bruges), 880 (5 September 1515, Thomas Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Brussels), 905 (13 September 1515, Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 983 (2 October 1515, Leonard 
eferment on his brother’s behalf back in March 1513. While no indication has been found to 
 crown; LPIi, 
3, Spinelly to Henry). 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Chur), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1496 (7 February 1516, Thomas Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Brussels), 2081 (23 June 1516, Thomas Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2303 (26 August 1516, Thomas 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2371 (17 September 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). Thomas Spinelly lobbied the king 
presumably for pr
suggest that Leonard had performed any specific service for England in Rome, Thomas may have been merely 
attempting to gain a living for his brother in recognition of his own diplomatic duties for the English
1676 (LPI, 3778; 11 March 151
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The Kingdom of France (and its Associated Titles), 1512-1514 
 The second genre of papal ‘honours’ that could be and were bestowed for political 
reasons was the elevation of an individual to the rule of a state (usually at the expense of 
another). Such gifts were rare, not least because they were difficult to enforce, but Julius II 
effectively offered the kingdom of France to Henry VIII, if he was able to conquer his southern 
neighbour. While Henry, at the Field of Cloth of Gold, dismissed the significance of such labels, 
in particular that of king of France, it will be seen that he actively sought such recognition when 
he became aware of the papal award.52 In any case, the Tudors already had a kind of experience 
of such a ‘gift’, when Innocent VIII effectively legitimised Henry VII’s conquest of England in 
1486. Henry VII later had this confirmed by Alexander VI in 1494.53 Henry VIII’s father, 
therefore, placed great value on the papacy’s ability to lend support to his newly acquired power 
and, for that matter, anybody else’s. 
 The award to Henry VIII came on 20 March 1512, when Julius II produced a brief 
translating Louis XII’s territories and titles to the Englishman and his successors ‘for as long as 
they shall remain in faith, devotion and obedience to the Holy Roman Church and Apostolic See’. 
Among the titles to be transferred was the honorary ‘Rex Christianissimus’ and the pope himself 
ould crown Henry king of France. Before any of this could be enacted, however, the English 
king had to defeat his French counterpart. There was perhaps some uncertainty as to the point at 
w
                                                 
52 Ven.iii, 60 (3-8 June 1520, Gioan Joachino, secretary of the governor of Genoa, resident at the French Court, 
Ardres). 
53 On 2 March 1486, Innocent issued a dispensation for the new king to marry Elizabeth of York (on account of 
consanguinity), which also pronounced ecclesiastical censures on anyone who opposed his possession of England; 
R.L. Storey, The Reign of Henry VII, pp.184-185. 
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which the English king would be deemed to have fulfilled this stipulation; in the meantime, the 
of February and on 6 March, Henry VIII informed Julius II 
 his 
brief was to remain secret and to be held by cardinals.54  
Many agree that this (potential) award to Henry VIII was intended as an inducement for 
English adherence to the Holy League.55 In other words, its aim was to ensure that the English 
king ‘protected’ the papacy. Around this period, the pope wanted to make certain that England 
actually followed through with membership of the coalition (originally concluded 8 October 
1511) and attacked its neighbour. As recently as 14 March, the pope wrote to Henry requesting 
his support ‘for the defence of the Apostolic See’.56 Henry VIII’s mandate to join the coalition 
had only arrived in Rome in early January 1512 and England’s formal adhesion would not take 
place until 17 May (during the third session of the Lateran Council). The papacy was counting on 
England to take some of the brunt of the war away from Italy with a planned Anglo-Spanish 
offensive and, both towards the end 
of determination to launch this in April.57 It was in this context that the pope effectively 
offered the English monarch the kingdom of France; it was a tempting inducement to ensure that 
the invasion did take place. This gesture may have been unnecessary, however, as Henry had 
already issued at least one declaration of his imminent intention to attack France, which 
apparently arrived in Rome before the brief bestowing France was drawn up.58 It seems likely 
                                                 
54 This ambiguity is further hinted at by historians; whereas the likes of Chambers and Scarisbrick suggest that Henry 
had to defeat Louis XII (albeit the latter hints at the need for conquest), Wilkie argues that the king was required to 
gain ‘effective control of France’; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.187-
188; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.38-39; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 
34, p.179; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.34-35; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.43-44. Henry VIII’s desire 
for a title such as that of ‘Most Christian’ will be examined later; see below, pp.151 ff. 
55 C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, p.187; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
96 (LPI, 3068; 14 March 1512, Julius to Henry). 
s unclear, however, whether the diplomat was referring to one or 
Bainbridge, p.39; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.34. 
56 LPIi, 10
57 See below pp.395-398. 
58 The Venetian orator mentions the receipt in Rome of such correspondence from England (dated 6 March) in 
missives of the 18th and 23rd-27th March 1512. It i
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therefore that the document that transferred France and the title of Most Christian King to Henry 
was Julius’ reaction to hearing that the offensive was about to begin and a bid to ensure that it 
took pl
                                                                                                                                                             
ace.  
The offer of the kingdom and titles to Henry VIII was also apparently linked to Julius II 
beginning to fulminate ecclesiastical censures against the French.59 In May or July 1512, he 
deprived Louis XII publicly and pledged the transference of his titles and territories to Henry on 
the ambiguous condition that he defeated the French king.60 Julius followed this in mid-August 
by imposing an interdict on France, which was reissued in the third session of the Lateran 
Council on 3 December.61 Also, some months prior to September, possibly at the same time as 
the deprivation of Louis XII, Julius released the Most Christian King’s subjects from their oaths 
and obligations.62  
 
 Unlike the previous papal honours, which the English crown did not pursue to any visible 
degree, this was evidently coveted by Henry VIII and was linked to one aspect motivating his 
 
59 While Ullmann stresses that the deposition and censure of a prince were separate papal actions, he also suggests 
that they often coincided, one being consequential of the other. While excommunication, for instance, removed the 
XII of France and of his title 
arch 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). 
from this censure, while Lyons and the fairs that it held 
ed; N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. i Nicaea I-Lateran V 
two communications from England; Ven.ii, 151 (LPIi, 1104; 18 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory), 152 (LPIi, 1119; 23-7 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
right to govern, deposition took away the right to a title (or titles). Furthermore, a third associated action may also 
need to be invoked, the release of subjects from their oaths of allegiance, as deposition theoretically did not affect 
these; W. Ullmann, The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages, pp.283, 301-303. Also see below p.176. 
60 The following authors disagree on the date of this event, the former citing July and the latter May 1512; F.J. 
Baumgartner, Louis XII, p.223; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.38-39. Also see below, pp.398-400. 
Spinelly reported hearing, via Imperial sources, of the pope’s desire to deprive Louis 
Most Christian King in July 1512; LPIi, 1301 (LPI, 3325; July 1512). See also ibid., 1101 (3077; 17 March 1512, 
Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1676 (LPI, 3778; 11 M
61 The interdict cited the duchy of Brittany to be immune 
were specifically mention
(1990), pp.597-598. 
62 STC 25947.7 (University of Birmingham, Special Collections). 
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anti-French agenda: the realisation of the traditional English claim to the French throne.63 Indeed, 
for the rest of his time in Rome, Christopher Bainbridge was assiduous in his bid to gain 
possession of the titular brief. The English cardinal first moved to gain possession of this 
docume
f which Bainbridge heard of some successes towards the end of September), a 
otable setback had occurred in August with the loss of The Regent, the flagship, along with two 
Bologna and the other papal territories under French control had been recently recovered, and 
Louis XII’s presence in Italy had been all but extinguished. There seems to have been a fear in 
nt in January 1513, but failed on the basis that Henry had not yet conquered France. That 
he may have come close to obtaining them is implied by the fact that the pope transferred them to 
Cardinal Vigerio for safe-keeping.64 It is difficult to account for Bainbridge’s motivation here, as 
the English were nowhere near conquering France. The Anglo-Spanish offensive in Guienne had 
been a fiasco, as Ferdinand had used the presence of English forces to assist his own conquest of 
Navarre. The cardinal asserted to the pope during December 1512 that this failure was 
attributable to the Spanish. Furthermore, while the English had been conducting naval raids along 
the Breton coast (o
n
of Henry’s courtiers, who had been in command.65 Bainbridge’s approach may well have been 
motivated by the fact that the immediate objectives of the Holy League had been achieved; 
England that Julius II may, as a result, cease his participation in the war, which would have 
thereby removed the opportunity for Henry VIII to gain papal recognition as king of France. In 
response to this fear, in the latter months of 1512, the English king proclaimed that he would 
invade France personally in 1513, continuing to cite his motivation to be the ‘defence of the 
Church’. It is perhaps in this context that one ought to see Bainbridge’s attempt to get hold of the 
                                                 
63 See above pp.69 ff. 
64 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.40. 
65 See below pp.402-404. 
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brief; if the papacy withdrew its support from the Holy League, Henry would have no chance of 
success. Indeed, the lack of tangible English military success up to that point need not be an 
obstacle; it could easily be argued that Henry VIII fulfilled his responsibility to the coalition by 
acting as a diversion to actions in Italy, that consequently weakened the French presence in the 
peninsula sufficiently for them to crumble after their ‘victory’ at Ravenna (11 April 1512).66 
 Bainbridge moved for this investiture for a second time in the wake of tangible English 
military progress against France during 1513. He apparently approached the pope as soon as 
unconfirmed news of the Battle of the Spurs (16 August 1513) and of the fall of Thérouanne (23 
August) arrived in Rome He reportedly told Leo X that Henry intended to go to Rheims for his 
coronation. The ambassador followed this up by trying to gain the brief from Cardinal Vigerio. 
While Vigerio accepted that the king had fulfilled its conditions, by virtue of the victories, he 
rejected the request, claiming that he had been instructed by Julius II to await an order from 
Henry himself in this regard. Vigerio also advised that the the grant be requested ‘in more ample 
manner’, as a bull. Bainbridge further recommended that Vigerio be rewarded in some manner.67 
Bainbridge returned to Vigerio by 14 October, thereby conveying Henry’s request for the brief 
(and a promise of a reward for the cardinal). According to the Italian, he complied with 
Bainbridge’s request, but admitted that Leo X’s confirmation was required, which the English 
orator was already seeking.68 Henry and Bainbridge had been caught out once again with this 
                                                 
 See above pp.114-116. 
67 Ven.ii, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 
68 The cardinal also excused himself, on account of illness, from the request to help gain this confirmation; LPIii, 
66
September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry], Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.50. 
2363 (LPI, 4506; 14 October 1513, Vigerio to Henry, Rome). Vigerio also seems to have written to Henry on 20 
December 1513, claiming that he had still not handed over the ‘depositum’ to Bainbridge and was still awaiting the 
s from the king. Chambers explains this confusion as having arisen from the cardinal having 
 orator; ibid., 2518 (LPI, 4610; 20 December 1513, Vigerio to Henry, 
ardinal Bainbridge, pp.54-55. 
appropriate instruction
earlier given a copy of the brief to the English
Rome); D.S. Chambers, C
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obstacle; they had managed to gain possession of the document, but it needed to be approved by 
the new pontiff. Perhaps recognising the impossibility of this (which will be explained below), 
Henry VIII and his advisors did not apparently respond to this new hurdle and failed to inform 
Bainbridge of their decision. At some point, the cardinal seems to have gained agreement from 
Leo X to confirm the brief ‘super nomine Christianissimi Regis’, but was confused, when writing 
been intended as an alternative to the investiture with France. Furthermore, around January 1513, 
on 20 May 1514, that he had heard no reply from England. Bainbridge speculated that this may 
be due to de Giglis’ dislike of the brief.69 
 While the timing of this second overture from Bainbridge is easily explained, he could not 
have been naïve enough to believe that it would not need some sort of affirmation by the new 
pontiff. It was perhaps thought by the English, however, that they had already gained the 
necessary commitment from Leo to honour his predecessor’s actions in two briefs issued on 25 
June 1513.70 Vigerio’s revelation that further approval was required was probably an unwelcome 
surprise to the English cardinal and Henry VIII. There is also reason to believe that, despite 
Bainbridge’s confidence in May 1514, the likelihood of the pope confirming this grant was 
practically non-existent. Leo X had been urging England towards peace with France since his 
election, made renewed overtures in this direction at the end of the 1513 campaigning season and 
publicly reconciled with Louis XII on 19 December, implicitly cancelling the king’s deposition.71 
It has earlier been posited that the award of the blessed cap and sword to Henry VIII may have 
                                                 
69 LPIii, 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome). 
70 Ibid., 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for 
Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.180. For Ferdinand seeking a similar assurance from the new pope in September 1513, vis-
à-vis the reissue of the investiture of Naples and the renewed excommunication of the king and queen of Navarre, 
see Sp.ii, 135 ([September] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
71 See below pp.424-425, 432-433; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.65-72. 
 149
Leo X may even have considered offering Henry VIII control of Scotland as a further 
inducement.72 
 Given the probable recognition in England that Leo would not honour this award, it is 
unsurprising that the subject was dropped. Henry VIII responded positively but secretly to papal 
peace overtures from around January-February 1514, up until the eventual Anglo-French accord 
in August of that year.73 It is on account of this ‘secret’ policy, that one can explain Bainbridge’s 
consternation in May 1514 that he had not had a reply to his correspondence reporting Leo’s 
                                                
decision to confirm Henry’s investiture of France. He was not made party to the new policy and 
he suspected his colleague, de Giglis, of treachery, unaware that the latter had been empowered 
to negotiate with the French. Instead, he was used to perpetuate the crown’s public anti-French 
rhetoric and Henry’s continued intention to launch a new expedition that year, probably to 
strengthen the English hand in negotiations.74 
 
 Overall, by making this gesture in 1512, Julius II had little to lose and everything to gain, 
politically speaking. While it risked angering the French king, he was already at war with him 
and was in the process of imposing ecclesiastical censures on him. Louis XII, for his part, had 
renounced obedience to the Holy See and supported a general council hostile to the pope in 
which Julius’ deposition would be anticipated.75 In effect, therefore, the pontiff was taking pre-
emptive action against a recalcitrant prince. Militarily, the deposition was a risky manoeuvre with 
 
72 Ven.ii, 366 (5-8 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome [Lippomano?] to the Signory). 
73 See below pp.435-443, 456-457. 
s’, in D. Baker (ed.), Schism, Heresy and 
74 See below pp.429-432. 
75 This belief had been held by Ferdinand for some time and the pope probably agreed. In spite of this, Ullmann 
argues that there is no evidence to suggest that the cardinals running the Council of Pisa-Milan ever intended to 
charge Julius II with any misdemeanour, let alone depose him; Sp.ii, 48 (calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his 
ambassador in Rome); W. Ullmann, ‘Julius II and the Schismatic Cardinal
Religious Protest, Studies in Church History 9 (1972), pp.182-183. 
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the potential to rebound on Julius, given the strength of the French in Italy, which may explain 
the pontiff’s reluctance to hand over the brief to the English. In terms of Henry VIII, the brief 
rdinand of Aragon, which was also claimed by the 
rench crown.77 Admittedly, the Spaniard was already in possession of the kingdom, but the 
could only benefit papal interests. Julius knew that he harboured ambitions for the longstanding 
English claim to the French throne.76 It was an easy trigger to ensure direct English involvement 
in the conflict. It was also a simple gift with a vital condition that the papacy probably did not 
expect to be fulfilled. Given the inability of successive English kings to realise their ‘right’ 
during the Hundred Years’ War, Henry was unlikely to deal a knockout blow to Louis XII during 
1512/13. Even if he did, that bridge would be crossed at a later date. From the English 
perspective, the offer, however unlikely to be realised, would always be seized, given the king’s 
motivation against France and the rare opportunity for papal recognition of the English claim to 
this throne. Indeed, there was a recent precedent for this occurring; on 5 July 1510, Julius II 
proclaimed that he would award Naples to Fe
F
gesture was no different to that of France; Henry had to be in control of the kingdom for this 
award to be made. Furthermore, the English king was not risking anything in his attempts to get 
hold of the investiture brief; he had already decided on his belligerent course before Julius II had 
made this offer. 
 
‘Fidei Defensor’, 1515-1521 
                                                 
76 See above pp.69 ff. 
77 The award of this kingdom was slightly different, however, as Naples was a papal fief, but the similarity of the 
gesture is valid; J.S.C. Bridge, A History of France from the death of Louis XI, iv, Reign of Louis XII 1508-1514 
(1929), p.63. 
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 The final genre of awards that could be and were issued by the papacy during this period, 
usually to political ends, was the honorary title, bestowed upon a prince or state and added to 
their formal title; Spanish monarchs, for instance, were known as ‘Catholic Kings’.78 While the 
heads of the contemporary ‘superpowers’ possessed such a name, Henry VIII did not and sought 
such recognition for most of this period, largely as a reward for his military role in protecting the 
papacy from France. While he was eventually recognised for his written defence of the Church 
against the Lutheran heresy, it will become clear that Henry’s political support of Rome in 1521 
and across the whole period generally, was effectively recognised in the reward. 
 Leo X bestowed the title ‘fidei defensor’ upon Henry VIII on 11 October 1521.79 This 
title recognised the king’s loyalty to the papacy and confirmed his place among the principal 
secular leaders of Christendom. It was the culmination of at least seven years of lobbying on the 
part of the English crown to have its wider political role vis-à-vis the papacy recognised.80 It was 
also the end of a lengthy process to gain an honorary title of any kind. It is probable that the 
English king was motivated in his quest for an honorary papal title by the 1512 offer of the title 
‘Most Christian King’ (in addition to France). This was clearly intended to ensure English 
military action against Louis XII and would have encouraged Henry to believe that he could gain 
such a title, if the papacy needed English political support. It is also likely that, when the English 
alised that the transferrence of Louis’ titles was unlikely, they began to push instead for an 
g of England; the papacy had already offered such a title once, so it 
                                                
re
honorary title for Henry as kin
 
he Popes, vi, p.321. 
p.38-40. 
78 L. Pastor, History of t
79 LPIIIii, 1659 (11 October 1521); C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 50, pp.191-
193. 
80 See above p
 152
was not unprecedented.81 Henry VIII could also look to recent instances of popes issuing 
honorary titles for political reasons, particularly the Swiss, Spain and perhaps Scotland. 82 While, 
cumulatively, these would have encouraged Henry’s hopes of gaining such a title it may well 
have been a title that had possibly given to James IV that spurred him on; if those who cite this 
are correct, not only did it recognise the Scot’s role as a ‘protector’ of Rome but, in English eyes, 
James was also Henry’s subordinate.83 
 
 The lengthy process by Henry VIII to gain recognition of his political protection of the 
papacy began in 1515. On 29 January, de Giglis informed Ammonius that he awaited the bull for 
Henry VIII’s title, presumably that of ‘defender’ or something similar.84 The timing of this is 
curious; England, at peace with France since August 1514 (after substantial papal pressure), 
feared a French descent into Italy as a consequence of this amity. Without any allies, however, 
Henry VIII was able to do little and, as far as the king was concerned, Leo X’s strategy was to 
push for ‘universal peace’.85 The death of Louis XII and the accession of the equally ambitious 
(vis-à-vis Italy) and more youthful Francis I added an extra factor to the mix. In reaction to the 
perceived French threat, de Giglis had approached the pope around 19 January with a view, it 
appears, to forming a coalition to defend Milan (against France). An honorary title, therefore, 
may have been presented as the English ‘price’ for its breach of the peace. If so, the crown 
                                                 
81 See above pp.144 ff. 
82 See above pp.38-39. 
83 See above p.39. 
84 LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
85 The papacy was, in fact, pursuing two other distinct policies at this time. On the one hand, Leo opposed the 
cretly allied with Ferdinand since late 1514 and secretly joined a league 
h crown towards a marriage agreement that took place in February 1515. Consequently, it seems to have been 
 Leo X really meant when he urged universal peace; see below pp.462-463, 470-472. 
prospect of a French descent; he had been se
against France in February 1515. On the other hand, the pope was simultaneously engaged in negotiations with the 
Frenc
unclear in England what
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miscalculated, as Leo rejected this overture, claiming that he could only advocate a general 
peace. A bold bishop of Worcester voiced his belief that ‘some Frenchman had been breathing in 
his [the pope’s] ear’. While de Giglis tried to lobby Leo again in this regard, he was unsuccessful; 
the orator again reacted quite aggressively, asserting that the papal response ‘was not a fit return 
for the services England has rendered him’. The exchange was so turbulent that one of Leo’s 
close advisors, Cardinal Bibbiena, visited de Giglis that night to urge the ambassador to smooth 
ver matters.86 Given papal adhesion to an anti-Gallic coalition during February 1515, it seems 
an indicator of favour on the English king because of its obvious connotations. Indeed, Leo X did 
o
likely that the English ambassador knew about the earlier negotiations and gained some sort of 
private agreement from Leo X to award Henry VIII an honorary title if England were to join the 
fray.87 That this did not occur may have arisen from the pontiff’s vacillation; in securing a French 
marriage for his brother, Giuliano de’ Medici, in the same month, Leo was clearly trying to cover 
all bases. Indeed, he kept a foot in both camps until July 1515, when he finally made his 
membership of the anti-French league public. Until shortly before that point, he does not appear 
to have contacted the English vis-à-vis this cause.88 Given the pope was trying to sit on the fence 
for as long as possible, it may be considered unsurprising, therefore, that he may have offered 
Henry VIII an honorary title, at a point when he himself was involved in negotiations towards an 
anti-French league and the English king had recently made overtures to him along these lines. As 
he was not prepared to make public his wish to resist Francis I, Leo was unlikely to bestow such 
                                                 
86 LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
87 Indeed, the treaty of 12 February stipulated that all parties were expected to induce the entry of other princes, 
including Henry VIII; see below pp.471-472, 475-476. 
88 See below pp.475-481. 
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not start making tentative approaches to the English concerning anti-French plans until May-June 
1515.89  
 The honorary title was not mentioned again until 7 September 1515, when de Giglis 
claimed to have spoken to Leo about Henry becoming ‘protector of the Holy See’.90 The political 
timing was far more opportune this time, as the English crown clearly possessed leverage over 
the pope, who was now actively seeking English membership of the anti-French coalition.91 This 
time, the crown had decided on a new ‘price’ for its alliance; a cardinal’s hat for Wolsey; the 
archbishop clearly used the pope’s desire for Henry VIII as an ally to lever a red hat out of him 
and, on two occasions, specified that, if this was not forthcoming, he would not gain English 
adhesion.92 This worked and, by 1 August, Wolsey understood that he would be raised to the 
Sacred College and, accordingly, issued Henry’s signed agreement to join the league. The new 
cardinal ramped up his demands by also requesting a legatine commission.93 Given this context, 
it is likely that Wolsey woud also have instructed de Giglis to seek an honorary title for the king. 
Indeed, Leo may have hinted at this opportunity to Wolsey on 12 July: responding positively to 
the archbishop’s initial demand for promotion and Henry’s declaration of ‘devotion to the Holy 
See’, he wished the English monarch ‘to be considered its patron and protector’.94 It is feasible 
that Wolsey, reading this, instructed de Giglis to suggest that this notion be formalised when the 
opportunity next arose. Notably, however, he did not seek to include it as part of his ultimatum to 
                                                 
89 See below p.469. 
90 LPIIi, 887 (7 September 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey). 
91 The English had known that Leo X was a member since March 1515, but could not be sure, on account of the 
secrecy and because the pontiff was also publicly pursuing ‘universal peace’; see below pp.477-478. 
92 Initially, towards the end of June, Wolsey unsubtly implied that English friendship was dependent on the 
cardinalate, but by the end of the following month, the archbishop spelt this out clearly to the pope; LPIIi, 648 
 my place beside Westminster’), 763 (calendared 30 July 
, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
(calendared end June 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis], ‘from
1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]). 
93 See below pp.482-483, 488-489. 
94 LPIIi, 700 (12 July 1515
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the papacy that offered English membership of the anti-French league, although this may well 
have been because he had already issued two missives stipulating that the price was a red hat and 
97 By this time, however, there were indications that Leo X might be 
felt obliged to honour this condition from 1 August, at which point he understood that he would 
become a cardinal. The timing of de Giglis raising this issue with Leo X was also significant; not 
only had the papacy apparently declared itself to be a member of the anti-French league by this 
time, but it also coincided with the receipt in Rome (by 3 September) of the English commitment 
to join the coalition, to which Leo asked Henry to honour his agreement to impose half a tenth on 
the English clergy and finally promoted Wolsey (on the 10th).95 De Giglis may have felt that this 
was an opportune moment to lobby for an honorary title, given the pope had submitted to English 
pressure vis-à-vis the cardinalate and now hoped for English money to fund the war against 
Francis I. Unaware of de Giglis’ approach to Leo, Wolsey thanked the ambassador for his work 
towards the cardinalate, declared that the king was now prepared ‘to support the honour and 
safety of the Holy See’ and further recommended that Leo award Henry ‘some honourable title’ 
in recognition, particularly as it would not cost the pope anything.96  
 By the end of September 1515, the prospect of an honorary title for Henry VIII had been 
discussed within papal circles. That of ‘protector’ was objected to as it belonged to the emperor; 
Leo preferred ‘defender’, but that already belonged to the Swiss; others forwarded ‘King 
Apostolic’ and ‘Orthodox’, but the pope did not like these. Such were the details that de Giglis 
relayed back to England.
reluctant to concede such a title. Wolsey had given up the political highground when Henry 
joined the alliance against France back in August. Indeed, the pontiff felt confident enough to 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis], Rome). 
olsey to [de Giglis], Rome). 
glis to Ammonius]). 
96 Ibid., 894 (10 September 1515, W
97 Ibid., 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Gi
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turn down Wolsey’s follow-up request for a legatine commission (reportedly because he was 
afraid of Francis making a similar demand). He would also have been discouraged on hearing 
(around the same time) that the promised clerical (half) tenth would not be forthcoming. Perhaps 
most importantly, however, the French victory inflicted at Marignano on 13-14 September 
immediately prompted the papacy to negotiate terms with Francis I.98 Given Leo’s position 
(reinforced by the meeting held with Francis at Bologna in December 1515 and its accompanying 
concordat), prospects for an honorary title for Henry VIII were now bleak.99 Nevertheless, on 19 
January 1516, de Giglis informed Ammonius of his confidence that he would soon get hold of the 
bulls entitling Henry VIII ‘S. Ro. Ecclesiae Defensor’.100 Leo X perhaps kept this inducement 
‘live’ to retain his amity with England, in case he could shortly turn against France again, as he 
was already indicating he might.101 
 The prospect of Henry VIII becoming ‘defender’ or something similar effectively ended 
by 28 January 1516, when Leo X informed Henry of the ‘difficulty’ of his demand. As de Giglis 
explained the following day, Leo ‘cannot assent at present without great danger’.102 In other 
                                                
words, French political pressure was too great; the pope could not afford to provoke Francis by 
 
99
101 The aforementioned legatine commission desired by Wolsey still seems to have been thought possible, albeit 
1
102 The English orator, assigned by the pope to expand on his inability to meet English demands, also suggests that 
correspondence from Giulio de’ Medici indicates that the cardinal protector had been approached to realise the 
English crown’s demands, but de’ Medici excused himself on account of his being preoccupied with matters in 
 Henry, Florence), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo to 
 Henry), 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici 
98 Ibid., 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de 
Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey). 
 For English fears for the papacy and its political ‘independence’, post-Marignano, see below pp.489-492. 
100 LPIIi, 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius). 
unlikely, by de Giglis and the pope still sought the promised tax from the English clergy; ibid., 1417 (19 January 
1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 14 8 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius). For the papacy’s eagerness to ensure 
that it retained English support, that Henry and Wolsey did not perceive Leo as ‘French’, as well as of England’s 
belief that it had a ‘secret understanding’ with Rome to continue the war, see below pp.499-509. 
Wolsey’s desire for a legatine commission could not be granted for the same reason. Contemporaneous 
Bologna up to that point; LPIIi, 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to
Wolsey, Florence), 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to
to Wolsey), 1456 (29 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, [Flor]ence). 
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recognising England through an honorary title. Nothing emanated from England then until the 
end of May. On the 22nd, an angry Wolsey wrote to Rome of the king’s displeasure that he had 
‘heard nothing of the title Defensor Fidei, as if the pope were afraid of the French’.103 At this 
point when Wolsey was trying to revive the anti-French coalition, which was collapsing during 
April-May 1516 after the emperor’s withdrawal from the Imperial-Swiss attack on French 
interests in Italy. In a bid to relaunch this offensive and to retain papal support for this (which had 
been tentative up to then), he also revived the king’s desire for an honorary title to recognise his 
protection of the papacy from France.104 In this context, this was either a last-ditch bid to 
browbeat the pope before the true scale of the enterprise’s failure became apparent or an attempt 
to induce the pope to declare himself committed to the coalition, as England backed the relaunch 
of the military offensive.105 The pope was not convinced; he was not as desperate for English 
 Perhaps due to an underlying perception that the papacy was ‘French’ (or, rather, subject 
1. Indeed, the failure of any English-financed 
participation in a coalition against Francis I as he had been in 1515, and still felt it too risky to 
break with the post-Marignano settlement and his overtures to England remained secret and 
indirect.106 The failure of the Imperial-Swiss armies at Milan earlier in 1516 could not have 
inspired Leo to act much differently. 
to French political influence) for several years after this point, the prospect of Henry gaining an 
honorary papal title did not arise again until 152
offensive to expel the French from Italy and, subsequently, the Treaty of London of 1518, 
                                                 
103 LPIIi, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). 
104 See below pp.528 ff. 
105 In the same way, Wolsey seems to have resumed his quest for a legatine commission in the same missive; he 
lamented that ‘others have more influence with the pope than he has, and have received legateships and distinctions 
which Wolsey has not’. He would even settle, he argued, for a faculty allowing him to visit exempt monasteries; 
LPIIi, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). 
106 See below, pp.549 ff. 
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precluded this until then, at least if the English king envisaged gaining recognition of his role 
protecting the papacy from the French. Once Wolsey became sure of Leo X’s commitment 
against France in 1521, he planned to extract such a concession from the pope as England’s 
‘price’ for joining this political cause. While, the cardinal sought recognition of Henry’s role in 
protecting the papacy against France, it was now to be tied in with the king’s defence of the 
Church against another contemporary concern of Leo X, Martin Luther.107 
 The book eventually produced, Assertio Septem Sacrementorum, was a response to 
Luther’s most recent work, On the Babylonian Captivity (1520). In particular, the king responded 
to the friar’s attack on papal primacy and defended this position.108 This provided the central 
tenet for the English argument for an honorary title; that Henry VIII was defending Church and 
papacy both physically and literally. Writing of this work may have begun shortly before the 
receipt in England of the Lutheran text to which it responded. Certainly, the king seems to have 
been busy ‘in scribendo contra Lutherum’ towards the start of April 1521 and, by the 16th, had 
agreed to Wolsey’s advice that the resultant book be sent ‘not only to Rome, but also into France 
                                                 
 Mitchell agrees that an honorary title was always expected as a reward for the book; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art 
from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.184. For an indication that this was Wolsey’s idea, see LPIIIii, 1659 (11 
1519 and that the papacy informed the crown of its own concern for this issue around the same time, see LPIIIi, 260 
(24 May 1519, Erasmus to Warham, Antwerp), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey), 476 (17 October 1521, 
107
October 1521, Rome). For indications that the Lutheran controversy raised concern among English theologians from 
Erasmus to John Fisher, Louvain), 640 (calendared 27 February 1520, More to Lee, Greenwich), 847 (28 May 1520, 
de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 1208 (30 March 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey); Ven.iii, 169 (10 March 1521, Surian to 
er of the Faith’, Dublin Review, 96 (1885), p.248. This may not have been the first time that 
18, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Woodstock), 4266 (28 June 1518, 
ck); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.110. 
the Signory, London). 
108 T.E. Bridgett, ‘Defend
Henry tried to pen a book; the English king appears to have written a text by June 1518, which was praised by ‘great 
learned men’, as well as by Wolsey, who may have played the role of ‘devil’s advocate’ during the writing process. 
There is no tangible evidence that this book was taken any further at this stage and Scarisbrick speculates that Henry 
VIII’s attention may have waned; LPIIii, 4257 (24 June 15
Pace to Wolsey, Woodsto
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and other nations, as shall appear convenent. So that all the church is more bound to this good 
and virtuous Prince, for the vehement zeal he beareth unto the same’.109 
 The plan was put into practice on the arrival of a papal bull and brief around 16 April, 
instructing that all Lutheran texts were to be burnt. The king was overjoyed ‘to have these tidings 
from the Pope’s holiness, at such time as he had taken upon him the defence of Christ’s church 
with his pen, afore the receipt of the said tidings’.110 Subsequently, a concerted campaign to gain 
recognition of Henry VIII as defender of the Church was launched with a magnificent public 
display against Luther on 12 May 1521 at St Paul’s Cross (outside the cathedral). Before an 
audience of foreign dignitaries and with the nuncio Ghinucci seated on his right-hand side, 
Wolsey presided over a Mass at which he published the papal excommunication of Luther (and 
his followers), had him denounced and his books burnt. One Venetian commentator wrote of 
                                                 
 While historians disagree on the question of Henry’s authorship, it is probable that he did contribute to the book, 
although the lion’s share of the work was probably done by a group of senior ecclesiastics, specifically ‘appointed to 
and handwritten by the king, these seem to have been conceived by others and a number were sent to Henry to select 
and transcribe them. The papacy may have recognised this collective contribution on 7 June, when de’ Medici 
109
examine Luther’s books’. Whereas Wolsey later suggested that the Assertio was prefaced by two verses composed 
indicated the pope’s satisfaction that Henry had induced scholars to write against Luther; LPIIIi, 1218 (3 April 1521, 
Warham to Wolsey, Canterbury), 1220 (7 April 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to 
Wolsey (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey, Greenwich), 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1450 
(calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges), 1333 (calendared 
7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to the bishop of Ascoli]); LPIIIii, 1450 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry), 
1499 (23 August 1521, Erasmus to Warham, Bruges). For the views of historians on this matter, including Wooding, 
whose argument is similar to this one, see T.E. Bridgett, ‘Defender of the Faith’, Dublin Review 96, pp.255-259; J.M. 
ignory, Worms). The idea to capitalise on the Lutheran issue may have began with Wolsey’s 
ingfield] to Wolsey). 
Brown, ‘Henry VIII’s book, “Assertio Septem Sacramentorum”, and the Royal Title of “Defender of the Faith”’, 
TRHS, 8 (1880), pp.250-258; D. MacCulloch, ‘Henry VIII and the Reform of the Church’, in D. MacCulloch (ed.), 
The Reign of Henry VIII, pp.162-163; V. Murphy: ‘The First Divorce: Literature and Propaganda’, in ibid., p.146; P. 
Smith, ‘Luther and Henry VIII’, EHR, 25 (1910), p.659; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.112; L. Wooding, Henry VIII, 
p.108. 
110 LPIIIi, 1233 (16 April 1521, [Pace] to Wolsey). For the arrival and reaction to these instructions, see Ven.iii, 195 
(23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 208 (11 May 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 223 (26 May 
1521, Contarini to the S
receipt of papal concerns in December 1520 and a request that Henry and Wolsey, on account of their influence 
among princes, write to Charles and others ‘to prevent its further diffusion’, although the idea to hold a book-burning 
event may have been formented some months earlier; LPIIIi, 810 (15 May 1520, Erasmus to Oecolampadius, 
Louvain), 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), 1185 (calendared end February 1521), 
1208 (30 March 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey), 1210 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -], 1234 (17 
April 1521, Leo to Wolsey, ‘Pali’), 1328 (3 June 1521, [Richard W
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Wolsey’s arrival that it was ‘as if the pope in person had arrived’, presumably in recognition of 
his legatine status.111 At this Mass, John Fisher (bishop of Rochester), arguably England’s 
remo
The papacy was informed of these events on 21 May, when Henry VIII outlined how, as it 
fo st theologian, gave an oration which commended Wolsey’s work against Luther and 
pledged that Henry would do the same. He further revealed that Wolsey held in his hand the 
king’s written work against the German friar, although it was yet to be finished: 
But touchynge these sacramentes the kynges grace our souerayne lorde in his owne 
persone hath with his pen so substauncyally foghten agaynst Martyn Luther that I doute 
not but euery true christen man that shal rede his boke shall se those blessed sacramentes 
clered and delyuered from the sklaunderous mouthe and cruel tethe that Martyn luther 
hath set vpon them, wherin al Englond maye take grete comforte and specially al those 
that loue lernynge.112 
was the duty of a Christian prince to ‘preserve the Christian religion against its enemies’, he 
strove to destroy the Lutheran heresy. Due to its proliferation, the king claimed to have adopted a 
multi-pronged strategy: he commissioned learned men to discuss and denounce Luther and wrote 
to the emperor and electors to the same end. In addition, Henry ‘thought it right still further to 
testify his zeal for the faith by his writings, that all might see he was ready to defend the Church, 
                                                 
111 It was speculated that over 30,000 people attended. The ceremony was followed by a great banquet; Ven.iii, 210 
(13 May 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 213 (14-17 May 1521, Lodovico Spinelli, secretary to Surian, to his 
brother, Gasparo Spinelli, Secretary to Badoer); LPIIIi, 1274 (12 May 1521). Wolsey followed up the book burning 
by instructing the episcopate to search for and send him all Lutheran texts within 15 days; ibid., 1279 (14 May 1521, 
Wolsey to Charles Booth, bishop of Hereford, ‘my house at Westminster’). 
112 C.A. Hatt, English Works of John Fisher Bishop of Rochester (1469-1535): Sermons and Other Writings, 1520-
1535 (2002), p.85. Also see J. Fisher, The sermon of Ioh[a]n the bysshop of Rochester made agayn the p[er]nicious 
doctryn of Martin luther w[i]t[h]in the octaues of the asce[n]syon by the assigneme[n]t of the most reuerend fader 
i[n] god the lord Thomas Cardinal of Yorke [and] legate ex latere from our holy father the pope (1521), 
[http://eebo.chadwyck.com, accessed 4 November 2007]; LPIIIi, 1273 (12 May 1521); Ven.iii, 210 (13 May 1521, 
Surian to the Signory, London). 
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not only with his arms, but with the resources of his mind’. As a final touch, the king told Leo 
that he had dedicated ‘the first offsprings of his intellect and his little erudition’ to the Medici 
pontiff.113 Given Henry’s allusion to defending the papacy both militarily and intellectually, there 
is little doubt that he was angling for an honorary title to reflect this.114 Perhaps because of Leo 






decision by the English crown, particularly as it had promised Cardinal Campeggio an episcopal 
benefic
ly: on 21 May, he awarded Cardinal de’ Medici the see of Worcester (recently vacant on 
t of de Giglis’ death). When notifying the pope’s cousin and most intimate confidante of 
ination, Henry implied that further reward may be available, admitting that Worcester ‘is 
al to his merits’.115 Given that the see had only been vacant since 18 April, and news of 
uld only have been received in England from early May, this must have been a swift 
e at the end of his legatine commission in England.116 
 
The pope acknowledged notification of the English strategy on 7 June at the same time as 
the preferment of his cousin to the see of Worcester. He did not explicitly mention the book, 
however. It transpires, as Cardinal de’ Medici  notified Ghinucci via a diplomatic back-channel, 
that while the pope was pleased that the king would defend the Church ‘with his pen as well as 
                                                 
113 LPIIIi, 1297 (21 May 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
114 In Wolsey’s notification of recent English actions against Luther, as well as referring the pope to Ghinucci for a 
mpeggio to Wolsey). 
full account, he also specified that Clerk would speak to him about his legateship (presumably concerning further 
powers) and other matters. Given the nature of Henry’s contemporaneous letter, the book and title were probably to 
be discussed; ibid., 1299 (21 May 1521, Wolsey to Leo, London). 
115 Ibid., 1298 (21 May 1521, Henry to de’ Medici, Greenwich). 
116 Ibid., 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). For the earmarking of Salisbury for Campeggio, see 
ibid., 533 (4 December 1519, Ca
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his sword’, he did not refer to it in his correspondence, as he understood it was still a secret.117 
The pope here may have been somewhat over-cautious, as the existence of the king’s work had 
been disclosed in the Fisher sermon.118 Nevertheless, it was discussed in Consistory on 7 June, at 
which, gratitude was again expressed at Henry’s piety for defending the Church ‘with his pen’. 
Significantly, at this same Consistory, de’ Medici was provided to Worcester and ‘it was resolved 
to bestow some honourable name or title on the King in return for his piety in resisting the spread 
of the Lutheran heresy, but the matter is deferred on account of its importance’.119 It was 
discussed again on 10 June, when various possibilities were proposed, including ‘Regem 
Fidelem’, ‘Anglicum’ ‘Orthodoxum’ ‘Ecclesiasticum’ and ‘Protectorem’. Henry VIII’s previous 
‘defence’ of the Church and the award by Julius II of the title ‘Most Christian King’ were cited as 
justification for the proposed honour, in response to scepticism among some present. Eventually, 
it was agreed that the pope should propose a selection of titles from which the English king 
ould choose.120 This discussion was not disclosed to Wolsey until 27 June, when Campeggio 
advised
                                                
sh
 that while the Sacred College had proposed ‘Apostolicus’ and ‘Protector’, it would be 
grateful for the Englishman’s opinion.121 In Consistory on that same day, Leo X finally made 
public his alliance to Charles V and, thereby, his intention to fight French interests in Italy, as 
 
117 Leo X was also allegedly impressed that Henry had gathered his scholars to write against Luther. Furthermore, he 
had written for a second time to Christian princes against Luther, as Wolsey had advised, and forwarded some anti-
Lutheran texts for the cardinal to peruse and comment on; ibid., 1332 (7 June 1521, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 1333 
(calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). For the papacy and de’ Medici’s enthusiastic acceptance of the 
 7 June), also see ibid., 1334 (8 June 1521, Giulio de’ 
(9 June 1521, [Campeggio] to Henry, Rome). 
reighton, History of the Papacy, vi, app..3, pp.374-
, Rome). 
see of Worcester (to which the cardinal was provided on
Medici, Florence), 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
118 Furthermore, Wolsey had disclosed the king’s writing such a book to the Venetian ambassador around 23 April; 
Ven.iii, 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). 
119 LPIIIi, 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1336 
120 Ibid., 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); M. C
375; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.116. 
121 LPIIIi, 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey]
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Campeggio had reported.122 It ought to be noted that, when the pope made this offer, he knew of 
Henry VIII’s negotiations with Charles for an alliance against France.123 The honorary title 
therefore was probably envisaged as the perfect inducement to secure English support, given that 
this had been sought after in the past. On 12 July, Ghinucci conveyed a secret communication 
from the pope (via de’ Medici) to Wolsey; he reminded the cardinal to ensure that the Assertio 
was completed and sent to Leo before he crossed to Calais. He also asked that he and Henry 
choose one of the honorary titles proposed by the pope’s cousin. This was followed, just before 
the 16th, by the same nuncio, presenting letters from Leo X to Wolsey, declaring the pontiff’s 
intention to join with Charles and, presumably, requesting English support.124 Wolsey apparently 
issued an immediate response, perhaps fuelled by the prospect of the title for Henry (reinforcing 
Leo’s declaration against France), and, although England subsequently appeared more 
enthusiastic about joining the papal-Imperial cause, Wolsey’s intention to host the Calais 
Conference, ally with the emperor under cover of this and attempt to delay the conflict until 
England was ready, did not alter.125  
 
To ensure the award of the honorary title, the Assertio had to be despatched to Rome; the 
timing of this was clearly politically motivated. While the book seems to have been ready 
                                                 
imself were not sold publicly. In a separate 
m ; LPIIIii, 1410 (12 July 1521, Ghinucci to Wolsey, 
 
122 This agreement had been concluded on 18 May 1521; see below pp.734 ff. 
123 Charles V, in a bid to secure his own arrangement with Rome, disclosed to the pope his negotiations with Henry 
VIII by April 1521, much to the English king’s ire. The pope, therefore, knew of a planned marriage alliance to seal 
this axis against France, in spite of de Giglis’ denials; see below pp.731-732. 
124 The nuncio also requested that Wolsey have the anti-Lutheran works sent by the pope to be examined and 
appraised by English theologians, as well as ensure that books by Luther h
missive to the English cardinal on the same date, Ghinucci further made his case to become bishop of Worcester 
which, he claimed, de’ Medici was prepared to resign to hi
London), 1411 (12 July 1521, [Ghinucci to Wolsey]), 1415 (13 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly
to Wolsey, Antwerp). For de’ Medici’s secret communiqué, see ibid., 1333 (calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici 
to the bishop of Ascoli]). 
125 See below pp.732 ff. 
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towards the end of July, it was not sent to Rome for another month.126 On 25 August 1521, 
Wolsey issued instructions for John Clerk to present the king’s book against Luther, the 
Assertio.127 At this ceremony, the orator was to declare ‘the King’s resolution to support the 
Church, and extinguish heresy by the sword and pen’. Reinforcing this role (and his angling for 
an honorary title), Clerk was also to deliver an oration and to advise ‘that the King has therein 
styled himself the very Defender of the Catholic Faith [of] Christ’s Church, which he has truly 
deserved of the See Apostolic’. Wolsey further stipulated the reward that he expected Henry to 
receive through ‘a memorial of such titles as will be most agreeable with annotations’, and 
instructed Clerk to have the relevant bulls drawn up along with a brief of thanks to the king 
‘“with certain words to be inserted therein by the Pope’s own hand”, … stating that [he does not] 
thinks his [grace can be b]etter employed’.128 With the papacy’s enmity towards France, the 
political implications of these statements were unambiguous. The calculated nature of this is 
further emphasised when one notes that Wolsey issued these instructions on the same day that he 
concluded the Treaty of Bruges, binding England to the Empire and committing Henry VIII to 
ar with France in 1523. The concordat bound both parties to act as ‘protectors’ both of the 
papacy
because of the latter’s attacks on the Empire and the Papal States, as well as due to papal and 
w
 and of the house of Medici.129 In the same letter, Clerk was instructed to bind Leo to 
secrecy when he revealed that Henry intended to ally with him and Charles against Francis I, 
                                                 
126 LPIIIii, 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry). 
127 The previous disclosure via Ghinucci may have been deemed ineffective because it elicited no response from 
Rome. 
128 Wolsey also thanked Clerk for gaining the bulls for his expanded legation, which he also levered out of the 
papacy at this time; LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). Wolsey sent a copy of this 
correspondence to Henry on the 24th (which was received on the 28th) and, while this suggests that the cardinal was 
the policy maker here, one would have expected the king to have assented to this approach; ibid., 1502 (24 August 
1521, Wolsey to [Henry], Bruges), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford). 
129 See below p.741. 
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Imperial requests for support. At this point, Leo was to be informed that, in order to prepare for 
the conflict, Wolsey had conducted the Calais (and Bruges) peace negotiations and that a 
marriage alliance had been agreed under cover of these. Leo was also to be asked to send a 
messenger to Wolsey, who intended to remain at Calais until the start of October, in a bid to 
extend the peace talks.130  
 John Clerk received the Assertio and Wolsey’s instructions by 14 September. He reported 
the pope to be enthusiastic about the book and agreed to it being presented in Consistory (and 
being distributed to other princes); he was also said to like the king’s (self-proposed) title of 
‘defender’. On politics, Clerk dutifully bound the pontiff to secrecy. He disclosed the Treaty of 
Bruges and Henry VIII’s intention to act ‘in defence of the Church’, before explaining how this 
would not happen immediately and that the Calais Conference would continue to keep up the 
pretence. While the pope replied positively, he procrastinated about sending a delegate to 
Wolsey, seemingly because Clerk was unable to show him a copy of the treaty.131 Perhaps 
because he did not entirely believe that England had made an anti-French pact with the Empire, 
Leo rejected overtures for the presentation of the Assertio in a public ceremony, instead receiving 
it in a secret Consistory on 2 October.132 By this, Henry would not be openly recognised as a 
‘defender’ of the Church, worthy of public papal support and Clerk may have feared that this 
would put the honorary title in doubt. Yet the ceremony went as well as could have been 
expected for Clerk. In his oration, he emphasised Wolsey’s work against Luther and drew 
                                                 
130 LPIIIii, 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). 
131 Ibid., 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). 
rk to Wolsey, Rome), 1654 
erk to Wolsey, Rome). 
132 On 25 September, Clerk reported that Leo agreed to the book’s presentation in an ‘open’ Consistory, but had 
evidently changed his mind by the following week. The pope claimed to reject a public ceremony, to avoid stirring 
up controversy, ‘as men’s minds as so much infected with Lutheranism’. The pope also later rejected a request from 
the ambassador for the book to be approved by formal decree in Consistory. Nevertheless, Leo did proclaim an 
indulgence of ten years for all who read the Assertio; ibid., 1607 (25 September 1521, Cle
(10 October 1521, Cl
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attention to the king’s desired title. In explaining Henry’s motivation for the book, the 
ambassador reasoned that it should not be seen as strange that such a devoted king, ‘who with his 
Forces and Reveng’d Sword, has formerly defended the Church of Rome when in greatest 
dangers and Calamities of Wars, should now for the Glory of God, and Tranquility of the Roman 
Church, by his Ingenuity and Pen, put a stop to Heresies, which so endanger the Catholick 
aith’.F  In response, Leo X mirrored this language by praising Henry who, in addition to now 
writing this book, ‘with His Sword has totally subdu’d the Enemies of Christ’s Church, that (like 
the Heads of the Hydra, often cut off, and forthwith growing up again;) has so often endeavour’d 
to tear in pieces the Seamless Coat of Christ’. He further gave ‘thanks to our Creator, who has 
rais’d up such a Prince to defend His Church and this Holy See’. Given such language, it is 
unsurprising that Clerk was promised that the bulls for the king’s title would be issued in the next 
Consistory.133 This must have relieved the ambassador somewhat, although it remained to be 
seen whether the pope would perform this publicly or even issue the bulls. 
 For present purposes, the most relevant section of the Assertio is the initial ‘Of 
Indulgences and the Pope’s Authority’. Here Henry sought to portray himself as a multi-faceted 
‘protector’ of the Church and papacy; by virtue of this unsubtle emphasis at the beginning of the 
book, no-one could dispute his performing this role, nor his worthiness of an honorary title.134 
The Assertio is avowedly pro-papal and is at pains to stress Henry’s devotion to the Holy See.135 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 1654 (10 October 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 1656 (calendared 10 October 1521); T.W. Gent (ed.), 
ohn Clark’ and pp.b2-b3; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art 
as presented, whereby ‘the Pope’s holiness sat in his majesty upon a 
Assertio Septem Sacramentorum (1688), ‘The Oration of Mr. J
from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.184. 
134 Scarisbrick speculates that this section may have been rescued from an earlier, aborted text written by Henry 
(from 1518); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII (1968), p.110. 
135 John Clerk reinforced this in his oration when presenting the book: ‘I speak somewhat of the Devotion and 
Veneration of my King towards Your Holiness and this most Holy See’; T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem 
Sacramentorum (1688), ‘The Oration of Mr. John Clark’, pp.4-8. The emphasis on papal primacy was reinforced in 
the secret Consistory at which the Assertio w
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The king, in his dedication of the text to Leo X, states that he wrote the book partly ‘to declare 
Our great respect towards your Holiness….and Our Obedience to the Service of Almighty 
God’.136 The king goes on to support the divine origin of pontifical authority, which Luther 
rejected. In his preface to the reader, for instance, Henry objects that Luther ‘calls the most Holy 
See of Rome, Babylon, and the Pope’s Authority Tyranny, and Esteems the most wholesom 
Decrees of the Universal Church to be Captivity; and turns the Name of the most Holy Bishop of 
Rome, to that of Antichrist’.137 In taking this position, the English king was at pains to stress the 
familiar role which he envisaged himself as playing; that of protector of the ‘faith’. Henry asserts 
‘I account it as much my own Duty, as his who is the most Learned, by my utmost endeavours to 
Defend the Church, and to oppose my self to the Poisonous shaffts of the Enemy that fights 
against her’. To perform this role, the king expounded the need to ‘Arm our selves with a two-
fold Armour: the one Caelestial, and the other Terrestrial’, thereby recognising his own 
employment of both temporal and spiritual powers in his defence of the papacy against Luther.138 
                                                                                                                                                              
[throne] three steps from the ground underneath a cloth of [state]; afore him in a large quadrant upon stools sat the 
[Bishops] in their consistorial habits’ and, while Clerk was unhappy with the need to kneel throughout the ceremony, 
returned to his place, Leo grasped his shoulders and had him kiss both cheeks; LPIIIii, 1654 (10 October 1521, Clerk 
136 This contained in the Henry VIII’s dedication of the text to the Pope that precedes the main text, in T.W. Gent 
(ed.), Assertio Septem Sacramentorum, c. 
 Henry further accuses Luther of inconstancy in his position on this subject and argued ‘that all the Faithful, 
honour and acknowledge the Sacred Roman See for their Mother and Supream; nor does distance of Place or 
he described Leo X breaking protocol early on; after kissing the pontiff’s foot, at which point he ought to have 
to Wolsey, Rome). 
137
Dangers in the way hinder Acce’s thereunto… If the Bishop of Rome has got this large Power, neither by command 
of God, nor the Will of Man, but by main force; I would fain know of Luther, when the Pope rush’d into the 
Possession of so great Riches?’ Henry went on to argue the legitimacy of papal primacy according to custom and 
t that its supremacy is universally recognised de facto and also that no 
entorum, ‘The Oration of Mr. John Clark’, c.2, pp.4-8. To 
historic writings. Finally, the English king likens denial of papal primacy to the sins of ‘witchcraft’ and ‘idolatry’, 
and should be punished as such. Overall, Henry issued his full support of the papal claim to the divine origin of his 
power, resting his argument chiefly on the fac
evidence can be found for the human origin of papal power. Again, this was reinforced by Clerk during the 
presentation; T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem Sacram
reinforce his message, Henry may also have sent with the Assertio a chasuble with gold embroidery depicting St 
Peter’s receipt of the keys from Christ; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art from Rome for Henry VIII’, JWC, 34, p.186. 
138 Contained in Henry VIII’s address to the reader, prior to the main text in T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem 
Sacramentorum, c 2. 
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Henry VIII then went on to defend papal primacy against the latter’s challenges in the section ‘Of 
the Pope’s Authority’, although he did not mention his role again explicity.139 
 
 As promised, on 11 October 1521 (at a public consistory), Leo proclaimed that Henry 
VIII was to become ‘Fidei Defensor’; the bull appears to recognise the English king’s 
longstanding protection of the Church with his ‘Material Sword’, in addition to the written 
defence against Luther, as the English had repeatedly desired. Notably, however, this document 
was not sent to England or handed over to Clerk at this stage.140 Indeed, the pope apparently 
delayed thanking Henry for the Assertio and notifying him of the honorary title ‘for his services 
to the holy see’ until 4 November, when he promised that the king would soon receive the 
appropriate bulls.141 This delay was probably linked to events in Calais; Leo was still quite cagey 
about English intentions and would have been reluctant to commit to this reward without any 
guarantee of English backing in the war against France. While the pope had responded to 
Wolsey’s request to commission someone to join the proposed truce (so that England could 
prepare for war) and had also sent a power to conclude an alliance with Henry and Charles, he 
does not seem to have received any tangible guarantee that England would honour its promise, 
according to the Treaty of Bruges, to attack Francis I in 1523.142 Being already at war with 
France, however, it appears that the pontiff acted, albeit cautiously, both by sending commissions 
that need not ultimately be exercised and by awarding the English king an honorary title, yet 
                                                 
139 Ibid., pp.4-8. 
140 The pope rejected, however, a late proposal (from members of the Sacred College) to add ‘Orthodoxus, seu 
Gloriosus, seu Fidelissimus’ to this label; LPIIIii, 1659 (11 October 1521, Rome); T.W. Gent (ed.), Assertio Septem 
Sacramentorum, ‘The Pope’s Bull’, pp.b3 on; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy v, p.375; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry 
VIII, p.116. 
141 LPIIIii, 1470 (4 November 1521, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
142 These papal powers arrived in Calais perhaps around 20 October and were probably sent around the time that Leo 
had decided to allow the Assertio to be presented in a secret Consistory; see below p.747. 
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withholding the bulls until such time as he was certain that Henry would act. The delay between 
the Consistory proclaiming Henry as ‘Fidei Defensor’ and the pope’s notifying him of this in 
riting can be attributed, therefore, to this uncertainty. On this basis, it would be surprising if w
Leo had released the bulls prior to the English actively joining the war, given the lengthy 
opportunity for Henry VIII to renege on this. 
 Back in England and Calais, news of the Assertio’s reception was eagerly awaited and 
received.143 Notification that the honorary title had been awarded reached Henry by 17 
November. He personally read Wolsey’s correspondence which described how the book had 
pleased the pope enough ‘to g[ive] unto him the high and most excellent tit[le] of Defensor of the 
Faith, to the perpetu[al] renown and glory of him and all his s[uc]cessors’. The king thanked God 
and the pope for having ‘given unto him so notable a reward spiritual for his labour, [with] the 
whole consent of all the College of Cardinals without contradiction’.144 Wolsey immediately 
instructed Clerk to have the bulls for the title expedited.145 No sooner were Henry and Wolsey 
celebrating news of the honorary title, however, than the pope died (1-2 December 1521). 
Probably recalling the obstacles that had arisen in 1513 to withhold Julius II’s promise of the 
investiture of France, Clerk immediately turned to gaining possession of the fidei defensor 
documents. He noted the uncertainty created by the interregnum and that ‘every one here begins 
                                                 
news of which he forwarded straight to his grateful king, who acknowledged this by the 27th; LPIIIii, 1709 (27 
October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1739 (4 November 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor). 
143 Wolsey apparently heard of the initial receipt of the book in Rome by the pope around either 14 or 22 October, 
144 As well as sending Henry two letters of congratulations of his own (one in English, the other in Latin), dated 11 
ey forwarded an extract of Clerk’s letters, two missives from Campeggio and a copy of a note from 
 fact that it refers to ‘the late Pope, Leo X’, confirms that it dates from outstide of the period under 
November, Wols
the secretary of de’ Medici. Richard Pace claimed to have read those from the cardinal to the nobles and councillors 
present, as per his instructions; ibid., 1771 (17 November 1521, Pace to Wolsey), 1772 (17 November 1521, [Pace to 
Wolsey], Windsor). There is also record of an oration given by Wolsey when presenting the title to Henry VIII, 
although the
analysis; ibid., 1659 (11 October 1521, Rome). 
145 Wolsey also instructed Clerk to have the king’s book distributed around universities; ibid., 1760 (Ellis, 282; 
calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]). 
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to shift for himself’. While he spoke reassuringly that the title was ‘under lead’ and signed by the 
Sacred College, he repeatedly failed to obtain it from them; they always promised to send it 
themselves.146 Clerk clearly feared this procrastination and with good cause. The interregnum 
dragged out for the rest of the month and Giulio de’ Medici, mentioned the title in a letter to 
Henry VIII on the 24th (as ‘the greatest proof of the esteem the Pope [Leo] had for him’), in an 
awaited the composition of verses in praise of Henry. The ambassador further implored Wolsey 
apparent bid for English support in the forthcoming conclave, although there was no direct 
mention of the bulls. 147 By the end of December, Clerk advised that the bull was ‘already sped in 
right good manner’, as Wolsey would see from the copy that he had recently sent him. The 
originals were held by de’ Medici and the orator told him to keep it safe so that, if he was elected, 
it would be unnecessary to lobby again. The cardinal protector agreed and added that they would 
have been sent already, had not Leo X not insisted on ‘divers verses and words’ to be composed 
in praise of Henry, which were intended to accompany the bulls. 148 
 The election of the non-curial Adrian VI on 9 January 1522 scuppered English hopes of 
easily gaining the bulls without seeking their confirmation. Nevertheless, Clerk pressured de’ 
Medici’s secretary (Gian Matteo Giberti), who held the documents, to release them. While 
Giberti admitted that that for the honorary title existed, he revealed that that confirming the 
king’s book did not. Clerk argued that Leo X had promised that everything was ready and only 
not to perceive any negligence on his part and relayed de’ Medici’s confidence that Adrian would 
                                                 
146 Ibid., 1825 (2 December 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). 
147 The Italian also enclosed letters written by Leo before his death, to which, he claimed, the pontiff intended to add 
a handwritten postscript. These may have mentioned the honorary title; ibid., 1893 (24 December 1521, [de’ Medici] 
 [Wolsey]). 
to Henry, Rome). 
148 Ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to
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issue confirmations.149 Finally, de’ Medici may have attempted a further strategy concerning the 
bulls as, during January 1522, he told Pace that he was sending the same Giberti to England 
‘upon the business that was to have been transacted with the late Pope’. If one takes into account 
that the secretary visited Charles V first, reportedly to seek the emperor’s backing for the next 
conclave, it could also be argued that Giberti sought the same outcome from Henry VIII, 
particularly given that he possessed valuable leverage.150 In the event, the bulls were not to be 
confirmed until de’ Medici himself did so in 1524 as Clement VII.151 
 
Scarisbrick describes the bestowal of the title fidei defensor as ‘a reward for persistence as 
much as virtue’ and, while this was partly true, it can also be viewed as papal recognition of 
Henry’s role in protecting the Church from France. Although the English king had to apply 
considerable pressure to gain this title, it was the culmination of a number of inducements that the 
                                                
pope could and did dangle in front of Henry, in return for his political backing, and that Henry 
clearly coveted.152 This process arguably began with the Golden Rose back in 1510 to draw 
England into a coalition against France, continued with the (potential) investiture of France to 
ensure that the English did attack the French, the Cap and Sword when Leo X wanted to induce 
peace with Louis XII (albeit these gifts recognised the king’s recent ‘protection’ of the Church 
against France), and finally the title ‘fidei defensor’, granted officially for Henry’s anti-Lutheran 
writing but also intended to recognise his practical defence of Rome. The offer and award of 
 
149 Ibid., 1960 (13 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
150 Unfortunately, nothing else seems to have survived concerning this mission; ibid., 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to 
[Wolsey], Florence), 1984 (24 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Florence), 1985 (24 January 1522, de’ Medici to 
 Wolsey, Rome); M.A. Tucker, ‘Gian Matteo Giberti, 
p.243, 245. 
[Wolsey], Florence), 2004 (30 January 1522, Campeggio to
Papal Politician and Catholic Reformer’, EHR, 18 (1903), pp.31-32. 
151 J.M. Brown, ‘Henry VIII’s book, “Assertio Septem Sacramentorum”, and the Royal Title of “Defender of the 
Faith”’, TRHS, 8, p
152 J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.117. 
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papal honours to the English crown during this period clearly demonstrates both that Henry VIII 
envisaged himself as a protector of the papacy’s political ‘independence’ from French dominance 
and that the popes recognised and played on this by using such awards to secure English support. 
3 
THE ROLE OF PAPAL CENSURES IN ENGLISH ATTEMPTS TO DEFEND THE 
PAPACY FROM FRANCE 
 
 Within its ecclesiastical armoury, the papacy possessed an array of spiritual weapons that 
it could wield against its enemies, political or otherwise. While the most well-known of these are 
probably excommunication and interdict, it could also reinforce these by promulgating economic 
sanctions, relieving populations of their obligations to their leaders, even deposing rulers, thereby 
justifying an attack (even crusade) against them and their states. It is almost universally accepted 
that the papacy’s spiritual weapons were (and had been for quite some time) integral to its 
political role as a temporal principate.1 A brief look at a bull of 21 July 1512 shows Julius II 
citing chiefly temporal motives in his publication of censures against the Biscayans and 
Cantabrians (and others of those regions), as well as those who assisted France against the papacy 
or its allies in the Holy League, militarily or otherwise. While the former were punished in this 
manner due to their being convinced by Louis XII ‘to become enemies of the Church’, there is a 
distinct political motive for the pope’s citing of the latter group; they threatened the territories of 
the Church.2 In the context of this study, it would be useful to define the key censures examined 
here. Excommunication of individual heads of state, at papal level, meant the act of excluding an 
individual from all aspects of religious life and, to a large extent, from society. It also referred to 
the subsequent state in which the individual was deemed to be. Only the pope could absolve the 
                                                 
1 Trexler envisages an ascending gradation of these spiritual punishments that may or may not be imposed by Rome 
one after the other, to induce submission; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.137-138; R.C. Trexler, The 
Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought IX (1974), 
pp.1, 8. For the relieving of subjects of their oaths and their connection with deposition, see E. Vodola, 
Excommunication in the High Middle Ages (1986), pp.21-23, 67-69. 
2 Sp.ii, 67 (LPIi, 1305; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid). 
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penitent recipient of the censure.3 Interdict, on the other hand, was a punishment whereby the 
ecc ed 
during the Middle Ages to be imp  of cities or states and it is in this 
nse that it must be considered here. As will be seen, it was often employed simultaneously with 
lesiastical life of a given area or group was to cease. As a papal weapon, this had develop
osed against entire populations
se
excommunication against a state and/or population and its leader(s), respectively. Again, only the 
pope (as instigator of the punishment) could remove the sentence.4 Confusingly, 
‘excommunication’ has often been employed by contemporaries and historians alike when 
‘interdict’ may have been the more appropriate term. This sometimes makes it difficult to 
correctly identify and understand the particular censure which is being referred to.5 Concerning 
                                                 
e 
excommunication itself can be subdivided into ‘major’ and ‘minor’ categories. One can further distinguish the ‘full 
in the face of defiance from the recipient. Here, however, the focus will remain on instances of excommunication 
issued by the papacy against the leaders of other states, which were invariably cases of the more serious ‘major’ 
excommunication (which technically excluded recipients from the Church, its sacraments, as well as from contact 
and support from almost elements of society, the one notable exception being one’s dependents; F. Donald Logan, 
Excommunication and the Secular Arm in Medieval England (1968), pp.13-15; R. Hill, ‘The Theory and Practice of 
Excommunication’, History, 42 (1957), p.1; R.N. Swanson, Church and Society, pp.179-181; E. Vodola, 
Excommunication in the High Middle Ages, pp. 14-16, 36-37, 45. 
4 Again, interdicts could be imposed by others, but it is papal instances that are the focus here; E. Vodola, ‘Interdict’, 
5 Among contemporaries, Trexler notes the use of ‘excommunication’ for ‘interdict’ among the lower levels of 
individuals who one would have expected to have been able to distinguish between the two. On 30 April 1509, for 
instance, Jerome Bonvisi (a papal notary and English solicitor) reported the excommunication of the Venetians. 
Ferdinand of Aragon uses the same term when writing to his daughter on the republic’s predicament in November of 
the same year. Even Henry VIII may have blurred the distinction between excommunication and interdict; apparently 
absolve ‘the Venetians, his friends, from the excommunication’. Even the pope himself pronounced ‘Greater 
Excommunication’ against the Biscayans, Cantabrians, and their adherents if they did not return to the obedience of 
the Church within three days, along with all those assisting, supporting or fighting for Louis XII and his allies. 
Finally, a Florentine diarist in June 1511, noted the pope’s excommunication of Bologna following the city’s 
3 It ought to be noted that popes were not th only individuals with the power to impose this censure and that 
ceremonial excommunication – the anathema’, intended to emphasise the seriousness of the censure or to reiterate it 
‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. iv, pp.536-538; F. Donald Logan, 
in J.R. Strayer (ed.), Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. vi, pp.493-497. 
society up to the end of the fifteenth century, but it seems to extend into this period at least and is apparent among 
quoting a letter to the pope from the English king, it was recorded in the senate that Henry requested that Julius 
throwing off the shackles of papal rule and welcoming the return of the Bentivoglio; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual 
ong historians, on the other hand, Shaw refers 
 on the republic was an 
Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, p.6; LPIi, 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome); 
Sp.ii, 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon); Ven.ii, 39 (LPIi, 373; 24 February 
1510, Paulo Capello to his brother, Rome); LPIi, 1305 (Sp.ii, 67; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons, Rome); A. de 
Rosen Jervis (trans.), A Florentine Diary from 1450 to 1516 by Luca Landucci Continued by an Anonymous Writer 
till 1542 with Notes by Iodoco del Badia (1927), p.245. Similarly, am
to ‘the bull of excommunication against Venice’ of 1509, when the censure that was laid
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the other papal censures, the economic sanctions that will be considered here are the right to 
confiscation of goods of those under excommunication or interdict; ‘a pretext for opportunistic 
robbery’, as Trexler describes it.6 The release of subjects from oaths and deposition are self-
explanatory concepts that were often inter-related, although they were usually a separate and 
secondary consequence of excommunication and interdict. They were, nevertheless, generally 
intended to be temporary, until the head of state or government had repented and was absolved by 
the pope. While, technically, vassals (and others subordinated by oath) were automatically 
released from their obligations to their lords when the latter were excommunicated, in practice 
this had long been a separate (and subsequent) pronouncement from the sentence of 
excommunication itself. The implicit intention of these acts was to allow the subjects of a 
deposed leader, whose obligations had been lifted, to rebel against them, not fight on their behalf 
(particularly against papal interests) and not contribute financially to their lord’s opposition to the 
papacy.7 After any or all of such censures were imposed, the papacy and its allies had ‘spiritual’ 
justification for war which may be presented as a form of crusade or a precursor to crusade (to 
the East), as the target was impeding universal peace (the necessary precondition to such a 
crusade).8 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
interdict. Similarly, Chambers cites the Venetian ambassadors in Rome during this interdict as ‘being 
excommunicate’. As a turn of phrase, Creighton even has Julius II ‘hurling his anathemas’, when he probably was 
referring to the pontiff’s tendency to impose excommunication and interdict on his temporal enemies; D.S. 
Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.24 n.; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.191; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.180. 
6 C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, p.138; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under 
Interdict, p.101. 
7 These censures were apparently separated from that of excommunication by Gregory VII in 1076. Concerning the 
desired consequences of these punishments, vassals and subjects had long been forbidden from fighting for an 
excommunicated lord, but deposition and the suspension of oaths reinforced this; W.J. Bouwsma, Venice and the 
Defense of Republican Liberty (1968), pp.7-8; E. Vodola, Excommunication in the High Middle Ages, pp.20-23, 67-
69. 
8 See above p.98. 
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In 1509, it would have been well-known within crown circles that Julius II was no 
stranger to using his spiritual weapons in the political sphere. He had excommunicated the 
Bentivoglio of Bologna (and their followers) in 1506 and would have been expected to lay 
Venice and its leaders under interdict as part of the League of Cambrai then formed against the 
republic. The main reason for Julius’ attacks on both was related to his attempts to secure and 
extend papal control over lands claimed as part of the Papal States.9 Similarly, Leo X’s wielding 
of spiritual weapons against Francesco Maria della Rovere, duke of Urbino, in 1516 was also 
motivated by temporal concerns.10 Some contemporaries readily recognised the underlying 
political motives of these papal weapons. For instance, Erasmus in his Julius Exclusus (c.1513-
1514), envisaged St Peter ridiculing the deceased Julius II’s use of these ‘thunderbolts’ in this 
manner and questioning their theological basis.11 Guicciardini, in a section of his History of Italy 
that was understandably omitted from Italian editions until long after his death, rued the historic 
tendency of popes increasingly ‘employing the terror of their spiritual weapons for temporal 
occasions…’.12 On the other hand those, such as Giles of Viterbo, Paolo Cortesi and Raffaele 
                                                 
a dispute over 
9 The interdict on Venice and excommunication of its senate duly came towards the April of 1509. Julius II also cited 
benefices for the breach, but this was not the root cause of the pope’s vilification of the republic; C.L. 
Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.138-139. Concerning Bologna, Julius also prepared to fulminate an interdict 
ainst the city, but apparently decided to limit his censures to the leading family and their adherents; W.K. Gotwald, 
cclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century (1927), p.71; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.159. 
10 The duke had conspired with France in 1515, prior to the battle of Marignano, withheld his military forces at the 
battle and afterwards stirred up the French king against the pope. As a result, Leo, citing breach of fealty, 
e 
poraries did perceive that the frequency of such use of papal censures had increased. Also see R.C. 
d with indulgences, excited fear and awe’. He also highlighted the ‘bad use of censures and arms’; W.J. 
and the Defense of Republican Liberty, pp.36, 38. 
ag
E
excommunicated the duke, deprived him of his lands and titles and placed the territories that continued to support 
him under interdict. The pope also planned to install his nephew, Lorenzo de’ Medici, in the duchy; W.K. Gotwald, 
Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century, p.81; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.147-150. 
11 The Julius Exclusus was published in 1517; P. Pascal (trans.), The Julius Exclusus of Erasmus, p.49. Also se
pp.55, 58. It must be noted that such criticism was not a new phenomenon, predating this period by at least 200 
years, but contem
Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, p.3. 
12 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.140 n., 147. Also see C.L. Stinger, The 
Renaissance in Rome, p.139. Machiavelli also criticised the politically motivated employment of spiritual weapons; 





with Rome.14 The role that papal censures played in the Anglo-papal political relationship was 
 perhaps did not wholly agree with this practice, but admitted that this was done 
ostensibly in defence of the Church and, therefore, the papacy.13 In essence, they recognised that 
this was a ‘necessary evil’ to ensure the papacy’s survival. While it is difficult to pinpoint the 
English crown’s attitude towards this practice, given that its principal figures do not appear to 
have commented publicly on such issues, one can probably lean them towards the latter camp, if 
any. It will become clear that Henry VIII did recognise the usefulness of papal censures in his bid 
to protect the papacy from the French and their allies and lobbied the papacy in this direction, but 
he was not oblivious to the potentially detrimental consequences, even indirect, that these could 
have on English interests, and the dangers that these posed when rivals like France attempted to 
influence the papacy in the same way. It is in these contexts that papal censures in the Anglo-
papal relationship demand attention. 
 
In light of the papacy’s preparedness to utilise these unique weapons in a temporal 
context, it is unsurprising that they were also politicised by the English crown in its relationship 
twofold. Firstly, they were an attractive reason for allying with the pontiff against England’s 
enemies, particularly France. Secondly, they were a reason to avoid the enmity of Rome and, if 
the English crown disagreed with their implementation (including against states and leaders with 
which it had no quarrel), they were ignored. There was, therefore, a sense of double-standards in 
Henry VIII’s treatment of the papacy’s spiritual weapons; this political expediency will become 
                                                 
13 J.F. d’Amico, Renaissance Humanism in Papal Rome (1983), pp.226, 235; W.J. Bouwsma, Venice and the 
haw, Julius II, pp.222-223. 
Defense of Republican Liberty, pp.7-8, 48; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.139-140. 
14 Despite some historians’ arguments that the employment of papal censures in a political context somehow 
lessened their effects, it will be demonstrated here that, even if this was the case, this did not dampen the desire of 
the English crown to have them imposed on mutual enemies. For an example of the former view, see W.K. Gotwald, 
Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century, p.82; C. S
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apparent in the subsequent analysis. Briefly, the reasons for these censures being a significant 
element of Anglo-papal policy lay in the political, economic and religious consequences they had 
(or could have) against the cited individuals, groups or lands cited. In a political sense, papal 
censures could help bestow papal, the Church’s and even God’s justification on a given conflict, 
discourage support or obedience being given to the recipient, even cause a rival to enter into 
‘rightful’ possession of certain lands and titles. In an economic sense, these spiritual weapons 
enabled the confiscation of the recipient’s or recipients’ goods and property. They were a 
particularly potent threat to states dependent on a strong mercantile element to their economy, 
such as Florence, which invariably had a considerable number of merchants and bankers (and 
assets) abroad who were vulnerable to the effects of these punishments, but they could also affect 
diplomats as well.15 The censure of deposition of a state’s leader could equally legitimise similar 
onfiscations, in addition to sanctioning invasion and regime change.16 Finally, in a spiritual 
sense, 
c
the original intention of these papal weapons, particularly in cases of excommunication 
and interdict, was to punish the recipient with their exclusion from the Church and its sacraments. 
The aim was for the recipient to feel that, without the ecclesiastical ‘insurance’ and protection 
involved with being a member of the universal Church, they needed to reconcile themselves by 
seeking absolution, in the cases focused on here, from the papacy.17 Of these consequences of 
papal censures, it will be the political and economic that will receive primary focus here. 
 
                                                 
15 This risk to the citizens residing abroad of, say, a state under interdict, had been extant for centuries. Moreover, the 
proximity to Rome and mercantile basis of the economies of most north Italian city-states made the economic 
implications of papal censures most serious for these entities; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.6, 222-223. 
16 R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.14-15. 
17 F. Donald Logan describes the intention of excommunication as ‘medicinal’ and one can also ascribe this adjective 
to other papal censures as well; the papacy’s intention was always for the recipient to seek the removal of the 
fulminations by submitting to the will of Rome; F. Donald Logan, ‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), 
Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. iv, p.537. 
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 Firstly, the English crown envisaged the papacy’s spiritual weapons as an attractive by-
product of having Rome as a political ally; they could be brought to bear against a mutual enemy, 
particularly France during this period when Henry sought to defend the Church, but also against 
the latter’s ally, Scotland. The sanctions that Henry VIII sought and/or observed from the pontiff 
ranged from excommunication and interdict to the deposition of the Most Christian King himself, 
along with the transfer of France to Henry, all as a prelude to papal-sponsored war against France 
(and Scotland). One can observe Henry VIII and his principal councillors advocating and actively 
seeking papal sanctions against England’s enemies during this period. Concerning the English 
desire to have sentences of excommunication and interdict fulminated against Louis XII (and 
later Francis I) and France, this was apparent when the papacy’s use of spiritual weapons was 
stipulated in the anti-French treaties of the period to which Henry VIII was party, as well as in 
actions, requests and statements reportedly emanating from the crown itself. 
Initially, England was intimately involved, through Bainbridge, in the negotiations which 
led to the Holy League of 4 October 1511. This bound the pope, in one of its articles, to 
excommunicate any opposition to the confederacy. In the military action that was to take place 
outside of Italy, the papal contribution was limited to its spiritual armoury.18 There would have 
been little doubt that France was the intended target. The English crown’s eagerness to observe 
such censures is next indicated when French intelligence from April 1512 reported that Henry 
ad refused to give audience to a French ambassador, having ‘learned from the Pope that the h
                                                 
18 Ven.ii, 1345-1346 (Sp.ii, 56; LPIi, 889; LPI, 1880-1881; 4 October 1511). England’s commission to Bainbridge 
(and the Spanish ambassador in Rome) to ratify the Holy League appears to have been dated 4 December 1511; ibid., 
140 (LPIi, 1001; arrival in Venice of an English courier carrying letters dated 4 December 1511, London). It ought to 
be noted that the inclusion of such clauses was normal and in no way exclusive to English involvement. 
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French are excommunicated, and are no better than dogs’.19 Similarly, by the end of May, the 
Venetian consul, Pasqualigo, talked of the English monarch’s resolve to act ‘against those who 
are excommunicated’, again suggesting the French, given the planned Anglo-Spanish attack via 
Guienne that summer.20 Subsequent treaties based on the Holy League against France also 
displayed a desire to use ecclesiastical sanctions against the mutual enemy. In a wider version of 
the league comprising the emperor, concluded 19 November 1512, it was provided that the pope 
excommunicate Louis XII and all Frenchmen.21 That the English crown was at least partly 
complicit in demanding these stipulations for the papacy is suggested by similar provisions being 
included in the more detailed and focused treaties concluded around the same time with two of its 
confederates, the Empire and Spain. In that with Maximilian (5 April 1513), Julius II was bound 
to excommunicate enemies of the league,22 while that with Ferdinand (18 April 1513) obliged 
them to induce Leo X ‘to excommunicate all the abettors and subjects of the King of France, 
whenev
                                                
er and as often as he is requested by the contracting parties, or any of them to do so’.23 
Whether the English crown was involved in instigating the deposition of Louis XII in March 
1512 is unclear, although one can clearly perceive a hope that this become permanent when 
 
been pronounced against Louis XII or France directly by this point, other than the then secret deposition of the Most 
Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century, p.77; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.364-365. 
ambassador in England Andrea Badoer, this time in the context of English military preparations against France; 
Ven.ii, 159 (LPIi, 1126; 30 April and 1 May 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
20 Ven.ii, 174 (LPIi, 1216; 27-29 May 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers in Venice, London). 
21 Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPIi, 1486; 19 [November] 1512). This confederacy also excluded Venice and Maximilian hoped to 
gain a papal pledge to level censures against the republic. In the event, Julius did admonish Venice that he would 
19 LPIi, 1127 (LPI, 3112; 1 April 1512). As will be outlined later, no excommunication or interdict seems to have 
Christian King on 20 March, news of which could not have reached England by 1 April, although Henry may have 
been forewarned about this. One can only otherwise speculate that the French were deemed ‘excommunicate’ on 
account of their adherence to the Council of Pisa, that first met in November 1511, which, according to the bull 
convoking Lateran V, thus sentenced all of its supporters; ibid., 932 (5 November 1511); W.K. Gotwald, 
That there was some belief in England that France had incurred ecclesiastical censure at this early point is suggested 
by a similar reference to the French as ‘excommunicated dogs’, at the turn of April-May 1512, by the Venetian 
wield his spiritual weapons against it if the republic did not come to terms with Maximilian, but does not appear to 
have followed this up; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.310-311. 
22 Sp.ii, 84 ([January] 1513). Also see ibid., 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3860; 5 April 1513). 
23 Ibid., 101 (18 April 1513). 
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Christopher Bainbridge, in Rome, repeatedly sought to gain possession of bulls that invested his 
king with the kingdom and its titles (in particular that of ‘Most Christian King’), thence to have 
them made public.24 It appears, however, that Julius II was behind this offer, despite the 
unlikelihood that it would be honoured unless Henry conquered France, as a political inducement 
to ensure English observation of the Holy League.25 Further and more direct evidence of the 
English crown actively pursuing such papal censures against France can be seen in the wake of 
Julius II’s death, when confirmation of the previous fulminations was needed from the new 
pontiff.26 On 12 or 30 April 1513, Henry wrote to Bainbridge in response to notification of Leo 
X’s election; in reply, he was keen to secure the new pontiff’s support for the impending English 
invasion of France, including Leo’s renewal of the spiritual censures pronounced particularly 
against Louis XII and France, but also against other enemies of the Church.27 By 25 June, 
Bainbridge notified Henry that Leo was sending two briefs confirming Julius II’s grants to him 
against the enemies of the Church, although the pope could not attack France himself.28 
Contemporaneous to Henry’s enthusiasm to take advantage of its alliance with the papacy 
in this way, he also sought similar benefits vis-à-vis the old French ally, Scotland. In this case, all 
of the running seems to have been done by England. Bainbridge worked to direct papal censures 
against Scotland as a result of Catherine of Aragon’s notification (18 September 1512) that James 
                                                 
24 See above pp.144-151. 
25 This being said, one cannot entirely rule out the idea coming from Bainbridge or from England. 
26 One can reasonably surmise that Henry VIII and his advisors were most concerned with Louis XII’s deposition 
resume that this request 
nry to Bainbridge, London). 
wal of the censure 
 Sp.ii, 132 ([September] 1513, Ferdinand to Cardinal Remolines). 
and the promised investiture of Henry with his kingdom and titles. In addition, one can also p
covered the bull releasing the French from their obligations to their king and the interdict placed on the kingdom in 
August 1512 (and reiterated in the third session of the Lateran Council on 3 December); N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees 
of the Ecumenical Councils, i, pp.597-598. 
27 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, He
28 Ibid., 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). Ferdinand also sought Leo X’s rene
of France in September 1513;
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IV had broken the Anglo-Scottish peace agreement.29 A monitory brief was granted by 24 
November and James IV had received this and a bull of execution by the following March 
(1513), for both of which the Scot blamed Bainbridge.30 The problem for England, however, was 
that a new pope had since been elected, which meant that these censures had to be reconfirmed. 
While Leo seems to have issued some sort of confirmation of those against Scotland in his first 
letter to Henry VIII, the king sought further clarification from Rome on these.31 By 25 June, the 
pope promised Bainbridge that he had written to James threatening that, if he attacked England, 
‘he [Leo] … woll not oonlie granntt unto Your Grace oon odr bull confirmyng the furst granntide 
by pope Julie butt also grantt oon harder…’.32 Perhaps satisfied with this, Bainbridge (and de 
Giglis) only returned to this issue on 15 September 1513, having heard of a Scottish incursion 
into England, when they sought the promised stronger bull. Despite French opposition, Leo 
reportedly pledged to send an orator to England with the desired bulls before Michaelmas. In any 
case, he presumed that the bishops of Durham and Carlisle would already have fulminated the 
                                                 
August 1509, which was a renewal of the peace between James and Henry VII from 1502, see LPIi, 153 (LPI, 474-
been ‘sanctioned by the strictest pontifical penalties’. Also, see James seeking exemption from his oath to observe 
the Anglo-Scottish peace, ‘ratified under apostolic censures’, because of Henry’s persistent infringement of the 
concordat (5 December 1511); ibid., 974 (LPI, 2020; 5 December 1511, James IV to Julius II), 1158 (LPI, 3146; 25 
April 1512, Leonard Lopez to James IV, London). Also see J.D. Mackie, ‘Henry VIII and Scotland’, TRHS 19 
o did not listen to 
 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, 
gainst Scotland when she wrote 
29 Ven.ii, 203 (LPIi, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London). For the treaty of 19 
475, 478; 29 August 1509). Both parties swore to observe the treaty under pain of excommunication (and, it seems, 
interdict); see, for instance, Leonard Lopez’s comments on the treaty to James in April 1512 which, he claimed, had 
(1947), p.98. 
30 James was reported to be so angry that he would not perform obedience to the new pontiff, if Le
his appeal against the censures; LPIi, 1735 (LPI, 3838; 1 April 1513, Nicholas West to Henry); D.S. Chambers, 
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.40. 
31 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London), 1775 (LPI, 3882; 13 April 1513, 
Nicholas West to Henry). 
32 Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPIii, 2029; LPI, 4283; 25
p.52. Catherine of Aragon may have been citing the confirmation of papal censures a
to Wolsey on 26 July that she was glad to have a brief sent to Henry; LPIii, 2120 (LPI, 4365; 26 July 1513, Catherine 
of Aragon to Wolsey, R[ichmond]). 
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excommunication originally expedited by Julius II.33 In comparison with the censures against the 
French, there is a distinct sense that, concerning Scotland, both Julius and Leo were reluctant to 
excommunicate James IV under their own authority. This was perhaps because the papacy had no 
direct quarrel with Scotland as, while that kingdom was an ally of France (and thereby liable to 
incur spiritual sanctions on account of their being contagious), it was not attacking the papacy 
directly and had not been party to the French-backed Council of Pisa-Milan. The English crown 
was, moreover, citing breach of oath as the justification of the sentence, which the pontiff was not 
really in any position to prove or disprove. It may well have been for this reason that the pope 
demonstrated his political support of England by devolving power and responsibility for the 
sentence against James IV to Bainbridge.34 
 
A similar impression of English enthusiasm for politically-motivated papal censures is 
gained from subsequent leagues intended against France, for which the pontiff’s support was 
hoped, expected or already attained. In negotiations during summer 1515 which led to England 
committing to join another league to defend the papacy against France, Leo X approached Henry 
          
VIII with a view to employing universal peace and a subsequent crusade as cover for this. The 
English king replied that he recognised the pope’s sense of obstacles caused by ‘the private 
interests of certain princes’, as a result of which he recommended that ‘such obstinacy should no 
longer be encountered by prayers, but by the spiritual sword, and [he, Henry] proffers his aid’.35 
                                       
Stuerd, but his instruction to compose a peace between England and Scotland make the 
ember 1515) understood that Henry had made to Rome and which, in the 
33 LPIii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome). A nuncio was 
commissioned, Balthazar 
enforcement of a stronger bull of excommunication unlikely; see below pp.438-439. 
34 LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]). 
35 LPIIi, 712 (15 July 1515, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). This is perhaps the request for papal censures against France 
that Ferdinand of Aragon (in Sept
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At a time when Francis I was increasingly rumoured to be preparing to descend into Italy, the 
English king clearly intended France as the object of these spiritual (and temporal) weapons. 
Henry may have been responding to a vague admonition issued by Leo during June, threatening 
censures against any aggressors to the Papal States, particularly the outpost cities of Parma and 
Piacenza.36 This was not pointedly against Francis I at this stage because the pope had yet to 
make his ratification of that year’s anti-French coalition public.37 If Henry was going to commit 
to this anti-Gallic alliance, however, an indirect threat was deemed insufficient and he 
consequently demanded a more public declaration of papal support. Ferdinand of Aragon 
understood this and encouraged the pontiff to wield the spiritual sword for his son-in-law’s 
benefit both in the summer and around mid-September 1515.38 In negotiations conducted in 
ome towards English membership of the anti-French league, it seems that censures were 
envisag
                                                                                                                                                             
R
ed, not least because it declared that the parties were bound to fight the ‘schismatics’. In 
addition a crusade was envisaged as the eventual aim.39 This league was never finalised, 
however, due to coalition’s loss at the Battle of Marignano (13-14 September). Subsequently, it 
was observed (probably by the Imperial Cardinal Lang) that, while the pope may have been 
induced to employ spiritual weapons if English commitment had occurred, his apparent leaning 
towards France at that point now made this unlikely.40 
 While the English crown struggled to organise an anti-French coalition involving the 
papacy from April 1516 on, it seems that use of the papacy’s spiritual armoury was always 
 
Spaniard’s opinion, would give his son-in-law the justification to attack Francis I; Sp.ii, 217 (14 September 1515, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). Also see ibid., 212 ([summer] 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
(14 September 1515, Ferdinand 
36 These territories were nominally held by Giuliano de’ Medici: W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.12. 
37 Public papal adhesion occurred during July 1515; see below pp.471-472. 
38 Sp.ii, 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 217 
to his ambassador in Rome). 
39 Ibid., 222 (calendared September 1515). 
40 LPIIi, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’). 
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envisaged. In the league ‘for defence of the Church’ eventually concluded in London on 29 
October 1516, Leo was expected to employ the spiritual arm in its support when he joined; 
excommunication and interdict were specifically mentioned and he was bound not to absolve 
anyone without the consent of his allies.41 Wolsey had been confident of such a clause shortly 
prior to this when he threatened the Venetians with such censures if they did not join the league. 
42 Similarly Wolsey, during December, notified Giustinian of his intention to demand that France 
and Venice cease their attack on the Imperial city of Verona, refusal of which would lead to 
England waging war on them as if they were ‘infidels’ and requesting the pope to censure both 
states, ‘so that should you choose to exist, it will behove you go into Turkey’.43 Given the lack of 
celebration surrounding the league, the English crown may not have been that confident of papal 
adhesion and, therefore, of the prospect of papal censures being fulminated. Indeed, Leo X 
visibly stepped back from the anti-French agenda following the defection of Charles and 
Maximilian to France by the Treaty of Noyon (13 August 1516) and, later, the Swiss.44 While 
papal ratification was not forthcoming, Leo continued to send positive noises to England and, as a 
result of an approach to gain a loan for the Urbino war during March-April 1517, was to offer his 
membership in exchange for this.45 Various papal commitments to the October league and its 
provisions for excommunication and censure were issued via a nuncio on 11 May and on 5 July, 
                                                
but these do not seem to have represented full adhesion to it. Indeed, Leo confirmed his 
membership of the league in August, but withheld this from de Giglis until 18 November 1517 
 
 
cember 1516, Giustinian to the Signory 
oise). 
41 Ibid., 2486 (29 October 1516); Sp.ii, 253-254 (15 November 1516).  
42 Wolsey pledged to lobby Leo X to excommunicate both Venice and France; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii,
pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
43 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.13 (Ven.ii, 822; LPIIi, 2642; 7 De
London). Francis I dismissed this threat when he heard of it; Ven.ii, 830 (22 December 1516, Venetian ambassador 
in France to the Signory, Amb
44 See below pp.557 ff. 
45 See below pp.606 ff. 
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and, even then, insisted that it remain secret.46 By this time, however, the English do not seem to 
have had much confidence in the coalition, let alone in the pope’s obligation to wield the spiritual 
sword. 
Finally, the English crown expected Leo X to use ‘the spiritual arm only’ against Francis I 
and France according to the Treaty of Bruges of 25 August 1521, by which Henry committed 
England to join the Empire in the conflict against France.47 Similarly, its extension to involve the 
papacy on 24 November also stipulated that France be laid under interdict.48 Prior or subsequent 
English pressure may have been deemed unnecessary, given that the papacy had already declared 
itself publicly against France and had started on this course already in late June 1521.49 At this 
point, Leo threatened with censure those who had invaded the Papal States, in particular the 
French commanders. While Charles V called for stronger sanctions, the excommunication of 
Francis himself, the pope did not respond until 4 September, when he demanded that the French 
cease hostilities and hand over Parma and Piacenza within 15 days, on pain of Francis and his 
generals incurring such punishment.50 
 
 In addition to Henry VIII’s enthusiasm for the papacy to employ spiritual weapons against 
the French and their allies when he was acting to protect the Church, the papacy equally 
recognised these as inducements to ensure English support and commitment against their 
enemies. The strongest example of this has already been discussed, whereby Julius II drew up 
                                                 
e censures’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
nours and prerogatives 
e Popes, viii, pp.46-49. 
46 Giustinian, reported hearing that it provided for the pope to ‘fulminat
p.95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIIi, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). LPIIii, 3437 (5 July 1517). 
47 It was stipulated that he ‘lay the whole of France under interdict, and withdraw all the ho
which the French have hitherto held of the Church of Rome’; LPIIIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). 
48 Ibid., 1796 (22 November 1521), 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, 
p.769. 
49 See below pp.734 ff. 
50 L. Pastor, History of th
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documents deposing Louis XII and investing the English monarch with the kingdom of France on 
20 March 1512 (also sanctioning Henry’s coronation as king). The catch was, however, that they 
were to be kept secret and the pope refused to publish them until Henry VIII had secured control 
of Fran
chieved, there was a slight chance, therefore, that English 
mbitions may be achieved. At the very least, the claim to France could be a bargaining chip in a 
ce, a position that Julius continued to hold despite sustained pressure from Bainbridge to 
obtain possession of the documents.51 Throughout this episode, one senses the papacy 
consciously employing its censorial powers (and powers of investiture) to induce positive English 
involvement in the conflict against France, without any serious intention of fulfilling its pledge. 
Only if Henry VIII dealt a knockout blow in France would the papacy’s bluff have been called. 
Conversely, the English crown, whether it believed the papacy or not, grasped at the bait offered, 
in the hope of realising its claim to France. Perhaps Henry was persuaded that there was a chance, 
however slight, of gaining at least papal recognition of his claim to the French throne, given that 
there was a recent precedent for Julius II investing a rival of Louis XII with a territory claimed by 
France. During July 1510, Julius II awarded the kingdom of Naples to Ferdinand of Aragon.52 If 
the Holy League’s military aims were a
a
future Anglo-French peace. Another occasion when the papacy used censures as bait for English 
support occurred in October 1516, when Richard Pace reported from Zurich, a papal offer via a 
nuncio to censure Francis I, using the latter’s usurpation of Milan as justification.53 Bearing in 
mind that Henry was, at that point, close to concluding a new anti-French league with Maximilian 
and the Swiss, it is entirely feasible that the pope envisaged such means vis-à-vis England to 
                                                 
51 See above pp.144-151. 
ry of France, iv, p.63. 
Zurich). 
52 J.S.C. Bridge, A Histo
53 LPIIi, 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, 
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ensure that this confederacy would align with him and/or his interests.54 Finally, papal 
recognition of the importance attached by England to the use of its censures can be seen in the 
excommunication of James IV 1512-1513. Despite its apparent reluctance, the papacy still 
delegated authority for this action to Cardinal Bainbridge, thereby indicating support for 
England’s defence of the Church against its enemies, even though France had been the main 
target.55 
It was not just the papacy that recognised the value placed on its spiritual censures by 
England when acting in defence of Rome; other states also identified and used this to encourage 
Henry VIII towards war with France. As early as September 1510, for instance, the Venetians, 
understanding that Julius II was considering such weapons against their mutual enemy, 
encouraged the pope in this direction, believing that such a move would induce English actions 
against Louis XII.56 Again, during October 1512, Venice wrote to its ambassador in Rome 
concerning the likely abandonment of the Anglo-Spanish invasion of Gascony. The republic 
asserted that it would write to Henry VIII, not only to urge his continuation of this expedition, but 
to request that the pope ‘transmit spiritual weapons and censures to aid the war in the duchy of 
Guienne’.57 Similarly, Ferdinand of Aragon in December 1513, seeking a renewed Holy League 
with England, wrote to his ambassador with Henry that ‘if the Pope has already absolved or is 
about to absolve the King of France, and if the schism is at an end, the Apostolic censures against 
the King of France must last until he gives back that of which he has unjustly deprived his 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 2497 (calendared start November 1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIIi, 
2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
ory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
enetian ambassador at the Curia). 
55 See below pp.422-424. 
56 Ven.ii, 79 (LPIi, 567; 7 September 1510, Sign
57 Ibid., 198 (LPIi, 1432; 11 October 1512, Signory to the V
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neighbours’.58 During the summer of 1515, Ferdinand encouraging resistance to Francis I’s 
expedition to Italy, instructed his orator in Rome, to persuade the pope both to write to Henry 
VIII and to pronounce Francis I excommunicated, which he claimed that Henry desired very 
much.59 By 14 September, Ferdinand reiterated that Leo ought ‘to publish, without delay, the bull 
of censure against the French which the King of England has asked of him. He is to stigmatise the 
French as usurpers of the property of their neighbours and disturbers of the peace of 
Christe
concede readily to all of Henry VIII’s requests in this area just because he was acting to protect 
                                                
ndom, and as the obstacle to war with the Infidels. Such a bull will have great weight with 
the King of England. It will animate him and furnish him with a good pretext for declaring 
war’.60 Finally, this sentiment can be seen in the Imperial minister, Matthew Lang, during 
December 1515, when the cardinal reportedly told Robert Wingfield that, if it had been known 
that Henry was willing to enter the Holy League that year, both pope and emperor could have 
been urged to ask Henry to start the war and Leo X could have been encouraged to fulminate 
censures against France.61 
 While these instances demonstrate considerable English enthusiasm for the use of papal 
censures against France and its allies, and some success in having them employed, particularly 
when seeking to act in defence of the Church, it should be borne in mind that having the pope as 
an ally did not automatically mean that he would wield them on demand. Indeed, as the obstacles 
raised in Bainbridge’s attempts to gain the brief investing Henry with France and the papacy’s 
reluctance to excommunicate James IV directly both demonstrate, the pontiff was not prepared to 
 
58 Concerning England, this could mean just Guienne/Gascony or even the kingdom of France itself; Sp.ii, 146 (6 
5, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
[December] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England). Also see ibid., 147 (6 [December] 1513, Ferdinand to 
his ambassador in Germany). 
59 Ibid., 212 ([summer] 151
60 Ibid., 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
61 LPIIi, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’). 
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him.62 Historically, the papacy had been fairly reluctant to impose such sanctions against heads 
of state, if they could be avoided.63 The perceived gravity of such weapons can be discerned 
through Julius II’s apparent reservations about leveling them against Louis XII and France, 1510-
1512. Initially, around November 1510, the pope excommunicated the French commander-in-
chief, de Chaumont, and his captains, along with Milan (a French dependency), when the former 
appeared with his army before Bologna, where the pontiff was then resident.64 If one bears in 
mind that the papacy had been openly in conflict with French interests in Italy since July 1510, 
why did Julius II limit his censures to the French army within Italy?65 The most obvious reason is 
that formal papal censure against the Most Christian King and his kingdom was a major step to 
take and would cement a breach with a ‘superpower’ that maintained a strong military presence 
in Italy. Julius was perhaps not ready to do that at this stage, not having formed the necessary 
coalition to help him resist this. Again the pope skirted around the issue when he 
excommunicated the adherents of Louis XII on 16 April 1511.66 Indeed, the French king could 
ave inh curred automatic censure on a number of occasions, such as on his intended adherence to 
                                                 
62 While Julius did depose Louis XII, such an action was theoretically meant to be temporary, until repentance and 
intended to be permanent and would have instigated a serious political situation in its future relations with France. 
have been uncomfortable about censoring a king with whom he had little quarrel, other than the Scot being an ally of 
Louis XII. While the pontiff did potentially have grounds for excommunicating James, as an ally of the schismatic 
king of France, the Scot had neither adhered to the Council of Pisa nor attacked England (yet). The only tangible 
grounds that Julius II could employ were Henry VIII’s rather subjective claims that it was solely James that was in 
excommunication, but not directly through him. 
63 Hill argues that the papacy was reluctant to censor the secular power on which it relied for the enforcement of its 
spiritual punishments (at all levels, from personal to state), as well as for papal authority in general; R Hill, ‘The 
Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, History, 42, pp.6-7. 
absolution. By making the investiture of Henry VIII public, the pope would have indicated that the deposition was 
Concerning the excommunication of James IV, that this was allowed through Bainbridge, suggests that Julius II may 
breach of the Anglo-Scottish peace. As an ally of England, the pope met Henry half-way by allowing the 
64 Ven.ii, 88 (LPIi, 613; 16 November 1510, Signory to Badoer). Theoretically, Louis could have incurred 
, although one can trace Julius’ sentiment back at least to the absolution of 
ury, p.77; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, 
excommunication as a result of his continued association with his excommunicated captains in Italy, but the gravity 
of the sentence against a king probably demanded a separate sentence in practice. 
65 Since attacks on Genoa and Ferrara
Venice in February 1510; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.252-263. 
66 W.K. Gotwald, Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Cent
vi, p.346. 
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the Council of Pisa, as condemned in the bull summoning the Fifth Lateran Council of 18 July 
1511.67 As already stated, actual papal censures against France only began to be issued in March 
1512, when Louis XII’s titles and territories were secretly transferred to Henry.68 The pope went 
one step further in consistory, either in May or July 1512, depriving Louis XII publicly in front of 
the cardinals and pledging the transferance of these titles and territories to Henry if he gained 
control of France.69 On 13 August, the same pontiff imposed an interdict on France, which was 
reissued in the third session of the Lateran Council on 3 December.70 Also, some months prior to 
September, possibly at the same time as the deprivation of Louis XII, Julius released the 
Christian King’s subjects from their oaths and obligations.71 It is uncertain whether Louis XII 
was personally excommunicated (as James IV was), although this is likely, at least because of his 
support for the ‘schismatic’ general council, as well as on account of his having been deprived 
and his subjects released from their oaths.72 
                                                 
Council of Pisa, along with threats of such a sentence against the French cardinals if they took part; W.K. Gotwald, 
Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century, p.77; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.332, 364-365. 
67 There had been talk of excommunicating Louis during the summer of 1510, prior to the initial summoning of the 
A similar reluctance on the part of the papacy to censure Louis and France can also be interpreted from the interdicts 
e Popes, vi, p.388; A. de Rosen Jervis (trans.), A Florentine Diary, 
e former citing July and the latter May; F.J. 
Councils, i, pp.597-598. 
al sovereign’, see Ven.ii, 203 (LPIi, 1391; 18 September 
icate by virtue of his support for the schismatic council, see Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPIi, 1486; 19 [November] 
placed, 1511-1512, apparently against Bologna for its contribution to the overthrow of papal authority and definitely 
against Florence and Pisa, the former for its allowance of the Council of Pisa to meet in the latter. The political 
object of both censures was to cease their support of France, but their contagious nature does not seem to have been 
passed on to their French allies, nor had there yet been any specific spiritual punishment of the French king or his 
kingdom. For the probable interdict against Bologna (although a contemporary diarist states it was 
excommunication), see C.M. Ady, The Bentivoglio of Bologna, p.204; A. de Rosen Jervis (trans.), A Florentine 
Diary, p.245. The likelihood that this censure occurred is indicated by Julius, when announcing the loss of Bologna 
to the Sacred College, attributing at least some of the blame to treachery by its population; L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vi, pp.349-350. For the interdict of Florence, see S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco 
Guicciardini, pp.234-235; L. Pastor, History of th
pp.247-250; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.180, 183, 185-186. 
68 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.38-40, 50-52; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.43-44. 
69 The following authors disagree on the date of this event, th
Baumgartner, Louis XII, p.223; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.38-39. 
70 Curiously, the interdict cited the duchy of Brittany to be immune from the interdict, while Lyons and the fairs that 
it held were specifically mentioned; N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical 
71 STC 25947.7 (University of Birmingham, Special Collections). 
72 For Catherine of Aragon calling Louis ‘that schismatic
1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London). For other references suggesting that Louis XII was 
excommun
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 The political motivations for such English enthusiasm for the employment of papal 
censures, particularly against France, require consideration. One reason was Henry VIII’s 
perception of himself as a defender of the Church. At all levels, papal censures required at least 
the assistance of, if not enforcement by, the secular arm; to perform this role at an international 
level was a mere extension of a more day-to-day function.73 In political terms, therefore, Henry’s 
claim to fulfil this defensive role, combined with papal approval, provided legitimacy for an 
attack on a mutual political enemy. If the papacy also fulminated ecclesiastical censures against 
this enemy, from excommunication up to deprivation, then justification of the casus belli in this 
context was practically watertight both politically and in the eyes of God.74 Indeed, this 
validation was reinforced by the fact that papal censure in defence of Church territories and 
possessions had long been accepted in canon law.75 It was entirely reasonable, therefore, for the 
crown to expect Julius II and Leo X to implement these sanctions when England was acting to 
protect the Church, as an integral part of the broader military offensive. This bestowal of papal 
legitimacy on such a conflict could also have important domestic implications; fighting against an 
                                                                                                                                                              
1512), 138 (17 October 1513), 146 (calendared 6 December 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz); Ven.ii, 316 (22 September 
1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai). Ferdinand, in particular, implies this when he reported Louis’ 
renunciation of Pisa-Milan and adherence to Lateran V, thereby gaining pardon and absolution for both himself and 
France; Sp.ii, 152 ([December 1513], Ferdinand to his ambassador in Germany). For an example of historians 
believing Louis to be excommunicated, see W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, i (1853), p.333. 
73 Concerning papal censures at a state level, towards the end of the fifteenth century, Lorenzo de’ Medici 
commented to Innocent VIII that ‘an interdict unsupported by armies produces little effect’, although one could 
probably substitute ‘interdict’ for any papal censure; W.K. Gotwald, Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the 
rial prince, to 
er powers of Christendom for the 
8; R.N. 
Fifteenth Century, p.82. While at state or head of state level, the papacy did have the means, as a territo
contribute to the imposition of say an interdict, in a military sense, against lesser Italian powers, it is probably safe to 
say that it was forced to rely upon external secular assistance from the oth
realisation of its spiritual sentencing against more distant and powerful states and their leaders. 
74 F. Donald Logan, ‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer (ed.), Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. iv, p.53
Swanson, Church and Society, pp.179-180. 
75 R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.14-15. It was also in these terms that a 
French herald in Venice explained Louis XII’s intention to attack the republic on 17 April 1509; J.S.C. Bridge, A 
History of France, iv, p.20. 
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excommunicated king might have great propaganda value among those from whom the crown 
wished
Aragon used the presence of English forces as cover for his conquest of Navarre.78 Even if 
 to raise money and recruit troops. Why else would Wolsey, on 22 September 1512, have 
issued an inspeximus of the bull that released the subjects of Louis XII from their allegiance to 
him?76 
Secondly, by seeking papal censures against mutual enemies, the English crown hoped to 
ensure its allies’ observance of treaties to attack those opponents. By having a head of state 
sentenced as excommunicate, for instance, all papal allies became duty-bound to attack this 
recipient. A similar motivation is visible in the stipulations of confederacies which often bound 
each adherent to attack a particular power under pain of excommunication. A treaty drawn up 
around September 1515 which provided for English membership of an anti-French coalition that 
had been formed with papal involvement earlier in the year and which claimed its aim to be 
(universal peace and) a crusade against the Turks, accordingly stipulated that Leo excommunicate 
any member which failed to fulfil its duties.77 Through such clauses, Henry VIII may have hoped 
that the risk of censures would cause Spain, for instance, to honour its pledge to join with English 
forces in a joint attack on Guienne in 1512, but it was not that easy. In the event, Ferdinand of 
Ferdinand had been judged to have clearly breached his oath in this respect, it is highly unlikely 
                                                 
76 STC 25947.7 (University of Birmingham, Special Collections). Already, in the Parliament of February 1512, a 
letter from the pope to Henry VIII, requesting aid against France, was read aloud. In a similar fashion, this would 
have been intended to have both justified the intended war against France and to convince the grant of revenues to 
pay for it; LPIi, 1065 (LPI, 2010; calendared 20 February 1512, Julius to Henry, Rome). 
77 Sp.ii, 222 (calendared September 1515). 
78 For Henry’s reported dissatisfaction with Spanish actions, see Ven.ii, 205 (LPIi, 1417; 1 October 1512, Badoer to 
e). While the abstracts of the treaty between England and Spain, 17 
5 (LPIi, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512). 
the Signory), 211 (LPIi, 1475; 9 November 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London), 220 (LPIi, 1586; 20 January 
1513, Pasqualigo to his brothers in Venic
November 1511, that arranged for this expedition do not explicitly mention ecclesiastical censures, one can interpret 
them as being at least implied, as both parties would have sworn oaths to observe it; Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 
1980; 17 November 1511), 6
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that the pope would have fulminated against him. Ferdinand was too powerful to offend, 
particularly while Julius II was at war with France and, in any case, it would be nigh on 
impossible to enforce excommunication without military coercion. Overall, one can thereby 
perceive that, although it was hoped that the threat of papal censure might ensure the 
commit
                                                
ment of England’s allies in their defence of Rome, this was impossible to enforce. 
Thirdly, Henry probably hoped that the use of papal spiritual weapons against enemies 
would reduce their military threat. For an excommunicated monarch, while the sentence 
technically entailed a temporary lifting of their subjects’ oaths to them (legitimising the 
withholding of revenues, military dues and even permitting rebellion), the contagious nature of 
the sentence also meant that their troops would incur the same punishment.79 Papal sentences of 
deposition and suspension of subjects’ obligations aimed for the same consequences. While these 
censures were never likely to affect the loyalty of Frenchmen, the papacy evidently believed that 
it could discourage non-French troops from being recruited or hired.80 Instead of relying on the 
unspecified effects of general sentences against, for example, adherents to Louis XII, the papacy 
issued specific bulls against those that it wished to discourage. On 21 July 1512, for instance, 
Julius II excommunicated the Biscayans and Cantabrians (complicit in France’s taking of Church 
lands) and ‘all who assist the King of France against the Apostolic See or its confederates, or who 
 
ember 1512, a letter to 
ement with the French fleet, whereby a suicidal move of one Frenchman, 
79 It was expected that contact with the excommunicate cease completely; E. Vodola, Excommunication in the High 
Middle Ages, pp.67-69. 
80 Even for those who fought for, say Louis XII against England, it must have crossed their minds that death in battle 
was risky to an excommunicate. This was certainly perceived by the English, as on 27 Sept
Bainbridge in Rome reported a naval engag
who allegedly set alight the gunpowder on his ship, caused the writer to comment that he (the Frenchman) ‘preferred 
to die a heretic’. Obviously, this risk was dependent on the recipient acknowledging his excluded status, which was 
unlikely, but this caused considerable handwringing by Henry VIII and his ministers in the case of James IV’s death 
at Flodden, causing Henry to write to the pope, requesting permission to take the body to London to be buried with 
royal honours; LPIi, 1403 (27 September 1512, - to Bainbridge, London), 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 
1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). 
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take service in his army, although they may have bound themselves to do so by a solemn oath’. 
While Henry VIII probably had nothing to do with this sentence, he was sent a copy of the bull 
which he would have probably welcomed.81 Similarly during March 1512, Julius II forwarded to 
Cardinal Schiner, his legate with the Swiss, a bull excommunicating those who went to fight for 
France.82 Again, there is no reason to believe that the English crown would have had any part in 
this, al
censure them; its hosting of the schismatic general council, for which it had no choice.85 On this 
though it would have doubtless welcomed such discouragement of renowned Swiss 
mercenaries from being employed by Louis XII, potentially against English forces. Of more 
direct relevance to England, in February 1513, the pope censured German mercenaries serving 
Louis XII against Henry and Ferdinand, whom he called ‘defenders of the Church’.83 One can 
further explain Henry VIII’s reported enthusiasm for the pope to fulminate censures against 
France during 1515-1516 at least partly as a bid again to discourage the Swiss, particularly when, 
during 1516, Henry VIII was trying to recruit them himself.84 While the efficacy of these 
spiritual weapons is impossible to discern, their issue presumably indicates that the papacy, at 
least, expected them to achieve at least some success. Pisa, for instance, was one place where 
interdict apparently caused a withdrawal from pro-French policy; also, to a lesser extent Florence, 
in 1511-1512. Papal sanctions appear to have affected the ‘hearts and minds’ particularly of the 
‘subject’ population of Pisa, which did not agree with the reasons for Julius II’s decision to 
                                                 
81 Sp.ii, 67 (LPIi, 1305; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons, Rome). In a similar vein, the Venetians were apparently 
unable to hire Swiss mercenaries because of their interdicted status, 1509-1510; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.240. 
82 C. Shaw, Julius II, p.295. 
83 LPIi, 1655 (LPI, 4832; calendared February 1513). 
84 Sp.ii, 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand 
to his ambassador in Rome). For England’s attempts to recruit the Swiss from late 1515, see pp.493 ff. 
85 Florence itself also tried to distance itself from the council; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican 
Florence under Interdict, pp.178-186. There are also parallels with the interdict threatened by Julius to Bologna in 
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basis, it is not inconceivable that the English crown envisaged the interdict against France 
causing pro-English elements (perhaps in Gascony or other areas that it claimed) to come out in 
its favour or withhold support for Louis XII. Finally, and most specifically, the English crown 
may have envisaged that papal censures against France could bring it closer to realising its age-
old claim to the French throne. While the papacy may have instigated the idea to invest Henry 
with the realm and its titles, the offer was firmly grasped and, through Bainbridge, its realisation 
repeatedly sought. 
 
 In spite of the English crown’s eagerness to seek papal censures against France and other 
enemies for their consequential political implications, it also recognised their advantageous 
economic effects, particularly the legitimisation of attacks on enemy merchants and their 
property, albeit with the important caveat that English trade was not to be affected until the last 
possible moment.86 Intelligence from France around the beginning of April 1512 revealed the 
French belief that Henry would not observe the papal censures understood to be applicable vis-à-
vis French merchants for a period of one to two months, until war commenced but, the author 
speculated, as the English king was influenced by his father in law, ‘he will not be long in taking 
his advantage’.87 This intelligence proved correct, as Lancaster Herald’s mission to the French 
                                                                                                                                                              
1506 if it did not expel the Bentivoglio, although the French intervened in support of Rome here; C. Shaw, Julius II, 
pp.159-161. 
86 The economic effects of state level excommunications and interdicts were not always explicit in the sentences 
fulminated although, in practice, political rivals were usually quick to recognise and act upon them, particularly 
ouwsma, 
epublican Liberty, p.50. Also see F. Donald Logan, ‘Excommunication’, in J.R. Strayer 
rned from the 
against the merchants of the censured power. In this light, Bouwsma argues that the effect of papal censures had 
diminished in Florence by 1500, that it was only being assessed in terms of its impact on trade; W.J. B
 Venice and the Defense of R
(ed.), Dictionary of the Middle Ages, vol. iv, p.536. 
87 That this referred to the interdict against France is suggested by the author of this news report suggesting that the 
French ambassador in England recently had an audience with the king on account of Henry having ‘lea
Pope that the French are excommunicated, and are no better than dogs’. In this case, the English crown would have 
logically assumed that economic sanctions against French merchants were now legitimised; LPIi, 1127 (LPI, 3112; 1 
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court later in the month to declare Henry VIII’s intention to go to war to support the pope 
involved an offer ‘that, for two months, French merchants shall not be molested in his dominions, 
and requests that Louis will allow a like privilege to English merchants’.88 Louis XII’s reply 
(around 27 April), however, was quite dismissive, reasoning that, as England and France were 
not at war, trade ought to continue as per usual.89 In light of the French disinterest in England’s 
offer to overlook the economic implications of papal censures, it appears to have become ‘open 
season’ on French naval vessels. Lorenzo Pasqualigo reported to Venice in May that the English 
ad seized ten Breton barks and four Spanish ships, containing merchandise belonging to 
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Florentine and Genoese traders. In reply to complaints from the merchants, Henry ‘declared the 
prize to be lawful, as said merchants, holding to France, are excommunicated and accursed on 
account of their being opposed to the Church’.90 In relation to these economic sanctions, on 17 
December 1512, crown instructions were issued to proclaim the prohibition of the import of 
Gascon wine into the kingdom.91 This prohibition was reiterated in a licence given to two Italian 
merchants, on 6 February 1513, to import all types of merchandise, including Toulouse woad, 
with the express exception of Gascon wine. 92 Why the wine was banned and the woad permitted 
 
Venetian ambassador in England; Ven.ii, 159 (LPIi, 1126; 30 April and 1 May 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London) 
88 LPIi, 1169 (LPI, 3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission). That this approach was made by 
rgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois). 
 it is entirely feasible that this related to an attack on a Breton 
April 1512). That there was some belief in England that France had incurred ecclesiastical censure at this early point 
is suggested by a similar reference to the French as ‘excommunicated dogs’, at the turn of April-May 1512, by the 
the herald is confirmed by an Imperial representative at the French court on 24 April; ibid., 1157 (24 April 1512, 
Andrea da Bo
89 Ibid., 1163 (27 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois). 
90 Ven.ii, 168 (LPIi, 1183; 6 May 1512, Lorenzo Pasaqualigo to his brothers in Venice, London). For an apparently 
separate incident of English seizures that involved Franco-Imperial trade also in May 1512, see LPIi, 1228 (6 June 
1512, Paul de Laude to Margaret of Savoy, Blois). Furthermore, in the ‘King’s Book of Payments’, sums are 
awarded in August 1512 to two men, the first for ‘attaching a Breton at Lyme’ and the second ‘for bringing up the 
same Breton’. The context of this is not clear, but
merchant vessel; LPIIii, p.1457. 
91 LPIi, 1524:34 (LPI, 3597; 17 December 1512). 
92 Ibid.. For an English merchant licenced in August 1512 to import Toulouse woad, see ibid., 1365:9 (LPI, 3369; 11 
August 1512). 
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is not stated, but it seems sensible that the former was not deemed vital to the English economy, 
while the latter was integral to its reliance on the wool trade. Still, this indicates that the crown 
could pick and choose economic areas in which it would observe papal censures against France. 
That these were observed is most powerfully demonstrated on 23 January 1513, when a member 
of the Venetian embassy in London reported that the effects of Henry VIII’s observation of the 
spiritual punishments leveled on France were biting. He wrote that ‘formerly many rich French 
merchants had houses in London; some of those who remain have been imprisoned, and their 
goods seized and sequestrated. Some French tradesmen have also remained, but when the English 
found them abroad, they maltreated them’.93 These incidents demonstrate a deliberate decision to 
implement the interdict against France, as an enemy of the Church, adherent to the schismatic 
council and opponent of the Holy League, although Henry had tried to avoid it for as long as 
possible before open hostilities broke out. Finally, in December 1516, shortly after the English 
crown finalised a league to defend the Church which envisioned papal censures, Wolsey 
demonstrated his enthusiasm for the economic threat implied by such sanctions, when he 
threatened France and Venice via Giustinian: if those states did not respond to an English demand 
to cease their attack on Verona, he said, ‘we are disposed to wage as utter war against you as if 
you were so many infidels; you will be prohibited trading all over the world; and we shall 
endeavour to get his Holiness to excommunicate both the most Christian King and your 
Signory’.94  
 
                                                 
93 Ven.ii, 219 (LPIi, 1591; 23 January 1513; Niccolo di Favri to Francesco Gradenigo, London). 
, 822; LPIIi, 2642; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory 
hreat; Ven.ii, 830 (22 December 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Amboise). 
94 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.13 (Ven.ii
London). This was made known in the French court by the Venetian ambassador there, in reply to which Francis I 
dismissed this t
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 The sources also indicate that, despite his economic aggression, Henry VIII was not fully 
prepared to impose papal economic sanctions against France, or rather ‘French’ merchants 
favoured by England, and could circumvent or ignore restrictions. In terms of evading these 
constraints, the English crown could make favoured merchants denizens. In addition to availing 
the recipient of fiscal benefits from which, as foreigners, they had previously been excluded, at 
times of papal censure, this probably also bestowed on them to the protection of the crown.95 
There was a small flurry of such grants from June 1512; for instance, Martin de Pyn, a merchant 
from Bayonne, was granted denization on 18 June 1512.96 Nor was the benefit of denization 
limited to merchants; it was also granted to a clerk, a gentleman usher of the Chamber, and others 
whose occupations are not identified and who were natives of various regions of France, 
including Brittany, Gascony (and Aquitaine), the Loire, Maine and Normandy.97 In addition, it 
seems that the crown also ignored the papal censures against the French and their allies when it 
granted licences to individuals to import and export around this time. Four Genoese traders were 
licenced to do business throughout England on 16 May 1512.98 A merchant from Toulouse and 
                                                 
Giuseppi, ‘Alien Merhcants in England in the Fifteenth Century’, TRHS, 9 (1895), pp.75-98; G. Rosser, with Scottish 
History of Britain, i, 600-1540 (2000), p.341. 
96 LPIi, 1266:15 (LPI, 3247; 18 June 1512).  
 Ibid., 1221:19 (LPI, 3185; 7 May 1512), 1316:5 (LPI, 3286; 2 July 1512), 1316:17 (LPI, 3300; 9 July 1512), 1316: 
36 (LPI, 3318; 17 July 1512), 1316: 37 (LPI, 3324; 19 July 1512), 1365:15 (LPI, 3379; 17 August 1512), 1365:22 
1462:8 (LPI, 3
1512), 1602:
95 For legal and fiscal restrictions placed on ‘alien’ merchants that were removed by virtue of denization, see M.S. 
material by E.P. Dennison, ‘Urban Culture and the Church 1300-1540’, in D.M. Palliser (ed.), The Cambridge Urban 
97
(LPI, 3391; 28 August 1512), 1415:22 (LPI, 3430; 23 September 1512), 1415:29 (LPI, 3444; 30 September 1512), 
455; 6 October 1512), 1524:7 (LPI, 3563; 4 December 1512), 1524:26 (LPI, 3587; 14 December 
4 (LPI, 3643; 5 January 1513), 1662:38 (LPI, 3734; 16 February 1513). Interestingly, no denizations of 
renchmen can be found prior to May 1512, suggesting that they may well have been motivated by the perceived 
apal censures against France; ibid., passim. 
98 Ibid., 1221:32 (LPI, 3199; 16 May 1512). Genoa was a staunch ally of France and it has already been mentioned 
how merchandise belonging to a native of this state had been seized by crown representatives on account of their 
being excommunicated; see n.90. Florence was placed under interdict 23 September 1511 to 31 March 1512, a 




separate censure because it hosted the Council of Pisa in its subject town. While no evidenc
suggest that denizations or licences to trade were issued to favoured Florentine merchants or citizens in England 
during the interdict, there was a flurry of licences issued in subsequent months (from May 1512). Given the 
significance of Florentine trade and Henry VIII’s earlier treatment of Venice in this regard, it is unlikely that
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one from Bordeaux were granted licences to import Toulouse woad and Gascon wine and export 
wool, among other goods, on 22 September 1512.99 Similarly, a licence to trade in England was 
granted to two Breton merchants on 23 October 1512.100 As mentioned earlier, a licence to two 
Italian merchants (from Pisa and Lucca), permitted the import of Toulouse woad, but upheld a 
ban on Gascon wine.101 In these cases, while the privileged individuals were doubtless favoured 
by the English crown, the latter was reluctant to sever ties with them by virtue of papal censures 
against France.102 Indeed, the geographical origins of some may betray political motives on the 
part of Henry VIII and his ministers. Firstly, the Bretons were a special case, as their duchy was 
excluded from the interdict published first in August 1512.103 Thus the denization and licences 
may have, in fact, demonstrated strict English observance of the censure, particularly as those 
confiscating French goods were not likely to have taken the time to establish the origin of the 
merchants and whether the interdict applied to them. Other crown grants were made to Gascons, 
their duchy closely associated with English claims to the French throne and the object of an 
intended expedition during 1512.104 If Henry VIII soon hoped to acquire this territory, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                              
crown set about confiscating the Tuscan state’s property in England, although the number of licences (as well as 
denization and other privileges granted), unprecedented in this reign, do suggest that a degree of safeguarding against 
future censures was felt necessary by the merchants in question; ibid., 1221:25 (LPI, 3192), 1266:24 (LPI, 3257), 
15:10 (LPI, 3410), 1462:16 (LPI, 3466), 1462:17 (LPI, 3467), 1494:13 
e three licences to trade were granted to French merchants prior to May 
1266:25 (LPI, 3259), 1316:32 (LPI, 3312), 14
(LPI, 3511), 1524:33 (LPI, 3596), 1662:48 (LPI, 3746), 1662:53 (LPI, 3756). For the Florentine interdict, see A. de 
Rosen Jervis (trans.), A Florentine Diary, pp.247-250; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence 
under Interdict, pp.185-186. 
99 LPIi, 1415:17 (LPI, 3424; 22 September 1512). 
100 Ibid., 1462:28 (LPI, 3482; 23 October 1512). 
101 Ibid., 1662: 15 (LPI, 3710; 6 February 1513). 
102 Perhaps unsurprisingly, only two, or mayb
1512 (from Henry VIII’s accession), which suggests a link between the perceived papal censures against France and 
the aforementioned measures taken by the English crown. During August 1509, the widow of a Breton merchant was 
permitted to import Gascon wine, as were two Gascon merchants in July 1510. Also in July 1510, a Piers Nerbon 
was licenced to trade in the same goods, but his place of origin is not stated; ibid., 158:21 (LPI, 402; 4 August 1509), 
546:21 (LPI, 471; 28 August 1509), 546:21 (LPI, 1143; 3 July 1520).  
103 N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, pp.597-598. 
104 See n.102. 
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it was prudent to maintain good (mercantile) relations with his potential subjects. The same could 
be argued for the natives of Normandy who benefited from crown protection around this time. 
 From this, it is clear that a contradictory position was adopted vis-à-vis these 
ecclesiastical punishments; on the one hand, a natural desire to disrupt the mercantile revenue 
streams of its enemy, but on the other, a willingness to make exceptions (not just among 
merchants), so that the English economy and, presumably, the crown’s involvement in it, was 
affected as little as possible. Crown protection of merchants from censured states was by no 
means new and can be traced back in England at least to the Florentine interdict of 1376.105 
Indeed, the papacy itself was known to act similarly, as it demonstrated when Julius II shielded 
Florentine merchants in Rome (curiam romanam sequentes) from the consequences of their 
state’s interdict, 1511-1512.106 The motives for these juxtaposed positions are not difficult to 
discern; while the benefits of seizing an enemy’s goods and wealth during wartime are self-
explanatory, Henry took a broader view of English trade, undoubtedly envisaging a time when 
the censures would be lifted, war ended and trading relations returned to normal.107 If Henry 
ruined French merchants during the war, it would impede existing and future trade. This attitude 
ld expect similar sanctions to be imposed on traders 
is perhaps encapsulated in the ban on Gascon wine, compared with the continued allowance of 
the import of Toulouse woad. Furthermore, Henry VIII clearly appreciated the vulnerability of 
English merchants in France and elsewhere, when he enforced the economic dimension of 
excommunications and interdicts; he wou
from his own realm and this clearly informed his request to Louis XII in 1512 to allow each 
                                                 
105 R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.59-66, 101. 
106 Ibid., pp.179-180. 
107 Trexler cites an unwillingness by states to permit ‘the dangers such licence [by permitting the confiscations 
al censure] posed to public order, and to the whole merchant community’; ibid., p.101. allowed by pap
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other’s merchants to continue unmolested for two months, despite Henry’s declared intention to 
observe the papal censures against France.108 The English king may also have hoped that, by 
                                                
naturalising favoured ‘alien’ merchants and excluding certain goods from the censures, his 
French counterpart may do something similar, thus limiting the inevitable attack on English 
mercantile interests that would result from Henry’s imposition of papal spiritual weapons. 
A significant problem inherent in assessing the economic effects of papal censures during 
wartime, or even the preliminaries to war, is that mercantile property was usually among the first 
to be attacked in any conflict. It is, therefore, difficult to ascribe Henry VIII’s actions vis-à-vis 
French traders wholly to his observance of, say, the interdict of France, when he would probably 
have targeted them anyway.109 Nevertheless, it is probable that the English crown did take such 
actions, in part at least, due to the ecclesiastical justification provided by the papacy’s censures. 
This idea becomes more convincing considering the opposition that Henry displayed towards 
such economic consequences on occasions when he opposed the interdict that permitted them, as 
in his dealings with Venice in 1509-1510.110 
 
 This was apparent in James IV’s complaints to Henry through Lord Dacre, during July 1512, that his merchants 
that the Scottish king was not excommunicated, so Scots could not have incurred papal censures by transmission in 
1512, Dacre to Henry, Carlisle Castle). For James IV’s excommunication, see above pp.182-184. Incidentally, in the 
bull that eventually excommunicated James IV, the ground on which was condemned was as ‘an adherent of the 
Schismatics’; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.53. Another example of the English crown limiting Scottish 
he possibility that James 
e-conduct (on the seas) for Scottish merchandise on the pretence that he was securing passage 
108 See above pp.197-198. 
109
had been imprisoned in London and their goods confiscated. James referred to ‘Englishmen “calling yame the Pape’s 
men”’. If this refers to the English themselves claiming to act on behalf of the papacy, then one can interpret this as 
an assertion to be acting, perhaps, by virtue of papal censures, as Scotland was an ally of France and, in the eyes of 
some, would have thereby automatically incurred ecclesiastical punishment. At this point, it ought to be remembered 
this manner. The only basis on which it could justify these seizures, vis-à-vis ecclesiastical punishments, is that 
Scotland was an ally of France and, therefore, its merchants’ goods were liable to confiscation in the same way as 
those of Florence and Genoa a few months earlier; LPIi, 1297 (LPI, 3320; 18 July 1512, James IV to Lord Dacre, 
Edinburgh). Also see ibid., 1298 (LPI, 3321; 18 July 1512, James to Dacre, Edinburgh), 1302 (LPI, 3326; 20 July 
trade for reasons other than papal censure can be seen in March 1513, when Henry wrote of t
IV had requested a saf
for his navy (and perhaps victuals); LPI, 3811 (20 March 1513, Henry to the dean of Windsor). 
110 See below pp.212-220. 
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While, for the most part, the English crown was eager to benefit from the justification 
provided by papal censures, particularly against the French and their allies, it was, on the other 
hand, quite dismissive of them and their authority when they did not suit English interests, 
although not defiantly so. Henry was tacitly able to ignore threats of ecclesiastical punishments, 
claiming immunity from such censures. Henry and his advisors were prepared to overlook the use 
of eccle
ance would be open to challenge if there was an 
alternative source of power. Alongside this, kings of England had long asserted their immunity 
ent by the papacy.112 Yet, while Henry VIII could claim that papal 
siastical weapons against friendly states, or powers with which they had no quarrel. 
The problem with the papacy’s employment of its spiritual weapons for political purposes 
was that, if the institution was unduly influenced by France for any reason (a situation that was 
feared by the English throughout this period), these censures could theoretically be turned against 
England. In practice, however, the English crown had long provided against this risk 
domestically by not recognising papal censures under common law; the pope could not impose 
sanctions as he was not an official of that legal system.111 This was logical, given that English 
common law was the monarchy’s tool for imposing its authority and governance over its 
territories and that this authority and govern
from spiritual punishm
censures did not apply to him, he could not prevent their being issued from Rome. However, he 
had various strategies available to him to counteract any such threats. He could prevent the 
relevant brief or bull from entering England, he could stop it from being published and, even if it 
                                                 
111 J.H. Baker (ed.), The Reports of Sir John Spelman, vol. ii, Selden Society, 94 (1977), p.65. 
112 For crown immunity in a general sense, see R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under 
Interdict, p.18. Crown immunity was implied in a thirteenth century conflict between crown and Church, whereby 
Edward I insisted upon the exemption from excommunication of crown officials. This culminated in Edward 
instructing the English episcopate in 1281 not ‘to attempt anything to our prejudice, or that of our realm, or against 





                                                
 had the means to prevent it being enforced (within the kingdom, at least).113 Outside 
England, however, it ought to be noted that the English crown had no such option to control the 
impact of excommunication or interdict; on a political level, the observation and imposition of 
such censures by other states was dependent on Henry VIII’s prevailing role in continental affairs 
and his relationships with individual princes. He probably understood that his allies would turn a 
blind eye, as he did, it will be seen, with the Venetian interdict of 1509-1510, and that his 
observe them, although it would remain to be seen whether acts of war would be actioned 
through their imposition.114 Theoretically, Henry only had tenuous potential forums for appeal 
against papal censures, to one of which most states on the receiving end of Rome’s spiritual 
weapons claimed to seek recourse; a future general council or pope, although the papacy 
naturally rejected these.115 In an economic sense, the implicit vulnerability of English merchants 
overseas to the imposition of papal censures was subject to the same dynamics as in the political 
sphere although, if the situation were to ever arise, Henry probably envisaged negotiating with 
other princes to avoid the inevitable confiscations and trade embargos as much as possible, just as 




Hill, ‘The Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, History, 42, p.4; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, 
Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.17-20; E. Vodola, Excommunication in the High Middle Ages, p.189. The 
crown’s reluctance to admit a legate a latere into England (until Wolsey’s appointment as co-legate with Campeggio 
 figure, independent of 
113 The non-recognition of these sanctions went back as far as William the Conqueror. In addition, the Constitutions 
of Clarendon (1164) precluded any recognition of the excommunication of crown officials, without royal consent; R. 
in 1518) may well have been due in part to a reluctance to risk the presence of such a powerful
the crown, who had within his remit the ability to fulminate papal censures himself, as well as to enforce those of the 
pope; see for instance pp.631-632. 
114 For Henry VIII ignoring theVenetian interdict of 1509-1510, see pp.212-220. 
115 See below, pp.206-207 (esp. n.119), 222. 
116 See above pp.197-198. 
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While the English crown claimed domestic safeguards against papal punishment 
(although it had little control over how these would manifest themselves externally), the English 
crown faced no tangible threat of censure by Rome during this period. While the legitimacy of 
the papacy’s spiritual armoury in England was not admitted vis-à-vis the crown, it was not 
prepared to rock the bark of St Peter by open and vocal defiance. Despite a tendency to pick and 
choose the elements of papal authority that it recognised at any given time (often according to its 
political interests), the crown did still adhere to papal spiritual supremacy. Despite the crown’s 
legal rejection of papal authority in this sense, it seems that, in terms of foreign policy, the 
potential implications of papal censure were at times feared. As the English diplomat Sir Robert 
Wingfield (then resident in the Empire) revealed to Wolsey in December 1515, he had not 
forgotten the interdict of England under King John when he outlined the historic enmity between 
England and France, and how this could be affected by Rome.117 On the other hand, while the 
crown was prepared to ignore excommunications and interdicts against those with whom it had 
sympathies, it did not do this in a particularly public manner and the papacy never challenged 
Henry VIII on this.118 Finally, if one speculates as to what Henry VIII would have done if he was 
excommunicated, if England was placed under interdict, or if he received a stronger papal 
nction, it is difficult to envisage his reaction to be any different to the likes of Venice in 1509. 
Venice had repeated its actions of 1483; it questioned the validity of the interdict given its 
sa
political nature, refused to publish it within the state, appealed to a general council and sponsored 
                                                 
117 LPIIi, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’). 
118 Hill identifies a reluctancy on the part of the papacy to impose excommunication on monarchs, on whom it relied 
d where, despite occasional threats, 
er and, only then, permitting loopholes and effectively placing blame on 
 ‘The Theory and Practice of Excommunication’, History, 42, pp.6-7.  
for the realisation of papal authority within their territories, particularly in Englan
only John was actually censured in this mann
the king’s advisors; R Hill,
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anti-Julian propaganda.119 Henry himself took precautionary action against expected 
excommunication in 1533, when he appealed peremptorily to a future general council. This 
initiative was proclaimed merely weeks before Clement VII threatened the English king with 
such punishment unless he reconciled with Catherine. In the event, however, the 
excommunication was never issued.120 
While the papacy never threatened England directly with censures during this period, the 
crown risked incurring excommunication and interdict during 1509-1510, as a result of its 
continued association with Venice, then subject to papal censure.121 An implied and ultimately 
empty threat seems to have come from Jerome Bonvisi, one of the English solicitors in Rome, on 
30 April 1509, when he informed the crown of the imminent Venetian interdict and enclosed a 
                                                 
ot
of Tours (that met on 15 September 1510) consider, among other matters, the validity of such actions by the papacy 
u
Council; and even to the Holy Spirit and to the whole body of believers. This was in spite of the fact that an appeal to 
excommunicate] would also deny that the excommunication really existed, since it was unjust…’. Back in the 
Anne Boleyn ensured that this did not come into effect. A similar bull was prepared against Henry in 1538, which 
121 In May 1513, Ferdinand, attempting to avoid war with France and to gain support for his truce with the latter, 
apparently tried to get the pope to act as a mediator between England and the Empire on one side and France on the 
other. If Henry or Maximilian were reluctant, he envisaged Leo (and the Lateran Council) wielding his spiritual 
weapons against them to bring about universal peace; Sp.ii, 104 (calendared 21 May 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy to 
English crown in 1514, had 
119 The Venetian appeal to a council was secretly attached to the doors of St Peter’s in Rome. The republic had 
challenged the validity of papal censures against it in terms of their political m ives as early as 1201, while Florence 
did so as early as 1376; W.J. Bouwsma, Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty, pp. 49-50, 80-81, 100-101; L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.312, 320. Concerning the legitimacy of papal censures, Louis XII had the Synod 
when the recipient had unsuccessfully requested papal arbitration and was defending themself from the papacy itself. 
The response of the synod was that the pope’s spiritual weapons, in these circumstances, could be considered invalid; 
J.S.C. Bridge, A History of France, iv, pp.93-94; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.330. More generally speaking, 
recipients of papal cens res also often appealed ‘to the Pope better informed, to a future Pope, to a future General 
a future General Council was made a reason for excommunication ipso facto by Pope Pius II, in 1459. He [the 
thirteenth century, the decretist Hostiensis admitted that papal censures could be unjust, upon which the pope in 
question would be punished if this was the case; W.K. Gotwald, Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth 
Century, pp.82-83; E. Vodola, Excommunication in the High Middle Ages, p.51 n.42. 
120 Henry was excommunicated in consistory again in 1535, but the death of Catherine of Aragon and execution of 
provided for his deposition and the suspension of his subjects’ oaths, but again this was not effected; J.J. Scarisbrick, 
Henry VIII, pp.317-320, 335-336, 361. 
France). Also, hypothetically, if a joint Anglo-French attack on Navarre, mooted by the 
been serious and had taken place, Henry would have risked incurring excommunication (presumably among other 
papal censures against him and his kingdom), as on 21 September that year a secret treaty was concluded between 
Leo X and Ferdinand of Aragon (then ruler and occupier of Navarre), in which the pope promised excommunicate 
anyone who attacked the Catholic King; ibid., 188 (21 September 1514). 
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copy of the bull.122 His words have an admonitory tone, possibly forwarding a message from the 
pope himself.123 While broadly a pro-papal news report on the initial successes of the Cambrai 
coalition against Venice, Bonvisi also reported that ‘the Pope is angry with three barons of the 
Ursins [Orsini], who had proposed to succour the Venetians. They have now submitted, and 
asked the Pope’s forgiveness’. This refers to an incident where the Orsini, for business reasons, 
chose t
commanded his attention and that any opposition to Cambrai would risk spiritual censure.125 
o ignore the spiritual censures imposed on the republic. It is implied, however, that the 
Orsini admitted their error and had reconciled with the papacy.124 Shortly after, Bonvisi mentions 
that ‘the Pope always asks for the King’ and, although this refers to current reports of Henry 
VII’s poor health, it could also be interpreted as an informal warning to the English king that, the 
pope’s preoccupation with military matters in Italy notwithstanding, peripheral England still 
Despite Henry VIII’s subsequent actions that undermined the Venetian interdict, it is significant 
that no further papal warning or action resulted.  
                                                 
122 LPIi, 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome). 
123 In addition to his position in English diplomatic service, Bonvisi was also employed by the papal favourite (who 
was probably also cardinal protector of England), Francesco Alidosi. It is clear from other correspondence from 
English diplomats in Rome that the pope or his intimates quite routinely instructed crown representatives to convey 
their views, opinions and requests, and it is quite feasible that, at this stage, the papacy feared England’s intentions 
considering it had not responded to its overtures to join the League of Cambrai; see above pp.31-32 n.75, 361. 
124 Creighton describes the Orsini’s defiance of the bull as being a case of returning money to the Venetian envoy, 
nvisi to Henry VII, Rome). The date that the bull of excommunication was 
lated. 
despite Julius II forbidding them to do so. The Orsini thought it worth risking excommunication for the sustenance of 
their good reputation. Bridge, on the other hand, outlines a dispute where the pope prevented the Orsini from fighting 
on Venice’s behalf; J.S.C. Bridge, A History of France, iv, p.20; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.117-118.  
125 LPIi, 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bo
published appears to be under dispute. Shaw cites 26 April 1509, while most other sources cite 27 April; M. 
Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.117-118; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.311-312; C. Shaw, Julius II, 
p.235. Bonvisi was not entirely accurate when stating that the excommunication came into force on 27 April, as the 
bull stipulates that it would only be enforced if, within twenty four days, Venice had not returned the lands and 
revenues from the Romagna claimed by the Church; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.235. Bonvisi presumably believed that the 
papal terms were too harsh for the Venetians to submit to. It was likely to have been a calculated ultimatum, 
designed to be too unpalatable to the republic. Bonvisi would also have calculated that, by the time the letter arrived 
in England, the twenty four days would have elapsed, thus making the excommunication real. According to Pastor, 
600 copies of this strongly-termed bull were immediately printed and circu
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The only other occasion when England seems to have risked spiritual censure from Rome 
came in October 1516, when Richard Pace wrote to Wolsey of the arrival in Zurich of a papal 
brief threatening excommunication, it appeared, of all the confederates and their ambassadors, 
including England. Pace, however, demanded that the pope either write in the allies’ favour or 
remain neutral.126 To put this into context, the English had been negotiating towards a league 
against France in the preceding months, although the pope had recently declared, since Charles of 
Castile had defected to the French, that he was unable to risk offending Francis I.127 In this light, 
such a move by Rome would have been of great concern, indicative of the French influence over 
Rome. Nevertheless, no reaction has been detected in England, although a treaty to defend the 
Church was concluded on 29 October 1516 albeit without papal adhesion and with low key 
celebrations, perhaps in case Leo X turned against it. There seems to have been no further move 
made in this direction by the papacy, as Leo soon approached England for money to support his 
war in Urbino, for which he was soon prepared to join the English coalition.128 Henry VIII had, 
therefore, ignored this indirect threat of papal censure and had tacitly called the papacy’s bluff.  
 
 In addition to the crown’s various domestic safeguards against the papacy’s spiritual 
weapons, one can also observe Henry VIII deliberately seeking to avoid political situations where 
censures might be incurred. On occasions when the papacy was perceived to be pro-French, the 
English crown sought to avoid universal peace initiatives emanating from Rome. While it has 
already been demonstrated that Henry VIII urged the papacy to pursue a general peace in 1510, 
so that those who refused to join could be ‘considered as a common enemy’, presumably then 
                                                 
126 LPIIi, 2495 (calendared end October, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). 
127 See below pp.557-559. 




imself. These culminated in November 1517 with Leo forming a commission of cardinals to 
g various spiritual sanctions, he would also have recognised the danger of the tables of 
such a strategy being turned against England if the papacy was dominated by France.129 A 
‘French’ papacy would be expected, in such cases, to wield ecclesiastical censures against 
England if it did not comply. An implicit fear of this was declared by de Giglis to the pope after 
the Bologna meeting between Francis and Leo in December 1515. Faced with the prospect of a 
pope susceptible to French influence, which had just discussed universal peace and crusade, the 
orator voiced his suspicion of French intentions for an Anglo-Scottish reconciliation as a part of 
this, believing that Francis only intended this so that he could attack England when he was ready. 
The pope, perhaps understanding that the English also suspected that he would use ecclesiastical 
censures to back such a campaign, replied that he ‘would be the first to draw both swords against 
him [Francis]’.130 
 Subsequently, the English felt the effects of French influence over Rome, as they failed to 
gain firm commitment from Leo to resist this. Concomitant with this were increasing calls from 
the pope for universal peace and crusade, at least partly as an attempt to tackle the French threa
h
draw up a crusading strategy to be distributed to princes for consideration.131 This proposal 
envisaged that peace be established in 1518 ‘under pain of papal censure’.132 While it has already 
been argued that a lack of English response was motivated by a fear that the crusading 
mechanism might be adapted by the French to their own ends, it seems that Henry VIII and 
Wolsey were also concerned about the prospect that papal censures may also be used to further 
                                                 
129 LPIi, 354 (LPI, 1457; calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]). 
Bologna). 
ber 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
d end November 1517). 
130 LPIIi, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, 
131 LPIIii, 3801 (18 Novem
132 Ibid., 3816 (calendare
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these ends, potentially at England’s expense.133 It was Wolsey himself who voiced this concern 
when he eventually replied to the papal appeal in late February 1518. To launch a crusade, he 
stressed the need for a general peace, which had been and still was being prevented by Francis I’s 
Italian ambitions. If this was impossible through diplomacy, Wolsey recommended that spiritual 
weapons be employed to bring this about.134 By this approach, therefore, the English crown 
sought to ensure that the French would be constrained under pain of censure by any papal 
crusading initiative, rather than be allowed to make a move on Naples under cover of this. If, 
while bound to such an agreement, Francis then acted in Italy, Henry VIII could lobby Leo to 
censure him on account of a breach of oath, similar to the justification used against James IV in 
1512-1513.135 In spite of this English approach, the pope had already decided to implement his 
own strategy, proclaiming a five year truce in early March 1518, for which legates a latere were 
to be despatched to the princes. When news of this arrived in England, Wolsey reacted by 
usurping the papal initiative to English ends, again to ensure that it did not allow Francis a free 
rein in Italy.136 This marked a success in the English crown’s attempts to restrain and distract the 
French from gaining further influence from Rome, albeit involving the papacy as little as 
possible, and culminated in the Treaty of London of 2 October 1518.137 This universal peace 
agreement was, as one would expect, bound by the oaths of the kings which, if breached, would 
open them up to the threat of ecclesiastical censure.138 Indeed, on 16 October, Henry swore to 
observe the marriage element of the agreement (of Princess Mary to the dauphin), enjoining 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 3781 (8 November 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
134 Wolsey further outlined his belief that Francis was mobilising an army for Italy; ibid., 3973 (27 February 1518, 
Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.178-181 (Ven.ii, 1022; LPIIii, 4076: 12 April 1518).  
135 For James IV’s excommunication, see LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]); also 
see above p.184. 
136 See below pp.630 ff. 
137 See pp.125, 629 ff. 
138 See below pp.643-644. 
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Wolsey to excommunicate him and lay England under interdict if he failed to do this.139 This was 
obviously a ‘loaded’ pledge, however, given that the legate was never likely to carry this out (not 
least because he eventually brought about a contradictory foreign policy in 1521). Nevertheless, 
Francis I was also bound by threat of papal censure to observe the agreement. While references 
have been found to such penalties vis-à-vis paying a dowry to England for the marriage and to 
refrain from fortifying Tournai, it is probable that Francis was so bound to keep the peace.140 
Notably, Charles V began accusing his French counterpart of breaching this treaty from April 
1521, in a bid to invoke England’s obligation to side against the ‘aggressor’ and besought the 
pope to censure Francis at the end of June.141 While the English crown did not attempt to 
reinforce these overtures, it ought to be noted that Henry and Wolsey were still publicly playing 
the role of arbiters at this point, their increasing commitment against France remaining secret.142 
In connection with this, one can cite a final instance when Henry sought to avoid being open to 
accusations that he was in breach of an oath. In November 1521, he notified Wolsey of his 
wariness of the truce that the cardinal was trying to facilitate at Calais. He was concerned that, if 
he swore to be the conservator of this truce, he would either have to break this oath in siding with 
Charles or breach the Treaty of Bruges, if he sided with France, in the coming conflict.143  
 
Also revealing of the English crown’s attitude towards papal censures vis-à-vis its desire 
to protect Rome from France was its reaction towards the imposition of such weapons against 
                                                 
139 LPIIii, 4504 (16 October 1518).  
140 Ibid., 4626 (6 December 1518, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich), 4687 (calendared end December 1518, 
ructions for Cheyney). 
. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.46-49. 
. 
d 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). 
Henry to Knight). Francis was also similarly bound to pay a pension to England; LPIIIii, 1991 (calendared 26 
January 1522, inst
141 See below pp.694 ff; L
142 See below pp.695 ff
143 LPIIIii, 1762 (calendare
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states with which England had no quarrel. Essentially, Henry VIII and his advisors could ignore, 
as much as possible, the spiritual weapons wielded against such states and sought to continue 
normal relations with them.144 A notable and reasonably well-documented example is their 
reaction to the interdict of Venice, imposed 27 April 1509, to bolster the League of Cambrai’s 
offensive against the republic. The crown would have expected the papacy to take this action, in a 
bid to shore up spiritual justification for the Cambrai conflict.145 It implicitly opposed this, 
however, at least partly because of a fear of the consequences for papal political independence if 
Venice was to fall. 
 Having received a copy of this bull to publish, Henry VIII was placed in a difficult 
position. His immediate political outlook was quickly becoming obvious to all; belligerently anti-
French.146 In this light, the destruction of Venice, one of the few strong and independent states in 
the peninsula that could oppose France and help him defend the papacy, therefore, was definitely 
not in English interests.147 The first indication of tacit defiance by the crown came when letters 
from Venetian merchants in England arrived in the republic in 10 June 1509, reporting (probably 
correctly) that Henry had refused to publish the papal bull.148 Henry proceeded to defy the bull 
                                                 
4 It ought to be noted that ignoring papal censures against heads of state and the states themselves was by no means 
mited to England and predated this period. Venice, for example, ignored excommunications and interdicts imposed 
both on i
recipient
Venice and the Defense of Republican Liberty, pp.80-81. Also see the various measures taken by western European 
145 As noted earlier, the papacy would have been expected to commit to fulminate at least excommunication and/or 
interdict as one of its obligations laid down in any treaty of confederacy, in this case the League of Cambrai. 
 England; Ven.ii, 5 (LPIi, 67; 10 June 1509, receipt in Venice of letters 
ops’ registers that have been checked, nor is 
s publication in the collections of royal proclamations (while the publication of such a bull 
s not an unprecedented procedure as, for 
14
li
tself and other states; during the war of the Otto Santi (1375-1378), it even became complicit with the 
 of such an interdict, Florence, by offering to protect its interests in Flanders and Ireland; W.J. Bouwsma, 
heads of state (including England) to circumvent the interdict of 1376 in order to protect the Florentine merchants 
and bankers resident with them; R.C. Trexler, The Spiritual Power, Republican Florence under Interdict, pp.44-108. 
146 See below pp.362-365. 
147 It ought to be borne in mind that, realistically speaking, England was unable to do anything to actively oppose a 
coalition that comprised the most powerful states of Christendom. 
148 It is unclear who sent these reports from
from England). No mention of the bull has been made in any of the bish
there any indication of it
would not necessarily have been expected via royal proclamation, it wa
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both politically by continuing to grant audiences to the Venetian ambassador and by acting to 
subvert it (ultimately despatching an orator to Rome to undermine it), and economically by 
encouraging the republic to continue trading with England, even lobbying some members of the 
Cambrai league to permit the unmolested passage of Venetian galleys to England. 
 Henry and his advisors maintained personal contact with the Venetian ambassador Andrea 
Badoer throughout the period of the interdict, risking excommunication themselves through the 
contagious nature of ecclesiastical censures. Conversations between king and ambassador 
reportedly covered Henry’s sympathy for the plight of the Venetian republic, his own personal 
hostility against France, and the actions that he took to end the attacks on Venice (notably writing 
to the Cambrai confederates, mediating on Venice’s behalf with the emperor and writing to the 
pope to lift his censures against the state).149 Nor was Badoer’s contact with the English crown 
limited to the king; it also included Henry’s intimate councillors. He occasionally names Fox, 
                                                                                                                                                              
example, Henry VII published Innocent VIII’s 1485 bull recognising m as the true king of England); Reg. de hi
Castello; Reg. Mayew; R.W. Heinze, The Proclamations of the Tudor Kings (1976), p.66, no.5. 
149 Badoer’s first recorded audience with Henry VIII seems to have been just after the new king’s coronation (24 
June) and reportedly took place throughout the period of the interdict, all the way up to the orator’s presentation to 
, (LPIi, 
ignory to Badoer) 24 (LPIi, 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 25 (LPIi, 280; 
January 1510), 30 (LPIi, 322; 5 September 1513, 
Henry of a copy of the bull of absolution, prior to 6 April. The orator gives the impression that he was able to gain 
audience whenever correspondence from his state arrived. Equally, the Venetian government was rightly under the 
impression, from very early on, that Badoer would be able to continue normal diplomatic relations with the English 
crown, as is indicated by its instructions to him throughout the period of the interdict, in which the orator was 
frequently ordered to seek audience of the king and his intimate advisors. Among the objectives that Badoer was 
instructed to facilitate were an English attack on France, English mediation between Venice and the Empire, a loan 
from England and the formation of an anti-French coalition; Ven.ii, 2 (LPIi, 53; 30 May 1509, Signory to Badoer), 7 
(LPIi, 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 8 (LPIi, 140; 6 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 9 (LPIi, 
154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer), 17
240; 15 November 1509, S
22 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 26 (LPIi, 238; 14 November 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 28 
(LPIi, 319; 5 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 29 (LPIi, 320; 5 
Roberto Acciauolo to Florence, Amiens), 33 (LPIi, 330; 12 January 1510, Signory to Badoer), 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 22 
February 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 45 (LPi, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer), 52 
(LPIi, 365, 385; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory); LPIi, 159 (2 September 1509, Badoer to the Signory, 
London). 
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Henry’s principal advisor, as a ‘friend’ of Venice.150 The republic also counted on the favour of 
the Latin secretary, Peter Carmeliano.151 None of this amounted to an observation of the Venetian 
interdict. 
 Furthermore, there were a number of actions that the English crown took during this time, 
part of a broader diplomatic offensive whereby the king wrote to the various Cambrai 
confederates between September and November 1509, including the pope, to cease their attacks 
appearing to centre around the dispatch of its new ambassador, Bainbridge, to Rome, that further 
clarify tacit opposition to this papal censure. In the first place, the archbishop was commissioned 
to go to Rome on 24 September 1509, ostensibly to detach the papacy from the League of 
Cambrai and to encourage the formation of an anti-French coalition, integral to which was the 
absolution of Venice.152 One ought not to underestimate the import of Bainbridge’s appointment 
as orator; the commission of a metropolitan with considerable Italian experience to these ends 
was a bold move while the Venetians remained under interdict.153 The crown must have been 
confident either in the orator’s abilities and/or in the views of the pontiff.154 This embassy was 
on Venice.155 That message was possibly presented by Bainbridge and read by Julius II by 1 
                                                 
150 Ven.ii, 2 (LPIi, 53; 30 May 1509, Signory to Badoer), 7 (LPIi, 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 
45 (LPIi, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer). 
151 Ibid., 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer), 25 (LPIi, 280; 22 December 1509, Signory to 
Badoer), 30 (LPIi, 322; 5 September 1513, Roberto Acciauolo to Florence, Amiens).  
152 LPIi, 175, 190:33 (LPI, 520; 24 September 1509). 
153 Bainbridge had studied in Italy and had been to Rome at least twice; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge (1965), 
pp.14-16. 
154 The Venetians were certainly hopeful of a successful resolution with the pope as a result of Bainbridge’s arrival; 
Ven.ii, 19-20 (LPIi, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian 
ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). As early as July 1509 (the same time as the pope first received the censured 
Venetian envoys), Julius II was counting down the time before the campaigning season was over and the French king 
would leave Italy, so that he could start to counteract his influence in the peninsula. In addition, there was soon to be 
a dispute between Louis XII and the papacy over the right to dispose of French benefices from October 1509, which 
further split the two parties; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.245-251; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.122-123; L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.318. 
155 For those to the Empire, France and Spain, see below pp.366-368. 
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December. It was probably cautious in its nature, reasoning that Venice ought not to be 
destroyed, on account of its role in resisting the Ottomans, that Christians should not fight 
Christians, and that, if Venice ceased to exist, Italy would be at the mercy of French ambitions. In 
                                                
other words, it would harm their chances to defend the Church. Most significantly, Henry 
probably stressed that Venice had conceded all territories claimed by the confederates before they 
had attacked it, an indirect reference to the ultimatum made in the papal bull threatening the 
republic with interdict.156 The English were thus advising that, as a part of the u-turn that they 
hoped the papacy would perform concerning Venice, the interdict should be lifted. Subsequently, 
Bainbridge was involved in delicate discussions with the papacy about the republic’s absolution 
(and reconciliation with the pope) in which he was extremely careful about disclosing English 
thoughts.157 Sometime around 4 February, the king, through Fox, wrote again to the pope, this 
time specifically requesting that he raise the interdict against Venice, particularly as the latter had 
proffered its obedience. This correspondence reached Rome on 22 February but, while it was 
presented to the pope two days before the absolution took place, probably did not contribute to a 
decision that already seems to have been taken.158 Shortly before this letter was written, on 29 
 
east); an expedient often employed by contemporary rulers to 
erdinand of Aragon, dated 1 
09, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 November 
d the confederates to cease their aggression once Julius and his allies had gained the territories that they 
hambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.29. Concerning the lack of impact that this 
s as early as 29 December, the pope promised 
156 In condemning the shedding of Christian blood, Henry may also have made reference to the pope’s duty to 
facilitate universal peace (and a crusade to the 
discourage or call for an end to warfare. The speculated contents of the letter to Julius are taken from the arguments 
for ending the war against Venice that Henry presented in two similar letters to F
November 1509; Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 15
1509, Henry to Ferdinand). The Venetians were unhappy with a clause in the pope’s letter to the pope, whereby 
Henry aske
claimed from the republic; Ven.ii, 17 (LPIi, 240; 15 November 1509, Signory to Badoer), 22 (9 November 1509, 
Badoer to the Signory), 24 (LPIi 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer), 25 (LPIi, 280; 22 December 1509, 
Signory to Badoer). 
157 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.24-26. Also, Ven.ii, 19-20 (LPIi, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to 
their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). Also see M. 
Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.123-124; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.237. 
158 Ven.ii, 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 22 February 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 
March 1510, Signory to Badoer); D.S. C
letter would have had, Venice had already submitted to papal demand
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January, Henry wrote to Bainbridge, thanking him for his work with the pope. While the context 
of this suggests that the king is referring to his proposing a league against France and detaching 
the papacy from Cambrai, it must also imply this business with Venice.159 Furthermore, the 
Venetians themselves felt obliged to thank Henry and Bainbridge for their contribution towards 
this reconciliation with Rome.160 The English crown, therefore, had acted to secure the absolution 
of Venice as part of a broader initiative to cease the Cambrai offensive and turn it against France, 
integral to which was a ‘softly, softly’ approach by Bainbridge to secure this end in Rome. While 
Henry VIII’s underlying anti-French agenda was no secret, he evidently did not want to force the 
issue unnecessarily, perhaps due to a latent fear that ecclesiastical censures could still be turned 
against him. In the event, when the English king did hear of the absolution, circa 6 April, the 
Venetian ambassador reported how Henry ‘rejoiced thereat’, before consigning the other copy to 
Ferdinand.161 
 While the crown did ignore the Venetian interdict in England and acted to end it through 
Bainbridge, it should be noted that the orator publicly recognised the censure when he reached 
Rome. On his reception (24 November), the ambassador was ceremonially received by all orators 
(among others), except the Venetians who, due to their censure, could not participate. It seems, 
however, that Bainbridge may have disobeyed the excommunication later that day, by receiving 
                                                                                                                                                              
to lift the excommunication in a consistory of 4 February 1510, while the final details were settled by 15 February 
1510; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.125-128; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.319; C. Shaw, Julius 
II, p.241. Later, in July 1512, Badoer, writing to his brother, claimed credit for persuading Henry VIII to write to 
me), 43 (LPIi, 382; LPI, 932; 2 March 
Julius II in pursuit of the absolution; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.67-68 (LPIi, 1307; LPI, 3333; Ven.ii, 191). 
159 LPIi, 354 (LPI, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge). 
160 Ven.ii, 41 (LPIi, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the ambassadors in Ro
1510, doge to Henry), 44 (2 March 1510, motion in the Senate for a letter to Badoer), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 March 1510, 
Signory to Badoer). 
161 Ibid., 59 (LPIi, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
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the ambassadors’ secretary, Andrea Rossi, sent to apologise for their unavoidable absence.162 
Bainbridge received the ambassadors in person on 26 November, among them Donato.163 By 
doing this, Bainbridge incurred the risk of excommunication as, despite the absolution of Donato 
(as well as of cardinals Cornaro and Grimani, in order to negotiate with the papacy), the others 
were still subject to the interdict. While Henry VIII could ignore the bull quite safely from 
England, the flouting of its terms by his orator in Rome itself appears at first glance to have been 
a considerable risk. However, that these ambassadors were resident in Rome and able to carry on 
with their business surely indicates that some sort of pragmatism was adopted by the papacy.164 
In addition, England’s friendship with Venice must have been obvious to all at this point, as the 
republic had deliberately lobbied for this to be the case.165 Perhaps the contagious implications of 
the interdict were overlooked by the papacy, as long as Bainbridge did not obviously flout their 
terms in Rome. In this instance, Julius II’s turning against France would have reinforced this 
position. 
A more open, albeit indirect, display of opposition is suggested by Henry’s positive 
response to a request apparently from Venice’s orator in his court in July 1509 to mediate on the 
republic’s behalf with Maximilian.166 If the credit for this ought to lie with Badoer, this was a 
                                                 
162 Ibid., 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). For Rossi being the secretary in 
question, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.23. Hironimo Donato was the only Venetian ambassador who 
had been absolved back in July in order to have contact with the pope; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, 
p.120; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.316; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.237. Bainbridge’s meeting with Rossi may not 
have been contrary to papal censures if the secretary was not a Venetian, but one could easily argue that his 
as neither secret nor condemned. As seems to have 
67; 8 December 1509, Signory to its ambassadors in Rome).  
association with the ambassadors of the republic would make him automatically excommunicate and, so, this would 
pass on to Bainbridge on their meeting. Indeed, the doge and senate instructed their ambassadors to breach the 
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164 Regardless of the interdict, the Venetians’ presence in Rome w
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clever plan that indicated England’s lack of willingness to observe the interdict. As go-between, 
Henry VIII thereby advertised the fact that he continued to entertain diplomatic contact with this 
censured state and, indeed, sympathised with its cause.167 
Finally, the English crown’s largely dismissive attitude towards papal censures with 
which it disagreed is demonstrated by its reaction to the economic implications of the interdict.168 
If Venetian merchants understood that Henry VIII had refused to publish the interdict in England, 
then they presumably did not fear confiscation of their property there. This was was further 
indicated by the Venetians on 30 August 1509, when they instructed their ambassador to thank 
the king ‘for his good treatment of the Venetian merchants’.169 In comparison with the French 
merchants earlier noted as protected by the English crown from the effects of papal censure, only 
one Venetian apparently benefited in a similar manner during the latter republic’s interdict. On 27 
July 1509, Antonio Bavaryno was given protection for one year while at Calais under the 
authority of its lieutenant, Sir Gilbert Talbot.170 More revealing, on the other hand, it seems that 
in December 1509, all Venetian traders resident in England reportedly benefited from a grant to 
prorogue the payment of custom duties to the crown for a period of two years, presumably arising 
from the difficulties caused by the war and the effects that the interdict was having on business 
                                                 
167 Ibid.. The republic itself was enthusiastic to employ Henry VIII in this manner and it seems that the king did take 
the role seriously; ibid., 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer), 24 (LPIi, 278; 21 December 
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outside of England.171 This suggests that the economic implications of the interdict were biting, 
probably by the lack of merchandise coming into the kingdom, regardless of crown support.172 
 
In addition to the above concessions, the English crown’s opposition to this political 
interdict manifested itself in the efforts it made to facilitate the continuation of Anglo-Venetian 
trade vis-à-vis the Flanders galleys. This fleet, which customarily sailed every year to 
Southampton, imported various luxury goods from the east, such as spices, in addition to wines 
from the Mediterranean. On their return journey, the galleys exported wool, tin and other 
products from England. While the voyage of the Flanders galleys was fairly regular during 
peacetime, it had often, as Henry VIII was doubtless aware, ceased during wartime in his father’s 
reign, as in 1497. Such was their perceived significance at this time that Henry VII wrote 
personally to the republic to request they be sent.173 That the cancellation of the Flanders galleys 
worried Henry VIII is indicated by his personal inquiry to the republic, which elicited a response 
on 6 August. The Venetian government informed Henry that they wanted to send the galleys, but 
the  Cambrai confederacy’s actions, including the threat of confiscation partly engendered by the 
interdict, made it too dangerous. Instead, they encouraged Henry to intervene in the conflict so 
                                                 
171 According to Ferigo Morexini (resident in London), writing to his brother on 5 December, the consul, Lorenzo 
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that voyages could resume.174 While Venice perhaps envisaged English assistance in a more 
military sense, Henry VIII’s intervention came as letters written to some of the confederates, 
questing them to grant safe conducts to the galleys or to desist from molesting them, in direct 
contrav
re
ention to the interdict. Henry reportedly approached Maximilian and Louis XII some time 
before 23 October 1509.175 Similarly, in November 1509, Henry requested that Ferdinand of 
Aragon allow them safe-passage around his territories, and though Ferdinand replied that he 
could not ignore the censures placed upon the Venetians, he pledged to order that they should 
pass unmolested.176 Notably, the papacy does not appear to have been approached in this regard, 
possibly indicating an English reluctance to publicly indicate opposition to the interdict. This is 
curious given that Venetian ships would have to pass by the Adriatic coast of the Papal States en 
route to England. Nevertheless, these approaches to France and Spain represented external and 
potentially public defiance of the papal interdict, to which Henry VIII presumably did not expect 
any papal rebuke. Despite these measures to circumvent the interdict, the English failed to induce 
a voyage by the Flanders galleys; Henry had to wait until May 1518 for this.177 He failed, 
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therefore, to forestall the economic effects of the Venetian interdict on Anglo-Venetian trade, and 
this equally indicates the success of papal censures in this sense. That the threat to the Flanders 
galleys had still not been adequately addressed, even after the absolution of Venice, is further 
demonstrated when Henry VIII’s representatives raised the issue of their safety in their 
negotiations for the Anglo-French peace of March 1510, which culminated in the inclusion of a 
clause guaranteeing their safe passage.178 While the English crown’s disregard for the Venetian 
interdict points towards a defiance of papal authority, it should not been seen in the same way as 
that displayed by the Venetians themselves. In addition to refusing to allow the interdict’s 
publication in the republic, Venetian agents pinned an appeal against it to a future general council 
to the doors of St Peter’s and Castel Sant’ Angelo, during the night of 27 April 1509.179 It is 
unlikely that Henry VIII would ever have contemplated supporting such an extreme measure in 
support of a state with which he was not even formally allied.180 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
), 842 (14 February 1517, Signory to 
doer to the Signory, London), 66 
ber 1510, Signory to Badoer), 88 (613; 16 November 1510, Signory to Badoer). 
October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 42-50 (Ven.ii, 859; LPIIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 63-68 (Ven.ii, 876; LPIIii, 3163; 23 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 754-755 (2 
August 1516, Signory to its ambassador in England), 841 (12 February 1517
Giustinian), 843 (14 February 1517, Signory to Giustinian), 848 (1 March 1517), 898-899 (5 June 1517), 947 (7 
August 1517), 976 (29 September 1517). 
178 The Venetians were unhappy with the protection afforded by this clause, however, and voted not to despatch the 
Flanders galleys in September 1510, thus continuing their absence from England and perhaps suggesting that, as the 
interdict had ceased, that what they really feared the general risk of seizure of their merchandise, whether such acts 
were blessed by papacy or not; Sp.ii, 36 (LPIi, 406; LPI, 962; 23 March 1510); Ven.ii, 52 (LPIi, 365, 385, 408; 14 
February 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 61 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 1510, Ba
(LPIi, 450; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 67 (LPIi, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, 
London), 80-81 (LPIi, 570; 9 Septem
179 The Venetians even went as far as to approach Cardinal Bakocz of Hungary, who as Patriarch of Constantinople, 
possessed the theoretical power to convoke a general council, although the cardinal did not respond to this and it is 
doubtful that there would have been wider support of his authority to take such action; L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vi, pp.311-312.  
180 It has already been posited that the English crown avoided placing itself at risk of papal censure if possible; see 
above pp.209-212. 
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 The motives for the English crown ignoring papal censures against Venice in 1509-1510 
were both political and economic. Politically, Henry VIII objected, certainly in writing to 
Ferdinand and probably to Julius II, to the destruction of Venice, partly because the rest of Italy 
(and Henry would particularly have had the Papal States in mind here) would be ‘unable to 
withstand the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes’.181 Indeed, it seems that Henry did 
not lay the blame for the war itself and, thereby, the interdict, at the door of Julius II; rather, he 
and his advisors seemingly believed the republic’s assertions that the pope had been coerced into 
these temporal actions by Louis XII. On 30 August 1509, the signory conveyed how, despite 
obeying the papal ultimatum to return certain towns to stave off the interdict within the stipulated 
timeframe and having written to the pontiff and sent ambassadors to Rome to seek absolution, the 
papacy’s position against the republic had not softened on account of French influence or 
coercion.182 This reasoning may well help to explain the broader contradiction in English policy 
 opposing papal actions, while retaining otherwise cordial relations with the Apostolic See. It 
also fits in with the whole anti-French agenda being pursued from the accession of Henry VIII, 
involving belligerent rhetoric, as well as initial attempts to detach the confederates from the 
in
League of Cambrai and form an anti-French coalition, of which the Bainbridge mission to Rome 
was part.183 English economic motives for ignoring, even attempting to counter the interdict can 
be easily be attributed to financial self-interest. The measures outlined above indicate a great 
desire, on the part of Henry VIII, to ensure ‘business as usual’, so that England continued to 
                                                 
181 Sp.ii, 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to 
Ferdinand). 
182 Ven.ii, 9 (LPIi, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer). During the period of the interdict, Venice also tried to 
convince the English crown that the papacy would declare its enmity against France if Henry attacked Louis XII. 
Also see correspondence of 24 April and 14 September 1509, respectively; Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, Signory to 
-363, 368ff. 
Badoer); Ven.ii, 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
183 See below pp.362
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benefit from its trading links with Venice and that these were in no way jeopardised; although 
this seems to have been largely unsuccessful, given that a concession concerning customs duties 
was required in December 1509 by Venetian merchants and the Flanders galleys did not come to 
England for a number of years. In addition, Henry VIII’s personal interest in and enthusiasm for 
the Flanders galley, further fuelled the crown’s preparedness to ignore papal sanctions in this 
instance.184 The crown’s failure to ensure the continuation of Anglo-Venetian trade highlights the 
effectiveness of the economic consequences of papal censures and the inability of the English, 
however supportive, to affect this outside its own territories. 
 
 Overall, it is noteworthy in this Venetian case study that no reaction appears to have 
emanated from Rome concerning England’s lack of observance of its censures. Given that there 
was papal diplomatic representation in England at this time, particularly Silvester de Giglis and 
Polydore Vergil, it is unlikely that the papacy was completely unaware of the crown’s stance. It 
was Bainbridge’s cagey negotiations with the pope on this issue that highlighted the difference 
between England and the actions of its representative in Rome. Bainbridge was extremely careful 
not to contradict the pontiff and tried to bring him around gradually.185 Yet, what could the pope 
do about it? Julius II could have excommunicated Henry and interdicted his kingdom, but what 
would that have achieved? He needed the secular arm to make a response and Henry was the 
secular arm. Even if Julius had acted, it would have made an unnecessary enemy of England, 
with military implications for the League of Cambrai. At the same time, it was not long before 
                                                 
184 See n.173. 
185 See below pp.368-373. 
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hat his allies met their obligations in 
is regard and even to help him realise a longstanding claim to the French crown. In an 
                            
the pope turned against Louis XII and envisaged England as an ally to this end.186 However one 
viewed Henry VIII’s challenge to papal authority in this area, it was politically pragmatic for the 
papacy to turn a blind eye to it, for now. 
 
 The English crown, then, held a somewhat two-faced attitude towards papal censures 
during this period where the French axis was concerned. On the one hand, Henry VIII envisaged 
the employment of spiritual weapons when England committed to act in defence of the Church, 
particularly in order to help justify military action, to ensure t
th
economic sense, the English king was also prepared to take advantage of the ability to confiscate 
property facilitated by excommunication and interdict, although he was prepared to delay this for 
as long as possible and to make exceptions for favoured merchants who happened to be native to 
the censured state(s). On the other hand, Henry VIII’s perception of the threat of papal censures 
against England or friendly states was somewhat different. While he rejected the validity of papal 
censures within England and never really risked incurring the imposition of these during this 
period, he did pro-actively seek to avoid papal overtures towards universal peace which, he 
feared, would prevent him under pain of censure from acting against Francis I, if the latter then 
used the crusade as an excuse to realise his Italian ambitions. Henry was also prepared to ignore 
excommunications and interdicts against friendly states, in particular Venice, at least partly on 
account of the republic’s position as a potential ally to defend papal independence. 
                     
ecifically French military power in Italy at this point, see above pp.114-116. 186 For England’s ability to affect sp
4 
ENSURING THE ‘FURTHERANS OF AL HYS [HENRY’S] AFERYS IN TYME TO 
KOME’: THE ENGLISH CROWN’S ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE CONCLAVES IN 
ITS OWN INTEREST AND TO PREVENT THE ELECTION OF A ‘FRENCH’ POPE1 
 
Theoretically, conclaves should not arise in any discussion of the English relationship 
with Rome, as the crown had no formal role in papal elections. In practice, however, this cannot 
be avoided, as not only did England have something to gain in a political sense by attempting to 
influence the outcome, but the cardinals that comprised the electorate were affected by various 
external pressures and loyalties that ensured that they would never be solely guided by the Holy 
Spirit in their choice of candidate. One such external loyalty was that owed by many to a secular 
state and their heads were not oblivious to the opportunities available to them on such occasions.2 
A cardinal might be obligated to a secular prince in one of two ways. On the one hand, he might 
be a native of that state, ostensibly owing his ecclesiastical seniority to the patronage of his king 
or prince. He could be resident in Rome on a permanent basis, thus providing his crown with 
                                                 
1 P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-53 (LPIi, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to 
[Fox]). 
2 Francis I reportedly told the English ambassador, Fitzwilliam in early January 1522, ‘that it was just not the fashion 
the cardinals who elected Adrian VI in 1522 to have been so spiritually motivated, sceptically stated, ‘as if the Holy 
Ghost...would not disdain to enter into souls full of ambition and incredible greed, and almost all dedicated to the 
most refined, not to say most dishonest, pleasures. The Imperial ambassador in Rome, Juan M
Charles V, shortly after Leo X’s death, openly condemned the clearly political intrigues of the card
at Rome to give their voices as the Holy Ghost puts in their minds’. Similarly, Guicciardini, in reporting the claim of 
anuel, writing to 
inals seeking 
votes for conclave, stating that ‘all is founded on avarice and lies’. Prodi goes as far as saying that, in papal elections, 
‘external factors have a decisive influence’ on the Sacred College; LPIIIii, 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, 
Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]); Sp.ii, 368 (11 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles); S. Alexander 
(ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.329-331; L. Nussdorfer, ‘The Vacant See: Ritual and 
Protest in Early Modern Rome’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 18 (1987), p.174; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.40, 
89. For some comments on the role played by ‘divine guidance’ on the cardinals’ choice, see C.L. Stinger, The 
Renaissance in Rome, pp.85, 90-91. 
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diplomatic service, or he could only attend Rom or conclaves.3 On the other hand, he might be 
a f e; 
th s 
d r 
employer, this might be different in the privacy of conclave, where one would envisage that the 
singula
protector. This position was usually accorded to the pope’s most prominent cardinal-minister. For 
e f
oreign (usually Italian) cardinal, employed by the state in some diplomatic context in Rom
e state employing this individual would invariably expect the cardinal to pursue its interest
uring papal elections. While both types of cardinal might affirm equal loyalty to their secula
r tie of the native cardinal might prove more steadfast than, say, the multiple loyalties of a 
curial-based Italian. For England during this period, therefore, Christopher Bainbridge was a rare 
example of an English-born curial cardinal, also acting as crown orator in Rome, and would have 
acted above all in Henry VIII’s interests at the 1513 conclave.4 More common were the Italian 
cardinals employed by England for general service at the Curia, such as Hadrian de Castello and 
Lorenzo Campeggio, who attended conclave in 1513 and 1521, respectively. While it would have 
been hoped or even expected in England that these would have voted in the crown’s interests, 
indeed both claimed to have done so after the event, Henry VIII would have been well aware that 
their loyalties were not exclusively to England, thus making their obligation less certain than 
Bainbridge’s. The English crown also employed Italian cardinals in the higher dignity of cardinal 
Leo X’s pontificate, this was his cousin, Giulio de’ Medici. By virtue of the power and other 
loyalties of this cardinal, however, the English crown is likely to have held some, but rather less 
hope of his service during conclaves. In the conclave of 1521-1522, de’ Medici had Florence to 
                                                 
3 Naturally, non-curial cardinals who did not attend conclave could not vote for the next pontiff. 
4 Bainbridge was the first English cardinal to take part in a conclave since Adam Easton in the second half of the 
fourteenth century; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.41. 
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think about (being scion of the city’s leading family), as well as his own candidacy in the election 
(he entered as papabile).5 
On this basis, therefore, secular states could hope that their interests would be pursued 
when ‘their’ cardinals cast their votes for a new pope, and/or also undertake their instructions to 
back one or more particular candidates. While most states were neither large nor powerful 
enough to command or influence more than one or two cardinals, the political ‘superpowers’, 
such as the Empire, France and Spain were widely perceived to have had control of their own 
‘parties’ within the Sacred College, which could conceivably have a bearing on the result of 
papal elections, particularly given the inherent and endemic rivalries between them.6 England, 
while not a ‘superpower’ on the scale of the big three, was not an insignificant political entity. It 
was, as is largely accepted, more of a second-rate power on the international stage and this was 
reflected by its representation at the Apostolic See.7 As far as its influence in Rome was 
concerned, it would be overstating the case to claim that an English ‘party’ existed among the 
College of Cardinals, particularly during papal elections. During the conclaves of this period, the 
closest that one can come to identifying such a group is in 1513, when both Christopher 
Bainbridge and the English collector and longtime diplomat, Hadrian de Castello, were present. 
Even then, however, the latter’s ‘English’ credentials can be called into question, given the 
apparently minimal diplomatic service that he had given to England since he left Rome to go into 
                                                 
5 De’ Medici was also cardinal protector of France, but the papacy’s concurrent war with Francis I, instigated by Leo 
X of whose government Giulio was the leading member, ruled out any chance of the latter fulfilling any obligations 
to France in conclave; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.86, 94-95. 
6 See, for instance, Lowe’s summary of this idea with reference to the 1523 conclave, as well as how this affected the 
, 121-124. 
y to Bainbridge, London). 
1513 and 1521 elections; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, pp.50-51, 72-73
7 For an example of Henry’s reluctance to attack France alone even though he had gone too far to pull-out by April 
1513, see LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henr
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exile in 1507.8 Furthermore, de Castello only arrived in Rome on the evening after conclave had 
opened, therefore giving him little time to build up any type of rapport with Bainbridge.9 While 
this ought not to have had any effect on their joint pursuit of English interests, the overall 
impression of this Italian is that his joining with the Cardinal of York in this respect would have 
been unlikely or, at best, insincere.10  
 
 To gain an insight into the underlying importance of political considerations in this aspect 
of the English relationship with Rome and how they linked in with Henry VIII’s perception of 
himself as a defender of the papacy from France, the occasions when its concern with conclaves 
arose will first be outlined, followed by the strategies that it adopted in response. Subsequently, 
the chapter will explore why the crown tried to affect papal elections and what it hoped to 
achieve, politically speaking. Analysis will also be made on how effective the crown believed it 
could be in this area and how successful it was in reality. 
 
                                                 
8
somewhat betrayed by his cautious initial links with the schismatic cardinals in 1511, the latter backed by the French 
and Imperialists at that point; ibid., 1007 (LPI, 2039; calendared 1511, [de Castello] to Henry); H. Jedin and D.E. 
Graf (trans.), A History of the Council of Trent, i (1949), p.107; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.353, 361-362; 
R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council: its Partial Successes and its Larger Failures’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform 
 De Castello spent most of his time, 1507-1513, in and around the Empire, and his loyalty to Maximilian is 
and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church (1981), pp.100-101. The English crown also recognised de 
Castello’s links with Maximilian in the winter of 1512-1513, when Henry commissioned the cardinal to induce the 
emperor to agree a peace with Venice; Ven.ii 214 (LPIi, 1574; 15 January 1513, messenger from de Castello in 
Venice); M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen and the King’s Mother’, in B. Thompson (ed.), The Reign of Henry 
VII, pp.79-80. W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.34. 
ove him 
9 Neither is there any indication that the cardinals communicated directly before the election; D.S. Chambers, 
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.42, 152-165; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.19. There also seems to have been no 
direct contact between Bainbridge and de Castello before this election. 
10 Bainbridge and de Castello later had considerable disagreements, as the latter attempted to reassert his diplomatic 
role with England. The Italian’s relations with Henry and Wolsey also soured, as a protracted attempt to rem
from the apostolic collectorship ensued, only ending when de Castello was deprived by Leo X in 1517 (on account of 
his tenuous involvement in a conspiracy against the pope’s life); see above p.32 n.79. 
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Two conclaves occurred in this period, which elected Leo X in 1513 and Adrian VI in 
1522. As will be seen, the English crown attempted to influence the outcome of both for 
principally political motives, a pro-English and anti-French agenda. In addition, from the English 
perspective, there were occasions when an election was either expected or feared to be imminent. 
Given the time delay in communications from Rome, the English crown had no choice but to take 
very rumour of papal illness seriously. Accordingly, Henry VIII and his ministers sometimes 
 a despatch that day from Bainbridge, 
porting Julius’ demise.14 He wrote again to Henry on the 21st of hearing that the cardinals 
peacefully entered conclave on the 4th, although he did not know of any result.15 The following 
e
developed contingency plans in anticipation of such a report being confirmed. 
The first vacancy arose following Julius II’s death on 20 February 1513.11 After a 
relatively short interregnum, conclave lasted 4-11 March, at which Giovanni de’ Medici was 
selected.12 The rapidity of events in Rome did little to facilitate an English reaction.13 News of 
Julius II’s death only began to arrive in England, firstly via Germany, through Thomas Spinelly 
in the Low Countries, in correspondence dated 9 March 1513, when conclave had already been 
meeting for five days. Spinelly claimed to have received
re
                                                 
11 On the 4th, Julius himself is said to have expected his imminent death when talking to his master of ceremonies, 
Paris de Grassis; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.187. Also, see C. Shaw, Julius II, p.312. 
12 M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.204-208; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.15-28; W. Roscoe, Leo 
the Tenth, i, pp.295-299. 
13 The quickest times between England and Rome achieved by couriers riding post around this time were 13-18 days. 
On this basis, if one assumes the best estimate of 13 days’ journey each way and an instant response by the English 
crown, this would mean that instructions could only have reached Rome on 18 March at the earliest. It is, therefore, 
unlikely that Henry could have received news of the death of Julius and issued his preference(s) in the intervening 19 
days, although this would not have necessarily stopped him from trying; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.42; 
I, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, 
G.B. Parks, The English Traveler to Italy, i, p.498. 
14 The diplomat states his source to be ‘the Cardinal de Jorco’. Spinelly also confirmed that Maximilian and Margaret 
were in receipt of the same news from their own source; LPIi, 1670 (LP
Mechelin). Leo X went on to notify Henry VIII of his election on 19 March, although it is curious that the conclave 
itself does not seem to have written to inform Henry of Julius II’s death and Leo X’s elevation until 19 July; ibid., 
1687 (LPI, 3806; 19 March 1513, Leo X to Henry, Rome), 2108 (LPI, 4354; 19 July 1513). 
15 Ibid., 1697 (LPI, 3817; 21 March 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]). 
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day, S
Bainbridge apparently pursued the candidacy of Raphael Riario (as recommended in 
 chance of election, effectively spoiled his vote in the first scrutiny (10 
pinelly may have notified the king of Leo X’s election, as he again forwarded 
correspondence from Bainbridge, although he does not mention its contents. It is unlikely, 
however, that the post carrying this news would have travelled quicker than all Imperial sources 
(as otherwise, Spinelly would have mentioned similar reports to Maximilian or Margaret).16 We 
can only be sure that Henry was aware of this news by Bainbridge’s correspondence by 12 April, 
as on this date Henry acknowledged receipt.17 That is not to preclude the possibility of 
intelligence from other sources, particularly from Germany or France. 
While the English could not have anticipated a short interregnum, there is no evidence of 
any reactive crown policy to instruct its representatives in Rome to lobby for a particular 
candidate (or candidates) in conclave. It is more likely that Bainbridge, along with de Castello 
and, to a lesser extent the non-cardinalatial de Giglis, were expected to use their discretion in 
choosing to back the cardinal most sympathetic to English interests and who had a chance of 
being elected. Bainbridge et al may or may not have received recommendations from England, 
based on one or more previous occasions when Julius II was thought to be terminally ill.18 In any 
case, it is clear that Bainbridge intrigued in the subsequent conclave on Henry VIII’s behalf. 
England by Thomas Ruthal and Charles Somerset earlier in 151119) but, quickly discovering that 
his candidate had no
                                                 
16 Ibid., 1699 (LPI, 3821; 22 March 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]). 
3. 
17 Ibid., 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). If Bainbridge was doing his job 
properly, one would expect him to have written letters of such import immediately on hearing of the relevant event; 
so, he would have notified Henry of the pope’s death on 20 February 1513 (possibly 21st, as Julius died in the night), 
and of Leo’s election on 11 March, as soon as he was allowed to leave conclave. 
18 See, for instance, the discussions that took place in September 1511, below pp.236-237, 39
19 See below pp.236-237. 
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March), by nominating a layman, Fabrizio del Carretto.20 By doing this, he probably hoped to 
avoid contributing to the election of another cardinal at this point. After this ballot, he could then 
enter discussions with his fellow cardinals and ascertain who, in the English interest, had the 
most realistic chance of selection. Bainbridge’s choice in the second scrutiny is unknown, but his 
opinions seem to have been academic, as Raphael Riario and Giovanni de’ Medici had already 
agreed to ensure the latter’s election.21 Given his diplomatic role and the need to work closely 
with the future pontiff, it is unlikely that Bainbridge worked against, and he probably voted for, 
the fut
, de 
                                                
ure Leo X.22 The inducements that bought Bainbridge’s support may have been, most 
significantly, an alleged promise by Leo to maintain the papacy’s confederacy with England 
(against France) and, to a lesser extent, the conferral on the English cardinal of one of 
de’Medici’s benefices.23 The other ‘English’ cardinal, Hadrian de Castello, while a supporter of 
Riario’s opponent, de’ Medici, voted for Bainbridge in the first scrutiny (along with Cardinal 
Cornaro). This was probably a politically motivated gesture, attempting to curry favour with the 
English crown in order to gain lucrative diplomatic employment once more, while probably not 
expecting the Cardinal of York to achieve sufficient votes to be elected.24 Furthermore
 
h
few minor states, and was subsequently regarded as an antipope; J.N.D. Kelly, Oxford Dictionary of the Popes 
(1986), pp.243-244. 
21 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.21-24. 
22 For an Imperial account of the conclave that seems to have reached England via Spinelly, see LPIi, 1677 (LPI, 
3780; 11 March 1513). 
I, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). The 
by the fact that Bainbridge’s other 
nbridge, p.44; L. 
s, vii, pp.22-23. 
20 Del Caretto was the brother and conclavist of Cardinal Carlo del Carretto di Finale; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.42-44, 107. Theoretically, anyone could be elected pope, alt ough it was extremely rare for the 
selection of anyone outside of the Sacred College. Most recently, Amadeus VIII duke of Savoy was elected as Felix 
V by the Council of Basle in 1439, although he failed to gain recognition of his role outside of his own lands and a 
23 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44; LPIi, 2029 (LP
benefice concerned was the Benedictine monastery of San Stefano, Bologna, awarded on 19 March and worth 
around 700 ducats per annum, less 200 ducats in pensions; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.96. 
24 Also, as a supporter of de’ Medici, whose candidacy was to remain secret until an appropriate time, he had to vote 
for somebody else in the first ballot. This argument is made more convincing 
benefactor, Cornaro, was also a member of the de’ Medici faction; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bai
Pastor, History of the Pope
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Castello appears to have been a fervent opponent of Riario during the election and was quoted as 
saying, during this time, that ‘Sic hic pontifex creatur, ultra Sauromatas fugere hinc libet’.25 
The second vacancy of this period began on 1 December 1521; while Leo X had suffered 
illnesses since August, his latest malady was only identified as life-threatening on 30 November. 
Dying within 24 hours, news of this in Rome, therefore, was completely unexpected.26 Conclave 
was delayed until 27 December, at least partly because of the college’s objections to the detention 
of Cardinal d’Ivrea en route to Rome, and then lasted until 9 January, thus allowing time, 
theoretically, for an English response.27 Henry and Wolsey appear to have been notified of the 
pope’s death by 16 December, in letters from Francis I. Their concern with events in and around 
Rome that led to their subsequent actions cannot be seen in anything other than an overtly 
political light. In immediate response, Henry VIII apparently decided that Wolsey’s candidacy 
should be pursued, thus invoking a promise that Charles V had made to the cardinal at Bruges in 
August 1521, to make a joint bid for Wolsey’s nomination, should a vacancy arrive. Before 
discovering the emperor’s apparent willingness to honour his pledge, Richard Pace was 
immediately despatched to Rome to this end. However, if the Wolsey nomination was unlikely to 
succeed or if Giulio de’ Medici was already likely to win, the secretary was instructed to back the 
latter.28 Despite the delays in Rome, Pace was to arrive some weeks after the election of Adrian 
                                                 
25 LPIi, 1677 (LPI, 3780; 11 March 1513); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.23. 
26 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.327; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi 
viii (1908), pp.58-64. Pace only believed the pope’s sickness to be 
e History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini (1969), pp.328-331; M. Creighton, History of 
entation of 
lsey, Ghent), 1906 (28 December 1521, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 1907 
(1903), p.188; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, 
serious on 1 December; LPIIIii, 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
27 S. Alexander (ed.), Th
the Papacy, vi, pp.214-222; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, ix, pp.1-25. 
28 The Imperialists appear to have first raised the idea with Wolsey of a joint bid for him to become pope back in 
1520, but this only seems to have become a more serious offer at Bruges in 1521. For the apparent implem
Imperial support, see LPIIIii, 1868 (15 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Oudenarde), 1876 (16 
December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent), 1877 (17 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey), 1880 (17 December 
1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London), 1904 (27 
December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wo
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VI, on 27 January.29 News of this event again seems to have reached England via Spinelly in 
Brussels, who wrote at 8 a.m. on 18 January 1522.30 Margaret of Savoy mentioned the same 
news on the 20th, although she would not confirm it.31 Wolsey was said to be disappointed at the 
emperor’s failure to help his candidacy in the election and it was predicted that England’s cool 
relations with France would warm as a result.32  
 In the absence of crown instructions, the English ‘party’ in Rome again used its own 
initiative in pursuing candidates in the English interest. The ‘party’ at this point consisted of the 
orator John Clerk, Lorenzo Campeggio and, to a lesser extent, Giulio de’ Medici. Clerk and 
Campeggio seem to have discussed a joint strategy with de’ Medici prior to the opening of 
conclave, in which the subject of the crown interest would have been integral. Essentially, Clerk 
and Campeggio intended to back the latter’s candidacy and Clerk’s offer to lobby other members 
of the Sacred College in this regard was accepted. It must also be noted that, in addition to his 
English loyalties, Campeggio was also firmly committed to the Medici camp both before and 
                                                                                                                                                              
(calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Ghent), 1908 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to his 
ambassador in Rome), 1934 (5 January 1522, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 1954 (10 January 1522, 
1523, Wolsey to Clerk, Pace and others). After the election, de’ Medici himself was told that his candidacy was the 
Henry, Rome), 1957 (12 January 1522, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). Also see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, 
pp.107- 10.  
Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent), 3372 (30 September 1523, Wolsey to Henry, ‘At the More’), 3389 (4 October 
priority of the Pace mission, with Wolsey’s to have been ‘plan B’; ibid., 1956 (12 January 1522, Giulio de’ Medici to 
1
29 LPIIIii, 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). Pace had an audience with Charles V on 22 January and 
with the emperor’s aunt, Margaret of Savoy, on 23rd; ibid., 1890 (23 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and 
nce and, after this, did not hurry 
 18 January 1522, Spinelly to 
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent) . Pace heard the news shortly before he arrived at Flore
to Rome, instead waiting at the former city to speak with Giulio de’ Medici; ibid., 1966 (16 January 1522, Pace to 
[Wolsey], Florence). 
30 Ibid., 1969 (18 January 1522, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1970 (calendared
Wolsey). 
31 Ibid., 1974 (20 January 1522, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Bruges). 
32 The Venetian author also reasoned that this change might come about because Francis had also promised not to 
interfere in Scotland. The implication is that Francis, recognising the political bias of the new pope, was already 
taking measures to prevent Henry joining Charles in the current Franco-Imperial conflict. Francis was, however, 
unaware of the secret alignment already concluded at Bruges in August 1521; Ven.iii, 396 (27 January 1522, 
Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). Also see LPIIIii, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, 
Brussels). 
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during the election, thus making this decision to back Giulio unsurprising. Also in pursuit of 
Henry VIII’s interests, Clerk made enquiries about Campeggio as the second choice of the 
Medici ‘party’, if Giulio’s attempts were met with opposition, but Campeggio himself proved 
evasive, being loath for this possibility to be raised unless de’ Medici did so first.33 While the 
Imperial ambassador, Juan Manuel, came to an agreement with de’ Medici by 24 December, also 
putting trust in any compromise candidate, but he eventually turned to Cardinal Adrian of 
providing for other suitable candidates if Giulio’s nomination failed, it is unclear whether both 
English and Imperial camps were working together at this time.34 
 In conclave, while it was only Campeggio and de’ Medici who held votes to be used 
potentially in the English interest, the latter entered as papabile with considerable backing within 
the Sacred College. De’ Medici, however, faced too much opposition and his last nomination was 
registered in the seventh scrutiny on 5 January. That of Campeggio, on the other hand, gained a 
number of votes in at least two ballots, but his interest effectively ended on Saturday 4th. In the 
face of the inability of the Medici faction to secure a victory, Clerk reported Giulio’s difficulty in 
Tortosa, a firmly Imperial candidate. Concerning the Wolsey nomination, neither Campeggio nor 
de’ Medici were informed of this before they left conclave, although each later claimed to have 
worked in some way towards this. There was some validity in these claims, given that de’ Medici 
was quoted by Clerk as commenting on Wolsey’s worthiness for the papal tiara prior to the 
                                                 
33 Clerk seems to have believed that he gained Cardinal Colonna’s commitment to support Campeggio if de’ Medici 
could not secure enough votes; LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1932 (4 January 
1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]), 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio 
to Wolsey, Rome); Ellis, pp.304-3166 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
34 Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome), 371 (24 December 1521, 
Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome). 
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opening of conclave.35 Furthermore, Wolsey did secure votes in at least one ballot, seven in the 
fifth scrutiny, the sheer number of which were probably the result of (some) support from within 
the Medici camp.36 After the election, de’ Medici claimed to have supported Wolsey in every 
scrutiny and to have induced 17 or 18 of his supporters to do the same.37 While this was untrue, 
he may have encouraged some of his party to demonstrate his commitment to England (as its 
cardinal protector) in the fifth ballot, if it was anticipated that this would be inconclusive, just as 
his cousin appears to have done back in 1513. In any case, de’ Medici, no longer principal 
inistem r to the pope, was seeking to secure English support for the future. 
 
 Finally, there were occasions when reports reached England that there was likely to be a 
change of pontiff, either on account of the pope falling seriously ill or because of a political or 
military threat to depose him. In such cases, there was sometimes activity within crown circles to 
prepare a reaction to the possibility that a conclave was imminent.38 One example occurred from 
mid-August 1511 when Julius II was widely believed to be mortally ill. In Rome itself, there was 
                                                 
Rome), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 
3166 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Even the Swiss cardinal Matthew Schiner claimed to have 
attempted to nominate Wolsey; LPIIIii., 1955 (11 January 1522, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], Rome). 
 It is unclear whether Wolsey received votes in any other ballot, as the only breakdown found lists only those 
cardinals with the greatest number of votes. It is difficult to imagine, however, that, in such a divided conclave, 
35 LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, 
1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa), 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome); Ellis, pp.304-
36
Wolsey, as a figurehead of the English crown, would have gained so many votes from the politically ‘neutral’, let 
alone from the pro-French ‘party’; Sp.ii, 375 (9 January 1522); LPIIIii, 1896 (calendared 24 December 1521); L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, ix, pp.14-25. 
37 LPIIIii, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). 
38 It must be noted that there was no knee-jerk reaction to news of papal illness, rather reactions only came if the 
reports deemed it to be life-threatening. See, for instance, reports from mid-July 1516 on of English business being 
520, Campeggio reported 
impeded on account of Leo X’s incapacity and the pope’s health being a noteworthy topic for correspondence; LPIIi, 
2194 (19 July 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius), 2241 (2 August 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2243 (4 August 
1516, de Giglis to Ammonius, Rome), 2359 (13 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). Also see ibid., 
2395 (27 September 1516, Boniface Collis to [Ammonius], Rome). Similarly, in October 1
to Wolsey of the pope having left Rome due to ill health, but makes no further comment; LPIIIi, 1016 (10 October 
1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
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great instability when the pope fell unconscious on 21st, as his apartments were despoiled by his 
own officials and the Roman noble families, particularly the Colonna, sought to reassert their 
authority through the Capitoline government. Julius soon recovered and reasserted control, but 
not before rumours of his demise had circulated throughout Christendom.39 Such news reached 
England in September 1511, via Sir Robert Wingfield in Germany. In what appears to have been 
an immediate response, several of Henry’s ‘inner circle’, including the rising Wolsey, discussed 
their favoured successors. A letter from Wolsey to Richard Fox at this time conveys the former’s 
recommendation to the king that Hadrian de Castello, also Maximilian’s favoured candidate, 
ould be supported, while Thomas Ruthal and Charles Somerset criticised de Castello and 
Given the various attempts to affect the outcomes of papal elections by and on behalf of 
sh
preferred Raphael Riario. Wolsey reported that the king was inclined to agree with him, but that 
Ruthal’s and Somerset’s dissension was preventing any final decision. Consequently, the almoner 
requested Fox’s return to Court to sort this out.40 This forethought given to a potential conclave 
came to nought, however, as Julius II soon recovered. 
 
the English crown, it is worth clarifying briefly the two broad strategies that were employed. 
Firstly, the English representatives in Rome identified their own candidate(s) to lobby for and 
support; this could involve joining with the ‘party’ of an English ally. Secondly, the crown may 
                                                 
39 Maximilian even briefly envisaged himself as Julius’ replacement; LPIi, 850 (26 August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to 
da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 865 (16 
atch over matters in his absence; see pp.23-24 n.56. 
Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 858 (2 September 1511, Andrea 
September[?] 1511, Erasmus to Ammonius), 866 (18 September 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy); M. 
Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.153-156; F. Gregorovius (A. Hamilton, trans.), History of the City of Rome in 
the Middle Ages, vol.viii part i (1902), p.80-85; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.286-290. 
40 Wolsey also raises other, non-papal matters, for which Fox’s return was required; P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), 
Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-3 (LPIi, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). It is as a result of the 
timing of the arrival of this news that we are fortunate enough to have this evidence. At this point, the king was still 
on his summer recess. During such recesses, Henry VIII was not surrounded by many councillors and, in 1511, Fox 
appears to have entrusted Wolsey to w
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nominate one or more cardinal to their representatives in Rome, which again may involve 
cooperation with a third-party power. The most significant factor that affected whether strategy 
‘two’ could supplant strategy ‘one’ was distance, specifically the time taken for communications 
to travel between Rome and England. A new pope had usually been elected in the time that it 
took for the English crown to be notified of the previous pontiff’s death and for any subsequent 
instructions to return to Rome.41 
Considering, firstly, the actions of those in the crown’s diplomatic service in Rome, it 
seems apparent that they were initially expected to formulate their own response to a papal death. 
This is obvious from the responses of Clerk and Campeggio in 1521-1522 and it is also likely 
that their remit was to choose the candidate they believed to be most suitable for English interests 
and most likely to win, at least until more direct instructions arrived.42 While Clerk tentatively 
raised the possibility of Campeggio’s candidacy without success, he and Campeggio eventually 
agreed to back de’ Medici, once they had consulted with him.43 Back in 1513, Bainbridge and 
robably de Giglis initially settled on Raphael Riario.44 On both occasions, it is notable that the 
English
                                                
p
 diplomats selected one of the firm favourites for the papal tiara, which implies that it was 
 
 For Clerk having discussed with Wolsey the possibility of the latter’s candidacy for election prior to leaving for 
that he would support him if de’ Medici did the same (although he was sceptical about de’ Medici doing so). Clerk 
then went to Campeggio, but the cardinal cautiously warned him not to mention this to de’ Medici unless the latter 
pting to conceal 
.230-233. 
41 For the implications of distance for the Anglo-papal relationship, see pp.36-37. 
42
Rome, see Ellis, p.308 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Following the 1521-1522 election, 
Charles V revealed that his own ambassador was empowered to work in his interests during conclaves, until more 
specific instructions arrived; LPIIIii, 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). 
43 Clerk originally raised Campeggio’s candidacy when lobbying Cardinal Colonna, to which the cardinal replied 
did first. In a subsequent conversation with Giulio de’ Medici, Clerk tried to hint at Campeggio becoming their 
candidate but, perceiving no support, did not mention it directly and let the matter drop; LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared 
end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
44 Bainbridge’s desire to back one of the two strongest candidates (the other being Giovanni de’ Medici) was 
probably genuine, given that one would surely choose somebody less likely to win if initially attem
the identity of the nominee that one truly supported. Indeed, this approach was taken by the Medici ‘party’ up to and 
including the first ballot. Also, it has already been outlined that the other ‘English’ cardinal in this conclave, de 
Castello, does not seem to have worked with Bainbridge in this election, having supported de’ Medici from the start 
and strongly opposed Riario. Moreover, de Castello’s vote for Bainbridge in the first scrutiny, as already noted, was 
not a genuine desire on the Italian’s part for the Englishman to become pope; see above, pp
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a deliberate policy to play it safe when selecting the ‘English’ candidate, preferably someone who 
would enter conclave as papabile.45 While this did have its limitations, particularly in terms of 
the narrow field from which to choose and the need to assess the political sympathies of these 
few candidates, it would make sense for the English representatives to do this, given their 
relatively weak position in conclaves and their need to please the king by their actions towards 
these. Having chosen the ‘English’ nominee, the diplomats would then visit various cardinals in 
an attempt to drum up support. In December 1521, Clerk reported to Wolsey that, as ‘princes’ 
orators here in the court be now somewhat busy as meet ministers in all these practices sede 
vacante, I offered myself at all seasons to go and to ride, to do and to sp[eak] in the King’s behalf 
and yours, and otherw[ise] that by him should be thought expedient’. The offer was made to de’ 
Medici and the latter accepted.46 While it is unknown how Bainbridge and de Giglis went about 
their lobbying for Riario in 1513, the similarity to their counterparts in 1521-1522 in their 
selection of candidates would suggest that they also visited other cardinals to this end. Indeed, it 
is known that Bainbridge did have good connections within the Sacred College.47 
                                                 
45 Bainbridge seems to have reported to England, via Spinelly in the Low Countries, that Riario was one of the two 
atius’) and, indeed, 
favourites (the other being Fieschi). This was borne out by an (Imperial) account of the actual election; LPIi, 1670 
(LPI, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1677 (LPI, 3780; 11 March 1513). In 1521, Clerk 
perceived de’ Medici as a favourite, towards the end of December, but before conclave opened Richard Wingfield 
and Thomas Spinelly reported their understanding of the same from Ghent on 26 December (they also named 
Cardinals Siena and Fieschi as likely candidates). Similarly, Pace, en route to Rome, reported on 31 December his 
hearing that de’ Medici was one of three likely to be elected (the others being Fieschi and ‘Jacob
that he was ‘at a great fordeale’, given the number of benefices he held and could, therefore, distribute to supporters; 
LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]), 1901 (26 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer). 
46 The date of this correspondence can be speculated on the basis of Clerk’s acknowledging the arrival of Wolsey’s 
dated 25 November and that it mentions that conclave will open on 26 December (St Stephen’s Day); LPIIIii, 1895 
(calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
47 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.106-112. 
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Another element of the English diplomats’ strategy could involve combining their efforts 
with colleagues from a friendly, third-party state, in order to strengthen their position.48 Once 
again, the 1521-1522 experience points towards this. In the first place, one ought to note that 
England at this time was politically aligned with the Empire against France, according to the 
Treaty of Bruges (August 1521), and thus it would have been common sense for both sets of 
diplomats to work towards an agreed end in Rome. Indeed, on 19 December, the Imperial 
ambassador in England reported Henry’s intention that Clerk ‘act in concert’ with his Imperial 
counterpart in Rome, Juan Manuel.49 Secondly, that this was expected is suggested on 19 
December, by Sirs Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly notifying Wolsey of their 
anticipation that Manuel and Clerk would hasten the election to occur before the arrival of the 
French cardinals, believed to be on their way.50 The likelihood of an Anglo-Imperial axis is also 
heightened when one considers the loyalties of Lorenzo Campeggio towards both powers. 
Campeggio’s close association with the Empire predated his relationship with England, having 
been sent there as papal nuncio on several diplomatic missions, having benefited from an 
Imperial bishopric (Feltre, 1512-1520), as well as the cardinal protectorship of Germany from 
perhaps 1517.51 It is unsurprising, therefore, that the Italian was eager to retain his links with this 
secular patron and that Juan Manuel, on 24 December 1521, listed him among the pro-Imperial 
cardinals.52 This alternative loyalty, however, was not perceived to be at odds with Campeggio’s 
service to England, as was indicated by Wolsey’s having assisted him to retain the cardinal 
                                                 
48 Again, one can ascribe the motive of such action as being the result of a lack of English strength within the 
College of Cardinals. As will be seen, however, such an alignment was never likely with France.  
49 It is entirely feasible that Clerk had already been instructed to do this, in the event of the pope’s death; LPIIIii, 
 in Rome to Charles, Rome). 
1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
50 Ibid., 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). 
51 T.F. Mayer, ‘Campeggi, Lorenzo’, DNB. 
52 Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador
 240
protectorship after the accession of Charles V.53 On this basis, therefore, Campeggio was 
evidently in contact with both Clerk and Manuel on this subject, before entering conclave. The 
probability that some sort of cooperation occurred is further increased by the similarity of the 
actions of Manuel who, by 19 December, was reporting early attempts to gain votes for the 
Medici ‘party’ and to prevent the pro-French faction from gaining the upper hand.54 Another 
coincidence in strategy is that both Clerk and Juan Manuel approached Cardinal Colonna with a 
view to his voting for de’ Medici.55 By the 24th, the orator deemed Campeggio to be pro-
Imperial, but he, like Clerk, claimed to have come to some arrangement with de’ Medici to be 
their favoured candidate, although others of Manuel’s designation were to be nominated if this 
failed. Of the latter, Adrian of Tortosa was to be the Medici-Hapsburg choice if a non-resident 
was proposed.56 The involvement of Campeggio and the pursuit of de’ Medici’s nomination, 
therefore, coincided with the English strategy outlined above. The only difference was that the 
back-up candidates were reportedly determined by Manuel. While the idea of Anglo-Imperial 
collusion during this conclave remains circumstantial, it is made even more likely by the more 
definite observation below that both parties worked towards Wolsey’s candidacy (at least to some 
extent). 
                                                 
53 In addition, Campeggio approached Wolsey in 1520 to write to Charles, suggesting that he attend the latter’s 
coronation; LPIIIi, 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche to Wolsey, St Omer), 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to 
[Wolsey], Rome); W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.119. 
Countries believed that Manuel would pursue de’ Medici’s candidacy as early as 17 December; Ven.iii, 376 
(Venetian ambassador in the Low Countries to the Signory, Ghent). It would have been difficult for Clerk et al to 
54 Sp.ii, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). The Venetian ambassador in the Low 
have worked with Juan Manuel prior to 11 December, as on this date he condemned to the emperor the intrigues 
involved and claimed to have listed 12 nominees for whom cardinals could vote, if/when they enquired of the 
368 (11 December 
Rome to Charles); LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 
 ambassador in Rome to Charles), 371 (28 December 1521, Imperial 
Imperial candidate. Thus, in his mind, the orator claimed to be devolving himself of all responsibility and preventing 
any enmities from developing with those who were not chosen by him on Charles’ behalf; Sp.ii, 
1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). 
55 Sp.ii, 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in 
1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
56 Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial
ambassador in Rome to Charles). 
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 Before and probably during conclave, English representatives in Rome were also 
empowered to make promises of money, benefices and so on, in a bid to guarantee the votes of 
cardinals.57 That Clerk was prepared to make such illegal simoniacal offers, albeit perhaps not 
explicit sums or named benefices, is suggested by the orator in December 1521, when he told de’ 
Medici of Wolsey’s desire to support him: ‘I showed him that I was sure your grace [Wolsey] 
would be contented to suffer largely, both in your goods and also in your body, to see him in the 
room, [the papacy] and that he might boldly to that intent promise all that your grace was hable 
[sic.] to make’.58 Clerk was suggesting, therefore, that he could offer inducements for votes. That 
he may have had considerable free-rein during this process is suggested by Clerk’s later claim 
that he ‘did not gretely labor bifor their [de’ Medici, Campeggio and Schiner] entre into the 
Conclaue’ because he did not believe that Wolsey wanted to become pope.59 
 Once conclave was underway and the ‘English’ cardinals were physically separated from 
their non-collegiate colleagues, they still attempted to communicate with each other, particularly 
as to the favourites for election. This was enabled by the English ambassadors at both elections, 
de Giglis and Clerk, being appointed to the security of the chapel precisely to prevent such 
breaches, the latter on the second of three ‘wards’ between the cardinals and the outside. In a 
tors’ and other prelates’ 
summary of his main duties, Clerk outlined that, while the first ward consisted of troops guarding 
the cardinals from violence, ‘the chief thing wherein consisteth [the ora]
                                                 
57 Such actions were not peculiar to England; the Imperial Juan Manuel allegedly offered de’ Medici a pension of 
10,000 ducats in addition to a bishopric to secure his support, although after the election he recommended Charles V 
grant the former, but not the latter; ibid., 376 (11 January 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). 
58 LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). Simony was blatantly illegal during papal 
elections and measures had been taken to prevent it. Julius II’s bull against simony was read at the beginning of the 
1513 conclave and the cardinals took an oath undertaking not to engage in such practices in 1521-1522; L Pastor, 
red to go to influence conclave in this manner back in 1520, see L Pastor, History of the 
nuary 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
History of the Popes, vii, p.21; LPIIIii, 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). For the extent to which Francis I 
indicated that he was prepa
Popes, ix, pp.10-11. 
59 Ellis, p.308 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 Ja
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charge in this custody [is] that there be no letters sent out ne into con[clave], nor none other 
watchwords to and fro, so that w[e] search their meat, their pots and their platters; and if they 
agree not after three days, we may diminish their fare, and at the last keep them at bread and 
wine. [Their meat and] their drink was delivered them at a round turning wheel made in the wall, 
as I am sure your grace [Wolsey] hath seen the like in religious places…’.60 Categoric evidence 
that the English ‘party’ was involved in such intrigues came in 1513 when, probably as a result of 
curial inexperience, Bainbridge was caught red-handed on the fourth day of conclave (8 March). 
Florentine diplomats, presumably contributing to the same security duties as de Giglis (and later 
Clerk), revealed that the bottom of one of the English cardinal’s plates had been etched with the 
names of the two favourites, ‘San Giorgio [Riario] o medici’. 61 It is unlikely that Bainbridge was 
the only cardinal to communicate in this way, but it did not bode well that he was caught so early. 
Such an attempt to breach security implies that he had something to gain (presumably in the 
English interest), by revealing this information to the outside.62 It is possible that he was 
attempting to make de Giglis aware of the election favourites, in case instructions had arrived 
from England or, if de Giglis had access to better information externally than he did within the 
Sistine Chapel, to seek advice. In either case, the Italian could then recommend which of the 
candidates was the more suitable for Bainbridge to support and whether he needed to adjust his 
strategy. In 1522, Clerk claims that by the second day of this conclave, ‘watchwords and tokens 
                                                 
60 LPIIIii, 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). Imperial sources in Rome were also in receipt of intelligence 
from inside the Sistine Chapel on 6 and 7 January; Sp.ii, 372 (6 January 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to 
Charles), 373 (7 January 1522, Hieronymo Severino to Charles, Rome). 
61 In a bid to prevent any similar occurrences in the future, the silver plates supplied to the cardinals were substituted 
for earthenware, D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.43; L Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.25. 
62 Bainbridge also had his nephew Roger Bainbridge, as well as his Latin secretary, Richard Pace, as his conclavists; 
D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.42-43. 
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had been given by those within,’ in order to oppose de’ Medici.63 He later admitted that he was in 
receipt of correspondence from Campeggio while the latter was in conclave, on 9 January. The 
orator notified Wolsey of the election of Adrian VI, news that he had received in a letter from the 
Italian at 3 p.m., before the conclave had ended.64 While ‘security’ may have been more lax once 
a pope had been elected, one cannot help suspecting that this orator, being involved in the 
security, was in regular contact with Campeggio and, perhaps, de’ Medici and his supporters. 
 While the English ‘party’ did evidently enjoy some independence of action vis-à-vis 
conclaves, although loathe to stray from the safest paths, they may well have also expected some 
kind of guidance from the crown, time allowing.65 What is definite for this period is that such 
instructions were discussed, planned or sent to Rome from crown sources both in 1511 and in 
1521-1522. Wolsey’s letter to Fox of September 1511 is extremely useful in revealing 
disagreement over whom the crown ought to back as a potential pope. Moreover, in terms of the 
candidates chosen, both occasions suggest a tension between the backing of one of the 
‘favourites’ (as the representatives in Rome tended to choose) and the pursuit of a less likely 
candidate. Given that Riario was to be a favourite in 1513, it is probable that his supporters in 
England, Ruthal and Somerset, were playing it safe by selecting him whom they understood to be 
the most likely winner who would be sympathetic to English interests. Wolsey, on the other hand, 
persuaded Henry to back an outsider, de Castello, who had been exiled from Rome for some 
                                                 
63 LPIIIii, 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). For Imperial sources also having inside knowledge of conclave, 
see above n.60. 
 of his expectation that he ought to have 
; Sp.ii, 365 (1 
64 LPIIIii, 1944 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey). 
65 While the following are not English examples, it is entirely feasible that they also reflected English practice. By 28 
December, for instance, the Imperial ambassador wrote to Charles V
received a reply to his notification of Leo X’s death three or four days prior. Similarly, the Cardinal Sta. Croce asked 
for instructions when he initially notified the emperor of the same pope’s death, on 1 December
December 1521, Cardinal Carvajal to Charles, Rome), 371 (28 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to 
Charles). 
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time. Nevertheless, the almoner may have envisaged this cardinal as having greater potential 
benefit to the crown, given his ties to England (as bishop of Bath and Wells and apostolic 
collector, as well as his past diplomatic service), if he did become pontiff. Alternatively, in 1521, 
the tension seems to have been between the candidacies of Wolsey and de’ Medici. On the one 
hand, the king was convinced that his minister had a chance of winning, based on his belief in 
Imperial support and probably reinforced by those of his intimate ministers who believed this. On 
Wolsey’s nomination at the next papal election and that Henry VIII had invoked this offer as 
the other hand, Wolsey claimed not to be interested in pursuing the papal tiara and, therefore, 
may have been behind the forwarding of Giulio de’ Medici’s nomination. The outcome was the 
confusing commission of Pace to secure Wolsey’s election if possible with de’ Medici’s as the 
‘fall-back’ choice. However, if Pace arrived and found that Wolsey did not stand a chance, the 
secretary was to throw his full weight behind de’ Medici; the ‘safe’ candidate.66 Once again, it is 
not difficult to see the reason for the tension between the two choices; de’ Medici was most likely 
to be elected and would be expected to plough a similar, if not the same, political furrow to Leo 
X which, at that point, involved war against France.67 Wolsey, on the other hand, would be an 
English pontiff, with all the implications that that carried with it. 
 That the English crown sometimes decided to act in common with one of its political 
allies for conclaves is certainly confirmed by the arrangements to forward Wolsey’s candidacy in 
1521-1522. It has already been outlined how, in August 1521, Charles V had pledged to back 
soon as he heard of Leo X’s death. The subsequent agreement to this by the emperor and his aunt 
(with Giulio de’ Medici to be their second choice), along with Richard Pace’s audience with them 
                                                 
66 See above pp.233-236. 
67 See below pp.751-752. 
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both en route to Rome, demonstrate a commitment to an Anglo-Imperial axis in the election (as 
far as England was concerned).68 This alignment even extended to a request from Wolsey that the 
emperor bring military pressure to bear on the conclave, to ensure a favourable outcome.69 
 Wolsey appears to have foreshadowed this inclination towards working with the Empire 
in backing candidates for the papacy back in 1511. He chose de Castello, it appears, not just 
because of his English connections, but also because of his links with the Empire. As a result of 
the latter, Wolsey had been informed by Sir Robert Wingfield that the Italian was Maximilian’s 
favoured nominee for the papal tiara and that he had encouraged Wingfield to go to Rome to 
lobby in this regard.70 Wolsey, therefore, was cognizant at an early stage of England’s limited 
power to affect the result of conclaves, unless it threw in its lot with another anti-Gallic third 
party. While Maximilian was not, at that moment, detached from France, it was hoped that he 
would participate in the planned attack on France.71 
As the English representatives at Rome could offer inducements to the cardinals to secure 
the election of the ‘English’ candidate, so did instructions from England contain similar 
                                                 
68 See above n.28. 
69 LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). Charles had pre-empted Wolsey in 
nsideri
would be used to ensure that Wolsey became pope. While the latter may have agreed privately with such a course in 
London), 1906 (28 December 1521, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 1907 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to 
Sacred College, should they need this; Sp.ii, 366 (2 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 368 
ambassador in Rome to Charles), 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome). 
70 P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-3 (LPIi, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to 
[Fox]). 
erial adhesion to the anti-Gallic agenda, see pp.373-374, 385-386 (esp. n.98), 390-
co ng the employment of such leverage, having implied in correspondence dated 23rd that his army in Italy 
his favour, it is unthinkable that he would have voiced such an opinion publicly, given the effect that this could have, 
not only on his candidacy, but also on external perceptions of the validity of his election (if this occurred). In reply, 
Charles V confirmed to Henry and Wolsey that he would fully support the English cardinal’s candidacy by any 
means possible, including the use of military force; ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, 
Wolsey, Ghent). Also see the commission from Charles to his ambassador in Rome to this end, from which this 
could be implied; ibid., 1908 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to his ambassador in Rome). Indeed, Juan 
Manuel, did have the power to instruct the Viceroy of Naples in military matters and did instruct him to keep the 
Neapolitans mobilised on hearing of Leo X’s death. Soon after, he offered the emperor’s services to ‘defend’ the 
(11 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). Also, see, ibid., 369 (19 December 1521, Imperial 
71 For the English desire for Imp
391. 
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promises.72 Richard Pace, it seems, was empowered to offer money and other rewards to ensure 
Wolsey’s election.73 Indeed, the Imperial ambassador in England quoted Wolsey as saying that 
‘the election should not be lost for want of 100,000 ducats’.74 Such inducements appear to have 
leader of a territorial principality in addition 
to the C
in shaping the English crown’s strategy to ‘protect’ the papacy from France. 
been expected, as Matthew Schiner, Cardinal of Sion, wrote to Wolsey after the conclave, 
claiming to have done all he could to forward the Englishman’s nomination, simultaneously 
requesting a pension from Henry VIII.75 
 
The next questions to ask concerning English interference in conclaves are why attempt to do 
this and what was the crown hoping to achieve? Addressing, firstly, the reasons for its attempts to 
influence the outcomes of papal elections, Henry VIII envisaged his contribution as necessary 
because the character, background and loyalties of the successful candidate would determine the 
subsequent political direction of the papacy. Being 
hurch ensured the pope’s active involvement in the politics of Christendom. As seen, the 
political stance of the papacy, shaped primarily by these characters, backgrounds and sympathies, 
was significant 
Furthermore, as the ability to influence conclaves was open to all states, the English crown had to 
take precautions against the election of a candidate sympathetic to its rivals, particularly France, 
and more hostile to England itself. The result of a papal election would, therefore, have a direct 
                                                 
72 Once again, this practice was not peculiar to England. Around 13 January, de’ Medici, in conversation with Pace at 
Florence, suggested that the French had made him many offers since Leo X’s death; LPIIIii, 1981 (23 January 1522, 
Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). 
73 So the Venetian ambassador in England, Surian, understood towards the beginning of January 1522; Ven.iii, 384 
([6] January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). That the Italian’s perception was correct seems 
likely given the parallels that one can draw from Pace’s instructions for a similar mission to the Imperial electors in 
ons). 
., 1955 (11 January 1522, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], Rome). 
May 1519, this time to secure Henry VIII’s election, if at all feasible; LPIIIi, 240 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s 
instructi
74 LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
75 Ibid
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bearing on the direction of Anglo-papal relations (in both temporal and spiritual spheres), as well 
as upon English foreign policy more generally.76 As already posited, a ‘French’ papacy was 
feared by Henry VIII and his advisors, a fear that was effectively realised post-Marignano (1515). 
This had taken a massive military effort on Francis I’s part in Italy and was to see an expensive 
English response in its financing an Imperial-Swiss enterprise in 1516. However, opposing the 
election of a ‘French’ pontiff need not be so costly, and could be avoided if precautionary action 
as taken in conclave.77 Wolsey summarised crown intentions in a general sense, when he wrote 
to F
ented, ‘If the said Flisco shall obtain the dignity, it is hard to know what way he 
w
ox in September 1511: having heard that Julius II was mortally ill, he consulted ‘with the 
Kyng in thys matter and shewyd on to hys grace how mych honor and also furtherans of all hys 
afferys in tyme to kome shuld insue to hym yf that by hys comendacion sume Cardinall myght 
atteyne to be Pope’.78 It can be posited that, leaving aside the attempt to increase Henry’s honour, 
the aim to secure the ‘furtherans of all hys [Henry’s] afferys’ was largely political and selfish in 
nature, seeking to secure the election of a pontiff who was at least sympathetic towards English 
temporal interests and, by implication, anti-French, which would in turn also grease the wheels of 
the Anglo-papal relationship both in spiritual matters and in making the papacy more amenable to 
the English desire to act in its defence. Similarly, Richard Pace reflected candidates’ political 
sympathies when he wrote to Wolsey on 31 December 1521, while on his way to Rome. In 
conveying intelligence he had gathered from a German concerning the favourites, on Cardinal 
Fieschi he comm
                                                 
76 See for instance pp.413-414. 
77 See above pp.119-120. 
, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to 78 P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-3 (LPIi, 880; LPI
[Fox]). 
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will take, quia Genuensi[s est]’.79 As Genoa was traditionally pro-French, the implication was, 
therefore, that Fieschi’s candidacy might not be favourable to English interests. Similarly, the 
broad concern with a candidate’s political views can also be identified post-election, when the 
crown sought confirmation of these from its own diplomats and other sources. This intelligence 
was more important than that on potential candidates, as it could indicate the direction of foreign 
policy to be pursued during the new pontificate, upon which could be based England’s own 
foreign policy. Henry VIII, for instance, was extremely pleased in April 1513, when Bainbridge 
informed him of the newly-elected Leo X’s commitment to the Holy League against France, in 
pursuit of which the king was about to invade his southern neighbour.80 
 The underlying anti-French bias in English attempts to influence conclaves is further 
highlighted when one explores what the crown was hoping to achieve therein. Firstly, the crown 
hoped to induce the election of a nominee who was sympathetic to English interests and, 
secondly, it sought to back someone who opposed (and would continue to oppose) those of its 
secular enemies particularly, in this period, France. In both conclaves of this period, Henry VIII 
was committed to going to war with France, so a pro-English pontiff would also need to be anti-
French. 
The desire to back a candidate who would be sympathetic to English interests could 
manifest itself in two ways; the support of English-born or pro-English nominees. The backing of 
English-born candidates by or on behalf of the English crown was relatively unusual, although, at 
                                                 
that Pace mentions, he only refers to the political stance of one, ‘Jacobatius’, whom 
o-French Colonna faction. Perhaps those of the cardinals de’ Medici and Mantua were 
769 (LPI, 3876; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). 
79 Of the other three favourites 
he includes among the pr
sufficiently well-known not to require comment; LPIIIii, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer). 
80 LPIi, 1
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first glance, it appears to have occurred twice in this period, albeit in different guises.81 It 
occurred first in 1513, when Hadrian de Castello apparently voted for Bainbridge in the first 
ballot of the 1513 conclave. This was probably a less than genuine attempt to secure an English-
born pontiff, as the cardinal had only just returned to Rome from exile and was probably seeking 
to ingratiate himself back into English diplomatic service. In any case, the Italian was a supporter 
of Giovanni de’ Medici, whose candidacy was intended to remain secret, initially at least.82 It is 
extremely unlikely that de Castello had been instructed from England to pursue Bainbridge’s 
nomination, given his relatively limited contact with the kingdom since 1507.83 De Castello’s 
gesture can therefore be dismissed, particularly given the further lack of evidence that Henry VIII 
and his advisors ever envisaged the Cardinal of York as pope material. It probably was not worth 
England throwing its weight behind its ‘national’ candidate, if he did not have any chance of 
being elected.84 On the second occasion that an Englishman was backed by the crown for the 
papacy, both the king and Wolsey were actively involved. In 1521-1522, a deliberate attempt was 
                                                 
81 Naturally, the most favourable outcome of English influence on a papal election would have been the elevation of 
an English cardinal. It needs to be stressed, however, that the lack of cardinals of English extraction, combined with 
the largely Italian composition of the Sacred College, meant that this would always remain an incredibly unlikely 
significant
proposition. Nicholas Breakspear (Adrian IV, 1154-1159) is the only Englishman ever to have been elected pope but, 
ly, he was not a creature of the crown; J.N.D. Kelly, Oxford Dictionary of Popes, pp.174-175. One could 




back Bainbridge in this initial ballot; Bainbridge’s other benefactor, Cornaro, was also a member of the de’ Medici 
Castello was a fervent opponent of Riario, the candidate chosen for English support by Bainbridge, in conclave itself; 
L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.23. 
84 Chambers also believes that Wolsey did not like Bainbridge, particularly later on when the latter made moves to 
return to England as a legate a latere. If Wolsey’s sentiment was true (and had existed for some time), this would 
have impeded any forwarding of his candidacy in England; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.42, 60. One 
olsey, 
n for being pro-French was born in English-controlled territory in France and has been found by Menache to 
rtive of the English crown; S. Menache, Clement V (1998), pp.247-268. 
 On account of de Castello’s need to keep the object of his genuine support secret, therefore, he had to vote for 
somebody else in the first ballot and, perhaps wisely, chose Bainbridge. De Castello was not the only cardinal to 
faction; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.22-23. 
83 Indeed, his contact with the principal English representative in Rome must have been minimal, given that de 
must also remember that there were a number of other factors that checked any Bainbridge candidacy, not least his 
being a relatively inexperienced cardinal (only being appointed in 1511), his not being particularly old (50-51) and 
his close political association with a secular prince; these factors will be expanded upon with reference to W
later. 
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made to induce Wolsey’s election, although this apparently depended on English faith in Imperial 
support (and, even then, Wolsey perceived his chances as being slim). If this came to pass, 
however, as de Mesa quoted Henry as saying, ‘both your majesties [Henry and Charles] might so 
dispose of the Cardinal’s authority as if the Holy See were your own possession’.85 It did not 
need to be made explicit that this included temporal authority, as the papacy was then allied with 
the Empire, with a view also to join with England in a war against France.86 Indeed, Wolsey 
himself was quoted by the same orator as saying that one of his intentions, should he become 
pope, was to ‘exalt his own King’.87 
 Wolsey’s nomination notwithstanding, it was probably more realistic for Henry VIII, his 
advisors and his representatives in Rome, to support non-English candidates who had pro-English 
sympathies. Such a stance could be as a result of the cardinal being (or having been) employed by 
the English king, or by a sort of proxy, whereby the nominee was also favoured by an ally of 
England. Both of these features can be seen in the crown discussions of September 1511 
concerning a potential successor 
chiefly, it seems, on account that he was ‘the Kyngis bownden subiect’, being the bishop of Bath 
and Wells and apostolic collector in England, with a number of years’ experience of diplomatic 
service to the kingdom. De Castello also, moreover, had had close links with the Empire during 
to Julius II. On the one hand, Wolsey backed de Castello 
 allies against 
his exile from Rome and this culminated in his being backed by Maximilian in both 1511 and 
during the 1513 election.88 While England and the Empire were not technically
France at this point, this was the aim of diplomatic negotiations that were eventually to bear fruit 
                                                 
85 In the ambassador’s opinion, however, Wolsey felt that his election was unlikely, although he did not completely 
dismiss it; LPIIIii, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
86 See below pp.755-756. 
87 LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
88 P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-3 (LPIi, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to 
[Fox]); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.17. 
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in November 1512.89 Wolsey may therefore have been anticipating that the backing of a pro-
Imperial and pro-English candidate may become beneficial in the near future. Ruthal and 
Somerset, on the other hand, preferred Riario, who had a longstanding relationship with England 
since the reign of Richard III, was currently a friend to the English cardinal, Bainbridge, and was 
later (in 1513) to be the ‘official’ candidate backed by the Spanish crown, as well as head of a 
powerful faction in his own right.90 England, at this point, was most closely aligned with Spain in 
its foreign policy and was just a few months away from joining the Holy League that was to be 
launched against Louis XII (of which the papacy was a leading member). In terms of this 
rgumea nt, moreover, not only can one see Wolsey opting for a cardinal who had served the 
English crown diplomatically, but there was a split among royal councillors about whether to 
back a pro-Imperial or pro-Spanish candidate. The latter was probably perceived to be a safer bet 
by Ruthal and Somerset, given England’s current foreign policy trajectory, while de Castello was 
perhaps deemed too uncertain in his loyalty to the kingdom.91 
 One can also see these trends evident in John Clerk’s attempts to raise Lorenzo 
Campeggio’s profile before the 1521-1522 election. On paper, he looked the perfect candidate; he 
had visited the kingdom as (co-) legate a latere in 1518 and, having made a favourable 
impression, returned to Rome to work in conjunction with the English orators there, de Giglis and 
then Clerk, in diplomatic service to the crown.92 Campeggio was also linked to the Empire, as its 
                                                 
 See below pp.407-408. 
90 In addition, given the dynastic tendencies of the papacy around this time, Riario may also have been an attractive 
89
candidate in England, given that he was the nephew of Sixtus IV (and, thereby, also related to Julius II); D.S. 
an’; P.S and H.M. Allen (ed.), Letters of 
Ii, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). For de Castello’s earlier 
d the King’s Mother’, in B. Thompson 
Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.25, 105; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.17, 23-24. 
91 These two were accused by Wolsey of ‘dysspreysyng the Cardinall Adri
Richard Fox, pp.52-3 (LP
diplomatic service to England, see M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen an
(ed.), The Reign of Henry VII,, pp.67-79. 
92 See above pp.32-33. 
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cardinal protector in Rome. This time, however, Anglo-Imperial relations were much closer, both 
being committed to go to war with France according to the Treaty of Bruges, negotiated in 
August 1521. Henry VIII and Wolsey must have been pleased, therefore, when early news from 
Rome after Leo X’s death, revealed that Campeggio was said to be among the frontrunners for 
election.93 That the English crown was motivated by the need for a pro-English pontiff is also 
reflected by Imperial reactions to the election of Adrian VI, in spite of the ‘official’ joint policy 
to back Wolsey. Adrian was intimately associated with Charles V, both as his childhood tutor and 
most recently as his viceroy in Spain.94 The emperor himself sought to reassure Henry and 
Wolsey that Adrian was pro-English, when he notified them of the election on 21 January; next to 
Wolsey’s election, he argued, Adrian’s was ‘most for the good of Christendom’.95 Again, on 5 
February, Charles, through his ambassador in England, tried to reassure Wolsey that he ought to 
‘rejoice at the advancement of one who can do him more favour than any other member of the 
College’.96 Similarly, de’ Medici, having met with Pace and discovered his mission around 23 
                                                
January, asserted that, while he failed to secure Wolsey’s election, he instead lobbied for ‘a friend 
to the King and the Emperor’.97 A need was felt, therefore, by England’s allies at this conclave, 
to reassure Henry VIII and Wolsey that the resultant pontiff, while an unforeseen choice, would 
be pro-English, not least in the political sphere. By the end of January 1522, Richard Pace, by 
then in Rome, appears to have been convinced of this; having spoken with the Imperial 
 
93 Campeggio’s name is one of four that Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly forward to Wolsey from Ghent on 
i, 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). 
states considered the 
 to la Batie and Poillot). 
ary 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). 
19 December 1521; LPIIIi
94 K. Brandi, The Emperor Charles V (1939), pp.166-167; J.N.D. Kelly, Oxford Dictionary of Popes, pp.258-259. 
95 LPIIIii, 1977 (21 January 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). 
96 Ibid., 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). Commentators from other 
election of Adrian of Utrecht to mark the start of an ‘Imperial’ pontificate, although most would not have known of 
the positive implications that this would be expected to have for England, given that the Anglo-Imperial alliance of 
1521 still remained a secret; Ven.iii, 395 (22 January 1522, Gasparo Contarini to Signory, Brussels); LPIIIii, 1994 
(calendared 26-28 January 1522, [Francis]
97 LPIIIii, 1981 (23 Janu
 253
ambassador Manuel, Pace reported Manuel’s recommendation that Adrian visit England, so that 
he could speak with Henry and Charles. Subsequently, the emperor-elect ought to accompany the 
new pontiff to Italy to ‘settle it [Italy] to the profit of his friends’.98 
The second aim of English interference in papal elections, to secure the elevation of 
someone who opposed the interests of the crown’s rivals, was equally as important. As the central 
argument of this thesis is that Henry and his inner circle generally sought to ‘defend’ the papacy 
(and papal ‘independence’) from French influence; the crown’s aim to secure the election of an 
anti-French pontiff is entirely consistent with this. Indeed, this situation did not contradict the 
desire for a pro-English pope. As both conclaves of the period coincided with occasions when 
England was planning war against France, and the period more generally witnessed frequent 
English hostility against France, not to mention the historic enmity between the two states, it was 
natural to assume that a pontiff who was broadly anti-French would be sympathetic to English 
interests.99 Implicit in the actions taken vis-à-vis conclave in this regard, was a simultaneous 
opposition to pro-French candidates, who could realise the worst-case scenario for Henry VIII 
and his advisors: a ‘French’ papacy, in both the temporal and spiritual spheres.100 Not only would 
England have to check its anti-French foreign policy, but it would also expect less favourable 
responses concerning requests over internationally disputed benefices, cross-border jurisdiction 
and so on. It could mark a return to the supposed ‘Babylonian Captivity’ of Avignon. 
                                                 
98 Charles would also be crowned emperor there; ibid., 1996 (29 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). 
99 In 1513, preparations were at an advanced stage for an invasion of France under the auspices of the Holy League 
nals, the French will gain in Rome as much as 
ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome). 
to defend the Church. In 1521-1522, an anti-French alliance with the Empire and papacy had been concluded, again 
with the protection of the Church as an explicit aim, although it still remained ‘secret’ at this point; see below pp.412 
ff., 699 ff. 
100 In 1521-1522, this worst-case scenario was shared by the Imperialists, whose ambassador in Rome commented, 
on 24 December, that, ‘in consequence of the passions of the Cardi
they have lost in Lombardy’; Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial 
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 Concerning the health scare of Julius II in September 1511, it seems that both candidates 
discussed at this time by those around the king had merits as anti-French candidates. Firstly, 
Riario’s anti-French credentials may have been interpreted by those in England from his 
friends
 pontificate 
Leo should attend with such pious shrewdness to the affairs of the church. Therefore at the royal 
od for the 
hip with the xenophobic Cardinal Bainbridge, with whom he approached the pope for the 
absolution of Venice back in 1509 (as the first stage in the formation of an anti-French 
coalition).101 Furthermore, he was related to the anti-French Julius II, having been made a 
cardinal by his uncle Sixtus IV.102 Secondly, de Castello, while having no overt anti-French 
pedigree, was presumably backed by Wolsey on account of his ties to England and the Empire. 
He would hopefully become an ally against Louis XII, which would translate, if he became pope, 
into hostility towards France.103 
 On the death of Julius II in February 1513, it was feared in England that the papacy’s 
staunch support of its anti-French foreign policy could be lost. This concern, as held by Henry 
himself, was highlighted by the nuncio Polydore Vergil, who reported that ‘the King received this 
news with great sorrow, being anxious lest the treaty [Holy League] should collapse and the 
enormous preparations which he had made for the war [against France] should perhaps prove to 
be in vain; and this he considered would by no means be in the interest of the Roman Church’. 
When Leo X was elected, however, and notified Henry of his intention to continue supporting 
England in this direction, the king ‘rejoiced greatly that immediately at the start of his
command, throughout the kingdom of England, prayers were said and thanks given to G
                                                 
101 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.107. Nevertheless, Riario’s anti-French credentials cannot be completely 
assured, as the Venetian ambassador in Rome, Lippomano, on the same papal illness, suggested that this cardinal 
was seen as part of the ‘French party’; L.Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.369.  
102 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.25,105; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.17, 23-24. 
103 M. Underwood, ‘The Pope, the Queen and the King’s Mother’, in B. Thompson (ed.), The Reign of Henry VII, 
pp.79-80. 
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elevation of Leo to the papacy’.104 In this sense, therefore, the significance of the continued anti-
French stance of the papacy is highlighted. In Rome, it is a pretty safe bet that Christopher 
Bainbridge would not have backed anyone other than an anti-French candidate, so extreme was 
his francophobia.105 Riario, his friend, could be expected to have shared Bainbridge’s views on 
this matter. Conversely, Bainbridge’s initial opposition to the Florentine Giovanni de’ Medici can 
be viewed as stemming from the latter’s city of birth, which he, as scion of his family, now 
controlled. Florence, being traditionally pro-French, could mean that Giovanni as pontiff would 
come under pressure from France.106 
 For the 1521-1522 election, Wolsey’s candidacy would surely be the ultimate anti-French 
ticket and does not really need further expansion, given the Anglo-Imperial commitment (through 
the Treaty of Bruges) to wage war on France in the near future. That this equally represented a 
desire to prevent a ‘French’ candidate from gaining the papal tiara is demonstrated by Wolsey’s 
request that Charles use military force, if necessary, to ensure this. According to de Mesa on 24 
December 1521, Wolsey requested that the emperor move his troops to Rome, so that, if he could 
not be elected, the cardinals ‘should be prevented by force from electing an adherent of the 
French party, to the destruction of Naples and Sicily, and consequently of all Christendom’.107 
Furthermore, the crown’s choice of Giulio de’ Medici as the alternative English (and Imperial) 
                                                 
105 See below pp.368-373 and passim. 
104 D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, pp.200-201. 
106 For Bainbridge’s reported look of displeasure as he left conclave, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44. 
For Florence’s traditional links to France and continued loyalties of some in the city during this period, see H.C. 
Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth Century Florence, passim.; F. Gilbert, ‘Florentine Political 
Assumptions in the Period of Savonarola and Soderini’, JWC, 20, p.200. 
 28 , the emperor reiterated this 
z to Charles, 
hent). 
107 LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). While de Mesa considered these 
comments to be strange, Charles V himself preempted the request, on 23 December, by suggesting that he would 
employ his forces in support of the English cardinal’s candidacy. On the th
commitment, having heard of Wolsey’s request; ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajo
London), 1906 (28 December 1521, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 1907 (calendared 28 December 1521, Charles to 
Wolsey, G
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candidate can also be viewed in similar terms of its opposition to France. Other than the pope 
himself, this Florentine cardinal had been the lynchpin of Leo X’s government and was, 
therefore, integral to the papacy’s current war against France in Italy. Indeed, de’ Medici’s 
prominence in this most recent conflict was marked by his appearance on the frontline as legate 
to the papal army that had been involved in the recent capture of Milan.108 On this basis, Henry 
and his advisors probably did not welcome reports received via France that conclave had already 
opened on the 20th and that Cardinal Flisco (Fieschi) was the favoured candidate, given that this 
candidate was from the traditionally pro-Gallic Genoa.109 
                                                
 Similarly, Clerk also shared the same anti-Gallic priorities as Henry and Wolsey. In 
describing his actions shortly before 26 December 1521, he reported having approached Cardinal 
Colonna to support de’ Medici’s candidacy. Unbeknown to Clerk, however, it seems that 
Colonna was gearing up to forward himself for the role of pope and would become the focus of 
the pro-French interests in the imminent conclave 110 During Clerk’s meeting with the cardinal, 
Colonna had tried to convince him that ‘De Medicis was naturally, as all Florentines, for the 
French part’. In Clerk’s opinion, however, ‘I cannot tell whether he said truth or not; b[ut] God 
 
108 This was not the first time that de’ Medici had fulfilled such a role; D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War 
while a Florentine candidate in 1513 was something of an unknown 
were concerned, Leo X’s pontificate had demonstrated that the Medici could 
uary 1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). 
(2006), p.142. It also needs to be stressed that, 
quantity, as far as political sympathies 
keep control of Florence and were broadly anti-French (whenever they could be), thereby making them a safer bet 
for England. Trust in Giulio de’ Medici had been indicated early on (1514), when he was appointed cardinal 
protector of English interests in Rome; see above p.30; H.C. Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth 
Century Florence, pp.187-307. 
109 LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). Pace’s conveyed doubts about this 
cardinal on this basis have already been mentioned; ibid., 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer). 
110 Ibid., 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer), 1946 9 January 1522, [Fitzwilliam to Wolsey], St 
Germain’s), 1967 (calendared 16-17 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Florence); Sp.ii, 369 (19 December 1521, 
Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, 
Rome), 372 (6 Jan
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forbid that everything should be of truth…’.111 While it Colonna unsuccessfully attempted to 
trick the Englishman into withdrawing his support from the most powerful anti-French candidate, 
this exchange serves to highlight the significance that outsiders perceived anti-French motives to 
have with the English crown both generally and during interregna. The ambassador also focused 
on the threat from the French ‘party’ in his reports on the papal election. On the fourth day of 
conclave (30 December), for instance, he relayed that cardinals kept on coming to the door, 
asking whether any more French cardinals were coming, to solve the impasse between the pro-
Imperial and pro-French ‘parties’.112  
Finally, it ought to be emphasised that the fear of the election of a pontiff hostile to one’s 
political interests was not limited to the English crown; it appears to have been felt universally. 
Ferdinand of Aragon notified England in June 1510 of his fear that Louis XII planned to depose 
Julius II and have a more ‘amenable’ pontiff elected.113 An Imperial diplomat in Rome reporting 
the 1513 conclave, claimed to have sent his secretary to the Sistine Chapel ‘to induce them not to 
elect a Frenchman or Venetian’.114 Similarly, Juan Manuel wrote to the emperor on 24 December 
1521, lamenting that ‘in consequence of the passions of the Cardinals, the French will gain in 
Rome as much as they have lost in Lombardy’.115 On the other hand, Francis I’s opposition to the 
possibility of a pro-Imperial pope was so strong that Fitzwilliam, England’s ambassador resident 
at the French court, around the turn of 1521-1522, claimed to have it on good advice that the 
                                                 
111 Clerk also outlined Colonna’s arguments why de’ Medici would become a ‘French’ pope; LPIIIii, 1895 
(calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
112 Ibid., 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
113 Sp.ii, 50 (LPIi, 483; [June] 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England). 
114 LPIi, 1677 (LPI, 3780; 11 March 1513). 
115 Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome). Also see ibid., 372 (6 January 
1522, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). 
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French king had threatened to withdraw obedience from Rome if de’ Medici was elected.116 That 
this is not entirely unfeasible can be interpreted from Francis I’s reaction to the subsequent 
election of Adrian VI. In correspondence to his diplomats in England, Francis stated his belief 
that a pope had been created ‘entirely at his [Charles’] devotion’. Furthermore, he believed that, 
if French forces were not in Italy, the first thing that the emperor would do ‘would be to occupy 
the duchy [of Milan], and consequently the whole of Italy, including even the patrimony of the 
Church, which the Pope, being his creature, would not deny’.117 
 
 
how the English representatives went about this during the interregna and how the cardinals with 
some sort of ties to the kingdom used their votes in its interest, with apparent support from the 
Given most recent historians’ scepticism regarding Wolsey’s bids for the papal tiara (by 
the cardinal himself, anyway), a necessary supplementary question to this analysis of politically-
motivated English involvement in the influencing of papal conclaves concerns how far Henry and 
his advisors expected their actions to be successful, either as a result of their own instructions 
emanating from England, or through their proxies’ using their own initiatives in Rome.118 While 
the English representatives in Rome and the crown back in England differed slightly in their 
assessments, they clearly did envisage the possibility of some success through these means, even 
if factors such as distance, lack of influence in the Sacred College and the limitations of backing 
an English candidate were likely to impede these attempts. If there was no possibility of affecting 
papal elections, surely they would not have bothered. It has already been rehearsed sufficiently 
                                                 
116 LPIIIii, 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]). 
117 Ibid., 1994 (calendared 26-28 January 1522, [Francis] to la Batie and Poillot). 
118 A second attempt was made to forward Wolsey’s candidacy in 1523; D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the 
Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, pp.27-30. 
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crown in England. Bainbridge best demonstrates how far English diplomats would go, when he 
was caught attempting to smuggle intelligence on the candidates out of conclave.119 A successful 
outcome, therefore, was obviously worth the risk of such underhand methods. 
It seems that English representatives in Rome were quite realistic about their ability to 
affect elections, given that they tended to back one of the favourites.120 Taking the almost 
automatic backing of de’ Medici by Clerk and Campeggio, he was not only the richest and most 
powerful cardinal in Rome at this point, but he had been Leo X’s right-hand man since 1513. 
deed, it is sometimes argued that it was de’ Medici who actually ran the show.121 On these In
bases, this Italian cardinal was to enter conclave as papabile. While most now regard this 
assessment as something of a poisoned chalice, it is doubtful whether contemporaries would have 
dismissed de’ Medici’s chances on this account. Indeed, Pastor asserts that there was a great 
groundswell of support for him (and indeed he was successful on the second time of asking, in 
1523).122 It seems, therefore, that the English representatives tended to back cardinals who 
already had a body of support behind them. While Clerk did put out feelers for Campeggio’s 
nomination, this was tentative and seems to have been abandoned when Campeggio rejected this 
without de’ Medici’s support.123 Essentially, the crown’s diplomatic representatives recognised 
the implicit tendencies of papal conclaves to choose senior, Italian, curial cardinals, some of 
whom had relatives who had gained the papacy previously.124 
                                                 
 See above p.243. 
120 See above pp.230-236. 
119
121 See above p.30. For an indication of de’ Medici’s perceived power based on an estimation his income by a 
Venetian orator, it was said that, at the time of the 1523 conclave, this was around 50,000 ducats per annum, almost 
double that of the next wealthiest cardinal then in Rome (26,000 reportedly received by Cardinal Cibo); K.J.P. Lowe, 
pp.7-9. 
Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.245. 
122 He did have powerful opponents, however; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, ix, 
123 LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
124 See below pp.286-287. 
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Based principally on the pursuit of Wolsey’s candidacy, it seems on the surface that those 
in crown circles back in England, may have had a slightly more unrealistic view of their chances 
to affect conclaves, as there were a number of significant obstacles to this ever being likely. Even 
before 
ly his most significant mission, in 
this context, was as Henry’s ambassador to Germany during the Imperial election process of 
                   
he knew of Charles V’s apparent willingness to support his nomination, Wolsey reportedly 
believed that, while he had little chance of success, he did retain some hope.125 The crown’s 
attempt to have Wolsey elected pontiff still seems to have been genuine; while it resulted from 
unusual circumstances (the pledge of Imperial support), it was still reckoned to be feasible, albeit 
a long shot. 
Firstly, the identity of the ambassador entrusted with this task suggests that the mission 
was taken seriously. Richard Pace, then the king’s principal secretary, was implicitly trusted by 
both king and cardinal.126 Charles V was notified that it was as if Henry ‘had sent his very 
heart’.127 In addition, Pace was both a curial and diplomatic veteran of some standing. He had 
been resident in Rome up to 1515, most prominently as Christopher Bainbridge’s Latin secretary 
and was attendant on his master when the latter voted in the conclave of 1513. He was also fluent 
in Italian, which ensured his continued involvement in papal affairs after returning to England in 
1515. In addition to Pace’s skills and experience, he probably also had good connections in 
Rome. Pace had also been entrusted with several significant diplomatic missions, including those 
to the Swiss to secure their services against the French. Possib
                              
ber 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). The emperor’s aunt, Margaret of Savoy, appears 
n in the correspondence to and from king and cardinal, while the 
ommunicated with Wolsey 
ber 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
125 LPIIIii, 1884 (19 Decem
to have been preparing Wolsey for failure as early as 27 December, when she warned him that, if the cardinal’s 
elevation did not come to pass, it was not Charles’ fault; ibid., 1904 (27 December 1521, Margaret of Savoy to 
Wolsey, Ghent). 
126 One only has to look at his role as go-betwee
latter was at Calais and Bruges during 1521. Pace, then resident with Henry, regularly c
on behalf of the king; see above pp.24-25, n.58. 
127 LPIIIii, 1884 (19 Decem
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1519, w
 mission and, therefore, provide an indication that Henry and Wolsey did seriously 
intend 
                                                
hen he tested the water vis-à-vis Henry VIII’s candidacy. In the event, Henry had no 
chance of becoming emperor, but Pace’s conduct of this mission, in addition to his being 
empowered to promise money in return for support, has obvious parallels with that intended for 
Rome.128 Finally, while Pace failed to reach Rome in time to fulfil his mission, despite traveling 
post, he appears to have done his utmost to have his instructions reach Rome in time, by 
despatching his servant, Thomas Clerk, post to Rome from Speyer around 31 December.129 In 
short, Richard Pace’s rank, experience, connections and efforts would have carried considerable 
weight in his
to affect the papal election if they could. 
Secondly, the whole feasibility of the mission appears to have stemmed from the 
expectation that Charles V would honour a pledge that he made at Bruges in this respect. While 
such a potential strategy seems first to have been identified (in this period) back in 1511 by 
Wolsey when he envisaged that acting with another secular power might increase the chances of 
English influence, in 1521-1522 they already had promises which both Henry and Wolsey called 
upon. That Charles V and his aunt Margaret pre-empted the English approach, doubtless fuelled 
English hopes. Not only did the Empire have greater influence in conclave, but it also had a 
military presence close by that could potentially affect the election. Pace’s visits to Charles and 
Margaret, en route to Rome, demonstrate a serious commitment to discovering whether the 
 
rtedly ‘riding post-horses the whole way for speed’, but does not appear to have reached Florence 
an ambassador in the Low Countries to the Signory, Ghent); LPIIIii, 
y 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). 
128 C. Curtis, ‘Pace, Richard’, DNB. The Venetian ambassador in England, Surian, commented on the breadth of 
Pace’s commission on 6 January 1522; Ven.iii, 384 ([6] January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the 
Signory). 
129 Pace was repo
before confirmed news of Adrian VI’s election reached him; LPIIIii, 1966 (16 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], 
Florence); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, pp.292-293. For Thomas Clerk as Pace’s messenger traveling before him 
post, see Ven.iii, 379 (24 December 1521, Veneti
1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer), 1981 (23 Januar
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Imperial promises were genuine. That the secretary continued on his journey suggests his belief 
that they were. 
 Thirdly, the pledge to Wolsey by Charles was not the first offer of conclaval backing 
received by the cardinal. By early February 1519, at a time when France was closely tied to 
England according to the Treaty of London, Francis I promised to throw the weight of the 
‘French party’ behind him in the next papal election. This would reportedly consist of 14 
cardinals, the Orsini and Marcantonio Colonna. Boleyn opined that, now Henry and Francis were 
aligned, ‘neither Emperor nor Pope be made but such as pleased them’. This apparently 
unprompted offer seems to have been linked with the English crown’s claim to be supporting 
Francis in the Imperial election contest; in other words, a quid pro quo.130 This offer may have 
been reiterated during 1520, when Francis I was negotiating with Wolsey towards his meeting 
Henry at the Field of Cloth of Gold.131 It ought to be stressed that while England and France were 
at peace during these years, the English crown’s anti-French agenda persisted, motivating this 
amity and, for instance, the meeting, in a bid to prevent Francis I from realising his Italian 
ambitions.132 It is unlikely, therefore, that Henry and Wolsey would have envisaged acting in 
concert with France in conclave, although some sort of deceit may have been considered. No 
indication has been found whether this offer was followed up or even taken seriously, but it is 
                                                 
130 Ven.ii, 1163 (8 February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris), 1172 (26 February 1519, Antonio 
Giustinian to the Signory, Paris); LPIIIi, 70 (9 February 1519, [Boleyn] to Henry, Paris), 121 (14 March 1519, 
Boleyn to [Henry], Paris), 122 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris). 
131 During March 1520, Wolsey was informed that Francis was anxious to recognise his service in this and, if there 
 wake of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Sir Richard Wingfield relayed Francis’ gratitude to Wolsey and 
was anything in his kingdom that he wanted, he would give it to him. As the Imperial ambassador in England 
understood the following month, this seems to have been a promise to make Wolsey pope. Furthermore, in the 
immediate
‘promised Wolsey a much greater recompence than any remembrance he had yet made him for the trouble he had 
taken to effect the amity’; LPIIIi, 666 (8 March 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Cognac), 728 (7 April 
1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 894 (1 July 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Abevyle’). For other 
suggestions of French offers, see ibid., 803 (13 May 1520, Coruna). 
132 See above pp.123-129. 
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probable that Francis was acting on what he believed to be Wolsey’s ambition and it is even 
possible that this sowed the seeds for Wolsey’s 1521-1522 candidacy. 
If Wolsey deemed his candidacy politically necessary, his apparent reluctance has perhaps 
Among other indicators that the Wolsey candidacy was genuine is the cardinal’s 
ambitions demonstrated up to this point. While he apparently seemed reluctant to forward himself 
for pontifical office, he may well have deemed this politically expedient for the current foreign 
policy interests of England and its ally at that time, the Empire.133 This belief is suggested by de 
Mesa’s report, from 16 December, of Wolsey’s statement to the king (in his presence) that he 
would not accept the papal dignity unless Henry VIII and Charles V deemed it in their 
interests.134 The English crown was committed, according to the Treaty of Bruges, to aiding the 
Emperor in his war against France. As the crown felt it necessary to have the pope as an ally 
during such conflicts, this would be ensured if a strong pro-English character was on the papal 
throne. Furthermore, until recently, the papacy had been pro-French, as a result of the military 
disaster at Marignano (1515), which had had significant repercussions for the political 
relationship between England and Rome.135 As far as Henry VIII’s interests were concerned, 
therefore, the Cardinal of York would be the perfect pontiff. As will be seen, this option would 
probably never have been considered if Imperial support had not been offered and, even then, it 
was likely considered an outside bet. 
been somewhat overstated. The strongest piece of evidence that suggests the cardinal did not 
                                                 
133 There has already been debate over whether Wolsey held an ambition to become pope and a broad consensus has 
arisen from Chambers’ argument that he did not. Pollard originally forwarded the idea that Wolsey was motivated by 
his desire for the papal tiara, so much so (he argued) that the cardinal aligned English foreign policy with that of 
Rome to this end; D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, pp.20-30; A.F. Pollard, Wolsey, 
pp.25, 121, 164 and passim. 
134 LPIIIii, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
135 See above pp.125-129. 
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welcome his nomination came from Clerk, writing after the election, on 13 January 1522. In 
justifying his failure to lobby for Wolsey, the orator claimed that it was ‘by cause your Grace at 
my dep
e archduchess replied that ‘I hope one day to be mother of 
my fath
arting shewed me precisely that ye wolde neuer medle therewith. And on my faith ware 
not the Kyngs persuasions I shulde stande yet in greate doubte whither your Grace wollde accepte 
it or no if it ware offred you’.136 One must remember, however, that the discussion between 
Charles and Wolsey on this subject did not occur until August 1521, when Clerk was already in 
Rome. Furthermore, the Imperial ambassador’s mention of the cardinal’s reluctance, of 16 
December, was made on the same day that news of Leo X’s death first arrived. Wolsey, 
therefore, was not yet assured that Charles would honour his pledge to support his candidacy.137 
One can reasonably assume, therefore, that Henry and Wolsey had not advertised Clerk of this 
agreement any earlier because they were not completely confident that Charles would follow 
through with his promise. When confirmation arrived that the emperor would support Wolsey in 
the election, moreover, Wolsey ‘was as thankful as if he had already been elected Pope’.138 From 
this point, Wolsey appears to have shown far more enthusiasm about his potential elevation; by 
27 December, for instance, Wolsey had replied to the archduchess Margaret through Pace, 
affirming his desire to become pope, expressing himself beholden to the emperor’s aunt and 
terming her ‘mother’. To the latter, th
er, that is to say, of our Holy Father’.139 Also, Wolsey displayed anger when he heard of 
the failure of the Imperial ambassador in Rome to support his nomination, so much so that 
                                                 
136 Ellis, pp.304-3166 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Indeed, Polydore Vergil, writing after this 
period, suggests a similar belief. Concerning the election, he wrote that ‘Wolsey began to hope (or rather pretended 
to hope) that he might acquire the papal dignity’; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, pp.292-293. 
137 LPIIIii, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
ndon). 
r 1521, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Ghent). 
138 Ibid., 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, Lo
139 Ibid., 1904 (27 Decembe
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Charles V felt it necessary to reply.140 In addition, he was reportedly discontented with the actual 
result of the papal election, believing that Charles had failed to support him.141 
Furthermore, Wolsey’s ecclesiastical career up to this point had indicated both 
considerable ambition and a desire to exercise ‘papal’ powers in both the temporal and spiritual 
spheres. His pursuit of promotions and offices was fully in keeping with what Anglo describes as 
a culture of aggrandizement at the court of Henry VIII.142 Wolsey’s ambition had been rapidly 
promoted from his initial episcopal provision to Lincoln (1514), taking in some unusual 
promotions. Tournai was extraordinary for having been taken from France; similarly, the brief 
acquisition of Badajoz was unusual for having been awarded by Charles V, apparently in 
recognition of Wolsey’s role in facilitating meetings with Henry VIII (to run in parallel to the 
Field of Cloth of Gold) and also for secret assurances that England remained committed to the 
anti-French agenda. Also remarkable were Wolsey’s acquisition of a bishopric and (exempt) 
abbey in commendam: Bath and Wells and St Albans.143 This was unheard of among English 
ecclesiastics, but common among curial cardinals. Wolsey was also driven in his pursuit of a red 
hat from shortly after his elevation to the English episcopate.144 Also, his legatine commission 
was levered out of the papacy in 1518. Once he was a legate a latere, there were a number of 
occasions when Wolsey appears to have acted almost as pope in northern Europe, albeit always 
                                                 
141 Ven.iii, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). 
142 Anglo talks in the context of court festivals reflecting a broad, European tradition of magnificence among heads 
140 Ibid., 1968 (17 January 1522, de Mesa to Charles). 
of state; S. Anglo, Spectacle, Pageantry, and Early Tudor Policy (1969), p.2. 
143 For most of these appointments, see S.M. Jack, ‘Wolsey, Thomas (1470/71-1530), DNB. For Badajoz (and the 
commutation of provision to this see to a pension deriving from its revenues), see below pp.370-372, 382-384. 
ions, he also received 
IIii, 3872 (6 January 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], 
elow pp.600-601. 
Charles V first dangled a bishopric in front of Wolsey at the beginning of 1518, a time when the emperor knew that 
the English were conducting peace negotiations with France (and that the return of Tournai, before 1513 a French 
enclave in Burgundy, was on the table). While Charles attempted to scupper these negotiat
secret pledges from England of continued anti-French intentions; LP
Valladolid), 3935 (9 February 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Valladolid); also see b
144 See below pp.293-294, 295-297. 
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publicly acting first and foremost under Henry VIII’s authority. Firstly, he hijacked Leo X’s 
universal peace/crusade initiative to take the lead in (and credit for) the Treaty of London (1518). 
Second
archbishop of York and had asserted his pre-eminence in Europe as a legate a latere. The only 
ly, he played a pivotal role in the meetings between Henry and the two greatest princes in 
Christendom, Charles V (at Canterbury and Calais-Gravelines) and Francis I (at the Field of 
Cloth of Gold). Thirdly, he acted as mediator between the latter monarchs over their differences, 
traditionally a role exercised by or expected of the pope (or his agents), at Calais and Bruges in 
1521. The papacy also came to be involved in the Calais conference as a partisan party on behalf 
of whom Wolsey attempted to mediate. To gain an alternative sense of the papal flavour of 
Wolsey’s roles, one can also examine the legatine ceremonial that occurred on his meeting these 
monarchs and so on. Such formalities were designed to give the sense that the pope himself was 
there and being honoured.145 In light of all this, therefore, it is not difficult to entertain the idea 
that Wolsey may well have envisaged himself as a future pope, particularly as he had already 
fulfilled some of the key ‘political’ roles expected of this position. Indeed, the Venetian 
Giustinian, in his summary of his stay in England, written in 1519, portrays Wolsey’s standing as 
seven times greater than if he were pope.146 He was at his peak in terms of the state, as both 
Chancellor and principal minister of the king; it goes without saying that he could never become 
king. He was also at the top of the ecclesiastical hierarchy in England, as cardinal-legate and 
possible promotion he could aim for now was the papacy itself. 
In arguing that genuine hopes were held for Wolsey’s candidacy, one must consider why 
the cardinal expressed reluctance to pursue the office of pontiff. In addition to the idea that 
                                                 
145 See below pp.702-706. 
146 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.314 (Ven.ii 1287; LPIIIi, 402; calendared 10 September and end July 1519, 
ustinian). repsectively; report of England by Gi
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Wolsey’s protestations predated any confidence on the crown’s behalf that Charles V would 
honour his promise, Gunn suggests the general existence of a tendency to react in this manner to 
potential promotions and appointments for the sake of one’s honour; ‘and when given the chance 
they [the appointees] expatiated at the moment of their appointment on their unworthiness to 
receive such an accolade’.147 This is also sometimes known as ‘nolo episcopari’. It does not take 
much to interpret Wolsey’s initial reluctance to being nominated as the Anglo-Imperial candidate 
for the papacy in this sense, particularly given his protracted attempts to secure the cardinal’s hat 
where, in contrast, his ambitions were no secret.148 Indeed, Giulio de’ Medici, who is certainly 
known to have held papal ambitions, when approached by Clerk with a view to his candidacy, 
‘[thought] himself far too unworthy for the room’.149 Similarly, Adrian VI, in his first letter to 
Henry VIII, claimed that it was ‘an honour which I not only never solicited, but never wished for. 
My strength is unequal to it, and I should have refused, but for fear of offending God and the 
Church’.150 Nevertheless, Adrian’s and later Giulio’s claims of unworthiness did not preclude 
their acceptance of the papal office. It must be emphasised, however, that Gunn does not believe 
that such a reaction demonstrated insincerity, instead that those who issued such statements took 
their promotions and nominations very seriously and that their reticence was perhaps an 
indication of this.151 It is in this context, therefore, that one ought to view Wolsey’s protest to the 
king (in front of the Imperial ambassador), that he would not accept the dignity unless both Henry 
                                                 
147 Gunn is talking specifically about appointees to the Order of the Garter during the early Tudor period, although 
this react
Gunn, ‘C
148 There are also parallels of ‘nolo episcopari’ to be seen in Silvester de Giglis’ initial reluctance to approach Henry 
see, for example, LPIIii, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London). 
149 LPIIIii, 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
2, Adrian VI to Henry, ‘Victoria’). 
ion has been discovered in other contexts, as is being argued concerning Wolsey and the papal tiara; S. 
hivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo (ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, p.109. 
and Wolsey directly concerning his ambition for a red hat, instead he chose to make enquiries through a subordinate; 
150 Ibid., 2018 (2 February 152
151 S. Gunn, ‘Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court’, in S. Anglo (ed.), Chivalry in the Renaissance, 
p.109. 
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and Charles deemed it in their interests.152 Wolsey’s overt reluctance is also unsurprising because 
any indication to the contrary would certainly scare off any potential support within the Sacred 
College. Given that all curial cardinals envisaged themselves as potential popes to some degree, 
they were arguably less likely to forward the likes of Wolsey as a non-curial compromise 
candidate (as Adrian VI became), if he showed himself desirous of the role. Moreover, on a more 
personal level, it would not redound to Wolsey’s honour and reputation, both domestically and 
externally, if he was known to covet the papal office and failed to get it, particularly given the 
high-profile role that he had carved out for himself in recent years on the European political 
stage, as legate a latere.153 
In arguing that Wolsey’s candidacy was genuine, one must also tackle a convincing 
element of Chambers’ thesis to the contrary, that ultimately he would not have given up his 
offices in England to live in Rome.154 Firstly, Wolsey, always having demonstrated his loyalty to 
the king, could have overcome this reluctance by seeing it in terms of his ‘duty’ to the king; 
indeed, this is how he portrayed his undesired candidacy.155 There is no sign of Wolsey’s 
reluctance in the audience he gave to de Mesa around 17 January, where the cardinal was 
reportedly extremely angry to hear from Rome that the Imperial ambassador there was lobbying 
the cardinals in favour of de’ Medici. De Mesa countered that, if this was true, his counterpart in 
Rome would change his policy on Pace’s arrival.156 Indeed, Charles V, on hearing of Wolsey’s 
                                                 
152 LPIIIii, 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
153 Again, one is thinking particularly of Wolsey’s role in the Treaty of London (1518), the meetings of Henry VIII 
 conclave; LPIIIii, 1990 (26 January 
19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London), 
, 1968 (17 January 1522, de Mesa to Charles). 
with Francis I and Charles V, as well as the conferences of Calais and Bruges; see below pp.702-709, 732-751. 
154 D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, pp.26-27. Also, this issue was reportedly one 
of the objections that cardinals had to Wolsey’s nomination when it was raised in
1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa). 
155 According to the Imperial ambassador, de Mesa; LPIIIii, 1884 (
1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
156 Ibid.
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ire, felt it necessary to answer him through de Mesa. The emperor assured Wolsey that his orator 
in Rome had no commission to lobby for anyone other than Wolsey, but at the time in question, 
had not yet received these instructions. Until this commission arrived, Manuel was empowered to 
choose and support the most suitable candidate which, on reflection of the result and Pace’s 
failure to arrive in time, was probably not de’ Medici anyway.157 Similarly, the Venetian, Surian, 
on 27 January reported Wolsey’s discontent with the actual result of the papal election.158 
That Wolsey was prepared to leave England can also be argued, to some extent, by the 
fact that he had already spent a relatively large amount of time across the sea from Henry (in 
Calais and Bruges during the latter half of 1521), during which time he saw no challenge to his 
suprem
searching for a way to lower the odds stacked against Wolsey’s candidacy in a future election and 
acy as principal minister.159 Admittedly, this did not involve the relinquishing of crown 
office that accepting the papal tiara would inevitably involve, but it is still significant. Finally, it 
is not impossible that Wolsey envisaged that he could exercise his papacy from England. Indeed, 
Clerk speculated that the new pope, Adrian VI, believed to be elderly and sick, could be induced 
to travel from Spain to visit the emperor via England where, if he died, Wolsey would be able to 
hold a conclave ten days later. Towards the end of February, however, Pace confirmed that this 
scenario would not be permitted, given that Clement V (1305-1314) had decreed that conclaves 
must take place in Rome, regardless of where the pontiff had died.160 That this was an impractical 
idea is difficult to dispute, but one can argue that it does demonstrate that crown sources were 
                                                 
157 Ibid., 2024 (5 February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). 
158 Ven.iii, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). 
159 See below pp.739-749. 
160 Pace negated, however, precedents set by the Avignon conclaves, among others (for instance, Martin V [1417-
e that Wolsey never intended to leave England; 
, BIHR, 38, pp.26-27. 
1431] elected at Constance); LPIIIii, 2017 (1 February 1522, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 2064 (22 February 1522, Pace 
to [Wolsey], Rome). Chambers employs the same sources to argu
D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’
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for a way for him to retain his influence in England. Clerk’s solution was theoretically perfect, 
but incredibly unlikely. Overall, it is still difficult to argue that Wolsey would have dropped 
everything in England to serve his king in Rome, but it cannot be ruled out entirely, given the 
weight of other evidence that supports the genuine nature of his candidacy in 1521-1522. That a 
pope failing to reside in Rome was not an entirely ridiculous proposition was voiced by those 
who feared that the newly-elected Adrian might not leave Spain. On 13 January, Clerk wrote, ‘it 
is trout
plan that has greater similarities to the Wolsey candidacy is Richard Pace’s mission to the 
            
h that he [Adrian] may kepe the See apostolique elliswher if he will, and as in tymes paste 
it hath been kepte in Avignon and in Fflorence, and in many other places, so likewise nowe, if the 
Pope will, he may kepe it in Spayne, or in Almayn…’.161 Pace reported de’ Medici’s opinion, 
around 23 January, that it is ‘expedient that the Pope should be at Rome for the conservation of 
the lands of the Church, and the contentation of all’.162 The secretary also conveyed on 26th 
hearing that Adrian intended to pass by England and the possibility of him visiting Henry and 
Wolsey was suggested.163 
 Finally, however outlandish Wolsey’s candidacy sounded, the crown’s belief that there 
was a slim chance of success is also indicated by parallels with other seemingly impossible 
missions of the period. Firstly, around 1512-1514, Henry VIII, through Bainbridge, sought to 
gain papal legitimisation of the English claim to the French throne, particularly the transfer of the 
title ‘Most Christian King’ to Henry. While success was extremely unlikely, the political situation 
was favourable enough to England for Julius II to draw up the appropriate brief to this end.164 A 
                                     
161 Ellis, p.313 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
162 LPIIIii, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). 
163 Ibid., 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa), 1996 (29 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). 
164 See above pp.144 ff. 
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Imperial electors in 1519 to forward Henry VIII’s nomination if possible, perhaps as a 
compromise candidate. Again, it was an incredibly unlikely prospect, but Henry and his advisors 
tried anyway 165 
 
 Given that the English crown and its curial representatives believed that they could affect 
papal elections at least to some degree, this idea ought to be tempered by a consideration of the 
principal impediments that limited such expectations. Foremost was the distance between 
England and Rome and its effect on the speed of communication. A round trip of around four 
weeks for notification and reply meant that conclave was likely to have opened (during which all 
communication with the outside was forbidden) before any instructions from England were likely 
to arrive.166 In terms of the conclaves of this period, therefore, Henry and his advisors would 
have been lucky to have received notification of Julius II’s death before Leo X was elected, let 
alone send instructions to Bainbridge in Rome, as the interregnum only lasted 18 days. The 
second vacancy of the period of 39 days, on the other hand, would have provided just enough 
time for Campeggio and Clerk to have been acquainted with the crown’s choices of Wolsey and 
de’ Medici, but this did not occur.167 Even in the latter case, Charles V reckoned himself too far 
away to successfully affect the election; on initially hearing of Leo X’s death and offering his 
support to Wolsey (on 16 December), the emperor wished that he was closer to Italy, presumably 
to have speedier and more direct influence.168 On the other hand, these communication 
                                                 
165 See below pp.653 ff. 
166 See above pp.36-37. 
167 Julius II’s death and Leo’s election occurred on 21 February and 11 March 1513, respectively. Similarly, Leo’s 
 January 1522. Usually, however, interregnums 
ry of Popes, pp.255-256, 258; L. Nussdorfer, ‘The 
ember 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent). 
death and Adrian’s election took place on, 1 December 1521 and 9
lasted around one to two months; J.N.D. Kelly, Oxford Dictiona
Vacant See’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, 18, p.173. 
168 LPIIIii, 1876 (16 Dec
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difficulties would have been taken for granted by those involved and are not likely to have 
affected behaviour in any instance. There was always an outside chance that the interregnum 
would be long enough for English instructions to reach Rome and the benefits of success must 
ave been deemed worth the risk. While Pace did not reach Florence before confirmed news of 
                                                
h
Adrian VI’s election reached him, he did his utmost to have the instructions reach Rome in time, 
by despatching a messenger ahead of him.169 As a result of this difficulty, it is entirely 
unsurprising that the English representatives in Rome were expected to use their own initiative to 
support a suitable candidate. 
Another obstacle to the English crown was lack of influence both at the Holy See in 
general or within the Sacred College, compared to other states and interests. At conclaves in 
particular, groups such as the ‘French cardinals’, the pro-Imperialists, pro- and anti-Medicean 
interests were most evident.170 England was not a ‘superpower’ on the scale of the Empire, 
France or Spain and lacked the resources to compete with them on an individual basis, not least 
in Rome. Furthermore, these powers all held interests in Italy, which they often affected directly 
and could, therefore, command the loyalty of elements within that peninsula.171 This power was 
transferable into the College of Cardinals during conclaves. England never had more than one 
native cardinal at a time and, Bainbridge notwithstanding, he was not usually resident in Rome. 
 
o
170 K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, pp.50-51, 72-73, 121-124. For a sense of the power of the 
pro-French/anti-Medici and the pro-Imperial/pro-Medici parties during the 1521-1522 interregnum, see for instance, 
22, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent); Sp.ii, 369 (19 December 
or in Rome to Charles), 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles), 
d affect the outcome of the 1521-1522 election by military 
 bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
169 Ibid., 1966 (16 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer), 
1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Fl rence). 
LPIIIii, 1933 (4 January 15
1521, Imperial ambassad
371 (28 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles). In both elections of this period, there even seems 
to have been a division between younger and older cardinals, although political sympathies could complicate this; M. 
Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.204-208; ibid., vi, pp.214-222. 
171 See, for instance, Wolsey’s belief that Charles coul
pressure from his troops in Italy; LPIIIii, 1892 (24 December 1521,
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This made the development of a ‘party’ problematic. The English crown’s tacit recognition of its 
limited power in both Rome and the Sacred College is indicated by its employment of Italian 
curials, the likes of de Castello, de Giglis and Campeggio for much of its business in Rome 
during this period. It was obviously too difficult and/or costly to develop Englishmen to provide 
this representation, Bainbridge and Pace excepted.172 Similarly, the earlier demonstration of the 
crown’s willingness to align with friendly third-parties during conclaves also suggests the 
English accepted that they were not powerful enough to affect conclaves alone.173 
It must be stressed that, despite the attempts of secular powers to affect papal elections, 
conclaves were unpredictable and the English crown would have been well aware of this 
impediment to their efforts. Papabile rarely emerged as pontiffs. The political interests and 
loyalties of the cardinals, such as they were, were also affected by other factors, including 
personal ambition and a desire for material wealth.174 Indeed Juan Manuel, even after aligning 
with Giulio de’ Medici, wrote that it depended on the cardinal keeping his word in conclave, ‘a 
thing which is not usual in Rome’.175 This unpredictability could be exacerbated by the invariable 
return of exiled cardinals who had been enemies of the dead pope, for one reason or another.176 It 
would also have been affected in the later conclave by Leo X’s elevation of 31 cardinals in 
1517.177 This put a major limitation on the likely efficacy of instructions emanating from 
England and explains the existence of a ‘plan B’, to back Giulio de’ Medici, when Henry and 
                                                 
172 See above pp.31-33. 
173 See above pp.245-246. 
174 Cardinals were frequently offered inducements before and during conclaves to support particular candidates, not 
least from the collection of benefices that the newly-elected would be obliged to relinquish. A few days after Leo X’s 
election, Bainbridge was awarded his abbey of S. Stefano in Bologna; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.44, 
96. 
175 Sp.ii, 370 (24 December 1521, Imperial ambassador in Rome to Charles, Rome). 
176 K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, pp.46-47. 
177 See below pp.302-303, 573-574. 
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Wolsey sent instructions to Rome in respect of the latter’s nomination in 1521-1522 (and again in 
1523) to circumvent this. 
In addition to these obstacles to English influence in conclaves, there were more 
particular limitations if the crown wanted to forward the nomination of an Englishman. Despite 
apparently genuine hopes for Wolsey, these obstacles would have have been as clear in 1521-
1522 as they had probably been in 1513, when Bainbridge was not pushed to the fore. Despite 
Imperia
wished that the Holy Ghost would inspire his brethren the Cardinals to lean that ways’, one must 
remember that the orator was at that point offering the cardinal England’s support, so this can 
l support making the difference in the later election, Wolsey was probably realistic when 
he told the Imperial ambassador that he was unlikely to become pope, although he did not 
completely give up hope. 
 The first characteristic going against Wolsey was that he was both non-curial and non-
Italian. As Chambers quotes a mid-fifteenth century cardinal, a non-curial was like ‘a fish out of 
water’, they did not have the experience or connections to run the papacy, let alone get elected to 
it.178 The importance of this for Wolsey, if he was to become pope, was implied by John Clerk, 
on 1 December, when he notified the cardinal of Leo X’s grave illness. The orator also 
commented that he wished Wolsey was there, which can only be an allusion to his potential 
candidacy in a potential conclave.179 Although de’ Medici, in conversation with Clerk prior to the 
election, ‘said that your Grace [Wolsey] was more meet for the room [papacy] than any man, and 
                                                 
178 D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, p.20. While there was no technical difference 
 able to wield more influence in 
and Princes, pp.64-65. 
erk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
between the positions of curial and non-curial cardinals, in practice the curials were
Rome, particularly in times of Sede Vacante; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes 
179 LPIIIii, 1824 (1 December 1521, Cl
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probably be dismissed as polite conversation.180 Furthermore, in the wake of Wolsey’s name 
having been raised in conclave, the Cardinal of Siena later reported to Richard Pace that one of 
the rea
eason.184 In addition to the non-residency issue, the election of a non-
                                                
sons for his candidacy being objected to was the expectation that he would not come to 
Rome.181 Even when a non-curial was elected, surprise and discontent were among the reactions 
emanating from Rome. Clerk wrote to Wolsey on 9 January that ‘the world is here marvellously 
abashed and evil contented. This man here is nother known nor spoken of’.182 The people of 
Rome were said to be so incensed that the cardinals were too scared to leave their homes for a 
number of days. 183 Even by Pace’s arrival in Rome on 27th, the cardinals were still reluctant to 
appear in public for this r
Italian had also become extremely unusual. As already mentioned, the composition of the Sacred 
College was overwhelmingly Italian and this was almost always reflected in the results of the 
subsequent elections.185 Once again, Adrian VI proved the exception, although this was 
unforseen. Finally, another tendency of conclaves was to elect candidates who were relatives of 
previous popes. In other words, a dynastic element had entered the electoral process, of which 
Julius II was a good example and the de’ Medici were soon to emulate. While this did not always 
 
182
184 LPIIIii, 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). 
(57%) out of 162 cardinals created were Italian (by way of comparison, only three were English). Partner more or 
less concurs with Chambers, calculating that, for the period 1471-1527, nearly 60% of college members were from 
the southern side of the Alps. On this subject, Prodi also stresses the increasing Italianisation of the College of 
Cardinals, indeed of the papacy itself around this time, although one must remember that the Italian cardinals were a 
far from homogenous group, possessing diverse political interests, usually based on their city (or city-state) of origin; 
on, Popes and Princes, 
180 Ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
181 Ibid., 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Palpa). 
 Ibid., 1944 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey). 
183 M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi, pp.221. 
185 At the 1513 conclave, McClung Hallmann demonstrates that 19 of the 25 cardinals were Italian (76%), while in 
1522 36 of the 39 (92%) originated from the peninsula. Chambers, on the other hand, states that, 1480-1534, 93 
D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; B. McClung Hallman, Italian Cardinals, Reform, and the Church as 
Property, 1492-1563 (1985), p.4 (table 1.1); P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.209; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.18, 
83-85, 171-172. Also see C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.93-94, J.A.F. Thoms
pp.61-64. 
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occur (and Adrian VI, among others, were exceptions), again, Wolsey obviously did not fit this 
criterion. 
 Other characteristics which would have been recognised in England as reducing the likely 
success of an English candidate included age and health, and state office. Age and health 
repeatedly arose as determining factors to papal electors. Probably due to the individual 
ambitions of cardinals, all potential aspirants to the papal throne, there seems to have been a 
general reluctance to elect a young, fit nominee.186 Thus, as Leo X was an extraordinary 38 when 
he was elected, it has been suggested that his election was eased by his fragile health when he 
entered conclave, which required the attendance of a medic.187 His broader physical appearance 
may have done little to dispel this impression, being corpulent and extremely short-sighted.188 
While Leo perhaps survived longer than some of his electors may have hoped, he did die at the 
relatively young age of 46. Adrian VI, on the other hand, seems to have been elected, in part at 
least, because of his age and ill health.189 Thus, it is not surprising that Wolsey’s age and 
presumed health were cited as obstacles to his candidacy in conclave. Campeggio, for instance, 
highlighted this issue to Wolsey as being significant to the failure of his candidacy. The Italian 
said he tried to convince his fellow cardinals that Wolsey was over 50, if not close to 60, but was 
                                                 
186 That age was seen as an issue, see for example Pace’s consideration of a ‘Jacobatius’ that he had heard was one of 
21; LPIIIii, 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer). 
, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
stor, History of the Popes, vii, p.18. 
 there and ensure his own victory; ibid., 2017 (1 February 1522, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). 
the favourites for the papacy, on 31 December 15
Also, see ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521
187 M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.205-206; L. Pa
188 For a comment on this made by a contemporary, shortly after the pope’s death, see L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, viii, p.67. 
189 Campeggio cites the Imperial cardinal’s age; LPIIIii, 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
Also, Pace reported from Florence to Wolsey, probably on 16 January 1522, that rumours abounded of the pope 
being ill and that bets were being placed that he had already died; ibid., 1967 (calendared 16-17 January 1522, Pace 
to Wolsey, Florence). Even the emperor himself was not particularly optimistic of these attributes of the new pontiff. 
Charles reportedly described Adrian VI as being ‘of great age, of a feeble complexion and sickly’ when he heard of 
his election; ibid., 1970 (calendared 18 January 1522, Spinelly to Wolsey). Finally, Clerk, on 1 February, reported to 
Wolsey a strong rumour that the pope was dead. If he was not, the orator recommended that Wolsey induce Adrian 
to come to England so that, given his age and infirmity, he might die there and Wolsey would thereby be able to hold 
the election
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unsuccessful.190 Similarly, John Clerk, asserted on 13 January that, among other reasons for 
opposition to Wolsey’s nomination, ‘your Grace was to yonge’.191 
ecognised obstacles. The English 
                        
A further potential impediment to an Englishman’s nomination was his holding of state 
office. The cardinals were generally not disposed to choose as pope those who held prominent 
state office, particularly those associated with the ultramontane powers. Again, Adrian VI was an 
exception, an intimate minister of the emperor and running Spain on Charles’ behalf when 
elected. He had also been the emperor’s tutor but, unlike Wolsey, he was never described as 
‘alter rex’.192 Adrian was also less prominent in international politics than Wolsey had been, 
particularly in recent years. Wolsey’s actions with the Treaty of London did not endear him to 
Leo X and overall, his conducting himself as a quasi-pope may not have been viewed 
supportively by his fellow cardinals; indeed, they may already have envisaged him as aspiring to 
the papal tiara. On 10 January 1522, Campeggio mentions Wolsey’s status as one of the 
objections of the cardinals; ‘some feared that with Wolsey’s greatness, they would not have 
enough intercourse with him’.193 Similarly, the Cardinal of Siena told Richard Pace, on 26 
January, that, while he had supported de’ Medici’s forwarding of Wolsey’s nomination, one of 
the objections was ‘that ye were nimis potens’.194 
 Overall, it does seem that the English crown envisaged its attempts to affect papal 
conclaves to have a limited chance of success, given the r
                         
190 Ibid., 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
191 Clerk also cited as impediments that the cardinals ‘had certain knowledge that ye were determined to trouth and 
the execucion of Justice,’ to which a number were opposed and, also, ‘that ye favored not all the best th’emperor’, a 
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193 LPIIIii, 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
194 Pace, however, speculated that he could have removed this objection; ibid., 1990 (26 January 1522, Pace to 
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representatives in Rome fully recognised their powers to affect conclaves, but their choice, 
usually dictated by the principal English-born diplomat, tended to be for those Italian candidates 
with es
e, an apparently suitable candidate emerged on 
                                                
tablished power-bases. 
 
After all this, how far did the English crown actually achieve its political goals in papal 
elections? While, superficially, the results of the conclaves of 1513 and 1521-1522 represented a 
failure in English policy, the reality of the outcome may be different.195 In both cases, the 
‘English’ cardinals in conclave all appear to have voted for the successful candidates, eventually. 
In 1513, Bainbridge, despite his ire, probably backed Giovanni de’ Medici in the final scrutiny, 
given that he soon after gained a Bolognese abbey previously held by de’ Medici.196 Similarly, 
Clerk’s disappointment at Adrian’s election ignores the ‘English’ cardinals’ involvement in it.197 
Definitely de’ Medici and, consequently, Campeggio, forwarded this candidate and voted for 
him. As the Florentine reportedly later told Pace, ‘he thought it best to obtain the papacy for a 
friend to the King and the Emperor, as he doubts not the newly elected will be’.198 
The underlying English political motive for interfering in papal elections was to ensure 
the success of an anti-French/pro-English nomine
both occasions. According to Bainbridge, writing on 25 June 1513, Leo X ‘woll never doo 
contrary to that he saide att his creacon unto me…he woll in deade firmelie kepe the 
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t in this election; pp.234-236. 
as 
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 very few had ever seen him’; LPIIIii, 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
195 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.44; LPIIIii, 1944 (9 Jan
(LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]).  
196 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.96. 
197 Admittedly, de’ Medici’s ‘English’ credentials can be questioned, but Clerk seems to have worked with both him 
and Campeggio to secure the English interes
198 LPIIIii, 1981 (23 January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence). Clerk reported on 13 January that Adrian w
nominated by the Medici ‘party’; Ellis, p.308 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 Jan
implied that he had voted for Adrian when he asserted that ‘the cardinals were influenced by his [Adrian’s] integrity 
alone, as none but a
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confederacon withe your grace’.199 It would be surprising if Bainbridge had not gained some kind 
of commitment from Leo before helping to enable his election. If, indeed, this did occur, then 
Bainbridge had facilitated the election of a candidate favourable to current English foreign 
olicy. No wonder Henry VIII was ‘very well satisfied with the writer’s [Bainbridge’s] diligence’ 
in this 
the good of 
Christe
would ‘confirm and increase the honours granted to you by his predecessor’. Indeed, the diplomat 
p
affair. He particularly ‘rejoiced to find that Leo sanctions the league for the defence of the 
Church and has joined it’.200 In summary, the result of the conclave was extremely positive for 
the English crown in the short-term. In the longer term, perhaps the degree of ‘success’ could be 
revised, given Leo X’s practical subjection to France following the battle of Marignano, but 
crown policy vis-à-vis papal elections was not blessed with foresight. 
 Again, in 1521-1522, the election of Adrian VI was politically positive for England. 
Intimately connected with Henry’s ally against France, Charles V, this ‘Imperial’ pontiff would 
be expected to be both pro-English and anti-French. De’ Medici said that he had been nominated 
for these qualities. Furthermore, Charles V wrote to reassure Wolsey on 21 January reasoning 
that, besides the Englishman’s own candidacy, Adrian’s was ‘most for 
ndom’.201 Similar sentiments were relayed to England by Clerk, on 13 January, that ‘men 
suppose heer [in Rome] that the Kyngs Highnes shall haue a greate stroke with themperor’.202 
Spinelly, reporting from Brussels, recalled his own meeting with the new pontiff while the latter 
was in Spain, where ‘I found him well inclined to the King and you’. In his opinion, Adrian 
also relayed Charles’ promise to obtain confirmation of Wolsey’s legatine commission from 
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200 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). 
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Adrian VI.203 Finally, on 29 January, Richard Pace, having spoken with Manuel, reported the 
latter’s recommendation that Adrian be conveyed to England, so that he could speak with Henry 
and Charles. Subsequently, the emperor-elect ought to go to Italy with the new pontiff to ‘settle it 
[Italy] to the profit of his friends’, as well as be crowned emperor.204 Unfortunately, there is little 
indication of reaction to Adrian VI’s election within crown circles. Only Surian, the Venetian 
ambassador in England, mentions this and cited Wolsey’s disappointment at the emperor’s 
failure, as he understood it, to help facilitate his election. As a result, Surian appears to have 
envisaged an English withdrawal from continental politics.205 While Wolsey may well have been 
disappointed, that does not mean that he was unhappy with the election of the Imperial cardinal. 
The Venetians at this time were unaware of any Anglo-Imperial alliance (and its commitment to 
war against France), so would not have appreciated the potential consequences that such a 
politically biased pope could have for England. The news may have been received positively in 
England, as the crown continued its preparations to aid the Empire in its war with France, 
according to the Treaty of Bruges.206 There was, nevertheless, something of a wait-and-see 
attitude in England from the moment Henry and Wolsey heard of Leo X’s death. They were not 
yet prepared to commit publicly to their alliance with Charles V, preferring to continue the façade 
of amity with France and to promote a truce (so that England could prepare for war). This 
appears to have persisted following confirmation of Adrian VI’s election being received in 
England; perhaps the crown was waiting to see how the papacy was going to act, particularly 
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given that Adrian was not yet in Rome and this was, according to the English representatives 
there, the cause of much instability.207 
Finally, confirmation of the intentions of the new pontiff came from Adrian VI himself 
when, on 2 February, he notified the crown of his election. He praised Henry’s ‘zeal for the peace 
of Christendom’ and urged him to join with the emperor in pursuit of this goal. Similarly, he 
urged Wolsey to ‘promote an indissoluble alliance between his King and the Emperor, as the 
greatest safeguard to the peace of Christendom’.208 In the context of the calls for universal peace 
that were made during this period, Adrian’s sentiment would most probably have been 
interpreted as an indication of continued papal support for the current war against France, to 
which England was committed. This indicated, therefore, that a pro-English/anti-French pontiff 
had been elected. 
 The problem with the new pontiff in the short-term, was his absence from Rome. 
Interregna were destabilising to the papacy at the best of times, but an absentee pope was even 
more so. 209 As the timetable for Adrian’s arrival was unknown, it was even questioned whether 
he would come, the instability of the interregnum continued. Clerk commented on this on several 
occasions. On 13 January, for instance, he reported that Adrian’s coming to Rome was greatly 
desired ‘not onely for the mayntenyng of thEmperors affaires heer in Lumbardy and Naples but 
also for the preseruation of the Lands of the Churche which hourely be invaded’. Concerning the 
                                                 
207 See below pp.753-756. 
208 LPIIIii, 2018 (2 February 1522, Adrian VI to Henry, ‘Victoria’), 2019 (2 February 1522, Adrian VI to Wolsey, 
‘Vittoria’). 
209 Political stability was arguably not aided by the effective shutdown of most aspects of papal government during 




vntell such tyme as he [Adrian] be crowned’.210 
 
            
anti-French foreign policy, to which Henry VIII was committed, Clerk further relayed a concern 
that ‘there can no expedicions be made 
Overall, it can be concluded that the English crown’s representatives in Rome were 
broadly successful in contributing to the election of pro-English and anti-French candidates, but 
not those who were initially chosen, nor favoured in England itself. Those looking to the crown’s 
interests in Rome, in a general sense, were able to adapt successfully to the fluctuating conditions 
there and the popes eventually elected were the best compromise candidates available. The 
nominations emerging from England itself, on the other hand, particularly Wolsey’s (although, to 
a lesser extent, Riario’s), were speculative and, while not deemed completely implausible, 
unsurprisingly failed. 
                                     
olsey], Rome), 2017 (1 February 1522, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). Also, see similar reports and sentiments 
ampeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
210 Ellis, pp.312-313 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522 [Clerk to Wolsey]). Also, see LPIIIii, 1961 (13 January 1522 
Clerk to [W
from Campeggio and Pace comments; ibid., 1979 (22 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1980 (22 
January 1522, Pace to [Wolsey], Florence), 1995 (28 January 1522, Pace to Wolsey, Rome), 2037 (10 February 
1522, C
5 
INFLUENCING ACCESS TO ‘THE FOUNDATION AND HINGE’ OF THE PAPACY: 
E
 the successor of St Peter.2 On the other hand, while it had traditionally 
been the advisory body of popes, this role had diminished considerably during the Renaissance 
(although it continued to claim this role), as the monarchical character of the papacy increased in 
connection with its territorial interests, to the extent, as some would argue, that its members had 
become little more than courtiers.3 This is not to say that the college’s role was purely ceremonial 
                                                
NGLISH ATTEMPTS TO AFFECT THE COMPOSITION OF THE SACRED 
COLLEGE1 
 
 The College of Cardinals occupied an influential yet ambiguous position within the 
governmental structure of the Church. On the one hand, its members, appointed only by the pope, 
were the most senior ecclesiastics in the ecclesiastical hierarchy other than the pontiff himself 
and its principal formal role concerning Church government was to assume control during an 
interregnum and elect
 
1 During an audience with the Venetian ambassador Giustinian during May 1516, Wolsey was told that, by virtue of 
being a cardinal, he was ‘the foundation and hinge’ of ‘the apostolic chair’, which he was bound to defend. Doubtless 
Wolsey agreed with this summary in a sense, but the Venetian was referring to the need to defend the papacy against 
the Emperor, with whom England was then allied, ostensibly aiming to eject France from Italy (or, at least, to 
relaunch an expedition that had recently failed); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years i,  pp.224-228 (LPIIi, 1960; 31 May 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). For the idea of cardinals as hinges in this sense and others, see S. Kuttner, 
‘Cardinalis: the History of a Canonical Concept, Traditio, 3 (1945), pp.130-131. 
2 P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-83, 88; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, p.72; W. Ullmann, ‘The Legal 
Validity of the Papal Electoral Pacts’, in W. Ullmann (ed), The Papacy and Political Ideas in the Middle Ages 
(1976), pp.3-35. For a brief account of the development of the college, see J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of 
Cardinals: Size and Geographical Composition (1099-1986)’, AHP, 25 (1987), pp.8-11. 
3 For the Sacred College’s general lack of actual governmental responsibility around this time, its failure in its 
attempts to assert a more prominent role for itself for instance through electoral capitulations and the opinion of 
some that they were largely courtiers, see G. Fragnito, ‘Cardinals’ Courts in Sixteenth-Century Rome’, JMH, 65, 
s of state, such as Francis I at Bologna in 1515; LPIIi, 1281 (14 December 
p.34; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.47; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-84, 88; J.A.F. 
Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.66-71. In terms of the college’s advisory function, Consistory had evolved from a 
consultative forum to an occasion where, most often, provisions to benefices were forwarded by cardinals. 
Consistories involving the presence of cardinals were also convoked to receive dignitaries, most commonly foreign 
diplomats but also, on occasion, head
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by this time; it still played an integral role or instance, in appointments to consistorial 
b  
body wers 
around Christendom, on commission from the pontiff, as legates a latere.6 Broadly speaking, 
                                                                                                                                                           
, f
enefices4 and could also be asked by the pope to consult on particular matters (as a corporate
 or through a commission of cardinals).5 Cardinals could also act with quasi-papal po
   
1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna); G. Fragnito, ‘Cardinals’ Courts in Sixteenth-Century Rome’, JMH, 65, 
.36-37
P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-83, 88. For cardinals as courtiers, see, for instance, their attendance on the pope 
November 1516, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1157 (13 February 1519, Venetian ambassador in 
subsequently divided among the cardinals (the rest went to the pope). Given their vested interest in this process, it is 
attempt by Wolsey to gain a remission of the service taxes due on Lincon in 1514, for instance, Leo X notified Henry 
College; LPIii, 2636 (LPI, 4724; SPV, xi; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 
Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.74; W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the 
Papacy with England 1327-1534, ii (1962), p.169 and passim; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.150-161. 
ld be ensured. One can only 
1 February 1520, Venetian 
pp ; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.47; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, pp.35-37, 211; 
when he received gifts of animals, including an elephant, from the king of Portugal in March 1514. Also, cardinals 
are mentioned as accompanying the pope on a grand hunting expedition in January 1515 (reportedly involving 3,000 
horse) and other hunting trips in November 1516, February and March 1519; Ven.ii, 387 (21 March 1514, Vetor 
Lippomano to -, Rome), 570 (17, 21 January 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 814 (16 
Rome to the Sigbnory), 1185 (30 March 1519, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
4 While individual cardinals proposed candidates (often at the behest of secular princes), as Bainbridge did for 
Wolsey’s promotion to York in 1514, work for which they were paid as individuals, the college benefited from a 
significant proportion of the revenue generated from the taxes associated with these provisions, which was 
entirely understandable that the cardinals (in Rome) were quite proprietorial about this function. Concerning an 
that the college had rejected this and this was confirmed by de Giglis. Around September 1514, however, de Giglis 
notified Ammonius that the college had been persuaded to reduce the amount due by 1,000 ducats, despite 
considerable opposition from the cardinals. Similarly, an attempt was made in September 1519 to obtain a reduction 
in the service taxes due on John Veysey’s provision to Exeter, which was successfully resisted by the Sacred 
1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]); 
LPIIIi, 443 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); D.S. 
5 Among the instances seen for this period, for example, during 1516-1517, Leo X delegated responsibility for 
planning a crusade to the east to the cardinals (or a least a committee of them), following the fall of Egypt to the 
Turks. In pursuit of this, the college wrote to Henry on 8 January, requesting that he send ambassadors to Rome to 
discuss the matter; LPIIii, 2759 (8 January 1517, College of Cardinals to Henry, Rome), 3165 (23 April 1517, de 
Castello to [Wolsey], Rome), 3816 (calendared end November 1517). Similarly, around December 1518 (in 
anticipation of Maximilian’s death which was shortly expected), the cardinals debated whether the Imperial crown 
should be sent into Germany at Maximilian’s behest (so that Charles’ ‘election’ cou
envisage this discussion taking place at the pope’s request; Ven.ii, 1124 (15 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, 
Rome). Also see LPIIIi, 19 (13 January 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Westminster). During 1520-1521, the cardinals were 
also involved in discussing Luther and were said to have permitted the bull of excommunication against him; Ven.iii, 
10-12 (4 February 1520, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 15-16 (1
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 28 (16 March 1520, Friar Gabriel to Lorenzo Bragadin, Rome), 171 (15 March 
1521, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 180-181 (31 March 1521). Finally, the cardinals deliberated, 
again almost certainly under papal instruction, the honorary title that Henry VIII ought to receive in recognition of 
his book against Luther, the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum; LPIIIi, 1335 (8 June 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, 
Rome), 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). 
6 J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.10. For legatine authority, see F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth-
Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal “Legatus a Latere”’, Traditio, 14 (1958), pp.296, 298-302, 307-308, 
315-316. 
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however, while popes still often used cardinals for counsel and to aid them in their oversight of 
the Church and its territories, this was largely due to the personal links of individuals with the 
pontiff (particularly as family, friends or servants) rather than solely by virtue of their 
membership of the Sacred College (the latter often coming as a by-product of the former).7 In 
spite of the apparent ambiguity of cardinalatial power in this sense by 1509-1522 (outside of 
n to this body as a 
interregna), enthusiasm for elevation to this body had not diminished. While 25 cardinals 
attended the 1513 conclave, this number had risen by the elevation of 31 candidates in 1517, so 
that 39 actually attended the 1521-1522 election.8 The overall trend was towards an increase in 
membership of the College of Cardinals.9 As mentioned, popes used promotio
means to reward family, friends and servants, as well as to bolster support for their policies and to 
ensure the existence of a powerful party that would elect a suitable successor when the time 
came.10 Another longer-term trend was the Italianisation of the Sacred College; a majority of 
                                                 
7 P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, pp. 83-84, 211; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.80-83, 88; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and 
Princes, p.71. 
8 Leo X created this unprecedented number in the wake of the Petrucci plot; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of 
Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.15; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.18-19, 199-201; ibid., ix p.12. For the creations of 
nal in the next creation. De Giglis was therefore 
f political favour); LPIIi, 2579 (22 November 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius); L. Pastor, History of the 
Julius II and Leo X, see C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi sive Summorium Pontificum, S.R.E. 
Cardinalium, Ecclesiarum Antistitum Series, iii (1910), pp.9-19. 
9 Despite attempts by general councils to limit the size of the Sacred College and a general reluctance of the cardinals 
themselves to welcome an increase in membership (partly due to fears that it would reduce individuals’ revenues 
from service taxes and the like, as well as that it may dilute the dignity of the position), as is reportedly evident in 
1513 and 1520, numbers were generally rising; LPIii, 2398 (LPI, 4525; 25 October 1513, Peter Martyr to Ludovico 
Furtdao, Valladolid); LPIIIi, 993 (26 September 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred 
College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, pp.13-15, 26-29, 36-40; K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, 
p.46; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.65-66. 
10 While Julius II (not reputed as a great nepotist) promoted four relatives during his pontificate, Leo X raised five, in 
addition to various supporters of the Medici; LPIii, 2320 (30 September 1513, [Giulio] de’ Medici to Henry, Rome); 
L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.201-203; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.60-63. Also see K.J.P. 
Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.49. That this trend would have been recognised in England can be 
interpreted through a letter from de Giglis to the Latin secretary Ammonius during 1516 whereby, following-up the 
pope’s desire for a relative to be installed in a benefice within the gift of the disputed see of Tournai, the orator 
reasoned that the candidate, a cousin of Leo X, would become a cardi
indicating both Louis de Rossi’s favoured status by virtue of his prospective membership of the Sacred College and 
thereby recommending that he benefit from the crown’s broader policy to reward those close to the pope (partly in 
the hope o
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cardinals had been native to the peninsula since the time of Calixtus III (1455-1458).11 Of course, 
it is difficult to draw any conclusions from this, given that Italy was not unified and the Italian 
cardinals held various loyalties, not just to their states of birth, but often also to one of the 
ultramontane ‘superpowers’ (the Empire, France or Spain) whose territorial claims and de facto 
power in the peninsula fluctuated prior to, during and beyond this period.12 In light of this, it is 
important to point out that there continued to be a considerable number of non-Italians raised to 
the cardinalate and that the possibility of this attracted secular rulers for reasons that will become 
clear.13 A final observable trend concerning the make-up of the Sacred College during this (and a 
broader) period, linked to its Italianisation, was its increasing population with members of 
aristocratic families from the peninsula.14 This has been posited as a reason why the popes of this 
time were so concerned with the temporal aspect of their role and one cannot really argue with 
this, particularly with the tendency towards nepotism. Julius II, for instance, belonged to the della 
Rovere family (admittedly a minor branch of it) and, among other actions which favoured his kin, 
he persuaded the duke of Urbino in 1504 to adopt Francesco Maria della Rovere as his heir.15 
Similarly, Leo X as scion of the Medici, brought with him to the papacy control of Florence and 
                                                                                                                                                              
Popes, vii, pp.79-84. Such nepotism can be traced back at least to the Avignon period; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred 
College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.21. 
11 27 of the 37 cardinals that elected Julius II were Italian, while 18 of the 25 that elevated Giovanni de’ Medici were 
from the peninsula; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, pp.18, 83, 171; C.L. Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome, pp.94-95; 
J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.61-64. This Italianisation was not limited to the Sacred College but occurred 
throughout papal government; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, pp.10-13, 17. 
12 See p.228. 
13 Chambers calculates that roughly 42.5% of those elevated 1480-1534 were certainly not Italian, while Partner cites 
40.3% 1471-1527; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.209. 
14 K.J.P. Lowe, Church and Politics in Renaissance Italy, p.46; B. McClung Hallman, Italian Cardinals, Reform and 
the Church as Property, pp.9-12; J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, pp.47; P. Prodi, The Papal Prince, p.83; C.L. 
Stinger, The Renaissance in Rome (1998), pp.28, 94-95. Again, this trend was not limited to the Sacred College and, 
quite naturally, affected the identity of those who became pope; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, pp.13-14, 158-170. 
15 Links between the della Rovere and Montefeltro had stretched back to a 1474 marriage alliance between the 
families, a by-product of which was Francesco Maria’s growing up at the duke’s court; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.17-18, 
183-184. 
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an innate concern for its interests. Among other nepotistic actions, he bestowed the same duchy 
of Urbino on his nephew, Lorenzo de’ Medici, in August 1516, after the latter had seized the 
territory from Francesco Maria della Rovere.16 
 Given the position of the Sacred College within the Church, their power (both real and 
perceived) and exclusivity and proximity to pontifical power (combined with the significance of 
the papacy’s temporal role), it is unsurprising that popes envisaged granting membership, partly 
at least, as a means by which they could induce others to align with their own political interests. 
In particular, popes focused on the recruitment of influential crown ministers in a bid to curry 
favour with their secular employers. Equally unsurprisingly, secular princes expected red hats as 
concessions when the papacy was in need of its political assistance.17 Monarchs also sought to 
block the candidates of rivals, or if the opportunity arose, urge the suspension or deprivation of 
their cardinals. While the number of Englishmen to be raised to the Sacred College was low 
(four, 1471-1527, and never more than one at any given time),18 Richard Fox and Thomas Ruthal 
incorrectly informed the Spanish ambassador in May 1510 that this was due to Englishmen 
choosing not to petition the pope for such favours.19 Nevertheless, the promotion of English 
ministers to the Sacred College did occur during this period for political reasons, particularly in 
relation to the crown’s underlying anti-French agenda and its self-perceived role as defender of 
 that of Thomas Wolsey (1515) was 
the Church from France. The elevation of Christopher Bainbridge (1511) was a bid by the pope to 
induce Henry VIII to commit to war against Louis XII, while
                                                 
16 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.155-157. 
17 Broderick traces the trend for princes to lobby the papacy to promote candidates in its (political) interests (and in 
some, but by no means all, cases succeed) back to the thirteenth century. He also finds that this trend continuing in 
later centuries; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, pp.23-26, 48-54. 
18 According to Partner’s calculations, this makes up 2.2% of the cardinals created during this time. Chambers, on 
 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). 
the other hand, cites three elevated 1480-1534, which makes up 1.9% of the membership of the Sacred College 
during that period; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.6; P. Partner, The Pope’s Men, p.209. 
19 Sp.ii, 44
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blatantly sought in exchange for English commitment against France. A point of comparison is 
provided by Henry VIII’s failure to have his long-serving orator, Silvester de Giglis, promoted in 
                                                
1520-1521, partly on account of Henry’s lack of political leverage over Leo X at that point. 
English attempts to block the candidacies of its rivals are more difficult to identify, but there is 
one definite indication of this vis-à-vis France in 1518. While Henry VIII had little power to take 
advantage of opportunies arising in which French or pro-French cardinals could be suspended or 
deprived, he did act again on one distinct occasion. It will be established, therefore, that there was 
a distinctly political context underlying the English crown’s relationship with the papacy over 
membership of the Sacred College and that this was influenced by English concerns to protect 
Rome from France. 
Firstly, considering the papacy’s attempts to curry political favour with Henry VIII vis-à-
vis France, the promotion of the king’s orator in Rome, Christopher Bainbridge, was a blatant 
example.20 It is difficult to ascertain, however, whether his candidacy was forwarded principally 
by England or Rome. The fact that two of Henry VIII’s inner circle, Fox and Ruthal, were aware 
of a rumour as early as May 1510 that the orator might benefit from such papal patronage implies 
crown support of the proposal (there was certainly no opposition). Also, it seems likely, given the 
senior status of this resident ambassador as archbishop of York, that Bainbridge was sent to 
Rome with the aim to gain a red hat; curial Venetians certainly believed that this was part of 
 
 the cardinalate for political purposes was not exclusive to the 
n that the negotiations 
ge; J.F. Broderick, 
20 The idea of having crown ministers elevated to
papacy. In May 1510, the Spanish ambassador in England, Luis Caroz, dangled the carrot of Spanish support for the 
candidacies of Fox and Ruthal, in order to facilitate an Anglo-Spanish alliance, although it is questionable how 
realistic a proposition this really was. It is perhaps revealing that Luis Caroz states his opinio
for an Anglo-Spanish treaty, in which context the topic of cardinals was raised, may have taken an extra month, if he 
had not done so; ibid., 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). Broderick recognises this as a 
fairly common alternative strategy to gain the admission of a ‘crown cardinal’ to the Sacred Colle
‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.53. 
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Bainbridge’s mission from his arrival in late 1509.21 Similarly, Maximilian opined to his 
daughter Margaret in January 1511 that cardinalatial status was the motivation for Bainbridge’s 
close relationship with the Venetians and support of the papacy against Imperial (and French) 
interests.22 Implicit in this is the recognition that Bainbridge would have been operating with 
crown support to pursue these policies in Rome. There are, on the other hand, reasons to believe 
that Julius II was the instigator of Bainbridge’s candidacy. The first is the lack of any evidence to 
suggest that the archbishop was ever proposed by Henry VIII for promotion. Indeed, the French 
ambassador in England d’Arizolles, writing in January 1511, reported that Bainbridge, while 
holding an ambition to become cardinal, had been unable to induce his king to write to the pope 
on his b
                                                
ehalf; that what the pope intended to do in this regard was not at Henry’s behest.23 Also, 
the aforementioned statements by Fox and Ruthal of 1510 give reason to suggest that 
Bainbridge’s creation was at the pope’s instigation; the ministers outlined how this and other 
elevations would be made in a bid to counter French influence at the curia in the event of his 
death.24 Similarly, it was rumoured (in France) in December 1510 that Julius II intended to create 
12 cardinals before Christmas for much the same reason; so that, in the event of Julius’ death, 
conclave would be packed with supporters, who would ensure the continuation of his anti-French 
policy.25 From this context, therefore, it is more likely that the pope was behind Bainbridge’s 
candidacy more than Henry. 
 
6; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.35. Also see LPIi, 669 
n Brisco). 
21 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.24-25, 27-28, 35. 
22 LPIi, 669 (4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg in Brisco). 
23 Ibid., 674 (10 January 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London). 
24 Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). Bainbridge was again rumoured for 
promotion in October 1510, but Julius II was discouraged from breaching an agreement to raise the numbers of the 
Sacred College; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.35. 
25 According to an Imperial source, writing to the Archduchess Margaret in the Low Countries. Chambers claims that 
the college obstructed this attempt as well; LPIi, 63
(4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg i
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Bainbridge’s actual promotion, on 10 March 1511, demonstrated the overtly political 
motives of Julius II when granting this honour. The papacy had been seeking English 
participation in a projected league against France since the previous summer at least and, while it 
knew of Henry’s sympathies, it also recognised that he had been drawn into a renewal of his 
father’s peace with France in March 1510. The net result was an anti-French Henry VIII biding 
his time, as advised by his senior ministers, until conditions were suitable to break with Louis XII 
and assist, indirectly, with the expulsion of the French from Italy.26 The coincidence of the timing 
of the elevation, therefore, suggests that Julius II was making a deliberate attempt to curry favour 
with the English crown, particularly as Bainbridge was renowned for his anti-French views.27 
This argument is strengthened when one considers that Bainbridge was appointed prior of the 
group of seven new cardinals. The papal master of ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, disputed 
Bainbridge’s suitability for this honour, but the pope insisted on his wish to honour Henry VIII. 
In addition, Bainbridge performed some very public ceremonial functions as prior. He took 
precedence when each of the new cardinals was received by Julius II for the first time and he led 
them in procession to their older colleagues, where he delivered an oration. The political context 
is difficult to dispute; the pontiff was courting a potential ally.28 This was done in a very public 
fashion that was probably designed, as far as the English crown was concerned, to pledge papal 
support
 the pope 
 for England if and when Henry VIII broke with France. The political nature and anti-
French undertone of the promotion is further emphasised by the identity of some of the other 
candidates elevated at the same time. The Imperial minister, Matthew Lang, with whom
                                                 
26 See below pp.379-380 and passim. 
27 See below pp.368-374, 375 ff. 
28 Chambers agrees that Bainbridge’s elevation was politically motivated; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, 
pp.36, 103-104. 
 291
intended to negotiate to detach Maximilian from France, was promoted in petto. The Swiss 
Matthew Schiner who was instrumental in bringing the Cantons over to the papacy and the 
Venetian Francesco Argentino, the latter’s state also being a papal ally, were also admitted.29 If 
all this was not enough, within a week of his elevation, Cardinal Bainbridge was commissioned 
as legate a latere to part of the papal army about to attack the pro-French forces of Ferrara.30 If, 
as is likely, the pope intended to force England’s hand into coming out against France both by 
appointing its orator to the Sacred College and by having him lead an army against French 
interests, it was certainly effective. The French ambassador in England complained to Henry, 
prompting the king to reply that he was happy to assist the Church and that Louis XII was in the 
wrong by supporting the rebellious duke of Ferrara against his overlord.31 The elevation of 
Christopher Bainbridge to the Sacred College, therefore, was a clear attempt to induce the 
English crown to act against France. Whether this was a success or not is debateable. On the one 
hand, the belligerent Henry VIII acted indirectly against France during 1511 by contributing 
towards the Imperial force against the duke of Guelders (backed by Louis XII) and sending Lord 
Darcy to Spain to join an aborted crusade to North Africa (which could be interpreted as sabre-
rattling).32 On the other hand, Henry’s hands were still tied by his intimate councillors, who had 
insisted that various conditions be fulfilled before they would sanction an invasion of France. 
While English membership of a holy league against France was on the cards during this year, it 
took the fall of Bologna on 23 May to inject some urgency into its formation and, even then, it 
                                                 
29 Ven.ii, 98 (LPIi, 714; 10 March 1511, a private letter received in Venice from Hieronimo Lipomano, Ravenna); 
LPIi, 718 (13 November 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy). For Pastor’s view that Schiner was 
originally elevated in 1508, but the proclamation was delayed until 1511, see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, 
pp.325-326. 
, Donato to the Signory), 104 (LPIi, 765; 8-10 May 1511, Proveditor Capello 
bers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.37, 81-93. 
85-386. 
30 Ven.ii, 99 (LPIi, 720; 15 March 1511
to the Signory, Dinale); D.S. Cham
31 LPIi, 776 (23 March 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna). 
32 See below pp.3
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took until December for Henry VIII to adhere to the coalition that was concluded in Rome on 4 
October.33 
 
In the same way that the papacy perceived that offers of a cardinalate might prompt 
favourable political actions from princes, so princes recognised their position of strength if Rome 
needed their assistance and, naturally, attempted to use this leverage to seek the admission of 
servants into the Sacred College.34 Such candidates were usually favoured ministers and that this 
was the case seems to have been a condition from Rome.35 In the case of Wolsey, for instance, 
Vergil and de Castello told him in May 1514 that the pope agreed in principle to elevation, ‘if 
Wolsey had great authority with the King’.36 Consequently, Henry VIII wrote to the pope on 12 
August, formally requesting Wolsey’s promotion (after Bainbridge’s death): ‘his merits are such 
                                                 
 Among the conditions placed on Henry VIII’s support of the papacy in this sense was the need for allies; see 
below pp.379-380. 
may be elevated despite having been unable to get Henry to write to Julius II on his behalf; LPIi, 674 (10 January 
1511, d’Ar lles to Robertet, London).  
 In the century prior to this reign, English cardinals tended to be archbishops, often of Canterbury and also to be 
Chancellors; John Kemp (York, 1425-1452, Canterbury 1452-1454, Chancellor 1426-1452, cardinal 1439), Thomas 
Chancellor 1487-1500, cardinal 1493). Henry Beaufort (also the king’s uncle, was created cardinal in 1417, although 
Winchester, although he did hold the chancellorship on several occasions (1403-1405, 1410-1411, 1413-1417, 1424-
1426). Given the preponderance of English cardinals, it is interesting that William Warham (Canterbury 1503-1532, 
33
34 The French ambassador, d’Arizolles, comments to this effect in January 1511, when suggesting that Bainbridge 
izo
35
Bourchier (Canterbury 1454-1486, Chancellor 1455-1486, cardinal 1465), John Morton (Canterbury 1486-1500, 
Henry V forbade him to accept, and again in 1426) was the exception, ecclesiastically speaking, being bishop of 
Chancellor 1504-1515) was never apparently considered by the king for a red hat. While this is not the place to 
explore this, it seems likely that Warham, despite his leading ecclesiastical and state positions that were carried over 
from Henry VII’s reign, was not particularly prominent within Henry VIII’s ‘inner circle’. Correspondence emerging 
from LP (and other published sources) fails to highlight much of a role for him, particularly in foreign (and Anglo-
papal) policy, and one suspects that his falling out with Fox over probate revenues (1512), merely confirmed the 
archbishop’s outsider status in this sense. From his resignation from the chancellorship in 1515 to Wolsey, Warham 
eaufort, Henry (1375?–1447)’, ibid.; J.J. Scarisbrick, ‘Warham, William (1450?-1532)’, ibid.. 
ted those in whose hands ‘all business 
nce); Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 
to Ferdinand, London). 
retreated further from affairs of state for the rest of this period. Perhaps one can explain Warham’s position as an 
administratively useful but unfavoured hangover from the previous reign; L. Clark, ‘Bourchier, Thomas (c.1411–
1486)’, DNB; R. G. Davies, ‘Kemp , John (1380/81–1454)’, ibid.; C. Harper-Bill, ‘Morton, John (d. 1500)’, ibid.; G. 
L. Harriss, ‘B
36 LPIii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; Pol[ydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]). Also, the Spanish ambassador in England, when 
offering Spanish support for the elevation of Fox and Ruthal in 1510, targe
affairs were’, to gain their goodwill in his quest for an Anglo-Spanish alliance (against Fra
29 May 1510, Luis Caroz 
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that the King esteems him above his dearest friends, and can do nothing of the least importance 
without him’.37 
While such applications to the papacy were made formally by the king, there are 
suggest
the pope to acknowledge his almoner in this matter as though he himself were speaking.40 
 on the king’s behalf is also apparent from comments to de Giglis in late 
 
ions that, during this period, Henry VIII’s ministers did most of the running. In May 
1510, Fox and Ruthal lobbied the Spanish ambassador to have Ferdinand advise Henry to look to 
their promotion. In addition, one can detect the two bishops’ enthusiasm for this prospect, 
allegedly having visited the Spanish orator’s house on seven or eight occasions to consult 
exclusively on the cardinalates.38 Despite their influence with the king on papal matters, they 
apparently believed that the matter would not be followed through. In the case of Wolsey, while 
Henry VIII’s personal contribution is clear, the almoner campaign-managed his own 
nomination.39 Around July 1515, for instance, Henry delegated this task to Wolsey, as he asked 
Wolsey’s acting
September 1515; ‘and if by your politic handling the Pope can be induced shortly to make me a 
cardinal ye shall singularly content and please the King; for I cannot express how desirous the 
                                                 
37 As Henry could only just have heard of Bainbridge’s death (which occurred on 14 July 1514), it is also likely that 
the king envisaged that this was an appropriate occasion on which the pope could be called upon to create a new 
English cardinal, particularly as this request also conveyed Henry’s desire that Wolsey hold all of the dead cardinal’s 
honours, which apparently included the archbishopric of York; LPIii, 3140 (LPI, 5318; 12 August 1514, Henry to 
Leo, Greenwich). That the creation was largely spurred by the crown is also stated by the Venetian ambassadors in 
England, on 20 September 1515: Wolsey ‘has been created Cardinal at the suit of this most serene King, who, with 
might and main, is intent on aggrandizing him’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.128 (Ven.ii, 650; LPIIi, 929; 20 
September 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
38 Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). 
39 From around March-April 1514, Wolsey employed Hadrian de Castello, through Polydore Vergil, to approach the 
pope in this regard, although the latter conveyed (on 21 May) the pope’s message that the almoner’s promotion 
would be a good idea ‘if Wolsey had great authority with the King’. The implication is that Leo X wanted Henry to 
PIIii, 12 app.; calendared July 1515, Henry to [Leo]). 
lobby him in Wolsey’s favour. Indeed, this is what Henry did in August 1514; LPIii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; Pol[ydore 
Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]), 3140 (LPI, 5318; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
40 ‘Quare ipsam rogamus, ut quae idem dominus Eboracensis vestrae sanctitati significabit, ex ipso ore meo se 
audivisse velit arbitrari’; Mart. Amp. iii, p.1296 (L
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King is to have me advanced to the said honour’.41 Here, Wolsey advised that Henry would not 
communicate this directly. That the king would not concertedly follow up such requests in person 
ay ac
to issue concessions to England in this regard, such as the honorary cap and sword of 
m count for the lack of evidence for the crown’s proposal of Bainbridge, prior to 1511. 
Perhaps Bainbridge, as an archbishop and councillor, was permitted to manage his own 
elevation? Similarly, this might explain why the Italian servant of the crown in Rome, Silvester 
de Giglis, later had to approach the king himself in this regard, at a point when he believed that 
his long service merited cardinalatial status.42 
While the political nature of such elevations is immediately apparent through the identity 
of the candidates and their positions both as state officials and advisors to the king, the timing of 
the crown application and the leverage employed to ensure success were also political, being 
closely linked to English foreign policy. More specifically, crown pressure towards Wolsey’s 
elevation was closely connected with the anti-French agenda during this period and the desire for 
the papacy to be protected from French influence.43 
 Initial overtures from England in Wolsey’s favour were closely connected with papal 
pressure for Henry VIII to make peace with Louis XII in 1514. The papacy was already prepared 
maintenance, its apparent agreement to replace the apostolic collector (Hadrian de Castello) and 
                                                 
41 LPIii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). In early February 1515, Wolsey 
wrote to Suffolk, then heading an embassy to France to negotiate the return of Henry’s sister Mary following the 
death of her husband Louis XII, asking him to recommend his affairs to Francis I. While this certainly would have 
again been seeking French support for a red 
m Roman obedience or 
implied the bishopric of Tournai, one can also surmise that he may have 
hat; LPIIi, 113 (3 February 1515, Wolsey to Suffolk). 
42 See below pp.302-307. 
43 Broderick highlights the tendency of most governments to employ ‘high-pressure tactics’ in a bid to secure the 
promotion of their candidates. These tactics could include the persistent nomination of individuals over long periods, 
denial of aid or support (particularly military) for the papacy, even threats of withdrawal fro
even a physical attack on the Church. Some of these will be apparent in the case of Wolsey’s candidacy for the 
Sacred College; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.49. 
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the reduction of consistorial taxes due on Wolsey’s appointment to the see of Lincoln (on 6 
February).44 If the papacy wanted England’s participation in a peace that much, Wolsey 
determined to push things one step further. Hence his employment of Hadrian de Castello, via 
Polydore Vergil, perhaps around March-April 1514, to approach the pope in this regard. The 
reply from Vergil on 21 May, however, while not a rejection, recommended that the request 
ought to come from the king and implied that there would be some delay.45 The English crown 
was evidently not in a strong enough political position to demand this favour at this point. This 
may ha
nderstood that Wolsey’s promotion might be 
leverage to secure Wolsey’s promotion. At first, this was not realised in England. Towards the 
ve had something to do with Leo X’s knowledge that Ferdinand had already abandoned 
Henry as an ally back in February and was pressuring Henry and Maximilian to join him in his 
truce with France. In addition, the pope would have been aware that Anglo-French negotiations 
were already under way and may have considered, therefore, that this extra concession was not 
required to ensure that the desired peace was concluded.46 
 In England, however, it seems to have been u
conditional on the peace being actually concluded. Why else would Henry VIII’s personal 
request in this regard concerning Wolsey have been issued on 12 August 1514, the same date as 
he formally notified the pope of his having agreed peace with France?47 This understanding 
turned out to be mistaken: as the peace was now made, Henry VIII no longer had sufficient 
end of September, Wolsey understood that the king’s application had caused Leo X to promise 
                                                 
44 For these and other concessions sought by England, see below pp.446-456. 
). 
45 LPIii, 2932 (LPI, 5110; Pol[ydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]). 
46 See below pp.429 ff. 
47 Ven.ii, 487 (LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). By the fact that de Giglis was also working to 
this end by September, it is likely that he was instructed to do so in letters that accompanied Henry’s August missive; 
LPIii, 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]
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him a red hat at the next creation.48 The question was, however, when would the next creation 
be? These were infrequent events. An actual response from Leo to Henry, dated 24 September, 
outlined that the promotion would be difficult, although he would comply at an appropriate time 
(whenever that would be).49 De Giglis reported on the state of negotiations around the same time, 
reasoning that the pope was naturally slow and that, while he was not prepared to elevate Wolsey 
alone, nor with those previously promised, he offered a secret promotion, as long as Wolsey did 
‘not carry the insignia publicly’.50 This offer had clear political undertones; the pope was 
reluctant to make an overt display of support for Henry VIII at this point.  
  This subject arose again on 22 March 1515, when the pope thanked Wolsey for his good 
offices and referred him to de Giglis for  what he intended to do for Wolsey’s honour.51 That this 
referred to the cardinalate is suggested by Ammonius, who reported how the pope was 
‘considering how he can increase his honour with the safety of his oath. Hopes he will be able to 
do it sooner than Wolsey thinks’.52 Once again, the political context vis-à-vis France was 
important, the balance of power having changed since the previous year. The accession of Francis 
I with vocal ambitions for Milan and for an Italian expedition that year, once again made England 
an attractive ally for the papacy. Leo X feared the implications of a French descent and had, as 
recently as 22 February, secretly ratified a treaty with the Empire, Milan, Spain and the Swiss, 
                                                 
Ammonius’ letter to Wolsey of 25 September, whereby the Latin secretary summarised the contents of de Giglis’ 
correspondence and commented that there was a good chance for the cardinalate; ibid., 3302 (LPI, 5449; 25 
48 LPIii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). This seems to have been linked to 
September 1514, [Andrew Ammonius] to Wolsey, Westminster). 
49 LPIii, 3300 (LPI, 5445; EP, 512; 24 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). That is not to say that Leo did not 
take this seriously, as Richard Pace, on 25 September, notified Wolsey that the pope had been making enquiries 
25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, 
his ought to be rejected, as he recommends that letters be written to Leo and Giulio de’ 
about him in this regard; Ellis, lxxi, pp.177-180 (LPIii, 3304; LPI, 5447; 
Rome). 
50 De Giglis implies that t
Medici; LPIii, 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]). 
51 Leo commanded the orator to write to Wolsey in this regard; LPIIi, 255 (22 March 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
52 Ibid., 312 (11 April 1515 Andrew Ammonius to Wolsey, Westminster). 
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that aimed for the defence of the Church and envisaged a crusade to the east, which Henry was to 
be persuaded to join. Realistically, however, the true object was a defensive alliance against 
France; English membership was envisaged to help prevent a French descent.53 To this end, 
therefore, it would have been the right time to resurrect Wolsey’s cardinalatial candidacy. 
 By this time, however, the crown seems to have believed that Leo X was procrastinating, 
as on 22 April the latter thanked Wolsey for his good services, but lamented the almoner’s belief 
that he was reluctant to fulfil his wishes. The pope reasoned that some delay was essential.54 De 
Giglis, on 25 April, relayed the pope’s apology that he could not promote Wolsey until a certain 
mber
empty promises. Perhaps linked to this seems to have been the cancellation of an embassy 
nu  of cardinals had been created. He also stated that Leo was under pressure from 
Maximilian and Francis I to elevate their candidates. So, although he valued the services of 
Henry VIII, ‘Wolsey’s promotion cannot take place for the present without the greatest scandal’. 
Leo asserted that he was not deceiving Wolsey and requested that Henry ‘send milder letters’. 
The pope, it appears, was still trying to keep his options open vis-à-vis his participation in an anti-
French coalition. His procrastination over Wolsey’s elevation was quite natural; the almoner’s 
creation would be both a powerful inducement to win over Henry VIII and a public indication of 
anti-French intentions at a time when Leo was still negotiating with France. The crown, on the 
other hand, was perhaps oblivious to Leo’s double-dealing, but was becoming impatient with his 
intended to go to Rome to perform the obedientia ceremony on Henry’s behalf.55 
                                                 
53 At the same time, Leo was hedging his bets by negotiating with France; see below pp.471-473. 
lis to Wolsey, Rome). 
, 
54 LPIIi, 366 (22 April 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). This letter does not explicitly refer to the red hat, but de Giglis’ 
letter a few days later confirms that this was what was meant; ibid., 374 (25 April 1515, de Gig
55 News of this is acknowledged in Rome by de Giglis on 25 April; ibid., 374 (25 April 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey
Rome). 
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 Subsequent Anglo-papal exchanges concerning Wolsey’s elevation were similar in nature. 
On the one hand, the pope promised that he was working in this direction, but still advocated 
delay. On the other hand, Wolsey and Henry, while pledging their obedience to Rome, began to 
threaten the papacy. The next surviving letter from de Giglis, dated around the end of June 1515, 
tion to the Holy 
                                                
conveyed the pope’s claim to be investigating how to promote Wolsey alone or otherwise. At the 
same time, the pope wanted to know the state of relations between England and France.56 That 
Leo wanted England to break with France by this time is demonstrated by requests on 16 June 
from both the pope and Giulio de’ Medici for England to assist in the struggle against the 
Turks.57 Reading between the lines, the papacy was asking Henry to join the league which also 
provided for the defence of the Church against France. To this end, Wolsey’s red hat had become 
a more realistic proposition. Probably around the same time though, Wolsey demonstrated to de 
Giglis that he had lost patience with Leo. While he pledged that ‘for the great love that I bear to 
his holiness an[d that I] would have the King fast to him [Leo]’, he also threatened the pontiff. 
Writing ‘by the King’s express commandment’, he continued, Henry ‘has always been a friend to 
the Pope and his alliance ought not to be lightly thrown away’ and further that he would ‘be 
greatly displeased if his desires are not regarded, as he is a better friend to the Church than all 
other Princes’.58 The context of this need not be spelt out. Also, during June, more tempered 
letters may have been sent to Leo X himself by Henry and Wolsey, as on 12 July, the pope 
acknowledged their receipt and, with respect to Henry ‘expressing his entire devo
 
h an ultimatum in 1506; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.49. 
56 Ibid., 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
57 Leo X’s invitation is alluded to by de’ Medici; ibid., 590 (16 June 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). 
58 Ibid., 648 (9-11 September 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). It ought to be noted that such a 
condition placed on military aid by Wolsey was not unprecedented. Louis XII had gained three French cardinals 
from suc
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See’, he wanted ‘the King to be considered its patron and protector’.59 The implication of this in 
military terms against France would not have been lost on the recipients. Before this arrived, 
however, Wolsey again applied pressure on the papacy once more, informing de Giglis how ‘the 
King’s grace marvelleth that the Pope delayeth so long the sending of the red hat to me, seeing 
how tenderly, instantly, and often his Grace hath written to his holiness for the same’. He further 
claimed that Henry asked him every day about it and that the pope ought to grant this as soon as 
possible. Most ominously, Wolsey added, ‘if the King forsake the Pope, he will be in greater 
“danger on this day two year than ever was Pope J[ulius]”’.60 
 By this time, however, the pope had already decided to join the coalition against France 
and, to induce English support, would promote Wolsey.61 On 1 August, Wolsey wrote to de 
Giglis, acknowledging that Leo X ‘hath granted to create me Cardinal sole’. With this letter, he 
also returned a copy of the anti-French treaty sent by the papacy, now signed by Henry VIII. 
Having gained the red hat, Wolsey now pushed for a legatine commission. The new cardinal 
further advised, ‘never had [the] Pope a better friend than the King of England, if he comply with 
his [Henry’s and, implicitly, Wolsey’s] desires’.62 Wolsey effectively admitted, therefore, that the 
papacy had paid for England’s adhesion to the anti-French alliance by granting him the 
cardinalate (and may gain further benefits if a legateship was granted). Indeed, on the date of his 
                                                 
Henry again recommends Wolsey for elevation, although in polite terms; Mart. Amp. iii, p.1296 (LPIIii, 12 app.; 
61 He had been preparing for war since June, but only formally joined the league at the end of July; see below 
pp.471-473. 
62 LPIIi, 780 (1 August 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis]). At this point, however, the promotion had not occurred. On 7 
September, de Giglis replied to Wolsey, thanking him for letters of 12 August from him and Henry, stating that the 
ll return the draft of the treaty signed. The pope also 
 
59 LPIIi, 700 (12 July 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). One of the letters in question may be the following, in which 
calendared July 1515, Henry to [Leo]). 
60 LPIIi, 763 (calendared 30 July 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]). 
pope was glad that Wolsey anticipated his (Leo’s) wishes and wi
claimed that he would insist on Wolsey’s promotion in spite of the cardinals. Wolsey further attempted to capitalise
on the political leverage that a papacy at war with France gave England by pushing for an honorary title for Henry 
VIII; ibid., 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 895 (calendared 10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de 
Giglis]). 
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actual elevation in Rome, 10 September, Wolsey understood that the promotion had already taken 
place and, as well as conveying his thanks, added that Henry VIII was now ‘ready to expose his 
person and goods to support the honour and safety of the Holy See’.63 That Henry’s political 
support had been bought in this manner to 'defend the faith’ was subsequently identified by the 
Venetian ambassador in Rome, who notified his state of the link between Wolsey’s imminent 
promotion and the pope’s desire that England attack France.64 Finally, the ‘balance of power’ in 
this elevation is suggested on 15 September by the cardinal protector, Giulio de’ Medici, writing 
to Henry that ‘Wolsey’s promotion is proof of the Pope’s anxiety to please the King’.65 However, 
the elevation was too late for England to have any effect on France. The disastrous Battle of 
Marignano took place on 13-14 September, which effectively ended opposition to Francis I in the 
peninsula in the short-term and initiated a period of French influence over Rome.66 As a result, 
England neither had the chance to act militarily in defence of Rome, nor to use the ostentation 
and display involved in Wolsey’s receipt of the hat in any anti-French propaganda. 
 
To put these ‘political’ nominations and promotions to the Sacred College into context, it 
would be insightful to examine an instance when Henry VIII approached the papacy to have an 
‘English’ candidate raised to the Sacred College without having the necessary political leverage 
                                                 
63 Ibid. 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). Sir Robert Wingfield also implies the link as, when he 
ow p.489. 
mentioned having received letters notifying him of the elevation that also mentioned de Giglis’ having joined the 
Holy League in Henry VIII’s name; ibid., 909 (14 September 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Ins[broke]). For 
Wolsey’s actual elevation on this date, see ibid., 892 (10 September 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 893 (10 
September 1515, [de Castello] to Wolsey, Rome). 
64 Ven.ii, 648 (9-11 September 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
65 LPIIi, 910 (15 September 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Bologna). 
66 See bel
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to facilitate success. The nominee was Silvester de Giglis, the Lucchese bishop of Worcester and 
longtime crown orator in Rome.67 
In retrospect, Chambers argues, if de Giglis was going to be promoted, it ought to have 
been in July 1517, when Leo X elevated an unprecedented 31 cardinals en masse, partly in 
response to the Petrucci plot and partly in a bid to raise money for war against the duke of 
Urbino.68 The pope made a deliberate attempt to pack the Sacred College with pro-Medici 
cardinals. A number of them can easily be described as political appointments, including the 
French Louis de Bourbon, the Imperial Adrian of Utrecht and the Spanish Raymond de Vich.69 
Considering the wider political context, the pope may not have elevated an English candidate 
because of ongoing Anglo-papal negotiations towards membership of an anti-French league. 
Henry VIII had been trying to gain Leo X’s commitment to such a coalition since 1516 but this 
only seemed to be coming to fruition on 5 July 1517, when a ‘league for defence of the Church’ 
was proclaimed in London with apparent papal approval but not ratification. In exchange for this, 
eo had been trying to lever money out of England to help him in the War of Urbino.70 Even on 
24 July
L
, however, the pontiff was unsure whether he would actually gain this money.71 Given this 
understanding, therefore, Leo X had already offered papal membership of the anti-French league 
                                                 
67 De Giglis’ diplomatic service in England for the papacy and in Rome for the English crown stretched back to 1483 
and, as he had been the crown’s orator at the Holy See since 1512, this effectively makes him an ‘English’ candidate; 
C.H. Clough, ‘Gigli, Silvestro’, DNB. It was by no means unusual for princes to lobby for the elevation of Italian 
nuncios that had visited their courts and who subsequently acted in their interests in Rome; J.F. Broderick, ‘The 
Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.48. 
68 J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.15; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.148-
149; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.199-200. 
 raised. The author suggests that the pope was suspicious of him; 
7, Minio to the Signory). 
69 Also, the Venetian Francesco Pisani and the Portuguese Alfonso de Portugal can easily be isolated as political 
appointments; C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, pp.16-19; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.201, 
204-205. There is evidence that some who thought they ought to have been promoted were disappointed. Perhaps 
echoing the private thoughts of de Giglis, Venetian source in Rome reported that Ludovico Canossa, bishop of 
Tricarico, complained to Leo that he had not been
Ven.ii, 938 (30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
70 See below pp.546-547, 578 ff. 
71 Ven.ii, 935 (24 July 151
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in exchange for monetary aid, and might not have been prepared to make further concessions at 
this stage. Furthermore, it was the crown that had been chasing papal commitment, not vice 
versa, g
77
iving Leo X the political advantage in negotiations. The sources consulted do not reveal 
any English reaction to these creations, save Wolsey’s moves to lobby for Hadrian de Castello’s 
deprivation, on account of his alleged involvement in the plot.72 Chambers argues that Wolsey’s 
silence may have had something to do with his belief that de Giglis had been negligent in 
attempts to realise the cardinal’s claim to Tournai.73 It may also have had something to do with 
the dispersal of the king and his ministers when the news reached England, however, as it was the 
summer recess and an epidemic of sweating sickness was prevalent.74 
The first move in de Giglis’ favour was apparently made by his deputy in England, 
Silvester Darius, who wrote to Wolsey in this regard on 18 September 1518, commenting that 
this promotion would benefit the crown.75 This may have been a bid on the part of the 
ambassador to take advantage of English involvement in the universal peace initiative that was 
shortly to result in the Treaty of London. Nothing more was heard about de Giglis’ request, 
however, perhaps because Leo soon realised that Wolsey had appropriated the crusading 
initiative to his own ends.76 Henry’s first letter in favour of de Giglis appears not to have been 
issued until 20 January 1520.  While the bishop was pleased with the approach, expecting to be 
                                                 
72 De Giglis notified Ammonius towards the end of June of a stormy Consistory at which this creation was discussed, 
th the fall-out arising from de Castello’s reported involvement, 
49. 
 1520, Henry to Leo, Tower of London). 
but this would have arrived in England far too late for any reaction; LPIIii, 3406 (calendared 26-27 June 1517, de 
Giglis to Ammonius). For Wolsey’s preoccupation wi
see for example R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.113-116 (Ven.ii, 944; LPIIii, 3558; 6 August 1517, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
73 LPIIii, 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). 
74 See for instance R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.111-113 (Ven.ii, 941; LPIIii, 3544; 31 July 1517, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
75 LPIIii, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London). 
76 See pp.628-630, 637-644, 648-6
77 Mart. Amp. iii, 1304-1306 (LPIIIi, 600; 20 January
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elevated at the next creation, he did accept that this creation had been delayed while Leo was 
negotiating with the emperor.78 If de Giglis had heard this reason through the pope, he had 
perhaps been duped, as Campeggio reported to Wolsey around the same time that the pope saw 
no imminent need for cardinals to be elevated.79 In a way, the pope was being truthful to 
Campeggio. Leo had by that point hedged his bets by, on the one hand opening diplomatic 
channels with Charles V towards an alliance and, on the other, having secretly concluded a treaty 
with Francis I in October 1519, which facilitated a papal attack on Ferrara.80 It was not, therefore, 
an appropriate time to create cardinals without sending out any political signals. Indeed, it was 
only two years since he had elevated 31 nominees, including Campeggio himself. In these 
circum
in the next creation.84 Meanwhile, as with Wolsey, the pope continued to procrastinate. On 4 
stances, England was not the attractive ally against France that it had once been, 
particularly when one also considers England’s concurrent policy of reconciliation towards 
Francis I.81 There was no need, therefore, to offer any inducements, such as a red hat. 
 This did not stop de Giglis from continuing his pressure on both crown and papacy. To 
the former, he wrote on 14 March that the planned creation would involve political promotions 
for various powers which, the orator argued, would be unacceptable if England did not also 
benefit. 82 Henry VIII took the bait and responded by writing again to the pope, as well as to 
Giulio de’ Medici, on 25 April.83 On this basis, de Giglis expected (on 28 May) to be promoted 
                                                 
78 LPIIIi, 651 (3 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey).  
79 Ibid., 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
80 See below pp.679-680. 
81 See below pp.680-681. 
82 In this correspondence of 14 March, de Giglis again requested that the crown urge his promotion; LPIIIi, 679 (14 
March 1520, [de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome). 
 Leo, Greenwich), 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to 
iglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
, Rome). 
83 Ibid., 762 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1306-1307; 25 April 1520, Henry to
Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de G
84 Ibid., 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey
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May, de Giglis told Wolsey that he expected a delay in the creation of cardinals because of the 
threat to Rhodes for which the pope was requesting aid and because the emperor elect probably 
would not respond to this until after his coronation at Aachen.85 At some point during May, 
however, the papacy decided to reject de Giglis’ nomination because, de’ Medici asserted, he 
lacked sufficient calibre. While Leo had hitherto indicated that he was prepared to promote the 
orator, he might still find it necessary to do so and, hence, de’ Medici warned that Wolsey should 
not be surprised if papal support of de Giglis’ candidacy continued.86 
 In spite of de’ Medici’s communication, de Giglis continued to believe that he would be 
elevated, albeit in a postponed creation. The crown continued to support him in this and, publicly 
at least, the papacy continued to delay. By 22 June, de Giglis still believed that he would be 
promoted, albeit aware of some sort of delay.87 On 12 July, the orator cited further letters from 
Henry VIII in his favour, but stated that the pope wanted to ensure that the promotion was truly 
French envoy, Morette, arrived. As a result, he requested Wolsey write again in his favour.89 
             
desired by the king. As a result, Leo had contacted his nuncio in England, presumably as an 
independent third party, to ascertain this. If Henry confirmed this wish, it would occur in 
September.88 This relieved Leo of up to a few months of pressure from the orator. The 
ambassador’s spirits must have been lifted by the end of the month, when de Giglis confirmed 
that his name was on the list of nominees. On 3 August, however, de Giglis hopes were dashed 
again, when he notified Wolsey that the creation was delayed for yet another reason, until a 
                                    
de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 85 Ibid., 791 (4 May 1520, 
86 De’ Medici’s correspondent was a nuncio in England; ibid., 853 (calendared end May 1520, [‘de Medici to --]). 
87 Ibid., 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
88 De Giglis blamed the Casali for persuading the pope that the letters in his favour had been extorted from the king; 
ibid., 909 (12 July 1520, de Giglis to Vannes, Rome). 
89 Ibid., 941 (3 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Morette’s significance will be outlined below. 
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 When the pope finally proposed three names in Consistory on 18 September, de Giglis 
was included alongside French and Imperial nominees. A Venetian source reported that only the 
French candidate was accepted by the cardinals and that alternative English and Imperial 
candidates were desired.90 Campeggio advised on the 26th that this Consistory was postponed 
because of the dissensions. Since then, he claimed, the French and Imperial candidates had been 
accepted, while de Giglis was unsuccessful.91 The bishop of Worcester initially attributed his 
failure to his role in de Castello’s deprivation (in 1518). 92 This probably did not make him 
popular within the Sacred College, which was highly protective of its members’ status. Still, the 
orator did not give up and by 8 October he had spoken to the pope and ‘reminded him of certain 
circumstances’. Leo, however, tried to fob him off, saying that the only way he could see that de 
Giglis would be raised was if Henry wrote to the senior cardinals.93 Presumably, it was this group 
that the pontiff cited as being behind objections to the nomination. The pope’s reaction here does 
not apparently reveal his true thoughts on the matter, however. Around November 1520, de’ 
Medici wrote once again to Ghinucci, relaying that the pope would rather not receive any further 
letters recommending de Giglis. De’ Medici also mentioned that he was continually approached 
by the ambassador for promotion and that, if he could not take the hint, Leo would have to tell 
him to his face.94 The matter was over by March 1521, when de’ Medici wrote again to thank 
                                                 
90 Ven.iii, 122 (18 September 1520, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
91 LPIIIi, 993 (26 September 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). According to Pastor, the French candidate was 
accepted and the Imperial nominee referred to Francis I for his thoughts. When the French king objected to the fact 
that the Imperial was even considered for promotion, Leo shelved both elevations; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, 
 
 Mayer, ‘Castellesi [da Castello, da Corneto], Adriano’, 
ome). 
viii, pp.12-14. 
92 LPIIIi, 994 (26 September 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). Also see ibid., 1015 (8 October 1520, [de Giglis]
to Henry, Rome). For de Castello’s deprivation, see T.F.
DNB. 
93 LPIIIi, 1015 (8 October 1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, R
94 Ibid., 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
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Wolsey for his compliance. The pope had decided not to promote de Giglis, he reported. 95 De 
Giglis died not long after (18 April), but there was a rumour that he had tried to bribe the pope.96 
 The story of de Giglis’ candidacy reveals a curious exchange between England and Rome, 
whereby the papacy presented its objections to de Giglis’ candidacy as arising chiefly from the 
personality of the nominee and not specifically from the prospect of an ‘English’ candidate. It 
should be noted that the papacy went to great lengths to avoid offence by not publicly rejecting 
the crown nominee. Nevertheless, there was more to de Giglis’ failure than this. In 1520, England 
simply did not possess the requisite leverage to induce this and may even have incurred papal 
displeasure over its exclusion from the Field of Cloth of Gold and the meetings with Charles V.97 
It should also be remembered that Bainbridge’s and Wolsey’s success occurred at times when the 
papacy was desirous of English complicity against France. In 1520, this was not (yet) the case. 
The year was dominated by threats from both Francis I and Charles V to descend into Italy, both 
of which were undesired by Leo X. The pope, however, had not decided who, if anybody, he 
would support in the subsequent conflict. Only once he had decided which ‘superpower’ was 
likely to win would the pontiff contemplate drawing in England. In this situation, an alliance with 
England was not yet an attractive enough proposition for the papacy to concede a red hat when 
Henry requested one. This general political situation was also reflected in the circumstances 
surrounding this intended creation of cardinals; it revolved around a Franco-Imperial dispute. It is 
ard de Giglis’ candidacy at the beginning of 1520 after hearing 
ub of the dispute lay in the nomination of de la 
probable that Henry first put forw
of Charles V and Francis I’s desire to press for the elevation of their own candidates, Eberhard de 
la Mark and Jean d’Orleans, respectively. The n
                                                 
95 Ibid., 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]). 
.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.149-150. 96 Ibid., 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome); D
97 See below pp.684-687. 
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Mark, to whom the French king objected. In light of this and the generally pro-French disposition 
of the papacy since Marignano in 1515, the planned creations were repeatedly postponed (as de 
Giglis noted) as Leo X sought a compromise. Ultimately, in Consistory on 17 September, when 
these candidates and de Giglis were proposed, only d’Orleans received assent, although even his 
elevation was postponed when Francis disputed the fact that de la Mark had even been nominated 
in the first place.98 Furthermore, it is possible to envisage that the whole initiative by the pope to 
raise these cardinals was an attempt to restore the papacy’s centrality to the peace process, 
initiative for this having been seized by England. This made the French and Imperial candidates 
most significant to Leo X, anxious to ingratiate himself with his potential allies.99 An English 
nomination, on the other hand, was probably prudent given Henry VIII’s prominent mediating 
role at the various conferences with Charles and Francis that year, but the actual concession of 
the red hat was perhaps deemed unnecessary, and the candidacy of de Giglis was relatively 
insignificant. Charles and Francis were the princes that Leo really needed to keep on-side; they 
had direct interests in Italy and were threatening to descend into the peninsula. The pope would 
need to decide which of these he intended to back before he needed to consider the place of 
England in his plans. Obviously, Leo needed to side with the ‘winner’, but who that would be 
remained unclear throughout 1520.100  
Secondly, in a political sense, the papacy was unlikely to concede to this English request 
as Leo X was, if anything, displeased with Henry VIII’s actions on the European stage, 
particularly vis-à-vis the meetings with Francis and Charles, about which he complained (to de 
                                                 
98 M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, vi, p.185; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.11-14. 
ut 
1 (23 December 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome). 
99 See below pp.684-687. 
100 Even on 23 December, Campeggio believed that Leo would remain neutral, despite Imperial pressure to come o
against France; LPIIIi, 110
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Giglis) that he had been excluded and kept uninformed on more than one occasion March-May 
1520.101 Even after the Field of Cloth of Gold and the meetings with the emperor had taken 
place, Leo complained in August of the lack of correspondence from England concerning what 
had been concluded at them, although by October he seems to have been placated by Wolsey’s 
promise not to make any arrangement without consulting Leo.102 Leo may have also have 
resented the prestige in which Henry and Wolsey bathed as a result of the summits.103 If this was 
the pope’s attitude, the English crown could hardly expect a political concession such as a red 
hat. A wariness, even distrust of conferences between princes was to be expected from all parties 
who would not attend, yet possessed an interest in their outcome.104 One only has to look back to 
the Franco-papal conference at Bologna in 1515 as viewed from the English point of view.105 It 
was probably as a result of his suspicions that Leo sent the trusted Girolamo Ghinucci to 
represent him at the meetings, described by Campeggio as ‘a friend to the Cardinal de’ 
Medici’.106 Wolsey initially attempted to counter Leo X’s distrust on 4 May 1520, asserting that 
the meetings aimed for universal peace and that nothing would be agreed to the detriment of the 
                                                 
101 Ibid., 
(15 Apri
102 Ibid., 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to 
104 Charles V and Francis I were also distrusting of each other’s meetings with Henry VIII, even to the extent that 
they tried to prevent them from occurring; see below pp.675-677. 
105 See below pp.502-509. 
villa nostra 
20, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). Campeggio was under the impression, towards the end 
680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 720 (4 April 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 744 
l 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
Ghinucci]). 
103 Around October 1520, de’ Medici commented on the honour gained by both king and cardinal as a result of the 
conferences, albeit not in a negative light; ibid., 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to 
Ghinucci]). 
106 LPIIIi, 780 (2 May 1520, Leo to Henry, ‘In villa [Manliana]’), 781 (2 May 1520, Leo to Wolsey, ‘In 
Manliana’), 784 (2 May 15
of April 1520, that Leo would despatch a relative of his, the Florentine noble Petrus de Pazzis; ibid., 756 (22 April 
1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).  
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Church.107 While Campeggio and de Giglis wrote on 28 May that the pope was pleased with this 
communication,108 a decision already seems to have been made concerning de Giglis’ candidacy. 
Giulio de’ Medici’s initial communiqué relating the papal rejection, in the same month, while 
citing the orator’s lack of calibre, also suggests that it might have arisen from the current state of 
Anglo-papal communications. The cardinal protector revealed earlier in the letter how he and Leo 
were confused about England’s foreign policy intentions, particularly as both the Empire (with 
whom the papacy admitted negotiating) and France claimed to have Henry VIII on-side. De’ 
Medici advised that no confidence was to be put in de Giglis if Anglo-papal relations were to 
progress (perhaps against France) and that, to this end, another representative ought to be sent.109 
The papal minister apparently blamed the lack of knowledge of the English meetings with 
Francis I and Charles V on de Giglis. This notion is reinforced when one considers de’ Medici’s 
second letter to England to warn against any further lobbying of de Giglis’s candidacy, in 
November 1520. Once again, the cardinal protector desired Wolsey to send ‘a well informed 
agent’ to Rome.110 The crown responded to this in March 1521, when it commissioned John 
Clerk to go to Rome.111 By this, Henry and Wolsey implicitly recognised that de Giglis was not 
in favour, perhaps as a result of their actions, and would not gain a red hat.  
 Leo X’s displeasure with Henry VIII’s arrangement of these meetings with Francis and 
 England; he Charles also seems to have gone beyond the lack of consultation accorded him from
                                                 
107 Letters from Henry to the same effect may have been sent at the same time. They also outlined arrangements for 
the meetings; ibid., 844 (27 May 1520, Campeggio to Henry, Rome), 845 (28 May 1520, Campeggio and de Giglis 
 May 1520, Campeggio and de Giglis to [Wolsey], 
to [Wolsey], Rome), 846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
108 Ibid., 844 (27 May 1520, Campeggio to Henry, Rome), 845 (28
Rome). 
109 De’ Medici’s correspondent was a nuncio in England; ibid., 853 (calendared end May 1520; [‘de Medici to --]). 
110 Ibid., 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
111 Ven.iii, 167 (28 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London); LPIIIi, 1189 (5 March 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, 
Calais). 
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also appears to have resented the crown’s apparent usurpation of the papacy’s traditional role as 
mediator between Christian princes. Henry, through Wolsey’s cardinalatial and legatine status 
(albeit always under the auspices of crown authority) had gradually asserted this role after 
hijacking Leo X’s universal peace initiative in 1518, which resulted in the Treaty of London.112 
Instead of being the centre of such processes to pursue universal peace (and thence a crusade 
against the Turks), Leo had become peripheral to their arrangement and, given that the venue for 
these events had shifted to northern Europe, was far less able to influence them. One can observe, 
during 1520, an attempt by the papacy to wrestle back the initiative for universal peace through 
its emphasis of the Turkish threat and its proposal of a crusade to counter this threat. From 
February of this year, news of the danger posed by the Ottomans was conveyed back to England 
through its representatives in Rome, de Giglis and Campeggio. That this was inspired by the 
papacy is suggested in de Giglis’ missive of 4 May, when he revealed that the pope had 
instructed him to inform Henry of the Turkish news as soon as possible.113 This culminated in 
Leo writing directly to Henry VIII on 3 June requesting that the king now act ‘for the safety of 
Christendom’.114 Indeed, the dispatch of Ghinucci to England as nuncio, officially to be present 
at the conferences, may also have been intended to achieve this end.115 This can be interpreted as 
                                                
an attempt by the papacy to appropriate control of the mediation process for two reasons. Firstly, 
there does not seem to have been much of an actual Turkish threat during 1520 to motivate such a 
 
112 See below pp.684, 687, 701-702, 706-709. 
56 (3 June 1520, Leo to Henry, Rome). According to Campeggio and de Giglis, the pope did not just 
pril 1520 that the papal nuncio in France 
4 ([4?] June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Boulogne). 
113 LPIIIi, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome), 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, 
Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 857 (4 June 
1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, Rome), 858 (4 June 1520, Campeggio [and de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome), 867 (10 June 
1520, [Hieronymus Pothelinus to --]), 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
114 Ibid., 8
appeal to Henry for assistance; ibid., 858 (4 June 1520, Campeggio [and de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome). 
115 The Venetian ambassador in England reported around the beginning of A
told him that his mission was to discuss the Ottoman threat with Francis, although Surian did not believe him; 
Ven.iii, 6
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response.116 Secondly, news of the danger posed by the Ottomans ceased to feature in the 
correspondence of the English diplomats based in Rome after the end of June 1520.117 
Suspiciously, this roughly coincides with Henry VIII’s meetings with Francis and Charles and, 
one suspects, that the stress on the need for a crusade may have ceased because, at this point, the 
papacy would have guessed that the meetings had taken place and were no longer preventable. In 
terms of de Giglis’ bid for promotion, the orator was never likely to be successful while the 
papacy was unhappy with Henry VIII’s current actions on the international stage. 
The English response to this papal initiative was quite effective. On the one hand, Henry 
could not be seen to object to such a ‘noble’ plan to crusade and had to express enthusiasm. Thus, 
one can observe, for instance, Wolsey telling Surian, the Venetian ambassador, on 18 May that 
Henry would write to the pope against recent reported Turkish attacks and that the king was 
ready to act.118 By the beginning of July, according to Surian, Wolsey had told him that Henry 
had promised 1,000 soldiers to defend Rhodes.119 This was quite feasibly a verbal response to the 
pope’s request for action in early June. In reality, however, the crown was quite sceptical about 
such timely calls to crusade. Wolsey allegedly stated that whenever the Italians needed anything, 
they cited the Turkish threat.120 
 
                                                 
relations between the Turks and Christendom. This is not to dispute that the reports from the East were genuine, but 
Leo X does appear to have been capitalising on them; K.M. Setton, ‘Penrose Memorial Lecture. Pope Leo X and the 
ilosophical Society, 113 (1969), pp.419-421. 
pt of Turkish 
116 Certainly, Setton’s study on this pope’s reaction to the Ottoman threat does not cite 1520 as a critical point in 
Turkish Peril’, Proceedings of the American Ph
117 The next point at which the possibility of a crusade is mentioned (by Campeggio in reporting an audience with the 
pope) is during January 1521; LPIIIi, 1123 (calendared 2-6 January 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey]). 
118 Ven.iii, 49 (18 May 1520, Surian to the Signory, London). 
119 Ibid., 99 ([6 July?] 1520, Surian to the Signory). 
120 Ibid., 86 (16 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, [Guisnes]). Wolsey’s alleged statement is almost word for word 
what two Venetian ambassadors reported the Imperial minister de Chièvres as responding on recei
newsletters (presumably via the orators) around 29 May. One ought to remember that Charles V was in England at 
this point to meet with Henry prior to the Field of Cloth of Gold; Ven.iii, 55 (29 May 1520, Cornaro and Surian to 
the Signory, Canterbury). 
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While the elevation of Englishmen to the Sacred College was used both by the English 
crown and the papacy in a political context vis-à-vis France, what political advantages resulted 
from the existence of English cardinals? At this point, one ought to distinguish between the two 
genres of cardinal extant during this time; curial and non-curial, those who went to or remained in 
Rome and those who resided in their native lands. While the status of each type of cardinal was 
theoretically equal, the characteristics to which princes such as Henry VIII were attracted 
differed.121 
English curial cardinals were extremely unusual, the last having been Easton in the late 
fourteenth century.122 This rarity was even recognised by contemporaries when Bainbridge’s 
candidacy was rumoured around January 1511. Despite his residency in Rome since late 1509, 
Maximilian predicted that, once promoted to the college, the orator would return to England.123 
Nevertheless, Bainbridge did become the first English curial cardinal in over a hundred years and 
his residency in Rome offered three broad political advantages to the crown, in terms of its 
foreign policy. It provided England with the ability to vote in conclave, gave it the opportunity to 
lobby the pope more personally and directly in the English interest, and bestowed honour and 
dignity on the crown within Christendom. 
The first political reason for Henry VIII to welcome the admission of an Englishman to the 
Sacred College lies in what was (and still is) the greatest element of a cardinal’s authority; the 
                                                 
121 This equality of status had been stipulated by Eugenius IV (1431-1447); J.A.F. Thomson, Popes and Princes, 
7-180 (LPIii, 3304; LPI, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). 
p.64. 
122 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.1. 
123 LPIi, 669 (4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg in Brisco). On the other hand, Richard 
Pace, having heard in September 1515 that Wolsey could be promoted, assumed that Wolsey would go to Rome, but 
that was in the wake of Bainbridge’s death and the secretary did opine that Henry VIII ought to maintain one or two 
curial cardinals; Ellis, lxxi, pp.17
 313
ability 
rtly after Bainbridge’s death: ‘for I assure you my Lorde itt is necessary for the 
Kyngis
to vote in conclave.124 Papal elections were watershed opportunities to affect, potentially, 
the identity of the next pope and, with it, the future political affiliation of the papacy vis-à-vis 
England. It is demonstrated elsewhere that the English crown during this period had a strong 
vested interest in trying to prevent the election of a ‘French’ pope and to secure that of a pro-
English candidate (an English pope was incredibly unlikely).125 Indeed, Richard Pace stressed 
this to Wolsey, on 25 September 1514, when recommending the need for an English curial 
cardinal sho
 Grace to have oon or ij. yff need were Cardinals, and resident in the Courte off Rome, 
…for the creation off Popis; whyche thynge is off greate importance to thoos Princes bi whoos 
means they be create, as they might be bi our most Christian Kynge aswell as odre Princes yffe 
he hadde sum Cardinals in thys Courte as odre have’.126 It ought to be emphasised that, 
realistically, an English cardinal had to be resident in the Curia to be able to exercise his vote. 
England was too far from Rome to enable a non-curial to travel there upon being notified of a 
pontiff’s death.127 On the one occasion during this period on which an English cardinal did 
contribute to a papal election, Bainbridge in 1513, it seems extremely likely that he was both 
                                                 
124 The College of Cardinals had monopolised this role by the start of the twelfth century; J.F. Broderick, ‘The 
Sacred
125 One
English crown appears to have sought to back a candidate also supported by an ally (particularly the Empire); see 
above pp.244-245. Another aspect of cardinalatial power during conclaves that could have offered political benefits 
to the English crown was the college’s insistence on electoral pacts that were customarily forced upon potential 
electees. While there is the potential that parties could have included political demands, no evidence has been found 
to suggest that Henry VIII tried to influence these when Bainbridge was involved in 1513. In any case, these pacts 
cred College to reassert a formal role for itself in papal government; W. Ullmann, ‘The Legal Validity of the 
e Papacy and Political Ideas in the Middle Ages, xv, pp.3-35. 
 College of Cardinals’, AHP, 25, p.10. 
 can interpret as a warning to the crown in May 1517, Richard Pace’s description of an attempt by Francis I to 
cause Leo to raise a number of cardinals, in his belief, to cause a Frenchman to be elected pope; LPIIii, 3276 (23 
May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance). In the papal elections of this period, however, both expected and actual, the 
were not enforceable and none was ever successfully imposed. Ullmann and others now view them as an attempt by 
the Sa
Papal Electoral Pacts’, in W. Ullmann (ed), Th
126 Note, that Pace had not heard directly that Wolsey’s elevation was being sought from England, so he naturally 
appears to have believed that the latter was intended to reside in Rome; Ellis, lxxi (LPIii, 3304; LPI, 5447; 25 
September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). 
127 For the implications of distance, see pp.36-37. 
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expected to back a suitable pro-English and anti-French candidate, as well as adhere to crown 
instructions (potentially specifying a particular cardinal) if these arrived in time.128 This idea is 
further strengthened by Richard Fox and Thomas Ruthal in May 1510 who spoke of the need for 
more English (and Spanish) cardinals due to the alleged fear of Julius II that a French pope would 
be elected if he died; the ‘French party’ was currently too numerous, they argued.129 The degree 
to which English curial cardinals could affect papal elections must not be overstated. Bainbridge 
was a lone voice working in the English interest and, in spite of being able to influence like-
minded members of the college, could not compete against other, more numerous ‘parties’ in 
conclave, such as the French, Imperial and Spanish. By not lobbying for the creation of more than 
one curial cardinal, however, Henry VIII implicitly recognised his limited position in this respect 
and one can conclude that this made it important for Bainbridge to associate in Rome with 
cardinals associated with those states currently aligned with English foreign policy interests.130. 
Secondly, Henry VIII benefited from having an English cardinal representing him at the 
Holy See as curial cardinals, by virtue of their status, were better placed than other crown 
representatives to lobby the papacy in the interests of English foreign policy. As Richard Pace 
explained to Wolsey in 1514, in addition to the ability to affect papal elections, England needed 
131curial cardinals ‘for knowliege off all thyngis that schall succeed here’.  Silvester Darius, in an 
attempt to gain crown support for de Giglis’ candidacy during 1518, suggested that it would 
                                                 
128While Bainbridge appears to have used his own initiative in this conclave, there is evidence to suggest that he 
pursued a candidate recommended from England during a papal health scare in 1511; see pp.230-231, 238. 
129 Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). 
130 See above pp.228, 240. 
131 Note, that Pace had not heard directly that Wolsey’s elevation was being sought from England, so he naturally 
appears to have believed that the latter was intended to reside in Rome; Ellis, lxxi (LPIii, 3304; LPI, 5447; 25 
September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). 
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‘advance the King’s service’.132 The implication from both is that a diplomat of lesser status 
would not be privy to such ‘knowliege’. If nothing else, cardinals had the opportunity to access 
the pope more regularly, on account of their presence at consistories, as well as various services, 
ceremonies, celebrations and even in leisure activities (such as hunting). They could also build up 
relationships with other cardinals, who were now their equals and create a network of 
connections in a way that English orators may not have been able to achieve. Furthermore, 
through their seniority within the Church, curial cardinals could be involved in the workings of 
the papal court and gain an inside knowledge of how to get things done, more so than, say, an 
orator.133  
Once ensconced as a curial cardinal, an Englishman could arguably work more effectively 
in the crown’s interest, particularly against France and its allies, through more direct access to the 
pope and his advisors. Indeed, this is what Bainbridge did (in continuation of the policy that he 
had p
                                                
ursued since his arrival in Rome). He induced Julius II to grant a brief that transferred Louis 
XII’s titles and territories to Henry VIII in 1512,134 he was instrumental in having Louis’ ally, 
James IV, threatened with papal censures, the responsibility for enforcing which was later 
devolved on Bainbridge himself,135 and he lobbied strongly, publicly, although unsuccessfully, 
against the restitution of the schismatic cardinals who had renounced the Council of Pisa-Milan 
in 1513.136 Also, as a curial cardinal, Bainbridge established a network of contacts within the 
 
132 LPIIii, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, London). 
133 Bainbridge, for instance, became Chamberlain of the Sacred College in 1514, responsible for the body’s revenues, 
particularly the consistorial taxes associated with provisions to benefices that took place in Rome; D.S. Chambers, 
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.111. 
134 Ibid., pp.38-39, 50-52, 54-55. 
135 Ibid., pp.40, 52-53. 
136 The cardinal caused comment by his refusal to attend the Consistory that reinstated his pro-French colleagues in 
June 1513. One must remember, at this point, that Henry VIII was on the cusp of launching a considerable invasion 
of France; ibid., pp.46-47. 
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Sacred College, through whom he could more effectively pursue English political interests. 
Among the cardinals with whom Bainbridge is known to have had a close working relationship, 
were Riario, Vigerio and Remolines.137 Bainbridge’s use of his cardinalatial connections to 
forward Anglo-papal relations gave him a stronger hand when he approached the pontiff, than it 
had been merely as English orator. Furthermore, it is unlikely that Bainbridge’s curial 
connections would have been as strong, had he not been of equal ecclesiastical status to other 
cardinals. Another political advantage that accrued to the English crown from having a cardinal 
resident at Rome was the knowledge gained of the workings of papal government, if he was 
appointed to any curial position. The most ‘political’ commission bestowed on Bainbridge was 
that of 
                                                
legate a latere to a section of the papal army fighting the duke of Ferrara (an ally of 
France), effectively in a bid to induce an English declaration against the French.138 Bainbridge 
was also employed by the papacy on various commissions which, in addition to demonstrating 
papal favour, perhaps gave greater access to the pontiff to political ends. In particular, he was 
appointed to examine the duke of Ferrara’s quarrel with the papacy in July 1512.139 Given 
Alfonso d’Este’s alliance with France to that point and Bainbridge’s direct involvement in the 
war against him, one could have expected a partisan approach from the Englishman. 
Finally, gaining the creation of and maintaining an English cardinal in Rome had positive 
political repercussions for the crown in the important sphere of international reputation. It could 
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useful outline of the cardinals with whom Bainbridge associated. The papal master of ceremonies, Paris de Grassis, 
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crown; D.S. Chambers, Cardi
138 LPIi, 776 (23 March 1511, Venet
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he was chosen to discuss the reform of the Curia and its employees, via the Lateran Council, in June 1513. While this 
does not have a direct political dimension, it again shows papal favour and may have facilitated greater access to the 
pontiff; D.S. Chambers, Ca
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bring both prestige and honour to the crown at this diplomatic hub, where other states could not 
avoid taking notice and the cardinal could be used to publicly display English foreign policy. 
Initially, the elevation of an English cardinal in itself would have highlighted a degree of papal 
favour bestowed on Henry VIII and this would have publicly been accorded through the 
ceremony in which Bainbridge received the dignity.140 In addition, as such creations had a 
political basis, they also served to emphasise political alignment between England and Rome. In 
this way, Bainbridge’s elevation both brought international recognition to the young Henry VIII 
early on into his reign and was used by Julius II to flush out the king’s anti-French ambitions.141 
Even if the anti-French association of Bainbridge’s promotion was not desired at this point by 
Henry VIII, the pope ensured that this was broadcast across Christendom. Also in this sense, the 
subcollector Silvester Darius, when first approaching Wolsey on behalf of his master de Giglis 
with a view to crown support for his bid for a red hat in 1518, reasoned that it would ‘show the 
world how great is the influence the King has with the Holy See’. 142 
If such a curial cardinal remained in Rome and came to be recognised by the pope, 
through titles and benefices, legatine commissions and appointments to committees, then there 
was political capital to be made in how this cardinal, and thus the crown, was perceived by 
others. 
                                                
In the first place, Christopher Bainbridge quickly came to be reputed (among other titles) 
as the ‘Cardinal of England’.143 This was a clear identification of his political affiliation; no-one 
 
don). 
d Venetian sources, see 
140 Ven.ii, 98 (LPIi, 714; 10 March 1511, a private letter received in Venice from Hieronimo Lipomano, Ravenna); 
D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.36. 
141 See above pp.288-293. 
142 LPIIii, 4442 (18 September 1518, Darius to Wolsey, Lon
143 For examples of the use of this title by English, papal (Giulio de’ Medici), Spanish an
Ven.ii, 104 (LPIi, 765; 8-10 May 1511, Proveditor Capello to the Signory, Dinale), 1006 (Sp.ii, 61; calendared end 
December 1511, Ferdinand to his ambassador in England), 1346 (Sp.ii, 56; 4 October 1511); LPIi, 776 (23 March 
1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna); LPIii, 2124 (LPI, 4366; 26 July 1513, Sir Robert 
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could ever have forgotten his association with Henry VIII. Indeed, Bainbridge managed to 
ingratiate himself with both pontiffs of this period. He was awarded the basilica of S. Prassede 
(Rome), as his titular church, in December 1511 and made Cardinal Protector of the Cistercians 
in November 1513.144 From Julius II and Leo X, he also received benefices, such as the priory of 
Sant’ Antonio (Reggio Emilia) from the former and the monastery of San Stefano (Bologna) 
from the latter.145 Such grants would not only have indicated the favour in which Bainbridge was 
held, but reflected back on the English crown. In a more overtly political sense, Julius awarded 
Bainbridge Vetralla, a town and castle in the Papal States (near Viterbo) in 1511, reputedly of 
some strategic significance.146 This patronage had a distinctly anti-French subtext, as not only 
had Bainbridge been given responsibility for the defence of this territory, for which the current 
threat was France and its Italian allies, but he had just finished his legatine commission. That 
commission was basically an attempt by Julius II to demonstrate English support against France 
and to induce Henry VIII to join the planned league against Louis XII.147 Contemporaries could 
not hav
foreign policy intentions and achievements could be advertised across Christendom. Bainbridge’s 
e avoided interpreting the papal award of Vetralla as an indication of favour on England, 
with a view to having Henry VIII act in support of Julius II’s desire to expel the French from 
Italy. Similarly, the appointment of Bainbridge to various cardinalatial commissions would also 
have reflected positively on the English crown’s standing in Rome.148 The maintenance of a 
curial cardinal in Rome could also be used by the English crown as a means by which English 
activities and reactions to events would reflect directly upon the English crown and it is 
                                                 
144 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.95, 98. 
145 Ibid., pp.95-97. 
146 Ibid., pp.93-94. 
147 See above pp.292-293. 
148 See above n.139. 
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reasonable to presume that the orator was aware of this. As he was also a member of the Sacred 
College, they would also be noted by observers. Thus, in receipt of ‘good’ news of English 
victories at the Battle of the Spurs and at Flodden in September 1513, Bainbridge ostentatiously 
had celebratory bonfires lit outside his residence.149 On occasions when there was apparently 
‘bad’ news for England, such as Bainbridge’s failure to influence the conclave earlier in 1513, the 
cardinal’s demeanour was noted; in this case Bainbridge was said to look unhappy with the 
result, as he left conclave.150 More of a snub to Leo X, Bainbridge’s failure to attend a consistory 
that restored two of the schismatic cardinals in June 1513, against which he had argued 
vociferously (under instruction from England), apparently caused a stir in Rome and publicly 
demonstrated the crown’s opposition to this papal reconciliation.151 This was completely 
understandable, given the current English invasion of France in ‘defence of the faith’ and against 
the schism last formented by their enemies.152 
 
 While the creation of English cardinals was relatively rare, non-curials proliferated.153 
From 1471 until the end of this period, there were three English cardinals who remained in 
England, Thomas Bourchier, John Morton and Thomas Wolsey.154 On account of their being 
located in England, these non-curials were, perhaps inevitably, in a different position to their 
                                                 
1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
153 It ought to be noted that, despite the concentration of this study on non-curial cardinals that also occupied 
positions of state, this was not the case for all cardinals that resided outside of the Holy See. Some, for instance, 
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Rome-based counterparts but, nevertheless, still offered a number of political opportunities to the 
crown. There was the slight possibility that they could be elected pope, they could potentially 
influence the papacy as its most senior representative in the kingdom, their position personified 
papal authority in England and could be used to further the crown’s foreign policy interests, and 
finally, their status served to enhance the reputation of the crown.  
The English non-curial cardinals’ ability to vote in conclaves was largely theoretical, as it 
was unrealistic to expect them to reach Rome from England before an election took place.155 
While the college could and did delay conclaves for brief periods, as in 1521-1522 for Cardinal 
d’Ivrea, who was detained by the papal general Prospero Colonna en route, this privilege was not 
accorded to more far-flung colleagues.156 That the issue of distance for non-curials was at the 
front of English minds at such times was demonstrated on 19 December 1521, when Sir Richard 
Wingfield and Sir Thomas Spinelly (based in the Low Countries) voiced their belief to Wolsey 
at the non-curial French cardinals would not be able to arrive in time for the election, for two th
reasons. Firstly, they cited a reform by the Lateran Council that reduced the stipulated length of 
exequies by six days and, secondly, they presumed that both the English orator, Clerk, and his 
Imperial counterpart could be relied upon to hasten proceedings and prevent the French from 
reaching Rome in time.157 The English ambassador in France, on the other hand, around 9 
                                                 
155 For Richard Pace’s inability to reach Rome in time for the 1521-1522 conclave with crown instructions, see 
21, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 1933 (4 January 1522, 
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157 LPIIIii, 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). According to Clerk, 
various cardinals in conclave were also anxious about the potential arrival of more French cardinals in Rome (that 
could affect the outcome of the election) on 4 January, on which day they kept on going to the door to enquire on this 
matter. Indeed, two days later, the Spanish ambassador in Rome reported a rumour he had heard that four French 
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January 1522, ominously indicated that Francis had told him that the conclave would not begin 
until his cardinals had arrived, whom he had despatched post. On a more positive note, 
Fitzwilliam cited a reliable source within the French court as telling him that this was unlikely.158  
While non-curials such as Wolsey would probably never attend a conclave, this did not 
preclude them from being chosen for the tiara, as Adrian VI exemplified in 1522 (then resident in 
Spain).
                                                
159 Adrian’s election notwithstanding, it was most unlikely that a non-curial would be 
elected, particularly one perceived as closely tied to a monarch. Up to this point, the increasing 
Italianisation of the Curia had assisted to ensure that this would remain the case.160 The election 
of a non-Rome-based candidate was also likely to be unpalatable to the populace of a city already 
unstable during interregna. The ‘Babylonian captivity’ of the papacy in Avignon was unforgotten 
and Clerk implied this shortly after the 1522 election. When the cardinals emerged from the 
Vatican, ‘every man here [was] right sore abasshed and very evill contented in there mind; in so 
moche that when the Cardinalls came oute of the Conclave the common people here (saving your 
honour) wh[is]tlid at them as they came by’.161 
In seeking the appointment of non-curial cardinals, the English crown both seems to have 
believed and wanted it to be understood that such recognition would increase its influence with 
the papacy, as Wolsey explained to de Giglis, around September 1514, when he was forwarding 
 
158 LPIIIii, 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]). 
 Kelly, Dictionary of Popes, p.258. It ought to be mentioned that, in conclave, cardinals were not bound 
159 Adrian was a political choice, being a minister of Charles V and, at that point, the emperor elect’s viceroy in 
Spain; J.N.D.
to elect one of their number and, indeed, Bainbridge, in the initial scrutiny of 1513, nominated the non-ecclesiastical 
brother of a cardinal; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.43-44. 
160 See above pp.276-277. 
161 Ellis, pp.304-305 (LPIIIii, 1960; 13 January 1522, [Clerk to Wolsey]). Similarly, Richard Pace, when he arrived 
in Rome on 27 January, wrote to Wolsey that the cardinals were scared to go out ‘for fear of the people, which 
hourly crieth out against them, to their great rebuke and shame, by reason of the said election’; LPIIIii, 1995 (28 
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his own candidacy, ‘to the intent not only men might thereby perceive how much the Pope 
favoureth the King and such as he entirely loveth, but also that thereby I shall be the more able to 
do his grace service’.162 While a non-curial English cardinal could not establish a personal 
rapport
 quid pro quo for English membership of an anti-
French
presume, was connected with England’s desire to launch an offensive against France in the 
 with the pontiff (or with collegiate colleagues for that matter) through face-to-face 
contact, he could still address the pope directly in Rome on political matters via correspondence. 
As such cardinals were also usually principal ministers of the king, they tended to become the 
channel through which much crown-papal communication was routed. This was certainly the 
case with Wolsey, although his becoming the hub for Anglo-papal contact (taking over from 
Richard Fox) did predate his becoming cardinal and was effectively complete by the summer of 
1515. Wolsey, as he assumed the lead as the king’s chief minister, became the only regular 
correspondent with the pope other than Henry himself. His communication could be both direct 
and indirect, the latter through the king’s Latin secretary as well as through English diplomats in 
Rome. He lobbied the pope on numerous matters of foreign policy, the first appearing to be his 
successful insistence on gaining the red hat in a
 league.163 Among other political matters in which Wolsey attempted to influence the pope 
as a cardinal, in December 1515, he was commissioned by Henry to convey to de Giglis 
‘business of the gravest importance to be communicated to the pope’.164 This, one can reasonably 
following year, particularly as the disastrous Battle of Marignano had effectively caused the 
papacy to submit to France at the conference of Bologna earlier that month.165 In 1518, Wolsey 
                                                 
162 LPIii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). 
163 See above pp.23-28. 
164 LPIIi, 1354 (29 December 1515, Henry to Leo, Eltham).  
165 See below pp.489 ff. 
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took responsibility for answering the pope’s request for support in a planned crusade to the 
east.166 Similarly, in 1519, the cardinal sent secret letters to the pope, conveying his and Henry’s 
wishes for the Imperial election. Later in the same year, Wolsey complained for himself and his 
king about the pope’s conduct in this matter.167 Finally, in January 1521, Wolsey conveyed 
‘matters of great importance’ to Leo X, written on Henry’s orders.168 These may well have 
related to the English intention to mediate (through Wolsey) between Charles V and Francis I at 
Calais later in the year and could feasibly have sought papal support for this. The correspondence 
may have even sounded out Leo X’s willingness to break with France; at this time, the English 
crown was secretly and tentatively moving towards an alliance with Charles V against France 
(eventually effected during August 1521 under cover of the ‘peace’ negotiations held at Calais), 
while publicly presenting itself as a neutral arbiter and, privately to Francis I, as a friend of 
France.169 While one cannot ascribe Wolsey’s contact with the pope on these matters solely to his 
cardinalatial dignity, it probably did contribute.  
While English non-curial cardinals were invariably crown ministers first and foremost, 
the crown also welcomed the air of ‘papal’ authority that this status brought with it. 
Domestically, it made them the most senior ecclesiastics in England and, as far as Wolsey was 
concerned, raised him above the archbishop of Canterbury. That the papacy insisted that 
prospective English cardinals were influential with the king was probably a consequence of this: 
once elevated, the non-curial cardinal would potentially become the focus for Anglo-papal 
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communication, if he had not already assumed this position.170 If he did not, it would be a snub to 
his position. From the English perspective, such a pivotal position enabled Wolsey to act 
somewhat like a computer firewall, in a prime position to decide which papal instructions or 
requests to allow into England from Rome and which to block or ignore. Being the king’s trusted 
principal minister, this would have both given the crown firmer control over the domestic Church 
and facilitated its veto of politically-tinged decrees or requests from the papacy that were not in 
the English interest.  
Wolsey’s employment of an air of papal authority seems to have been deliberate in other 
spheres, such as in the attention he gave to wearing the appropriate cardinalatial attire, on all 
public occasions at least. Even before he officially received this, the chronicler Hall wrote that 
the hat itself was conveyed ‘to London with suche triumphe as though the greatest prince of 
Christendome had bene come into the realme’.171 As early as 10 September 1515, for instance, he 
requested that de Giglis supply him with appropriate garments for his appearance in Parliament 
‘in crastino Animarum’.172 As Wolsey had made the red hat conditional on England’s joining the 
papacy in the fight against France, the new cardinal’s concern to be suitably attired for what 
would ostensibly be a ‘war’ Parliament is not difficult to fathom; the will to fight and the 
financial means to ‘defend the faith’ might be more forthcoming if the pope was visible through 
his cardinal. Also, Polydore Vergil described how Wolsey ‘soon began to use a golden chair, a 
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golden cushion, a golden cloth on his table, and, when he was walking, to have the hat, symbol of 
the rank of cardinal, carried before him by a servant, raised up like some holy idol or other’.173 
This increased when he became a legate a latere in 1518, from which time he ‘was not satisfied 
with the one cross which he had used in his capacity as archbishop of York, but would have 
another carried before him by two elegantly proportioned priests riding on horses’. Vergil also 
noted Wolsey’s tendency to celebrate Mass more often when the king was present, insisting on 
his right on such occasions, as legate, to be attended by the highest ranks of the secular and 
ecclesia
                                                
stical nobility.174 In addition to the way he looked and acted, Wolsey clearly sought to 
project ‘papal’ authority through his cardinalatial dignity in what he said to foreign diplomats. 
During an audience with two Venetian ambassadors in January 1516, when questioned on 
rumours that English money was being transferred to the Low Countries to be used against the 
French and Venetians in Italy, he allegedly prefaced his denial of this by saying, ‘I will speak to 
you with all sincerity and truth, and will tell you what becomes a Cardinal on the honour of the 
cardinalate’.175 In a similar manner, around mid-August 1517, Giustinian quoted Wolsey as 
swearing that the pope wanted to expel the French from Italy, among other things, ‘per haec 
sacra et per dignitatem cardinalatus’.176 An indication that such a ‘papal’ perception of Wolsey 
was either held in Rome or was deemed prudent to employ when talking about him (particularly 
to English diplomats) comes in 1521. On 27 October, the English ambassadors in the Low 
 
173 D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.231. 
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the Signory). 
174 The Italian cites dukes and earls, in addition to bishops and abbots; ibid., p.255. 
175 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.155-160 (Ven.ii, 671; LPIIi, 1380; 2 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). The same ambassadors quoted Wolsey as using the same phraseology to deny the same rumour again on 8 
March; ibid., pp.184-189 (Ven.ii, 695; LPIIi, 1638; 8 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Londo
176 Ven.ii, 763 (19 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also, around 10 August 1516, at a dinner he 
gave to the Venetian ambassadors, during a discussion on the malevolence of French power in Italy and urging 
Venice to detach itself from France, Wolsey was quoted as answering the orators’ cautious, conditional reply; 
‘possibly his Majesty the King, and I, who am at least a Cardinal , do not deserve an “if, indeed”’; R. Brown (trans.), 
Four Years, i, pp.267-268 (Ven.ii, 757; LPIIi, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to 
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Countries relayed a discussion with the the papal nuncio, Jeronimo Adorno, on whether he had 
sufficient power from the pope to join the truce that Wolsey had been lobbying for during the 
Calais Conference, including a statement by Adorono’s colleague Leo that he ‘held you [Wolsey] 
in higher honour than any Cardinal of the College, “reputing you in manner as his brother”’.177  
In addition, the crown may have benefited from a trait adopted by Wolsey that was more 
commonly associated with his curial colleagues; the holding of benefices in commendam. Thus, 
as the cardinal was provided to the see of Bath and Wells in 1518 and the abbey of St Albans of 
1521, this would have emphasised this non-curial cardinal’s authority to observers, both foreign 
and domestic.178 
Realisitically, however, Wolsey’s personification of papal authority was of limited use in 
international politics, not least because other princes possessed their own cardinals and because, 
from an external point of view, Wolsey would have been envisaged quite clearly as Henry VIII’s 
cardinal, whose true priority was the English interest. This dignity merely put Wolsey on the 
same level as other the cardinal-ministers (not an insignificant thing in itself). The only means by 
which such a non-curial cardinal could enhance his ecclesiastical status any further while still 
serving the crown and which would ensure a precedence on the international stage over most 
other cardinals was by obtaining a commission as a legate a latere, what Vergil terms ‘the loftiest 
                                                 
177 The ambassadors in question were Thomas Docwra, Thomas Boleyn and Richard Wingfield; LPIIIii, 1714 (29 
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service and expenses at Calais and Bruges earlier that year; LPIIIii, 1760 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, 
[Wolsey to Clerk]). Admittedly, Wolsey had some form in this, having ‘held’ the right to administer the diocese of 
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rung in the ladder’.179 A legatine commission bestowed on its recipient quasi-papal status 
wherever the commission applied.180 While this did not mean that the legate could override the 
pope, and the details of his powers varied depending on the commission, it did mean that he 
outranked all other ecclesiastics with whom he came into contact (the pope himself and, generally 
speakin
ge, as this supports the argument that he wanted to become the English 
embodi
g, most other legates a latere excepted) and even most laymen.181 Wolsey obtained this 
status in May 1518, wrung out of Leo X in return for his allowing the original legate, Lorenzo 
Campeggio, to cross from Calais to England.182 It is significant that the English cardinal had 
sought this status (for which being a cardinal was a pre-condition) since his initial promotion to 
the Sacred Colle
ment of ‘papal’ authority. It is perhaps indicative of Wolsey’s extensive ambitions that he 
was reportedly disappointed with the initial commission that arrived, which was to end on the 
departure of his co-legate, Campeggio.183 From this first appointment, Wolsey regularly sought 
extensions to his powers, both in scope and duration.184 From his legatine commission, Wolsey’s 
role in English foreign policy assumed an increasingly ‘papal’ character. In the first instance, he 
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[Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges).
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appropriated Leo X’s plan for a five year truce and crusade in 1518 with his own universal peace 
initiative that culminated in the Treaty of London.185 Subsequently, in 1520, one can observe 
Wolsey’s principal role in the meetings and ceremonies involving Henry VIII with Francis I 
(Field of Cloth of Gold) and Charles V (Canterbury), in which his cardinalatial and legatine 
dignity was again prominent. He also continued to forward himself as a mediator, attempting to 
prevent war between the Hapsburg and Valois monarchs.186 Subsequently during 1521, Wolsey 
‘mediated’ in Henry’s name between France and the Empire at the Conference of Calais and at 
Bruges, both seeking to conclude an anti-French alliance with Charles V and to arrange a truce so 
that England could prepare for war. At these events, Wolsey’s ecclesiastical authority was clearly 
and deliberately visible, as was his assumption of the role of arbitrator.187 In particular, one can 
see Wolsey invoking his legatine power in trying to force a truce from the end of August and, at 
                                                 
185 A sense of the pontifical authority invoked y the English crown can be seen in accounts of the two legates’ 
reception by Henry VIII from 3 August 1518. Wolsey himself described Campeggio as ‘so honourably received [into 
London], that had the Pope come in person he could scarcely have been welcomed with more magnificent pomp’. 
could scarcely have been shown’, see LPIIii, 4361 (3 August 1518); Ven.ii, 1062 (20 August 1518, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1355 (calendared August 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii (1854), 
b
Giustinian, on the other hand, commented on a mass and banquet on 8th at which ‘less respect for the holy chair 
pp.204-206 (LPIIii, 4366; Ven.ii, 1053; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 206-207 (LPIIii, 4371; 
Ven.ii, 1057; 11 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); C. Whibley, Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, 
as to be centralised in Wolsey’s hands was emphasised from the outset, as 
hat of his retinue and 
eace that he himself had brought about in 1518. One can also recognise the same emphasis of Wolsey’s 
aro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury); LPIIIi, 740 (11 April 1520), 906 (10 July 
Calais summit, nominally intended to settle differences between Charles and Francis, Wolsey was given 
o the Signory, Bruges). 
pp.166-167. That this legatine authority w
the English cardinal asserted his ‘seniority’ over his co-legate at every opportunity and largely excluded Campeggio 
from negotiations; see below pp.636-643. 
186 At the Field of Cloth of Gold, one can again observe Wolsey’s invocation of ‘papal’ authority in a number of 
ways. Overall, he appears to facilitate the actual meeting (which he took the lead in organising). Indeed, Francis 
appointed him his ‘procurator’ to arrange it; LPIIIi, 645 (2 March 1520), 677 (13 March 1520, Francis to [Wolsey], 
Angoulesme). Wolsey deliberately highlighted his pontifical status through his own attire, t
even by the way he acted as senior to the French legate present de Boissy and the other French cardinals (de 
Bourbon, d’Albret, de Lorraine). It also ought to be remembered that the meeting itself was a celebration of the 
universal p
legatine authority at the Canterbury meeting with Charles during May 1520; Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 53 
(27 May 1520, Francesco Corn
1520). 
187 For the 
broad negotiating powers by Henry to conclude one of six different alliances with the Empire; LPIIIii, 1443 (29 July 
1521). At the Bruges meeting with Charles V, Wolsey was given considerable respect by the emperor elect. They 
shared a canopy and kneeling desk at a service on 15 August. Furthermore, Charles negotiated directly with Wolsey, 
rather than delegating this to his subordinates; Ven.iii, 298 (16 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges), 302 
(19 August 1521, Contarini t
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one stage, he even pledged to act as security for Leo X’s adhesion when the Imperial delegates 
argued that they could not conclude without consulting Rome.188 While the English cardinal was 
awaiting commissions from Leo to this end, he was not really in a position to offer this assurance, 
however, not least because the papacy was a partisan power in negotiations. 
 
Finally, the crown was interested in the international esteem gained by the king’s 
attendance by a non-curial cardinal. In an age when display, ostentation and magnificence were 
gauges to reflect a prince’s power, honour and reputation, the presence of a cardinal within the 
kingdom provided the opportunity there to capitalise on his dignity in front of observers, albeit 
within the context of crown authority. With an increasing general tendency towards resident 
diplomacy, orators and other foreign representatives in England (including merchants) could 
thence be counted upon to broadcast this to their respective governments.  Indeed, one would 
expect that Henry VIII’s and Wolsey’s ideas on this were shaped, or at least encouraged, by 
observations from English diplomats about the non-curial cardinals that surrounded his fellow 
princes. An English embassy to Francis I in early February 1515, for instance, cited the presence 
of ‘a great number of cardinals, archbishops and bishops’.190 At this point, England had no 
189
cardinals, Bainbridge having died the previous summer, and given Henry VIII’s great rivalry with 
                                                 
188 LPIIIii, 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis), 1816 (calendared end November 
1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference). Also see Ven.iii, 321 (30 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, 
Calais). 
189 See above p.31 n.73. Also, there was doubtless an intention to present this dignity to a domestic audience, but 
examination of this is not relevant here. 
ck]); LPIIii, 3174 (26 April 1517, Somerset to [Henry]). 
190 The delegation, consisting Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield was sent, ostensibly, to retrieve Henry’s sister, 
Mary, who had been married to Louis XII in 1514 and to negotiate as much dower as possible; LPIIi, 105 (3 
February 1515, Suffolk, West and [Richard] Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Saunt Leez’). Similarly, Sir Robert Wingfield 
reported the presence of two cardinals at the Imperial court at Innsbruck in October 1515 and the earl of Worcester 
the same number at a St George’s Day service attended by the emperor in Antwerp during April 1517; LPIIi, 1006 (9 
October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], [Innsbru
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the French king, this could not have been an entirely comfortable situation. Wolsey’s candidacy 
had been proposed unsuccessfully during the previous year and by March-April, perhaps in light 
of hearing of the cardinals attendant on the young Francis, the English archbishop had accused 
Leo X of procrastination.191 Similarly, in 1520, during de Giglis’ failed campaign for promotion, 
e reasoned to Wolsey at one point that, as the pope intended to elevate the candidates of other 
states, 
Francesco Maria della Rovere against the pope, would subsequently use his advantage to force 
h
that it would be ‘disgraceful’ if England was not included. Receipt of this correspondence 
prompted Henry VIII to lobby the papacy again in favour of his orator and it may have been this 
particular argument that strengthened his resolve.192 The sense of one-upmanship was also 
emphasised at the Field of Cloth of Gold when Wolsey assumed a senior position as cardinal-
legate over the French members of the Sacred College present.193 
 
 Just as the English crown sought the elevation of its own candidates to the Sacred 
College, it also opposed the strengthening of the presence of its rivals in this body, particularly 
France, for much the same reasons. Firstly, it feared the increase of French voting power within 
conclave. In 1510, for instance, Fox and Ruthal alleged that Julius was fearful that, on account of 
the large number of French cardinals, a French pope would be elected when he died.194 Similarly, 
Pace relayed a worrying rumour in March 1517, that Francis I, intending to ensure the victory of 
the creation of a substantial number of French cardinals; enough for Pace to believe that he 
                                                 
191 See above pp.296-298. 
192 LPIIIi, 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome). 
193 See below pp.701-704. 
194 Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). 
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planned to raise a French pope.195 Secondly, it feared the ability of a stronger ‘French party’ to 
influence the papacy, contrary to English interests.196 This is confirmed in September 1521 when 
Clerk told Wolsey of two candidates interested in ‘buying’ cardinalates from Leo X, which the 
pope refused because they would be pro-French.197 Finally, Henry would have objected to the 
increase in international standing (particularly compared to himself) that the honour and dignity 
of a French cardinal could bring to his rival; such events would be perceived as detrimental to the 
recognition of England by the papacy, as perceived by the outside world. The admission to the 
Sacred College of Francis I’s tutor and advisor, Adrian Gouffier de Boissy on 14 December 1515, 
for instance, would have demonstrated in England the dominance of France over the papacy in 
the wake of the Battle of Marignano. Indeed, this clearly political creation, which involved no 
ther elevations, took place at a meeting between king and pope at Bologna, which was intended 
 symb
                                                
o
to olise this French victory.198 To counter any increase in France’s power within the College 
of Cardinals, the English crown therefore attempted to obstruct French intrigues on at least one 
identifiable occasion. On others, it seems to have been unhappy with French elevations, but heard 
about them too late to do anything about them. Finally, Henry VIII sought to deprive cardinals 
with French loyalties when the opportunity arose. 
The clearest indication of obstruction, on the part of the English crown, surfaces in a letter 
of April 1518, where Wolsey was to be told that ‘the Pope has adhered to his advice against 
creating a Cardinal at the instigation of France, as England would always interpose in behalf of 
 
195 Whether the secretary thought that Francis wanted to depose Leo or merely pack the Sacred College for the next 
conclave is unclear; LPIIii, 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance). 
196 It was only as recently as 1506 that Louis XII and Cardinal d’Amboise insisted that Julius II name three 
ollege (all relatives of d’Amboise), in return for French aid to recover Bologna and 
, 25, p.49.  
d at 30 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
Frenchmen to the Sacred C
Perugia; J.F. Broderick, ‘The Sacred College of Cardinals’, AHP
197 LPIIIii, 1618 (calendare
198 See below p.505. 
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the Holy See, which has the more enraged the French’.199 The candidate in question was 
probably a German, Albert of Brandenburg, archbishop and elector of Mainz. As the question of 
Imperial succession was already being considered,200 electors such as Brandenburg were to 
become increasingly significant in terms of their voting power. In May 1518, Spinelly informed 
Henry from Spain of intelligence from Rome (dated 12 April) that the archbishop was likely to 
become a cardinal, at Francis I’s instigation. It was believed that the French king planned these 
promotions so that Brandenburg could then become a legate a latere and sway other Imperial 
electors in his favour.201 Contemporaneously, Kite and Bourchier, also in Spain, confirmed the 
same ploy by Francis, as one way in which he ‘goeth about covertly and layeth many baits to 
attain to the empire’.202 The implication was that the promotion ought to be prevented, if Francis’ 
Imperial ambitions were to be prevented. Given the fundamental English objection to the French 
king’s candidacy, therefore, Wolsey’s obstruction to Francis’ attempt to buy votes was entirely 
understandable.203 Despite the original message from Rome that Wolsey’s objection had been 
sustained, English opposition had already failed, as Leo X had actually elevated him on 24 March 
1518.204 This may have remained a secret however until at least October.205 
 While it has been difficult to find other instances of English blocking tactics vis-à-vis 
other F
                                                
rench cardinalatial candidates, it ought to be remembered that there was often little notice 
 
200 See below pp.595, 704-705. 
4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Bourchier to [Henry]). 
203 See below pp.595, 704-705. For the English crown’s fundamental objection to Francis’ candidacy in 1519, see 
rasmus to Warham, Louvain). Indeed, 
ng that it was politic for some delay in this; 
 Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.19. 
199 Both author and addressee are unknown; LPIIii, 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to -). 
201 LPIIii, 4146 (4 May 1518, Spinelly to Henry). 
202 The two diplomats also outlined how the son of another elector was offered ‘much fat spiritual promotion’; ibid., 
pp.653-673. 
204 C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.19. 
205 A Venetian diplomat in Rome refers to him only as an archbishop towards the end of June and, even the usually 
well-informed Erasmus only mentions Brandenburg’s becoming a cardinal on 24 October; Ven.ii, 1350 (23 June 
1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome); LPIIii, 4523 (24 October 1518, E
Brandenburg only received his cardinalatial title in January 1521, implyi
C. Eubel, Hierarchica
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given of creations, making pre-emptive action difficult. Furthermore, the distance between 
England and Rome further contributed to this, making it more problematic for Henry VIII to 
make an effective or even any response. The first of these candidates, Adrian Gouffier de Boissy, 
the brother of the Admiral of France (de Bonnivet), was promoted at the Bologna conference 
between Francis I and Leo X, following the defeat of anti-French forces at Marignano in 
September 1515.206 It was to be the first indication that the papacy was under French political 
influence. While Henry VIII’s reaction to both the defeat and the meeting was anger and 
suspicion, there was little he could have done to prevent this elevation, as he had no advance 
warning of it.207 The pope, recognising that this concession would be unpopular in England, 
informed de Giglis that, while he had granted one red hat, he had turned down French requests 
for another three.208 This news was probably received as an indication of de facto French 
influence over the papacy as a defeated power. Furthermore, there were other issues arising from 
the Bologna summit, particularly the discussion of universal peace and crusade, which could 
potentially scupper England’s moves to forment opposition to France in Germany and the Swiss 
Cantons.209 The intended military response to Marignano would have taken priority over 
opposition to de Boissy’s promotion, given that the expulsion of the French from Italy would 
enable Leo X to resist such pressure in the future. It is noteworthy, however, that English pledges 
                                                 
206 LPIIi, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna); C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii 
p.139. 
monius, Bologna). Pastor differs slightly, writing of a rumour 
 Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.139. Significantly, the pope did not mention the creation in his own 
 instead on the need for (universal) peace and crusade that 
Aevi, iii, p.15; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
207 See below pp.499-509. 
208 LPIIi, 1281(14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Am
that Francis had sought three cardinals in total, the other two being the brothers of the dukes of Bourbon and 
Vendôme; L.
accounts of the conference to Henry and Wolsey, focusing
he and Francis had discussed. If this omission was deliberate, it is feasible that Leo’s informing the crown instead via 
its orator (in the perhaps exaggerated manner outlined above), may have been intended to soften a piece of news that 
was not likely to be received well in England; LPIIi, 1282 (14 December 1515, Leo to Henry, Bologna), 1283 (14 
December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Bologna), 1284. (14 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Bologna). 
209 See below pp.503-509. 
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of continued support up to the Bologna conference were not enough for Leo X to avoid making 
this cardinalatial concession. English concern at French pressure on the papacy to create cardinals 
was next displayed in May 1517 when Richard Pace, writing from Constance, warned Wolsey of 
an attempt by Francis to cause Leo to raise a number of cardinals, in his belief, to ensure that the 
next conclave would elect a Frenchman.210 Again, it was impossible for Henry and Wolsey to 
obstruct this, as two promotions had already occurred on 1 April.211 
 It also ought to be noted that there was no need for English avoidance tactics at times 
when the papacy was aligned against France and committed to the expulsion of French interests 
from Italy. Julius II, for instance, was never likely to create any French cardinals after his 
detachment from the League of Cambrai during 1510. This is evident from the composition of his 
sixth creation of March 1511, of which Bainbridge has been noted to have been raised on an anti-
Gallic ‘ticket’.212 Similarly, Clerk informed Wolsey in September 1521 that, while Leo X 
planned to create cardinals to raise money, he had turned down two offers because of their pro-
French tendencies.213 The papacy was at war with France at this point. 
 
There is, on the other hand, one instance of the English crown appearing to support a 
French nomination to the Sacred College, in spite of its underlying anti-Gallic agenda. Certainly, 
Leo X was approached to further Stephen Poncher’s candidacy around July 1520, as the 
e letters on the 13th and asked Henry and Wolsey archbishop of Sens acknowledged receipt of thes
                                                 
210 LPIIii, 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance). 
211 C. Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, pp.15-16. 
212 Ibid., pp.12-13.  
213 LPIIIii, 1618 (calendared at 30 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey]). 
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to write further letters to the cardinals, in particular Giulio de’ Medici.214 While this seems to 
contradict the English crown’s whole ‘defensive’ strategy vis-à-vis Rome, it was consistent with 
Henry VIII’s current foreign policy. Having struggled to gain definitive papal support for an 
aggressive course against France up to 1517, he turned towards reconciliation with Francis I, 
through which he aimed to restrain the latter from his Italian ambitions, albeit largely excluding 
Rome from this process.215 At the time of English ‘support’ for Poncher’s candidacy, this had 
cently
7 All was not as it seemed, 
erefore. That Henry and Wolsey never really intended to follow through with their pledge of 
backing
                                                
re  manifested itself in the Field of Cloth of Gold.216 Indeed, the date of Poncher’s 
acknowledgement suggests that a request for backing came at the meeting itself. It would have 
been completely in keeping with the ethos of the event, therefore, if Henry and Wolsey agreed to 
write to the pope in support of Poncher. It would also have been in keeping, if the letters were not 
intended as a genuine demonstration of backing, as the English made exaggerated public 
demonstrations of amity with France and hostility towards Charles’ intention to descend into 
Italy, while privately entertaining anti-French overtures from the emperor. This was all intended 
to demonstrate England’s good faith and distract Francis I from Italy.21
th
 Poncher is suggested by the fact that their missives were conveyed to the archbishop to 
forward to the pope and, also, by his request that they then write further letters to the cardinals. If 
 
ns
when de Giglis reported Leo X having been lobbied for both Poncher’s and d’Orleans’ elevation, alongside de la 
Mark’s exclusion, in August 1520. Interestingly, however, Campeggio’s account of the same French diplomat’s 
audience with the pope only mentions d’Orleans’ nomination; ibid., 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey), 958 
(22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). It was not unusual for princes to ask fellow princes to support 
their nominations for the Sacred College. In 1517, for instance, Charles may have contacted de Giglis with a view to 
17, de Giglis to Vannes). 
-694. 
214 LPIIIi, 912 (13 July 1520, [Poncher] to Wolsey, St Germain). It is unclear from what date Poncher’s candidacy 
was forwarded by the French crown, but the only other mention of it (in the co ulted sources) seems to have been 
having Chièvres elevated; LPIIii, 3682 (14 September 15
215 See pp.125-126, 596 ff. 
216 See below pp.687
217 Ibid. 
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they had wanted to indicate their full backing for Poncher, they would have surely sent their 
letters directly to Rome and would have also applied pressure to the Sacred College in the first 
instance. Furthermore, there is no indication that English representatives in Rome were instructed 
to lobby to this end, despite de Morette’s attempts both to secure the promotion and to work with 
de Giglis. While de Morette may have been instructed to present Poncher’s letters in conjunction 
with his English counterpart, de Giglis was reluctant to act with de Morette until he received 
instructions to do so.218 Indeed, de Giglis implied his opposition to this whole episode on 8 
August, when he reported that, as Leo ‘has no hope of protection from England, he will be 
obliged to comply with these and other unlawful requests’.219 In other words, despite publicly 
cordial Anglo-French relations, de Giglis still envisaged the promotion of French cardinals as 
detrimental to the English interest. 
 
 Finally, the English crown could pressure the papacy to limit French influence in the 
Sacred College by pushing for the suspension or even deprivation of existing cardinals. This was 
a tricky area and there was only limited opportunity for princes to take advantage of such 
possibilities.220 The only apparent occasion when Henry VIII became involved in such 
                                                 
218 As a result of the Field of Cloth of Gold, Francis approached Henry with a view to working bilaterally in Rome. 
De Morette approached de Giglis soon after in this regard and also seems to have been commissioned to secure a red 
hat for two French nominees; see below pp.713-714. 
e its own cardinals. A warning of 
ember 1515, when the Imperial cardinal, Matthew Lang, alleged that Francis I had sought 
 of the role he had played in the war against France, at the recent meeting with Leo X at 
m the English point of view, if the French had moved against Lang, then why not Wolsey? ibid., 1347 
219 LPIIIi, 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey). 
220 There seems to have been a general reluctance by the papacy to deprive cardinals. In terms of the ‘schismatic’ 
cardinals linked to the Council of Pisa-Milan, for instance, while they initially convoked their meeting on 28 May 
1511, the initial suspension of revenue for only three of the nine initially listed, did not take place until August, while 
they were not deprived and excommunicated until 24 October. It took the pope five months to react to this open 
defiance of his authority. Similarly, English pressure to deprive Hadrian de Castello following his implication in the 
Petrucci Plot in 1517 faced papal reticence and took some time to bear fruit, despite the conspiracy aiming to take the 
pope’s life. Equally, the English crown probably feared attempts by rivals to depriv
this possibility came in Dec
his deprivation, on account
Bologna. Fro
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negotiations concerned cardinals Carvajal and Sanseverino who had sided with France for the 
Council of Pisa-Milan.221 In his bull Sacrosanctae Romanae Ecclesiae (issued 25 July 1511), 
convoking the Lateran Council, Julius II described the dissidents as ‘sons of darkness’, making 
sanctions against them inevitable.222 English support probably played its part in enabling the 
pope to facilitate their deprivation, as he only pushed it through Consistory once the Holy League 
had been concluded (4 October) and the backing of his anti-French allies could be assured.223 
Admittedly, Bainbridge did not receive the power to adhere on Henry VIII’s behalf until 
December, but he had been pivotal in the treaty’s negotiations and English commitment was 
deemed inevitable.224 He is also known to have gained the confidence of the pontiff, particularly 
in terms of his anti-French disposition, and presumably the orator would not have failed to 
encourage Julius to deprive the breakaway cardinals, not least because this would have suited his 
                                                                                                                                                              
7 Dec
(1974), pp.107-110. 
and the Schism inals’, in D. Baker (ed.), Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest, p.181. 
bull was dated 18 July, but only published on the 25 according to Pastor and Ullmann. The Venetian ambassador in 
Rome at this time, on the other hand, indicates that it was published sometime between 1-5 August; L. Pastor, 
History of the Popes, vi, pp.352, 364; W. Ullmann, ‘Julius II and the Schismatic Cardinals’, in D. Baker (ed.), 
s (or three of them at least) were merely suspended, as was 
; LPIi, 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to 
(2 ember 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravespurgh’); W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors 
221 While not all of these cardinals were French-born (only two out of the five actual dissidents, Briconnet and de 
Prie, the others being Carvajal, Consenza and Francesco Borgia), their council was to be supported by the French 
crown. By virtue of their embodiment of French opposition to Julius II, one can thereby deem the dissidents ‘French’ 
and, in this way, understand English hostility towards them; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.281-283; W. Ullmann, ‘Julius II 
atic Card
222 In response to the cardinals’ citation to appear at the Council of Pisa (that the pope was aware of on 28 May), this 
th 
Schism, Heresy and Religious Protest, p.187; LPIi, 816 (18 July 1511), 829 (Ven.ii, 109; 31 July 1511, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
223 Initially, the revenues of the schismatic cardinal
reported by a Venetian source in Rome during August
the Signory). Briçonnet, Borgia and de Prie were excommunicated and deposed in Consistory on 24 October 1511, 
while Sanseverino and d’Albret were threatened with the same, if they continued to adhere to the Council of Pisa-
Milan. The English crown (as far as the Latin secretary Ammonius indicates and de Grassis confirms), on the other 
hand, was under the impression on 28 November, however, that four of the five had been deprived and four are 
mentioned as being deprived in a bull of excommunication against adherents of France, dated July 1512. The amount 
of time between the initial citation by the dissident cardinals, publicised in Rimini on 28 May and the eventual 
deprivations suggests deliberate delay by Julius, so that he could enact them with the public support of his allies 
against France; ibid., 964 (LPI, 2002; 28 November 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London); D.S. Chambers, 
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.45 n.2; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.352, 374. 
224 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.373-374. 
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crown’s interests at this point.225 Back in England, however, one can note that Henry did not 
condemn the dissident cardinals when they approached him via a servant. This seems to have 
been a ploy to gain information, as the cardinals later complained that someone at the English end 
had forwarded their correspondence to the pope.226 
 While Julius II was alive and committed to the anti-French project, Bainbridge and the 
English crown need not fear the absolution of the schismatic cardinals. However, Leo X’s 
election changed matters as, while he was eager for peace and sought to end the schism by 
bringing the dissident cardinals back into the fold, England was committed to invade France and 
acting against the schismatics was a significant casus belli. Fear of losing this major element of 
justification caused Henry VIII to write to Rome, as soon as news of Leo’s election reached 
England. He expressly instructed Bainbridge to oppose any restoration in April 1513; ‘though it 
may appear merciful, yet as, after the death of the present Pope, one of the schismatic cards may 
ardinals 
obtain the Papacy, who would favour the French in all things to the prejudice of all orthodox 
supporters of the Church, the King thinks it necessary that his Holiness should weigh this matter 
well, and do nothing without communication with the confederate princes’. Henry invoked the 
article of the Holy League, whereby no party would make peace with their enemies without 
consulting his allies and included the cardinals among their enemies.227 Bainbridge’s objections 
at the seventh session of the Lateran Council (17 June), at which the submissions of C
Carvajal and Sanseverino were discussed, had little effect, despite support from Cardinal Lang, as 
                                                 
225 LPIi, 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
226 Ibid., 625 (LPI, 1353; 25 November 1510, the cardinals at Pavia to Henry), 732 (LPI, 1581; 2 April 1511, the 
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well from the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors.228 Bainbridge tried a last-ditch attempt to block 
this process on the 24th; having heard that Leo had sent for Carvajal and Sanseverino, he went to 
the pope, accompanied by his Spanish and Imperial counterparts and, according to Henry’s 
instructions, begged the pontiff not to do this ‘withoutt the consentt of all princes crystinyde 
                                                
frendes unto the churche’. Leo claimed that the matter was too far advanced, although he would 
not do anything about the French interdict without consulting his allies. Bainbridge notified 
Henry VIII of his failure in this affair the following day, although he argued that he had done his 
best and suggested that letters of thanks be sent to four cardinals in particular for their 
cooperation.229 The absolution and restoration took place on the 27th, although Bainbridge and 
Lang are alleged to have criticised the pope and did not turn up to the ceremony, arguing that it 
set a precedent for such behaviour (by the schismatics) and they left Rome as a result.230 This 
episode may not have been completely without consolation for England. Leo X was not prepared 
to withdraw support completely for Henry VIII’s invasion of France, so he confirmed the existing 
ecclesiastical censures against the enemies of the Church (France, as far as England was 
concerned) and threatened worse spiritual sanctions. It is a timely coincidence, therefore, that on 
 
P
230 LPI, 4371 (27 July 1513, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid); LPIii, 2032 (LPI, 4287; 27 June 1513, 
enclosing a copy of their absolution and restitution; LPIi, 2030 (LPI, 4288; 27 June 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
Significantly, it does not seem as if the restoration of these two was entirely complete. In December 1515, Matthew 
Lang informed the English diplomat Sir Robert Wingfield that Francis I had pressured Leo X, at their meeting at 
as deprived. This was of concern to the 
d and that, in any case, Ferdinand would not allow his restoration to the diocese in 
8 (8 April 1516, bishop of Siguenza to Henry, ‘Majoreti’). 
228 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.54-55. It was understood by Peter Martyr, in Spain on 19 May, that the two 
cardinals had surrendered to Leo X at Florence and were seeking their restoration; L Iii, 1902 (LPI, 4096; 19 May 
1513, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid). 
229 Cardinals Riario, Vigerio, del Monte and Lang; LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). 
de Castello to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.47 and n.1; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
pp.56-69. On the same day as the ceremony, Leo sent a brief to Henry notifying him of what had happened and 
Bologna, to restore Cardinal Carvajal to all dignities that he held before he w
‘bishop of Siguenza’ who benefited from Carvajal’s deprivation; while he understood that his see was safe when 
Carvajal was initially absolve
question. As Ferdinand was now dead and the bishop questioned Charles of Castile’s experience, he approached 
Henry to write letters to Charles and his chief minister in this regard; LPIIi, 1347 (27 December 1515, Cardinal 
Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravespurgh’), 174
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and by the beginning of 1514 were engaged in negotiations to this end.235 If the pope was so 
28 June, the pope wrote to James IV, declaring his annoyance at hearing of Scottish war 
preparations against England, impeding papal efforts towards universal peace and crusade, for 
which Henry was said to be enthusiastic. Finally, Leo told James that he was in no position to 
refuse the imposition of ecclesiastical censures against him and Scotland, if the English king 
asked (which he had).231 The coincidence in timing of this concession may therefore have been 
intended to placate Henry VIII’s expected discontent concerning the restored cardinals.  
 The absolution and restoration of the two French cardinals associated with Pisa-Milan, 
Briçonnet and de Prie, was delayed until April 1514.232 This seems to have been because Louis 
XII did not sign a declaration to renounce the Council of Pisa-Milan and adhere to Lateran V 
until 26 October 1513, and this was not ratified by the latter until its eighth session of 19 
December.233 While Spinelly notified Henry of Imperial intelligence that Louis XII had offered 
to abandon the schismatic council as early as 29 June 1513, there is no indication that the other 
English representatives in Rome either anticipated or attempted to block this second 
reconciliation.234 Perhaps they did not expect success. Even if Henry and his ministers had been 
forewarned of this, they were under increasing pressure from Rome to make peace with France 
intent on peace, the English had little hope of preventing the absolutions, particularly given that 
the schismatic council had been renounced. 
                                                 
231 LPIii, 2036 (28 June 1513, Leo to James IV, Rome). 
232 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.73 n. 
233 The declaration was drawn up in Rome on 6 October by French diplomats in consultation with the papacy; ibid., 
pp.66-68, 71-72. 
234 LPIi, 2038 (LPI, 4296; 29 June 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]). 





By the end of 1521, Henry VIII had finally achieved his aim to be recognised for the 
political role that he had been performing vis-à-vis the papacy since his accession: as its 
defender against France.1 While the honorary title bestowed on him, fidei defensor, has been 
traditionally attributed as a reward for the anti-Lutheran book alleged to have been penned by 
the king, it has been demonstrated that this was more the culmination of a longer-term 
strategy by the English crown (certainly going back as far as 1515, if not earlier) to
fo recognition of its temporal policy towards Rome, specifically its attempts to protect 
the papacy and Papal States from the perceived threat of French hegemony in northern Italy.2 
The presentation of the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum to Leo X itself indicated this 
motivation, having been carefully orchestrated to coincide with the announcement of the 
Treaty of Bruges (1521), an Anglo-Imperial alliance committing both parties to war against 
France that directly addressed this issue (among others). Wolsey’s instructions to present the 
book were issued on the same day as the conclusion of this compact.3 This political 
underpinning of the award of ‘fidei defensor’ was stacked with problems for the future, 
however. Henry’s vociferous assertions of papal primacy as a ‘dutiful son’ of the Church 
would come back to haunt him in later years, when he sought to assert his own independence 
from papal authority and, vis-à-vis the Assertio at least, Henry would subsequently claim that 
                                                 
1 While Leo’s death prompted a delay of the bulls from being published and it took until 1524 for this to occur, 
at the end of this period, Henry and Wolsey understood that, to all intents and purposes, the title had been 
awarded and still hoped to gain possesion of the relevant documents. 
2 That is not to say that the 1521 move for a title was not linked to Henry’s anti-Lutheran actions, rather that this 
was part of Wolsey’s attempt to portray his king as a multi-faceted protector of Rome, given that attempts to 
gain such recognition by virtue of Henry’s temporal actions in defence of the papacy had been hitherto 
rival in April 1521 of a bull ordering the burning of Lutheran 
l actions alone. In addition during the ceremonies surrounding the bestowal of the Assertio to 
 defence of the Church by ‘sword’ as well as the 
, which is subsequently recognised in the bull conveying the honorary title to Henry. 
unsuccessful. 
3 It has been argued that Wolsey identified the ar
texts as the opportunity to apply pressure for a title, given the crown’s prior failure to secure such an award in 
return for politica
the pope, there is reference on both sides to Henry’s previous
current format (by ‘pen’)
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he had been coerced into writing it at the instance of the fallen Wolsey and others of his 
episcopate.4 
As a fundamental guiding principal underlying the English crown’s political 
relationship with Rome during this time, defending the papacy from France was found to be a 
clear priority that was based on a broader and longstanding enmity with France that 
permeated English foreign policy throughout the period 1509-1522. Based on a full-scale 
reconstruction of the diplomatic narrative, albeit with a concentration on an Anglo-papal axis, 
this assessment has implications when considering its place alongside previous studies of 
Henrician foreign policy and could perhaps form the basis of a future reconsideration of this 
area, with a primary focus on how this preoccupation with its traditional enmity with France 
shaped other or even all external relations.5 Certainly, through an Anglo-papal lens, it was 
                                                 
4 Certainly, given debate over Henry’s authorship and actual contribution to the book, Henry’s later claims are 
quite convincing, although it is unlikely that he was an unwilling participant, unable to grasp the implications of 
his actions and not in a position to say ‘no’ at any point. It has been argued here that Henry entered this process 
with his eyes open; this was a means to a clear end – an honorary title; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.111-113; 
5 In particular, research into Anglo-papal political relations could be fruitful vis-à-vis England’s other 
‘traditional’ enemy and ally of France, Scotland. During this study, Henry VIII’s concern with his northern 
neighbour has occasionally been highlighted in his contacts with Rome, for instance in his attempts to have 
ecclesiastical censures imposed on James IV and Scotland, circa 1512-1513. Unlike the mutual concern with 
differently concerning Scotland. Given that Scotland was even more peripheral than England in geographical 
the running when seeking papal concessions against the Scots and that the papacy would be broadly reluctant to 
grant these. More generally speaking, this research sits slightly apart from previous studies on Henry VIII’s early 
foreign policy, albeit without fully contradicting them. It does not agree with Pollard’s overarching assertion, for 
instance, that Wolsey had England’s foreign policy mirror that of the papacy in his pursuit for the papal tiara, yet 
also see pp.108-109, esp. n.109. 
France that England and the papacy shared, however, it would be expected that the dynamic would be weighted 
terms and it bore no direct political interest for Rome, one would probably find that the English crown did all of 
it does ascribe importance to papal considerations in shaping English foreign policy during this period. Similarly, 
this work does not directly disagree with Scarisrick’s belief that Wolsey fostered a peace policy, not least 
implication, Henry VIII was only at peace 
nd Wolsey went to great efforts to appear ‘neutral’ during these later years, they never fully sat on 
of 
because Wolsey’s rise coincided with the beginning of a recognition in England that the belligerent policy 
against France was not working (due to a lack of allies and so on), but goes further by positing that an anti-Gallic 
sentiment also permeated England’s peaces with France and that, by 
because it was not in his interest to be in conflict with France at that point. Vis-à-vis the more traditional ‘balance 
of power’ paradigm, this work also recognises some validity, particularly from the election of Charles V as 
emperor onwards, but again places a stronger stress on an underlying anti-French motivation in shaping this. 
While Henry a
the fence; their modus operandi was always to oppose the political ascendancy of France, despite being forced to 
veil this approach through peaceful methods up to 1521. Gwyn, in particular, agrees with this idea. Furthermore, 
the ‘balance of power’ argument has never traditionally been applied to the early years of Henrician foreign 
policy and there has been no reason to dispute that here. Up to 1519, there were three ‘superpowers’ (France, the 
Holy Roman Empire and Spain), one too many for Henry VIII act as a ‘balance’ towards, but Charles 
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found that this fear of augmenting French power on the Continent (and particularly in Italy) 
extended to a concern for how this would affect the papacy as a political entity and, 
conseq
crown sources, from April 1512 when Lancaster Herald declared war on Louis XII, 
uently, as a source of spiritual authority.6 This was reinforced when subsequently 
considering how this affected the Anglo-papal relationship with regard to papal awards and 
censures, as well as England’s attempts to influence conclaves and membership of the Sacred 
College. As a motivation for shaping Anglo-papal political relations, this priority manifested 
itself as much in ‘offensive’ confederacies intended to physically defend the papacy and its 
territories from France as it did in peace agreements with the French. In the latter, the papacy 
(and its associated interests) tended to be named specifically, with the consequential hope that 
France would not threaten papal ‘independence’ by descending into Italy or moving against 
the Papal States, for instance. This credo was also found to have been expressed directly by 
pronouncing Henry duty ‘bound to defend the Church’, through to the end of the period when, 
while angling for an honorary title, this protection of Rome ‘by the sword’ was repeatedly 
alluded to. 
 
While Henry envisaged it his duty as king to defend the Church generally, his focus 
against France (as opposed to, say, Spain or the Holy Roman Empire, who also held Italian 
interests) was rooted in a general antipathy towards ‘outsiders’ that was held by most 
contemporaries and could be seen, for instance, in widespread negative ‘national’ stereotypes. 
In England, the most extreme manifestation of this antipathy was a xenophobia reserved for a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Castile’s election as emperor, thereby effecting the ‘merger’ of the Empire and Spain, combined with the 
emergence of the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry, fostered a situation in which England could play such a pivotal role; 
P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: the Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered’, HJ, 23 (1980), 
pp.755-772; A.F. Pollard, Wolsey; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII. 
6 By implication, the Papal States were not deemed powerful enough to defend themselves against French 
incursions. 
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group widely considered to be the ‘natural enemy’, the French. While this sentiment 
permeated crown circles (including the king himself) as well as the population at large, it is 
clear that Henry VIII and his ministers were able to rein back at politically expedient times, 
for example at the Field of Cloth of Gold (1520), arguably demonstrating that such a stance 
was a deliberate or cynical policy. Nevertheless, even at such times when England was 
nominally at peace with France, an undercurrent of anti-Gallic fervour has still been detected 
and continued to motivate the king in his foreign policy and in his political relationship with 
Rome. 
This overarching anti-French sentiment was shaped partly, it has been argued, by a 
combination of historical and geographical factors, particularly as the Hundred Years War 
remained unresolved as far as the English crown was concerned, not least in terms of its claim 
to the French throne (which crops up again and again when Henry sought conflict with 
France) and the fact that English continental possessions had long been reduced to the Calais 
region. If one also takes into account the chivalric commitment of Henry VIII and the young 
lay nobles around him, a clear context emerges whereby one can understand Henry’s desire to 
imitate the victories of his recent predecessors (particularly Henry V) in this manner.7 
Conseq
English crown endeavoured, therefore, to avoid this worst-case scenario by acting to protect 
uently, it becomes increasingly understandable why, in Anglo-papal political relations, 
Henry VIII would focus on protecting the papacy from France, particularly when his chief 
enemy had actively pursued its claims in Italy since 1494. This raised the fear that the papacy 
was on the brink of another ‘Babylonish captivity’, as was perceived to have occurred during 
the late fourteenth- and early fifteenth-centuries, while the papacy was exiled in Avignon. The 
the papacy from French political hegemony in northern Italy and, as it understood, the 
                                                 
7 While these factors were treated in this study as a means to prove Henry VIII’s driving xenophobia against 
ntinue the Hundred Years War, see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, esp. pp.21-40. 
France, there is certainly room for further investigation of each. For Scarisbrick’s argument that Henry VIII 
sought to co
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inevitable shadow that it would cast on the papacy’s temporal and wider independence. This 
situation was perceived as detrimental to the English political interest for a number of reasons, 
not least that the Church would subsequently be supportive of French foreign policy and be 
unable to commit to any anti-Gallic agenda.8 As the pope could (and post-1515 did) sanction 
French foreign policy by proclaiming it to be contributing towards the desire for a crusade to 
the East (usually in some preparatory fashion relating to ‘universal peace’), Henry VIII thus 
found it difficult to oppose France, particularly when his justification was in defence of a 
papacy that, publicly at least, did not need defending. The prospect of Louis XII or Francis I 
becoming what was often styled ‘monarch of the world’ in this way (and to be portrayed as 
the ‘Christian Turk’) led Henry to oppose French ambitions in Italy with all means at his 
disposal, albeit with his eye (and those of his advisors) remaining firmly on the English 
interest. 
Clearly, this desire to defend the papacy from France could not have been advanced if 
it was not condoned by Rome. Indeed, the papacy acutely felt the effects of French power in 
northern Italy and, for most of the period, sought to avoid becoming partisan as a result, often 
seeking to solve this predicament by fostering the expulsion of French influence from the 
peninsula.9 As this interest was common to both England and Rome, contemporary popes 
repeatedly appealed to Henry VIII to act in a ‘protective’ capacity and encouraged him to 
think of himself as performing such a role against France. The earliest instance of this was 
                                                 
French dominance in Italy meant that it was unable to do so publicly until mid-1521. 
9
times during this period, it did not relish the prospect of being subject to Imperial or Spanish influence either. 
This was perhaps best demonstrated during the Imperial election process of 1519, when Leo X initially sided 
8 While the post-Marignano papacy did still seek to oppose Francis I from late 1515 onwards, the degree of 
 It should be noted that the papacy was not just concerned with the prospect of French power in Italy; at various 
with Francis I over Charles of Castile as the lesser potential evil; he believed that Charles, if elected, posed the 
greater political threat to him in Italy. Later, Leo told Henry VIII that he only backed Francis’ candidacy because 
he anticipated the impossibility of the Frenchman’s election and hoped that they could combine to back a minor 
third-party candidate; see pp.653-673. 
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1510, when Julius II sought protection from the ‘extreme will of the French’.10 Equally, 
England’s other allies against France also played on Henry’s self-perception as fidei defensor 
when appealing for his backing against the Most Christian Kings. If they did not believe it 
would be successful, surely none of these parties would have played on this factor when 
pressing England to turn against the French. 
From his accession, Henry believed that he could best ‘defend’ the papacy from 
France in a military sense, ideally a full-scale invasion led in person, but this soon broadened 
to encompass smaller expeditions that included the support of pre-existing border conflicts 
(such as that in which Burgundy was involved against the French-backed duke of Guelders) 
and raids (particularly on France’s northern coast), as well as fostering a latent threat by 
sabre-rattling. From late 1515 on, this policy widened again, as the English crown also began 
to explore the possibility of funding third parties (particularly the Swiss) to act against the 
French
In seeking to identify and explore the strategies by which the English crown sought to 
defend Rome from France, it became clear that these were subject to a number of clear 
t also caused them to 
 in Italy. Vis-à-vis the papacy, Henry VIII’s overarching aim in these actions was to 
safeguard papal ‘independence’ by the intended expulsion of French power from Italy. 
Through diversionary military actions in the north (both actual and threatened), he believed 
that he could (and did) contribute to this by causing his French rival to withdraw troops from 
or to fail to send reinforcements to the peninsula, in order to face the English threat, thus 
increasing the chances of anti-French forces in Italy (including the papacy) to achieve their 
ultimate aim. 
limitations that not only shaped their initially belligerent format, bu
diversify to incorporate the more peaceful methods apparent from 1515 on. These constraints 
                                                 
10 Ven.ii, 71 (LPIi, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
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were based largely on the distance from Italy and its perception of English military strength 
(or lack thereof) relative to that of its neighbouring ‘superpower’. Consequently, the English 
would not intervene directly in Italy (except through a third party), would not act unilaterally 
and would always require time to prepare for any military action. During the protracted 
process 1510-1512, for instance, when Henry VIII eventually adhered to his first coalition 
against
 of commitment from potential allies (including Rome) in response to 
subsequ
 France, he was restrained by his ministers from committing himself against Louis XII 
until all of these conditions were met.11 
While a belligerent approach to protecting the papacy from France persisted as Henry 
VIII’s preferred strategy throughout the period under study, the aforementioned constraints, 
combined with a decisive shift in the degree of French power in Italy, would force him to 
diversify his approach to include alternative means that could at least limit French power in 
Italy and influence over Rome.12 The seeds of this policy change can be traced back to the 
watershed Battle of Marignano of 13-14 September 1515. This decisive defeat of anti-Gallic 
forces in Italy marked the beginning of a period of French dominance in the north of the 
peninsula and initially prompted a more concerted attempt by Henry to act there directly (via 
employed third parties). However, Henry VIII’s inability to act from afar and to intervene 
without allies soon made itself clear. The defeat of an English-funded, Imperial-Swiss 
expeditionary force, sent to expel the French from Milan in 1516, combined with the 
sustained lack
ent English attempts to revive the offensive and organise coalitions ‘in defence of the 
                                                 
11 In this instance, the conditions placed on Henry VIII (also including the need to produce an heir before he led 
pp.379-380 and passim. 
12
exercised to amass a committed coalition, saw Henry receive only very limited support from the emperor and 
nominal backing from the new pope, Leo X; the anti-Gallic impetus in Italy (and Spain) had evaporated, 
an invasion in person, although this was later relaxed) was found to be the result of ministerial pressure; see 
 A forewarning of this prospect occurred during the 1513 invasion of France which, despite the caution 
following the expulsion of French forces from the peninsula that resulted from the Battle of Ravenna (1512). 
Sustained papal pressure towards peace from late 1513 left England with little choice but to negotiate with Louis 
XII; England could not continue the struggle alone, particularly when the pope that he sought to defend had 
removed the casus belli. 
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Church’, caused the English crown to rethink its strategy by 1517. Consequently, Henry and 
Wolsey envisaged that they would ‘defend’ Rome by more peaceful means; by seeking 
reconciliation with France, with a view to keeping Francis I from crossing the Alps and, 
therefore, away from the papacy.13 This was also pursued largely to the exclusion of the 
papacy. Through a veneer of friendship, the English crown kept the French king’s focus away 
from Italy for most of this time, particularly through the Treaty of London, the great set-piece 
of meetings of 1520, especially that with Francis, and the Calais Conference of 1521. Beneath 
these, h
                                                
owever, the anti-French agenda was never far away and, even during the Field of 
Cloth of Gold, Henry and Wolsey entertained hostile overtures from Charles V concerning 
France. The reconciliation strategy was to fail because of the Hapsburg-Valois rivalry that 
resulted from Charles’ becoming emperor in 1519, which left Christendom dominated by two 
‘superpowers’ with conflicting Italian interests: Charles wanted to be crowned in Rome and 
Francis coveted Naples. It was almost inevitable that political focus would return to Italy and 
demand that Henry VIII play his part (against France) to protect a vulnerable papacy. Thus, 
this period ends with Henry’s commitment to the Treaty of Bruges, along with Charles V and 
Leo X, with a view to another full-scale invasion of France in 1523 but this time as ‘fidei 
defensor’. Incidentally, Henry and Wolsey’s ability to restrain any anti-French sentiments 
when required and adapt their policy to defend the papacy from France as circumstances 
 
this year and is widely deemed to have taken a principal role in foreign policy (alongside Henry) from around the 
nch attack on Navarre. Compared to 1517 on, however, these early instances 
13 It is tempting to link Wolsey’s increasing influence with this diversification in English policy from 1515 on, 
particularly given that he was the main conduit for Anglo-papal correspondence (other than the king) by June of 
same time. In terms of the ‘peace’ methods employed towards France, it has been found that these were not 
entirely new, such as the Anglo-French peace of March 1510, along with proposals during 1515 for a meeting 
with Francis I and a joint Anglo-Fre
were both inconsistent and unsuccessful (in terms of restraining the French from Italy). It could be suggested, 
therefore, that Wolsey helped to develop a more concerted peace strategy with France, in order to prevent any 
further increase of French power in Italy (and over the papacy). Indeed, the lead taken by Wolsey in negotiating 
the Treaty of Londona, along with the role he played in arranging and attending the subsequent meetings and 
conferences certainly offer a convincing line of argument to follow, although further investigation would be 
required to verify this. 
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dictacted, could perhaps indicate a degree of cynicism in their approach, rather than an 
ideological rigidity that may have seen them constantly seek all-out war against France. It 
would have been unlikely, however, that neither possessed sufficient political pragmatism to 
realise when it was or was not in their interest to pursue the anti-Gallic cause. 
While it would be expected that the English desire to defend the papacy from France 
would continue in the same vein for several years after this period and within the limitations 
outlined, beginning with Surrey’s raids in northern France during 1522, an interesting test 
would be expected to arise from 1525-1527 onwards, as the Battle of Pavia and the Sack of 
Rome (along with the ‘capture’ of Clement VII) gave rise to Imperial hegemony in Italy, 
which may have challenged the English perception of France as the greatest threat to Rome’s 
political independence. While prior to 1522, the old anti-French xenophobia, including that 
vis-à-vis Rome, had been an uncomplicated affair, the rise of Charles V as a ‘superpower’ to 
rival Francis I would certainly test the extent to which Henry’s desire to defend the faith from 
France was genuine. This would certainly require further reconstruction of the narrative 
beyond the limits of this study. At a cursory glance, Scarisbrick portrays Henry to be opposed 
to this new Imperial predominance, particularly following Charles V’s occupation of Rome 
(the pope effectively a prisoner in Castel S. Angelo), albeit he was reluctant to act against the 
emperor in accordance with his alliance with Francis I. Indeed, the continued preoccupation 
with the French ‘threat’ seems to have led to an unrealistic plan whereby Wolsey would 
                 
oversee a caretaker papal government at Avignon until this situation was resolved.14 Another 
factor that would be expected to affect English policy in seeking to defend Rome from France 
would be the rise of Henry VIII’s marital dispute from the later 1520s and his subsequent 
                                
 J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.134-147. 14
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attempts to assert himself as a ‘Catholic’ king outside of papal control.15 Again, this would be 
expected to influence the relatively uncomplicated anti-French xenophobia that had hitherto 
underlain English foreign policy towards the Holy See and could make a valid contribution to 
Reformation scholarship. 
 
Having identified and explored the framework for Henry VIII’s attempts to protect the 
papacy’s political ‘independence’ from France during this period, the nature of this 
motivation was further tested by focusing on several aspects of the Anglo-papal relationship 
in which this was found to be highlighted. Vis-à-vis honourary papal awards, in demonstrating 
that the title fidei defensor was as much the result of the English king’s fulfilling this role 
against France as it was for engaging in theological argument with Luther, it was found that 
the English crown had been lobbying directly for such formal recognition since early 1515 
and that this move was the cumulative result of earlier exchanges between England and Rome 
concerning other papal awards, all of which have been linked to recognition of this defensive 
role. This began with the Golden Rose of 1510, continued with papal lure of a brief 
translating Louis XII’s territories and titles to Henry in 1512, for which the English strove 
unsuccessfully to induce publication, and also included the blessed sword and hat of 1513-
1514, which may have been intended as a sop instead of the French titles.16 Furthermore, it 
was demonstrated that the papacy was as complicit in touting such honorary awards in return 
for English political backing concerning France as Henry VIII was in seeking them. 
                                                 
15 See, for instance, P. Marshall, ‘Is the Pope Catholic? Henry VIII and the Semantics of Schism’, in E. Shagan 
(ed), Catholics and the ‘Protestant Nation’: Religious Politics and Identity in Early Modern England (2005), 
pp.22-48. 
16 While Burns and Mitchell have connected individual awards with English foreign policy vis-à-vis France, this 
study has gone a step further to suggest that they all link together to form a timeline that resulted in Henry VIII 
seeking and gaining that of fidei defensor; C.H. Burns, ‘Papal Gifts and Honours for the Earlier Tudors’, MHP, 
 from Rome for Henry VIII’ JWC, 34, pp.178-203. 50, pp.173-197; M. Mitchell, ‘Works of Art
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In terms of papal censures, the English crown fully recognised their politicisation by 
Rome and expected to benefit from their threat and imposition when supporting the papacy 
against France. Equally, the papacy (and other anti-French confederates) recognised the utility 
of spiritual weapons as an inducement to encourage English commitment against France. By 
irtue of the pope being an ally, such spiritual weapons could add justification to a war, be 
employ
e adapted 
to Francis I’s interests (enabling him to pursue ambitions in Italy or against England), 
inducing Leo to employ spiritual weapons in support of these. In terms of the nature of Henry 
v
ed as propaganda among one’s own population, encourage allies to observe the treaties 
that they had joined, hopefully reduce the military threat posed by the enemy (if opponents 
chose to avoid, say, the risk of excommunition by association) and help facilitate economic 
sanctions. In this sphere there was, however, something of a contradictory stance adopted on 
both the English and papal sides. While Henry VIII was an enthusiastic proponent of papal 
censures against France (and its allies), he did not fully impose the economic sanctions that 
these permitted when they affected English interests, particularly concerning certain favoured 
‘French’ merchants or products. With regards to the risk of papal censure to himself, Henry 
both deemed himself immune to all potential spiritual weapons (according to common law) 
and ignored papal censures imposed on others when it suited his interests, as he did with the 
Venetian interdict of 1509-1510 (the republic being a powerful potential ally against the 
French in Italy). Nevertheless, the English king remained wary of the prospect of a ‘French’ 
papacy employing censures against him and consequently sought to avoid political situations 
where this prospect could arise. In particular, Henry resisted Leo X’s universal peace 
overtures from 1517 on, whereby it was envisaged that a crusading initiative could b
VIII’s defending the papacy from France, one can certainly detect a degree of cynicism in his 
attitude towards such censures; on the one hand, he was eager for their imposition against 
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France when acting as a ‘loyal’ son of the Church but, on the other, would be selective in their 
implementation and, in any case, deemed himself impervious to their effects and did not 
observe them when they were wielded against friendly states. Henry could easily justify 
ignoring the latter by considering the pope to have been subject to French coercion when the 
censures were imposed, but it should be noted that the English crown did not publicly or 
vocally oppose them. Henry VIII’s contradictory stance may well have been influenced by 
Rome’s own ambiguous approach towards the employment of spiritual weapons in the 
political sphere. While it was clear that the papacy induced English support against France 
through censures, it was traditionally hesitant about wielding them against heads of state 
generally and reluctant during this period to follow through with them against both the kings 
of France and Scotland at Henry’s behest; this was demonstrated particularly in the 1512 brief 
whereby Julius II deposed Louis XII and invested Henry VIII with his territories and titles, 
which neither Julius nor his successor ever looked likely to publish, despite the best efforts of 
Cardinal Bainbridge. 
While Henry’s attempts to influence the outcome of papal elections reveal a strong 
anti-French imperative up to 1522, they also highlight his limited ability to actually make a 
difference during the conclaval process. As confined his efforts to defend the papacy in 
general against France, he was subject to the same broad limitations in this sphere: distance 
and relative lack of political influence. This time, distance affected Henry’s ability to react 
quickly to news of a pope’s death in terms of communications and the lack of an English 
‘party’ to rival that of France (and also those of the Empire and Spain) would always be a 
disadvantage. In spite of these constraints, Henry and his ministers still believed that they 
ought to act preemptively to prevent the election of a candidate contrary to the English 
interest and that, to some extent, they could affect the outcome of conclaves. Discussions 
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concerning the choice of the crown nomination could become heated as was the case in 1511 
and, if the timeframe was deemed feasible, instructions were issued from England for crown 
representatives to lobby for the election of a particular candidate.17 Indeed, contrary to 
Chambers’ assertions, it has been argued that Wolsey’s nomination during 1521-1522 was 
intended as a serious tilt at the papal tiara, even if it was always going to be a ‘long shot’.18 
Whether in receipt of recent instructions or not, English diplomats in Rome did their utmost to 
secure the success of an anti-French (and, invariably, a pro-English) nominee, often in 
combination with other like-minded diplomats.19 They were seemingly empowered to offer 
money and benefices to potential voters and, if participating in conclave itself, could engage 
in espionage (as Bainbridge was detected doing in 1513). Crown representatives in Rome 
tended to be more realistic about their ability to affect papal elections than their superiors in 
England, insomuch that they tended to back an anti-French cardinal that was also deemed to 
be papabile. As in his attitude towards papal censures, a cynicism can perhaps again be 
highlighted in Henry VIII’s approach towards influencing papal elections; he was not 
prepared to allow the ballot to be determined by the ‘Holy Spirit’ and risk an outcome to his 
political detriment. It must be noted, however, that Henry was not alone in doing this; all 
parties, including fellow princes and the voting members of the Sacred College were playing 
the same ‘game’. 
Finally, Henry VIII’s attempts to influence the composition of the Sacred College 
again reiterate a strong correlation with the lengths he went to to be recognised as fidei 
defensor against France. The rigid (and successful) insistence that Wolsey become a cardinal 
                                                 
17
have no chance of success. 
18 For Chambers, see D.S. Chambers, ‘Cardinal Wolsey and the Papal Tiara’, BIHR, 38, pp.20-30. 
 It seems that there was an impetus within crown circles to back the same candidates as the emperor during this 
period. Wolsey pushed for Maximilian’s nomineee de Castello in 1511, Wolsey himself was to be supported by 
 Or candidates; during 1521-1522, a second-choice was advocated in case the first failed or was deemed to 
19
both Charles and Henry during 1521-1522, while John Clerk, unaware of this agreement in Rome, worked 
alongside the Imperial orator in lobbying for Giulio de’ Medici. 
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in 1515 before Henry would join the papal-led coalition against France demonstrated the 
efficacy of the political leverage held by the English over Rome at this point.20 The papal 
concession of creating an English cardinal at this time sent out a strong political message 
concerning Rome’s anti-Gallic (and pro-English) credentials. Similarly, Julius II’s elevation 
of Bainbridge in 1511 was a clear attempt to induce English adhesion to and observance of 
the incipient Holy League against France. Despite these ‘successes’ in the anti-Gallic context, 
Henry VIII’s ability to affect membership of the Sacred College was otherwise limited; there 
was only one English cardinal at any given time which, it was stipulated by Rome, must be 
the king’s principal minister. Furthermore, the crown was rebuffed by the papacy when it did 
lobby for the creation of a second ‘English’ cardinal during this period, Henry’s longstanding 
curial representative Silvester de Giglis between 1518 and 1521.21 That this lack of leverage 
was recognised in England is perhaps suggested by the crown’s failure to build on the 
foundation stone of permanent diplomatic representation established in Rome by Bainbridge, 
following the latter’s death in 1514.22 Also, despite a desire to block, suspend or deprive 
French (and pro-French) candidates if the opportunity arose, Henry was further limited in his 
ability to affect the papacy. In the instances detected, the English had no success. The 
implication is, therefore, that Henry VIII’s influence of the composition of the College of 
Cardinals was limited to the occasional elevation of an Englishman and only seemingly when 
the pap
papacy’s loyal defender against France in the temporal sphere, albeit within the confines of 
          
acy sought English support against France. 
Overall, this focus on aspects of the Anglo-papal relationship both reinforces and goes 
beyond supporting the broader argument that Henry VIII went to great lengths to act as the 
                                       
of anti-French 20 That is in spite of this arguably being a poor decision in hindsight, given the crushing victory 
forces that occurred shortly after at the Battle of Marignano. 
21 Although de Giglis was Italian, he was widely recognised for his long association with the English crown. 
22 Henry reverted to his father’s practice of using Italian curials, although English-born diplomats, such as Clerk 
and Pace, did continue to visit Rome for extended periods. 
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the English ‘interest’, even to the extent of his attempting pre-emptive actions when the 
prospect of a conclave arose. They further highlight Henry’s strong desire to be recognised 
and rewarded for this, as well as his concern that he be actively supported by the papacy while 
he performed this role. In this sense, he expected the popes to invoke various aspects of papal 
‘spiritual’ authority in an overtly politicised way. The study of these contacts has also 
revealed how the papacy deliberately cultivated and exploited Henry’s self-perception at 
times when it sought English support in its own dealings with France; sometimes 
unobtainable concessions were offered and on other occasions these were achievable and 
actually awarded. Both parties actively played on their mutual concern for France and tried to 
assert whatever political leverage they believed they held over each other at any given time. 
While Henry VIII clearly secured concessions and gained formal recognition of his anti-
French role from the armoury of papal authority on a number of occasions up to 1522, these 
rarely came easily and he sometimes struggled to capitalise on his strength as a counterweight 
to France.23 England’s political influence vis-à-vis Rome would always be limited by its 
being a relatively small kingdom located on the outer-reaches of Christendom; it lacked the 
strength and ability (possessed by France) to coerce the papacy more directly.24 This 
juxtaposition was clearly demonstrated in Henry’s efforts to seek the title fidei defensor; the 
fact that Henry had to branch out into the ‘spiritual’ sphere to be rewarded for his ‘temporal’ 
actions hints at the longer struggle he had in getting to that point. Even from the death of Leo 
X, thro
                                                
ugh the subsequent conclave and beyond, Henry laboured to gain publication of the 
titular bulls, the political imperative having been lost. Nevertheless, recognition and 
concessions were potentially available and could be achieved if the pope needed English 
 
rancis I was able to influence the papacy in the 
23 It would be interesting to compare the English and French experiences of levering concessions from Rome 
during this period, particularly in terms of how strongly F
aftermath of the Battle of Marignano (1515). 
24 One cannot help but wonder whether Henry envied the Most Christian Kings’ ability to influence the papacy 
in this manner.  
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support enough. While there is some suggestion that Henry VIII may have cynically 
employed his desire to defend the papacy from France, such as his ability to rein in his anti-
Gallic sentiments at politically expedient moments, his selective observance of papal censures 
and in his attempts to affect the outcome of papal elections, it is difficult to assess the extent 




























HENRY VIII FULFILS HIS AMBITION TO ATTACK FRANCE IN ‘DEFENCE’ OF 
THE CHURCH, UNTIL A LACK OF ALLIES AND A WITHDRAWAL OF PAPAL 
SUPPORT FORCE HIM TO PEACE: 1509-1514 
 
enry VIII is initially unable to act against France on account of the League of Cambrai 
1508) against Venice: 22 April 1509 – September 1509 
On 22 April 1509, Henry VIII inherited a kingdom whose government had been 
itherto, while perhaps not at odds with the papacy in temporal mattters, at least in tacit 
pposition to its political direction. Julius II had recently ratified the League of Cambrai (on 
1 This confederacy, also com pire, France and Spain (the latter then a 
union of the kingdoms of Arag l of Ferdinand I), was formed 
ostensibly to regain lands ‘lost’ by each power to the Venetian republic, and was about to 
embark on a major offensive against the maritime state.2 Papal membership of the league was 
driven exclusively by temporal objectives and Julius II, just like his allies, aggressively 
sought territorial gains and, in fact, achieved considerable initial success.3 England under 
Henry VII had rejected papal attempts to gain his adhesion to the League of Cambrai, 
principally through Julius’ appealing to the notion of the crusade.4 This was at least partly 






23 March). prising the Em
on and Castile under contro
 
1 The two treaties comprising the league were originally concluded on 10 December 1508. The pope 
procrastinated over confirming his membership of the league until 23 March (Creighton suggests the 25th), as he 
was not comfortable with throwing his lot in with France (as will later become apparent). When a pre-emptive 
Venetian submission sought by Rome was not forthcoming, Julius II dragged his feet over the league’s 
ratification, holding out for a change of heart by the republic. He also, allegedly feared that Louis XII would 
betray him and attack the Papal States instead; F.J. Baumgartner, Louis XII, pp.191-192; M. Creighton, History 
of the Papacy, v, pp.116-117; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.310; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.233-234. 
2 One of the Cambrai treaties concentrated on solving disputes between Louis XII and Maximilian, while the 
other pledged a collaborative war against Venice before 1 April 1509; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.229-232; J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.24.  
3 Papal forces quickly made progress in the Romagna and, in the wake of the Venetian rout at Agnadello on 14 
May, the republic ceded Cervia, Faenza, Ravenna and Rimini to Julius II; C Shaw, Julius II, pp.232-236. 
4 Julius II had invoked his spiritual role to induce English membership of the confederacy through a papal brief 
that appears to have arrived with Henry VII not long before his death, whereby the English king was invited ‘to 
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motivated by the English crown’s fear for the repercussions of the republic’s potential 
d
a l 
suspicion that Engla  manifest itself into 
estruction; in particular, the advent of a powerful French presence in Italy and its by-product, 
 ‘French’ papacy.5 At Henry VIII’s accession, one can perhaps detect a degree of papa
nd’s non-participation in the Cambrai coalition might
some sort of active support for Venice. This is reflected in the first correspondence to be 
received by Henry VIII from Rome, although it was almost certainly written before 
                                                                                                                                                        
act against the Turks and Infidels’. The brief was, the Venetian Signory believed, the pope’s final attempt to gain 
England’s adhesion to the League of Cambrai which, by implication, would go on to fight the Ottomans once the 
genuine, Henry VII seemed to interpret the request as a ruse to gain his compliance (even involvement) in the 
attack on Venice, as can be seen by his reply to the pope. Although the king pleaded illness as the main reason 
for his refusal to participate, he went on to say how he was ‘grieved to hear that France was hostile to the 
Signory of Venice, which fact was at variance with an attack on the Infidels, as the Signory is a power which 
concurs with the pressure put on Henry by the Venetians, who instructed their ambassador in England: 
all that his Holiness does not make the demand for that purpose, but solely for the sake of giving repute and 
favour to the stir, which he, together with the King of France, has raised against the Christians’; Ven.i, 941 (28 
April 1509, the Signory to Badoer), 945 (LPIi 5; 15 April 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London); C. Shaw, Julius 
II, p.232; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.299. 
5
the war were that it was unbecoming of Christian princes to attack a state with such a high reputation and also 
that Venice provided a wall against the Turks that would be useful in a future crusade; Sp.ii, 25 (LPIi, 221; 1 
November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand). This fails to take into account, however, Henry VIII’s early, public, anti-
French rhetoric and his belief that the French were the root cause of this league; see n.11. Concerning trade as a 
desire for the the continuing visits of the Flanders galleys. This fleet was a fairly regular visitor to England 
lands of the Church and the confederates had been reclaimed from Venice. Whether or not this intention was 
might do much with a fleet, wherefore the Pope should see to allaying these dissensions’. Henry VII’s answer 
‘respecting the suit made by the Pope to have an English ambassador for the Turkish affairs, acquaint him first of 
 Henry VIII, in a letter to Ferdinand (dated 1 November 1509), asserted that his main reasons for objecting to 
partial motivation for the crown’s Venetian sympathies, as Chambers agrees, this can be traced largely to a 
during peacetime, but it had, as Henry VIII was doubtless aware, ceased during times of war during his father’s 
reign, such as in 1497. Such was their perceived significance at this time that Henry VII wrote personally to the 
republic to request they be sent; Ven.i, 735 (28 January 1497, Almoro Pisani, Venetian Consul in London, and 
erates, 
ember 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, 
 (LPIi, 
Piero Contarini to Venice), 736 (22 March 1497, letters from Henry VII to the Signory). That the prospect of the 
Flanders galleys not coming in 1509 was of concern to Henry VIII is indicated by his inquiry about this to the 
Venetians, a reply to which is recorded in a letter from the Doge and Senate of 6 August 1509. In this, they 
informed Henry that they wanted to send the fleet, but the actions of the Cambrai confederacy made it too 
dangerous, instead encouraging the English king to intervene in the conflict so that the voyages could resume; 
ibid. ii, 8 (LPIi, 140; 6 August 1509, doge and Senate to Badoer), 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, doge 
and Senate to Badoer). This intervention came in the form of letters written to some of the Cambrai confed
requesting them to grant safe conducts to the galleys or to desist from molesting them. Henry seems to have 
approached Maximilian and Louis XII some time before 23 October 1509 (LPIi 189; 23 October 1509). Also see 
Sp.ii, 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 Nov
Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon); Ven.ii, 52 (30 January 1510, Henry to Maximilian), 61 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 
1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 66 (LPIi, 450; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 67
463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.9; see above 
pp.220-221. 
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knowledge of his father’s death had reached the Curia.6 In the course of a pro-papal news 
report on the confederacy’s initial successes against Venice that predicted the latter’s 
imminent demise, Girolamo Bonvisi, ‘the King’s beloved solicitor’, probably writing under 
instruction from Julius II, appears to issue an implicit admonition against any English 
reaction. He reported the papal censures placed on Venice on 27 April 1509 and enclosed a 
copy of the relevant bull, exemplifying just before this the submission to the pope of the 
Orsini who had initially intended to support Venice.7 In effect, Julius II, in whose interests the 
bull was sent to England for publication, had indirectly, by virtue of the contagious nature of 
ecclesiastical weapons, issued a tacit threat of censure against the king of England. While this 
letter does not definitively demonstrate papal hostility towards England at this time, it is 
probably fair to say that political relations between crown and papacy were in a sort of limbo 
when Henry VIII became king. How the relationship would progress in this sphere depended 
a great deal on the character and contribution of the new monarch and those he chose to be his 
principal advisors. However, in the short-term, there was little that Henry could do to affect 
the papacy’s contribution to the League of Cambrai, even if he did oppose it; England was not 
powerful enough to act alone, it could not engage in direct military action in northern Italy 
and its diplomatic presence in Rome was negligible.8 
                                                 
6 This seems to have been the first contact between Rome and England, since Henry VII declined the pope’s 
request to send an ambassador to discuss England’s joining the league; Ven.i, 942 (LPIi 17; 3-4 April 1509, 
letters from Rome to the Signory). 
7 LPIi 9 (LPI, 11; 30 April 1509, Bonvisi to Henry VII, Rome); see above pp.207-208. Bonvisi’s multiple roles 
and loyalties make it unclear which ‘hat’ he was wearing when writing this letter. He was also employed as a 
papal notary and was a subordinate of the most likely candidate for English cardinal protector, Francesco 
Alidosi, the latter himself who was also the favourite and right-hand man of Julius II. It later turned out that both 
Alidosi and Bonvisi were Francophiles and the latter’s espionage with the French ambassador was detected when 
Bonvisi visited England in 1511; see pp.30-32 (n.72, 74), 58. 
8 Even if Henry hoped to intervene by attacking France, time would be needed to prepare for such a campaign. 
For the available options open to England vis-à-vis acting in Italy, see pp.113 ff. For the relatively poor standard 
of diplomatic representation maintained in Rome at this time by England, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.11-12. 
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News of Henry VII’s death reached Rome around 3-4 May 1509 and the pope deemed 
the news significant enough to announce in a special Consistory. It is feasible that the political 
implications arising from this were discussed in this meeting, not least due to England’s 
ambiguous position concerning the Venetian war. Perhaps more ominously, the republic’s 
source in Rome also reported intelligence received about the political disposition of the new 
king, that he was so hostile towards France that he would undoubtedly invade his neighbour.9 
Such information would have been of concern to Julius II, as it had the potential to threaten, 
or at least impact upon, the league’s military actions in Italy; an English invasion of France 
could pull French troops from the peninsula and thus dilute the strength of the league.10 No 
immediate reaction appears to have issued from the papacy, however, Julius II perhaps 
choosing to wait for confirmation of any English military build-up before taking any action. 
Initial reports reaching Rome concerning Henry’s belligerent disposition were quickly 
confirmed and would have indicated that the new king’s vocal enmity against France would 
preclude any hope that he may have harboured about gaining the new king as a confederate 
against Venice.11 Further hostile sentiments may have been stirred with the king and his inner 
                                                 
have come from the Bonvisi bank at Lucca, contained in lette
9 Ven.i, 942 (LPIi 17; 3-4 April 1509, letters from Rome to the Signory). The author reports this intelligence to 
rs from its London branch. While it is unclear 
whether Henry VIII’s anti-French sentiments were known by papal sources or not, it is likely that they were, 
given the public nature of his comments. Also, the letters came through the Bonvisi bank, which may well have 
been linked to the papal notary with the same name who was employed in English diplomatic service. Secondly, 
the Venetians in Rome, in receipt of such intelligence that favoured their cause, would doubtless have capitalised 
on it by informing the pope or his subordinates. 
10 See above pp.114-115. 
raight after his coronation, swore to attack France; Ven.i, 941 (LPIi, 5; 25 
ade France unilaterally and so pull French forces 
, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer), 12 (LPIi, 169; 14 or 15 September 1509, 
11 Even before his father’s death, Henry VIII was portrayed by the Venetian ambassador, Badoer, in letters to his 
government, as being an enemy of France and willing to attack his neighbour. Indeed, it was reported by 
Venetian merchants that Henry, st
April 1509, Badoer to the Venetian Signory, London; 26 April, private letters from merchants, London). 
Venetian sources in England, principally Badoer, continued export such a view home in subsequent months; see 
for example; Ven.i 942 (LPIi, 17, 3-4 May 1509, letters from Rome to Venice), 943 (26 April 1509, letters from 
merchants, London), 945 (15 April 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London); Ven. ii, 1 (LPIi 7; 26, 28 April 1509, 
Badoer to the Signory, London). The Venetian conviction was such that, from as early as 28 April 1509 and for 
the rest of the year, Henry VIII was lobbied by Venice to inv
from Italy. This pressure was stepped up when Venice understood Henry’s anti-French disposition and was 
sustained at least up to December 1509; Ven.i, 941 (28 April 1509, Signory to Badoer), 944 (16 May 1509, 
Signory to Badoer); Ven.ii, 2 (LPIi, 53; 30 May 1509, Signory to Badoer), 8 (LPIi, 140; 6 August 1509, Signory 




           
hen they heard, from Venetian sources, complaints that the pope’s treatment of them 
in this war was ‘contrary to all equity and justice, and utterly unmerited’.12 Furthermore, they 
were told that the papal army was ‘perpetrating against Christians such cruelties that greater 
could not be committed by Infidels’.13 While Henry and his advisors probably perceived this 
to be indicative of the pope’s exercising a temporal policy in the same way as any other 
prince, they seem to have believed the republic’s assertions that Julius II had been coerced 
into these actions by Louis XII and, further, that he would declare his enmity to the Most 
Christian king if England attacked France.14 This reasoning may well explain the 
contradiction in English policy that becomes apparent, in opposing papal actions, while 
retaining cordial relations with the Apostolic See. Indeed, the belief that Julius II was being 
coerced by the French (or at least was in a position that meant his actions were constrained b
                                                                                                                                             
LPIi LPIi
passed in Venice to write to Henry VIII). One could argue that Venetian sources may have exaggerated the 
extremity of Henry’s xenophobia, particularly as the isolated state was desperately looking for any signs of 
potential opposition to the French, whom it perceived as responsible for the League of Cambrai. Nevertheless, 
one incident involving Henry’s berating a French envoy who had turned up in August 1509, in response to a 
quite convincing in conveying this view. The likes of Chambers and Scarisbrick also accept this incident at face-
value. Furthermore, the summoning of Parliament in October 1509 (to meet the following January) to discuss 
Signory to Badoer), 24 ( , 278; 21 December 1509, Signory to Badoer); , 33 (16 May 1509, motion 
letter requesting peace, written apparently under crown authority but without Henry’s knowledge, appears to be 
French affairs, according to Badoer, is another suggestion of Henry’s belligerence. The Venetian also claimed 
that the king told him shortly after his coronation that he would do this. It is widely accepted that Henry was in 
signed to ensure that the French crown continued to pay him the 
 that due in July 1509) that was payable twice a year, an arrangement renewed in the 
no great financial need at this point (having a considerable legacy from his father) and so it would have been 
natural to interpret the summons in terms of the king’s desire to go to war and raising the extraordinary revenues 
needed to wage it; Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, Signory to Badoer); Ven.ii, 7 (LPIi 98; 3 July 1509, Badoer to the 
Signory, London), 11 (LPIi 156; August 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 22 (LPIi, 230; 9 November 
1509, Badoer to the Signory, London); LPIi, 205 (17 October 1509), 219 (LPI, 613; 1 November 1509); D.S. 
Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.22; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.24-26. It could also be posited that 
Henry’s belligerent rhetoric was a clever ruse de
lucrative pension (such as
Treaty of Étaples of 1492. It will be seen later, however, that even this was not enough to prevent Henry 
breaking with France, although it may have contributed to its timing. For the French pension, see for example 
LPIi, 1181 (ibid., 535; LPI, 318; 22 July 1510), 1182 (LPI, 538, 22 July 1510). For the English preparedness to 
drop the pension when convenient, see pp.387-389. Overall, this idea of Henry VIII as being belligerently anti-
French from the moment of his accession, has been widely adopted by historians looking in any depth at English 
foreign policy during this period. See, for example, J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.24; R.B. Wernham, Before the 
Armada, p.78.  
12 Ven.ii, 9 (LPIi, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to Badoer).  
13 The ambassador was to communicate this to Henry and ‘all such leading members of the Privy Council as 
shall seem fit to him’; ibid., 12 (LPIi, 169; 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). Also see a similar statement 
in a dispatch to England of April 1509; Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
14 Ven.i, 936 (24 April 1509, doge and Senate to Badoer); Ven.ii, 9 (LPIi, 154; 30 August 1509, Signory to 
Badoer), 12 (LPIi, 169; 15 September 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
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them) may have provided some justification for Henry VIII to ignore the ecclesiastical 
censures fulminated against Venice.15 
Uncertainty about English intentions and news of Henry VIII’s anti-French stance 
perhaps induced the pope to despatch a nuncio to England in July 1509. While Girolamo 
Bonvisi’s remit was to smooth out issues arising from Thomas Ruthal’s provision to the see 
of Durham, there is no reason why this could not have been done in Rome or through existing 
nuncios in England.16 It seems feasible, therefore, that Bonvisi was sent to England to 
ascertain the political intentions of the new king. Papal suspicion and/or uncertainty of Henry 
VIII’s projected foreign policy would not have been helped around the beginning of July 
1509, when the Venetian ambassadors seeking peace with Julius II proposed an agreement 
that included England, thereby implying the latter’s friendship.17 Papal ignorance of English 
foreign policy direction was further demonstrated by rumours circulating Rome around mid-
August 1509; that England and Scotland had made a joint attack on France prompting Louis 
XII’s return across the Alps.18 Furthermore, the contents of a letter from the other English 
solicitor in Rome at this time, Christopher Fisher, around September 1509, suggests that the 
                                                 
15 See above pp.212-222. 
16 Letters of credence were issued by Julius II and Cardinal Alidosi, respectively. Curiously, that from Alidosi 
does not mention Durham and only states that Bonvisi wished to live in England; LPIi, 100 (LPI, 267; 6 July 
1509, Julius to Henry, Rome), 111 (LPI, 300; 15 July 1509, Alidosi to [Henry], Milan). 
17 Spain and Hungary were also to be included in the peace that Venice instructed its orators to put forward on 29 
June. It is not known whether Henry VIII approved his inclusion in this plan or was even aware of it, as no 
mention of it has been found in the English sources, although one would suppose that he would not object to his 
incorporation in any projected peace; LPIi 90 (Ven.ii, 6; 29 June 1509, Signory to the six Venetian ambassadors 
in Rome). It is unclear whether the proposal was actually made to the pope, as the ambassadors found it difficult 
enough to gain access to the pontiff. Even when the envoys did speak with Julius II, he was not ready to 
negotiate with them; rather he demanded that Venice agree to excessively harsh terms. Nevertheless, it is 
probable that the Venetians did make some sort of proposal at some point; C. Shaw, Julius II (1996), pp.237-
239. 
18 LPIi, 147 (22 August 1509, Paulo Capello to Philip Capello, Rome). This rumour had probably grown out of 
the confirmation of the 1502 treaty between England and Scotland on 29 June, as well as the commissioning of a 
 a perpetual peace and settle border disputes. The 
9). The rumour may also 
Scottish ambassador in July to go into England to conclude
latter treaty did not come into being until 19 August 1509; LPIi 88 (ibid., 94:107; LPI, 234; 31 October 1509), 
114 (LPI, 475; 19 July 1509), 129 (LPI, 369; 30 July 1509, James IV to Henry, ‘oure Abbay of Haly Croce 
beside Edingburgh’), 153 (LPI, 474-475; 29 August 1509); LPI, 478 (29 August 150
have been exacerbated by the Venetian belief that Louis XII had left Milan to cross the Alps back to France; 
Ven.ii, 8 (LPIi, 140; 6 August 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
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crown may not have contacted him since Henry VIII had come to the throne; he was unaware 
whether he would retain his office.19 If so, this would have implied English opposition to 
current
Henry VIII sought to renew existing peace treaties with his neighbours, while seeking a 
 papal foreign policy and would have contributed to the lack of papal understanding of 
its intentions. It may also betray the new English regime’s decision to remain aloof from the 
current political situation, being in no position to affect it (yet). In the early months of the 
reign, therefore, Henry VIII’s political relationship with the papacy reflected wider English 
foreign policy. In spite of the king’s vocal hostility towards France, then an ally of Rome, and 
apparent opposition to papal intentions against Venice, albeit blamed on French coercion, and 
particularly manifesting itself in his refusal to allow the publication of ecclesiastical censures 
against the republic, Henry was unable to act, in the short-term, to prevent Louis XII from 
gaining control of northern Italy and gaining de facto political influence over the papacy. 
 
English pressure on Julius II to break with France, September 1509 – February 1510 
 English inaction ceased from around September 1509, however, as Henry sought to 
meet conditions imposed by his senior councillors for going to war. In the first instance, 
diplomatic resolution to the threat against Venice (thereby attempting to break-up the League 
of Cambrai) and sounding out relevant powers about an anti-French coalition. Once domestic 
security had been achieved, the coalition against Venice dissolved and potential commitments 
for an anti-French confederacy gained, the next stage of the councillors’ plan could begin; the 
development of an anti-French league.20 
                                                 
19 Fisher seems to have written at least twice to the recipient of this piece, who we know as ‘his Lordship’, and to 
the king at least once (‘six or seven lines’), but he does not acknowledge receipt of any correspondence as 
diplomats routinely did; LPIi, 165 (LPI, 880; 2 September 1509, [Fisher] to my lord [-], Bacano). 
20 In spite of Henry’s early anti-French rhetoric and refusal to observe the interdict against Venice, the crown’s 
actual response to the League of Cambrai was far more measured. This was probably due to the fact that England 
understood that unilateral action would have little effect on France (while it was ensconced in a coalition of the 
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In terms of Julius II, these terms required, firstly, that the pope cease his attack on 
Venice and thereby be detached from the League of Cambrai, and secondly, that he be 
instrumental in forming, or at least joining, a new anti-French coalition. To achieve the first 
aim, the English were ready to engage in direct diplomatic relations with the papacy at some 
point between September and November 1509, when Henry wrote to Rome in this regard.21 
This may have been a partial response to Ferdinand’s notification to Henry on 13 September 
that the pope had ‘reconquered all the country of the Church’ and had thereby achieved his 
territorial aims.22 Upon receipt of this information, therefore, it may have been decided in 
England that Julius II would become more receptive to English approaches to cease the attack 
on Venice. While this correspondence to the papacy has not survived, its contents can be 
surmised through an examination of similar letters sent by Henry VIII to the pope’s allies, 
questing that they cease hostilities against Venice and, in those despatched to Ferdinand and re
                                                                                                                                                        
‘superpowers’) and that, in any case, military preparations would take time. An alternative strategy was patently 
necessary. It is from this point that one senses the influence of the wisened heads advising and restraining the 
new king in his intended foreign policy, particularly the likes of Fox and Ruthal. The adoption of this policy 
implicitly encouraged him towards war with France, he discouraged him from breaking with Louis XII until a 
LPIi LPI
Henry, Valladolid), 329 (LPI, 796; 11 January 1510, , John Stile to Henry); Sp.ii, 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 
November 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon), 32 (LPIi, 260; 3 December 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of 
Aragon). A further motivation for this ministerial caution was domestic security; one ought to remember that 
Henry VIII was the first of a new dynasty to acquire the throne by inheritance and the Tudor regime could do 
the new king. For the later threat of English rebels harboured by France, see for instance; LPIi, 1223 (Ven.ii, 
172; 31 May and 1 June 1512, letters from Friar Angelo, Rome), 1297 (LPI, 3320; 18 July 1512, James IV to 
Lord Dacre, Edinburgh). For the confirmation of 
379-380 n.70. 
concurs with the advice given to Henry by his father-in-law from 9 September 1509; while the Catholic King 
league had been formed, also comprising the emperor;  162 ( , 490; 9 September 1509, John Stile to 
without foreign states, particularly France, sponsoring rival claimants to the throne in this settling in period for 
peace treaties and lobbying of potential allies, see pp.375 n.53, 
21 Dating this letter, which does not appear to have survived, is problematic. The Venetian ambassador in 
England suggests that it existed in letters dated between 10 September and 4 October 1509. Badoer only saw this 
letter, however, on 9 November, then forwarding a copy home. If one assumes that the missive was to be carried 
(LPIi, 278; 21 
and presented by Bainbridge (as will be posited later), then the date of the letter can probably narrowed down to 
before 30 September, on which date the archbishop left England; Ven.ii, 17 (LPIi, 240; 15 November 1509, 
Signory to Badoer), 22 (LPIi, 230; 9 November 1509, Badoer to the Signory, London), 24 
December 1509, Signory to Badoer); LPIi, 187 (LPI, 538; 30 September 1509, Christopher [Bainbridge] to 
[Ruthal], Winchelsea). 
22 Sp.ii, 22 (LPIi, 167; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid). 
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Maxim
Venice, against the infidel.25 Henry probably also reasoned that, having regained Church 
territories, there was no further need to fight.26 Further light on these letters to the pope is 
ilian, also sounding them out about turning against France.23 The tenor of the letter 
sent to Ferdinand on 1 November 1509 was that the league should cease its war against the 
Venetians, which England opposes because: Venice has traditionally formed ‘a wall against 
the Turks’; that ‘it does not become Christian princes to destroy, to molest, and to annoy the 
Venetian republic,’ that is to fight another Christian state; that Venice had conceded all lands 
demanded of them by the confederates before the war began, though the league pressed on 
with their attack; and, finally (probably the prime motivation for Henry’s writing), that ‘if 
Venice were conquered and destroyed, the other states of Italy would be unable to withstand 
the ambitious designs of certain Christian princes,’ – a thinly veiled reference to the king of 
France.24 In tailoring his message to his papal audience, Henry may have appealed to the 
pope’s ‘duty’ to call for universal peace (as a precursor to a crusade), desiring his 
condemnation of the shedding of Christian blood and instead his advocating a league, with 
shed by Venice when, after expressing thanks, criticised a passage contained in one of the 
letters that presumably requested the papacy to lay down its arms against the republic, ‘“after 
his Holiness has obtained his places and towns, and after the other confederate powers in like 
manner shall get possession of well nigh all those places to which they lay claim;”- because 
                                                 
23 Henry VIII also directed communications to Louis XII, Ferdinand I and Maximilian I, all to the same end; 
ibid., 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 November 1509, Henry to 
Ferdinand). 
24 These arguments for ending the war against Venice were taken from two letters sent to Ferdinand of Aragon 
on 1 November 1509 and which, in essence, stated the same thing though one was more detailed than the other. 
y Ferdinand; Sp.ii, 22 (LPIi, 167; 13 September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, 
It ought to be noted that this is the first instance to be found that clearly states Henry VIII’s concern with French 
hegemony in Italy; ibid., 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand), 25-26 (LPIi, 221; 1 
November 1509, Henry to Ferdinand).  
25 This was merely an appeal by the English crown to a role traditionally associated with the papacy and which 
was frequently employed for political purposes; see pp.97-105. Henry VIII would later be subjected to similar 
pressure towards peace from Leo X (as well as from fellow princes) during this period and was often 
unenthusiastic; see pp.105-109. 
26 As had been argued b
Valladolid). 
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this furnishes matter for his Holiness to reply that the Emperor has not obtained that to which 
he lays claim’.27 This complaint suggests that Henry VIII was cautious in the phrasing used to 
urge the papacy to end hostilities. Notably, the Venetians did not take issue with the loss of 
territory that the English condoned here, but with a clause which allowed Julius II to 
procrastinate over a possible settlement. One can understand the English crown’s logic here, 
that it was just feeling its way into negotiations, rather than making any major demands. This 
would concur with Christopher Bainbridge’s later reluctance to present even these apparently 
mild letters to the pope at such an early stage in this new, more direct Anglo-papal 
relationship.  
 In addition to and perhaps to deliver this correspondence, a more decisive gesture was 
made to the papacy in the despatch to Rome of a new English ambassador, the archbishop of 
York, Christopher Bainbridge.28 Commissioned to be the king’s representative in Rome on 24 
September 1509, this may have been anticipated there since at least August.29 The sending of 
such a high-ranking ambassador to the pope, along with the letters, marked a new intensity in 
its political relationship with Rome and was made more significant by the fact that similar 
approaches made to Ferdinand, Louis XII and Maximilian do not appear to have involved any 
such special envoy.30 This is perhaps indicative of the significance attached by the English 
                                                 
27 Ven.ii, 25 (LPi, 280; 22 December 1509, Signory to Badoer). 
28 To replace two low-ranking, ‘solicitors’, Fisher and Bonvisi; see p.31 n.74. 
Fisher may have recommended himself to the archbishop in a letter from Rome of 12 September; 
hop of Canterbury). To send such a senior ecclesiastic could also be 
ee; G.M. Bell, A Handlist of British Diplomatic Representatives 1509-1688 , 
esiastic) dying while in Rome, see the following Milanese correspondence commenting on 
29 According to the commission, Bainbridge was to be ‘Oratorem, Procuratorem, Actorem, Factorem, 
Negotiorumque Gestorem ac Nuncium specialem’; LPIi, 175, 190:33 (LPI, 520; 24 September 1509). 
Christopher 
ibid., 165 (LPI, 880; 12 September 1509, [Fisher] to my lord [-], Bacano). 
30 Admittedly, Henry already had representatives resident in the Low Countries (through which he was lobbying 
the emperor) and in Spain, but the dignity of Spinelly and Stile (respectively) could not compare with that which 
Bainbridge carried in his embassy. In terms of seniority, the metropolitan was second in the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy of England (after the archbis
deemed risky, given that the papacy claimed the right to provide to benefices vacated (by death or otherwise) in 
Curiam Romanam. Bainbridge also had experience of Rome and had been educated in Italy. This status and 
experience, therefore, suggests that the mission could not be entrusted to the existing, relatively low level of 
crown diplomats at the Holy S
Royal History Society Guides and Handbooks no.16 (1990), pp.159, 170, 252. For the implications of an English 
(or any eccl
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crown to papal amity in the desired conflict against France; in addition to his military and 
economic resources, Julius II could also remove spiritual justification for the current offensive 
against Venice and legitimise that intended against France.31 That Bainbridge was sent to 
mediate between the papacy and Venice, and further detach Julius from the League of 
Cambrai is widely accepted, and the mission may have been deemed more immediate because 
of the positive signals emanating from Rome by its engaging in negotiations with Venetian 
ambassadors or on account of the failure of these representations to come to any agreement. 
In either case, Henry VIII may have spotted an opportunity to mediate in these talks, just as he 
had between Venice and Maximilian.32 Indeed, Venice had no other influential allies to lobby 
                                                                                                                                                        
on its behalf and, by assuming this role, the English could more effectively urge the pope to 
break from the League of Cambrai and turn against France.33 There must have been at least 
some confidence among Henry VIII and his advisors that the pope’s attitude had softened in 
order for the embassy and letter to be sent, not least because this approach would imply 
continued English contact with an interdicted state. Indeed, Julius II had been negotiating with 
the republic with a view to its absolution since July 1509.34 Furthermore, Julius II had also 
begun to turn against his French ally, who had become too dominant in northern Italy for the 
pope’s comfort. As early as July 1509, Julius II was counting down the days before the 
Bainbridge’s death their in July 1514; Mil., 698 (12 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke) 700 
republic. 
o lobby the pope for the absolution of 
(17 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke). 
31 One will remember that spiritual censures had been promulgated against the 
32 See, for example, Ven.ii, 28 (LPI, 319; 5 January 1510, Signory to Badoer). 
33 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.316-318. While a number of reasons have been postulated to account for 
the despatch of the Archbishop of York to Rome, most of which are political in nature, it is generally agreed that, 
despite the very general nature of his commission, he was sent principally t
Venice (from its interdict) and to draw the papacy out of the League of Cambrai to oppose France. Indeed, the 
Venetian ambassador Badoer, later (in 1512) suggests that this was the case. Among the few that cite different 
reasons for the commission, Brewer states that Bainbridge was sent to announce Henry VIII’s accession, but 
provides no evidence to suggest that this was the case; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.68 (Ven.ii, 191; LPIi, 
1307; LPI, 3333; 24 July 1512, Badoer to his brother, London); LPIi, p.xiv; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, p.22; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.25; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.38. 
34 These negotiations were not very productive at this stage, but the fact that they were taking place indicated a 
readiness by the pope to make peace with Venice; Ven.ii, 6 (29 June 1509, Signory to the six Venetian 
ambassadors in Rome); C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.237-239; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.120-124; L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.316-318. 
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campaigning season was over and Louis XII would leave Italy, so that he could start to 
counteract his influence in the peninsula.35 So, when Christopher Bainbridge arrived in Rome 
on 24 November 1509, the English must have been quietly confident that the pope would be 
receptive to their approaches.36 
 From his reception in Rome, Bainbridge was thrown immediately into the stalled 
negotiations between Venice and the papacy. He had a number of audiences with the pope, in 
which he trod extremely carefully.37 By 1 December, the pope had apparently read the letter 
from Henry and sent for Bainbridge. In response, Julius II restated the justification of the war 
against Venice, before proposing a reconsideration of the case by Cardinals Caraffa and 
Riario, which Bainbridge would be expected to attend.38 Officially, therefore, the papacy’s 
position concerning the war with Venice remained, at that point, intractable, although Julius 
permitted some review of his position. In Bainbridge’s next interview with Julius, on 3 
December 1509, he still refrained from displaying any definite views on the Venetian matter. 
He kept the pope on-side by sympathising with his point of view in the conflict when pressed 
for his opinion. Julius II was apparently content with this reaction and encouraged Bainbridge 
                                                 
around October 1509, which further split the two parties; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v (1903), pp.122-
History of the Popes Julius II
35 To add fuel to the flames, there was also a Franco-papal dispute over the right to dispose of French benefices 
123; L. Pastor, , vi, p.318; C. Shaw, , pp.245-251. 
36 The Venetians were certainly hopeful of a successful resolution with the pope as a result of Bainbridge’s 
nt letters of favour they 
e would be their ally, they should 
e Papacy, v, pp.123-124; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.237.  
arrival; Ven.ii, 19-20 (LPIi, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in Rome), 21 (26 November 
1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). 
37 The Venetian ambassadors, on 26 November 1509, requested that the archbishop prese
had received from Henry to the pope. Bainbridge declined, saying that though h
present the letters themselves and that the pope could then discuss them with him afterwards. Furthermore, 
Bainbridge disclosed that he had already met the pontiff in a secret audience on the previous day, and did not 
raise the letters he had brought for fear of upsetting (the famously volatile) Julius II, though he claimed to have 
hinted to the pope that Henry intended to invade France. Bainbridge was wise to have approached the pontiff 
with caution, as the Venetian Cardinal Cornaro subsequently tried to present the letter in question and received a 
cool reception from Julius, who refused to read it in full. Indeed, a despatch to Venice stated that the pope may 
have become ill on reading this letter; ibid., 19-20 (LPIi, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in 
Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.24-25. 
38 Riario and Caraffa were two of those charged by the pope, in late October, to negotiate with the Venetian 
ambassadors towards a settlement; Ven.ii, 19-20 (LPIi, 262; 3 December 1509, Signory to their ambassador in 
Rome), 21 (26 November 1509, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, p.25; M. Creighton, History of th
 370
to convey what had occurred to the king.39 Bainbridge met with the pope again on the 11th, to 
ask what he should report to Henry VIII on the Venetian matter. Julius II asked him what he 
wanted to write, and Bainbridge replied that he could only tell the king that his letters had 
been of little use to the republic. When pressed further, Bainbridge remained neutral, 
the rebuff. The king’s reply of 29 January 1510 gave cautious assent for Bainbridge to explore 
responding that it was not his place to comment and that he would convey Julius II’s opinions 
as his own. Once more, Bainbridge was extremely guarded, but following this exchange, he 
reminded Julius of the latter’s recent idea to absolve Venice if the two main issues 
outstanding (concerning towns in the Romagna and navigation in the Gulf of Venice) were 
settled in Rome’s favour. Bainbridge then tentatively introduced a proposal for a papal league, 
to include England and Venice, to oppose France, but was swiftly rebuked.40 This reaction 
reveals the sage reason for the crown’s caution in dealing with Rome so far; despite the 
occasional positive noises emanating from the Apostolic See that Julius II was prepared to 
absolve Venice and league against France, he was certainly not ready at this stage. Bainbridge 
wrote to Henry VIII of this meeting with the pope on 16 December 1509, although he 
presented the idea of the anti-French confederacy as coming from Julius II, not mentioning 
this plan, even though Anglo-French ‘peace’ negotiations were already in train.41 It is unclear 
why Bainbridge apparently lied to his king, as the consequences could potentially make his 
life extremely difficult, but the possibility that Julius II informally implied his desire for such 
a league with Bainbridge, while remaining overtly and publicly opposed to such an idea, 
should not be ruled out. 
                                                 
39 Bainbridge’s caution prompted mutterings of discontent from the Venetians in Rome, who saw the 
Englishman as interested only in gaining promotion to the Sacred College; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, 
p.25. 
40 Ibid., p.26. 
41 Although the orator’s letter of 16 December 1509 no longer exists, its contents have been gleaned from the 
reply dated 29 January 1510; LPi, 354 (LPI, 1457; 29 January 1510, Henry to Bainbridge). For Anglo-French 
negotiations, see pp.374-382. 
 371
By late January 1510, English pressure on the papacy to absolve Venice and withdraw 
from the League of Cambrai, with a view to allying against France, had combined with 
Spanish representations. Bainbridge informed a Venetian secretary on 20 January of such a 
combined meeting with the pope. As a result, Bainbridge recommended that the Venetians 
compromise with Julius in order to bring about absolution.42 This implies that the pope had 
indicated his readiness to make peace with Venice, due to the intervention of the English and 
Spanish ambassadors. Thereafter, Venetian envoys consulted with Bainbridge regularly in the 
days leading up to the lifting of the interdict on 24 February 1510.43 Doubtless responding to 
encouraging signals from Rome, Henry again wrote to the pope (this time through Fox) prior 
to 4 February, requesting that he raise the censures against Venice. He also informed Julius II 
that he was at peace with Scotland (one of the preconditions for preparing for war against 
France) and that he would not ally with anyone against Christians or infidels without the 
inclusion of Venice. This correspondence reached Rome on 22 February and, while it was 
presented to the pope before the absolution took place, the latter already appears to have been 
a foregone conclusion.44 Nevertheless, the Venetians still thanked the English crown for its 
                                                 
Venice ought not to be overstated. Ferdinand of Aragon had been working to this end since hinting to the 
September 1509. Furthermore, the Catholic King seems to have had turned down his allies’ wish to destroy 
Venice and sought instead to ally with England. By 18 November, Ferdinand had confirmed his opposition to the 
destruction of Venice, and had already entered secret negotiations with the pope. Again relaying to Henry that 
the Church had obtained its territorial aims, Ferdinand posited that the pope ought to ally with England and 
no danger to himself. Furthermore, the Spaniard believed that the pope would have immediately joined a new 
league had it already been concluded. Finally, Ferdinand urged Henry to maintain cordial relations with the 
French for now, until a new 
actions vis-à-vis the papacy 
42 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.28-29. Bainbridge’s role in the raising of papal censures against 
English crown that he was satisfied with his (and the other confederates’) territorial gains in a letter of 13 
Spain and that, while Julius II agreed with him, he was not prepared to make these plans public until there was 
league came into being. In this light, therefore, one ought to note that England’s 
concerning Venice were made with Spanish support; Sp.ii, 22 (LPIi 167; 13 
September 1509, Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon, Valladolid), 23-24 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Ferdinand 
to Henry), 25-26 (LPIi, 220; 1 November 1509, Ferdinand to Henry), 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, 
tion, see Ven.ii, 40 (LPIi, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to his brother, Rome), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 
ignory to Badoer); M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.125-128; L. Pastor, History of the 
ello to his brother, Rome). The letter was read to the Venetian ambassadors in 
Ferdinand to Catherine). 
43 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.29; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.42. For accounts of the 
absolu
March 1510, S
Popes, vi, pp.319-320; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.241-243. 
44 Ven.ii, 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 22 February 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 40 (LPIi, 373; 
24 February 1510, Paulo Cap
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Henry wrote that he would not do this without first knowing their foreign policy intentions. 
ce in obtaining the absolution.45 The implication is that Henry VIII’s diplomatic 
actions were deemed effective in contributing to the state’s pardon and absolution and, 
thereby, the public detachment of Julius II from the League of Cambrai.46 If Henry VIII did 
not hear news of the papal-Venetian reconciliation through his own diplomatic network, he 
was probably notified of the absolution by Julius II himself in a letter issued the same day (24 
February).47 When the king first saw a copy of the absolution, by 6 April, he reportedly 
‘rejoiced thereat’ and forwarded this to his father-in-law and potential ally against France, 
Ferdinand.48 The first stage of the English plan to form a coalition against France, therefore, 
had been achieved quite rapidly, vis-à-vis the papacy at least. 
 
The long road to forming a ‘holy league’ against France: February 1510-May 1512 
 The second stage of the English plan for war with France was to gain papal adhesion 
to a confederacy for this purpose. As far as Henry VIII was concerned, the pope had been 
prepared to join such a league as early as December 1509 and had urged him to lobby 
Ferdinand and Maximilian, with a view to their membership. In his reply of 29 January, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rome on 23 February; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.29. As far as the inevitability of the lifting of 
papal censures against the Venetians was concerned, the latter had submitted to papal demands as early as 29 
December 1509, the pope had promised to lift the sentence in a consistory of 4 February 1510, while the final 
details were settled by 15 February; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.125-128; L. Pastor, History of 
the Popes, vi, p.319; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.241. 
45 Ven.ii, 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 1 March 1510, meeting of the Venetian Senate,), 41 (LPIi, 384; 1 March 1510, 
Signory to the ambassadors in Rome), 43 (LPIi, 382; LPI, 932; 2 March 1510, doge to Henry), 44 (2 March 
1510, motion in the Senate for a letter to Badoer), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer). 
46 Confederates of this alliance had committed themselves not to make peace with Venice until the (territorial) 
aims of all had been achieved. Papal actions on 24 February effectively contradicted this and publicised that 
Julius II had effectively ceased his involvement in the league. 
47 That sent to James IV of Scotland has survived; LPIi, 372 (LPI, 908; 24 February 1510, Julius to James IV). 
ak. Henry was definitely presented with these by 6 April, 
The Venetians notified Henry VIII through letters to Henry, as well as to their orator in England, dated 2 March; 
Ven.ii, 43 (LPIi, 382; LPI, 932; 2 March 1510, doge to Henry), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer). 
48 Copies of the bulls arrived with Badoer by 30 March, but he was unable to present them to the king while he 
and his councillors were dispersed during the Easter bre
however; Ven.ii, 59 (LPIi, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 61 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 1510, 
Badoer to the Signory, London). 
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He would, however, join a league with them as members, had already written to Ferdinand to 
this end, and recommended that Julius II lead it. The nature of Henry’s proposal seems to be 
one of universal peace and subsequent crusade, ‘to which, if other princes refuse to accede, 
they must be considered as a common enemy’. If this was impossible, Bainbridge was 
instructed to urge the pope’s promotion of an apparently simple alliance against France, 
consisting of England, Rome, the Empire and Spain.49 As mentioned, Bainbridge may have 
been untruthful when he reported this original papal proposal, but this does not make sense. 
However much of a gallophobe Bainbridge was, he surely would not have invented it to stoke 
up war; it was far too risky. Given that Julius II had, by this time, turned against the French, it 
 likely that he was given tacit go-ahead to report this, while being publicly rebuked for 
direct snub to the pope, who had publicly indicated his rejection of Cambrai largely on 
is
raising this subject. 
 In reality, however, the English crown had no intention of going to war in the short-
term; Henry’s senior councillors were plotting the opposite course to that pursued in Rome; 
they were negotiating peace with Louis XII, which was concluded on 23 March 1510. This 
was effectively a renewal of Henry VII’s Treaty of Étaples (1492).50 While it appears to 
represent a complete volte-face by the English crown and, as far as this study is concerned, a 
account of English (and Spanish) support, this was not the case. Indeed, an indicator of this 
was the sacking of the pope’s favourite, Francesco Alidosi, as cardinal protector of England 
                                                 
49 LPIi, 354 (LPI, 1457; calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
e to join a league also comprising England, the 
; ibid., 587:7 (LPI, 1227; 14 September 1510). 
Bainbridge, pp.26-28. Note that Ferdinand had already advised Henry (in November 1509) that Julius was 
prepared to join such an alliance when there was demonstrably no danger to himself. By 11 January 1510, the 
Catholic King recommended that his son-in-law urge the pop
Empire and Spain (as well as Charles of Castile); Sp.ii, 27 (LPIi, 253; 18 or 28 November 1509, Ferdinand to 
Catherine); LPIi, 329 (LPI, 796; 11 January 1510, John Stile to Henry). 
50 LPIi, 406 (LPI, 962-963; Sp.ii, 36; 23 March 1510), 416 (3 April 1510), 447:1 (LPI, 974; 1 April 1510). For 
the 1492 accord, see R.L. Storey, The Reign of Henry VII, pp.80-81. England ratified the treaty on 20 June, upon 
which date a copy was sent to the pope for confirmation; LPIi, 498-499 (LPI, 1106-1108; 20 June 1510), 519:47-
48 (LPI, 1104-1105; 20 June 1510). Notably, Bainbridge was only commissioned to seek papal confirmation of 
the treaty in mid-September 1510
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prior to 6 April, reportedly on account of his pro-French sympathies.51 While the king was 
enthusiastic for a confederacy against France, as outlined earlier, the necessary pre-conditions 
did not exist for this to be in the English interest yet and England was not prepared to commit 
itself to war during 1510.52 The Anglo-French peace, therefore, was merely a continuation of 
a broader policy to confirm England’s amicable relations with its neighbours (in the short-
term) and, more specifically, a bid to ensure a continued income from the pensions due from 
France.53 
While this strategy was not inconsistent with Henry VIII’s longer-term plan for war 
against France, this was not communicated to Rome, which could only take Bainbridge’s 
                                                 
51 This again came from a Badoer despatch of 6 April; Ven.ii, 59 (LPIi, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the 
Signory, London). Henry
January, with regard to hi
 VIII had already acknowledged Bainbridge’s concern with Alidosi’s behaviour in late 
s obstruction of Silvester de Giglis in some unnamed business; LPIi, 354 (LPI, 1457; 
calendared end January 1510, [Henry to Bainbridge]). For other indicators of Henry’s continued belligerent 
tention
 Nevertheless, the Venetians were under the impression, both from their own ambassador in England and from 
the Signory, Rome), 41 (LPIi, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome), 45 (LPIi, 
 
sought domestic security, in the short-term at least, by renewing the kingdom’s existing peace treaties with its 
Scotland was renewed on 29 June 1509); 88 ( , 234; 29 June 1509), 94:107, 114 ( , 475; 19 July 
(27 September 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Constance), 621 (22 November 1509, Maximilian to 
Margaret of Savoy), 627 (28 November 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Fribourg). Vis-à-vis Spain, the 
English crown may well have envisaged the renewal of the Treaty of Medina del Campo (1489) through Henry’s 
0), 461 (Sp.ii, 38; LPI, 1055; 18 May 
in s, see for instance Ven.ii, 63 (LPIi, 434; 20 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
52
Bainbridge, that England’s recent peace with Scotland was or could be connected with preparations for a 
coalition against France. Indeed, by mid-March 1510, the republic was confident of immediate English (as well 
as Spanish, Imperial and other) adherence, if the pope formed such a league; Ven.ii, 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 22 
March 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 40 (LPIi, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to 
383; 2 March 1510, Signory to Badoer), 48 (LPIi, 398; 15 March 1510, Signory to Venetian ambassador in 
Rome), 52 (LPIi, 408; 24 March 1510, Donat to the Signory, Rome), 55 (LPIi, 425; 8 April 1510, Signory to the 
ambassador in Rome). 
53 It was mentioned earlier that, before war against France could be countenanced, Henry VIII’s inner circle first 
neighbours, which it proceeded to do between August 1509 and May 1510 (the 1502 perpetual peace treaty with 
LPIi LPI LPI
1509), 129 (LPI, 369; 30 July 1509), 153 (LPI, 474-475; 29 August 1509); LPI, 478 (29 August 1509). As far as 
the Empire was concerned, the existing amity with Maximilian I appears to have been confirmed by 7 Octoer 
1509, but this is unclear, as around September 1510, an approach was made for the emperor to renew existing 
mercantile treaties with England; LPIi, 196 (7 October 1509, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, ‘Lymisne’), 576 
marriage to Catherine of Aragon, given that the original pact had provided for the nuptials of Arthur to the 
Spanish princess. An Anglo-Spanish treaty was only concluded, though, on 24 May 1510 which, while 
confirming Medina del Campo, amounted to a new alliance; ibid., 21 (11 May 1509, Ferdinand to Henry), 22 
(Sp.ii, 3; calendared 11 May 1509 Ferdinand to his ambassador in England), 23 (Sp.ii, 8; calendared 11 May 
1509 Ferdinand to his ambassador in England), 162 (LPI, 490; 11 June 1509), 260 (Sp.ii, 32; ; 3 December 1509, 
Ferdinand to Catherine of Aragon), 321 (Sp.ii, 35; LPI, 793; 6 January 151
1510), 465 (20 May 1510), 468 (Sp.ii, 38-41; LPI, 1059; 24 May 1510), 485:51 (LPI, 1055; 18 May 1510). 
Henry VIII even continued the renewal of his father’s peace treaties with more minor heads of state, such as that 
with George duke of Saxony, ratified on 9 June 1511; ibid., 729 (LPI, 1565; 29 March 1511), 789 , 804:14 (LPI, 
1717-1718; 9 June 1511), 811 (10 July 1511, Henry to George Duke of Saxony). It is in this context that the 
Anglo-French accord of March 1510 ought to be viewed. 
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continued efforts at face value.54 Rumours of Anglo-French negotiations quickly reached 
Rome from England, however. The pope was certainly aware of them during an audience with 
Venetian representatives on 1 January 1510. He allegedly stated that Henry was forced to 
revert to his father’s peace policy because of the negative response to his letter to cease the 
war by Louis XII and the majority opinion of his Council. Julius was aware that a French 
embassy was in England, and the nature of its mission did not require much guesswork.55 
This engendered concern in Rome and, as a result, the concerned parties, in particular the 
pope an
eded him.  
d Venice, in collusion with Bainbridge, concocted a plan to forestall the treaty. It was 
apparently agreed around 12 March that direct steps be taken to urge Henry VIII against this 
course, both by using Bainbridge and by commissioning Christopher Fisher to go to England 
to present the king with a papal honour, the Golden Rose.56 A preparatory brief, presumably 
explaining the papacy’s desire for Henry to break off the talks with France, prec 57
Curiously, there was no urgency for Fisher to leave Rome, as the rose was not presented to 
                                                 
54 Up to news of the Anglo-French accord arriving in Rome, Bainbridge continued to encourage the belief that 
Henry VIII would commit against Louis XII. He certainly appears to have had the Venetians convinced of this; 
that England’s recent peace with Scotland was or could be connected with preparations for a coalition against 
France. Furthermore, by mid-March 1510, the republic was confident of immediate English (as well as Spanish, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
Imperial and other) adherence, if the pope formed such a league; Ven.ii, 39 (LPIi, 360, 373; 22 March 1510, 
Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 40 (LPIi, 373; 24 February 1510, Paulo Capello to the Signory, 
Rome), 41 (LPIi, 384; 1 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassadors in Rome), 45 (LPIi, 383; 2 March 
1510, Signory to Badoer), 48 (LPIi, 398; 15 March 1510, Signory to Venetian ambassador in Rome), 52 (LPIi, 
408; 24 March 1510, Donat to the Signory, Rome), 55 (LPIi, 425; 8 April 1510, Signory to the ambassador in 
Rome). 
55 C. Shaw, Julius II, p.240. As, from 14 February 1510, the Venetian ambassador Badoer communicated home 
the movements of French ambassadors at the English Court, it is reasonable to assume that the papacy was aware 
of this intelligence as well (being an ally of the republic and having its own nuncios in England); Ven.ii, 52 
(LPIi, 365, 385; 14 February 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 56 (LPIi, 395; 12 March 1510, Badoer to the 
Signory, London). 
56 Chambers suggests that the mission and briefs were Fisher’s idea. In support of this, the Venetians urged the 
pope to issue ‘ample promises’, presumably financial given that the French paid pensions, both to Fisher and the 
king’s principal councilors to secure this end; LPIi 418 (LPI, 976; 5 April 1510, Julius to Warham, Rome); 
Ven.ii, 49 (LPIi, 402; 17 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.29-31. The Venetian Signory also urged Badoer in England to keep the crown on course in a 
despatch of 17 March; Ven.ii, 50 (LPIi, 401; 17 March 1510, Signory to Badoer).  
57 That the brief urged Henry to break with the French is implied by Bainbridge having hidden it in the cover of a 
book, in order to avoid its interception by French interests on the road; Ven.ii, 51 (LPIi, 407; 23 March 1510, 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 52 (LPIi, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); 
D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.30. According to Venetian sources, a second papal brief was to be sent 
with Fisher himself; Ven.ii, 53 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 1510, 
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Bainbridge until 1 April and, even then, Fisher was not due to leave until the 8th, albeit with 
haste through France.58 The plan failed, however, and Julius II was incensed when the news 
first reached him around 11-12 April 1510. When Bainbridge subsequently visited the pope to 
deny any prior knowledge of the treaty and to pledge that Henry VIII would still go to war 
with France, the temperamental Julius II reacted just as one may have expected; ‘You are all 
rascals!’ he shouted at the ambassador.59 In fact, Bainbridge may have known what was going 
on at home, as he intimated to a Venetian diplomat on 23 March; that, ‘between England and 
France there would be neither peace nor war [that year], both parties holding their own’.60 In 
other words, the renewal of the peace treaty would not change anything in practical terms. 
Given the volatility of the pontiff, however, Bainbridge perhaps deemed it prudent not to push 
this line of argument. Indeed, while his reported refusal to perform or even attend a mass 
celebrating the treaty may have betrayed his own opinion on the matter, one can also interpret 
                                                 
58 Ven.ii, 54 (LPIi, 417; 3 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The Venetians became 
quite impatient with Fisher’s not departing and urged its importance through their ambassador in Rome on a 
number of occasions; ibid., 51 (LPIi, 407; 23 March 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 55 
(LPIi, 425; 8 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). Furthermore, letters of commendation 
issued for Fisher on 9 April suggest that he may not even have left Rome until this date; LPIi, 426 (LPI, 982; 9 
April 1510, Cardinal Riario to Henry, Rome), 427 (LPI, 983; 9 April 1510, Cardinal Isvalies to Henry, Rome). 
Even after it was known that Fisher’s mission would be unsuccessful, Venice’s doge and senate opined that it 
would still be worthwhile, as it would at least raise Louis XII’s suspicions; Ven.ii, 60 (LPIi, 433; 19 April 1510, 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
n.ii, 56 (LPIi, 432; 8, 11, 12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory; 12 
59 Venetian sources cited the pope as receiving news of the league in letters from France, dated 2 April and 
through letters from Peter Griphus in England. News of the peace was received in Venice (from Rome) during 
the night of 17-18 April and the treaty was initially taken at face value as signifying the loss of England as a 
prospective ally against France. Bainbridge, doubtless hoping to avoid the pope’s initial anger, kept a low profile 
by going hunting; Ve
March 1510, Badoer to the Signory); 57 (LPIi, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Prozil to Zuan Badoer), 58 
(LPIi, 432; 15 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.27; W.E. Wilkie, 
Cardinal Protectors, pp.42-43. For accounts of the French celebrations in Rome, see Ven.ii, 56 (LPIi, 432, 8, 11, 
12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory; 12 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 57 (LPIi, 
432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Prozil to Zuan Badoer), 58 (LPIi, 432; 15 April 1510, Donato to the Signory, 
Rome). 
60 The significance of this statement, however, does not seem to have been noted, as the orator, in his letter of 
12th, refers to Bainbridge’s denial of any prior knowledge of this league. If the English diplomat did know that 
England would not go to war during 1510, this would be consistent with the plans of Henry’s senior councillors 
at this time; Ven.ii, 52 (LPIi, 408; 24 March 1510, Donato to the Signory, Rome), 56 (LPIi, 432; 8, 11, 12 April 
1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
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this as an ‘English’ response.61 From this episode, it is apparent that Julius II quickly adopted 
a pragmatic political perspective; he did not object per se to the negotiations being conducted, 
indeed, he himself was no stranger to such double dealing, but it was the outcome of the 
negotiations to which he objected and his failure to affect them. 
 It seems, therefore, that the Anglo-French agreement was a ‘public relations’ disaster 
for the English crown, forcing Henry and his ministers to move quickly to dispel any fears 
and to convince its potential allies of its commitment against France.62 A communication was 
reportedly sent to the pope from the king on this subject; that it revealed a continued 
commitment to an anti-French coalition is suggested by its allegedly being formulated as a 
minute to be sent to Bainbridge, so that the French should not see it. This may have reached 
Rome by 21-22 April and was to be read aloud to the pope.63 A copy of the treaty also seems 
to have been sent for the pope’s perusal.64 While Fox and Ruthal reportedly understood that 
Julius II greatly distrusted England after he heard of the peace, the placatory missive from 
                                                 
had assured him that the peace had been made to the republic’s 
 sense that the message to Rome was different. This letter may have been intercepted and read by the 
dinand, London). 
61 Bainbridge, however, did allow bonfires to be lit outside his house and wine was available for passers-by; 
Ven.ii, 57 (LPIi, 432; 12 April 1510, Hieronimo da Porzil to Zian Badoer, Rome), 58 (LPIi, 432; 21 April 1510, 
Donato to the Signory, Rome). 
62 The Spanish ambassador in England claimed to have gained an admission from sources close to the king ‘that 
the manner was bad in which the alliance [with France] was concluded’. The same orator also conveyed 
ministerial displeasure when it was heard about ‘how arrogantly the French had behaved’ upon the conclusion of 
the peace; Luis Caroz, dated 29 May 1510; Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, 
London), 46 (LPIi, 478; 29 May 1510, Spanish ambassador in England to Miguel Almazan). Similarly, Badoer 
reported that Henry and many of his ministers 
advantage and quoted Henry as adding ‘I wish thee [Venice] vastly well’. The Venetians may also have been 
convinced of the ‘true’ nature of the Anglo-French compact once their orator in Rome had opened and read the 
king’s correspondence to Bainbridge; Ven.ii, 59 (LPIi, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 61 (LPIi, 413; 
30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 66 (LPIi, 450; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 
67 (LPIi, 463; 18 May 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London), 73 (LPIi, 493; 8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, 
London), 74 (LPIi, 508; 25 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London); LPIi, 441 (26 April 1510, Signory to the 
Venetian ambassador in Rome), 531 (17 July 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
63 The exact meaning of this communication’s sleight of hand is uncertain, but the intention is clear; the contents 
were not intended for view by French eyes. In addition, Badoer reported that a brief on the same subject was sent 
to Maximilian, albeit ‘somewhat modified’. Again, given that the emperor was still an ally of France at this time, 
it makes
Venetian ambassador in Rome, who reported home that the English king was still friendly to them; Ven.ii, 59 
(LPIi, 421; 6 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory); LPIi, 441 (26 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador 
in Rome). The date of arrival can be speculated from the Venetians’ receipt of news of this treaty around 17-18 
April; Ven.ii, 60 (LPIi, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
64 Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Fer
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Henry must have predated their receipt of this news.65 The English rearguard action was 
successful and it was not long before Julius II recognised that the Anglo-French peace was not 
an act of treachery on Henry VIII’s part.66 Indeed, Richard Fox and Thomas Ruthal revealed 
to the Spanish orator towards the end of May 1510 that the pope ‘had been somewhat 
that he acquire allies and that at least a year was needed to prepare.70 While the king 
comforted’ since seeing the treaty.67 
 In spite of English reassurances, a calculated risk had been taken by virtue of the 
Anglo-French agreement, as the guarantee given to Louis XII about the security of his 
northern borders gave him chance to focus on his Italian ambitions, thereby threatening the 
papacy. Consequently, it was increasingly reported that Louis XII planned to cross the Alps 
that year.68 There was, however, nothing that Henry VIII could do in the near future, as he did 
all the groundwork to prepare for a war, so it was pragmatic that he benefit from the interim 
peace.69 English ministers had imposed a number of conditions before any breach with France 
could occur; by May-June 1510, it had been apparently stipulated that Henry produce an heir, 
                                                 
65 The ministers reportedly told the Spanish ambassador about the pope’s reaction towards the end of May 1510; 
arly led by Fox and 
 on the king before he went to war, all 
ibid.. 
66 The Venetians also realised quite early on (before the end of April) that the arrangement may not spell the end 
of English involvement in a future anti-French league; Ven.ii, 60 (LPIi, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the 
Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
67 Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). 
68 Ferdinand was sure, from intelligence emanating from Rome and France, that Louis was marching south, 
intending, among other things, to replace the pope. He wrote in this vein to Luis Caroz in England, although the 
orator was not to disclose this information to Henry VIII until after an Anglo-Spanish alliance had been 
arranged; ibid., 47 (LPIi, 481, May 1510, Ferdinand to the Viceroy of Naples), 48 (calendared June 1510, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 50 (LPIi, 483; calendared June 1510, Ferdinand to his ambassador in 
England). As it was, the French king was still in Blois on 5 July and did not look to be going anywhere, although 
he did have a considerable force already in Italy under de Chaumont; LPIi, 522 (5 July 1510, Louis XII to de 
Chaumont, Blois). 
69 For the lucrative French pensions, see LPIi, 399 (LPI, 952; 16 March 1510, Louis XII to the Earl of 
Shrewsbury, Paris), 444, 449:19 (LPI, 1027; April 1510), 535 (LPI, 1181; 22 July 1510), 538 (LPI, 1182; 22 July 
1510); 744, 751:2 (LPI, 1632; 25 April 1511), LPIi, 916, 924:34 (LPI, 1919; 27 October 1511), 981 (LPI, 2026; 
9 December 1511). On initially hearing of the Anglo-French peace in Rome, there was speculation there that the 
English would receive an enhanced pension from the French as the result of this deal; Ven.ii, 56-58 (LPIi, 432; 8, 
11, 12 April 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For the English crown following Ferdinand of 
Aragon’s advice to enjoy the benefits of peace until a league could be concluded, see above n.42. 
70 The ministerial pressure on Henry VIII’s intended foreign policy already cited, particul
Ruthal, galvanised by May-June 1510 into a number of conditions placed
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attempted to meet these conditions, the momentum for the creation of an anti-French coalition 
shifted decisively to Rome where the pope, now an open enemy of France, was in need of 
allies.71 The Venetians appear to have recognised this impasse and urged the pope to speed up 
negotiations with England on several occasions between June and August 1510.72 Julius II’s 
fightback would have begun, partly unintentionally, with the arrival of Christopher Fisher in 
                                                                                                                                                        
London (by 8 June) to present the Golden Rose to Henry, with all of the underlying political 
symbolism that that entailed. The nuncio’s original mission to prevent the Anglo-French 
peace had probably morphed into one which sought Henry VIII’s adhesion to an anti-French 
alliance.73 In addition, from perhaps late June 1510, with the papacy on the verge of 
hostilities against Genoa and Ferrara, Julius’ impatience with Henry VIII’s apparent inaction 
caused him to put further diplomatic pressure on England by a combination of 
correspondence, working through Bainbridge and the despatch of an embassy. Henry was sent 
a letter from the pope around the end of June or the start of July, requesting that he help resist 
led an army in person, secondly, England needed to acquire allies (notably Ferdinand, Maximilian and Julius II) 
and, finally, time was needed for preparation (Fox was quoted as saying ‘another year something will be 
done…Let this year glide by’ and, later, unquoted crown sources argued that nothing could be done during 1510 
t must suffice to merely identify their emergence in three separate diplomatic reports (two Venetian of 15 
 Concerning their caution, compared to the king, the Spaniard Caroz, on 
incipal councillors (of whom he named 
s, vi, pp.327-329, 332-336; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.252-265.  
 still be useful, 
of which follow on from the strategy pursued during 1509. Firstly, Henry needed to produce an heir before he 
because ‘we are at a distance’). While time and space limits the ability to demonstrate these ‘conditions’ in depth 
here, i
April and 25 June and one Spanish of 29 May 1510). The former cites a conversation with Fox, whom Badoer 
describes as ‘alter rex’, while the latter gives accounts of discussions with Henry, Fox, Ruthal and other, 
unnamed, principal councillors.
reporting his negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish alliance, described the pr
only Fox and Ruthal) as being very different from the king; slow to conclude anything and tending to raise their 
king’s suspicions; Sp.ii, 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London). For Badoer’s 
despatches, see Ven.ii, 64 (LPIi, 430; 15 [April] 1510, Badoer to the Signory), 74 (LPIi, 508; 25 June 1510, 
Badoer to the Signory, London).  
71 Julius II began to move against French interests within Italy during 1510 (from August onwards), notably 
Ferrara and Genoa. Against the former, the pope decided to lead the campaign in person and made his way to 
Bologna, where in October, he came close to being captured by the French commander, de Chaumont; L. Pastor, 
History of the Pope
72 On 27 June 1510, Venice instructed its ambassador to Rome to this end, arguing, perhaps optimistically, that if 
Julius declared himself against France, England (along with other powers) would follow suit. Two further 
despatches to the same effect were sent in August; Ven.ii, 68 (LPIi, 525; 10 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador in Rome), 76 (LPIi, 558; 23 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 77 (LPIi, 
558; 2 August 1510; Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
73 Ibid., 73 (LPIi, 493; 8 June 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). Once the Venetian government had 
reflected on the Anglo-French peace (by 10 April 1510), it believed that the Fisher mission would
as it could not fail to offend Louis XII; ibid., 60 (LPIi, 433; 19 April 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador 
in Rome). Also see above pp.132-135. 
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the French threat to the Church (and Italy), arguing that Ferdinand and Maximilian were about 
to adopt this course.74 It seems, however, that the courier carrying this missive, along with 
correspondence from Bainbridge, was intercepted by the French.75 On hearing this, the 
Venetian government predicted that Henry VIII would be extremely angry and that the pope 
would inflame the situation.76 Further correspondence to the same end was despatched by the 
pope towards the end of July, accompanying a nuncio.77 Secondly, the pope seems to have 
used Bainbridge as a conduit to lobby the English monarch. Notably, the aforementioned 
intercepted messenger was also carrying correspondence with a similar message from the 
ambassador, although intended for a nuncio in England. One can speculate, therefore, that the 
orator was working under instruction from the pope himself here, as otherwise he would 
surely have addressed this directly to the king or one of his ministers.78 In terms of embassies, 
the pope already had Fisher in England, but he also had the sub-collector Peter Griphus to call 
upon; both were probably working towards an English breach with France (under instruction 
                                                 
10, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The gravity of the situation 
d, Julius II ordered this nuncio to obey 
74 One gets a sense of the contents of this correspondence through Maximilian in separate letters to his daughter 
and to Henry; LPIi, 562 (31 August 1510, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, Landeck), 564 (LPI, 1221; 2 
September 1510, Maximilian to Henry, Visbourg). According to the Venetian government, Henry was not the 
only prince to whom the pope wrote in this vein. The Venetians also instructed Badoer to assist in this project 
and to work closely with the resident papal nuncios; Ven.ii, 71 (LPIi, 529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador in Rome), 72 (LPIi, 530; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The republic 
again attempted to lobby Henry VIII through their own ambassador in England during September and, implicitly, 
November; ibid., 81 (LPIi, 570; 9 September 1510, Signory to Badoer), 87-88 (LPIi, 613; 16 November 1510, 
Signory to Badoer).  
75 News of this interception, which reportedly occurred in France, was known in Rome by 8 August 1510; LPIi, 
553 (8 August 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Based on the description of contents later 
summarised by Maximilian, it is reasonable to assume that this was the papal missive sent originally at the turn 
of June-July; see n.74. 
76 Ven.ii, 77 (LPIi, 558; 23 July 15
caused by this intercept is also indicated by Sir Thomas Spinelly (based in the Low Countries), in his despatch to 
the deputy of Calais. Spinelly speculated that intelligence received concerning the sending of a French 
ambassador to England was linked to Louis XII’s need to excuse his actions; LPIi, 568 (9 September 1510, 
Thomas Spinelly to Sir Gilbert Talbot, Brussels). 
77 See p.382. 
78 Not only did Bainbridge’s missive accompany that of the pope’s (and was intercepted), but it is reported to 
have conveyed the same message; Bainbridge apparently instructed the nuncio (perhaps Griphus, but probably 
Fisher) ‘to speak very boldly’ to Henry, urging him to seize the opportunity ‘to recover all that belongs to him’, 
alluding to the English claim to the kingdom of France. Indee
Bainbridge’s instructions. In addition, the Venetians evidently believed that Julius II was employing the English 
orator in this manner and were eager for this to continue; Sp.ii, 52 (10 September 1510, Hieronymo de 
Cabanillas to Ferdinand, Tours); Ven.ii, 79 (LPIi, 567; 7 September 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in 
Rome).  
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from Rome).79 In addition, a military setback for the pope at Genoa reportedly caused him to 
despatch ‘Zuan Englese’, perhaps a nuncio, to the king by 28 July, carrying letters urging him 
to the same anti-Gallic end.80 Furthermore, the papacy seems to have considered stronger 
measures to induce potential confederates, including England. There is an indication that, by 
the summer of 1510, the pope had attempted to bully England into making a financial 
contribution towards the anti-French cause through the medium of crusading taxes, but this 
was reportedly resisted by Henry VIII.81 Also, by the beginning of September, Julius II seems 
to have toyed with the idea of employing spiritual weapons against France, perhaps with the 
hope that his potential allies would publicly display themselves as enemies of the Most 
Christian King.82 An interdict was not fulminated against France, however, until 1512.83 
 
Meanwhile, Bainbridge continued to work hard in Rome towards the anti-French aim 
of his commission, lobbying the pope towards a coalition and cooperating with friendly 
fellow ambassadors towards this end, in spite of the Anglo-French peace.84 Around 20 May, 
                                                 
79 On 8 June, Badoer reported that Fisher had been working in the Venetian (i.e. anti-French) interest, which 
coincided with the papacy’s at this time; Ven.ii, 73 (LPIi, 493; 8 June, 15 July 1510, Badoer to the Signory, 
London). For the pope’s reported displeasure that Griphus and Fisher did not succeed in winning the king over, 
see LPIi, 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London). It was also the republic’s understanding that the 
nuncios in England would be pursuing this end, so they instructed their orator to assist them; Ven.ii, 71 (LPIi, 
er’s support against France; Ven.ii, 70 (LPIi, 525; 10 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian 
peace of March 1510; D. Hay, ‘Pietro Griffo, an Italian in 
-1512,’ Italian Studies, ii (1938), pp.124-125. Lunt, however, has detected no such papal demand; 
2 (LPIi, 530; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). He must have been 
529; 15 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
80 LPIi, 541 (28 July 1510, from a friend to Peter Bibiena, Rome). That ‘Englese’ was a nuncio is suggested by a 
Venetian letter, dated around the beginning of July, which supports a papal proposal to send such a delegate to 
England to seek the latt
ambassador in Rome). Overall, the Venetians approved of the various strategies employed by Rome to break the 
Anglo-French peace, as was indicated, for example, on 23 July; ibid., 75 (LPIi, 558; 23 July 1510, Signory to the 
Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
81 This threat is reported by the Venetian ambassador in Rome during the summer of 1510 and seems to mark 
part of the papal response to the Anglo-French 
England: 1506
W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, p.160. 
82 Indeed, the Venetians entertained this hope and consequently encouraged the pontiff in this course; Ven.ii, 79 
(LPIi, 567; 7 September 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).  
83 See p.192. 
84 The Venetians in particular continued to cultivate the archbishop’s friendship for this purpose; Ven.ii, 62 
(LPIi, 456; 12 May 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 65 (LPIi, 479; 25 May 1510, Signory 
to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 69 (LPIi, 525; 3 July 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in 
Rome), 7  
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perhaps buoyed by the expectation of an imminent Anglo-Spanish alliance, Bainbridge 
allegedly told his Venetian counterpart that, if Louis XII attacked the pope, Henry would 
attack him, as he was not bound by the earlier agreement with France in this respect.85 Prior 
to 9 August 1510, Bainbridge had absented himself from Rome, causing rumours to be spread 
that he was travelling back to England in haste, presumably on a mission concerning hostility 
against France. The Venetian ambassador in Rome, however, soon reported that this was not 
the case and speculated that the story was planted to worry the French.86 Bainbridge nailed 
his colours firmly to the mast in the days following 19 October, when the pope lay ill and 
besieged within Bologna by French forces; he went (along with his Spanish counterpart) to 
the commander Chaumont and demanded that he withdraw, under pain of Henry VIII 
attacking France.87 The English ambassador may have received instructions to make direct 
vertures concerning an anti-French league in the later months of 1510; sometime around 19 
Novem
from such a treaty were based on the lack of Spanish and Imperial involvement to share costs. 
o
ber, Bainbridge proposed to the pope and Venetians a tripartite league, pledging that 
Henry VIII would attack France in the north, although Julius II allegedly declined this on the 
grounds of expense.88 Presumably, the pope’s complaints of the financial burden resulting 
In reality, the pontiff may have been reluctant to combine formally against France without the 
adherence of one of these ‘superpowers’. It is unlikely that this proposal originated in 
                                                                                                                                                        
perceived as performing effectively, as Badoer reported home on 11 May that he had convinced Henry VIII to 
overturn his decision to send a doctor to Rome to confer with the pope on behalf of the republic, because 
Bainbridge was doing such a good job; ibid., 66 (LPIi, 450, 455; 30 April 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
85 LPIi, 466 (20 May 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). A defensive alliance with Spain, 
o da Porzil, Rome). 
64-265. 
LPIi, 624; 24 November 1510, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 90 (LPIi, 617; 19 
which seems to have been a precursor to the anti-French league, was concluded on 24 May 1510; Sp.ii, 42 (LPIi, 
472), 44 (LPIi, 476; 29 May 1510, Luis Caroz to Ferdinand, London), 46 (LPIi, 478; 29 May 1510, Spanish 
ambassador in England to Miguel Almazan), 50 (LPIi, 483; June[?] 1510, Ferdinand to Luis Caroz). 
86 LPIi, 554 (9 August 1510, letters that reached Venice from Hieronym
87 According to the French orator d’Arizolles, Bainbridge took credit for the French not taking Bologna; LPIi, 
674 (10 January 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London); C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.2
88 Ven.ii, 89 (
November 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory), 91 (LPIi, 630; 30 November 1510, Signory to 
the Venetian ambassadors in Rome). 
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England, however, as it claimed that James IV of Scotland would head the Venetian 
contingent.89 On 4 January 1511, Bainbridge, as Maximilian understood, was intriguing with 
the pope and Venetians against him (to gain a red hat).90 The same impression was confirmed 
by the French ambassador in England on 10 January, although d’Arizolles lay emphasis on 
the archbishop’s writing back to Henry VIII firmly in the pope’s favour (against the French 
interest).91 It is possible that Bainbridge became frustrated at English inaction against France, 
as it was reported by the French ambassador in England (April 1511) that the cardinal now 
only contacted Henry VIII through his groom of the stool, William Compton, as he feared the 
influence of others as French pensioners.92 Indeed, a crown commitment to a continuation of 
the peace policy towards France was sent to Bainbridge in September, when he was instructed 
to seek confirmation of the Anglo-French treaty.93 Again, though, this must be interpreted in 
terms of the wider English commitment to ensure peace with its neighbours in the immediate 
term, while preparing for conflict in the future. 
 
 The papacy continued its encouraging approach to England into 1511, when Julius 
raised Bainbridge to the Sacred College on 10 March.94 Julius II’s intentions were even more 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 90 (LPIi, 617; 19 November 1510, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). Not only was this 
incredibly unlikely, politically speaking, but at an earlier point in 1509, misunderstanding of the Anglo-Scottish 
relationship can be seen in rumours that circulated in Rome concerning a joint Anglo-Scottish attack on France, 
 to have the 
e king; if Louis XII 
er probable reason for the promotion was to load the College of Cardinals 
in defence of Venice; see above p.364. 
90 The emperor elect referred to Bainbridge as the archbishop of Canterbury, however, but it was clear who he 
meant. He complained that the orator’s true motive was to gain entry to the Sacred College. As a result of 
Bainbridge’s actions, the emperor instructed Margaret to write to Henry, saying that she could not believe that he 
was acting under orders from England and that, instead, he should be told to act in concert with the Imperial 
diplomats (as well as the Spanish and Scottish); LPIi, 669 (4 January 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy, 
Fribourg in Brisco). Also see ibid., 681 (LPIi, 1458; January 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Mechelin). 
91 Ibid., 674 (10 January 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London). 
92 Ibid., 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, London). It was, however, in the English interest
French believe at this point that Bainbridge was a lone, anti-Gallic voice, trying to corrupt th
perceived that Henry was planning war, he would cease to pay the pensions. 
93 W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.43. 
94 The political nature of the promotion is emphasised by the elevation, at the same time, of other candidates 
closely associated with existing or potential papal allies, for example Matthew Schiner for the Swiss and 
Matthew Gurk for the Empire. Anoth
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blatant when, a week later, he commissioned the new cardinal to be legate a latere to a 
division of the papal army fighting against the French and their allies.95 Bainbridge’s 
prominence as English ambassador and within England’s ecclesiastical hierarchy would be 
highlighted in this role he played in the war; it would associate Henry VIII with the anti-
French conflict being waged in Italy. If it did not induce Henry to become a participant of his 
own accord, then perhaps France would declare war on England on account of Bainbridge’s 
involvement. This measure was reported by Venetian sources to have had some success in 
England, towards the beginning of May; in reply to the French ambassador’s complaint of 
Bainbridge’s military role, Henry had allegedly answered that he was happy to assist the 
Church, arguing that Louis XII was at fault for supporting the duke of Ferrara (the object of 
Bainbridge’s campaign), given that he was a vassal of the papacy.96 
 Back in England, the crown continued on the same cautious course; Henry’s plan for 
war with France, tempered by the various conditions that needed to be met. Nevertheless, Fox 
ad intimated back in 1510 that the crown would act this year.97 Indeed, the intention of the 
traced to the beginning of 1511. Both campaigns can easily be interpreted as intended to 
h
English to participate in two expeditions during 1511, a Spanish crusade against the Moors in 
North Africa, and the Imperial conflict with the French-backed duke of Guelders, can be 
                                                                                                                                                        
with politically sympathetic members who would not be likely to elect a ‘French’ candidate in the event of 
Julius’ deposition; Ven.ii, 98 (LPIi, 714; 10 March 1511, a private letter received in Venice from Hieronimo 
Lipomano, Ravenna); LPIi, 718 (13 November 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy); C. Shaw, Julius 
II, p.272. Also see above, pp.289-293. 
95 During May, he was said to have had 2,000 Spanish troops with him; Ven.ii, 99 (LPIi, 720; 15 March 1511, 
o the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 104 
, Ravenna). 
 produced, Henry had made an alliance with Spain and negotiations 
Donato to the Signory), 101 (LPIi, 754; 2 May 1511, Signory t
(LPIi, 765; 8-10 May 1511, Proveditor Capello to the Signory, Dinale). Also see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, pp.36-37, 81-93. 
96 LPIi, 776 (23 March 1511, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory
97 See above n.70. While an heir had not been
with the emperor were ongoing. The lack of heir to allow Henry VIII’s personal leadership of a campaign against 
France may explain the indirect actions taken during 1511. For English efforts with Maximilian, see for instance 
Ven.ii, 61 (LPIi, 413; 30 March 1510, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
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worry the French king.98 The desire to act more directly, however, was indicated by William 
Warham (traditionally cited as a member of the ‘peace party’ within the Council), writing to 
Lord Darcy, prior to the latter’s leading the English contingent on crusade in March 1511. The 
archbishop conveyed his wish ‘that he [Darcy] and his archers, when sent out of England, 
were to be with the Pope “to strength him against the enemies of the Church, which be little 
better than infidels”’.99 In reality, however, the security of an appropriate coalition still did 
not exist in which Henry VIII could do this; he was waiting for one of the ‘superpowers’ to 
                                                 
certainly have been interpreted as a potential threat in France, indeed as sabre-rattling at the very least. Firstly, 
h wars, and Mother Church in 
S niard feared the French threat 
to his kingdom of Naples. That this expedition worried the French is indicated by the French ambassador in 
ngland
king and council had assured him that they were only to be employed against the Moors, one senses that 
June 1511, ‘Abbatis’ [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London), 795 (14 June 1511, [Lord Darcy] to [Ferdinand]), 797 
himself to support the prince against his enemies. The troops left England around the middle of July, for an 
success by around December. On 26 December, Henry promised Margaret more support against the same duke. 
Certainly, the Venetians interpreted it to be a diversionary attack on France, that would disrupt or even stall 
French action in Italy, giving the republic chance to reinforce its army; LPIi, 804:35 (LPI, 1740; 22 June 1511), 
809 (6 July 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Valence), 825 (Ven.ii, 116; 26 July 1511, Badoer to 
the Signory, London), 832 (calendared end July 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 851 (Ven.ii, 117; 26 
August 1511, Signory to Badoer), 856 (calendared end August 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 872 
enry to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich), 999 (26 December 1511, Henry 
6 (LPI, 1902; 17 October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Boisledue); J.J. 
ack to January 1510, 
bury). 
98 The presence of English expeditionary forces around the southern and north-eastern borders of France would 
Lord Darcy’s crusading mission (consisting of 1,000 archers) of May-June 1511 responded to a request from 
Ferdinand to assist in fighting the Moors of North Africa, but the Spaniard cancelled the expedition shortly prior 
to the English crusaders’ arrival in Spain, as ‘at present Christendom is vexed wit
so great necessity’. Roughly translated, on account of the fall of Bologna, the pa
E , writing around 8 April that, while Henry was going to send the requested archers to Spain and that both 
d’Arizolles suspected an ulterior motive; LPIi, 724 (23 March 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy), 727-728 
(28 March 1511), 730 (LPI, 5741; calendared end March 1511, instructions to Lord Darcy), 731:12 (LPI, 1531; 8 
March 1511), 731:41 (LPI, 1562; 28 March 1511), 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet London), 742 
(LPI, 1622; 20 April 1511, Ferdinand to Henry, Seville), 787 (6 June 1511, [Lord Darcy] to Ferdinand), 793 (14 
(LPI, 5743, 1726; 16 June 1511, Ferdinand to Lord Darcy, Seville); LPI, 1566 (29 March 1511); J.J. Scarisbrick, 
Henry VIII (1968), p.28. Sir Edward Poynings, on the other hand, was appointed admiral of an expeditionary 
force consisting of 1,000-1,500 soldiers to fight against the French-backed duke of Guelders in the Low 
Countries. His commission cited Henry’s observance of a treaty with Charles of Castile in which he committed 
initial three months, but were retained a further month on Margaret’s request, returning after achieving some 
(Ven.ii, 125; 27 September 1511, Badoer to the Signory), 884 (calendared end September 1511, Margaret of 
Savoy to Maximilian), 906 (LPI, 1902; 17 October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, ‘Boisledue’), 919 (28 
October 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 989 (15 December 1511, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, 
Greenwich), 992 (17 December 1511, H
to Margaret of Savoy, Greenwich); S.G. Ellis, ‘Poynings, Sir Edward (1459–1521)’, DNB (2004). For the sense 
that this was a political gesture designed to buy Maximilian’s friendship against France, see LPIi, 832 
(calendared end July 1511, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian), 884 (calendared end September 1511, Margaret 
of Savoy to Maximilian), 90
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.27-28. One may be able to trace the origins of this expedition b
around which time Margaret of Savoy, Charles’ regent, used this as a condition for her support in talking her 
father around to joining an anti-French league; LPIi, 355 (LPI, 923; calendared end January 1510, Henry to 
[Spinelly]). 
99 LPIi, 725 (LPI, 5740; 25 March 1511, Warham to Lord Darcy, Canter
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make the first move.100 The pope was growing impatient with English inaction and, by 8 
April, it was understood by the French ambassador in England that Julius wished to deprive 
Peter Griphus of the sub-collectorship, on account of his lack of success in this respect. Also, 
Christopher Fisher, was reportedly sent away from the pope, for the same failure.101 Julius 
did, however, commission Girolamo Bonvisi as nuncio and collector to England on 19 May, 
with instructions to rouse Henry against the French.102 
 
 England, Rome and Spain were shaken from their lack of urgency in forming an anti-
French coalition when Julius II lost Bologna on 23 May 1511. This acted as a wake-up call, at 
least as far as the English crown was concerned. Combined with the almost simultaneous 
citation from a group of dissident cardinals (supported by Louis XII and Maximilian) 
convoking a general council, the papacy appeared to be in grave danger. In territorial terms, 
Bologna’s strategic significance to the security of the Papal States and its symbolic 
importance as their second city would have been well-known to Henry VIII and his 
advisors.103 The proposed general council, if it met during a time of French military 
                                                 
100 As the Venetian orator, Badoer, revealed towards the beginning of May, Henry was reportedly ready to do 
‘great things against France should the King of Spain also do the like’. He also wished that Maximilian would 
ally with them; Ven.ii, 106 (LPIi, 759; 5-6 May 1511, Badoer to the Signory). The lack of English desire to act in 
any direct sense at this point is supported by Henry VIII’s less than hostile reaction towards approaches (from 
Louis XII and a group of dissident cardinals) for him to support the convocation of a general council against 
Julius II (November 1510-April 1511). In fact, the English king gave the impression that he was sympathetic to 
this move; LPIi, 625 (LPI, 1353; 25 November 1510, the cardinals at Pavia to Henry), 732 (LPI, 1581; 2 April 
1511, the cardinals at Milan to Henry). 
101 Griphus is referred to by d’Arizolles as ‘Andrew Gryst’; LPIi, 734 (8 April 1511, d’Arizolles to Robertet, 
London); also see p.34, n.86. 
102 W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.38; Ven.ii, 109 (LPIi, 829; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome 
to the Signory). This papal gesture may have been in response to a recent request from Venice to have Henry 
VIII ‘put in execution the offers made by him in case the King of France should come into Italy’ (supporting the 
idea that England was expected to act that year); ibid., 103 (LPIi, 761; 7 May 1511, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia). Bonvisi may already have been in England, as on 14 June, he received correspondence 
from Rome dated the 8th, which would have made his journey (as a diplomat) extremely quick; LPIi, 793 (14 
June 1511, Abbatis [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London). 
103 Strategically, the city sat at the head of the major artery through the Appenines and was the key to the 
Romagna. It also offered other tactical advantages vis-à-vis Venice, Florence and Milan Symbolically, Bologna 
was the second most populous city of the principality and was home to the most important legation of the Papal 
Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and States (not to mention the substantial revenues that accrued therefrom); D.S. 
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dominance in Italy, was likely to pronounce the deposition of the pope with the benefit of 
sufficient coercive power to effect this in practice. Julius II was so alarmed at the loss of 
Bologna that he wrote immediately to Henry VIII, presumably to request his urgent 
assistance.104 Bonvisi may well have received this communication on 6 June 1511, instructing 
him to urge England’s participation with the papacy and Spain in a league against France.105 
While the king’s response does not seem to have survived, Henry may have advertised the 
ope prior to 10 July that he intended to act, particularly on account of the loss of this papal 
                                                                                                                                                        
p
city. The crown’s actions in England must have indicated that definite moves had been made, 
as the Venetian ambassador there reported, on this date, that he was sure that a league 
Partner, , p.50. In addition, Bologna’s fall was significant insomuch that Julius II 
in great peril. On 30 May, Wingfield described a conversation he had held with the servant of a papal envoy 
re
‘should be so molested, “and most specially that the fault appeareth so largely in himself”’. In any case, 
Wingfield continued, he did not believe that the French would proceed beyond Bologna, which would cause the 
assador at the Curia to the Signory, Ravenna), 829 (Ven.ii, 109; 31 July 
conveyed through the Spanish ambassador. Bonvisi was instructed to convince 
I, 1676; 19 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, 
War, p.xvii; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.151-161, 275-276, 296-298; P. Partner, The Lands of St Peter, pp.438-440; P. 
The Papal State under Martin V
had only left the city as recently as 15 May; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.348-349. A flavour of the 
general reaction to the loss of the papal city can be gleaned from Sir Robert Wingfield (based at the emperor’s 
Court). On 27 May, he reported Maximilian’s minister, Cardinal Matthew Lang, as opining that the Anglo-
Spanish alliance would have made great progress if it had been enacted and that its failure to do so had resulted 
[Constantine] sent to the Emperor, where the latter expressed his hope that Henry (and Ferdinand) ‘would not 
suffer the F nch King to oppress him and the Church’. In reply, the English diplomat regretted that the pope 
Empire, Spain, as well as England to act. Interestingly, the papal servant considered that Henry was now freed 
from his commitment to the Anglo-French peace by virtue of Louis XII’s attack on the papacy, which echoes the 
sentiment that Bainbridge conveyed to his Venetian counterpart in Rome back in May 1510 (that, in such a case, 
Henry was not bound to his treaty with the Most Christian King and would, therefore, attack France); LPIi, 466 
(20 May 1510, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 780 (LPI, 1689, 1697; 27 and 30 May 1511, Sir 
Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck). 
104 According to the Venetian ambassador with the pope, similar briefs were also sent to the Empire and Spain; 
LPIi, 776 (23 May 1511, Venetian amb
1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.348-349. 
105 The brief was reportedly 
Henry to join the league and, while the English king had reportedly been preprared to do this since late May, he 
awaited Ferdinand gaining a definite answer from the pope on this matter before issuing a commission to 
conclude. This would not be aided by Bonvisi himself who, indulging in pro-French espionage, claimed that he 
would drag out negotiations for six months or more; LPIi, 793 (14 June 1511, Abbatis [Bonvisi] to Robertet, 
London), 829 (Ven.ii, 109; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). The English crown was 
also informed of the Bolognese crisis by one of its own diplomats; Sir Robert Wingfield, based with the 
emperor, reported as it unfolded; ibid., 773 (LP
Innsbruck), 777 (LPI, 1681; 24 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 780 (LPI, 1689, 1697; 27 
and 30 May 1511, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck). At some point around this time, Hadrian de 
Castello (probably based in Germany) reported hearing of the fall of Bologna and that there was no intelligence 
as to where the pope was in the aftermath; ibid., 1007 (LPI, 2039; calendared 1511, [de Castello] to Henry). 
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between England, Rome and Spain had been concluded.106 Henry VIII may have written 
again on this subject during July.107 He appears to have issued instructions to Bainbridge to 
conclude as soon as possible, as on 26 July he was quoted by Badoer as saying, ‘Ambassador! 
thou wilt soon hear some good news from Rome; and by this time the Signory must know 
all’.108 The English crown’s decision-making could not have been aided during these months 
by Bonvisi, who was involved in pro-French espionage and pledged to drag out the process of 
the league’s formation and even brief Henry’s councillors against the pope. He was 
unsuccessful, however, as his correspondence to France was intercepted and he was arrested 
by the end of July.109 
 
 A further inducement to join the anti-French papal cause came on 18-19 July 1511, 
when Julius II convoked the Lateran Council for 19 April 1512. Its aims were cited as peace 
among Christians and a crusade.110 In practical terms, however, the council would have been 
seen as a papal weapon to beat both the rival Council of Pisa and the French.111 By effectively 
forcing the French to become schismatics, Julius II was offering (spiritual) justification for 
war against them. Henry VIII’s commitment to support the papacy from this point was 
indicated formally and publicly by his sending an embassy (Young, accompanied by a 
Spanish ambassador) to Louis XII during August to demand that he to join ‘a general peace, 
therein providing for the rights of the Church and the restoration of Bologna, and leave the 
                                                 
106 This information was reported by Badoer to Venice in his despatch of this date; Ven.ii, 110 (LPIi, 812; 10 
July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
107 Such correspondence was expected from him in Rome by 7 August, according the Venetian orator there; LPIi 
842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
108 Ven.ii, 116 (LPIi, 825; 26 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
109 LPIi, 793 (14 June 1511, Abbatis [Bonvisi] to Robertet, London); Ven.ii, 109 (LPIi, 829; 31 July 1511, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 110 (LPIi, 812; 10 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
110 LPIi, 816 (18 July 1511). According to a Venetian source in Rome, however, it was not published until 
around 7 August; ibid., 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
111 Citations for the Council of Pisa were affixed to St Peter’s (and the other basilicas) in Rome on 9 June. The 
quick reaction of Julius II to this must be considered in this context; ibid., 794 (14 June 1511, letters to Venice 
from Hieronymo da Porzil, Rome). 
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holding of the Council to the Pope’.112 The English, therefore, had drawn a calculated line in 
the sand, beyond which its French counterpart had already stepped (and was never likely to 
retreat).113 On Young’s return, Henry’s Council agreed to war.114 In addition, England had 
begun to demonstrate indirectly that it was prepared to act militarily, by the departure of the 
Poynings expedition to fight in support of Imperial forces against the French-backed duke of 
Guelders by mid-July 1511.115  
 
 In Rome, negotiations for the league between England, Rome and Spain continued 
during July and August 1511. As the Venetians understood, they were to be excluded from 
e prospective alliance, unless they reached terms with the emperor.116 In other words, the th
urgent necessity for a coalition engendered by the loss of Bologna overrode the need to get 
Maximilian on-side, although the principal parties were not prepared to rule out his 
involvement entirely, nor were they prepared to make him an enemy (the natural outcome of 
                                                 
112
August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Valence), 850 (26 August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to 
Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 854 (Ven.ii, 119; 25 July – [?] August 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London), 860 (7 
September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, ‘La Palize’), 983 (11 December 1511, Jean de Veau to 
Margaret of Savoy, Blois); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.161. Among the Anglo-Spanish demands, other 
1511, Badoer to the Signory, London), 858 (2 September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons).  
113
as a last-ditch attempt to forestall war but, realistically speaking were expected to face rejection. Henry VIII (and 
Ferdinand) went on to rehearse the sending of this embassy in the Anglo-Spanish offensive alliance (November 
1511), when he sought to justify the intended conflict; Sp.ii, 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). 
Also see the Holy League itself of 4 October, prior to English adhesion; Ven.ii, 1346 (Sp.ii, 56; 4 October 1511). 
114
 Such an embassy seems to have been expected in France since the beginning of the month; ibid., 840 (7 
towns claimed by the Church were also to be ceded by Louis XII; LPIi, 854 (Ven.ii, 119; 25 July – [?] August 
 Such diplomatic approaches to rival heads of state were quite normal among belligerent parties, superficially 
 Vergil portrayed some discord within the meeting, particularly based on those who posited that the pope (as 
beneficiary of the Holy League) already had powerful allies in Spain and Venice, that England was too far away 
existed, it was not necessarily held among Henry’s inner circle, who 
n predates the fall of Bologna, it is not 
e, 
2; 10 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
to act and that, if it did act, they might be left facing France alone, once Louis XII was expelled from Italy. 
While such opposition to conflict may have 
had thus far facilitated their king’s road to war; D. Hay, Anglica Historia, pp.161-163; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry 
VIII, p.28. 
115 See above pp.385-386. While the background of the Guelders expeditio
unfeasible that it came to represent a response to the papacy’s loss of the city. Indeed, one could argue that this 
and English participation in the Spanish crusade represented only a partial English commitment against Franc
pre-Bologna, while following the city’s loss, Henry VIII was prepared to commit to direct warfare (as will be 
seen). 
116 Ven.ii, 108 (LPIi, 838; 15 July 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). Badoer also mentions 
this on 10 July, although he explains that Venice and the Empire could join the alliance, once they had settled 
their differences; ibid., 110 (LPIi, 81
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involving Venice in this league). By the end of July, a ‘grand consistory’ had also been held, 
presumably to discuss this situation.117 Indeed, correspondence was expected in Rome from 
England (and Spain), vis-à-vis the league, by 7 August.118 An agreement seems to have been 
concluded between the pope, English, Spanish and Venetian diplomats by 10 August.119 
Bainbridge apparently played a pivotal role in these negotiations and was reportedly confident 
that his king would accept the terms.120 Indeed, if Henry VIII was expecting ‘good news from 
ome’ in this regard around 26 July, then he must have given his ambassador the nod to 
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finalise an anti-French alliance towards the beginning of the month at the latest.121 Around the 
end of July, the pope may have written to Henry VIII again, protesting at the loss of Bologna. 
By then, however, Julius may have understood that England was finally prepared to act.122 
Perhaps in recognition of this, around the beginning of August, Julius sent 100 Parmesan 
cheeses, along with wines and other gifts to Henry VIII on a papal galley.123 It is highly likely 
that these were intended as inducements to an imminent ally of Rome. Indeed, intelligence 
 
117 See the tone of the Venetian ambassador, writing on 31 July; ibid., 109 (LPIi, 829; 31 July 1511, Venetian 
198; 18 May 1512), 1346 (Sp.ii, 56; 4 October 1511).  
’s loss; ibid., 109 (LPIi, 829; 31 July 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
118 So reported the Venetian ambassador there; LPIi 842 (7 August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). 
119 Ven.ii, 112 (LPIi, 844; 15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). The Venetians appear 
to have been happy with this and commissioned their ambassador to sign the alliance on their behalf as soon as 
possible; ibid., 113-114 (15 August 1511), 115 (15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). 
The conclusion of this agreement does not seem to have been a surprise, as the Venetian Signory issued an 
authorisation for its representative conclude this league on 14 August; ibid., 1344 (14 August 1511). On 26 
August, the Venetians instructed their ambassador in England to follow their curial representative’s instructions 
in inducing Henry VIII to join as quickly as possible. To this end, the Signory portrayed the French as 
committing serious ‘war crimes’; ibid., 117 (LPIi, 851; 26 August 1511, Signory to Badoer). 
120 See the Venetian Signory’s conveyance of thanks for his work in this matter and its general recognition of 
this, on 15 August and 20 October, respectively; ibid., 112 (LPIi, 844; 15 August 1511, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador in Rome), 1347 (20 October 1511). Indeed, the articles of the initial league, concluded on 4 October, 
which left a place for England, acknowledged Bainbridge’s contribution and, later, the Venetians, when 
proclaiming England’s adhesion to the league in May 1512, referred to its ‘entire conclusion [on Henry VIII’s 
behalf] having been negotiated by the Right Reverend Lord Christopher of York, Cardinal of England’; Ven.ii, 
163 (LPIi, 1
121 Ibid., 116 (LPIi, 825; 26 July 1511, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
122 Julius is also said to have written in the same vein to Ferdinand and Maximilian by the Venetian orator in 
Rome on 31 July. As a result of the letter to England not having been found, it is uncertain whether this was an 
entirely new piece of correspondence or if the Venetian was referring to that sent in the immediate aftermath of 
the city
123 Guicciardini emphasises the extraordinary nature of the visit of a ship flying the papal banner; LPIi 842 (7 
August 1511, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); S. Alexander, The History of Italy by Francesco 
Guicciardini, p.243. 
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emanating from England was all positive, as far as the papacy was concerned. Around 10 
October, it was reported that Henry had (recently) written to Rome to say that he would 
comply with the pope’s wishes.124 Similarly, letters from Peter Griphus that reached Rome 
towards the beginning of November reported Henry’s willingness to do all that he could for 
the pope.125 
 The Holy League ‘for the recovery of Bologna’ (and other occupied papal 
territories) was finally concluded in Rome between the papacy, Spain and Venice on 4 
October 1511, without England’s membership. One of its articles stated, however, that the 
league had been formed ‘with the participation and knowledge of the King of England’ and 
that his adhesion was postponed until the receipt of appropriate instructions by Bainbridge.126 
The English delay quickly unsettled at least one of the confederates, as the Venetians lobbied 
the pope and Bainbridge to ensure that it would occur.127 Julius II may not have heard of 
                                                 
124 Ven.ii, 130 (LPIi, 896; 10 October 1511, Badoer to the Signory). This letter was probably sent in late 
 Holy League had reached England, as reported by Venetian sources in 
ticle cited suggests that Bainbridge’s commission was delayed by postal problems and that the 
ment heard of the 
ome, expecting to hear that Bainbridge had 
s II (and Ferdinand) were urging Henry 
20 November, 
ntense pride and arrogance of the French’. In addition, the republic promised to send the 
September; LPIIii, p.1452. 
125 Griphus wrote before news of the
Rome; Ven.ii, 127 (LPIi, 923; letters received by Venice from Rome on 8 November 1511). 
126 The ar
confederates were no longer willing to postpone the league’s conclusion. This implies that the treaty may have 
been finalised earlier if the power from Henry had arrived; ibid., 1345-1346 (Sp.ii, 56; LPIi, 889; LPI, 1880-
1881; 4 October 1511). According to the Venetian ambassador there, the details of the treaty had been finalised 
by all parties by 29 September, but, because Bainbridge was insufficiently empowered, all parties could only 
hope at that stage that Henry VIII would still join. The league was published on 5 October in S. Maria del 
Popolo in Rome, at which ceremony it was reported that Henry VIII would join the alliance. Indeed, emblems of 
Henry VIII were carried in the celebratory procession on 10 October. Surely Bainbridge would not have 
permitted this if he was unsure of his king’s intentions. In addition, when the Venetian govern
league’s conclusion, it readily believed its ambassador’s claims that England would adhere. Similarly, an 
Imperial official at the French court believed, on 14 October, that England was already comprised in the alliance 
and that Ferdinand had pledged Henry’s ratification; LPIi, 873 (29 September 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to 
Venice, Rome), 892 (5 October 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Venice, Rome), 895 (Ven.ii, 123; Signory to the 
Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 896 (10 October 1511), 902 (14 October 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret 
of Savoy, Beaugency), 1347 (20 October 1511). 
127 As early as 13 October, Venice wrote to its ambassador in R
received his commission and that, in the meantime, it hoped that Juliu
VIII to this end. By the 20th, however, the state understood that the relevant correspondence was still yet to arrive 
(although it was expected imminently). By 25 October, Venice’s concern was such that it instructed its orator at 
the Holy See to adopt a conciliatory policy with Henry VIII, not only to have him join the league, but also to 
demonstrate his enmity towards the French. Even when Doge Loredano ratified the league on 
however, the power for Bainbridge had still not arrived. On 26 November, Venice optimistically informed 
Badoer that it expected England to have joined the Holy League by the time he received the letter, but still urged 
Henry ‘to humble the i
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Henry VIII’s intention to commit the league until the end of November at the earliest. In the 
meantime, Bainbridge claimed that correspondence both to and from him was being 
intercepted.128 This may have been an attempt to reassert that he retained influence with the 
king, although one cannot rule out such postal problems at this time. Indeed, Bainbridge 
seems to have implied some familiar reasons why English ratification was not forthcoming; 
mely, Hna enry’s distrust of Ferdinand and desire for Imperial adhesion to the Holy League.129 
Finally, the delay may have been motivated by a recent bout of serious illness suffered by 
Julius II; news of this reached England in September 1511, in response to which candidates 
were considered for the prospective conclave at the end of the month.130 When the crown was 
informed of the conclusion of the Holy League soon after, it is likely that caution was deemed 
expedient until the pontiff’s recovery was confirmed. It would be unwise to commit to this 
coalition when papal involvement may be withdrawn, if Julius’ successor were to be pro-
                                                                                                                                                        
Flanders galleys, now that it was allied with Spain, probably as an inducement to this end. Finally, on 10 
December, the Venetians instructed their ambassador in Rome to lobby the pope (and Spanish ambassador) to 
ensure that Henry VIII acted, as ‘the slightest stir made at the present moment by the King of England would 
bring the affairs of the French to ruin’; Ven.ii, 124 (LPIi, 900; 13 October 1511, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia), 126 (LPIi, 914; 25 October 1511, Signory to the Venetian secretary at the Curia), 131 
(LPIi, 958; 26 November 1511), 132 (LPIi, 960; 26 November 1511, Signory to Badoer), 134 (LPIi, 982; 10 
December 1511, Signory to the Venetian secretary at the Curia), 1347 (20 October 1511), 1348 (20 November 
1511). 
128 Ibid., 136 (LPIi, 965; 28 November 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Zuan Badoer, Rome). 
129 Ibid.. Initial distrust of Ferdinand arose from the latter’s rejection of Lord Darcy’s contingent to join in the 
planned crusade to north Africa only after the English had arrived in Spain. The desire for Maximilian’s 
membership was one of the outstanding conditions originally imposed on Henry VIII’s going to war, although it 
soon became clear that the English crown would be prepared to join a coalition without him; see above pp.385-
386. 
130 P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 35 (LPIi, 880; LPI, 3443; 30 September 1511, Wolsey to [Fox]). 
The perceived seriousness of Julius’ illness cannot be overstated; at one stage his death was deemed imminent 
and rumours that it had occurred spread through Christendom. The pope had recovered, however, by the end of 
the month; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.368-373; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.286-289. Also LPIi, 850 (26 
August 1511, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 858 (2 September 1511, Andrea da Borgo to 
Margaret of Savoy, Lyons), 865 (LPI, 1842; 16 September[?] 1511, Erasmus to Ammonius, Cambridge), 866 (18 
September 1511, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy). Finally, see above pp.236-237. 
 393
French.131 The English crown seems to have been aware of the pope’s recovery by late 
October, but that does not mean that concerns for his health had lifted completely.132 
 News of the Holy League reached England by 8 November and, while Ammonius 
reported that ‘England has not yet resolved what to do’, the crown’s commitment to Rome up 
to that point makes this is unlikely.133 Indeed, Henry VIII had apparently viewed the articles 
of the Holy League by 9 November and reportedly intended to send an envoy to Rome to 
adhere to it on his behalf. 134 Ratification was issued on 13 November.135 The commission to 
Bainbridge, however, was not issued until 4 December.136 This delay may be explained again 
partly by continued English concerns for the pope’s health. It was probably also motivated by 
the crown’s fear of being left isolated; immediately after he heard of the settlement of the 
Holy League, Henry sought a formal, supplementary agreement of Spanish support in the 
planned offensive. Bainbridge voiced this concern to a Venetian diplomat, towards the end of 
November 1511, who quoted him as saying, ‘I am more afraid of Spain than of France, on 
account of the uncertainty of his [Ferdinand] keeping faith, as seen heretofore, although it is a 
                                                 
 most likely have had to travel through Germany; LPIi, 933 (LPI, 1948; 8 November 1511, Ammonius to 
enetian secretary at the Holy See until around late November to early December. Finally, Badoer’s letters 
131 Doubtless in light of such concerns, supplementary articles were added to the Holy League on 8 October, 
compelling the Sacred College to continue the Church’s commitment to the arrangement until another pontiff 
was elected; Ven.ii, 133 (LPIi, 959; 26 November 1511). 
132 LPIi, 917 (LPI, 1918; 27 October 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London). If the Venetians were aware of this 
by 21 September, it is unlikely that intelligence of such import took more than a month to reach England; Ven.ii, 
121 (LPIi, 867; 21 September 1511, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia). 
133 It is probable that such an important notification would have been carried to England far quicker, even though 
it would
Erasmus, London). 
134 Ven.ii, 135 (LPIi, 97; 27 November-7 December 1511, letters from the Venetian secretary Trevisan to Venice, 
Rome). There are a number of indications that Henry VIII was declaring his readiness to join the league around 
this time. Intelligence conveying this from a papal agent in England, ‘Piero di Rizo’, reached Rome by around 28 
November. Similarly, further letters from England containing this intelligence, dated 9 November, did not reach 
the V
of 12 November, indicating similar information, reached Venice only on the 27th; ibid., 135 (LPIi, 977; 27 
November-7 December 1511, letters from the Venetian secretary Trevisan to Venice, Rome), 136 (LPIi, 965; 28 
November 1511, Hieronymo di Porza to Zuan Badoer, Rome), 139 (LPIi, 937; 12 November 1511, Badoer to the 
Signory, London). 
135 Sp.ii, 58 (LPIi, 939, 969:40; LPI, 1967; Ven.ii, 128; 13 November 1511).  
136 Its despatch was probably arranged by Thomas Ruthal; Ven.ii, 140 (LPIi, 1001; arrival in Venice of an 
English courier carrying letters dated 4 December 1511, London); LPIIii, p.1453. 
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question of his own interest’.137 An Anglo-Spanish agreement was swiftly concluded on 17 
November, which committed both parties to defend the Church (and help recover Bologna) by 
launching a joint offensive on Louis XII through Aquitaine.138 English procrastination may 
also have been financially motivated; if Henry could drag this out long enough, he could 
secure the November installment of the French pension.139 In the event, the mandate did not 
reach Rome until around 7-11 January 1512. It reportedly empowered both Bainbridge and 
the Spanish ambassador to join the league on Henry’s behalf, although at a time and in a 
manner to be chosen by the Spaniard.140 England’s actual formal adhesion to the league did 
not occur in Rome until the third session of the Lateran Council (17 May 1512), at which a 
letter from Henry was read aloud, in which he pledged to observe the alliance ‘and to peril 
                                                 
 Ven.ii, 136 (LPIi, 965; 28 November 1511, Hieronymo da Porza to Zuan Badoer, Rome). English suspicions 
about Ferdinand’s commitment were doubtless raised by the the Spaniard’s cancellation of the crusade against 
137
the Moors earlier that year, only after Lord Darcy’s force had reached Spain; see above pp.375-376. A further 
indication that the English were concerned with their potential allies’ commitment was raised in Henry VIII’s 13 
November declaration of adherence to the league, in which he stipulated the condition that no party would make 
peace with France without the consent of all members. Sp.ii 58 (LPIi, 969: 40; LPI, 1967; 13 November 1511). 
This was also a condition of the Anglo-Spanish agreement cited below, lending weight to Banbridge’s reported 
dinand did not confirm the treaty, however, until 20 
December 1511). For the 
old crowns were expected at Calais from 1 November and may only have been received 
rying letters dated 4 December 1511, London), 143 (LPIi, 1020; 7-11 January 1511, letters 
dge finally being empowered, 
suspicion of Spain; ibid., 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). 
138 Surrey and Shrewsbury were commissioned on 10 November to arrange this compact with Spain as soon as 
news had arrived of the Holy League’s conclusion. Fer
December, while Henry followed suit on 9 February 1512; Sp.ii, 57 (LPIi, 934, 969:29; LPI, 1955, 3513; 10 
November 1511, Henry to Surrey and Shrewsbury, Westminster), 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 
1511), 63-64 (LPIi, 1054; LPI, 2094; 9 February 1511), 71; LPIi, 995 (LPI, 2033; 20 
supplementary treaty of 16 March 1512, increasing the number of troops to be deployed in Aquitaine, see ibid., 
65 (LPIi, 1098; LPI, 3797; 16 March 1512). 
139Close to 14,000 g
around 9 December. Louis XII was likely to have cancelled this if he received firm intelligence that Henry was 
about to become his enemy. As at 15 November, according to the Imperial ambassador at the French Court 
(citing correspondence from the French ambassador in England, d’Arizolles), Louis understood that the Holy 
League had been concluded without Henry VIII’s knowledge and, furthermore, that the latter remained 
committed to the amity between their two kingdoms, despite the French king’s rebuffal of the recent English 
embassy to him calling for peace; LPIi, 916, 924:34 (LPI, 1919; 27 October 1511), 942 (15 November 1511, 
Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois), 981 (LPI, 2026; 9 December 1511). 
140 The courier passed through Venice around 29 December; Ven.ii, 140 (LPIi, 1001; arrival in Venice of an 
English courier car
from Rome to Venice). The Venetians, presumably in response to Bainbri
conveyed their thanks for his ‘good disposition’; ibid., 144 (LPIi, 1029; 19 January 1512, Signory to the 
Venetian ambassador at the Curia). 
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everything for the recovery of Bologna and other towns of the Church’. Subsequently, 
Bainbridge and the Spanish ambassador signed the league on Henry’s behalf. 141 
 
 From the moment that Henry VIII committed himself to the Holy League, he began 
to ready his kingdom for war. Indeed, the messenger carrying the commission to Bainbridge 
to adhere reported (in Venice) that extensive preparations were already afoot for the invasion 
of France in 1512.142 The formal justification for this continued to be England’s defence of 
the Church, at the papacy’s behest. Thus, in the commissions given to the earls of Surrey and 
Shrewsbury in November 1511 to arrange a supplementary offensive alliance with Spain, 
Henry VIII specified that he was responding to Julius II’s request for aid against France and 
its allies who, in addition to having taken Bologna, planned ‘to divide among them even the 
“tunic of our Lord”’ (the Papal States). The king, therefore, empowered the two nobles to 
conclude a league with Ferdinand to ‘defend the Church against any further aggression, and to 
reconquer for her Bologna and its territory’.143 Similarly, the resulting agreement, providing 
for a joint Anglo-Spanish invasion of France, also stipulated the chief purpose to be the 
defence of the Church.144 Furthermore, in the ‘war’ Parliament, on 19 February 1512, the 
same letter from the pope to Henry VIII as that cited in the Surrey-Shrewsbury commission, 
                                                 
141 The reading of Henry’s letter was followed by that of a similar missive from Ferdinand. England’s (and 
Spain’s) membership was celebrated with bonfires and other ‘great rejoicings’; ibid., 162 (LPIi, 1191; Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory, received in Venice 18 May 1512), 165 (LPIi, 1204; 21 May 1512, letters 
ugh Spain; he implied that 
received in Venice from Friar Angelo, Rome), 166 (LPIi, 1204; 24 May 1512); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, p.39; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The 5th Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the 
Medieval and Reformation Church, pp.106-107. 
142 Ven.ii, 140 (LPIi, 1001; arrival in Venice of a courier with letters from London, dated 4 December 1511). By 
28 November, the Latin secretary Ammonius reported (to Erasmus) that the king’s principal minister Richard 
Fox was ‘so much occupied he can scarcely attend to any other business than his own’; LPIi, 964 (LPI, 2002; 28 
November 1511, Ammonius to Erasmus, London). On 19 April, Thomas Ruthal wrote to Lord Darcy (then 
ambassador to Scotland) of the preparations and their intentions for the invasion thro
this will enable the Holy League to challenge French military strength within Italy; ibid., 1147 (LPI, 5745; 19 
April 1512, Thomas [Ruthal] to Lord Darcy, Greenwich). 
143 Sp.ii, 57 (LPIi, 934, 969:29; LPI, 1955; 10 November 1511). 
144 Ibid., 59-60 (LPIi, 945; LPI, 1980; 17 November 1511). For how this compact supported the broader Holy 
League, see above pp.394-395. 
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requesting aid against France, was apparently read aloud to the assembly when the ‘secret’ 
reasons for summoning the assembly were announced.145 English preparations culminated in 
e despatch to France of Thomas Wall, Lancaster Herald, to declare war. Reaching the th
French court on 22 April 1512, he declared that, in response to requests for aid from the pope 
(and Ferdinand), Henry believed it his duty ‘to defend the Church’, in pursuit of which he 
would launch an expedition against France.146 Subsequently, Henry defended his position in a 
letter to the emperor, written towards the end of May 1512, in which he justified his decision 
to fight Louis XII, who had ‘lacerated the seamless garment of our Lord Jesus Christ, 
snatched St Peter’s patrimony, took the cities of the holy Roman Church, and fostered petty 
tyrants in them, threatening chains, dungeons, and everything most atrocious to the pope 
himself’. Henry even went one step further, making allusions to the crusade against the 
Ottomans, citing ‘war crimes’ committed by the French which ‘showed a worse than Turkish 
cruelty’ and opining that this conflict will ‘prove as acceptable to the Almighty as if he 
[Henry] actually fought against the Turks or Saracens’.147  
 There are indications that the English crown sought to keep the papacy informed of 
its preparations during the months leading up to and after its formal adhesion to the Holy 
                                                 
145 LPIi, 1065 (LPI, 2010; calendared 20 February 1512, Julius to Henry, Rome); 'House of Lords Journal 
Volume 1: Decimo quinto die parliamenti', Journal of the House of Lords: volume 1: 1509-1577 (1802), pp. 12-
ntions. Lancaster Herald’s response was that the English army 
eld to inform the emperor of his declaration of war 
ar is presumably his response to the emperor’s 
13. It is likely that the disclosure of this letter was planned when Parliament (and Convocation) was initially 
summoned, back on 28 November, given that the commission to Surrey and Shrewsbury in which it was also 
cited was virtually contemporaneous; LPIi, 962-963, 969:74-76 (LPI, 2003-2005; 28 November 1511). 
146 In reply, however, Louis XII reportedly reasoned that, as he had no quarrel with either the pope or king of 
Spain, Henry had no reason to act against him. Nevertheless, the Frenchman would send his own herald to 
England to discover the English king’s true inte
was ready and had to land somewhere. The marquis of Mantua understood that Wall tried to declare war through 
a public proclamation, but was not permitted to do so, on account of the danger that he would put himself in; 
LPIi, 1148 (20 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Louis Brangier, Blois), 1157 (24 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to 
Margaret of Savoy, Blois), 1163 (27 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois), 1169 (LPI, 
3986; calendared end April 1512, Lancaster Herald’s mission), 1220 (letters from Mantua read in Venice on 24 
May 1512); Ven.ii, 158 (LPIi, 1178; 3 May 1512, Marquis of Mantua to Proveditor Capello at Vicenza, Mantua). 
147 Henry VIII originally commissioned Sir Robert Wingfi
against France on 8 May. The king’s later justification of the w
reply; LPIi, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to [Maximilian]), 1215 (Ven.ii, 178; calendared end May 1512, 
Henry to Maximilian). 
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League (in May). On 6 March, he advertised Julius II of these, as well as of his intention to 
attack France on 1 April.148 Around 6 May 1512, Henry VIII instructed Bainbridge to tell the 
pope that he had a considerable fleet at sea (that had already achieved some successes) and 
that an even bigger force would join with Ferdinand to invade Guienne. In the meantime, he 
urged the pope to attack France, ‘so that the slaughter of Ravenna [11 April 1512] may be 
avenged’.149 England’s continued anti-French commitment was received well in Rome. 
Receipt of Henry’s 6 May correspondence may have encouraged a rumour, circulating Rome 
by the beginning of June, that England had offered the pope a significant number of troops.150 
The papacy was able, therefore, to capitalise both unintentionally and intentionally on Henry 
VIII’s pledges; firstly through hearsay that circulated about an English military contribution 
in Italy and secondly through a public display of England’s continued commitment (which 
perhaps further fuelled the earlier rumours). 
 
 In a bid to ensure that Henry did attack France, sustained pressure was applied by the 
Julius played an extremely astute card by offering potential papal recognition of the historic 
papacy on Henry VIII. Firstly, on 14 March, the pope wrote to Henry requesting his aid ‘for 
the defence of the Apostolic See’.151 Probably in response to positive news from England, 
                                                 
148 Ven.ii, 151 (LPIi, 1104; 18 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 152 (LPIi, 1119; 23-
27 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
149 Ibid. 169 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). For the significance of the Battle of Ravenna, 
pp.400-401. 
150 Ven.ii, 172 (LPIi, 1223; letter that reached Venice from Friar Angelo, dated Rome 31 May and 1 June 1512). 
The Venetians were so pleased either with this rumour or with the actual contents of Henry’s correspondence 
that, on 8 June, a letter was approved for Bainbridge (among others), presumably intended to further encourage 
England and Rome against France; Ven.ii, 173 (LPIi, 1232; calendared 8 June 1512, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia). 
151 LPIi, 1096 (LPI, 3068; 14 March 1512, Julius to Henry). This and subsequent actions seem to indicate an 
element of doubt in Rome whether England would actually follow through with its commitments against France, 
particularly given that Bainbridge’s commission to join the Holy League would already have arrived. This idea is 
supported by the instructions emanating from Venice to Badoer during April 1512, to urge Henry to attack 
France. Also, during early May (in response to despatches from Badoer in England), the Venetian government 
ordered its ambassador in Rome to request that the pope apply pressure on Henry (and Ferdinand) to hasten their 
invasion; Ven.ii, 155 (LPIi, 1128; 1-7 April 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London), 156 (LPIi, 1179; 4 May 1512, 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia). 
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English claim to the French throne. On 20 March 1512, bulls were produced which translated 
to Henry the titles (and rights) of King of France and Most Christian King, also providing for 
his coronation. Despite continued pressure by Bainbridge, however, the pope refused to 
publish them until Henry VIII had secured control of France.152 Julius II took a further step in 
consistory during May or July 1512, publicly depriving Louis XII in front of the Sacred 
College and announcing the transfer of his titles and territories to Henry VIII (dependent upon 
the latter’s conquest of France).153 To reinforce these actions (at some unspecified date before 
September, but later than 20 March), Julius released Louis XII’s subjects from their oaths and 
obligations.154 This gesture was an extremely potent sign in England and cost the pope 
nothing. A second, related incentive to ensure Henry (as well as his allies) attacked France 
was the employment of the papacy’s spiritual weapons against France and its interests. From 
March 1512 and in subsequent months, Julius II began to fulminate censures against those 
ho assisted Louis XII.155 Indeed, French intelligence relayed back to England, dated 1 April, w
reported that the French themselves had been ‘excommunicated’.156 It is reasonable to 
                                                 
 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.38-40, 50-51; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.33-34; W.E. Wilkie, 
Cardinal Protectors, pp.43-44. The issue o hese bulls coincides with the receipt of letters from England (by 18 
sources, arrived in Rome around 23-27 March. Indeed, Venice was so pleased with the latter news that it 
152
f t
March), outlining preparations and pledging an attack on 1 April. Similar reports, possibly from Venetian 
instructed its ambassador in Rome to have the pope ‘stimulate their Majesties [Henry and Ferdinand] by all such 
means as shall seem expedient’; Ven.ii, 151 (LPIi, 1104; 18 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
, Louis XII, p.223; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.38-39. 
erates, or who take service in his army, although they may have bound themselves to 
Signory), 152 (LPIi, 1119; 23-27 March 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 153 (2 April 1512, 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome).  
153 The following authors disagree on the date of this event, the former citing July and the latter May; F.J. 
Baumgartner
154 STC 25947.7 (University of Birmingham, Special Collections). 
155 During March 1512, Julius II forwarded to Cardinal Schiner, his legate with the Swiss, a bull 
excommunicating those who went to fight for France. On 21 July 1512, Julius II excommunicated the Biscayans 
and Cantabrians (complicit in France’s taking of Church lands) and ‘all who assist the King of France against the 
Apostolic See or its confed
do so by a solemn oath. While there is no reason to believe that Henry VIII had anything to do with this 
sentence, he was sent a copy of the bull which, one can speculate, he would have welcomed. In addition, 
ecclesiastical weapons were wielded by Rome in favour of the English crown in a more specific sense during 
February 1513; C. Shaw, Julius II, p.295; Sp.ii, 67 (LPIi, 1305; 21 July 1512, Julius II to all persons, Rome). 
156 LPIi, 1127 (LPI, 3112; 1 April 1512). Julius II had already excommunicated the adherents of Louis XII on 16 
April 1511 and, while there is no reason to believe that this was intended as a direct incentive for Henry VIII to 
attack France, it doubtless helped; W.K. Gotwald, Ecclesiastical Censure at the End of the Fifteenth Century, 
p.77; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.346. 
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presume, therefore, that Louis XII himself may have been under such a sentence, given that 
he had been deprived and his subjects released from their obligations (James IV of Scotland 
was soon to suffer a similar fate).157 The papacy’s wielding of its spiritual weapons 
culminated on 13 August with imposition of an interdict on France, which was reissued in the 
third session of the Lateran Council (3 December).158 A third papal inducement was Julius’ 
bestowal of a crusading flavour on the coming war by his grant of an indulgence probably 
during April 1512, which Henry enthusiastically acknowledged on 6 May.159 Both of the 
latter ‘spiritual’ gestures would have been intended to bolster justification for the war, in 
English eyes at least. 
 
Probably the chief limitation of English foreign policy, vis-à-vis Rome, was the 
distance from which it sought to affect matters there. To prevent French domination of Italy 
was difficult enough by indirect means aone, but the crown also had to contend with the fluid 
political situation within the peninsula. Thus, when a major battle took place, in which 
England was not involved, resulting in an apparently decisive defeat of the papacy, one would 
have expected big question marks to be raised about current crown intentions in that area. The 
battle of Ravenna (11 April 1512) raised due concern, when initial reports portrayed a 
catastrophic defeat for the Holy League’s forces (a papal-Venetian coalition at this point) and 
caused Julius II to prepare to flee Rome, such was the fear of his vulnerability. Indeed, the 
Romagna fell within days. It soon became apparent, however, that the French were also badly 
                                                 
157 See pp.180-181. 
158 N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, pp.597-598. 
159 LPIi, 1182 (Ven. ii, 169; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 1533 (LPI, 3602; calendared 1512). Henry also 
makes allusion to the indulgence in a crusading context in a letter to Maximilian, towards the end of May 1512; 
Ven.ii, 178 (LPIi, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to Maximilian). 
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affected, with Louis XII’s forces unable to follow-up their victory.160 Furthermore, the pope 
had finally gained Swiss participation in the Holy League, who sent forces to intervene in the 
war. All of this tipped the balance in favour of the confederacy in Italy, resulting in the almost 
complete abandonment by the French of their Italian interests. Due to this, the summer of 
1512 was spent by the papacy scrambling, with the other powers in Italy, to control the 
vacuum. The knock-on effect was to leave the Anglo-Spanish invasion as the only threat to 
France.161 Nevertheless, the initial uncertainty caused by the Battle of Ravenna was felt 
deeply by the English crown and Henry VIII remained unsure of its outcome as late as 8 
May.162 It provoked caution and caused Henry to defer the departure of his ambassadors to 
e Fifth Lateran Council. Yet, Henry claimed to be determined to continue his belligerent 
course;
th
 writing to Bainbridge on 6 May, he asserted that he had ‘never in the midst of this 
mishap, and of these contradictory stories, changed his intention of defending the Church and 
protecting the pope’.163 The English king reiterated this commitment via his orator around 29 
May, that ‘he [Henry] is ready to risk his goods, life, and kingdom for the maintenance of his 
Holiness and of the Church’, also notifying the pope of his rejection of Maximilian’s 
universal peace initiative.164 However, the English crown had already nailed its colours to the 
mast, having declared war against France (through Lancaster herald) on 22 April. In addition, 
Sir Edward Howard had already commenced hostilities in the English Channel and 
                                                 
160
Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, pp.399-403; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.294-295.  
161 See below p.402. 
 The French both lost their commander, Gaston de Foix, and suffered the withdrawal of Imperial troops; L. 
162 LPIi, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, [Henry] to [Maximilian], Greenwich). Reports that a significant battle 
had taken place at Ravenna (on 11 April) began to reach England as early as 23 April, although the result was 
reported to be uncertain. Henry wrote of this to Christopher Bainbridge, probably on 6 May, maintaining that he 
was still none-the-wiser about the outcome; Ven.ii, 169 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). News of 
the battle also appears to have been received through the access of English diplomats to foreign correspondence; 
LPIi, 1157 (24 April 1512, Andrea da Borgo to Margaret of Savoy, Blois). 
1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge). 
s moves towards peace, if these were 
163 Ven.ii, 169 (LPIi, 
164 Bainbridge was also instructed to brief the pope against the emperor’
made. Henry also enclosed a copy of the letter that he had sent to Maximilian, rejecting his offer; Ven.ii, 177 
(LPIi, 1214; 29 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge), 178 (LPIi, 1215; calendared end May 1512, Henry to 
Maximilian). 
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preparations for the joint Anglo-Spanish invasion of Guienne were already at an advanced 
stage.165 Henry VIII was, therefore, beyond the point of no return and could issue nothing less 
than the defiant pledges of commitment to the anti-French cause that he conveyed to Julius II 
via Bainbridge.166 
 
Henry VIII goes to war in defence of the Church, but has to face a new pope in favour of 
peace: May 1512 - September 1513 
England’s initial military forays in defence of the Church were far from successful. 
The joint Anglo-Spanish offensive into Guienne failed to materialise, prompting accusations 
of blame from both sides.167 Also, the English fleet maintained in the Channel to harry French 
                                                 
Maximilian, Greenwich). 
set foot on French soil and amid accusations from both side. English commanders objected to Ferdinand’s 
the other, Henry reportedly had the commanders questioned in Parliament and his council ultimately blamed 
of his army to Margaret of Savoy was that, on account of the weather and lack of supplies, both he and 
of Alva to [Grey], Pampeluna), 1320 (LPI, 3352; 2 August 1512, Ferdinand to Grey, Burgos), 1321 (Ven.ii, 186; 
3 August 1512, Venetian consul Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 1326 (LPI, 3355; 5 August 1512, Stile to 
1359 (27 August 1512, extract of 
night, ‘Longiono in Castilia’), 1417 (Ven.ii, 205; 1 October 1512, Badoer to the Signory), 
his brothers, London); LPI, 3313 (14 
0 September 1513, report made on the 5th of a 
 in England), 70 (LPIi, 1447; 22 October[?] 1512, Ferdinand to his representatives in Flanders and 
165 Ven.ii, 169 (LPIi, 1182; 6 May 1512, Henry to Bainbridge); LPIi, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to 
166 Indeed, such a commitment was repeated on 8 May in a letter from Henry to Maximilian, justifying England’s 
reasons for going to war and requesting the emperor’s support; LPIi, 1186 (LPI, 3188; 8 May 1512, Henry to 
[Maximilian], Greenwich). 
167 English forces, commanded by Thomas Grey marquis of Dorset, left Spain by October 1512 without having 
insistence that the kingdom of Navarre needed to be conquered prior to any incursion into France, perceiving, to 
all intents and purposes, that the Catholic King was using their presence as a diversion to this end. After the 
army had arrived home (by November), one finds that, on the one hand, the English crown seem to blame Spain 
for the fiasco and there was tension with Spain even in January 1513 (according to Venetian reports), while on 
Dorset for the failure (according to a Spanish dispatch). Furthermore, Henry’s ‘official’ explanation of the return 
Ferdinand agreed to this departure; LPIi, 1239 (LPI, 3243; 14 June 1512 William Knight to Wolsey, ‘beside 
Reinteria’), 1286 (LPI, 3298; 8 July 1512, Thomas Howard to [Wolsey]), 1319 (LPI, 3350; 1 August 1512 duke 
Henry), 1327 (LPI, 3356; 5 August 1512, Knight to Wolsey, Fontarabia), 1356 (P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of 
Richard Fox, 37; LPI, 3388; 26 August 1512, Wolsey to [Fox], Farnham), 
letter possibly from K
1422 (LPI, 3451; 4 October 1512, Knight to Wolsey, ‘St Sevastian’s’), 1458 (31 October 1512, Peter Martyr to 
Marquis Bellecensis, ‘Lucronii’), 1475 (Ven.ii, 211; 9 November 1512, Badoer to the Signory, London), 1484 
(Sp.ii, 72; 19 November 1512, [de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London), 1487 (23 November 1512, Margaret of 
Savoy to Maximilian, Mechelin), 1492 (LPI, 3555; calendared end November 1512, Henry to Poynings and 
others), 1511 (LPI, 3593; 16 December 1512, Stile to Henry), 1586 (Ven.ii, 220; 20 January 1513, Pasqualigo to 
his brothers in Venice), 1591 (Ven.ii, 219; 20 January 1513, Pasqualigo to 
July 1512 Grey to Ferdinand, ‘from the camp’); Ven.ii, 298 (1
conversation with two English knights of Rhodes, Venice). For the Spanish side of the story (and Ferdinand still 
complaining about the conduct of the English in January 1513), see Ven.ii, 198 (LPIi, 1432; 11 October 1512, 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia); Sp.ii, 68 (LPIi, 1461; October[?] 1512, Ferdinand to his 
representatives
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(and other) shipping suffered defeat in a naval engagement off Brittany, when the flagship 
(The Regent) was lost, along with two of the king’s courtiers, Carew and Knyvet.168 A visible 
strengthening of Calais was also made which, combined with the raids conducted on the 
Breton coastline by Sir Edward Howard, commander of the fleet that transported the 
xpeditionary force to Spain, gave rise to the expectation by foreign observers, including 
icise them to the papacy. 
Thus, t
himself on 8 August, outlining ‘what he had done for the benefit of Holy Church against 
e
Italians in England, that a second front (at least) would be opened up by England in the 
north.169 In advance of these actions, Henry VIII was keen to publ
owards the end of May, he notified Bainbridge of the sailing of his invasion force to 
Spain.170 Similarly, on 1 July 1512, an unnamed councillor appears to have written to Rome 
to publicise the recent victories of Edward Howard, who had raided Brittany.171 Henry wrote 
France’ and what he was continuing to do, also outlining some naval success.172 Also, on 18 
September, Catherine of Aragon wrote to Bainbridge, apparently on Henry’s behalf, notifying 
him of a Scottish attack on Berwick, in response to which the king sent the earl of Surrey (and 
                                                                                                                                                        
England), 80 (LPIi, 1557; 11 [January] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Germany). Also see J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.29-31. 
168 This battle occurred on 9 August 1512. In response, Sir Edward Howard vowed to avenge the loss and an 
English fleet continued to be maintained in the English Channel up to November at least (apparently under 
Howard’s command); see below pp.404-405. 
169 Even on 9 June, Badoer, reporting the crossing of troops to Calais, noted that Henry was to sail there himself 
by the end of the month with many more soldiers. It would not be surprising if the English crown cultivated such 
rumours as a diversionary tactic; Ven.ii, 182 (LPIi, 1233; 9 June 1512, Badoer to the Signory). Also see, ibid., 
183 (LPIi, 1291; 14 July 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 185 (LPIi, 1310; 25-26 July 1512, Badoer to 
the Signory, London); LPIi, 1268 (1 July 1512, letter from an English councillor), 1136:40 (LPI, 3332; 22 July 
1512), 1136:41 (LPI, 3336; 24 July 1512), 1321 (Ven.ii, 186; 3 August 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, 
London), 1344 (LPI, 3377; 17 August 1512, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1377 (9 September 1512, letters from 
merchants in London; 20 September 1512, letters from merchants in Flanders). 
170 He also enclosed his rejection to the emperor’s approach for universal peace. The courier also cited troops 
numbers; Ven.ii, 172 (LPIi, 1223; letter that reached Venice from Friar Angelo, dated Rome 31 May and 1 June 
1512), 176 (LPIi, 1246; 21 and 26 June 1512; Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see LPIi, 
1250 (25 and 26 June, letters to Venice from Rome). 
171 The letter reached Venice via Rome and, although it is uncertain whether it was originally intended for Julius 
II or for Venice, it is likely that the English crown would have advertised the papacy of its military 
achievements; LPIi, 1268 (letter from an English councillor, 1 July 1512). 
172 This letter appears to be that said to have been sent ‘in great haste’, according to the Venetian consul, 
Pasqualigo, who persuaded the courier to take his correspondence as well; Ven.ii, 186 (LPIi, 1321; 3 August 
1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 190 (LPIi, 1354; 21, 22 and 24 August 1512, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
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others) northwards.173 Finally, Bainbridge was informed from London in late September of 
English successes in raiding the country around Bayonne, which did not actually occur.174 In 
spite of the positive spin sent to Rome by the English, intelligence received in Rome and Italy 
about Henry VIII’s actions was extremely contradictory.175 Concerning the failing Guienne 
campaign, Ferdinand briefed the papacy against England, alleging that its failure was Henry’s 
fault. Correspondence from the Spanish crown to this end would have reached Rome by mid-
October, also reporting the departure of English forces from Spain.176 In response, Bainbridge 
had already voiced his opinion of the Catholic King, as early as 28 August, reportedly telling 
the pope that, given Henry was contributing half the cost towards Ferdinand’s troops, 
Ferdinand was making progress (against Navarre) at the expense of the English.177 By 
December, the English orator had assigned blame for, what was by then known to be, the 
failure of the campaign; he asserted that this was due to the Spanish army’s failure to join 
with the English contingent.178 Vis-à-vis the English naval defeat in Breton waters, the papacy 
was quickly au fait with this in spite of Wolsey’s desire to keep this sensitive event a 
secret.  Bainbridge was apparently notified by a letter dated 27 September.  Further 179 180
                                                 
173 Ibid., 203 (LPIi, 1391; 18 September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London). 
174 LPIi, 1403 (27 September 1512, - to Bainbridge, London). 
dor). 
lish military inaction; that Henry kept his army in port for 
r) to the Signory, Rome). 
ulated in Italy about this from around the same time; P.S. and H.M. Allen, 
175 For the untrue intelligence supplied to Bainbridge, see ibid.. Among other examples of the misinformation 
circulating in Italy about this campaign, on the one hand, it was understood at points during July and September 
that the Anglo-Spanish force was making considerable progress in France. At another stage in September, a 
Venetian source in Milan perceived that the same forces had broken their siege of Bayonne. All of this 
information was false, as neither English nor Spanish troops breached the borders of Gascony, let alone 
challenged the city of Bayonne; Ven.ii, 180 (LPIi, 1281; 4 July 1512, receipt of news from Trent by the Spanish 
ambassador in Venice), 193 (LPIi, 1368; 1 September 1512, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory), 194 
(LPIi, 1376; 7 September 1512, statement to the Signory by the Spanish ambassa
176 This correspondence was directed to the Spanish ambassador at Venice and its contents were forwarded by 
the latter to its orator at Rome. It is probable that Ferdinand also sent letters of a similar tenor to his 
representative with the pope. John Stile, in Spain, also reported, during December 1512, of Ferdinand 
complaining to the papal nuncio at his Court, of Eng
two and a half months; Ven.ii, 198 (LPIi, 1432; 11 October 1512, Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the 
Curia); LPIi, 1509 (LPI, 3584; 13 December 1512, John Stile to [Henry]). 
177 Ven.ii, 192 (LPIi, 1361; 28 August 1512, Francesco Foscari (ambassado
178 D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.40, 157-158. 
179 The event was deemed so sensitive, that Wolsey requested that Fox keep it secret, maintaining that only 
Henry and themselves were aware of it at that point. Venetian sources in England knew of the battle by 5 
September, however, and rumours circ
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disappointment at English actions may have been engendered by the failure of Henry VIII to 
open up a second front against France around Brittany.181 It is unclear, whether Julius II was 
aware of such hearsay, however. Finally, the pope understood by the end of October that 
James IV had attacked England.182 It would not be surprising if this caused the pope to 
believe that the English might focus their attentions on Scotland. 
 
In spite of the apparent lack of success from the English perspective, these events (or 
lack thereof) were probably deemed to be relatively insignificant by the papacy, as the 
immediate objectives of the Holy League had been achieved; Bologna and other papal 
territories under French control had been recovered and the French had been all but expelled 
from Italy. If nothing else, Henry VIII (along with Ferdinand) had been successful in his 
diversionary role, diluting Louis XII’s military capabilities within the peninsula, and was 
believed by some at least to have facilitated these achievements.183 To England, on the other 
hand, the fact that the pope had achieved his immediate war aims was a worry. In a letter sent 
to Rome ‘in great haste’ on 8 August, Henry VIII recognised that the French had left Italy 
(‘and would be in so much the greater force against him, though he holds them in no 
                                                                                                                                                        
Letters of Richard Fox, 37 (Fiddes, c.10-11; LPIi, 1356; LPI, 3388; 26 August 1512, Wolsey to [Fox]); Ven.ii, 
193 (LPIi, 1368; 1 September 1512, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory), 199 (LPIi, 1371; 5 September 
1512, Antonio Bavarin to Francesco Pesaro, London), 200 (LPIi, 1385; 12 October 1510, news reported by Piero 
Lando); LPIi, 1377 (news from Venetian merchants in London and Flranders, 9 September 1512 and 20 
September, respectively); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.29-30. 
180 The author of the letter to Bainbridge is unknown, but the missive was seen in Venice by 29 October; LPIi, 
1403. 
181 See above pp.403-404. 
182 Ven.ii, 202 (LPIi, 1449; 26 October 1512, Francesco Foscari to the Signory, Rome), 203 (LPIi, 1391; 18 
September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London). 
183 While some contemporaries attributed Henry with credit for having contributed to the expulsion of the French 
from Italy, it is not difficult to detect their agendas for doing so. The Venetian orator Badoer conveyed his 
opinion of this to his brother on 24 July, while boasting of his own contribution in persuading the king to adopt 
 could well 
Spain, ascribed this role to the English invasion force 
this course. The doge of Venice stated this in his letter to Henry of 26 August 1512, although this
have been mere courtesy. Finally, an English diplomat in 
there in a letter of the same month; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.70-71 (Ven.ii, 191; LPIi, 3333; 24 July 
1512, Badoer to his brother, London); Ven.ii, 187 (26 August 1512, doge to Henry); LPIi, 1359 (letter seen by 
Venice from an English envoy in Spain, dated 27 August 1512, ‘Longionio in Castilia’). 
 405
account’), but also requested that Julius II send a fleet into Provence.184 The subtext here is a 
fear that the pope would no longer prosecute hostilities against Louis XII, leaving Henry VIII 
isolated to face the French. This idea also emerged in Catherine of Aragon’s missive to 
Bainbridge of 18 September 1512. While the queen conveyed Henry’s continued commitment 
to the war, she mentioned that he had ‘said openly to all hearers a few days previously that he 
rmly believed that neither the pope nor his very dear father [Ferdinand] would ever desert 
him, th
fi
ough if by any chance they should happen thus to do, yet he would never withdraw 
from this war until that schismatical sovereign [Louis XII] be made an end of’.185 Given that 
one of the conditions imposed on Henry VIII by his councillors for entering the war was that 
he be supported by a coalition of allies, one can detect an element of bravado in this statement 
and an implicit plea for Julius to remain committed.186 
 
 By the end of the campaigning season, the English crown and its confederates were 
already looking towards the renewal of hostilities in the following year, Henry this time 
anticipating a personal invasion of France.187 In pursuit of this, the English crown continued 
                                                 
184 Ven.ii, 186 (LPIi, 1321; 3 August 1512, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 190 (LPIi, 1354; 21, 22 
and 24 August 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
185 Ibid., ii, 202 (LPIi, 1449; 26 October 1512, Francesco Foscari to the Signory, Rome), 203 (LPIi, 1391; 18 
h one army royal into France’; LPIi, 1412 (LPI, 
LPI, 3425; 22 September 1512, [Poynings and others to Henry], Antwerp), 1529 (LPI, 3615-3616; 
 1512). Sir Richard Jerningham was in Germany (and on his way to Milan), by 
gham to Henry, Milan). On 19 October, Henry 
13, Niccolo di Favri to 
September 1512, Catherine of Aragon to Bainbridge, London).  
186 It will be recalled that such a condition would have been imposed on the king because England was unable, 
realistically speaking, to fight this ‘superpower’ alone; see below pp.379-380. 
187 A document has survived, compiled by Wolsey and calendared at September 1512, entitled ‘Things to be 
remembered by the King’s grace touching his going in person wit
3884; calendared end September 1512). Also see, for example, ibid., 1382 (LPI, 3414; 13 September 1512), 
1394 (
calendared end December
October, recruiting troops and apparently sourcing armour; ibid., 1440 (LPI, 3471; 17 October 1512, Jerningham 
to Henry, ‘Newys’), 1568 (LPI, 3658; 13 January 1513, Jernin
wrote to Venice, pledging to continue the war; ibid., 1443 (Ven.ii, 211; 19 October 1512, Henry to the Signory). 
This rhetoric was further followed-up by deeds in the the continuation of Parliament on 4 November (from when 
it was prorogued back in February) and various Venetian correspondents stated that it both sanctioned the 
planned invasion (for the following February-March) and had granted 600,000l. for this purpose. One of latter 
sources also added that the assembly had granted more money, on account that Henry intended to go in person; 
ibid., 1471 (LPI, 3502; 4 November 1512), 1512 (18 December 1512, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari London), 
1513 (Ven.ii, 216; 18-19 December 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 1578 (Ven.ii, 215; 19 December – 
16 January 1512, Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 1591 (Ven.ii, 219; 23 January 15
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to justify its aggression in terms of its protection of Rome; thus, on 13 November 1512, Henry 
reiterated his commitment to the Holy League ‘for defence of the Church’.188 Similarly, 
during May 1513, Thomas lord Howard, was commissioned to become commander-in-chief 
of the king’s army ‘raised at the request of the late Pope, and of Ferdinand of Arragon, for 
relief of the Holy See’.189 Also, on 6 June 1513, Catherine of Aragon was appointed ‘Regent 
and Governess of England, Wales, and Ireland, during the King’s absence in his expedition 
against France, for the preservation of the Catholic religion, and recovery of his rights’.190 
Moreover, in terms of the papacy, a quid pro quo was envisaged for this; a military 
contribution by Julius II. Henry continued to hope that Julius would make an attack around 
Provence, for which he had urged Ferdinand to lobby the pope during February 1513; ‘as we 
entered this war for defence of the Church and Pope and the assistance of our father’s army in 
aly, it is reasonable the Pope should aid us’, he argued.191 It
 
In spite of English plans, the sands were shifting. The emperor finally adhered to the 
Holy League on 19 November 1512.192 This was positive for England, given its commitment 
                                                                                                                                                        
Francesco Gradenigo, London). Subsequently, the sources consulted are full of references to preparations, both 
ns, see ibid., 1507, 1524:25 (LPI, 
actual and reported, for the planned attack; LPIi and Ven.ii passim. 
188 LPIi, 1494:27 (LPI, 3523; 13 November 1512). For other similar indicatio
3586, 13 December 1512), 1514, 1524: 39 (LPI, 3603; Sp.ii, 77; 20 December 1512); Sp.ii, 79 (calendared end 
December 1512), 84 (calendared January 1513). 
189 Leo X had become pope by this time; LPIii 1948:12-13 (LPI, 3997; 4 May 1513). 
190 The other declared war aim was the conquest of France, which kings of England claimed by hereditary right; 
LPIi, 2055:46 (LPI, 4179; calendared 6 June 1513). 
191 The English ambassadors in Spain were commissioned to pass this on to Ferdinand. This also became a 
stipulation in the Anglo-Imperial agreement to supplement the Holy League (and set out that year’s military 
plans) on 5 April 1513; ibid., 1659 (LPI, 4055; calendared February 1513, draft of a commission from Henry to 
his ambassadors in Spain), 1750 (LPI, 3859-3860; Sp.ii, 84; 5 April 1513). For the earlier approach to the pope 
by Henry in this regard, see above pp.395-396. Positive intelligence was received via France (during February 
1513), in which it was reported that the pope had supplied galleys for a planned Genoese assault on Provence; 
LPIi, 1647 (LPI, 3552; February 1513). For a formal indication that the English crown hoped for this papal 
expedition, see the renewed Holy League concluded between Henry and Maximilian on 5 April 1513. It should 
also be noted that this treaty demanded that Leo employ his spiritual weapons as well; see below p.408. 
192 Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPIi, 1486; 19 [November] 1512), 76 (19 November 1512). 
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to gaining Maximilian as an ally since 1509.193 This was followed by a reconstituted Holy 
League at Mechelin on 5 April 1513, produced between the emperor and the English 
representatives there ‘for defence of the Church’, committing all parties to attack France that 
year.194 An underlying problem with this, however, was that Maximilian had not solved his 
differences with the Venetians and, therefore, wanted them excluded from any new alliance. 
Spotting that this would probably drive the republic into the arms of France and, therefore, 
into enmity with the Holy League, the English crown sought to resolve this situation through 
Bainbridge.195 This strategy failed, however; the Venetians found Maximilian’s terms too 
harsh and Julius II concluded a new Holy League with the emperor, which excluded the 
republic, on 19 November. In addition, the pope concluded a separate, although 
complementary, alliance with Maximilian, in which Venice was named as an enemy (to be 
‘excommunicated’). While a place was left in the compact for Henry (and Ferdinand), it is 
otable that Bainbridge again seems to have been central to its conclusion, but did not sign it 
on Eng
                                                
n
land’s behalf. As Venice understood, Julius did try to persuade Bainbridge to sign the 
league, but the cardinal refused and counseled against it. Nor was the amended league ever 
 
193 It also brought Henry VIII closer to fulfilling one of the conditions for war earlier imposed on him by his 
 in the Low Countries) notified the pope, through Bainbridge; 
to English ambassadors, 
, Robert Wingfield to Henry); Sp.ii, 97 (5 April 1513), 101 
 also be 
councillors, although the intention to invade had already been made without any stipulation that Maximilian be 
involved; see above pp.379-380. 
194 This was confirmed in England on 3 May and Maximilian swore to observe it by 15th. It was intended to 
include Leo X and Ferdinand. It was hoped that the pope would ratify within two months. It was to be 
confirmed, however, by neither. Spinelly (based
LPIi, 1514 (1524:39; LPI, 3603; Sp.ii, 77, 20 December 1512, commissions 
Westminster), 1750 (1814; LPI, 3859-3861; Sp.ii, 84 ([January] 1513), 1792 (LPI, 3915; 19 April 1513, Spinelly 
to Bainbridge); LPIii, 1884 (LPI, 4069; 15 May 1513
(18 April 1513), 103 (25 April 1513). 
195 Margaret of Savoy reportedly foresaw this issue back in July 1512 and, believing that an Imperial-Venetian 
settlement could not be made in Brussels, recommended that Henry use Bainbridge to this end in Rome; LPIi, 
1279 (LPI, 3291; 4 July 1512, [Young, Boleyn and Wingfield to Henry], Brussels). The state conveyed its thanks 
to the cardinal for his services on both 12 and 26 November; Ven.ii, 206 (LPIi, 1483; 17 November 1512, 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia), 207 (LPIi, 1490; 26 November 1512, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia), 208 (LPIi, 1489; 26 November 1512, Signory to Badoer). For an Imperial version of 
events and an account relayed by John Stile from Spain, see LPIi, 1491 (28 November 1512, Maximilian to 
Margaret, ‘Wizembourg en Elsass’), 1519 (LPI, 3614; 29 December 1512, Stile to Henry). It should
noted that the emperor and Venice did not resolve their differences here. 
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apparently ratified by Henry (or by Ferdinand of Aragon).196 Apparently, the pope was not 
entirely comfortable with the exclusion of Venice and, by 9 December, had apologised to the 
state for his actions against it, claiming he had been compelled to take this action. The 
Venetians, in reply, instructed their ambassador in Rome to keep the pope on-side, along with 
Bainbridge and two other cardinals.197 Henry VIII may have first found out about the revised 
Holy League towards the beginning of December 1512.198 The English crown’s concern with 
this must have engendered an immediate response, as around 11 January, the pope would 
have received Henry’s letter urging him to mediate between the Empire and Venice, also 
requesting that Bainbridge be given audience to speak on this subject.199 The English cardinal 
continued working actively to this end and the urgency is suggested by at least one direct 
approach to Maximilian during January 1513.200 In England, there was probably little hope in 
any resolution being achieved, particularly as by 20 January it was widely reported that 
                                                 
by the Church and provided for an invasion of France itself; Sp.ii, 73-75 (LPIi, 1486; 19 November 1512), 76 
concluded without Spanish participation and, later, Ferdinand stated that he would not formally adhere to it 
Ven.ii, 208 (LPIi, 1489; 26 November 1512, Signory to Badoer); Sp.ii, 81 (LPIi, 1558; 11 January[?] 1513, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Venice); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.40-41. Also see L. Pastor, 
History of the Popes, vi, pp.423-427; C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.309-310. 
t on 28 November and several English ambassadors (Spinelly, at least, being 
ly to Henry, Mechelin). 
196 This new Holy League was again intended to defend the pope and the Papal States, reconquer lands claimed 
(19 November 1512). In spite of Bainbridge’s opposition, he was unable to avoid indicating England’s implicit 
approval by performing the celebratory Mass on 25 November. The Venetians also reported that the league was 
197 This instruction was repeated on 8 January 1513; Ven.ii, 209 (9 December 1512, Venice to its ambassador at 
the Curia) 210 (8 January 1513, Venice to its ambassador at the Curia). 
198 Maximilian informed Margare
accustomed to forwarding Imperial intelligence) were then resident at her court, attempting to negotiate the 
emperor’s entry to the Holy League from that angle. Henry VIII would also have been notified of the impending 
loss of Venice from the Holy League through the exiled Hadrian de Castello’s 23 November despatch. John Stile 
(based in Spain) later notified Henry, on 29 December, that Julius and Maximilian had allied against Venice, 
without including England; LPIi, 1488 (LPI, 3543; 23 November 1512, [de Castello] to Henry, Terni near Trent), 
1491 (28 November 1512, Maximilian to Margaret, ‘Wizembourg en Elsass’), 1519 (LPI, 3614; 29 December 
1512, Stile to Henry). 
199 Ven.ii, 212 (LPIi, 1521; December 1512, Henry to Julius). Around 20 January, Henry told Badoer either that 
he had done this, or had written a second letter in this regard; ibid., 220 (LPIi, 1586; 20 January 1513, Badoer to 
the Signory, London), 229 (LPIi, 1628; 10, 12 and 15 December 1512, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). The English king had pre-empted Ferdinand’s request, conveyed through John Stile on 13 and 15 
January, to write to Julius II (as well as to Maximilian and the Venetians) in this regard, as the Catholic King had 
already claimed to have done; LPIi, 1570 (LPI, 3661; 13 January 1513, Stile to Henry), 1575 (LPI, 3662; 15 
January 1513, Stile to Henry). 
200 On 26 January, Spinelly reported receipt of a despatch from Bainbridge to the emperor concerning the state of 
negotiations with Venice; LPIi, 1594 (LPI, 3678; 26 January 1513, Spinel
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Venice had allied with France.201 By 15 February, the Venetian consul relayed that the king 
and his ministers were unhappy at not being notified of this, particularly given that 
Bainbridge had done so much for the state.202 The actual alliance between France and Venice 
occurred on 14 or 23 March.203 The English Latin secretary, Ammonius, told a Venetian 
merchant, on 3 June, that this had ‘caused great displeasure to everybody in England’, but 
speculated that Henry VIII was likely to support the emperor against the Venetians.204 
According to Badoer, the king was so unhappy with the defection that he initially refused to 
give him an audience, eventually doing so, but even then he complained of the compact.205 He 
also tried again to kickstart attempts to mediate between the republic and the emperor.206 
Again resorting to Rome, Spinelly relayed instructions to Bainbridge around 5 July to lobby 
the pope (now Leo X) in this direction.207 On 13 September, Venice, understanding that the 
English cardinal was making overtures to the pope on this subject, urged its own ambassador 
in Rome to ensure that Bainbridge continue this work. 208 While Leo may have envisaged 
                                                 
201 Ven.ii, 220 (LPIi, 1586; 20 January 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London). 
202 Ibid., 229 (LPIi, 1628; 15 February 1513, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brother, London). 
203 The Venetian ambassador in England, Badoer, was formally notified of this in correspondence dated 18 April, 
continued Imperial aggression being cited as the reason for this course. This news was confirmed by Knight 
from Spain on 12 May; ibid., 234 (18 April 1513, Signory to Badoer); LPIii, 1866 (LPI, 4058; 12 May 1513, 
Knight to Henry). Pastor is vague about the date of the compact, stating merely March, but citing that it was 
hafiri, Venetian merchant, London).  
 June 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy in England). 
September 1513, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome). On the previous 
tember 1513, 
announced on 25th; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.426. 
204 Ven.ii, 254 (LPIii, 1956; 3 June 1513, Andrew Ammonius to Nicolo C
205 Writing on 6 June, Badoer also claimed that Thomas Ruthal had intercepted his letters and ordered their 
decryption in his presence, in relation to this subject. In addition, the Venetian alleged that three of his servants 
had been injured by the English because of the league and that even he himself was wary about going outside. 
On the same date, Henry even went as far as to send a formal letter of complaint to Venice on account of this 
agreement with France ibid., 250 (6 June 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London), 251 (6 June 1513, Henry to the 
Signory). Ferdinand attempted to rouse Henry against this Franco-Venetian agreement in correspondence around 
18 June, in which he instructs his ambassador to tell the king that the compact intended the conquest of Italy; 
Sp.ii, 118 (calendared 18
206 Ven.ii, 250 (6 June 1513, Badoer to the Signory, London), 251 (6 June 1513, Henry to the Signory), 305 
(calendared 13-15 September 1513, proposed letter from the doge to Henry). Also see the approach to Margaret 
of Savoy in this regard; LPIii, 2063 (LPI, 4319; 3 July 1513, Spinelly to Henry). Approaches were also made to 
Rome, as will be seen later: see pp.425-426. 
207 LPIii, 2068 (LPI, 4322; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2069 (LPI, 4333; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to 
Bainbridge). 
208 Ven.ii, 304 (LPIii, 2264; 13 
day, Bainbridge reported being urged by the Venetian orator to encourage Henry to mediate in this regard, given 
that he was with Maximilian (in France); LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; Fiddes, c.12-13; 12 Sep
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such an accord as a step towards universal peace (that he was also pursuing in order to end the 
conflict), Henry and his advisors presumably predicted the return of Venice to the anti-Gallic 
cause if an agreement was effected. 
The de facto composition of the Holy League altered again on 1 April 1513, when 
Ferdinand concluded a truce with Louis XII.209 Detecting delay during February, Henry 
instructed Stile and Knight to urge Ferdinand to observe their agreement to attack France, 
thereby defending the Church.210 Still failing to get anywhere, the English crown tried again 
shortly after concluding an agreement with the emperor (5 April) and even concluded a treaty 
with the Spanish ambassador in England on the 18th, ‘the principle object of which is to 
defend the Holy Church against her enemies’, although this was never ratified by 
Ferdinand.211 The Spanish defection raised wider English concerns; firstly, that its allies 
(especially the pope and potentially the emperor) would believe Ferdinand’s assertions that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bainbridge to [Henry]). Venice understood that the English card l was still pursuing this policy on 23 ina
September; Ven.ii, 317 (23 September 1513). 
209 Sp.ii, 91-92 (1 April 1513); LPIi, 1736 (LPI, 3839;1 April 1513). While Ferdinand’s overtures to his son-in-
law to do likewise seemingly came via enciphered correspondence from Knight and Stile, dated 3 March 1513, 
offensive alliance from late 1512. 
is was never signed or 
is representatives in England), 1484 (Sp.ii, 72; 19 
to 
, Ferdinand revealed to his ambassador 
, 1650 (LPI, 3755; 27 February 1513, Stile to Ruthal), 1657 (LPI, 
there had been signs of procrastination in Spain’s willingness to renew their 
Henry VIII proposed a new treaty with Spain (to attack France) in December 1512, but th
confirmed by Ferdinand. The latter quibbled over money and troop contributions, among other matters. On 19 
March, Stile notified Henry that Ferdinand had been negotiating with the French for this end, hence the Catholic 
King’s procrastination over a renewed Anglo-Spanish commitment to the invasion of France. In any case, Spain 
was not prepared for war; LPIi, 1447 (Sp.ii, 70; 22 October[?] 1512, Ferdinand to his representatives in Flanders 
and England), 1461 (Sp.ii, 68; October[?] 1512, Ferdinand to h
November 1512, [Martin de Muxica] to Ferdinand, London); LPIi, 1509 (LPI, 3584; 13 December 1512, Stile 
[Henry]), 1665 (LPI, 3766; 3 March 1513, Knight and Stile to [Henry]); LPIi, 1689 (LPI, 3807; 19 March 1513, 
Stile to Henry).  
210 They were instructed to negotiate a treaty ‘for defence of Holy Church, the recovery of its Patrimony 
(Bologna) and defence of the Pope’; LPIi, 1507 (1524:25; LPI, 3586; Sp.ii, 77; 13 December 1512 commission 
for Knight and Stile). An English proposal for the treaty was drawn up, providing for separate invasions by 
England and Spain, and for Henry’s contribution of 150,000 ducats towards the Spanish effort. Stile 
acknowledged receipt of this on 31 January but, as Ferdinand was unhappy with it, the latter had drawn up a new 
version to be sent back to England and to be signed as it was. In addition
in England, Caroz, that he had made a separate proposal of universal peace, but it is not clear to whom; Sp.ii, 79 
(calendared end December 1512), 82 (LPIi, calendared 11 January 1513; Ferdinand to the Viceroy of Naples), 86 
(LPIi, 1656; calendared February 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 87 (LPIi, 1658; calendared February 1513, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); LPIi
4038; February 1513), 1659 (LPI, 4055; February 1513, draft commission from Henry to his ambassadors in 
Spain). 
211 Sp.ii, 99-100 (12 April 1513, Henry to Surrey), 101 (18 April 1513). The unfortunate orator, Luis Caroz, yet 
to discover his king’s conclusion of the truce with France, readily swore to observe this treaty on Ferdinand’s 
behalf; ibid., 103 (26 April 1513, Caroz to all persons). 
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Henry would adhere to the truce;212 and secondly, that other confederates would join the 
peace, thus leaving England to fight alone. Fox, addressing Wolsey on this subject on 16 
May, wrote, ‘I feer that themperor woll daunce the same daunce’.213 Three days later, the 
Lord Privy Seal again voiced his opinion (to Wolsey) that Maximilian would follow suit; ‘I 
thynk his will be good, but powayre woll faile hym’. As a result of this, Fox summarised, 
‘then gette we noo helpe, neyther of the Pape, themperor nor the Kyng of Aragon’, as they 
were all tied up in Italy.214 
Perhaps most significantly, the Holy League and England’s planned contribution 
towards it was threatened on 20-21 February 1513, when Julius II died.215 The English crown 
received news of the pope’s death from around 9 March.216 English political concerns on 
receiving this news were twofold: the immediate effect of the pontiff’s death on the 
continuation of the Holy League and the longer term implications of the next pontiff’s attitude 
towards France. In the short-term, interregna could cause instability in the Papal States. If this 
occurred, it could prompt the papacy to cease hostilities against the French at this crucial 
juncture, while the new pope put his house in order. At worst, the volatility could offer Louis 
XII an opportunity to regain a foothold in Italy. Spinelly conveyed news of attacks on the 
northern Papal States on 22 March and hoped that ‘the creation of a new Pope will put an end 
to many disorders’.217 Meanwhile, the sede vacante administration was obliged to continue 
                                                 
212 Maximilian confirmed to Margaret on 12 May that Wingfield had assured him that Henry would not be party 
to the truce; LPIii, 1867 (LPI, 4059; 12 May 1513, Maximilian to Margaret of Savoy). 
213 Fox only seems to have known of the truce for certain from this date; P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard 
Fox (1929), 41 (LPIii, 1885; LPI, 4075; 16 May 1513, Fox to Wolsey). 
214 Ibid., 43 (LPIii, 1899; LPI, 4094; 19 May 1513, Fox to Wolsey). By 27 May, Ferdinand was under the 
impression that an Imperial ambassador was on his way to Spain to join the truce; Sp.ii, 109 (27 May 1513, 
Ferdinand to Pedro de Quintana). 
215 C. Shaw, Julius II, pp.311-313. 
216 Spinelly, in the Low Countries, forwarded this intelligence immediately. French intelligence of February 
1513, later received in England reported that the pope was ill; LPIi, 1647 (LPI, 3552; February 1513), 1670 (LPI, 
3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). 
217 The Florentine had the Viceroy of Naples defending Modena and Reggio against the duke of Ferrara, while 
himself taking Piacenza, and described the Venetians threatening Ravenna and Faenza; ibid., 1699 (3821; 22 
March 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]). 
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observing the Holy League according to supplementary articles added to the treaty on 8 
October 1511.218 Given the distance from England to Rome and the effect that this had on 
communications, the crown only had an outside chance on being able to react to news of a 
papal death by attempting to influence the subsequent conclave.219 Henry VIII was probably 
advised to adopt a pragmatic approach, awaiting intelligence on the papal election, before 
making any decisions on the invasion of France. 
 
The English in Rome were preoccupied with the need to ensure that an anti-French 
candidate was not elected pope. Bainbridge was active in pursuit of this and ultimately 
appears to have backed the strength of the Medicean party in conclave.220 It is unclear exactly 
when Henry VIII first knew of the election of Giovanni de’ Medici (9 March 1513), but it was 
certainly before 5 April. The pope apparently declared his commitment to observing the Holy 
League.221 Perhaps around the same time, Henry would also have seen an Imperial report (by 
da Carpi) on the disposition of the new pontiff, forwarded by Thomas Spinelly, which offered 
both good and bad news. It confirmed Leo X’s adhesion to the anti-French confederacy, 
which he was reported to have expressed publicly. However, the pope had expressed to the 
Imperial delegate his desire for universal peace, but this could be interpreted in two ways; a 
desire for war or peace.222 That it meant peace is suggested by da Carpi’s further claim that 
                                                 
218 Ven.ii, 133 (LPIi, 959; 26 November 1511). 
219 See pp.237-238. 
220 See pp.231-233. One can detect the crown’s concern with the identity of Julius’s successor through Spinelly’s 
ourt, received a copy of this via Ruthal on this date. The nature of its contents 
s IV’s alleged reply to West, that ‘your grace [Henry] was fortunate that ye 
f Venetian merchant firm similarly reported that Leo prayed 
speculation, as early as 9 March, as to who the favourites were rumoured to be (and whether the schismatic 
cardinals of Pisa-Milan would take part); LPIi, 1670 (LPI, 3777; 9 March 1513, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). 
221 Nicholas West, at the Scottish c
can also be detected through Jame
had such a Pope so favourable to your Highness, and that was entered the League’; LPIi, 1687 (LPI, 3806; 349; 
19 March 1513, Leo X to Henry, Rome), 1775 (LPI, 3882; 13 April 1513, Nicholas West to Henry). This letter 
must have been publicised, as on the 9th, the agent o
Henry ‘to persevere in the undertaking [invasion of France], which was unnecessary, as the latter is more eager 
than ever’; Ven.ii, 237 (9 April 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari in Venice, London). 
222 See pp.98-99. 
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Leo was not predisposed to war and that he ‘will not neglect the dominions of the Church, but 
not enter on any war except from compulsion, except, perhaps, against the infidels’.223 More 
ominously, the English envoy Jerningham reported from Innsbruck on 15 April that Leo had 
threatened to attack Maximilian, if the emperor waged war on Louis XII. The Englishman’s 
opinion, however, was that this was a feint.224 
The new pope’s political disposition was, therefore, worryingly unclear. English 
oubts would have been compounded by the fluctuating situation concerning the other anti-
French
 
                    
d
 powers, particularly the defection of Venice and Spain, as well as fears for the 
emperor’s commitment.225 It is unsurprising, therefore, that on 12 April, Henry lamented to 
Bainbridge that ‘the whole expense and danger of the war will fall upon England’.226 While 
Henry VIII may well have anticipated this, he did seek to bind his father-in-law into a 
renewed offensive alliance (supplementary to the Holy League) from 12 April, shortly after 
he had discovered the new pope’s identity; this treaty was concluded on the 18th, ‘the 
principle object of which is to defend the Holy Church against her enemies’.227 On a more 
positive note for the English cause, the new pope’s identity would only have been known for 
a matter of days when the Anglo-Imperial agreement was finally reached at Mechelin on 5 
April, which Leo was expected to join.228 It is tempting to consider that the timing was no 
coincidence. 
                             
ast within two months; 
; LPI, 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513). 
223 The copy of this account that reached England is in the hand of Spinelly (in the Low Countries); LPIi, 1677 
(LPI, 3780; 11 March 1513).  
224 Ibid., 1781 (LPI, 3897; 15 April 1513, Richard Jerningham to Henry, Innsbruck). 
225 See above pp.411-412. 
226 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).  
227 Sp.ii, 99-100 (12 April 1513, Henry to Surrey), 101 (18 April 1513). Luis Caroz was yet to discover his 
king’s conclusion of the truce with France, but swore to observe this treaty on Ferdinand’s behalf; ibid., 103 (26 
April 1513, Caroz to all persons). 
228 This appears to have been a reformulated version of the (1511) Holy League. While no papal or Spanish 
representative were present, the participation of both parties was envisaged, Leo’s at le
ibid., 97 (LPIi, 1750
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 In subsequent months during 1513, while the English crown sought renewed papal 
support for the anti-French cause (both notional and tangible), it failed to gain much more 
than the broadest of commitments and, instead, had to face down Leo’s (universal) peace 
initiative. Before examining these developments, it is worth outlining how the invasion of 
France developed within this framework. To begin with, despite the ambiguity of the papal 
position
                                                
, there is nothing to suggest that Henry VIII altered his plan to attack his neighbour.229 
From the opening of the new pontificate, the English crown notified Rome of its preparations 
and actions in this regard, beginning with correspondence of 12 April (via Bainbridge), in 
which Henry notified Leo X that a fleet was already on the sea and that his preparations for a 
land invasion were almost complete.230 Various newsletters were sent up until the end of the 
campaign, when Henry notified Rome of his having returned to England by early 
November.231 The factual, reporting nature in these communiqués of events seems to imply 
an underlying message that, while active papal support was sought, it was not deemed 
essential.232 This was perhaps a response to the lack of papal backing. These newsletters also 
served to counter, albeit tardily, contrary claims reaching Rome (largely from ‘French’ 
 
underwhelming and the strategy as curious, especially given the size of the invasion, that the king had his army 
ly insignificant towns (although Tournai was the seat of a bishopric) and that Henry, at one 
ld for some days to celebrate his victories (at Thérouanne and the Battle of the Spurs) at Lille. It 
uld be argued, however, that given the English crown’s fears at being left in the lurch by its allies and the 
apacy’s ambiguous position, this represented a scaling down of the enterprise that was originally intended to 
gain the French crown. However, this would require deeper investigation that cannot be warranted here. For 
accounts of the campaign, see C. Cruickshank, Henry VIII and the Invasion of France; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry 
VIII, pp.34-37. For Bainbridge claiming, as late as 7 September, that still Henry intended to be crowned at 
.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London); LPIii, 1846 (Ven.ii, 240; 5 
, 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). On 5 July, for instance, Spinelly informed 
 1513, Spinelly to Henry, 
arguments that Leo X no longer supported the anti-French cause; LPIi, 1665 
8 June 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy in England). 
229 Historians, such as Scarisbrick, have often portrayed Henry VIII’s 1513 campaign as somewhat 
besiege two fair
point, left the fie
co
p
Rheims, Ven.ii, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
230 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven
May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory).  
231 Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436
Bainbridge of Henry’s arrival in Calais on 30 June; LPIii, 2068 (LPI, 4322; 5 July
Brussels), 2069 (LPI, 4333; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge). 
232 Indeed, it is interesting to note that Henry also resisted Spanish pressure to adhere to Ferdinand’s truce with 
France, based on various Spanish 
(LPI, 3766; 3 March 1513, Knight and Stile to [Henry]); Sp.ii, 89 (calendared end March 1513, Ferdinand to 
Caroz), 93-94 (calendared April 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 111-112 (calendared beginning June 1513, 
Ferdinand to his ambassadors in England), 118 (calendared 1
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sources) that Henry VIII was suffering various defeats in France.233 Prior to the end of 
September, it does not seem to have been recognised in England that French misinformation 
was a problem and could be affecting Leo X’s inclination to support the anti-French agenda 
more actively, although one can envisage that Bainbridge would have cast doubt on them. 
Indeed, communications between the crown and Rome during the invasion appear to have 
lessened; newsletters were channelled through lesser dignitaries, notably Thomas Spinelly and 
Brian Tuke. That ‘French’ misinformation was becoming a problem was identified by 22 
September at least, when Brian Tuke (clerk of the signet) indicated his perception that 
Bainbridge and his secretary, Pace, were doubtful as to the veracity of reports of the king’s 
                                                 
 The misinformation began as early as mid-May, when French correspondence claiming English naval losses 
was received in Rome. A papal envoy repeated these claims to the Venetians; Ven.ii, 244 (13-14 May 1513, 
the papal envoy), 246 (19-20 May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Rumours and reports 
had reportedly received news from the French Court, alleging that an English force had been routed at Boulogne 
and that James IV had invaded England. The pope’s ambassador at Venice, Bibbiena, however, admitted that 
reports of the defeat at Boulogne were contradictory; ibid., 249 (2 July 1513, letters received from Rome by an 
English merchant in Venice, dated 18 June 1513), 257 (9-10 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
1513, letter received in Venice from Florence, via Rome). Towards the end of July, there were a number of 
rumours (that would have reached Rome) of an English defeat around Thérouanne, some of which alleged that 
233
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 245 (20 May 1513, statement made to the Venetian College by 
alleging English defeats by land were circulating Rome from as early as 9-10 July, when Cardinal San Severino 
Signory), 258 (14 July 1513, statement made to the Venetian College by the papal envoy Bibbiena), 259 (14 July 
Henry lost a significant number of soldiers; ibid., 260 (23 July 1513, communication to Venice by Bibbiena of a 
letter from Florence), 261 (18 July 1513, bishop of Marseilles to Andrea Griti, Florence), 262 (3 July 1513, 
Florentine ambassador in France to Florence, Paris), 263 (13 June-3 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in France 
ignory to the Venetian 
around 16 September that James IV had defeated and 
dici to Bartolomeo d’Alviano, Beauvais), 306 
to the Signory, Paris), 264 (13-14 July 1513, Gian Giacomo Triulzi to Andrea Griti, Tours[?]). Similarly, around 
the same time, it was being circulated that Louis XII intended to attack Henry VIII in person, although one 
Venetian ambassador (in France) was convinced that the English and French armies would not actually meet; 
ibid., 265 (30 July 1513, Florence to the papal ambassador at Venice Bibbiena), 266 (26-27 July 1513, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 268 (14-19 July 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 270 
(24 July 1513, bishop of Turin to the Signory), 271 (4 August 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory), 274 (14 July 1513, unsigned letters from France to Rome, Lyons). Reports of another supposed great 
defeat of the English reached Rome by 11 August (alleging that Henry had come close to capture and was now 
seeking terms with France); ibid., 272 (9 August 1513, unsigned letter to Count Guido Rangone), 273 (11 
August 1513, Vetor Lippomano to the Signory, Rome), 275 (18 August 1513, S
ambassador in France), 281 (14 August 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory). The papacy also 
received intelligence of Scottish progress, no doubt hearing 
captured the earl of Surrey, although a Venetian source in Rome asserted that this was untrue and a Florentine 
diplomat based in France questioned the veracity of the sources; ibid., 276 (24 July 1513, Venetian ambassador 
in France to the Signory), 279 (8 August 1513, Giuliano de’ Me
(12 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 307 (7 September 1513, de Lucon to the 
French ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 313 (20 September 1513, duke of Ferrara to his secretary in Venice), 314 
(15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 320 (17 September 1513, Dom. 
Costanza to the Signory, Lyons), 322 (5 September 1513, Roberto Acciauolo to Florence, Amiens), 323 (14-26 
September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
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military success and blamed it partly on ‘the mere lies which he [Pace] may have heard from 
the French and their partisans’ and also on the failure of Henry’s councillors to keep him 
informed.234 Similarly, Henry himself outlined the details of the fall of Tournai (23 
September) and the Battle of Flodden (9 September) to the pope on 12 October so ‘that he 
[Leo] may not be deceived by false rumours’.235 In addition, belief in English reports of their 
victories would have been aided by communications supporting their claims, which began to 
arrive in Rome from the beginning of September.236  
 
The pope was notified of the English victories at the Battle of the Spurs (16 August) 
and at Thérouanne (23 August) on 5 September by the Florentine representative based in 
France.237 Henry sent his notification of these events to Leo X and Bainbridge on 31 August, 
which Bainbridge received on 13 September.238 In response to this good news, the English 
cardinal (along with the Imperial orator) quickly capitalised by publicly celebrating with 
                                                 
234 Ibid., 316 (22 September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai). While Spinelly and Tuke seem to 
have been appointed to communicate with Rome while the king was in France, this was not normal. While on 
campaign, formal correspondence from the king to the pope was only issued to publicise England victories. 
Furthermore, Henry seems to have been under the impression (on 12 October) that ‘numerous letters’ had been 
sent to Bainbridge and de Giglis concerning Flodden at least, although Tuke (in late September) suggested that 
the king’s council had failed to keep them informed sufficiently with events; Ven.ii, 316 (22 September 1513, 
Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai); LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, 
Tournai). 
235 LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). 
236 Just as Bainbridge et al sought news from the French campaign, so would have other interested parties in 
Rome; one would expect reports from Venetians in England, therefore, to have reached Rome. Even French 
reports of the Battle of the Spurs and the fall of Thérouanne eventually reflected what occurred, albeit playing 
down their significance; Ven.ii, 283 (2-12 August 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari in Venice, London), 284 
(1 September 1513, - to Domenego Contarini), 288 (8 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the 
Signory), 293 (6 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 294 (9 September 1513), 295 
(6 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to his brother, Rome), 297 (29 July-25 August 1513, Venetian ambassador 
in France to the Signory, Amiens), 299 (7 September 1513, Bartolomeo Contarini to the Signory, Cremona), 300 
(12 September 1513, report from the German factory to Venice), 302 (12 September 1513, Signory to the 
Venetian ambassador in France), 303 (9 September 1513, intelligence sent to Venice from Rome), 308 (16 
September 1513, Florence to the papal ambassador in Venice Bibbiena). One must also note that some reports 
exaggerated the extent of the English progress. Vetor Lippomano, around mid-September, for instance, 
understood that Henry’s army was marching straight to Paris. On the 6 October, the duke of Ferrara was 
circulating a rumour (to the Venetians at least) that Henry VIII was to continue the war over the winter; ibid., 
323 (14-26 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 328-329 (6 October 1513, duke of Ferrara to 
Venice). 
237 LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]). 
238 Ibid., 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome). 
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bonfires and a Mass at S. Maria del Popolo on 16 September, but Leo reportedly either 
refused to accept the veracity of the English claims or reserved judgement on whether they 
had actually occurred, arguing that, as no reliable source had yet reached Rome on this 
subject, ‘no trust can be placed either in English or French intelligence’.239 A flavour of 
Bainbridge’s triumphalism can be gleaned from his letter to Wolsey of 17th, claiming that ‘the 
glory of the King for this victory is deemed immortal’.240 In spite of his actions, Bainbridge 
may have held some initial, private reservations about the veracity of the news (prior to the 
rrival of the king’s letters).241 Before news of Flodden arrived in Rome, the pope believed a 
widesp
a
read rumour that James IV had defeated Surrey’s forces and had captured the earl.242 
Spinelly notified Bainbridge of the victory on 17 September, writing again in more detail 
three days later.243 The cardinal had received this news by 30 September-1 October and again 
had bonfires burnt and a Mass celebrated in public recognition.244 He immediately passed on 
his news to the pope on 1 October and the victory was confirmed by independent sources by 
the 4th.245 A formal notification to the pope by the king was apparently sent at or around the 
                                                 
239 According to two Venetian sources in Rome; Ven.ii, 314 (15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in 
Rome to the Signory), 315 (16 September 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
240 LPIii, 2277 (LPI, 4454; 17 September 1513, Bainbridge to Wolsey). 
241 Brian Tuke interpreted this from letters that reached him on campaign by around 20 September. In his reply, 
e reservations; Ven.ii, 316 (22 
o the Signory). Also see ibid., 334 (6-7 October 1513, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). 
Tournai, where Maximilian’s secretary 
the Scot’s gauntlets 
Tuke also suggested that the cardinal’s secretary, Richard Pace, shared thes
September 1513, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai). 
242 On 17 September, Bainbridge had the pope believing the French ambassador’s report of this. The Venetian 
Vetor Lippomano confirmed Leo’s acceptance of this apparent Scottish victory over England; LPIii, 2276 (LPI, 
4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome); Ven.ii, 315 (16 September 1513, Vetor 
Lippomano to -, Rome). 
243 Ellis, 163-164 (LPIii, 2286; LPI, 4459; 20 September 1513, [Spinelly] to Bainbridge, Lisle). The emperor’s 
secretary, Bannisius, notified the Imperial ambassador in Rome, Count da Carpi, of Flodden in two letters of the 
same dates; Ven.ii, 331 (17 September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of Carpi, Tournai), 332 (20 
September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of Carpi, Tournai). 
244 The Venetian ambassador Foscari doubted this news, however. Chambers claims that Bainbridge first heard 
about and celebrated Flodden in mid-October but, as will be seen, he is more likely to be referring to the arrival 
of intelligence of the fall of Tournai; Ven.ii, 325 (30 September-1 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome 
to the Signory); see p.419. 
245 Foscari conveyed that Flodden had been corroborated by Maximilian’s secretary, writing from the English 
camp, as well as by a Florentine merchant based in London; Ven.ii, 327 (4 October 1513, Venetian ambassador 
in Rome t
Any doubts would have been removed by an Imperial report from 
reported Henry having shown him a garment that James IV had worn at the battle and that 
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same time as Spinelly’s correspondence.246 The fall of Tournai was predicted by Spinelly to 
be imminent in his correspondence to Bainbridge of 17 September, news which was conveyed 
to the pope by the latter on 1 October.247 Venetian diplomats in Rome were reporting the 
actual surrender of the city by 6th-7th October.248 Once again, Bainbridge may have had 
bonfires lit in recognition and a celebratory service held at S. Maria del Popolo.249 Henry 
formally notified Leo of the conquest (and ‘of the great success which God has continuously 
vouchsafed to him’) on 12 October.250 Finally, Henry told the pope of his intention to return 
to England in the aforementioned, although he pledged to return to France in 1514.251 
 
 Having established the context in which the English invasion of France was 
communicated to Rome by the crown (as well as other parties), the role of Leo X in Henry 
VIII’s plans can now be developed. In a bid to ensure that the invasion took place and was a 
success, Henry VIII naturally sought the papacy’s continued support as an ally and even its 
active participation, both in ‘temporal’ and ‘spiritual’ senses, in the war against France, 
                                                                                                                                                        
had also arrived. Even this, however, was countered by intelligence from Lyons that reached Rome by 15 
Scottish king may still be alive; 
arpi, Tournai), 342 (15 October 1513, 
tification of this battle to the duke of Milan, dated 16 
m Lyons, dated the 3 ; Ven.ii, 334 (6-7 October 1513, Venetian ambassadors in Rome 
ing makes it more likely that this was in 
Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). It is curious that Henry did not 
October, claiming that James IV had not been killed, rather a brother who wore his coat. Reports of late October 
that reached Venice from the French Court also perpetuated the myth that the 
ibid., 332 (20 September 1513, James Bannisius to Lord Albert of C
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 352 (14 November 1513, French news received in Venice). 
246 Henry alludes to this in a later letter; LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, 
Tournai). Its form may have been similar to the king’s no
September; Ven.ii, 309 (16 September 1513, Henry to the duke of Milan, Tournai). 
247 Ellis, 163-164 (LPIii, 2286; LPI, 4459; 20 September 1513, [Spinelly] to Bainbridge, Lisle); Ven.ii, 327 (4 
October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
248 Citing intelligence fro rd
to the Signory). Also see ibid., 338 (18 October 1513, statement made by the Ferrarese secretary to the Venetian 
Signory). 
249 Chambers cites the English cardinal celebrating in this fashion during the second week of October and claims 
that this was connected with receipt of news of Flodden, but the tim
recognition of the surrender of Tournai. A Venetian representative, however, has Bainbridge and de Castello 
lighting celebratory bonfires to celebrate a recent defeat of his state; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.53; 
Ven.ii, 339 (12-15 October 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
250 LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; 
write immediately on gaining Tournai, as he did to the duke of Milan (on 24 September); Ven.ii, 318 (24 
September 1513, Henry to the duke of Milan, Tournai). 
251 LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). Henry confirmed to the pope 
that he had returned in a subsequent letter of 9 November; Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to 
Leo). 
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initially at least. He also acted to prevent a papal (universal) peace initiative, in addition to 
other signals that apparently indicated a move towards Franco-papal rapprochement. 
Firstly, Henry VIII sought confirmation that the papacy would continue to support the 
impending invasion of France. Thus, in a general sense, in his 12 April reply (through 
Bainbridge) to the pope’s initial contact with him, while Henry would have been delighted 
that Leo supported the league, he also besought the pontiff to ‘follow the example of his 
predecessor in sanctioning this expedition undertaken for the liberation of the Church’.252 In 
other words, the English crown believed the new pope to have only gone so far in his support 
f the conflict. This may well have had something to do with the revised Holy League that 
255
rt a 
e anti-French cause. Bainbridge’s report 
o
Henry had just concluded with Maximilian on 5 April, which he intended to send to Leo (via 
Bainbridge), for the latter to join.253 This was to have no effect, however, as the Venetian 
ambassador in Rome observed that the pope remained neutral in spite of this intelligence.254 
Henry may have planned a grand embassy to Rome to seek papal adhesion during June 1513, 
but its failure to materialise may indicate that Henry was already aware that Leo would not 
agree to the treaty.  Indeed, by 26 July, Henry was informed of the pope’s rejection of the 
reformulated Holy League; Leo preferred a treaty also involving Spain, Milan and the Swiss, 
but without naming France.256 The inference here was that the papacy would not suppo
new anti-French coalition. There were, moreover, occasions when it may have been perceived 
that the pope could be induced to openly support th
                                                 
252 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). 
gnory). 
ing invasion of France; LPIii, 2010 (LPI, 4272; 19 June 
 Wingfield to Henry, Brussels). 
253 Sp.ii, 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513). Henry told his diplomats in the Low Countries of 
his intention to send the treaty to Rome as soon as it was concluded. One such representative, Spinelly, notified 
Bainbridge of the league as soon as it had been concluded; LPIi, 1723 (LPI, 4085; calendared end March 1513, 
Henry to [Poynings and others]), 1792 (LPI, 3915; 19 April 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge). 
254 Ven.ii, 240 (5 May 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Si
255 On 19 June, Maximilian had reportedly seen a copy of an English letter to the pope, in response to which he 
offered to send Imperial envoys along with those from England. The contents of this letter are unclear, but the 
timing suggests that it was connected with the forthcom
1513, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
256 This may well have been interpreted as a desire for universal peace; ibid., 2124(LPI, 4366; 26 July 1513, Sir 
Robert
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(10 June) of the pope’s reaction to the Swiss victory at the Battle of Novara (6 June), for 
instance, would have been cause for celebration in England, as the cardinal claimed Leo had 
declared himself more against the French as a result, shooting guns from the Castel S. Angelo 
to indicate this.257 Nothing came of this, however, and the English probably held out little 
hope in subsequent months for further papal demonstrations of support for the anti-French 
agenda.258 Leo was in a difficult situation; however much he desired peace, he was committed 
(as Julius II’s successor) to support an invasion that was already all but inevitable. While, 
theoretically, he could have withdrawn his support (particularly given Ferdinand’s truce with 
France), this would have caused considerable resentment in England and, more significantly 
and in a direct sense, in Germany. In practice, therefore, the most pragmatic course for Leo 
was to encourage peace, while offering as little tangible support of the anti-French agenda as 
he could get away with. If this was the case, it is unsurprising, therefore, that England was in 
receipt of mixed messages from Rome. 
 Secondly, in addition to general support of the anti-French offensive, the English 
sought more tangible backing from Rome, particularly in the employment of the papacy’s 
spiritual weaponry. Those papal measures which censured England’s enemies were integral to 
the casus belli and, with the accession of a new pope, needed to be renewed. Thus, one can 
observe the crown’s involvement in the revised Anglo-Imperial version of the Holy League (5 
April) and the renewed English alliance with Spain (18 April), which stipulated that Leo X 
                                                 
257 Ibid., 1984 (LPI, 4196; 10 June 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]). Also see ibid., 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, 
Bainbridge to Henry). De Castello also reported the battle back to England, but did not comment on the pope’s 
reaction; ibid., 2032 (LPI, 4287; 27 June 1513, de Castello to Henry, Rome). In contradiction to Bainbridge’s 
nly side with either the French or 
513, but this cannot be confirmed; Sp.ii, 130 (calendared 7 September 
uding one in England). 
claims, Pastor asserts that Leo was careful not to react to this news, nor to ope
anti-French parties, but Henry VIII and his advisers were not to have known this, given that they were briefed 
otherwise; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.52-54. 
258 Henry may have followed Ferdinand’s advice to urge the pope towards active participation, both militarily 
and through censures, in September 1
1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, 
Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, incl
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was to ‘excommunicate’ their enemies.259 Again, in writing to Bainbridge on 12 April, Henry 
lobbied the pope to confirm all bulls issued to England against the ‘enemies of the Church’, 
including the interdicts against France and Scotland.260 The censures against France were 
perhaps confirmed as issued under Julius II in the two briefs forwarded to Henry by 
Bainbridge on 25 June. He also conveyed Leo’s pledge not to raise the French interdict 
without the consent of his allies. While this looks to have been a successful request by the 
English crown, Bainbridge’s missive also reported that Leo was not prepared to attack France 
at this stage.261 Nevertheless, Henry appears to have been satisfied with this outcome, as no 
further pressure appears to have been applied in this regard.262  
Unlike with France, where ecclesiastical censures had already been issued, those 
against Scotland were still being developed when Leo X was elected. Instigated and pursued 
by the English crown from September 1512, these were initially based on allegations of James 
IV having breached the Anglo-Scottish peace of 1509. After sustained pressure from 
                                                
Bainbridge, James IV received the bull of excommunication by March 1513. Given Leo X’s 
election the same month, these immediately needed renewal and confirmation and, while 
some sort of broad affirmation was issued, Henry VIII still sought clarification during 
April.263 The reply, via Bainbridge on 25 June, both generally confirmed Julius II’s actions 
against the papacy’s enemies (including an apparent interdict against Scotland) and claimed 
that Leo had written to James IV threatening that, if he attacked England, ‘he [Leo] … woll 
 
259 While the renewed Anglo-Spanish alliance, concluded in England, never came into effect, the inclusion of 
ther-in-law’s commitment against France) would have 
this clause demonstrates the importance of papal censures to the English war effort; ibid., 97 (LPIi, 1750; LPI, 
3649, 3859-3861; 5 April 1513), 101 (18 April 1513). 
260 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London).  
261 Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPIii, 2029; LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). 
262 During September 1513, Ferdinand urged Henry to lobby the pope to impose ecclesiastical censures, but it is 
unclear whether the English king (already wary of his fa
followed this advice; Sp.ii, 130 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including 
one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in 
England). 
263 See pp.182-184. 
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not oonlie granntt unto Your Grace oon odr bull confirmyng the furst granntide by pope Julie 
butt also grantt oon harder…’.264 This response was hardly a resounding demonstration of 
papal support for England’s actions in ‘defence of the Church’: while Leo did confirm Julius 
II’s actions, as requested, he was not yet prepared to go any further. Perhaps satisfied with this 
answer, or having conceded that they were unable to make any further progress, Bainbridge 
(and de Giglis) only approached Leo again about this on 15 September 1513 when, having 
heard of a Scottish incursion into England, he sought a new bull against James IV (probably 
that promised earlier). In spite of French opposition, Leo reportedly promised to send an 
orator to England with the desired documents before Michaelmas, although he presumed that 
the bishops of Durham and Carlisle would already have pronounced Julius II’s 
excommunication of the Scottish king.265 The pope issued a letter of credence and safe 
conduct (with Bainbridge’s blessing) on 20 September to Henry VIII for Balthazar Stuerd; the 
nuncio was to go to Scotland to negotiate peace with England and to help facilitate a 
crusade.266 It is unclear whether Stuerd would have issued a new sentence against James IV, 
as the king was killed at Flodden, but the papacy’s earlier reluctance to follow through with 
                                                 
264 Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPIii, 2029; LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
Bainbridge, p.52. 
 LPIii, 2276 (LPI, 4455; 17 September 1513, [Bainbridge] and de Giglis to Henry, Rome). According to the 
Venetian ambassador Foscari, writing at the same time, Leo refused this request from Bainbridge to censure 
265
James IV, but may have been just interpreting the pope’s failure to issue anything at this stage (after receiving 
opposition from French representatives) in these terms. Bainbridge may also have had an audience with the pope 
on this issue on 7 September; Ven.ii, 301 (9 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 314 
ilian wrote in the nuncio’s favour to the English king on 
 to James IV; ibid., 2343 
LPI, 4615; 26 December 1513, 
 were brought; ibid., 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2469 
mber 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). For the Stuerd mission, see below pp.438-439. 
(15-16 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
266 LPIii, 2288 (LPI, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). Giuliano de’ Medici issued a similar letter 
to Henry on behalf of Stuerd on 7 October and Maxim
26 December, revealing that Stuerd had been instructed to visit both of them en route
(LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2526 (
Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg). It is unclear whether the bulls were ever brought, given that James IV’s death 
at Flodden effectively annulled them; Henry himself sought the end to the censures against the Scot, seeking 
papal permission to give him a royal burial. In reply, Leo X assented, presuming that James had repented just 
before death. Also, that Stuerd’s mission became one of peace makes it unlikely that these provocative 
documents
(LPI, 4582; 29 Nove
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this, combined with the underlying pacific nature of the nuncio’s mission, make this 
unlikely.267  
 Also seeking to gain papal support against France via its spiritual armoury, Henry VIII 
still expected Leo X to honour his predecessor’s pledge to transfer the rights and titles of 
Louis XII to Henry VIII, albeit the brief/bull had been given to Cardinal Vigerio for safe-
keeping, until the English king had conquered France. While neither Henry nor Bainbridge 
initially appear to have pressed for its renewal from the new pontiff, one could assume that 
they interpreted Leo’s generalised confirmation of his predecessor’s actions against France as 
including this political bombshell. The Cardinal of York only seems to have renewed efforts 
to obtain the ‘depositum’ on 6 September, following the arrival of news of Henry’s victories 
in France (the Battle of the Spurs and Thérouanne). Indeed, Vigerio was extremely cautious, 
refusing to hand over the document/s until specifically instructed to do so by Henry VIII, 
while also recommending that the king request it be reissued ‘in more ample manner under 
lead’.268 Bainbridge also seems to have approached the pope around the same time, notifying 
him of Henry’s intention to go to Rheims for his coronation, thus implying his desire for 
Leo’s recognition of Julius’ promise.269 While the Cardinal of York does not seem to have 
gained any concession out of the pope in this regard, there was further progress in terms of the 
Vigerio document/s. Henry appears to have responded quickly, as Vigerio acknowledged 
receipt of the king’s letters, through Bainbridge, on 14 October and claimed to have handed 
over the depositum to the English cardinal, on condition that he hand it to Henry in person. As 
far as seeking its confirmation (by Leo, one presumes), the Italian cited illness as preventing 
                                                 
267 For a papal reluctance to excommunicate James IV, see above p.184. 
268 LPIii, 2258 (LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]).  
269 The Venetian orator cited Leo showing him statements from Bainbridge to this effect; Ven.ii, 301 (9 
September 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
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him from doing this at present.270 Curiously, Vigerio wrote again to Henry VIII, towards the 
end of December 1513, recounting Bainbridge’s approaching him for the documents, post-
                                                
Thérouanne, and his reply that Henry needed to write to him in person, but claims that the 
king had not yet addressed him on the subject.271 While it is likely that there is a dating issue 
with one of the latter two letters, it is clear that Vigerio was reluctant to release the politically 
sensitive document/s in his charge and to seek their revalidation by the new pontiff. This issue 
is raised again on 20 May 1514 by Bainbridge, who wonders why the king had not replied to 
the pope’s preparedness to send the brief ‘super nomine Christianissimi Regis’. While the 
cardinal suspected de Giglis’ opposition, the true reason was more likely to have been a desire 
in England not to rock the boat with such provocative gestures while peace negotiations were 
underway.272 
 Henry also sought an indication of unambiguous ‘temporal’ support from Rome for 
his invasion of France by continuing to urge active papal military participation. In his April 
missive to Bainbridge, the king cited a promise made to him by Julius to invade Gallia 
Narbonensis (Provence) through an army led by the Viceroy of Naples.273 Pressure was also 
applied to this end by English attempts to have Leo X join the revised Holy League, 
negotiated between England and the Empire on 5 April, which provided for this assault.274 
Privately, however, such tangible papal support was considered unlikely, as on 19 May Fox 
predicted, in a private letter to Wolsey, that Leo (and England’s other allies) would be 
preoccupied with Italy.275 This suspicion was confirmed by Bainbridge on 25 June, who 
relayed that, while Leo intended to keep Julius’ promise (presumably to invade via Provence), 
 
270 According to Vigerio, Julius II instructed that the depositum be personally delivered to Henry by him or 
Bainbridge; LPIii, 2363 (LPI, 4506; 14 October 1513, [Cardinal Vigerio] to Henry, Rome]). 
271 Ibid., 2518 (LPI, 4610; 20 December 1513, Cardinal Vigerio to Henry, 20 December 1513). 
272 Ibid., 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, [Bainbridge] to Henry, Rome); see above pp.149-150. 
e, London). For the English desire for a 
I, 4094; 19 May 1513, Fox to Wolsey). 
273 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1513, Henry to Bainbridg
papal attack on Provence since late 1512, see above p.406. 
274 See above p.408. 
275 P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 43 (LPIii, 1899; LP
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he ‘cannot yet openly invade the French King, as he is bound by an oath to promote the peace 
of Christendom’. 276 The subsequent silence on this issue suggests that, by the time that Henry 
crossed to Calais (on 30 June), England had, to all intents and purposes, given up on the 
papacy playing any military role.277 Finally, the English crown maintained pressure on Rome 
to remain committed to the anti-French cause by seeking Leo X’s mediation of the differences 
between Maximilian and Venice, which had earlier pushed the republic into the arms of 
France. The intention was presumably to draw the Venetians back into the Holy League, 
although it would have also demonstrated papal support for the coalition. This strategy did not 
succeed, however.278 
At the same time as the English crown was failing in its efforts to gain anything more 
than lukewarm support from the papacy for its invasion of France (and the Holy League in 
                                                
general), Henry and his advisors simultaneously sought to counter signals from Rome that 
Leo X was moving towards a rapprochement with France. These manifested themselves most 
broadly in papal calls for England to join a general peace that was intended, formally at least, 
to enable an attack on the Turks.279 In seeking to reject these overtures, the English crown 
tackled the call for a general peace, the pope’s intention to send a legate a latere to England to 
facilitate this and, finally, resisted other indications that the papacy was moving towards an 
understanding with Louis XII. Despite these indications, Leo X was not pro-French; indeed, 
 
 Henry may have instructed Sir Thomas Cheyney, Bainbridge or de Giglis to pressure the pope in this regard, 
279 Leo received encouragement in this from Ferdinand of Aragon. By early April, the Spaniard, in support of his 
uis XII to persuade 
Ferdinand to the 
endared 21 May 
 between England and France, as otherwise, the Scot 
to attack Henry VIII; Ven.ii, 230 (17 March 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
276 LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.46-48. 
277
if he listened to Ferdinand’s advice in early September, but this is unclear; Sp.ii, 130 (calendared 7 September 
1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, 
Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England). 
278 See above pp.409-410. 
truce with France, lobbied the pope to seek universal peace (to launch a crusade) and to write to England in this 
regard. During late May, Ferdinand applied similar pressure on the papacy and also urged Lo
the pope to mediate a peace with Henry and Maximilian; Sp.ii, 98 (calendared April 1513, 
Viceroy of Naples), 104 (calendared 21 May 1513, Ferdinand to his envoy to France), 105 (cal
1513), 106 (21 May 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). Reportedly, Leo also received similar pressure 
from James IV of Scotland, exhorting him to mediate peace
argued, he would have 
Signory). 
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he funded Swiss troops to defend Milan against Louis XII’s forces during this year. Rather, he 
tended towards neutrality, although this was not necessarily sensed in England. Peace with 
France became increasingly likely following the latter’s defeat by the Swiss at the Battle of 
Novara (6 June 1513).280 Papal overtures for England to agree to a proposed universal peace 
emanated from Rome from the beginning of the pontificate and continued while Henry was 
on campaign. Given the English commitment to attack (and thereby protect the papacy from) 
France during 1513, it is unsurprising that Henry VIII vociferously rejected these approaches 
from the outset. In reply to Leo X’s initial approach, shortly after his election, the king 
answered bullishly (through Bainbridge, during April) that universal peace and, thereby, a 
crusade would be achieved by virtue of this war. In addition, he agreed with an apparent papal 
assertion that while the French had approached Rome with a view to peace, they were ‘only 
seeking to carry out designs against the Church’.281 Henry also cited Julius II changing his 
mind, following his appeal for peace following the Battle of Ravenna (April 1511), on being 
convinced that such a course would allow the French to become stronger. Finally, Henry 
argued that the pontiff was precluded from coming to terms with France without the consent 
of his allies in the Holy League.282 The pope’s reply in late June relayed a continued 
commitment to a general peace and crusade and, through Bainbridge, reasoned that he was 
bound by oath to work in this direction.283 
                                                 
280 The military setback is said to have induced Louis to consider peace overtures towards Rome; L. Pastor, 
.46-72. 
 Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.46-48. 
History of the Popes, vii, pp
281 The idea that the peace initiative was a ruse sponsored by the French was relayed to Bainbridge via Spinelly 
in early July 1513, reportedly citing Imperial intelligence from France; LPIii, 2068 (LPI, 4322; 5 July 1513, 
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2069 (LPI, 4333; 5 July 1513, Spinelly to Bainbridge). 
282 Henry’s fear of the pope’s pacific tendencies were also indicated by his instructing Bainbridge to forestall 
Scottish pressure on the pope in this direction by having the bishop of Murray intercepted and detained, on his 
way to Rome, lest he get there and ‘disturb our holy expedition’; LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 
1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). 
283 LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry), 2048 ([June] 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome); D.S. 
Chambers,
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 The English also feared some sort of Franco-papal deal when, in his first letter to 
Bainbridge following Leo’s election, Henry feared that Leo was considering the absolution of 
the schismatic cardinals of Pisa-Milan (who were backed by Louis XII). By bringing them 
back into the fold, Leo would effectively signal the (beginning of the) end of the schism, 
central to the English casus belli. Henry urged his cardinal to prevent the pope from taking 
such a course.284 By 25 June, however, Bainbridge had failed and reported the restitution of 
Cardinals Carvajal and San Severino.285 This early setback, which would have been known to 
the king not long after his arrival in France, may have helped to shape the crown’s subsequent 
expectations for papal participation in the anti-Gallic campaign. It would not have been aided 
by other reports of Franco-papal negotiations from English diplomats during June 1513, 
particularly regarding offers made to the Medici family, including a lucrative marriage for 
Leo X’s brother (Giuliano) to a relative of Louis XII.286  
 
As Leo X withdrew the casus belli for the English attack on France, Henry had little 
choice but to engage in peace negotiations, albeit extorting expensive terms from Rome: 
September 1513 – August 1514 
                                                 
284 LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 April 1 135 , Henry to Bainbridge, London). 
285 LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry), 2030 (27 June 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2032 
(LPI, 4287; de Castello to Henry, Rome). A letter from the pope notifying Henry of this event was issued on 27 
June; EP, 142 (27 June, Leo to James IV, Margaret of Savoy, the king of Portugal and Henry VIII, Rome). The 
significance of this event and Bainbridge’s perception of his failure to prevent it is suggested by the cardinal on 
12 September, when he felt it necessary to account for de Castello’s pre-empting him in advertising the crown of 
e in promoting the reconciliation, rather than in preventing it; LPIii, 2258 
 LPIii, 2016 (LPI, 4274; 21 
report was portentous; Giuliano de’ Medici married Filiberta of Savoy, 
the absolution; Bainbridge claimed that the bishop of Bath and Wells had bribed a secretary to get early news of 
this and, in any case, had been activ
(LPI, 4446; 12 September 1513, Bainbridge to [Henry]). 
286 In return, it was rumoured, Louis XII would renounce the Council of Pisa-Milan and the Pragmatic Sanction. 
These reports came from Robert Wingfield (21 June) and Thomas Spinelly (29 June);
June 1513, Sir Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2038 (LPI, 4296; 29 June 1513, Spinelly to [Henry]). Ferdinand later 
relayed these reports to England in September, further suggesting that Giuliano de’ Medici would also gain lands 
in Italy and France as part of the deal; Sp.ii, 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassadors at 
the English and Imperial Courts). This 
aunt to Francis I, but not until 25 June 1515; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.106; G.L. Williams, Papal 
Genealogy (2004), p.73. 
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 nry, Maximilian and Ferdinand to 
ttacking France in 1514. While the treaty mentions the motive of the previous league (‘the 
 (along with Milan) were to be included in the league and 
permitted to join (indeed, it was hoped that they would), the implication was that the papacy 
288
As the campaigning season drew to a close and Henry VIII prepared to return to 
England, there was a reassessment of English foreign policy, given that the king had borne 
most of the burden of the conflict that year and that he was receiving increasing pressure from 
Rome towards peace. This reappraisal appears to have begun towards the end of September 
(shortly after Henry’s victory at Tournai), when Henry indicated to the pope his enthusiasm 
for the proposed league against the Turks ‘if affairs were once settled in Christendom’.287 In 
other words, the English king had opened the door slightly to the papal peace initiative. 
Implicit in papal peace overtures was Leo X’s intention to withdraw justification for the 
original casus belli as stipulated in the Treaty ‘for the recovery of Bologna’ (October 1511) 
and its offshoots; the papacy no longer wished to be ‘protected’. This concern was indicated 
when, shortly before Henry returned home, Fox and Sir Thomas Grey concluded a renewed 
version of the Holy League at Lille, committing He
a
object of which was to defend the Church and to extinguish the schism’), it was now reasoned 
that the alliance was required because ‘the allied princes have not yet entirely executed their 
work’. While Leo X and Florence
may not be counted upon as a future ally against France.   
                                                 
287 LPIii, 2310 (LPI, 4470; 28 September 1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai). That this letter indicates a change in 
attitude is suggested by the fact that it congratulates Leo on his election more than six months after the fact and 
refers to Henry’s intention to send an embassy to pledge his obedience. That it was issued from Tournai, i.e. at 
the end of the 1513 campaign, implies a deliberate withholding of obedience to the new pontiff that was linked 
to the invasion and may well have been motivated by his fear of the loss of the papacy as an ally and the 
justification for the war that this alliance carried with it. An earlier indication that the English crown may have 
eracy; ibid., 143 (calendared November 1513, Ferdinand to Knight Commander 
considered the papacy’s motions towards peace was made by Catherine of Aragon (then regent of England, in 
Henry’s absence) on 27 July, when she mentioned to Wolsey that she would be glad if the pope could ‘make an 
honourable peace for the King, or “help on his part, as much as he can, knowing that all the business that the 
King hath was first the cause of the Church”’. It is unlikely, however, that this would have been acted upon 
while Henry was militarily active in France; ibid., 2120 (LPI, 4365; 26 July 1513, Catherine of Aragon to 
Wolsey, R[ichmond]). 
288 Sp.ii, 138-139 (LPIii, 2377; LPI, 4511; 17 October 1513). Indeed, Ferdinand did not want Leo to know that 
he had joined this confed
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 The above treaty hints at the contradictory policies emanating from England in 
subsequent months. On the one hand, Henry VIII remained committed to relaunching the 
invasion of France in 1514, regardless of papal support. On the other hand, Henry became 
cautiously but increasingly receptive to papal peace overtures, particularly as he lost more 
allies and sought to capitalise on his political leverage by inducing various concessions from 
the papacy. Firstly outlining England’s continued commitment against France, Henry pledged 
to the pope on 12 October that he would renew the war in 1514.289 Even after his return to 
England, he warned the pope against coming to terms with France on the back of his victories 
and voiced his fear that ‘a premature peace might only be the source of greater wars in the 
future’. Henry further instructed Bainbridge and de Giglis in this regard and seems to have 
sent Sir Thomas Cheyney to Rome for this purpose.290 In subsequent months, Henry remained 
committed, publicly at least, to a renewed attack on Louis XII and observers across Europe 
noted English preparations.291 Even on 24 April 1514, the new earl of Surrey, Thomas 
Howard (the younger) was appointed admiral and commander-in-chief of the English troops 
going ‘in aid of the Holy See, at the request of the Pope and the King of Arragon’.292 In 
                                                                                                                                                        
emperor’s (and Ferdinand’s) grandson, Charles of Castile, by the following May; LPIii, 2366 (LPI, 4508; 15 
LPI LPI
1513). 
289 LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 1513, Henry to Leo  To
Brizeno). To cement the Anglo-Imperial axis, it was agreed, on the 15th, that Princess Mary would marry the 
October 1513), 2378 ( , 4512; 17 October 1513, [Henry to his ambassadors]), 2446 ( , 4560; 15 November 
, urnai). 
290 Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). On the 10th, Henry issued a letter of credence to the 
pope on behalf of Cheyney, who was to go to Italy. The coincidence of the timing would suggest that this 
PI, 4849, calendared 23 January 1514), 2684:1-5 (LPI, 4694-4698; 1 February 1514), 
embassy was linked with Leo X’s desire for universal peace (and to send a legate to England); LPIii, 2437 (LPI, 
4548; 10 November 1513, Henry to Leo, Windsor). 
291 On 16 March, for instance, the Venetian consul, Pasqualigo, reported that the rumours that his state had 
received from Rome concerning a likely Anglo-French peace were incorrect, as preparations for Henry’s 
crossing were continuing. Even as late as April and May 1514, intelligence reached Rome conveying this 
intention; Ven.ii, 344 (25 October 1513, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 362 (6 November-6 
December 1513, Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari of London, London), 375 (17-18 February 1514, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 382 (7 February 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 396 (LPIii, 2747; 16 March 
1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 397 (24 March 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, 
London), 403 (LPIii, 2891; 12 May 1514, Vetor Lippomano to the Signory, Rome), 417 (LPIii, 2950; 28 May 
1514, Paulo Giovio to Marino Sanuto, Rome); LPIii, 2590 (LPI, 4848; 23 January 1514), 2590 (calendared 23 
January 1514) 2591 (L
4848-4849 (4 March 1514). 
292 LPIi, 2863 (LPI, 5007; 24 April 1514). 
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R Bainbridge continued to promote the anti-French cause as late as 20 May 1514, 
apparently oblivious to his employers’ double-dealing.
ome, 
to Bainbridge’s actions. Even as late as 19 June, the English crown denied that it was 
293 On this date, the cardinal also 
complained to the king about de Giglis’ apparently treacherous behaviour, citing suspicious 
meetings with French representatives, including his conspiring with the cardinal protector of 
France, San Severino, in ‘vynes and garthynges’. He also suspected de Giglis of ‘writing 
clandestine letters’.294 In further illustration of this, the crown appears to have contacted the 
cardinal through its representatives in the Low Countries (Thomas Spinelly, Richard 
Wingfield and William Knight) on 10 April 1514, in answer to the recent Franco-Spanish 
truce which, formally speaking, it opposed. This missive, the contents of which were to 
remain secret to all apart from the pope himself, instructed Bainbridge to urge the pope to 
support the continuation of the war against France.295 The message was sent through these 
diplomats in a bid, perhaps, to conceal its continued employment of Bainbridge in this manner 
from the French, with whom the king and his ministers were currently negotiating. It may also 
have been intended to keep the Cardinal of York in the dark concerning England’s true 
intentions; anyone seeking indications of Henry VIII’s intentions would naturally have looked 
                                                 
293 It will be seen later that Fox and Wolsey were already using de Giglis for their pro-peace communications 
; also see below pp.440-442. 
ly clear, although it does desire the cardinal to urge the pope 
44; 3 March 1514, Spinelly to Henry), 2800 (LPI, 4955; 10 April 1514, Richard 
dors at Rome, Mechelin). 
with the papacy (from February); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, pp.57-59
294 LPIii, 2926 (LPI, 5106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, 
pp.58-59. On 7 June, Lippomano also reported de Giglis having daily meetings with San Severino; Ven.ii, 424 
(10 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
295 The message conveyed to Bainbridge is not entire
to write to Maximilian (in opposition to Ferdinand’s truce initiative), to assert that he had no intention of 
invading Naples or harming his allies (as the Catholic King must have claimed), and that the pope should 
mediate an arrangement between the Empire and Venice, as well as encourage the Swiss to continue against 
France. Vis-à-vis England, they argued, ‘the Pope should not grudge the prosperity of the King of England, as he 
has always been an obedient son to the See Apostolic’. The broad message of England’s continued commitment 
against France, on the other hand, is quite clear. The use of Spinelly et al to convey this message can be 
explained by the latter still labouring under the impression that England would attack France; as they were 
resident at the Court of the emperor’s daughter and negotiating their joint attack (as well as Charles of Castile’s 
marriage to Princess Mary), it is likely that they were as unaware of the peace negotiations as Bainbridge in 
Rome. Certainly, Spinelly indicates this belief on 3 March (having contacted Bainbridge to urge the pope’s 
support); LPIii, 2694 (LPI, 48
Wingfield and others to the king’s ambassa
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involved in any peace discussions to the Imperial delegation.296 In spite of apparent crown 
attempts to conceal negotiations with France, these were not particularly successful and 
Venetian sources in Rome knew that these were afoot as early as 21 March,297 while those in 
England were speculating on this from 11 April.298 
 In addition to continued public commitment to war with France, Henry VIII also 
sought to counter any other perceived moves in Rome towards rapprochement with Louis XII. 
By 12 October, rumours circulated Rome that French diplomats were on their way to 
repudiate the Council of Pisa-Milan and to submit to papal guidance to end the war.299 
Henry’s answer of 9 November, if in response to these reports, was to urge the pope against 
making peace, particularly as a result of the English victories, warning him that it may only 
cause further wars and also requesting him to listen to the English orators, Bainbridge and de 
Giglis.300 The English overtures failed to have any effect, however, as Louis XII’s declaration 
of adhesion to the Lateran Council and renunciation of Pisa-Milan was read aloud and 
approved in the eighth session on 19 December 1513.301 While no record has been found of 
                                                 
 These denials were issued even though the Imperial diplomats knew that they were not true. England was still 
formally committed to a joint invasion of France at this point, as well as to the marriage of Princess Mary to 
296
Maximilian’s grandson, Charles of Castile; ibid., 3018 (LPI, 5173; 19 June 1514, Gerard de Pleine and John 
Colla to Maximilian, London).  
297 Ven.ii, 387 (LPIii, 2746; 21 March 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). Also see ibid., 452 (26 July 1514, 
 Signory), 444 (LPIii, 3029; 21 June 1514, Badoer to the Signory, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 455-456 (8-12 July 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, 
London). 
298 Badoer believed that the agreement was a fait accompli from 21 June; ibid., 401 (LPIii, 2801; 11 April 1514, 
Lorenzo Pasqauligo to his brothers, London), 405 (22 April 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, London), 
413 (LPIii, 2844; 27 April 1514, Badoer to the
London). It was not only the Venetians that heard such rumours; the Swiss cardinal, Matthew Schiner, wrote to 
Bainbridge of such reports on 26 March; LPIii, 2752 (LPI, 4916; 26 March 1514, Cardinal Schiner to 
Bainbridge, ‘Ex Viglo’). 
299 Ven.ii, 335 (28 September 1513, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Amiens). 
300 Sp.ii, 141 (LPIii, 2436; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). It is feasible that this missive was a response to 
Ferdinand imploring his son-in-law to advise the pope that England had no intention of making peace with 
France, in order to encourage the papacy to come out against Louis XII; Sp.ii, 130 (calendared 7 September 
1513, Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England), 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, 
Ferdinand to a number of diplomats, including one in England). 
301 This document was drawn up in Rome near the beginning of October and ratified by the French king on 26th. 
A copy of this document apparently made its way to England; LPIii, 2399 (26 October 1513); R.J. Schoeck, ‘The 
Fifth Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, 
p.108. 
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Henry’s reaction, it was probably hostile. Indeed, his father-in-law, Ferdinand, while still 
publicly committed to joining Henry on the coming campaign, was critical of Leo X’s 
incorporation of the French into Lateran V and requested that Henry (and Maximilian) lobby 
the pope for overt support in their continued fight against France, in particular the 
con u
had been earlier indications that Ferdinand would withdraw and, on 27 February, Henry 
ted that the main aim, the defence of the Church and the ending of 
                                  
tin ation of spiritual censures until the confederates had ‘recovered’ the territories that 
they claimed (given that their initial casus belli had been removed).302 
 
 Following the papacy’s reconciliation with France, the English crown’s intended 
continuation of the conflict in 1514, ostensibly in defence of the Church, became increasingly 
untenable. The subsequent defection of Ferdinand and Maximilian in the early months of 
1514 probably sealed this fate. The Spanish king double-crossed Henry VIII again by 
agreeing to another truce with Louis XII on 25 February 1514, itself ‘for the defence of the 
Church, and to avoid the effusion of Christian blood’, which was enshrined in a treaty that 
intended universal peace (and England’s participation in it) on 13 March.303 As in 1513, there 
expressed his fear that this would be the case.304 Among arguments for English adherence to 
the truce, Ferdinand sugges
               
 and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, p.108. 
1 April 1514), 
2 (calendared November 1513, Ferdinand to his 
ared between 6 and 20 December 1513), 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz) and passim. 
302 Sp.ii, 146 (calendared 6 December 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 152 (calendared December 1513, Ferdinand to 
the Spanish ambassador at the Imperial Court). The Catholic King wrote in a similar vein at the same time to his 
ambassador in Germany; ibid., 147 (calendared 6 December 1513, Ferdinand to the Spanish ambassador at the 
Imperial Court). By March, however, Ferdinand was citing the same reconciliation to argue why England should 
agree to the truce that the Spaniard had concluded with their enemy; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council’, 
in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform
303 The truce was declared on 1 April; LPIii, 1736 (LPI, 3839, 4818; Sp.ii, 91; 25 February and 
2725 (LPI, 4875; Sp.ii, 164; 14 March 1514); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.93-94. 
304 LPIii, 2678 (LPI, 4829; 27 February 1514, Henry to [Spinelly], Lambeth). Again, Ferdinand had 
procrastinated over his agreement to a proposed alliance with England to invade France the following year; for 
example, Sp.ii, 131 (calendared 7 September 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassadors at the English and Imperial 
Courts), 138-139 (LPIii, 2377; LPI, 4511; 17 October 1513), 14
ambassador at the Imperial Court), 146 (6 December[?] 1513, Ferdinand to Caroz), 147 (6 December[?] 1513, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 148 (6 December[?] 1513), 149 (6 December[?] 1513, 
Ferdinand to Caroz), 150 (6 December[?] 1513, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 151 
(calend
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the schism had actually been achieved, since Louis XII had come to terms with the papacy.305 
Henry was notified about the truce by his ambassador in Spain, John Stile, on 21 March, 
although he seems to have known about it towards the beginning of the month, having already 
relayed his fury to Spain.306 Fox was later quoted as blaming Ferdinand for England’s foreign 
policy reversal.307 Maximilian apparently accepted the truce by the turn of May 1514; Henry 
understood that this was the case by the 5th.308 Nevertheless, the English crown continued the 
çade of negotiations for Princess Mary’s marriage to Charles of Castile into June and 
olsey
fa
W  even maintained to an Imperial diplomat that the union would still happen.309 Henry’s 
reaction to the emperor’s desertion mirrored that he displayed towards the Spanish; anger. On 
19 June, an Imperial ambassador relayed the English Council’s assertion that their king had 
                                                 
305 Sp.ii
regard, see for instance ibid., 171 (April[?] 1514, Ferdinand to his ambassador at the Imperial Court), 177 
(July[?] 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz). 
 Around 5 March, Stile relayed Henry’s anger for Ferdinand having induced him to enter war and having 
urged the pope to use his influence with the king for that purpose; LPIii, 2707 (LPI, 4864; 8 March 1514, Peter 
307 Richard Fox was reported by the Venetian Badoer to have argued this to be the reason for the lack of invasion 
preparations around 27 April and his colleague, Pasqualigo, implies this motive later on 12 July; Ven.ii, 413 
(LPIii, 2844; 27 April 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 456 (12 July 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his brothers, 
London). 
Richard Wingfield, Knight and Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). Also see ibid, 2925 (LPI, 5105; 20 May 1514, 
 , 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz). For other pressure from Ferdinand on England in this 
306
Martyr to Lud. F. Mendoza, Valladolid); Sp.ii, 165 (21 March 1514, Stile to Henry). 
308 LPIii, 2877 (LPI, 5041; 5 May 1514, Henry to Maximilian, Eltham), 2894 (LPI, 5059; 10 May 1514, Sir 
Robert Wingfield to Henry, Vienna). For English suspicions about Imperial commitment in late February, see 
ibid., 2678 (LPI, 4829; 27 February 1514, Henry to [Spinelly], Lambeth). Maximilian seems to have approached 
Henry with a view to adhering to the armistice on 18 April; ibid., 2815 (LPI, 4978; 18 April 151, Wingfield and 
ne 1514, Gerard de 
others to Henry, Mechelin). In addition, from early April at least, there seems to have been growing English 
uncertainty about the prospective marriage between Mary and Maximilian’s grandson Charles, although the 
façade of negotiations was still maintained into June; P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, 47 (LPIii, 
2811; LPI, 4976; 17 April 1514, [Fox] to [Wolsey]); LPIii, 2779 (LPI, 4932; 3 April 1513, Knight to [Wolsey], 
Mechelin), 2849 (LPI, 5018; 28 April 1514, Margaret of Savoy to Maximilian, Mechelin), 2868 (LPI, 5029; 2 
May 1514, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin) and passim. 
309 LPIii, 2656 (LPI, 5139; calendared end May 1514, instructions for the ambassadors with Margaret of Savoy), 
2972 (LPI, 5148; 4 June 1514, Henry to Margaret of Savoy, Eltham), 3041 (LPI, 5203; 30 Ju
Pleine to Margaret of Savoy), 3109 (LPI, 5290; 1 August 1514, Spinelly to [Henry]); also see above n.288. It 
only seems to have fallen through, officially, when news of the Anglo-French peace and the associated betrothal 
of Mary to the dauphin Francis became public. See, for instance, LPIii, 3208 (LPI, 5362; 29 August 1514, 
Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Henry], ‘Burghez’), 3210 (LPI, 5368; calendared August 1514, Margaret of 
Savoy’s instructions to an ambassador sent to England), 3235 (LPI, 5377; 3 September 1514, Richard Wingfield 
and Spinelly to [Henry]), 3240 (LPI, 5379; 4 September 1514, - to Mons. de Giennes), 3245 (LPI, 5387; 6 
September 1514, Spinelly to the Council), 3268 (LPI, 5407; 14 September 1514, Jaques de Caestres to [Margaret 
of Savoy]). 
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been treated like a child in this affair.310 He later reiterated this sentiment to the pope, 
claiming to have agreed to marry his sister to Louis XII because he was abandoned by his 
allies.311 Given the earlier stress placed by Henry’s councillors on the need for allies in order 
for him to act directly in ‘defence’ of the papacy, the need for England to act in a coaliton to 
achieve this was evidently deemed integral. 
 A final factor that probably contributed to the English decision to seriously pursue 
peace negotiations at the turn of 1514 was the opportunity to ‘gain’ the kingdom of France 
that arose from the death of Queen Anne of France on 9 January. As Louis XII did not have 
an heir, the progeny of his next wife would inherit the realm. If, as was likely, the heir would 
be a minor when this happened, there would be a chance for English influence. In other 
words, the English crown may gain the chance to control France in such an event (in the same 
manner that it was then trying to influence Scotland), which would represent partial 
achievement of one of its war aims.312 
 
 Just as Henry VIII opened the door to peace negotiations to the pope in late September 
1513, Leo X promoted the same idea. Around 6-7 October, having just heard confirmed news 
of Flodden and the fall of Tournai, the pope stated his intention to now mediate a peace 
between the warring powers.313 Consequently, on the 11th, Leo congratulated Henry on his 
                                                 
310 LPIii, 3018 (LPI, 5173; Gerard de Pleine and John Colla to Maximilian, London). Peter Martyr (based in 
Spain), also asserted Henry’s disgust with his former allies on 23 July; ibid, 3089 (LPI, 5267; 23 July 1514, 
Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid). 
311 Ibid., 3482 (LPI, 5642; 27 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid).  
312 This opportunity was clear to contemporaries, as Sanuto indicated that of three candidates discussed in 
Venice as potential suitors towards the end of January, two were Henry’s sisters. Similar rumours circulated in 
Rome around the same time (and, in October 1514, de Giglis cites Leo X as having suggested the match). It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that by March, intelligence at the Holy See suggested that Louis XII might indeed marry 
an English princess; F.J. Baumgartner, Louis XII, pp.234-235; Ven.ii, 367 (LPIii, 2596; 23 January 1514, French 
ambassador in Venice communicating letters from Rome and France to the Signory), 369 (21 January 1514, 
Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 383 (10 March 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome); LPIii, 3132 (LPI, 5543; 
calendared 7-8 August 1514, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
313 Ven.ii, 334 (6-7 October 1513, Venetian ambassadors in Rome to the Signory). 
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military success and further urged the king to peace and a crusade against the Turks.314 In 
December, however, Leo answered Henry’s further reservations about the initiative. Firstly, 
concerning the king’s wish not to enter negotiations without the consent of his allies, the pope 
responded that he did not wish Henry to abandon them, rather ‘to sow among them the seeds 
of peace’; secondly, Leo hoped that the monarch would now respond to these pacific 
the Pope’s secret intentions in the matter of war and 
eace’.317 This may also have been intended as a sop to counter the effective absolution of 
overtures, ‘as the holy purpose for which the King took up arms has been secured’.315 To 
strengthen his approach, Leo also wrote to influential members of the English episcopate, 
Warham, Ruthal and Fox at least, notifying of this strategy and asking for their support. The 
pope argued that Louis had requested pardon, that Henry had profited from the war, and that it 
was his duty as pontiff to stop war among Christians and to promote it against the 
Ottomans.316 On 19 December, Leo appears to have offered a lure to Henry to entertain peace 
negotiations, suggesting that if he admitted a legate a latere to England in this regard, ‘he [the 
legate] may communicate to the King 
p
Louis XII that occurred in the Lateran Council on the same day.318 In response to being urged 
towards peace, Fox and Wolsey replied on behalf of the prelates approached by the pope 
during January 1514, claiming that they had lobbied the king in this regard and enclosed 
Henry’s answer; that this was positive (albeit not for the reception of a legate) is suggested by 
                                                 
314 EP, 233 (LPIii, 2354; 11 October 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). For an indication that Leo made similar 
-99. 
overtures in his first communication to Henry after being elected, see LPIi, 1769 (LPI, 3876; Ven.ii, 238; 12 
April 1513, Henry to Bainbridge, London). 
315 The ‘holy purpose’ presumably being the recovery of Bologna and other ‘papal’ territories, more generally 
referred to as the defence of the Church (and not Henry’s claim to France); LPIii, 2512 (LPI, 4605; 17 December 
1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
316 Ibid., 2513 (EP, 251; 17 December 1513, Leo to Warham, Ruthal and Fox). 
317 Ibid., 2517 (LPI, 4608; 19 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). For universal peace initiatives used also as 
a means to promote war within Christendom, see pp.97
318 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vi, p.67. 
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their stating that de Giglis would ‘negotiate the business’.319 Further letters were issued by the 
pope on 4 January 1514 to Fox and Wolsey, requesting they urge the king towards peace, to 
Henry himself on 8 February and to Wolsey and Fox on the 19th, the latter approach to 
Wolsey perhaps attempting to take advantage of any gratitude accruing from his recent 
promotion to the see of Lincoln (on the 6th).320 
 Also in response to increasing positive indications from England (and perhaps on 
account of the resistance to a legate), Leo despatched a stream of nuncios to Henry VIII to 
facilitate peace, which led to the development of ‘secret’ negotiations from January-February 
1514. The arrival of two of them predated the Franco-Spanish armistice, thereby backing the 
idea that England was already prepared to move in this direction. Gianpietro Caraffa was the 
first to appear in England, towards the end of January, with a commission focused on peace 
with France.321 This mission had already received royal sanction, when Fox and Wolsey 
wrote to de Giglis in January 1514, arguing that Caraffa could be utilised by the pope to 
mediate peace, instead of a proposed legate a latere.322 There is evidence to suggest that 
Caraffa did gain access to the king and was believed to have been involved in subsequent 
                                                 
319 This was conditional on Maximilian being in agreement and the desire that an accord between the Empire and 
Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56. 
320
it does imply this by stating Leo’s confidence in Fox, presumably in influencing Henry to this end. In terms of 
the pope seeking Wolsey’s gratitude for his recent episcopal provision, one ought to remember that the pope had 
Venice be arranged first; LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de 
 While the letter to Wolsey directly cites the pope’s desire for (universal) peace, that to Fox does not, although 
just turned down the bishop’s request for a reduction in the consistorial taxes due on his appointment. At this 
point, therefore, it is difficult to see where such gratitude would come from; LPIii, 2559 (EP, 316; 4 January 
1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2560 (EP, 317; 4 January 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 
1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2660 (EP, 362; 19 February 
1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
321 Caraffa (the future Paul IV) was despatched to England in late October or early November 1513, quite 
io ought to focus on Fox and Wolsey; Ven.ii, 372 (21 January 1514, 
cio’s journey to England via Germany and the Low Countries, visiting Margaret of 
(LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, 
14, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, 
feasibly in response to Henry VIII’s encouragement of late September. The pope acknowledged correspondence 
from the nuncio dated London, 25 January, and instructed Caraffa that Giulio de’ Medici would communicate 
with him about his mission and that the nunc
Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Blois), 382 (7 February 1514, Badoer to the Signory); LPIii, 2610 
(LPI, 4727; calendared end January 1514, Erasmus to William Gonell), 2658 (EP, 364; 19 February 1514, Leo to 
[Caraffa], Rome). For the nun
Savoy en route probably as part of a broader peace initiative, see; ibid., 2448 
Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Ausgburg]). 
322 LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 15
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56. 
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peace negotiations.323 Furthermore, the pope could now combine his diplomatic efforts 
through direct correspondence with the English crown and via instructions to his nuncio. On 
20 April, for instance, he contacted Caraffa to urge peace, although he was concerned about a 
lack of response from England.324 On the same date, Leo approached Wolsey and Fox again 
to the same end, the ministers having apparently assured the papacy of their support.325 A 
                                                
nuncio, probably Caraffa, was also contacted on the same date. A second nuncio, Balthazar 
Stuerd, seems to have crossed to England only a matter of days after Caraffa, but may have 
travelled immediately towards Scotland.326 Originally empowered on 20 September 1513 to 
mediate peace between England and Scotland, as a precursor to their participation in a 
crusade, it seems that he also had a broader remit vis-à-vis Henry VIII and Maximilian’s 
enmity towards Louis XII.327 Henry’s implied support of Stuerd’s mission is suggested when 
he wrote in defence of the nuncio on 7 May; in response to hearing that Stuerd was denied 
 
peace negotiations by 20 March; Ven.ii, 385 (20 March 1514, Giovanni Ratto to the Marquis of Mantua). By 
peace; Sp.ii, 170 (calendared April 1514, Ferdinand to Caroz). 
x, Rome), 2822 (EP, 408; 20 April 1514, Leo to Wolsey, 
 on 7 October, the nuncio’s mission was apparently delayed, perhaps requiring a 
PI, 4615; 26 December 1513, Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg); Ven.ii, 
papal cousin, see D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.99. 
323 LPIii, 2084 (LPI, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). A Mantuan source has the nuncio active in 
April, Ferdinand of Aragon understood that Caraffa was similarly occupied and instructed his own orator in 
England to lobby the nuncio to induce Henry to adhere to the Franco-Spanish truce as the first stage of universal 
324 The nuncio is not named, but it was probably Caraffa; LPIii, 2820 (EP 410; 20 April 1514, Leo to a nuncio in 
England, Rome).  
325 Ibid., 2821 (EP, 409; 20 April 1514, Leo to Fo
Rome). Henry VIII may also have been contacted directly on this date EP, 384 (calendared 1514, Leo to Henry, 
Rome). 
326 LPIii, 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Ausgburg]), 2633 (LPI, 4725; 7 
February 1514, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Stuerd has not been found to have visited the king, but was 
certainly around the Scottish borders by 20 March and in Scotland by 9 April; ibid., 2740 (LPI, 4902; 20 March 
1514, Lord Darcy to Henry, Templehurst), 2793 (LPI, 4951; 8 April 1514, Dacre to Henry, Carlisle Castle). 
327 While Leo issued Stuerd (also known as Stuart or Stewart) credentials for this mission on 20 September and 
Giulio de’ Medici did the same
refocus following news that Henry VIII was open to peace overtures. Curiously, the pope claimed that this 
nuncio’s despatch was made with the full support of Bainbridge, despite the cardinal’s apparent lack of 
knowledge about his employers’ later change of heart on France. The Venetian Lippomano heard on 20 October 
that the pope intended to send nuncios to England and Scotland to settle their differences. En route to the British 
Isles, Stuerd visited the emperor elect, who in turn wrote in the nuncio’s favour to Henry on 26 December. One 
also suspects that Stuerd is the ‘legate’ cited by Sir Robert Wingfield on 15 November as calling for Maximilian 
agree to universal peace (and crusade); ibid., 2288 (LPI, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2343 
(LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert 
Wingfield to Henry, [Ausgburg]), 2526 (L
343 (22 October 1513, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). For another part of Stuerd’s mission, to gain possession of 
the see of St Andrew’s for a 
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entry to Scotland, the king offered to attack Scotland ‘to avenge the dignity’ of the pope.328 
The crown also seems to have responded to a report by the nuncio, presumably linked to 
Anglo-Scottish negotiations, which reached Rome by 9 May.329 Perhaps most significantly, 
the pope was reported, around early January, as intending to induce Henry VIII to peace by 
offering him the governance of Scotland.330 While it is feasible that the Stuerd mission was 
intended to explore this possibility, maybe to compensate Henry for the papacy’s failure to 
grant the brief/s transferring all rights to the kingdom of France, there is no evidence that it 
was ever a real possibility; while Leo X had no coercive powers over Scotland, he may have 
envisaged Henry assuming direct control of Scotland, given his decisive victory at Flodden, 
his affinity with its new, young king James V and his declared intention to the pope during 
October-November that he was returning to England to seize the opportunity now offered 
there.331 Another diplomat that Leo X was rumoured to be sending to England was the Polish 
ambassador, doubtless to emphasise the crusading imperative, to seek peace between England 
and France, but there is no evidence that anything came of this.332 A third nuncio was sent to 
England perhaps around mid-May. Lodovico Canossa was despatched on a secret mission to 
France and England, certainly to seek a truce between the two and to help with the 
negotiations.333 Canossa arrived in England around 17 June ‘in great haste, and incognito, to 
                                                 
328 LPIii, 2084 (LPI, 5048; 7 May 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
329 Ibid., 2890 (LPI, 5054; 9 May 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). 
330 Ven.ii, 366 (LPIii, 2568; 5-8 January 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
331 Henry was uncle to the minor James V and brother to the latter’s mother and current governor of Scotland, 
Margaret. For the decisive nature of the English victory at Flodden, see LPIii, 2246 (LPI, 4441, 9 September 
1513), 2268 (LPI, 4451 16 September 1513, Catherine of Aragon to Henry, Woborne); Ven.ii, 309 (LPIii, 2270; 
16 September 1513, Henry to the duke of Milan, Tournai), 341 (LPIii, 2313; 29 September 1513). For Henry’s 
declared intention to follow-up his victory over the Scots, see LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; Sp.ii, 137; 12 October 
1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai), 2436 (Sp.ii, 141; 9 November 1513, Henry to Leo). 
332 Ven.ii, 349 (4 November 1513, Vetor Lipomano to -, Rome). 
333 De Giglis informed the English crown of the former purpose (on 20 May), while the Venetian government 
believed the latter. It ought to be noted that the mission could not have been that much of a secret if the 
Venetians knew about it. Certainly, it will be seen later that Canossa’s arrival in England and the nature of his 
mission seem to have been common knowledge among foreign diplomats; LPIii, 2917 (calendared 18 May 1518, 
Leo to Henry, ‘Mallianae’), 2918 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to Henry and a similar letter to Fox and 
Wolsey), 2919 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to Louis XII), 2920 (calendared 18 May 1518, Leo to the 
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favour (it is said) the peace with France’. The Venetian Badoer understood that the nuncio 
would remain indoors until he knew the final decisions on the peace, upon which he would 
leave immediately. Badoer speculated that Canossa would depart in a few days with a 
marriage proposal.334 Despite this nuncio supposedly being incognito, Imperial ambassadors 
were also aware of his presence and purpose.335 Soon after, Leo X again combined direct 
written pressure for peace to the king and his advisors with instructions to Canossa.336 As 
Ferdinand I understood by July 1514, Canossa failed to achieve anything, returned to France 
empty-handed and was said to be deeply unhappy with his treatment in England.337 The 
Venetian Lippomano in Rome, however, cited correspondence from the nuncio dated 16 July, 
claiming that he had gained Henry VIII’s agreement to peace and had returned to Louis XII to 
gain consent. Further correspondence from Canossa notified Leo X that the negotiations were 
in good train and that a conclusion was expected by 10 August.338 It then seems that Canossa 
travelled back to England with Louis’ final conditions, which must have been accepted given 
that the peace was concluded on 10 August. 339 
Henry and his ministers’ increasing amenability towards the papal peace initiative in 
early 1514 can also be observed from their employment, on 7 February, of Silvester de Giglis 
                                                                                                                                                        
dauphin), 2927 (LPI, 5107; 20 May 1514, de Giglis to Henry, Rome); Ven.ii, 421 (LPIii, 2980; 7 June 1514, 
Leo to Henry, Fox and Wolsey, Rome). 
nry, Fox and Wolsey, Rome). The 
t, Paris); Ven.iii, 
ncy ought not to have been 
 Colla to Maximilian, London). 
Signory to the Venetian ambassador in Rome); EP, 430 (May 1514, 
334 For Canossa’s commission in May, see EP, 430 (May 1514, Leo to He
nuncio was said to have left France on the 8th; LPIii, 3004 (LPI, 5164; 15 June 1514, [-] to Colar
1485 (LPIii, 3009; 17 June 1514, Badoer to the Venetian ambassador at the Curia); Ven.ii, 431 (20 June 1514, 
Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). The secrecy surrounding Canossa’s visit to the kingdom is also confirmed by 
another member of the Venetian embassy; ibid., 505 (LPIii, 3298; 24 September 1514, Nicolo di Favri to 
Francesco Gradenigo, London). 
335 Given that, officially, England was still committed to war against France, as far as the Imperials were 
concerned and the crown denied any negotiations with France, Canossa’s reside
known by them; LPIii, 3018 (LPI, 5173; Gerard de Pleine and John
336 The nuncio Canossa was also instructed to recognise communications from Giulio de’ Medici; EP, 438 (16 
June 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 443 (19 June 1514, Leo to Canossa, Rome), 444 (19 June 1514, Leo 
to Ammonius, Rome); LPIii, 3019 (LPI, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry). 
337 Sp.ii, 176 (calendared July 1514, Ferdinand to Cardinal de Cisneros). 
338 Lippomano does state, however, the pope’s understanding that the agreement had stalled since Canossa’s 
writing, later explaining that this was linked to the English possession of Tournai; Ven.ii, 453 (26 July 1514, 
Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
339 Ibid., 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
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to negotiate in Rome with the pope and French representatives on their behalf.340 The date 
suggests an almost immediate response to Caraffa’s arrival, and that something was said or 
offered to make peace an instantly attractive proposition. Subsequently, the bishop of 
Worcester received a number of communiqués from Fox and Wolsey, and was involved in 
frequent negotiations with the pope and French representatives about the peace, right up to its 
conclusion. Furthermore, Leo X appears to have used the orator as the conduit for some of his 
own communications concerning the peace.341 The significance of the bishop of Worcester’s 
role was such that William Burbank believed, after news of the peace (in August) had reached 
Rome, that Leo X wished to sweep later allegations of de Giglis’ involvement in the alleged 
murder of Bainbridge under the carpet, on account of this.342 De Giglis himself believed that 
his work deserved a more lucrative benefice than the see of Worcester that he already held.343 
It is unclear why the English crown employed de Giglis rather than Bainbridge but, while 
Chambers’ understanding that he may have been a victim of Wolsey’s enmity may hold some 
truth, Fox was also involved and both ministers still had to achieve a successful outcome for 
English interests; surely, personal grievances would not have interfered in this. An alternative 
                                                 
task is implicit in the actual letter sent by Fox and Wolsey, but this (and its actual date) becomes clearer 
Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56; LPIii, 2928 (LPI, 5353; 20 May 1514, [de 
340 This 
in its later citation by de Giglis himself; LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and 
Giglis to Fox and Wolsey]). 
341 Other evidence of de Giglis being instructed and informed by Fox and Wolsey about the peace, as well as the 
106; 20 May 1514, Bainbridge to Henry, Rome). In addition, on 7 June, 
oison of the 
at he needed such a promotion because 
olsey], Rome), 3255 (LPI, 
1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
bishop’s responding to the same ministers (up to the conclusion of the peace in August 1514) can be found in 
LPIii, 2783 (LPI, 4936; 4 April 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2927 (LPI, 5107; 20 May 1514, de Giglis to 
Henry, Rome), 3019 (LPI, 5174; 19 June 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de 
Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, R[ome]), 3362 (LPI, 5496; 13 October 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). 
Bainbridge’s spotting his colleague’s apparent intrigues in this respect (during May) have already been 
mentioned; ibid., 2926 (LPI, 5
Lippomano also reported de Giglis having daily meetings with the cardinal protector of France, San Severino; 
Ven.ii, 424 (10 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
342 Burbank was one of Bainbridge’s servants, attempting to implicate de Giglis in the alleged p
cardinal, who died on 13-14 July 1514; LPIii, 3203 (LPI, 5356; 28 August 1514, [William Burbank] to Henry, 
Florence). For Leo writing to Wolsey and Fox on 29 September, asserting de Giglis’ innocence, see EP, 521 (29 
September 1514, Leo to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). 
343 De Giglis requested this through Wolsey on 17 June, albeit claiming th
of his debts. The previous day, the pope had interceded with the king on the same subject. Leo implored Henry 
again to recognise de Giglis’ contribution to the peace on 8 September (on the same date he replied to English 
notifications of the treaty); LPIii, 3011 (LPI, 5168; 17 June 1514, de Giglis to [W
5392 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome); EP, 437 (16 June 
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explanation is that de Giglis was commissioned in an attempt to keep the negotiations secret 
(in the same way that Canossa’s mission to England was to remain covert); Bainbridge would 
remain a vocal and convincing anti-French firebrand, who might unwittingly help to ensure 
that this would remain the case, thus perpetuating the underlying anti-French agenda. As the 
most high-ranking English representative in Rome, Bainbridge’s actions would be scrutinised 
for any indication of changes in English foreign policy more so than, perhaps, de Giglis. The 
cardinal also posed a latent threat to the papacy with the English crown’s demand for 
concessions in return for its compliance (as will be outlined); that Bainbridge and de Giglis 
were proponents of different views may have suggested to the pope that Henry VIII was not 
completely decided on the peace and that there may have been a split within crown circles on 
the issue. Leo would have been encouraged, therefore, to give in to the crown’s requests, to 
ensure that the anti-French ‘party’, apparently represented by Bainbridge, did not again 
become ascendant. Of other English diplomatic representatives in Rome who may have been 
employed to pursue peace, Polydore Vergil, who was dispatched from England on 26 
February, was the most likely to have been involved.344 While there is no direct evidence that 
he did act on this subject, he did write to Wolsey from Rome on 21 May, by which time de 
Giglis was actively negotiating towards the peace, concerning an approach to Leo for Wolsey 
to gain a red hat, a concession which must have been linked to the wider political context.345 
Finally, Sanuto notes on 10 June 1514 that an English bishop was to go to Rome, to finalise 
the peace, but this does not appear to have occurred.346 
 Another indication that Henry VIII was manoeuvring closer to the papacy and thus 
towards Leo’s desire for peace, can be seen through his grants to two papal relatives, probably 
                                                 
344 LPIii, 2674 (LPI, 4819; 26 February 1514, Henry to Leo, Westminster). 
345 Vergil reported Leo as saying that Wolsey first needed to have ‘great authority with the king’ and 
recommended that de Castello be commissioned to facilitate this; ibid., 2932 (LPI, 5110; 21 May 1514, 
Pol[ydore Vergil] to [Wolsey], [Rome]). 
346 Ven.ii, 425 (10 June 1514, news recorded by Marino Sanuto, Rome). 
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issued during January 1514. The pope’s cousin (and closest confidant), Giulio de’ Medici, 
was appointed cardinal protector of England, while Leo’s brother, Giuliano, was admitted to 
the Order of the Garter.347 While the political benefits for Henry of ingratiating himself with 
those closest to the pope are easily apparent, it is difficult to explain these actions in terms of 
the dominant theme of political relations between England and Rome at that point; the latter’s 
desire to arrange peace with France. It may have been a bid to ensure close relations with the 
papacy after the peace and/or to work against French influence in Rome. Alternatively, it 
could have been a gesture to ensure that as many concessions were gained out of the papacy 
as possible, before the peace became a reality. A final suggestion that Henry VIII was moving 
towards peace is his positive response to a request from the pope, dated 2 October, to 
intercede with the emperor in his ever-continuing dispute with Venice.348 Henry seems to 
have written to the pope twice on this subject by February 1514.349 Indeed, Fox and Wolsey, 
in their January letter to de Giglis, suggested that an Imperial-Venetian peace ought to be 
concluded first.350  
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have arrived in Rome until the 18th; LPIii, 2639 (EP, 350; 8 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2640 (EP, 
352; 8 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henr , 
Rome), 2644 (LPI, 4747; 11 February 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 2653 (LPI, 4786; calendared 18-19 
February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2659 (EP, 363; 19 February 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome), 2838 
348 The pope, it seems, was lobbied himself to act in this regard
subsequent months; Ven.ii, 362 (6 November-6 December 1 3
 Leo had seen copies of Henry’s letters awarding these honours on 8 February, but the originals do not seem to 
y
(23 April 1514). 
 by the Venetians and apparently did so in 
51 , Antonio Bavarin to the Pesari of London, 
ondon)
77; 26
349 As is claimed in instructions conveyed to Spinelly around this time; ibid., 2609 (LPI, 4831; calendared end 
Signory to send to Badoer), 364 ( , 2566; 7 January 1514, doge to Henry), 365 ( , 2567; 7 January 1514, 
Signory to Badoer), 371 (LPIii, 2573; 13 January 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 376 (LPIii, 2582; 18 January 
ory to Henry). 
l location; LPIii, 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, 
6. 
L ; LPIii, 2448 (LPI, 4563; 16 November 1513, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Ausgburg]), 2462 (LPI, 
45  November 1514, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Termonde’). 
January 1514, instructions for [Spinelly]). Also see Ven.ii, 363 (LPIii, 2565; 6 January 1513, letter approved by 
LPIii LPIii
1514, Henry to the Signory, London), 378 (LPIii, 2689; 1 March 1514, Sign
350 Also, the bishop of ‘Feltri’ was deemed sufficient for the emperor. Concerning the proposed negotiations, the 
English crown was open to a French embassy coming to England or meeting English and Imperial 
representatives at Calais or another neutra
[Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.5
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 At odds with the English crown’s increasing receptiveness to papal peace overtures 
were the lengths to which it went to resist Leo X’s intended despatch of a legate a latere to 
facilitate universal peace. If the pope was already aware of English reluctance to entertain 
such a legate on English soil, as was likely, then this was an aggressive proposal. Leo seems 
to have pledged to send such delegates to the Christian princes at some point during the 
election process (back in February), but it only seems to have become a serious proposition 
towards the end of June 1513, when the pope notified Henry of his intention to despatch such 
officials to him and Maximilian.351 Bainbridge, however, in a contemporaneous despatch, 
recommended that Henry bar any such legate from the kingdom, as the pope ‘doithe it oonlie 
for ashewe and to be sean to kepe his Oithe’.352 On 7 July, the orator revealed that he had 
induced Leo to change his mind about the legates and that he would send prelates instead, as 
nuncios.353 Despite this apparent concession, papal pressure on England to admit a legate 
appears to have increased towards the end of 1513, as the pope headed towards a formal 
pledge to despatch such envoys to promote universal peace and reconciliation in the eighth 
ssion of the Lateran Council (19 December 1513).354 It is entirely feasible that this was 
intended to coincide with the end of the campaigning season, which the pope may have 
identified as an ideal opportunity to force a peace. That this came at the same time as the 
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absolution of Louis XII would not have filled the English with much hope about the political 
                        
n France to Florence, Paris). For the promise arising 
g and very 
351 LPIii, 2048 (calendared June 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
352 Fiddes, c.5-7 (LPIii, 2029; LPI, 4283; 25 June 1513, Bainbridge to Henry). It was understood by the 
Florentine ambassador in Paris that Leo X was to adopt this strategy (also intending to despatch a legate to the 
emperor); Ven.ii, 262 (3 July 1513, Florentine ambassador i
in conclave, see LPIii, 2077 (LPI, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome); L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vii, p.45. 
353 Bainbridge also suggested that de Castello had forwarded himself to become legate to England (and the 
Empire); LPIii, 2077 (LPI, 4327; 7 July 1513, Bainbridge to Ruthal, Rome). 
354 The decree may have been implicitly referring to Henry VIII when it referred to ‘the threatenin
obvious danger from the infidels and the spilling of Christian blood, which even then was being poured out 
because of our blatant faults’; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and 
Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, p.108; N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical 
Councils, i , pp.606-607. 
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direction of such a peace.355 De Giglis notified Henry of the pope’s renewed commitment to 
sending a legate to him on 11 October, proposing Bainbridge and wanting an answer within 
22 days.356 In response, Henry instructed both Bainbridge and de Giglis to lobby the pope 
against his proposal.357 The mission of Sir Thomas Cheyney to Italy in early November may 
also have been linked to this, perhaps indicating that the ‘threat’ was deemed serious.358 Just a 
few days before the general council sat to decree the commissioning of legates, the pope 
warned Henry that he had no choice, arguing that he had made a promise to the assembly.359 
On the day of the eighth session, Leo wrote again to Henry (answering his objections), 
reiterating that he could not avoid sending a legate. He again proposed Bainbridge and, in 
requesting permission for him to enter England, added that the cardinal would be able to 
reveal his ‘true’ plans for the peace.360 Leo thereby implied that the apparently pro-French 
gesture towards peace was not all that it seemed. This correspondence seems to have been 
accompanied by the aforementioned briefs to urge various members of the English episcopate 
to urge the king in this direction, although Fox and Wolsey conveyed Henry’s rejection of 
even Bainbridge’s candidature as a legate, regardless of it having been decreed within the 
general council. Moreover, the two ministers advocated the employment of two existing 
nuncios to facilitate the peace and crusade (Caraffa in England), claiming that the Lateran 
Council did not prohibit this.361 This statement emphasises that the English opposition to 
legates a latere should not be overstated as an indication that Henry VIII was unreceptive to 
                                                 
355 See above pp.435-436. 
356 LPIii, 2353 (LPI, 4500; 11 October 1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). 
 p.420; D.S. Chambers, Cardinal 
. 
357 Sp.ii, 141 (calendared end October 1513, Henry to Leo). 
358 Cheyney seems to have been in Rome by February 1514; see above
Bainbridge, p.57. 
359 On 12 or 17 December; LPIii, 2507, 2512 (LPI, 4605; 17 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
360 Ibid., 2517 (SPV, x; LPI, 4608; 19 December 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
361 Ibid., 2611 (LPI, 4598; dated by Chambers at January 1514, [Fox and Wolsey] to de Giglis); D.S. Chambers, 
Cardinal Bainbridge, p.56
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papal peace overtures per se.362 It was, moreover, the level of authority invested in such 
diplomats with which he was uncomfortable, as he voiced later in 1518.363 Viewed in political 
terms, the visit of a legate a latere to England shortly after the pope had reconciled himself 
with Louis XII at the Lateran Council would have sparked concerns in England for the 
intended direction of universal peace. If the pope was now pro-French, then such a peace 
could be adapted to Louis’ interests (particularly in Italy) and preclude any English reaction in 
defence of the Church. Consequently, if a legate was pursuing this policy in England, he 
would be wielding a great deal more power to force English compliance than mere nuncios. 
 
 In addition to diplomatic pressure from Rome for England to agree a peace with 
France, Leo X also envisaged some inducements to help sway Henry VIII’s decision. The first 
of these was his bestowal on 24 December 1513 of the cap and sword of maintenance, an 
honour awarded annually to favoured heads of state.364 As Leo later explained, these gifts 
were in recognition of Henry’s role in defending the Church against France and in a bid for 
him now to turn his arms against the infidels (the precursor to which would be peace with 
Louis XII).365 These were received in all solemnity by Henry in a ceremony on 21 May.366 
While the delay between bestowal and receipt was originally put down to the weather, it is 
possible that Leo awaited positive indications of England’s political direction before he 
despatched the cap and sword.367 The pope was mistaken, however, if he believed that he 
                                                 
362 This acceptance of nuncios as substitutes is consistent with his earlier signals to Rome that he was prepared to 
open discussions. The pope’s understanding of this is suggested by the fact that two nuncios were already en 
is process; see above pp.437-440. 
omano to -, Rome), 2530 (LPI, 4621; 31 December 
 (LPIii, 2688; LPI, 4835; 1 March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
-, London); 
 1 March 1514; LPIii, 2530 (LPI, 4621;31 December 1513, de Giglis to Henry, 
route to England to begin th
363 See below p.632. 
364 LPIii, 2527 (Ven.ii, 361; 27 December 1513, Vetor Lipp
1513, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). 
365 Fiddes, c.11-12
366 Ven.ii, 433 ([May-June] 1514, Badoer to the Signory), 445 (15 June 1514, Nicolo di Favri to 
LPIii, 2029 (LPI, 5111; 21 May 1514). 
367 De Giglis informed Henry that Leonard Spinelly would bring it to him once the weather had become milder, 
but this did not occur until
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could ‘buy’ the king’s adhesion so cheaply, as the English crown proceeded to seek a plethora 
of other concessions, some connected with the rising Wolsey, as a sign of ‘goodwill’.  
 Among the more general concessions sought from Rome, the first was an indulgence 
issued on 7 February, at the request of Thomas Ruthal, to help rebuild Norham Castle, 
destroyed by James IV in the run-up to Flodden, in spite of its unusual form.368 Principal 
secretary Ruthal, as bishop of Durham, was partly responsible for the defence of the Scottish 
border, towards which some of his temporalities were directed, and this fortification was a 
manifestation of this role. The papacy had reservations about the diversion of episcopal 
mporalities to this end, at a bishopric that was usually the preserve of intimate crown 
iniste
te
m rs, and had most recently investigated this through a nunciature in 1509.369 This 
Norham indulgence may seem a relatively insignificant concession from Rome, yet it 
demonstrated recognition of de facto crown authority in this area and, whereas it may have 
otherwise objected, its issue at a time when the pope was lobbying England towards peace, 
suggested that it was intended, at least partly, as a bargaining tool.  
 An arguably more significant concession sought and gained by the crown around this 
time was Leo X’s agreement, on 16 August that Henry could accept the clerical contributions 
made for the now abandoned 1514 expedition. This approach may have been made by Fox 
                                                                                                                                                        
Rome), 2664 (EP, 365; 20 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), LPIii, 2688 (LPI, 4835; Fiddes, c.11-12; 1 
March 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). Also see above pp.139-141. 
368 LPIii, 2636 (LPI, 4724; SPV, xi; 7 February 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2641 (EP, 351; 8 February 1514, 
Leo to Ruthal, Rome), 2642 (LPI, 4735; 8 February 1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). For the 
destruction of Norham by the Scots and Ruthal’s pledge to spare no expense in rebuilding the castle, see ibid., 
ctober 1514, Ruthal to Wolsey, Akland); Ven.ii, 
13, Brian Tuke to Richard [Pace], Tournai). 
hambers, Cardinal Bainbridge, p.12. Also see A.S. Brown, Appointments and 
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n pursuit of which Henry VIII commissioned Cardinal de’ Medici (the 
2279 (LPI, 4457; 18 September 1514, Ruthal to Wolsey, Durham), 2284 (LPI, 4460; 20 September 1514, Ruthal 
to Wolsey), 2283 (LPI, 4461-4462; 20 September 1514, Ruthal to Wolsey, Durham), 2381 (LPI, 4497; 19 
October 1513, Dacre to Ruthal, Carlisle), 2394 (LPI, 4523; 24 O
316 (22 September 15
369 LPIi, 100 (LPI, 267; 6 July 1509, Julius II to Henry, Rome). Bonvisi had previously investigated Durham on 
behalf of the pope in 1506; D.S. C
Benefices, Jurisdiction, and Taxation; Aspects of Relations Between the English 
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cardinal protector) and de Giglis on 9 January; LPIIi, 108 (3 February 1515, [Giulio de’ Medici] to Henry, 
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and Wolsey to de Giglis on 30 July to secure this.370 While the underlying desire to keep the 
monies raised was entirely understandable, given the expenses that would have accrued in the 
wn’s desire to retain lay 
originally intended for the war against France. 
war preparations for that year, this request to Rome was curious. Direct taxation of the 
English clergy, while originally a papal prerogative, had by this time been long controlled by 
the crown and permission was not granted to the papacy to raise money in this manner during 
this period.371 Why did the English crown apply to Rome for confirmation that it could keep 
the levies, thereby admitting formal papal authority in this area? The answer, or at least a 
suggestion of it, is perhaps revealed by the Venetian consul in London on 12 July; he, 
reported a widespread rumour that the Anglo-French peace had already been concluded, but 
not published, because Henry was trying to collect the monies granted by Parliament; if the 
peace was published, it was envisaged that objections would be raised to the levies, as they 
were agreed to for the purpose of war.372 It was not a question of whether the peace had been 
concluded and kept secret, but the Italian’s belief that there may be unrest if the tax was still 
collected and not put towards war. While this refers to the cro
taxation, it would be logical that Henry and his ministers would equally have wanted to keep 
any clerical levies raised. By seeking Leo X’s confirmation, therefore, the English crown 
would allay or at least deflect any criticism surrounding its retention of clerical taxes 
                                                 
370 De Giglis claimed that the cardinal protector, de’ Medici, had not assisted in this and it was also made 
difficult by Bainbridge’s claims that Henry VIII exacted frequent levies from the clergy, which themselves were 
probably feints to argue against the papacy imposing its own clerical tenths. If Rome believed that the English 
clergy was so burdened, it would have envisaged opposition to its own levies; LPIii, 3157 (LPI, 5331; 16 August 
1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, R[ome]). 
371 W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, pp.160-168. Interestingly, the underlying 
friction between England and Rome over control of these fiscal measures can be seen when de Giglis claimed 
that he had found this concession difficult to wring out of the pope LPIii, 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de 
Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, R[ome]). 
372 Pasqualigo is apparently referring to lay taxation here; Ven.ii, 456 (12 July 1514, Lorenzo Pasqualigo to his 
brothers, London). 
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 A further general concession requested by the crown, in connection with its decision 
to negotiate peace with France, was the replacement of Hadrian de Castello as apostolic 
collector with the king’s own nominee and Latin Secretary, Andrew Ammonius. Henry VIII 
apparently approached the pope in this regard prior to the conclusion of the Anglo-French 
peace and Leo, replying on 16 August, begged a delay of a few days before he confirmed the 
king’s nomination.373 It may be significant that the pope understood that the Anglo-French 
peace was certain by this time, as it may suggest that he was manoeuvring to avoid this 
concession, now that he knew that the English crown had played its hand.374 Leo’s ‘few days’ 
were over on 29 September, when he agreed to Ammonius’ assumption of the office.375 This 
was not the end of the matter, however, as de Castello fought a rearguard action in Rome, 
causing the pope to vacillate on allegations (from the cardinal) that Henry VIII did not support 
this action.376 Subsequently, Leo X compromised in March 1515, allowing de Castello to 
remain collector, but appointing Ammonius as his deputy; the Latin secretary did not gain his 
prize, however, until 1517 when de Castello’s fall was prompted by his implication in a plot 
against the pope’s life, of which the English crown took full advantage.377 
 
 A ‘concession’ made by the papacy to England that was not sought by the crown 
followed the death of Bainbridge in curiam Romanam. When a cleric died at the Curia, it was 
the pope’s right to provide to benefices thereby vacated. While English kings had de facto 
control over appointments to bishoprics within their kingdom (helped by control over vacancy 
                                                 
373 LPIii, 3158 (LPI, 5332; 16 August 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). De Giglis reported de Castello’s belief that 
Wolsey was the instigator of his sacking; ibid., 3496 (LPI, 5464; calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to 
[Ammonius]). 
374 Ven.ii, 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
375 LPIii, 3311 (LPI, 5457; EP, 520; 29 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3322 (LPI, 5458; 29 September 
1514, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Rome). 
376 On 31 October, for instance, the pope sought confirmation from both the king and Fox that the replacement 
was actually desired by Henry, as he had been informed otherwise; ibid., 3401 (LPI, 5538; Fiddes, c.17-18; EP, 
34. 
533-534; 31 October 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3402 (31 October 1514, Leo to Fox, Rome). 
377 See above pp.32-
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te alities), the death of a bishop in Rome was different and unusual. Given that the last 
time such an English vacancy at Rome occurred (in 1493), there seems to have been little risk 
that the then pope, Alexander VI (1492-1503), would exercise his right of reservation, it was 
was equally unlikely in 1514.
mpor
an unprecedented 
pportunity for the English crown to make tangible political capital on the situation, 
e senior metropolitan in the kingdom, the archbishop of St Andrew’s, as well as 
378 Indeed, the Milanese ambassador in Rome commented that 
the pope, while Bainbridge was in extremis, intended to wait for Henry VIII’s nomination to 
the imminent vacancy at York. The orator further reported that Leo encouraged Bainbridge to 
draw up a will, so that his considerable wealth would not be acquired by the papacy. While 
the Milanese writer seems to have been surprised at Leo’s restraint in exercising his rights vis-
à-vis York, he also implies a reason for this; the pope was still awaiting a decision from 
England in connection with the desired peace with France.379 In this case, therefore, Leo 
would never have considered jeapordised the peace negotiations by interfering in English 
episcopal appointments or even the distribution of Bainbridge’s wealth back to England. 
 Finally, a broad concession that the English crown failed to lever from the pope in 
relation to its coming to terms with France related to its claims to overlordship over Scotland. 
The decisive English victory at Flodden (9 September 1513) offered 
o
particularly given that James IV had been killed and that his successor was both Henry VIII’s 
nephew and an infant (born in 1512). If Henry acted quickly, therefore, he may have 
envisaged himself able to realise the longstanding English claims to subordinate Scotland. 
The papacy could assist in this by supporting subsequent English attempts to assert control 
over the Scottish episcopate (indeed, the Church in Scotland). This opportunity had arisen on 
account of th
                                                 
378 A.S. Brown, Appointments and Benefices, Jurisdiction, and Taxation; Aspects of Relations Between the 
English Crown and the Papacy, 1485-1509, pp.20-21. 
379 Mil., 698 (12 July 1514, Milanese ambassador at Rome to the duke of Milan), 700 (17 July 1514, Milanese 
he duke of Milan). ambassador at Rome to t
 450
the bishop of the Isles and two abbots, having been killed at Flodden. This meant that there 
were multiple episcopal vacancies to be filled, which could affect the political landscape of 
Scotland. In the subsequent political turmoil, the waters were further muddied by powerful 
dignitaries backing rival candidates for many of the vacant positions.380 In his first move on 
12 October 1513, Henry VIII asked the pope to the reduce St Andrew’s from primatial status 
back to a suffragan see of the diocese of York, thereby reasserting English jurisdictional 
control over the Church in Scotland.381 No response has been found to this. Secondly, Henry 
sought to assert control of appointments to the Scottish episcopate per se by asking Leo X to 
approve his nominations.382 Finally, Henry, in co-operation with his sister, Queen Margaret, 
attempted to install their own candidates to a number of vacant sees. Of these, the most 
significant was the archbishopric of St Andrew’s, which led to a number of vying candidates. 
From October 1513, the Scottish crown, then controlled by Margaret, pushed for William 
Elphinstone, bishop of Aberdeen and met with papal procrastination up until the prelate’s 
death on 25 October 1514. At odds with the ‘English party’, Leo X himself also tried to take 
advantage of the chaos in Scotland (and the lack of clear crown power there over episcopal 
nominations) by attempting to shoehorn his nephew, Cardinal Cibo, into St Andrew’s on 13 
October 1513. Henry VIII would have been aware this by mid-February 1514, when Spinelly 
                                                 
 N. Macdougall, An Antidote to the English: the Auld Alliance, 1295-1560 (2001), p.118; L.J. Macfarlane, 
William Elphinstone and the Kingdom of Scotland, 1431-1514 (1985), pp.218, 431-432; D. Mackie, ‘Henry VIII 
381 St Andrew’s had become an an archbishopric in 1472 at the behest of the Scottish crown. The deanery of 
Galloway was also detached from the province of York at the same time. In 1492, the Scottish crown 
successfully lobbied for a second archbishopric to be created at Glasgow; LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; 12 October 
1513, Henry to Leo, Tournai); N. Macdougall, An Antidote to the English, p.116; D.E.R. Watt, ‘The Papacy and 
382 The problem was that, unlike the modus vivendi in England, the Scottish crown’s candidates were not 
380
and Scotland’, TRHS, 19, pp.102,104; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.37; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.96. 
Scotland in the Fifteenth Century’, in R.B. Dobson (ed.), Church, Politics and Patronage (1984), pp.115-127. 
automatically provided by Rome. While Innocent VIII agreed in 1487 that royal nominees would be appointed, 
if referred to the papacy within eight months of any given vacancy, neither Alexander VI nor Julius II provided 
every recommendation emanating from James IV. They did, however, appoint the king’s choice for St Andrew’s 
onarch; LPIii, 2355 (LPI, 4502; 12 October 1513, Henry 
on the last two occasions. Macfarlane, on the other hand, does argue that, by the reign of James IV, episcopal 
posts had become political rewards bestowed by the m
to Leo, Tournai); L.J. Macfarlane, William Elphinstone and the Kingdom of Scotland, 1431-1514, pp.218, 431-
432. 
 451
advertised him that a secretary of the papal-nephew (Balthazar Stuerd) carried formidable 
powers to enforce the provision, namely the ability to lay Scotland under interdict. He was 
also impressed by the secretary himself; ‘a subtle and quick fellow, who can full well say one 
thing and think another’. A signal of English failure to gain any concessions in this area 
would have been indicated by the pope’s response when he realised that Cibo would not be 
successful. Leo proposed a compromise concerning the candidate supported by the 
Francophile heir-presumptive to the Scottish throne, the duke of Albany; if Forman resigned 
his recent acquisition of Bourges to Cibo, the pope would provide him to St Andrew’s (and 
remove his nephew’s claim to the latter). Spinelly notified Henry VIII of this plan on 1 July 
1514, as well as of ominous recent news that the pope was ‘French’. English hopes for 
influence over the Church in Scotland had failed, therefore, before the end of 1514.383 Leo X 
was evidently unwilling to grant concessions in this area in return for English compliance in 
the peace negotiations. This was perhaps because, given the French interest in this, with Louis 
XII protecting and backing Albany, the political repercussions could spread far beyond 
England and maybe come back to haunt him in the future. 
 
 In addition to more general papal concessions for the crown, several others were 
Wolsey-specific, perhaps demonstrating his rapidly ascending trajectory at this point. Henry 
VIII employed all of the English representatives to seek a reduction in the consistorial taxes 
                                                 
383 While Henry VIII had failed to affect St Andrew’s during 1513-1514, this did not deter him from trying to 
’, DNB; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.81-82, 97-100. 
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due on Wolsey’s provision to Lincoln.384 Initially, Leo refused this, however, claiming that 
the Sacred College had rejected the request ‘as detrimental to the Holy See’.385 De Giglis, 
moreover, asserted that the pope also objected to the reduction, although Leo did apparently 
waive the annates due on the deanery of St Stephen (Westminster), perhaps as a compromise, 
and further promised to recompense Wolsey and Fox in the future, particularly given the 
recent rewards given to his relatives.386 Shortly after, the pope further promised ‘to show him 
[Wolsey] favour in greater things’.387 Wolsey was apparently dissatisfied with this rejection, 
much to de Giglis’ dismay, although the orator further had to admit that he had failed to 
obtain a ‘faculty for holding benefices of 2,000l’, on account of the expense.388 With regard to 
the consistorial taxes, the English crown did not take ‘no’ for an answer and further letters 
concerning this matter reached de Giglis around 17 June.389 Again, on 26 August, however, 
the orator relayed his inability to secure any remission.390 Yet sustained pressure seems to 
have borne fruit; in November, the pope waived 1,000 ducats and, by October, the Sacred 
College had conceded a similar sum.391 Further waivers were sought from England, as the 
diocese had been vacant twice in one year.392 By January 1515, the pope had also released 
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Wolsey from payment of all sums due to him connected with the service taxes of Lincoln and 
the minister ultimately paid 1,625 ducats of the original 5,000 due.393 While these tax 
reductions occurred after the Anglo-French peace was concluded, they may still have been 
papal concessions linked to this, as Leo’s subsequent offer(s) of financial reward for Wolsey’s 
efforts to have the duchy of Milan included retrospectively in the Anglo-French peace may 
have been remitted through these service taxes.394 
 
 Perhaps the boldest concession sought by the English crown for Wolsey at this time 
was a red hat, particularly given that he had only just been elevated to the episcopate. 
Polydore Vergil was sent on a secret mission to Rome in February 1514 to raise this issue 
tentatively with the pontiff.395 This could have been an immediate response to the pope who, 
when recently rejecting Wolsey’s desire for service taxes to be waived, hinted at greater 
concessions.396 Although Vergil failed in this regard, conveying the pope’s basic 
recommendation that Wolsey must be the king’s chief minister before this could be 
considered and, perhaps, also that a peace ought to occur, Henry did take this advice seriously 
and wrote formally and directly to Leo X on 12 August, asserting that he ‘esteems him 
                                                                                                                                                        
metropolitan. Indeed, precedents did exist for a successor to pay the whole or part of the balance due from a 
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394 See below pp.461-462. 
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why Vergil, whose position as vice-collector was under attack by Wolsey would intercede on his behalf for a red 
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of his position (even de Castello’s of his); LPIii, 2674 (LPI, 4819; 26 February 1514, Henry to Leo, 
Westminster). 
396 Ibid., 2660 (19 February 1514, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
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[Wolsey] above his dearest friends, and can do nothing of the least importance without 
him’.397 Significantly, this letter was issued on the same date that the English king notified the 
pope that the Anglo-French peace had been concluded and one can reasonably assume, 
therefore, that both pieces of correspondence were connected.398 While Wolsey understood 
during September 1514 that the pope would elevate him at the next creation, Leo politely 
refused Henry’s August request on 24 September, promising to fulfil it ‘at a suitable time’.399 
he papacy had managed, therefore, to delay this desired concession until the leverage on 
on 17 June 1514.402 It cannot have been a coincidence that Leo also conveyed to Fox and 
T
which the English crown was relying, the agreement of peace with France, had disappeared. 
While it could be argued that Wolsey was naïve in his dealings with the papacy on this 
occasion, he would not be in 1515, when he finally succeeded in gaining a red hat.400 
 Finally, Henry VIII appears to have taken advantage of his political leverage to have 
Wolsey appointed to the wealthy ‘French’ see of Tournai, the city having been conquered 
during 1513. While a bishop elect had been appointed in August 1513, he made his position 
untenable, as far as the English were concerned, when he refused to pledge obedience to 
Henry VIII.401 As a result, the English king forwarded Wolsey’s candidacy and, while the 
date is unknown, the pope forwarded a brief, presumably a positive reply, through de Giglis 
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Wolsey his desire for Henry’s participation in the Anglo-French (and universal) peace on the 
19th; the almoner’s goodwill at least was expected, presumably in return for this 
concession.403 The brief was followed by Leo’s confirmation of Wolsey’s appointment to this 
see (or at least to its administration) on 16 September and, probably around the same time, de 
Giglis confirmed that bulls enabling him to hold the see in commendam with York, had also 
been granted.404 In spite of the pope’s apparent acquiescence in this matter, this was merely 
the beginning of Wolsey’s protracted struggle to gain control of the diocese (until 1519), 
which involved the pope vacillating on a number of occasions and it ultimately ending in 
failure for the Englishman.405 Nevertheless, the timing, the political sensitivity of the issue 
(given that the papacy was already enjoying cordial relations with France) and Leo’s 
Milan, specifically, during June and July,407 and finally the English possession of Tournai 
                                                                                                          
conceding the see to England all suggest a link for request and reply with the peace 
negotiations then in train. 
 
 Despite England’s apparent willingness to listen to papal proposals from January 
1514, a peace treaty was not concluded until 7 August. During the interim, there seem to have 
been a few hiccups that stalled negotiations, including the question of French pensions to 
England during May,406 the English desire for Louis XII to not interfere in Italy, generally, or 
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1519, pp.143-187. 
406 Ven.ii, 420 (LPIii, 2921;
407 Ibid., 427 (12 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 448 (16 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to 
the Signory). Confirmation that this was a major sticking point is indicated by Henry on 12 August, when he 
notified the pope of the treaty’s conclusion; LPIii, 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii
Greenwich). The Venetian, Lippomano, also commented on Henry’s considerable demands during June 1514; 




 another cycle of military action to prevent this. 
during July.408 The nuncio Canossa flitted between England and France, finally returning to 
Henry VIII with Louis XII’s final proposals on 30 July.409 In the peace that was finally 
concluded, Henry included among his allies ‘Pope Leo X, the Holy See, and all the territories 
and places belonging to it’. In other words, he was still fulfilling his self-perceived role as 
defender of the papacy. Notably, however, Milan, one of the keys to maintaining papal 
‘independence’ from France, was not included and Henry notified the pope that he had tried, 
but failed, in this regard.410 Thus, by the end of this first phase, political relations between 
England and Rome had nearly gone full circle; Henry VIII was once again at peace with 
France, unwillingly but forced by circumstance. As the peace now released the French to 
concentrate on their Italian ambitions, it may have even been predictable to contemporaries, 
that English fears of the French threat to papal ‘independence’ would soon resurface, lea
to
                                                 
408 Ven.ii, 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 
 Rome). 
ugust and ratified by Henry on the 20 ; Sp.ii, 178 (9 July 1514), 183-185 (LPIii, 3129; LPI, 
4), 3134 (LPI, 
465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
409 Ibid., 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 
458 (8 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -,
410 Louis XII had agreed to Henry VIII’s financial demands as early as 9 July, but the treaty was only proclaimed 
in England on 10 A th
5305; 7 August 1514); LPIii, 3130 (LPI, 5306; 7 August 1514), 3131 (LPI, 5307; 7 August 151
5311; 8 August 1514), 3136 (LPI, 5315; calendared 10 August 1514), 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 
1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 3226:24 (LPI, 5343; 20 August 1514). The significance of Milan in the 
negotiations was noted by a Venetian observer from Rome, on 12 June, who cited contradictory reports about 
whether Louis XII would guarantee the safety of the duchy; Ven.ii, 427 (12 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, 
Rome). 
PHASE II  
FROM PEACE TO ‘UNIVERSAL PEACE’. ENGLAND’S ATTEMPTS TO 
PREVENT THE PAPACY FROM BEING CAUGHT ‘BETWEEN THE 
FRENCH MOLARS’: 1514-15181 
 
A flawed peace that enabled France to launch a successful expedition into Italy: 
August 1514 - September 1515 
Henry VIII notified the pope of his arrangement with Louis XII on 12 August 
and attributed it to ‘the frequent and earnest exhortations of the Pope’. He now urged 
Leo to facilitate the universal peace (and crusade) that he had been pressing for.2 
Wolsey and Fox pre-empted their king’s letter by sending details of the peace days 
earlier.3 Leo X had been expecting news of an agreement since around 15 May, but 
certainly anticipated a successful resolution from the beginning of August.4 Henry’s 
                                                 
1 De Giglis described the pope’s predicament as such on 4 October 1516, when relaying to Wolsey the 
pope’s inability to provide support for English moves against France until a treaty be concluded 
between Henry VIII and Charles of Castile. The pope reportedly feared raising Francis’ hackles, as this 
would risk the French stirring up various rebels within the Papal States. To put this into some sort of 
context, Leo X was reacting to the recent blow to the anti-French ‘holy league’ caused by the Catholic 
King’s ‘defection’ to Francis’ side, enacted by the Treaty of Noyon; LPIIi, 2420 (4 October 1516, [de 
Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome).  
2 LPIii, 3139 (LPI, 5319; Ven.ii, 487; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
3 Ibid., 3362 (LPI, 5496; 13 October 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). 
4 Ven.ii, 408 (15 May 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Most reports from Rome 
around this date, some at least based on intelligence from England, believed that an Anglo-French 
rapprochement was going to happen; ibid., 415 (1 June 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory), 419 (31 May 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 424 (7 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, 
Rome), 425 (10 June 1514, news heard and recorded by Sanuto), 426 (13 June 1514, Council of 10 to 
e Venetian ambassador in Rome), 427 (12 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 429 (16 June 
etian College by the French ambassador), 440 (30 
 By 10 August, De’ Medici’s secretary was saying that it had been made. The news was 
reportedly in Florence by the same date and in Venice on the 12th. The government of the latter were 
th
1514, Council of 10 to the Venetian ambassador in France), 432 (24 June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, 
Rome), 439 (1 July 1514, announcement to the Ven
June 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 442 (3-4 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 447 (12 
July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 448 (16 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory), 449 (17 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 450 (17 July 1514, Vetor 
Lippomano to -, Rome), 451 (23 July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 452 (26 
July 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 453 (26 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, 
Rome), 454 (30 July 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 457 (4 August and 27 July 1514, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome and France to the Signory), 458 (3-4 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
On the 16th, the pope was overheard saying that that he now intended to ‘form a Christian league’ to go 
on a crusade that he himself would lead in person; ibid., 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, 
Rome).
 458




Ultimately, Henry VIII’s lack of support for the continuation of war meant 
y wrote to the pope alleging that the marriage 
agreem
ondence from
st.5 In reply, Leo hoped that this amity would mark the basis of universal peace an
ld help precipitate a crusade.6 
 
that he had little choice but to agree to a rapprochement with France, however 
reluctantly.7 He even apparentl
ent was arranged because he had been forsaken by his allies.8 With regard to 
Henry VIII’s underlying concern for the papacy’s political ‘independence’, however, 
the August 1514 peace with Louis XII had one major flaw; by effectively 
guaranteeing the security of France’s northern borders, Louis XII was now free to 
indulge in his Italian ambitions, which were still very much alive.9 This flaw was not 
                                                                                                                                            
expecting imminent confirmation; ibid., 459 (Presentation to the Signory by the French ambassador of 
letters from Florence dated 10 August 1514). By 16th, the Venetian ambassador in Rome reported a 
 to the Venetian ambassador in Rome), 479 (28 August 1514, Vetor 
 26 and 31 August; 
LPI, 5365; 31 August 
marriage treaty to have been finalised; ibid., 463 (LPIii, 3178; 16 August 1514, Venetian ambassador 
in Rome to the Signory). The Portuguese orator, on the other hand, reported that celebrations were 
made without Leo X’s permission and that guns were not fired from the Castel S. Angelo, as would 
otherwise have been expected; LPIii, 3236 (LPI, 5378; 3 September 1514, John Faria to the king of 
Portugal, Rome). Also see Ven.ii., 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 466 (21 
August 1514), 467 (22 August 1514, Council of 10 to the Venetian ambassador in France), 468 (22 
August 1514, Council of 10
Lippomano to -, Rome). De Giglis received notification from England between
LPIii, 3197 (LPI, 5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox]), 3220 (
1514, de Giglis to [Wolsey and Fox], Rome). 
5 De Giglis received notification from England between 26 and 31 August. A celebratory service was 
performed on 2 September, attended by de Giglis and de Castello, among others; LPIii, 3197 (LPI, 
5354; 26 August 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox]), 3220 (LPI, 5365; 31 August 1514, de Giglis to 
[Wolsey and Fox], Rome); Ven.ii, 489 (3-4 September 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
6 The pope replied to English proclamations of the agreement on 8-9 September ; LPIii, 3249 (EP, 500; 
7 September 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 3254 (EP, 501; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, 
Rome); EP, 503 (9 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
7 It will be argued here that the peace of August 1514 (as with that of March 1510) was hardly a sincere 
one. The necessary preconditions for war against France (mainly allies, including Rome) were not there 
and, as a result, England reverted to its traditional foreign policy vis-à-vis that kingdom, a peace made 
profitable through pensions. 
8 This letter is cited by Martyr at the Spanish Court and seems to be confirmed by the Milanese orator 
in Rome; LPIii, 3482 (LPI, 5642; 27 November 1514, Peter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid). 
Also see Mil., 711 (17 August 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan).  
9 The Venetian government, in December 1514, implied to a papal representative that this peace had 
freed Louis to pursue his aims for Italy, see Ven.ii, 527 (14 December 1514, Signory to the papal 
ambassador, Pietro Bembo). For other indications of the increased French threat to Italy as a result of 
the peace with England, see below, pp.463-466. 
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new, having last arisen as a result of Henry VIII’s renewal of the Treaty of Étaples 
(1492) in March 1510 and which consequently led to a French campaign in Italy, 
during which the papacy lost Bologna.10 Indeed, there is some suggestion that the 
nglish may have attempted to draw out the peace negotiations longer than was 
and perceived to be of fundamental strategic importance as a launchpad for further 
E
necessary, in part at least to discourage Louis from crossing the Alps during 1514.11 
 Recognising this flaw, the English crown tried to provide for the security of 
Rome by having the papacy and, more specifically Bologna named within the Anglo-
French peace, presumably in a bid to secure the Papal States against French ambitions 
and perhaps to ensure a get-out clause if one was ever needed.12 However, this was 
merely sticking plaster over the broader English failure to have Milan comprised in 
the treaty. The duchy, which fell from French control in 1512, was a principal object 
of French ambitions in the peninsula. It was both claimed by the French king by right 
operations into the peninsula.13 Its security, therefore was of direct significance to 
English interests in Italy and with regard to the papacy, and it is entirely 
                                                 
10 One immediate consequence of the 1510 renewal of the Treaty of Étaples was a French campaign in 
Italy, engendered at least in part by the peace on the northern borders. Similarly, the Venetian 
government implied to a papal representative in December 1514 that this peace had freed Louis to 
pursue his aims for Italy, see Ven.ii, 527 (14 December 1514, Signory to the papal ambassador, Pietro 
Bembo). 
11 On 12 July, a Milanese source in Rome claimed that England would not conclude unless France 
July 1514, 
Ven.ii, 488 (24 August 1514, Venetian 
EP, 503; 8 
promised to leave Italy alone; Mil., 697 (12 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of 
Milan). Similarly, the Milianese ambassador in Rome suggests procrastination by Henry on 21 July 
(but to see what the Swiss would do; although he does mention Henry’s insistence on generous terms); 
ibid., 704 (21 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan), 705 (27 
Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan). Also, the marriage element to the peace ensured 
that Louis could not leave northern France until this was fulfilled. For a Venetian source suggesting 
that this prevented him from going to Italy during 1514, see 
ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris). Also see ibid., 491 (18 September 1514, 1514, Venetian 
ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris). The marriage did not take place until 9 October 1514, by 
which point in the campaigning a personal descent by Louis was unlikely; LPIii, 3348 (LPI, 5482-
5484, 8-9 October 1514). 
12 Henry was at pains to stress this when he notified Leo of the peace. Perhaps in a bid to retain the 
confidence of the pope, the king also made a show of transparency by sending him a copy of the 
compact; Ven.ii, 487 (LPIii, 3139; LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo); LPIii, 3254 (
September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome).  
13 For the French claim to Milan, see Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII 
to the duke of Suffolk, Paris). Knecht argues that Italians envisaged the duchy as a ‘bulwark against 
foreign invasion’; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.36. 
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understandable why the crown desired some sort of proviso for the duchy in its amity 
with France. However, Wolsey and Fox seem to have admitted that Milan would not 
be contained in the peace as early as 26 July, on which date they informed the pope 
that they had had to concede on this point, on pain of the negotiations failing. They 
promised, nevertheless, to keep the matter at the fore of ongoing discussions.14 Henry 
18
VIII reiterated the extensive, albeit failed, efforts to comprise Milan, when he notified 
the pope of the peace on 12 August. It may be for this reason that the English king 
went on to urge the pope to advocate universal peace (which, if achieved, would 
theoretically secure the duchy).15 By September 1514, Leo X seems to have 
interpreted the earlier English pledge to persist in representing Milan as an offer to 
broker a more direct agreement between Louis XII and Duke Maximilian Sforza. 
During October, Leo urged Wolsey and Fox to persuade Henry to mediate an 
agreement between Louis and Sforza that would pave the way towards universal 
peace.16 By November, the pope was hopeful of Wolsey’s success.17 While Wolsey 
did apparently reply to de Giglis with regard to the duchy, his subsequent actions are 
unclear.  It is possible that, at one point, he pursued a plan for the duchy to be a 
                                                 
14 The Milanese source of this information refers neither to Wolsey or Fox by name, only to bishops 
who controlled the king. However, they are the most likely sources; Mil., 715 (9 September 1514, 
reward of 20,000 crowns, if he achieved this, and also pledged to send 1,000 
either passed him the money nor made further mention of it; 
letters from Rome to the duke of Milan). 
15 Ven.ii, 487 (LPIii, 3139; LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo). Letters from England that 
reached the Milanese ambassador in Rome by 17 August confirm that Henry had done his best to have 
Milan included, but relented when he thought the peace treaty to be in danger of collapsing and 
because he did not have any allies; Mil., 711 (17 August 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the 
duke of Milan). In demonstration of how such issues were amplified and distorted, Venetian 
intelligence from Rome, dated 30 September, claimed that one article of the Anglo-French treaty 
threatened with exclusion anyone who opposed French moves to reacquire Milan; Ven.ii, 483 (LPIii, 
3237; 3 September 1514, Bortolomeo Alviano to the Signory). 
16 The pope envisaged Louis XII being bought off by a 50,000 ducats pension; LPIii, 3407 (calendared 
end October 1514, [de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox]). 
17 Leo promised Wolsey a 
crowns (through de Giglis and Ammonius), on behalf of Maximilian Sforza; ibid., 3496 (LPI, 5464; 
calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]). This ‘gift’ was not apparently given, as 
de Giglis, writing in June 1515, mentioned not having received it and the pope wishing that he had not 
mentioned it, as Maximilian Sforza had n
LPIIi, 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]).  
18 LPIii, 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place 
besides Westminster’). 
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dower gift for Princess Mary on her marriage to Louis XII; perhaps envisaging that 
Mary retain Milan (or title thereof) in the likely event that her husband predeceased 
her.19 It is uncertain how this would have fitted in with earlier desires to uphold the 
Sforza claim although, if Milan were ever to fall into English hands, this would 
provide a valuable toehold in northern Italy, from which Henry VIII could pursue his 
anti-French agenda.  
Bearing in mind this ‘loophole’ in the peace treaty, the omens for keeping the 
papacy free from French influence did not look good. Even before the agreement was 
concluded, rumours circulated in Rome and Italy more generally that Louis XII 
subsequently planned to descend into the peninsula. In late May, for instance, de 
Giglis warned Wolsey of a supposed French plan to recover Milan.20 While this 
prospect was initially rejected by the papacy and others in Italy in subsequent months, 
rumours persisted and Pace, towards the end of September, heard in Rome that a 
French army (with 10,000 English archers) was heading towards Lorraine, although 
he issued strong denials.21 Any trepidation felt by the English crown would have been 
                                                 
19 The only evidence for this suggestion comes from a Venetian source in England, writing on 24 
September, who cited Henry VIII as being receptive to this plan. Probably, it was either a fanciful 
y and troops to achieve this, while the latter’s grandson, 
, Venetian ambassador in France to 
tion to invade Italy continued to build through to 
gnory, Paris), 515 (26 November 1514), 
ter Martyr to Ludovico Furtado, Valladolid), 3519 (LPI, 5675; 3 December 
rumour or it received short shrift from the French; Ven.ii, 505 (LPIii, 3298; 24 September 1514, Nicolo 
di Favri to Francesco Gradenigo, London). 
20 Louis was to offer Maximilian mone
Ferdinand (Charles of Burgundy’s brother) was to marry one of the French king’s daughters and 
receive the duchy as a dowry; LPIii, 2928 (LPI, 5353; 20 May 1514, [de Giglis to Fox and Wolsey]).  
21 Ellis, pp.177-180 (LPIii, 3304; LPI, 5447; 25 September 1514, Pace to Wolsey, Rome). For 
indications that such rumours were circulating and initially rejected by papal and other sources, see 
Mil., 702 (20 July 1514, duke of Milan to his governor of Asti, Cremona); Ven.ii, 460 (10 August 1514, 
Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 463 (LPIii, 3178; 16 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory; 3 August 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Blois), 479 (28 August 1514, 
Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome), 488 (LPIii, 3191, 24 August 1514
the Signory, Paris), 491 (LPIii, 3286; 18 September 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the 
Signory, Paris). Rumblings about Louis XII’s inten
November and December 1514, emanating from (Venetian sources in) France and circulating in 
England and Rome, as well as Spain (among other places). Increasingly it was believed that the 
incursion would not take place until the early months of 1515; ibid., 490 (14 September 1514, Venetian 
ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), 496 (22 September 1514, Venetian ambassador in France 
to the Signory, Paris), 507 (15-17 October 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, 
Abbeville), 513 (1 November 1514, ‘A faithful friend’ to the Si
553 (22 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris); LPIii, 3435 (LPI, 5581; 
13 November 1514, Pe
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heightened by news from Italy that its potential allies against France, in particular 
Milan and Spain, were suffering militarily.22  
In response, a lack of allies meant that English aggression against France was 
impractical, although Henry VIII employed several general strategies in a bid to 
distract Louis XII from the Italian enterprise, one of which was an apparently bizarre 
proposal for a joint Anglo-French attack on Spanish-controlled Navarre, combined 
with an
Henry in late 1514 or early 1515, thereby preventing him from journeying south.26 
 attempt to ‘recover’ parts of Castile that by right belonged to Catherine of 
Aragon.23 As a ploy to distract Louis from Milan by occupying him around the 
Pyrenées, however, this failed, as the French king maintained that Milan remained his 
priority.24 Nevertheless, Henry VIII was careful to appear to the French to be tacitly 
supportive of their plans for Milan, at least as far as Louis XII was concerned. A 
flavour of this can be detected around late December when Louis, having heard via a 
papal nuncio that his English ally was opposed to the expedition, requested Henry 
write to the pope to dispel this rumour.25 The English crown may also have attempted 
to distract Louis XII from Italy by making half-hearted offers for a meeting with 
                                                                                                                                            
1514, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels); Mil., 716 (24 December 1514, summary of letters to Milan from 
Rome). 
22 The Venetian ambassador in England was notified of Venetian victories in the region on 30 
September. Similarly, on the 30 October, he was informed of a rout of Spanish forces at Este. On 31st, 
Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly relayed intelligence that Bergamo (again close to Milan) was 
close to falling, although the Viceroy of Naples was rushing to relieve the town; Ven.ii, 494-495 (6 
October 1514, Signory to Badoer), 504 (30 October 1514), 506 (30 October 1514, Signory to Baoder); 
LPIii, 3400 (LPI, 5539; 31 October 1514, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Henry]). 
23 Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, Paris); 
LPIIi, 1 (1515, instructions to the French ambassador). Also see Ven.ii, 532 (15 December 1514, 
Venice to its ambassador in France). 
24 It did gain initial approval from France, although Louis remained undiverted from his Italian 
ambitions. Indeed, Louis seems to have been cautious about English claims to Castile; Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 
3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, Paris); LPIIi, 1 (1515, 
instructions to the French ambassador). 
25 LPIIi, 1 (calendared beginning of January 1515, instructions to the French ambassador). Louis was 
so convinced of English sincerity that, on 26 November, he asked for a substantial loan from Henry for 
its recovery; Sp.ii, 192 (LPIii, 3477; LPI, 5637; 26 November 1514, Louis XII to the duke of Suffolk, 
Paris). 
26 During December, Badoer in England conveyed home the rumour of an imminent meeting between 
the two kings. The Venetian ambassador in Rome asserted, on 15 December, his belief that this would 
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 While brief respite from the growing French threat to Italy came on 1 January 
1515, when Louis XII died, this was no reprieve, as English diplomats soon assessed 
that his successor, Francis I, intended to continue the same Italian policy, but with the 
advantage of youth on his side.27 In a move at least partially intended to facilitate this, 
the new French monarch moved to confirm existing agreements with other states, 
including England. Despite opposing the implicit outcome of this, a French move 
against Milan, Henry VIII could do little other than confirm the status quo on 5 April 
1515. Notably, Milan was again omitted and Francis was referred to in the treaty, 
among other titles, as its duke.28 This time, it does not seem as if the English crown 
                                                                                                                                            
occur on the 29th. On 27 December, the republic’s orator in France asserted that Louis was travelling 
towards Picardy to meet Henry. Around the same time, the French king instructed his orator with 
Henry to suggest that this conference took place in March. Also, on 15 December, the Venetian 
government understood that the request for the meeting came from Louis and that Henry had refused 
December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 542 (28 November 1514, Venetian 
ambassador in France to the Signory, Paris), 555 (December [1514], Badoer to the Signory); LPIIi, 1 
(1515, instructions to the French ambassador). 
27 Henry VIII appears to have heard of Louis’ d ath on 6 January; Ven.ii, 580 (6 January 1515, Badoer 
positive, the diplomat reporting that the Italian expedition had been prorogued for that year, but not 
issue on 29 January and at some point in February from the Imperial Court, but mutilation makes
opinion(s) unclear; ibid., 69 (29 January 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 205 (calenda
this; Ven.ii, 532 (15 December 1514, Venice to its ambassador in France), 539 (LPIii, 3547; 15 
e
to the Signory, London). Initial intelligence from Spinelly (in the Low Countries) on 17 January was 
cancelled; LPIIi, 32 (17 January 1515, Spinelly to Henry). Sir Robert Wingfield commented on this 
 his 
red 
end February 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). In Rome, Cardinal Bibbiena, a confidante of Leo X, 
was quoted around 21 January as saying that Francis I was more committed to the expedition than his 
 to the Signory). For other reports across Europe that an Italian expedition was likely, see Sp.ii, 
gnory), 589 (23 
nian to the Signory), 50-54 (Ven.ii, 592; LPIIi, 267; 25 March 
 addition to a continued lack of allies upon whom Henry 
n by stirring up Scotland and by encouraging rumours of an intended assault on Tournai; LPIIi, 
predecessor and would bring more troops; Ven.ii, 570 (17 and 21 January 1515, Venetian ambassador 
in Rome
207 (January[?] 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); Ven.ii, 572 (27 January 1515, 
communication by Pasqualigo to the College). On the manner in which Francis had Louis XII’s claim 
to the duchy of Milan transferred to him, see W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.2. 
28 For various contemporary reports that Francis’ expedition would not occur until he had made an 
agreement with England (although the French king did, nevertheless, claim not to fear Henry VIII), see 
Ven.ii, 583 (17-21 January, 4 February 1515, Venetian ambassador in France to the Si
March 1515, three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris), 596 (30 March 1515, three 
Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.38-40 
(Ven.ii, 578; 3 February 1515, Giusti
1515, three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris), 55-59 (Ven.ii, 595; 30 March 1515, 
three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory). 
While the Anglo-French peace did not need to be renewed in the short-term, it was an 
opportune moment for Francis to do this. In
could rely to act, there were other reasons for him to plot the same course with France, including the 
lucrative pension payments associated with the peace and the need to secure the safety and recovery of 
Henry’s widowed sister (and her dower) from France. Francis I further encouraged England in this 
directio
300 (4 April 1515), 301 (5 April 1515), 302 (5 April 1515); Ven.ii, 598 (5 April 1515); R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.59-60 (Ven.ii, 599; LPIIi, 307; 7 April 1515, Giustinian and Pasqualigo to the 
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tried to bargain for the duchy’s inclusion.29 Despite apparent acquiescence to French 
overtures, which would facilitate Francis’ intended Italian expedition, there are 
indications that the English were not entirely comfortable with the situation. Henry 
VIII’s anti-French prejudice, for instance, was undiminished; in early March, while 
negotiations towards a renewal of the peace were in full swing, he was quoted as 
saying that ‘the King of France was indeed a worthy and honest sovereign, but 
nevertheless a Frenchman, and not to be trusted’.30 The English carried over to the 
new reign their attempts to distract the French with the offer of a personal meeting 
with Henry, but this was unsuccessful.31 Following the April peace agreement, the 
prospect of a French assault on northern Italy became practically inevitable. While 
initial intelligence (in England, Rome and elsewhere) on the likelihood of this was 
contradictory, an enterprise was deemed increasingly certain from late May onwards, 
                                                                                                                                            
Signory, Boulogne); W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.3. For reports on Henry’s inclination towards 
peace and on the negotiations from foreign observers in England and France; Ven.ii, 572 (27 January 
1515, communication to Venice by Pasqualigo), 585 (LPIIi, 200; 27 February 1515, Giustinian and 
Pasqualigo to the Signory, Lyon), 586 (9 March 1515, Giustinian and Pasqualigo to the Signory, 
Moulins), 587 (21-22 February 1515, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 590 (23 March 
1515, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.50-54 
(Ven.ii, 592; LPIIi, 267; three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, Paris). For it being 
widely understood that the Anglo-French peace was to last for one year after the death of either 
ndon). 
 Discu
principal signatory; ibid., pp.55-59 (Ven.ii, 595; three Venetian ambassadors in France to the Signory, 
Paris); Ven.ii, 563 (13 January 1515, French ambassador in Venice), 572 (27 January 1515, 
communication by Pasqualigo to the College). 
29 By way of comparison, Giustinian reported from Paris in late March that, while the renewal of the 
Anglo-French peace was inevitable, that with Spain was not as Ferdinand insisted on the inclusion of 
Milan, a concession which the new French king was not prepared to make; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i, pp.48-50 (LPIIi, 253; 20 March 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, Paris). 
30 Ven.ii, 594 (6 March 1515, Badoer to the Signory, Lo
31 ssions to this end were conducted during February-April 1515; LPIIi, 146 (12 February 1515, 
[Suffolk] to [Henry], Paris), 157 (13 February 1515, Suffolk, West and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], 
Paris), 198 (27 February 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Gaunt), 304 (6 April 1515, Suffolk, West and 
Richard Wingfield to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 587 (21-22 February 1515, Venetian ambassador in France to 
the Signory). The English meeting proposal still seems to have been on the table as late as August 
1515, although by this date Francis envisaged it taking place after his return from Italy; LPIIi, 826 (20 
August 1515, Henry to Francis), 827 (calendared 20 August 1515, instructions to Richard Wingfield), 
828 (calendared 20 August 1515). 
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at least in England.32 Francis I eventually announced his intention to go to Italy on 26 
June, leaving for Lyons shortly after, in preparation to cross the mountains.33 
 
 Given that the English crown had failed to have Milan included in the Anglo-
French peace of 1514 and was thereafter reluctant (if not unable) to mount any direct 
opposition to the growing French threat to Italy, where did this leave the papacy and 
Henry VIII’s desire for it to remain free from French influence? Despite Leo X’s 
original encouragement of the Anglo-French accord, he was now politically 
vulnerable to any French descent, and he perhaps recognised this from the moment he 
received news of its conclusion.34 As a result, the pontiff explored all political options 
open to him and tried to provide for all eventualities. Firstly, he looked towards an 
                                                 
32 For intelligence reaching England from April onwards that a French assault on Milan would be 
launched, see LPIIi, 343 (21 April 1515, Nicholas West to Henry, Paris), 399 (calendared end April 
1515, intelligence addressed to Wolsey), 535 (calendared May 1515, Robert Wingfield to -, Augsburg); 
Ven.ii, 619 (15 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Venetian ambassadors in France, London); R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 97-100 (Ven.ii, 628; LPIIi, 585; 15 June 1515, Badoer and Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). For reports even as late as 17 June indicating that the expedition had been 
postponed or even cancelled, see LPIIi, 431 (9 May 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Augsburg), 479 
(20 May 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 594 (17 June 1515, Sampson to Wolsey, Bruges). Between 
st, at which point Francis I approached Suffolk seeking 
to Henry, ‘Lynce in 
field to [Wolsey], Calais), 685 (10 July 
May and July, the Venetian ambassadors in England alluded to a prevailing confusion among English 
ministers on this subject, as well as to denials from the king (on 3 July), about the French intention to 
cross the Alps that year. When considering these Italian accounts, however, one must remember that 
the claims by Henry and his ministers were probably disingenuous, intended to convince the orators 
that Francis I was deceitful and not to be trusted; Ven.ii, 618 (15 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to 
the Signory, London), 623 (29 May 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London); R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIIi, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 115-117 (Ven.ii, 637; LPIIi, 716; 16 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). Even if there had been any confusion in crown circles about Francis’ intentions, these would 
have been lifted shortly after 28 May at the late
to postpone the latest instalment of the pension, due to the great expense to which he was committed in 
Italy; LPIIi, 522 (28 May 1515, Francis I to Suffolk, Lyons). From late June onwards, intelligence 
reaching the English crown had Francis either at or on his way to Lyons and preparations to cross the 
Alps at an advanced stage; ibid., 624 (26 June 1515, Robert Wingfield 
Lontupterence in Aswstryk’), 665 (6 July 1515, Richard Wing
1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges). 
33 R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.41-42. 
34 The Portuguese ambassador in Rome, writing on 3 September 1514, reported that celebrations of the 
accord were made without the pope’s permission and that there was a distinct lack of public display to 
this end. In contradiction, however, Ammonius reported (on the 25th) that Leo instructed de Giglis to 
celebrate a Mass in this regard at S. Maria del Popolo; LPIii, 3236 (LPI, 5378; 3 September 1514, John 
Faria to the king of Portugal, Rome), 3302 (LPI, 5449; 25 September 1514, [Ammonius] to Wolsey, 
Westminster). 
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agreement with France (by which Naples would be conquered for Giuliano de’ 
Medici), but it does not look as if the English were aware of this initially.35 A Franco-
apal accord eventually came in the early months of 1515, via the marriage of Leo’s 
direction was received by the English crown from its sources in the Low Countries 
p
brother Giuliano de’ Medici to Filiberta of Savoy.36 Subsequently, Francis I 
envisaged obtaining papal support for his Italian plans and negotiations continued 
with the pope.37 Henry and his advisors were certainly aware of the marriage and, in 
correspondence from de Giglis to Ammonius of 29 January, would have been au fait 
with the pope’s unwillingness to break his alliance with Francis.38 Secondly, Leo 
sought protection from France by building up a counterweight network of allies. This 
manifested itself most formally in a secret defensive alliance between Rome and 
Spain on 21 September 1514.39 Intelligence that the papacy was moving in this latter 
and Germany. Possibly the first indication came via Sir Robert Wingfield in mid-
September, who reported that the pope had sent Maximilian a copy of Henry’s letter 
notifying him of the Anglo-French peace and, as a result, wanted the emperor to join a 
                                                 
35 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.282-283; M. Creighton, 
History of the Papacy, v, p.229; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.105-106. 
36 This arrangement was first proposed during the time of Louis XII. The Venetian orator in Rome 
quoted Leo as saying (on 17 January) that he envisaged a closer relationship with France now that he 
and Francis would be related through this marriage. Giustinian reported from Lucca on 25 January, that 
Giuliano had left Florence to go and celebrate this marriage; Ven.ii, 570 (17 and 21 January 1515, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.35-36 (Ven.ii, 571; 
25 January 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, Lucca); W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, i, pp.384-385; ibid, ii, 
pp.5-6. 
37 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.106-110. 
38 LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). For indications that the English knew of 
Giuliano’s marriage and papal associations with France, see ibid., 189 (26 February 1515, Suffolk to 
Henry, Paris), 291 (2 April 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Gaunt), 1342 (26 December 1515, Robert 
Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Ravesbourge] in Swave’). 
39 The purpose of this treaty, the defence of the pope, the Church and its territories, makes it difficult to 
the Anglo-French peace; Sp.ii, 188 (LPIii, 3291; 21 
The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.282-283. 
see this as anything else but a reaction to 
September 1514). Also see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.103-104. The emperor and the Swiss 
also seem to have been lobbied to join this alliance and the former may well have done so; Mil., 715 (9 
September 1514, letters from Rome to the duke of Milan); Sp.ii, 189 (calendared October 1514, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Germany), 190 (calendared October 1514, Ferdinand to his ambassador 
in the Low Countries); Ven.ii, 520 (4 December 1514, Signory to its ambassador in France); S. 
Alexander (ed.), 
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league for the defence of Italy, presumably against Louis XII.40 It does not seem as if 
Henry VIII was approached directly by the pope to become a member of this league, 
although, in apparent reaction to the peace, the king was requested in August to 
maintain his amity with Spain, ‘to bridle the inconstancy of the French’.41 The Anglo-
Spanish relationship was at a low ebb at this point and there is nothing to suggest that 
the English king took heed of the papal request.42 Leo also enquired during the same 
month as to what arrangements had been made with the the emperor (as well as with 
his grandson Charles of Burgundy and daughter Margaret of Savoy).43 Later, in 
October, Leo may have been fishing for reassurance when, through de Giglis, he 
requested confirmation of a rumour from the Spanish ambassador that a treaty was 
being negotiated between Henry and Ferdinand.44 
 
Probably the most vocal strategy adopted by the papacy in the wake of the 
Anglo-French accord, as far as England was concerned, was its promotion of 
universal peace (and crusade), through which Leo hoped that the French descent 
                                                 
40 Wingfield also cited Ferdinand, the Swiss and a duke (probably of Milan) as the other potential 
adherents. On 27 October, Wingfield again mentioned negotiations between Leo X, Maximilian, 
Ferdinand and the Swiss, but added cryptically that ‘now that the way is open betwixt your Grace and 
France,’ Henry would know what to do. By 31 October, Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly 
reported from Brussels that Spain, Milan and the Swiss had made an offensive alliance (against the 
French) and were merely awaiting Leo X’s adhesion before concluding. On 3 December, moreover, 
Spinelly conveyed hearing that Swiss troops were being raised for the defence of Milan and that 
 in their power to win over Leo. Finally, on 19 
 to [Henry]), 3400 (LPI, 5539; 31 October 1514, 
Ferdinand and Maximilian were doing everything
December, Robert Wingfield further notified Henry that the Swiss had allied with Leo, Florence and 
Genoa, and were currently negotiating another treaty with the emperor, king of Spain, and duke of 
Milan; LPIii, 3274 (LPI, 5410; 15 September 1514, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]), 3392 
(LPI, 5532; 27 October 1514, Robert Wingfield
Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 3519 (LPI, 5675; 3 December 1514, 
Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 3556 (LPI, 5430; 19 December 1514, Robert Wingfield to Henry, 
Innsbruck). 
41 The orator also mentions other elements of the Anglo-French peace that the pope wished to be 
altered; ibid., 3132 (LPI, 5543; calendared 7-8 August 1514, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
42 See above p.463. 
43 LPIii, 3362 (LPI, 5496; 13 October 1514, de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox, Rome). 
44 Ibid., 3407 (calendared end October 1514, [de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox]). 
 468
could be avoided.45 As early as 27 July, the Milanese ambassador in Rome claimed 
that the pope had changed his mind about the Anglo-French peace and was trying to 
dissuade Henry; the pope allegedly admitted this, on account of his desire for the 
peace to be universal and not just between those two states.46 Similarly, Leo was 
overheard around 16 August opining that he would facilitate a general peace and even 
lead a crusade himself, now that Anglo-French differences were understood to have 
been arranged.47 Given subsequent papal actions, it is difficult to avoid interpreting 
this as a defensive measure intended primarily to secure the papacy against an 
increasingly likely French descent. It is likely that this subtext was not lost on the 
English crown as, when Henry VIII notified Leo of the Anglo-French peace on 12 
August 1514, he encouraged the pope in this direction, presumably for the same 
ason.48 The pope responded positively, both praising the peace and exhorting Henry 
to work
further lobbied about the latter during November.50 Wolsey seems to have given some 
unknown answer to be expanded upon by Ammonius, but Venetian reports in Rome 
re
 now towards these pious aims.49 Through de Giglis, Leo put further pressure 
on Fox and Wolsey to work towards universal peace and crusade during October, 
linking this desire with the need to reconcile France and Milan, and Wolsey was 
                                                 
45 For some background on this, see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.104-105. For the belief, by 
a Milanese source in Rome in early September, that the pope would move in this direction, see Mil., 
715 (9 September 1514, letters from Rome to the duke of Milan). Also, that this was to avoid a French 
descent; Ven.ii, 525 (LPIii, 3533; 8 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
46 Mil., 705 (27 July 1514, Milanese ambassador in Rome to the duke of Milan). That Leo may have 
genuinely hoped for some sort of passagium is suggested by his notifying the Hungarian Cardinal 
Backocz of the peace on 7 September; EP, 499 (7 September 1514, Leo to Cardinal Bakocz, Rome). 
47 Ven.ii, 465 (16 August 1514, Vetor Lippomano to -, Rome). 
48 Ibid., 487 (LPIii, 3139; LPI, 5319; 12 August 1514, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
49 Leo wrote in these terms to Henry on 8 and 9 September. He also praised Wolsey and Fox’s 
4, Leo to Henry, 
eptember 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
, 3496 (LPI, 5464; 
contribution on the 7th; LPIii, 3249 (EP, 500; 7 September 1514, Leo to Fox and Wolsey, Rome), 3254 
(EP, 501; 8 September 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3255 (LPI, 5392; 8 September 151
Rome); EP, 503 (9 S
50 LPIii, 3407 (calendared end October 1514 [de Giglis to Wolsey and Fox)
calendared end November 1514, [de Giglis] to [Ammonius]). 
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(by 8 December) suggested that Henry VIII had rejected these papal overtures.51 Leo 
felt it necessary to write once more on this matter to Henry on 8 December.52  
 Given the apparent lack of a tangible English response to papal calls for 
universal peace, it is perhaps unsurprising that rumours circulated in Rome that Henry 
VIII supported Louis XII’s Italian ambitions. It has already been suggested that the 
Venetian orator in Rome believed, by 8 December 1514, that the English king had 
rebuffed the pontiff’s request for universal peace and even that, now he understood 
the French claim to Milan, he had urged Louis to pursue its recovery.53 Around 15 
December, the same ambassador told the pope of a recent threat from Henry to 
Ferdinand, that he would attack Spain if the latter resisted Louis XII, presumably in 
Italy.54 While this was probably an attempt to distract and occupy the French king in 
Spanish-controlled Navarre, it would not have looked like this to Leo.55 Another 
English attempt to distract the French from Italy, the offer of a meeting between the 
kings, may also have unsettled the pope around this time; again, around 15 December, 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 3497 (LPI, 5465; calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place 
besides Westminster’), 3533 (Ven.ii, 525; 8 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). 
52 EP, 551 (8 December 1514, Leo to Henry, Rome). The Venetian ambassador in Rome, writing on 25 
November, claimed that the pope had appointed four legates to be despatched in a bid to facilitate 
universal peace (de Grassis for England), but no further reference to this has been found to verify the 
action or intention; Ven.ii, 517 (25 November 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For 
a contemporaneous papal approach to Venice urging peace during early December (although in a more 
threatening form), see ibid., 520 (4 December 1514, Signory to its ambassador in France). It may also 
have been in a bid to woo Henry towards the idea of universal peace that Leo wrote to the king’s young 
 
5; 
 my place besides Westminster’), 3533 
ory). The Venetian 
nephew, James V, on 23 November 1514, firstly congratulating him on his accession (which was 
strange, considering that he was only two years old and had been king since the September 1513) and, 
secondly and probably more to the point, urging that the king (and, implicitly, those who governed on 
his behalf) be obedient to his uncle, Henry VIII. The pope claimed to be responding to a letter from
James, dated 5 October, notifying him of the Scot’s accession; LPIii, 3470 (LPI, 5613; 23 November 
1514, Leo to James V, Rome). 
53 He suggested that Henry had promised to assist Louis in this undertaking; LPIi, 3497 (LPI, 546
calendared end November 1514, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From
(Ven.ii, 525; 8 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Sign
government, on 14 December, similarly suggested that England was now supportive of French 
intentions; Ven.ii, 527 (14 December 1514, Signory to the papal ambassador, Pietro Bembo). Also see 
rumours circulating Rome in September that Henry VIII had supplied archers for the expedition; see 
above p.462. 
54 Ven.ii, 539 (LPIii, 3547; 15 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
55 See above p.463. 
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the Venetian orator, quite feasibly citing intelligence from England, notified Leo X 
that this would occur on the 29th.56 While the pope’s opinion on these rumours is 
the confederates were bound to gain the adhesion of other princes, including Henry 
unclear, they surely caused him to question Henry VIII’s anti-French sentiments.57 
 
 In the early months of 1515, the papacy’s universal peace strategy developed 
more clearly into an anti-French measure to be enshrined in a league. While Leo 
contacted Wolsey indirectly through Cardinal de’ Medici on 11 January, urging him 
towards a general peace and offering him a fiscal inducement for his support (the 
remission of half the service taxes due on his provision to Lincoln), the apparent lack 
of response suggests that the papacy’s intention to formalise this in such a way may 
have been unclear.58 In any case, the pope did not give the English much time to 
respond, as a league, formally intended to launch a crusade was formed on 12 
February. While the Ottoman threat was cited, its articles focused on the French 
danger and it can be interpreted, moreover, as a coalition to defend Milan. In addition, 
VIII.59 These elements were reiterated in Leo X’s ratification of 22 February, 
although the pope also asserts that the coalition was intended to defend him and the 
Papal States. In keeping with Leo’s attempts to deal with both sides at the same time, 
                                                 
56 Ven.ii, 539 (LPIii, 3547; 15 December 1514, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see 
earlier p.463. 
57 In spite of this Louis XII probably writing at the end of December 1514, understood from the nuncio 
newed pressure from his ally Ferdinand to form such a league against France and, in 
rdinand 
 Rome). 
in France that the pope was informed of Henry VIII’s opposition to his plans for Milan; LPIIi, 1 
(calendared start January 1515, instructions to the French ambassador in England). 
58 Leo was also said to be sending an ambassador to England in pursuit of this. Wolsey had been 
seeking to have the impositions on Lincoln reduced or cancelled, particularly given that he had been 
recently promoted to York; ibid., 20 (11 January 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). 
59 Sp.ii, 208 (12 February 1515); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.107. During January 1515, Leo 
X received re
connection with this, to bring Henry VIII into the fold; Sp.ii, 207 (calendared January 1515, Fe
to his ambassador in
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it is unsurprising that this confirmation appears to have remained secret.60 In a letter 
of defiance of around the same date from representatives of the confederates to 
Francis I (presumably not including the papacy and perhaps never sent), it was 
lleged, among other things, that Louis XII had breached his peace with England by a
supporting the dukes of Guelders and Saxony against Maximilian and Charles of 
Burgundy, both of whom Henry had named as party to the peace.61 It is widely 
recognised that Leo X did not publicly ratify the alliance until July, continuing to 
negotiate with both sides up to this point.62 Henry would have been aware that the 
papacy might be moving to protect itself against France as early as January 1515, 
when Spinelly informed him that Leo might back off from France, now that Giuliano 
de’ Medici had acquired Piacenza, Parma, Reggio and Modena as part of his French 
marriage, and that his nephew (Lorenzo) was to marry into the Spanish royal family.63 
The king seems to have confirmed his knowledge of the anti-French league to the 
Venetian orator Badoer, around 6 March, and may well have believed that the pope 
had adhered to it.64 In both Leo’s pro- and anti-French policies, one can discern the 
pope seeking to establish his brother as a territorial prince in northern Italy, perhaps 
intending him to preside over a buffer state that would assume Milan’s de facto 
                                                 
60 Sp.ii, 209 (22 February 1515, Leo to all persons, Rome). While Pastor argues that the pope did not 
ratify the league until July, while he continued to negotiate with the French, Creighton is convincing 
when he suggests that the aforementioned ratification was kept a secret for the time being; M. 
Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.236-237; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.107-110. For 
further evidence of the secrecy of the pope’s involvement, keeping it even from his own brother, see 
W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.9. 
61 The letter also insisted that the Most Christian King concede to Leo’s requests and not attack the 
d 22 February 1515, papal nuncio and ambassadors of Maximilian, Ferdinand, the Swiss 
ary 1515, 
515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]). 
Church (or its territories). It also required Francis to renounce his claims to Milan and Genoa; Sp.ii, 
210 (calendare
and other members of the Holy League, to Francis I). 
62 Roscoe argues that French pressure initially stopped Leo X from joining the league to defend Milan; 
L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.110; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.5, 12. 
63 LPIIi, 85 (calendared end January 1515, Spinelly to Henry). 
64 Ven.ii, 594 (6 March 1515, Badoer to the Signory, London). For earlier warnings from English 
envoys of an impending league against France involving the pope, see LPIIi, 11 (7 Janu
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 69 (29 January 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 70 (29 
January 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 85 (calendared end January 1515, Spinelly to Henry), 107 
(3 February 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck), 124 (6 February 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], 
Mechelin), 167 (16 February 1
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strategically vital role in protecting the Papal States (and Florence). As Henry VIII 
and his inner circle were cognisant of such intelligence, it is entirely feasible that they 
also concluded that the pope intended to create a Medici shield for the defence of the 
Church.65  
 
 As both Henry and Leo were simultaneously pursuing amicable relations with 
France, there is reason to believe that, even when they approached each other with a 
view to resisting a French descent into Italy, the pope may not have entirely trusted 
England’s apparent underlying anti-French agenda. Thus, around mid-January, de 
Giglis urged the pope, on Henry’s behalf, to ‘free Italy and extend his own authority’. 
While the nature of the conflict desired by England is unclear, the sense of the letter 
suggests that it wanted Leo X to resist any French descent into Italy.66 Furthermore, 
given that the last papal communication to England in December related to universal 
peace, it is feasible that the English envisaged turning such an initiative against 
France.67 Apparently missing this point, the pontiff rejected de Giglis’ proposal, 
claiming that he could ‘only show himself an advocate for universal concord’. To this, 
the orator suggested ‘that some Frenchman had been breathing in his [Leo’s] ear’ and 
that the pope was wrong to believe that Franci
ambitions, alleging that he ultimately coveted Naples and that, once gained, ‘it was all 
s would not attempt to realise his Italian 
                                                 
65 In addition to other territories, Giuliano was also envisaged, at various times, as being installed in the 
kingdom of Naples, as well as the duchies of Ferrara and Urbino; LPIIi, 85 (calendared end January 
e of Leo’s familial 
ording to Giustinian, writing to Venice 
1515, Spinelly to Henry), 167 (16 February 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]); W. 
Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, i (1853), pp.381, 384-385; ibid., ii, pp.5-6. Knowledg
territorial ambitions seems to have circulated quite widely. Acc
from Lucca during January 1515, the Lucchese feared that their city was coveted by Leo for his 
brother; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.35-36 (Ven.ii, 571; Ven.ii, 571; 25 January 1515, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lucca). 
66 One would speculate that de Giglis’ instructions for his audience around 19 January were sent in late 
December 1514, before Louis XII’s death; LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
67 See above pp.468-470. 
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up with the Pope’.68 Shortly after this, perhaps having received further orders from 
England, de Giglis again approached Leo, seeking his mandate to form an alliance 
with Henry, Maximilian, Ferdinand and the Swiss, seemingly against the French, but 
the pontiff gave reasons for why he could not rely on any of his potential 
onfederates; concerning Henry VIII, he argued that he did not know how long 
descent. While Wolsey informed de Giglis, on 1 February, that he had instructed the 
                                                
c
England could provide him with financial support and also that Henry had not 
pledged to invade France. That this was indicative of cool relations between England 
and Rome is suggested not only by the rather combative tone with which de Giglis 
claimed he had responded to Leo, but also by an alleged visit following the latter 
exchange to the orator by Cardinal Bibbiena, a close advisor of the pope, who 
besought him to smooth things over between Henry and Leo, albeit the pontiff’s mind 
had not changed.69 This treatment of English overtures is more curious when one 
considers that concurrent negotiations with Ferdinand, Maximilian and others would 
shortly result in a ‘crusading’ league against France. Uncertainty about English 
intentions would certainly explain this and also put into context Giulio de’ Medici’s 
approach to Wolsey of 11 January, more neutrally advocating universal peace and 
crusade, rather than its intended direction against Louis XII/Francis I.70 The lack of 
anti-French agenda emanating from the papacy in the universal peace initiative would 
hardly have inspired confidence in England that Leo was prepared to resist a French 
 
68 LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). This puts into context the lack of anti-French 
 (5 February 1515). 
uary 
ome). 
subtext in de’ Medici’s approach to Wolsey of 11 January, urging universal peace, even though a 
league to resist a French descent was shortly to be concluded; see above pp.471-472.  
69 While he named the king of France as a potential party to this league, the broader context of the letter 
suggests that this was either a mistake or, as with the February league, was included but was not 
expected to occur; LPIIi, 71 (29 January 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Given that Parliament was 
usually convoked when the crown was seeking fiscal grants, usually for war, it is not unfeasible that 
that which met briefly on 5 February 1515 anticipated a positive response from Rome to resisting 
French ambitions in Italy; ibid., 119
70 Ibid., 20 (11 January 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). Hadrian de Castello echoed this on 
16 January, informing Henry that the pope was determined to launch a crusade; ibid., 30 (16 Jan
1515, de Castello to Henry, R
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Latin secretary (Ammonius) to convey ‘divers secret things of great importance to be 
showed to the Pope’, the timing suggests that these were probably a response to the 
papal rejection of English overtures against France and to Leo’s exhortations towards 
a general peace.71 England and the papacy were not on the same political wavelength 
at this point, despite the latter’s secret involvement in negotiations towards an anti-
Gallic coalition. Indeed, Leo X evidently did not admit England to the broader talks 
that resulted in the anti-French treaty. 
 Once the league to defend Milan and go on crusade had been concluded in 
February 1515, an approach from Rome to gain English adhesion might be expected, 
not least because this was stipulated within the accord.72 Increased English activity to 
join might also be expected, given the increasing prospect of a French descent into 
Italy; indeed, Wolsey was warned of the vulnerability of both Milan and Bologna on 
16 February.73 While Henry may well have written to Leo X concerning the new 
alliance around the turn of March, it is unclear what he said, but one would suspect 
that the English were open to offers to join it.74 Nevertheless, there was plenty of 
reason for both sides to be suspicious of each other’s true intentions concerning 
France; Henry knew that Leo had agreed a French marriage for his brother Giuliano 
                                                 
71 Ibid., 91 (1 February 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis], ‘From my place beside Westminster’). 
February 1515, papal nuncio and ambassadors of Maximilian, Ferdinand, the Swiss and other members 
72 Sp.ii, 208 (12 February 1515), 209 (22 February 1515, Leo to all persons, Rome), 210 (calendared 22 
of the Holy League, to Francis I). Indeed, Spinelly reported on 29 January that Maximilian intended to 
send an ambassador to England for this purpose, the emperor perhaps anticipating his obligation; LPIIi, 
ator implied that 
rdered the ambassador to cease any discussion 
h 1515, Wolsey to Suffolk). 
70 (29 January 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). 
73 LPIIi, 168 (16 February 1515, Thomas Colman to Wolsey, Bologna). 
74 Badoer claimed that Henry had told him about this correspondence, although the or
the king may have voiced his displeasure that Venice had not been comprised in it. Nevertheless, in the 
same correspondence, Henry was said to have questioned the honesty of Francis I, on account of his 
being a Frenchman. One also ought to bear in mind that Venice was an ally of France at this point; 
Ven.ii, 594 (6 March 1515, Badoer to the Signory, London). An English opinion of the league is further 
suggested by instructions from Wolsey to the duke of Suffolk (then in France negotiating with Francis), 
towards the beginning of March 1515; the archbishop o
of Tournai, the return of which the French king was insisting upon, because he believed that Francis 
‘will have enough to do to take care of his own matters. He is in the greatest danger that ever man was 
in’; LPIIi, 224 (calendared 5-6 Marc
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and Leo knew that Henry was receptive to Francis’ overtures for a renewal of the 
Anglo-French amity (which occurred during April).75 
 In spite of the lack of any papal approach for assistance against France, the 
English were at least aware that an anti-French coalition had been formed and could 
be quietly confident that the political circumstances that forced Henry to peace with 
France, a lack of papal and other support, might soon change. That the crown was 
thinking about the composition of this confederacy was indicated at Giustinian’s first 
audience with Henry in late April 1515, whereby Henry envisaged Venice’s inclusion 
in ‘the league for the defence of Christendom’.76 Also, at some point in May, Henry, 
in pursuing an alliance with Charles of Burgundy, further envisaged a league between 
them, Leo X, Maximilian and the Swiss.77 The English crown was also involved in 
negotiations during these months towards new agreements with Spain and the Empire 
and, although nothing seems to have concluded, it is likely that they were linked to 
the anti-French agenda.78 While the English crown clearly interacted with other 
                                                 
75 See above pp.464-468. 
76 According to Giustinian’s 24 April report of his first audience with the king; LPIIi, 371 (25 April 
1515, Giustinian to Wolsey). 
77 Henry indicated that he had been discussing this in England with the Provost of Cassel (George de 
Theimseke), a representative of Charles of Burgundy; ibid., 539 (calendared end May 1515, Henry to 
[Poynings and Tunstal]). 
78 During May and June, Ferdinand seems to have sought a new accord with his son-in-law; Sp.ii, 211 
(LPIIi, 405-406; 2 May 1515, Ferdinand to de Mesa, Ventosilla); LPIIi, 609 (23 June 1515, Poynings 
 one could 
ature) was subsequently drawn up, by Wolsey on 
s record of the Spanish orator, 
ember 1515, Ferdinand to his 
and others to [Henry], The Hague). Nothing came of this in the short term, however, but
forgive Henry if he did not entirely trust his father-in-law. The relationship between England and Spain 
at this point is uncertain. While it is feasible that some rapprochement was sought between the two 
states, as Thomas Ruthal referred to a reconciliation with Ferdinand in early July, it is not until 8 
August that Ferdinand commissioned a representative to conclude an alliance with Henry (and 
Maximilian) and, while a draft treaty (defensive in n
the part of England, this was not finalised until 19 October. Also, there i
de Mesa, requesting an audience of Wolsey on 14 August, commenting on the long time since they last 
did business. There may have been, on the other hand, a lingering distrust of the Spanish on the part of 
the English, Ferdinand having double-crossed Henry on several occasions. Indeed, in an audience with 
Henry around the same time, the Venetians were asked whether Ferdinand was the friend or enemy of 
the republic. Concerning the wider league against France, Ferdinand invited Henry to join in 
September, having discovered that his son-in-law was willing to adhere, see R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i, pp.102-103 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIIi, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, 
London); Sp.ii, 214 (8 August 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador to Flanders and England, Aranda), 
215-216 (calendared August-September 1515), 221 (calendared Sept
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potentially anti-French powers probably to this end, there was no urgency to forestall 
Francis I’s intended descent into Italy or even to ‘defend’ the papacy. This may well 
have been motivated by knowledge of the existence of the defensive coalition (which 
England had not been invited to join), as well as by intelligence that powers were 
mobilising to meet its obligations.79 
 
 The papacy’s apparent failure to trust England in its pointed crusading 
initiative (against France) presumably compounded Henry VIII’s lack of urgency to 
come to Rome’s ‘defence’, particularly given that his offer to do this had earlier been 
rejected. Indeed, it must have been difficult for the English king to understand 
whether Leo X was actually committed to the coalition against France; he had heard 
of papal membership of such a league, but this was uncertain.80 There were also 
indications that the papacy might still align with France.81 Such was the perception of 
                                                                                                                                            
ambassador in Rome), 228 (12 October 1515, Henry to Wolsey, Westminster), 228-230 (19 October 
1515), 231 (20 October 1515, Henry to Ferdinand, Greenwich), 232-233 (20 October 1515, Henry to 
Ferdinand, Greenwich), 234-237 (27 October 1515, Henry to all persons, Westminster); LPIIi, 685 (10 
nry, Bruges), 810 (14 August 1515, de Mesa to Wolsey, London), 813 (16 
ibid., 767 (calendared end July 1515, Henry to [Robert Wingfield]). 
ield to Henry, Augsburg), 535 (calendared end May 1515, Robert Wingfield 
July 1515, Spinelly to He
August 1515, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Calais). For overtures from the emperor during July, 
looking to continue their amity; 
79 The (rumoured) commitment of Swiss military expertise was particularly noted in English diplomatic 
newsletters and it was believed Ferdinand of Aragon would also act. See, for instance, LPIIi, 531 (31 
May 1515, Robert Wingf
to -, Augsburg), 563 (7 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck), 594 (17 June 1515, 
Sampson to Wolsey, Bruges). 
80 While Henry seems to have been aware of the league and papal membership thereof back in March, 
the papacy’s commitment to secrecy meant that he was in receipt of intelligence that questioned Leo 
X’s membership. For reports that Leo had joined this anti-French league, see LPIIi, 537 (calendared 
end May 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Bruges), 528 (30 May 1515, Sampson to [Wolsey], Bruges), 624 
(26 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Lynce in Lontupterence in Aswstryk’), 641 (29 June 1515, 
Robert Wingfield to Henry). Also see above pp.471-472. For reports that the pope was yet to join, see 
LPIIi, 563 (7 June 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, 
pp.114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIIi, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). For a 
report that Leo, Maximilian and Ferdinand were not working together to oppose the French threat to 
Genoa; LPIIi, 564 (7 June 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges). 
81 Towards the beginning of May, Robert Wingfield asserted that the French were marching on Genoa, 
with the permission of the pope (as well as of the city itself). On 28 May, Spinelly reported hearing 
from Bruges that Francis I, on hearing that Leo would ally with Maximilian, Ferdinand and others 
against him, had offered (to resign his claim to) Naples to the pope’s brother, Giuliano de’ Medici. 
Also, on 7 June, Spinelly wrote that the pope favoured the French concerning Genoa; LPIIi, 520 (28 
May 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 535 (calendared May 1515, Robert Wingfield to -, Augsburg), 
564 (7 June 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges). 
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the papal strategy that Spinelly opined on 13 June that, ‘the Pope is pursuing such a 
policy as will plunge all Italy into bloodshed’.82 Furthermore, it is possible that the 
nunciature of Balthasar Stuerd, at work in Scotland since early 1514, may also have 
caused concern in crown circles. Originally intended to bring about peace between 
England and Scotland, with a view to universal peace and crusade, the papal 
presentative may have been suspected of being pro-Scottish, if not pro-French. He 
coalition (still shaded with crusading intentions), the crown was cautious in its 
re
was certainly working to the same end as the French ambassador around May-August 
1515 and also entered into negotiations to these ends with the French-backed duke of 
Albany when the latter arrived in Scotland to take control of the government.83 Given 
English doubt as to the true intent of the papal peace initiative, it is quite feasible that 
Stuerd’s work was viewed warily as an attempt to stifle any anti-French intentions. 
Thus, in the months following England’s April peace renewal with France, 
while the papacy began to indicate to England that it was in favour of an anti-French 
reception of these overtures and, at the same time, sought to gain at least one major 
concession from Leo X in return for its eventual alignment. The suggestion that papal 
                                                 
82 Ibid., 577 (13 June 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Bruges). 
83 In Scotland since February 1514, Stuerd (or Stuart) was originally commissioned to facilitate peace 
between England and Scotland but, on his arrival there, this commission seems to have broadened, on 
account of the dissensions within the kingdom. Stuerd was also instrumental in facilitating James V’s 
(or rather his guardians’) decision to join the Anglo-French peace during May 1514, under instruction 
h), 421 (7 May 1515, La Batye and Mace 
, James V King of Scots 1512-1542 (1971), pp.27-37. 
from Leo X, who reportedly argued that continued Scottish attacks on the English borders were 
obstructing a crusade. While the nuncio planned to leave once this was achieved, he soon became 
involved in Anglo-Scottish negotiations, following the arrival of the pro-French duke of Albany. Stuerd 
finally reached the English Court around 29 July where he sought to put the Anglo-Scottish peace into 
writing, although it still seems that he had to argue that Albany was de facto head of state in Scotland. 
In terms of the nuncio’s loyalties, Spinelly certainly thought him duplicitous and Albany referred to 
him as his ‘kinsman’. Given, Stuerd’s name, it is entirely feasible that the nuncio was Scottish; LPIii, 
2288 (LPI, 4458; 20 September 1513, Leo to Henry, Rome), 2343 (LPI, 4491; 7 October 1513, 
Giuliano de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2633 (LPI, 4725; 7 February 1514, Spinelly to Henry); LPIIi, 
415 (4 May 1515, Balthazar [Stuerdus] to Wolsey, Edinburg
de Villebresme to Wolsey, Edinburgh), 464 (15 May 1515, James V to Francis), 543 (calendared end 
May 1515, Balthazar [Stuart] to Henry), 559 (6 June 1515, Balthazar Stuard to Wolsey), 560 
(calendared 6 June 1515, Albany to Leo X), 561 (calendared 6 June 1515, Albany to Cardinal [St 
Mark]), 784 (R. Brown [trans.], Four Years, i, pp.118-123; Ven.ii, 638; 5 August 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory), 858 (27 August 1515, Poynings and Knight to [Henry], Bruges). For the 
struggle for control over James V’s minority, between the English Queen Margaret and the ‘French’ 
duke of Albany up to this time, see C. Bingham
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foreign policy could turn anti-French came around 22 May when the pope transmitted 
(through de Giglis) his satisfaction that England had a ‘good understanding’ with the 
Empire and Spain, as it would deter France. Indeed, he believed that Francis would 
not cross the Alps unless England was friendly. To this end, Leo requested that 
England join the league to defend Milan and urged that Fox and Wolsey help 
persuade the king.84 This was presumably Leo’s fulfilment of his obligation to gain 
England’s adhesion (although his own confirmation still remained secret). This 
disposition would have concurred with intelligence from Sir Robert Wingfield, dated 
15 May, that Leo X was preparing to resist the French descent.85 Either the same or a 
subsequent (June) approach by the pope, through de Giglis, sought information on the 
current state of relations between England and France and the exact terms of the 
earlier 
asserted Henry’s desire for his entry 
peace, given the current French threat to Milan. At the same time, the pope 
searched for a way to raise Wolsey to the cardinalate, almost certainly as an 
inducement for England to join the anti-French cause. It appears that the pope was 
unsure of English intentions, not least because he believed that Henry was due to meet 
Francis, and because he requested credentials for an English ambassador in whom he 
could confide.86 Wolsey’s reply seems to have 
into the Sacred College as a rather threatening quid pro quo for English support 
against France; ‘the King has always been a friend to the Pope and his alliance ought 
not to be lightly thrown away’. Wolsey further emphasised that ‘the King will be 
greatly displeased if his desires are not regarded, as he is a better friend to the Church 
                                                 
84 De Giglis had also heard of a conversation between the pope and French ambassador whereby, in 
reply to the latter requesting support for the intended recovery of Milan, Leo refused and added ‘that 
the King of England was a young man of great power and would easily conquer France’; LPIIi, 493 
(calendared 22 May 1515, [de Giglis to -]). 
85 Ibid., 463 (15 May 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
86 Ibid., 647 (calendared end June 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
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than all other Princes’.87 In all likelihood, one of these ‘desires’ was the red hat, and 
other concessions were probably also sought. In political terms, the cardinal’s hat, 
particularly if Wolsey was promoted alone, would have transmitted a clear message 
about the papacy’s intentions vis-à-vis France. Contemporaries would have 
understood that there was only one reason why Leo X would seek to ‘buy’ the English 
crown just when France was poised to descend into Italy; as an ally against this threat. 
Wolsey was, therefore, forcing the papacy’s hand; either come out definitively against 
Francis I, by which he would benefit from ecclesiastical office, or lose Henry VIII’s 
commitment to defend the papacy (and potentially, albeit this was unlikely, see him 
support Francis I). The pope’s response to Wolsey, on 12 July, appears to have 
interpreted the latter’s correspondence quite positively. Agreeing in future to 
communicate through the archbishop and being appreciative of his role in influencing 
the king (against France), Leo X claimed to be desirous of Henry’s goodwill and 
appreciated his expressions of devotion, adding that the king should be considered to 
be the ‘patron and protector’ of the Holy See. While nothing was mentioned about the 
red hat, it is feasible that this would have been broached by de Giglis, whom the 
pontiff had instructed to write more fully.88 
 Also indicative of the papacy’s increasing commitment against France, vis-à-
vis England, may well have been Leo’s warning during June 1515 that any aggression 
against the Papal States, particularly the outpost cities of Parma and Piacenza, would 
result in papal censures being imposed on the culprits.89 While this would have been 
deemed a ‘positive’ measure if or when news of this arrived in England, it was still 
not a categoric declaration of anti-French intent. Indeed, there are indications, albeit 
from Ferdinand of Aragon, that Henry VIII had sought such ecclesiastical weapons to 
                                                 
87 Ibid., 648 (calendared end June 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis], ‘From my place beside Westminster’). 
d., 700 (12 July 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.12. 
88 The de Giglis letter does not seem to have survived; ibi
89 These territories were nominally held by Giuliano de’ Medici; 
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be invoked against Francis I at least from summer 1515. That Ferdinand urged Leo to 
excommunicate Francis for Henry’s sake at some point perhaps around May-June and 
again on 14 September, however, suggests that the general papal monition issued in 
June was not deemed acceptable to the English crown as sufficient sign of papal 
intent.90 
 
Concurrent with papal contacts with England proposing an alignment against 
France, Leo X also continued to issue overtures calling for universal peace and 
crusade where the underlying agenda was unclear. On 16 June 1515, he and Giulio 
de’ Medici wrote to Henry VIII, requesting his assistance against the Turks.91 While, 
no doubt, the English crown would have liked this approach to have been a tacit 
request for assistance against the French and, indeed, it could have been interpreted as 
such if it was made in accordance with the papacy’s (then, still secret) membership of 
the anti-French league, the fact that it was accompanied by a brief to the same effect 
from the Hungarian bishop of Vesprim, gives cause for doubt. Given Hungary’s more 
tangible concern for the Turkish threat, this metropolitan was probably little 
concerned with the political in-fighting within Christendom, which suggests that the 
call to crusade may have been genuine. However, given the confusion around papal 
foreign policy, it is entirely feasible that, on receipt of these briefs in England, the 
                                                 
90 Sp.ii, 212 (calendared summer 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 217 (14 September 
1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
 Leo X’s invitation is alluded to by de’ Medici; LPIIi, 590 (16 June 1515, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, 
Rome). That universal peace and crusade continued to be a strategy perhaps independent of the concern 
the Swiss, with a view to these ends. Robert Wingfield reported on 24 July that papal ambassadors 
were indeed pressuring the emperor to respond positively, but Maximilian did not, arguing that, while 
he had always desired to go on crusade, four French kings had prevented him from doing so. Wingfield 
also reported on a meeting, at the same time, between the emperor and the kings of Hungary and 
91
for France is also suggested by the despatch, on 13 July, of a nuncio to visit Maximilian, Francis and 
Poland. It may well be that the papacy perceived this as an opportune moment to lobby for universal 
, peace and crusade, in spite of the wider political context within Christendom; ibid., 703 (13 July 1515
Leo to Baptista, General of the Order of Carmelites, Rome), 746 (24 July 1515, Robert Wingfield to 
Henry, Vienna), 764 (30 July 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Vienna). 
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king did not know what was really meant; did Leo intend to use the crusade as a 
pretext for war against France (as is suggested by the February league to defend 
Milan); was it a mechanism to prevent an attack on Francis (as may already have been 
suspected from the Stuerd nunciature in Scotland), or was it a genuine call to arms in 
defence of Christendom?92 Perhaps predictably, Henry VIII’s reply, of 15 July, 
dicates his understanding that it was the former; he was sympathetic to the pope’s 
desire 
French threat to the papacy and Milan. This assessment of the English contribution 
in
for peace, particularly given the obstacles experienced through ‘the private 
interests of certain princes’. In the face of such ‘obstinacy’ (from France), therefore, 
the king encouraged Leo to use the ‘spiritual sword’, which he would support, 
presumably in a military sense. Nevertheless, while he would respond to the papal call 
to arms against the Turks, Henry insisted that a broad league be concluded first, to 
impose the universal peace.93  
 While the king’s correspondence was supportive, Wolsey’s continued to be 
more threatening. At some point, probably during July (and perhaps at the same time 
as that from Henry), he notified de Giglis how ‘the King’s grace marvelleth that the 
Pope delayeth so long the sending of the red hat to me’. Furthermore, the archbishop 
continued, ‘if the King forsake the Pope, he will be in greater “danger on this day two 
year than ever was Pope J[ulius]”’.94 The implication of this warning was clear; if the 
red hat was not forthcoming (and quickly), Henry VIII would not neutralise the 
                                                 
92 In his encouragement of the pope to urge Henry’s involvement against France, on 14 September 
1515, Ferdinand advocated the portrayal of the French as ‘usurpers of the property of their neighbours 
and disturbers of the peace of Christendom, and as the obstacle to war with the Infidels’. It is 
improbable, therefore, that the papacy failed to understand that its universal peace overtures to England 
could be and were being misconstrued; Sp.ii, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in 
Rome). For the reality of the Turkish threat in Hungary and the response around 1514 on, see N. 
Housley, ‘Indulgences for Crusading, 1417-1517’, in R.N. Swanson (ed.), Promissory Notes on the 
Treasury of Merit: Indulgences in Late Medieval Europe (2006), pp.300-301. 
93 LPIIi, 712 (15 July 1515, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
94 Ibid., 763 (calendared 30 July 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]). 
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also mirrored what Wolsey, Henry and others, told the Venetian ambassadors.95 If the 
date of Wolsey’s missive is correct, it would not have reached Rome before 1 August, 
on which date he discovered that Leo X was going to make him a cardinal and, by 
implication, intended to resist Francis I, particularly given that he was to be the only 
candidate for this creation. Consequently, Wolsey wrote, he had been able to take 
advantage of the king’s positive demeanour to have him agree to the league (which he 
enclosed, signed by Henry); ‘never had Pope a better friend that the King of England, 
if he comply with his desires’ continued Wolsey, in relation to his further demand to 
be commissioned as a legate a latere.96 The rough date of the concession coincided 
with Leo’s decision to side with the anti-French coalition.97 Thus, the English crown 
finally accepted, probably by virtue of the public bestowal of the red hat, that Leo X 
intended to resist the French. Indeed, it was fairly trusting of Wolsey to have sent the 
English power to join the treaty before this had actually occurred. 
 In spite of Wolsey’s brinksmanship, it does not seem that England would have 
deserted the papacy in its hour of need. Ferdinand of Aragon understood during the 
summer of 1515 that Henry was willing to help the pope and the league against 
France and recommended that Leo ought to write to him in this regard.98As far as the 
                                                 
95 See pp.483-485. 
96 LPIIi, 780 (1 August 1515, [Wolsey to de Giglis]). Ferdinand of Aragon later (by September) seems 
Henry VIII’s membership of the anti-French coalition was yet to occur; Sp.ii, 221 (calendared 
to have understood that England and Rome had reached an agreement just between themselves and that 
September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
97 Preceded in June by a general threat to excommunicate those who threatened the papal principality, 
by the end of July 1515, the pope admitted to the Venetian ambassador that he had joined the coalition 
against France, although he still claimed to be waiting for a response from Francis that might change 
 by Henry, to encourage 
ts on 14 September. In the former letter, the 
 war and encourage him to observe the 
this. By early August, however, there were various signals that the pope intended to resist the French 
descent, including the proclamation of the league in Rome with papal membership. Robert Wingfield 
confirmed from Vienna on 6 August that the league against France had been proclaimed throughout 
Italy and that the papal army was actively participating in its endeavours; L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vii, pp.110-111; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.12, 16; K.M. Setton, ‘Pope Leo X and the 
Turkish Peril’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 13 (1969), p.384, n.65; LPIIi, 786 
(6 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Vienna). 
98 Ferdinand also advocated a bull of excommunication, as allegedly requested
him in this regard. Ferdinand reiterated these sentimen
Spaniard also sought to rekindle the pontiff’s enthusiasm for the
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Venetian embassy assessed the mood of the English crown towards the beginning of 
July, it was firmly opposed to the impending French descent into Italy, but denied that 
it was going to take place and even asserted that it was in a position to allow or 
prevent it.99 The king and his advisors also claimed to hold sufficient influence over 
the papacy to affect Leo’s foreign policy direction. When questioned about his 
relationship with the pope (on 3 July), Henry allegedly stated: ‘[I] am his good son, 
and shall always be with his Holiness and with the Church, from which I mean never 
to depart; and I think I have sufficient power with the Pope to warrant hopes of my 
making his adhere to whichever side I choose’.100 While the English crown may well 
have been confident that its overtures to the pope would be successful, one can also 
detect doubt from Henry in this audience, probably arising from the continued 
                                                                                                                                            
ipulatio
mmer 
ambassador in Rome). 
his agreements with England and, given that the Venetian diplomats perceived that Henry was close to 
‘ego credo quod metu mei, ne aliquam vim inferam ejus regno, non transilibit montes’. He later 
reiterated this, stating that ‘my belief is, that if I choose he will not cross the Alps, and if I choose he 
will cross’. This sentiment was echoed separately by some of his principal advisors, among whom, 
t of claiming, that while he was the architect of the peace, he was willing to throw 
i, 635; LPIIi, 666; 6 July 1515, Badoer and 
i, 635; LPIIi, 666; 6 July 1515, Giustinian to 
st ns of the anti-French league (which included lobbying England to join); Sp.ii, 212 (calendared 
su 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his 
99 At one point, Badoer discovered that Henry was sending an envoy to warn Francis against breaking 
the pope at this point and that there were no signs that England was preparing for war, they believed 
that this mission was at Leo’s behest. When challenged, English ministers either denied the mission or 
its motivation. In addition, the Venetians cited Henry and his advisors rejecting the idea that Francis 
would cross the Alps that year. When questioned why this was the case, the king reportedly replied 
Wolsey made a poin
his weight behind destroying it, if the king so decided, and that there was plenty of support among 
Henry’s advisors; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 106-107 (Ven.ii, 634; LPIIi, 653; 3 July 1515, Badoer 
and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 107-114 (Ven.i
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIIi, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 115-117 (Ven.ii, 637; LPIIi, 716; 16 July 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
100 Wolsey had reportedly given the same sort of answer a few days earlier and is said to have repeated 
this sentiment on 5 July; ‘be assured that this King’s example will be followed by his Holiness… 
Should our King espouse the French interests, the Pope will do the like’. Ruthal is also said to have 
repeated this opinion. In a subsequent interview given to Giustinian and Badoer (around 16 July), 
Wolsey claimed that, while the pope had yet to make a decision on which side to choose, he ‘would 
doubtless follow the example of this kingdom’; ibid., pp.103 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 113 (Ven.i
the Signory, London), 115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIIi, 673; 7 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 115-117 (Ven.ii, 637; LPIIi, 716; 16 July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). 
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uncertainty surrounding the papal position. Why else would he have asked the 
Venetian diplomats which side the pope was on?101  
 While Henry VIII remained formally on good terms with France, the red hat 
(and its consequent sending of the king’s authority to join the league to defend Italy) 
marked a tipping point.102 From this point, clearer suggestions of his opposition to 
Francis I and his crossing of the Alps can be observed. At some point probably during 
August, Henry allegedly indicated to the Spanish orator his readiness to join the anti-
French coalition, provided that he was invited by the pope.103 On 12 August, Henry 
referred to France as ‘the ancient enemy of England’ in a routine diplomatic letter.104 
Around 20 August, Henry also sent Sir Richard Wingfield to Francis (then at Lyons) 
to raise various issues between them (concerning Albany in Scotland, French piracy, 
Mary’s dower and so on); while it is unclear whether the ambassador urged Francis 
directly to cease his expedition, one would expect this to have been implicit in the 
mission and that Wingfield would also have been expected to gather intelligence.105 
                                                 
101 Badoer and Giustinian replied that they did not know but, if Leo chose to pursue ‘justice’, it would 
that of France and Venice; ibid., pp.100-106 (Ven.ii, 633; LPIIi, 652; 3 July 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
102 A French ambassador apparently arrived in England on 7 August and announced that Francis had 
decided to cross the Alps to recover Milan. Henry replied with surprise that his fellow king had not 
informed him about this this earlier. While the English response was not one of defiance, it fits in with 
earlier crown behaviour, whereby Henry and his advisors pleaded ignorance, so that they could assert 
that Francis had breached the peace treaty; ibid., pp.124-126 (Ven.ii, 644; LPIIi, 847; 24 August 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
103 If this was said from August on, then Henry had already made this commitment to Leo X, following 
the concession of Wolsey’s entry to the Sacred College. In response, Ferdinand urged Leo X to induce 
English participation and also invited Henry to adhere himself; Sp.ii, 221 (calendared September 1515, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 222 (calendared September 1515). 
104 Henry was writing to William Knight, an English representative in the Low Countries, requesting 
safeconduct for a merchant; LPIIi, 798 (12 August 1515, Henry to Knight, ‘From our Monastery of 
.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, p.287. Henry VIII had already, in late 
Chertsey’). 
105 Francis’ reply does not suggest that Wingfield urged a cessation, although Francis did mention his 
hope that the Anglo-French amity would benefit Christendom and the crusade, possibly implying that 
the latter subjects were raised in this context. Guicciardini suggests that an English diplomat did make 
such a request around this time. Nevertheless, there is an indication by Wolsey that Wingfield was 
expected to continue his ‘espial with the French King’, although it is uncertain whether this was to be 
during his mission to Francis or while he was at Calais; ibid., 826 (20 August 1515, Henry to Francis), 
827 (calendared 20 August 1515, instructions to Richard Wingfield), 828 (calendared 20 August 1515); 
LPIIii, 141: addendum 1929 (calendared August-October 1515, [Wolsey] to Richard Wingfield); S. 
Alexander (ed
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Indeed, perceiving that a change in foreign policy had occurred, Robert Wingfield 
opined to Henry, on 22 August, that there would only be universal peace in 
pontiff pushed for the payment of a crusading tax, half a clerical tenth, that Henry had 
                                                                          
Christendom ‘if the crown of France be once set on your head’.106  
 In terms of the papal position, Henry VIII and his advisors would have been 
further buoyed by news that the pope had finally joined the anti-French coalition and 
was moving troops in its support.107 It would also have been interpreted positively 
when de Giglis’ missive to Wolsey, dated 21 August, arrived in England, claiming 
that the pope was too busy to write, on account of his being ‘occupied by the 
impending war’.108 News of Henry VIII’s commitment to the league in defence of 
Italy (and, consequently, to attack France) reached Rome, on the other hand, by 3 
September. Despite the ominous military situation (as will be seen below), the pope 
was pleased that he had gained England as an ally and returned a signed draft of the 
treaty for Henry to countersign. De Giglis dutifully delayed his reply to Wolsey until 
his promotion to the Sacred College had occurred in consistory. At the same time, the 
agreed could be levied from the English clergy and de Giglis seems to have taken this 
opportunity to lobby for Henry’s honorary title, in connection with his joining this 
league to protect the Church and to reflect this commitment.109 Wolsey thanked de 
                                                                  
7 (Ven.ii, 634; LPIIi, 653; 3 
, Lyons), 665 (6 July 1515, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Calais), 740 (23 July 1515, 
June or early July, sent Sir William Sidney to Francis to seek redress for English merchants who had 
suffered losses at the hands of Frenchmen. In addition, the Venetian ambassador initially suspected, 
Sidney may also have been charged with warning the Francis against breaching their agreements, 
ostensibly in relation to Italy; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.106-10
July 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 114-115 (Ven.ii, 636; LPIIi, 673; 7 July 
1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIi, 613 (24 June 1515, Boy[sy] to [Wolsey 
and Suffolk]
Francis to Henry, Lyons), 741 (23 July 1515, Francis to Wolsey, Lyons). 
106 Wingfield believed that other heads of state (presumably Ferdinand, Maximilian and Charles of 
Castile) would be in support of this resurgent English claim to the French throne; LPIIi, 838 (22 
August 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
107 Ibid., 786 (6 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Vienna). Wingfield reported on 20th that 
the pope had partly funded the Swiss; ibid., 838 (22 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
108 Ibid., 836 (21 August 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
109 Henry and Wolsey’s correspondence was dated 12 August; ibid., 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis 
to Wolsey]). See also ibid., 909 (14 September 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Ins[broke]). The 
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Giglis for his work towards his promotion on 10 September, as a result of which, ‘the 
King will be ready to expose his person and goods to support the honour and safety of 
the Holy See’. The cardinal also notified the orator that Henry had signed the treaty 
                                                                                                                                           
(presumably to defend the pope) and, therefore, was deserving of an honorary title, 
which he hoped for by the next post.110 
While Henry and Wolsey probably congratulated themselves on an astute 
piece of diplomacy, whereby they had successfully sold their service to the papacy in 
return for a red hat, their commitment to defend Leo X and Italy had come too late, as 
the French military advance into Italy was rapid and decisive.111 While initial 
intelligence reaching England on this subject was mixed, a truer picture seems to have 
gradually filtered through from the likes of Thomas Spinelly and Robert Wingfield.112 
By mid-September, confirmation of French progress by Francis’ mother (Louise of 
Savoy), then in temporary charge of France, was received badly in England, ‘owing to 
 
the Venetian ambassador, Marino Giorgio, on several occasions in early September. He talked of 
 LPIIi, 894 (10 September 1515, Wolsey to [de Giglis]). 
o
Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.114-115. 
112 Various reports reaching England from late August suggested French defeats, even that the French 
25 August 1515, Signory to 
ndon); Sp.ii, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his 
Francis 
n English contingent in the French army; 
pope was also reportedly bullish on understanding that Henry VIII was now his ally when speaking to 
having urged the English king to attack France, now that he had secured sufficient support to back his 
elevation of Wolsey as an inducement towards this; Ven.ii, 647 (5 September 1515, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 648 (9-11 September 1515, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory).  
110
111 The French duped the Swiss by entering Italy via an unexpected pass, causing the Swiss to retreat 
on Milan and, significantly, captured the Milanese commander, Prospero C lonna, by 12 August; L. 
army had been chased back across the Alps. Spinelly reported on the 25th that the French had outwitted 
the Swiss to cross the Alps and had capture of Colonna. Spinelly must have given these reports 
credence, as he opined that ‘Arragon must awake, or else Naples will be in danger’; LPIIi, 829 (20 
August 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 838 (22 August 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, W[elce]), 
848 (25 August 1515, Spinelly to [Henry, Bruges), 873 (1 September 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, 
Innsbruck), 890 (8 September 1515, Mountjoy to Wolsey, Tournai), 900 (12 September 1515, Robert 
Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruck]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.124-126 (Ven.ii, 644; LPIIi, 
847; 24 August 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 645 (
Badoer and Giustinian). Also see LPIIi, 886 (7 September 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], 
Innsbruck); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.126-127 (Ven.ii, 649; LPIIi, 912; 15 September 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, Lo
ambassador in Rome). Equally, intelligence was sent to the crown about the strength of the Franco-
Venetian force, even that papal troops had joined them and that the pope had promised to help 
‘recover’ Naples. A rumour even circulated that there was a
LPIIi, 839 (calendared 22 August 1515, Hector de Vicquemare to -), 849 (25 August 1515, Ammonius 
to Wolsey, Westminster), 886 (7 September 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Innsbruck). 
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the natural feeling existing between the two nations’.113 The pope, for his part, 
panicked at the French advances and, at one stage, even considered flight to Spanish-
controlled Naples.114 The implications of France’s potential ascendancy in Italy, 
particularly in terms of a French-controlled papacy and its consequent effect on 
English interests relating to Rome, would surely have been appreciated in England on 
receipt 
was stated, was declined after considerable discussion of various possibilities, 
tment that a crusading subsidy, previously agreed by Wolsey, was now in 
of de Giglis’ correspondence of 18 August and 7 September (around the same 
time). While the communications conveyed the papacy’s commitment against the 
French, they were written after news had been received of setbacks in northern Italy. 
In light of this, the orator conveyed bad news about Wolsey’s desire for a legatine 
commission and the request for Henry to be awarded an honorary title. In fact, Leo’s 
refusal to concede the legation was based on his ‘dread of France demanding the 
same’ (as well as Maximilian requesting this for his own minister, Matthew Lang), 
although a little light was offered by virtue that the refusal was temporary. The title, it 
although there was no indication that a suitable alternative would be sought. While the 
context of the letters suggests that Leo X’s intransigence was based on his 
disappoin
doubt, particularly as the legatine commission was offered if Henry committed 
himself to go on crusade, it can only be speculated that the English crown suspected 
the papacy may have made these decisions with one eye on the rapid military 
                                                 
113 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.126-127 (Ven.ii, 649; LPIIi, 912; 15 September 1515, Badoer 
and Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
114 Leo’s reaction to these and further reverses seem to have been knee-jerk. One minute he was 
insisting that the anti-French forces should not give in, the next he was considering sending a secret 
mission to Francis to open negotiations. In addition, Pastor considers that the anti-French league was 
not assisted by the failure of papal (and Florentine) troops to advance north of the Po and that, in any 
case, by September, it was clear that they would not contribute actively. To reassure the pope in the 
wake of Colonna’s capture, Ferdinand of Aragon, among other things, encouraged Leo to engage 
Henry VIII’s active support; Sp.ii, 217 (14 September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome), 
221 (calendared September 1515, Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome); L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vii, pp.114-118. 
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advances of Francis I. Certainly, Leo’s motive for rejecting Wolsey’s legatine 
commission suggests this. A further worrying prospect for England, vis-à-vis papal 
intentions against France, was the pope’s continued desire to aid the Hungarians 
against the Turks, albeit mentioned in the same breath as the English crusading levy. 
As far as Henry VIII was concerned, however, was Leo keeping a strategy to force 
peace up his sleeve, just in case Francis made too much progress?115 This did not 
matter, however, as Francis I’s Italian enterprise soon culminated in a decisive victory 
against Swiss and Milanese forces at Marignano, 13-14 September 1515, the net result 
of which was the collapse of the anti-French league and the return of Milan to French 
control.116 This was a watershed moment that marked the failure of the English 
crown’s strategy to ‘defend’ the papacy from French influence. 
 
Post-Marignano, a swift but unsuccessful English reaction to defend the papacy 
from French dominance: September 1515 – April 1516 
The implications for the the papacy following the Battle of Marignano were 
grave and the resulting threat to the Papal States and Medicean Florence caused a 
reversal in foreign policy. After initially panicking at news of the defeat on 17 
September 1515, Leo X’s reaction was more tempered a few days later, when he told 
                                                 
doing this, that he wished to conduct visitations of the exempt monasteries in England. According to de 
115 Concerning Wolsey’s desire to become a legate a latere, he may have claimed, as a motive for 
Giglis, this aspect was not refused by the pope and Wolsey may have more chance of gaining a specific 
commission to undertake this. Among these rejections, there was one small grant apparently made to 
England around this point; the pope awarded Wolsey the titular church of St. Cecilia from which, he 
dared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 
ctober 1515, Erasmus to Ammonius, Basle). 
asserted, many popes had derived. In the light of the other refusals, however, this was but a small 
benefit to the English crown; LPIIi, 966 (calen
(calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, 
Ammonius to Wolsey). 
116 Papal and Florentine troops were not active against the French by this time; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, 
pp.41-47; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.118-120. The gravity of this defeat ought not to be 
understated; the Swiss, almost universally considered to be an invincible military force, had been 
comprehensively defeated. Erasmus wrote a cynical response to the surprise of the Swiss at their 
defeat, that they were ‘in a boiling rage against the French, because they did not civilly allow 
themselves to be thrashed as they were by the English,’ rather the French ‘dispersed them with their 
artillery’; LPIIi, 985 (2 O
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a Venetian audience that ‘we will throw ourselves into the arms of the Most Christian 
King, and beg his mercy’. This was probably the most pragmatic approach for the 
papacy and really his only option, as he was mostly devoid of allies who could act 
following the defeat, the Swiss retreating across the Alps and the Spanish expected to 
withdraw back to Naples. If he continued to resist, therefore, Leo X would risk his 
temporal power (both of the Church and of Florence), not to mention his position as 
pontiff.117 The pope entered into immediate negotiations towards a rapprochement 
with France, which he agreed on 13 October.118 This was to be sealed by a meeting 
with Francis I at Bologna during December.119 
For the English crown, Marignano signified its failure to ‘defend’ the papacy 
from French influence; by holding out for Wolsey’s cardinalatial dignity before 
ommitting to its protection had proved costly, as Leo X now had to submit to French 
ould be critical. It did not 
take lon
defeat for France.121 This lack of confirmation is further demonstrated by Henry’s 
c
terms, in the short-term at least.120 For England’s political relations with Rome, this 
was the worst-case scenario and Henry VIII’s reaction w
g for news of the Battle of Marignano to reach England, but the problem, once 
more, was the variability of the intelligence received. Arriving perhaps from 25 
September onwards, just as English ministers were returning to London for the new 
legal term, initial reports were contradictory, suggesting both a major victory and 
                                                 
117 Leo initially heard that the Swiss had won, then that the loss had not been decisive, before the true 
result reached him. He particularly feared a follow-up attack by the French on Florence and the Papal 
States, and was urged to negotiate with Francis, particularly by the Florentines in his entourage; L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.120-125. Also see R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.48. 
118 Sp.ii, 219 (20 September 1515), 223 (39 September 1515, Leo to Francis); M. Creighton, History of 
the Papacy, v, p.245; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.48; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.122-127. 
d to Wolsey, Calais), 958 (29 
119 Francis’ entry to the papacy’s second most important city occurred on 11 December; Ven.ii, 666 (10 
December 1515, Venetian ambassador at the papal Court to the Signory, Bologna); R.J. Knecht, 
Francis I, pp.48-50. 
120 Sir Robert Wingfield described the fallout of Marignano as ‘a great crisis for all Christendom’; 
LPIIi, 1006 (9 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], [Innsbruck]). 
121 For mixed intelligence from English diplomats, see ibid., 944 (calendared 23-24 September 1515, 
[Spinelly to Henry]), 953 (29 September 1515, Richard Wingfiel
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failure to mention it in his letter to the pope on 30 September 1515.122 In spite of this 
lack of (reliable) intelligence, the English king may have requested in strong terms 
that Francis desist from attacking the pope, perhaps in early to mid-October.123 
Indeed, it may have been only on 27 October 1515 (a month after initial news of the 
battle had arrived) that the outcome at Marignano was formally announced to Henry 
VIII by the French ambassador. Upon reading Francis I’s letter on this, a ‘much 
vexed’ Henry quibbled with the orator about the number of Swiss allegedly killed 
during the battle, among other things, accusing the French delegate (and Francis, 
whose letter to Henry was being read) of exaggeration. It is important to note, 
however, that while it was clear to the French ambassador that Henry was unhappy 
with the French progress in Italy, he was still careful, formally speaking, to say that he 
was pleased for his ‘ally’ when this was raised by the former, although the king 
reportedly changed the subject to the need for a crusade against the Turks.124 In this 
                                                                                                                                            
even in early October, see ibid., 981 (2 October 1515, Spinelly to [Wolsey]), 982 (2 October 1515, 
reverse during his audience with the Venetian orators on 25 September. During the following few 
weeks, however, the same ambassadors implied a lack of knowledge about Marignano among English 
ministers who, as they were returning to Court (after the summer recess), enquired about the French 
victory, but were yet to discover whether any strategic advantage would be accrued by either side; R. 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 133-137 (Ven.ii, 653; LPIIi, 1017; 11 October 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 652 (27 September 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). 
122 He merely thanked L o for elevating Wolsey to the College of Cardinals The underlying assumption 
September 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For a lack of recognition of the gravity of the result, 
Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Innsbruck). Nevertheless, Wolsey alluded to some kind of French 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.129-133 (Ven.ii, 651; LPIIi, 948; 26 September 1515, Badoer and 
e
here is that no other letters from the king accompanied this one; LPIIi, 960 (30 September 1515, Henry 
to Leo, Windsor). Neither was there any mention of the letters from de Giglis in Rome, nor Ammonius’ 
summary of them, that were sent in the same month; ibid., 966 (calendared end September 1515, [de 
bassadors, he still 
y Henry VIII; LPIIi, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, 
French advances. This could 
Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 968 (calendared 
end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey). The English uncertainty about Marignano is further 
suggested by Henry VIII’s lack of urgency; he only returned to Greenwich (from his summer progress) 
on 15 October. Furthermore, at a subsequent audience given to the Venetian am
seems to have been uncertain of the true result of the battle; Ven.ii, 655 (16 October 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
123 Wolsey and the French ambassador apparently discussed Francis’ reply to this on 5 November, 
which the latter had apparently interpreted as an ultimatum which, if not adhered to, would result in a 
declaration of war b
London). 
124 In other words, Henry posited ‘universal peace’ as a means to cease 
perhaps be seen as a precursor to the strategy that he and Wolsey would adopt in 1518; ibid., 1113 (6 
November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). For confirmation of the nature of this 
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meeting, Henry also registered concern for the papacy, particularly the implications 
for papal security (if Francis intended to march through Church territory on his way to 
Naples) and Leo X’s continued commitment to the anti-French league. Concerning 
the former, Henry enquired whether his French counterpart now intended an assault 
on Naples, which suggestion the ambassador refuted.125 Henry also enquired whether 
any Franco-papal arrangement had been concluded; the orator replied positively, but 
was contradicted by the king.126 One can observe at this point, therefore, a king 
apparently embittered by the news of this Swiss defeat in Italy and the danger in 
which this placed the papacy.127 
 
From this point, Henry VIII sought to react swiftly and robustly to Marignano. 
As the Spaniard de Mesa opined on 5 November, after speaking with him, ‘the 
                                                                                                                                            
exchange and further suggestion that England was still uncertain about the implications of Marignano, 
ovember 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). Doubts about this would 
53; LPIIi, 1017; 11 October 1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the 
nelly in December 1515 a common fear of French ambitions generally, that was shared in 
see; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.137-142 (Ven.ii, 659; LPIIi, 1086; 29 October 1515, Badoer 
and Giustinian to the Signory, London), 143 (Ven.ii, 664; LPIIi, 1154; 14 November 1515, Badoer and 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). The bad feeling in England would have been exacerbated by the 
continued receipt of news indicating that the French were prevailing in Italy, culminating in early 
November with de Giglis’ report that Milan and its duke had fallen; LPIIi, 1097 (calendared end 
October 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels); Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, 
London); Ven.ii, 657 (26 October 1515, Signory to Badoer and Giustinian). At the same time, there was 
reason for the English crown to remain positive, as intelligence was simultaneously received about 
French set-backs in the peninsula; LPIIi, 1067 (25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1096 
(calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). 
125 LPIIi, 1113 (6 N
have lingered in England and these would have been fuelled by Robert Wingfield’s despatch, on 7 
December, conveying the emperor’s belief that Naples was Francis’ next target; ibid., 1253 (7 
December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn’). Also see ibid., 1352 (28 December 1515, 
[Cardinal Schiner] to -, ‘Ravenspurch’). 
126 Ibid., 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London); Ven.ii, 652 (27 September 
1515, Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Spinelly predicted that such negotiations were 
imminent in late September. Indeed, Giustinian cited members of the king’s ‘inner circle’, (on or 
before 11 October) telling him that they had, as yet, unconfirmed reports of an arrangement, but did not 
seem to believe it; ibid., 958 (29 September 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), 
Four Years, i, pp.133-137 (Ven.ii, 6
Signory, London). 
127 This fear of French control of the papacy was sometimes couched in more general terms of Francis’ 
ambition to become ‘monarch of the world’ (or something similar). For instance, Margaret of Savoy 
voiced to Spi
England; that Francis hoped to ‘obtain the monarchy of Christendom’. In this context, the archduchess 
envisaged it to be a potential consequence, post-Marignano, in the event of Ferdinand or Maximilian 
dying; LPIIi, 1339 (calendared 24-25 December 1515, [Spinelly to Wolsey]). 
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English are very desirous to do some injury, whatever it may be, to the French’.128 
Thus, Henry swiftly resolved on an aggressive foreign policy to act on his earlier 
commitment to ‘defend’ the pope. One tangible response, perhaps during mid- to late 
October, seems to have been a sharply worded demand that Francis cease his attack 
on the papacy. This may have been a knee-jerk reaction to confirmation of the defeat 
at Marignano, possibly not sanctioned by Wolsey or Fox, as Francis reportedly 
interpreted this as an ultimatum that, if not observed, would result in Henry’s 
attacking him, which Wolsey subsequently denied.129 In spite of this refutal, plans 
were afoot to carry out this threat. Firstly, Wolsey’s secretary, Richard Pace, was 
espatched to Germany and the Swiss Confederation, to facilitate an expedition to 
Italy th
                                                
d
at would defend Milan, expel the French and produce an assault on France 
itself.130 While the emperor and the Swiss were Pace’s priority, it will be seen later 
 
128 Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London). The English also received news 
owever, contradictory reports were also 
ber 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
st haste to Italy in late October, to ensure that the league continued to resist France, 
ly, Wolsey envisaged 
hinting at French vulnerability. In late November, for instance, report came from Charles Somerset that 
the French had suffered a catastrophic defeat at Bologna, with suggestions that Francis had been killed 
or taken prisoner; LPIIi, 1197 (25 November 1515, Charles Somerset to [Wolsey], Tournai). For 
similar intelligence reaching England that suggested Franco-Venetian reverses, see ibid., 1135 (12 
November 1515, Pace to Wolsey, Innsbruck), 1164 (16 November 1515, Margaret of Savoy to the 
Spanish ambassador), 1198 (26 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Memmingen’), 1215 (29 
November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 1227 (calendared end November 1515, - to Wolsey), 
1249 (5 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn in Swave’), 1253 (7 December 1515, 
Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn’), 1339 (calendared 24-25 December 1515, [Spinelly to 
Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.142-148 (Ven.ii, 664; LPIIi, 1154; 15 November 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Once more, h
received by the English crown; Ven.ii, 670 (28 December 1515, Signory to Giustinian). Indeed, around 
this time, Henry and his ‘inner circle’ may not have been entirely confident in their news sources and, 
as Giustinian pointed out on 6 December, early news from Venice was appreciated by the England, 
particularly as that gained via Germany often turned out to be untrue; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, 
p.145 (Ven.ii, 665; LPIIi, 1250; 6 Decem
129 The ultimatum resulted in some ministerial backpeddling; in his audience with the French orator on 
5 November, accompanied by Fox and Ruthal, Wolsey commented on the strangeness of Francis’ 
‘misinterpretation’ of the king’s request, that was merely intended as a request for him not to make war 
on Leo X. De Baupame responded that ‘the King’s words were gracious enough if not misinterpreted, 
and that Henry had written much more rudely’; in other words, it seems, the English monarch’s tone 
was deemed aggressive; LPIIi, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, London). 
130 Pace was sent po
particularly the Swiss (20,000 of whom he was to hire en route,) in combination with Maximilian. This 
appears to have been a direct response to the arrival of the duke of Milan’s secretary, Michael de 
Abbatis (or Abbate), who arrived in England earlier in October. He encouraged England to ally with 
the Swiss and urged Henry to realise his claim to the French throne. Shortly after meeting with Sforza’s 
secretary (while en route to England), William Knight, resident in Brussels, urged Wolsey to seize the 
opportunity to attack the ‘ancient enemy’, by leaguing with the Swiss. Subsequent
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that papal support was also sought.131 Secondly, Henry VIII sought to consolidate the 
anti-French powers on two levels; generally, through the existing coalition that he had 
agreed to join following Wolsey’s gaining the red hat, or, if this league had failed, the 
formation of a new one; and, more specifically, through specific English alliances 
with individual powers directed against France.132 At the same time, the English 
                                                                                                                                            
that, via a league with the Swiss to expel Francis I from Italy, universal peace could be attained and a 
crusade launched. De Abbatis travelled with Pace to fulfil the mission. The sources give the impression 
offered 10,000 ducats per annum by the duke of Milan if the French were expelled from the peninsula 
(indeed, Pace’s instructions were drafted by and addressed fr  Wolsey); ibid., 916 (17 September 
1515, duke of Milan to Henry), 1003 (8 October 1515, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels), 1053 (20 October 
1515), 1066 (calendared 24-25 October 1515, [Pace to Wolsey]), 1095 (calendared end October 1515, 
November 1515, [Michael Abbate] to Henry, Innsbruck), 1137 (12 November 1515, Michael Abbate to 
Schiner (Cardinal of Sion), as well as the canon of Berne; ibid., 982 (2 October 1515, Robert Wingfield 
to [Wolsey], Innsbruck), 1004 (9 October 1515, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). For English knowledge 
of Maximilian’s attempts to retain the Swiss, albeit without any money to do so, see ibid., 1037 (16 
October 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, [Innsbruc]k), 1043 (18 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to 
that Wolsey was the driving force behind the Pace mission, perhaps not least because he was being 
om
instructions from Wolsey to Pace), 1135 (12 November 1515, Pace to Wolsey, Innsbruck), 1136 (12 
Wolsey, Innsbruck). Overtures may also have come from the Swiss themselves, particularly Matthew 
Henry, Innsbruck), 1070 (26 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck), 1096 (calendared 
end October 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1170 (16 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to 
Henry, [Innsbruck]); Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London). The emphasis of 
wever, was the 
n 29 
the Pace mission changed quickly following news of the fall of Milan. The secretary’s principal aim 
was now to hire the Swiss and effect an attack on French interests in Italy, with a view to recovering 
the duchy, before effecting their expulsion. Pace reached reached Innsbruck by 8 November and 
immediately began negotiations with Cardinal Schiner and the emperor; LPIIi, 1077 (27 October 1515, 
Pace to Wolsey, Antwerp), 1094 (31 October 1515, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1135 (12 November 
1515, Pace to Wolsey, Innsbruck), 1136 (12 November 1515, [Michael Abbate] to Henry, Innsbruck), 
1137 (12 November 1515, Michael Abbate to Wolsey, Innsbruck), 1226 (calendared end November 
1515, [English ambassadors] to the Lords of the League of Upper Almain). 
131 See below for instance pp.516-520. 
132 While Henry VIII had already agreed with the pope to join the 1515 league against France, its status 
would have been called into question following Marignano. Thus, Henry VIII concluded a treaty of 
peace and defensive alliance with Spain on 19 October 1515. The timing coincides with news of the 
French victory reaching England and Catherine of Aragon even suggested it might have been a knee-
jerk reaction; she wrote, ‘the time for concluding a treaty between Spain and England could not have 
been worse chosen. There is no people in the world more influenced by the good or bad fortunes of 
their enemies than the English. A small success of their enemies prostrates them, and a little adversity 
of their antagonists makes them overbearing’. Central to Anglo-Spanish negotiations, ho
English doubt of Ferdinand’s commitment, which had proved lacking on several previous occasions. It 
was, Henry claimed ‘the very pith of the whole question’; Sp.ii, 228 (LPIIi, 1022; 12 October 1515), 
229-230 (LPIIi, 1046; 19 October 1515), 234-237 (LPIIi, 1076; 27 October 1515), 238 (31 October 
1515, Catherine to Ferdinand, Greenwich), 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London), 
241 (LPIIi, 1268; 11 December 1515), 243 (calendared December 1515); LPIIi, 987 (3 October 1515), 
1072 (26 October 1515), 1356 (30 December 1515, Ferdinand to Henry, ‘Xarasuel’. Similarly, o
October, Henry also concluded a treaty for mutual defence with Maximilian and his grandson, Charles 
of Castile. This envisaged the pope as the head of the league and provided for the entry of other parties 
including, specifically, the Swiss. Furthermore, by mid-December, Maximilian had commissioned his 
daughter, Margaret, to negotiate a treaty with England and Spain, ostensibly against France, that would 
ultimately launch a crusade against the Turks (on the 8th) and to conclude an alliance with England to 
defend Brescia and Verona (on the 14th), again from Francis I; LPIIi, 987 (3 October 1515), 1087 (29 
October 1515), 1097 (calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1261 (8 December 
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1515), 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’), 1285 (14 
December 1515, Maximilian to Margaret, ‘Imbst’), 1339 (calendared 24-25 December 1515, [Spinelly 
While it is clear that some sort of broad league against France was actively sought by Henry 
VIII (as well as Maximilian at least, variously to include themselves, the papacy, Burgundy-Spain, the 
Swiss and Francesco Maria Sforza), the actual process and progress of negotiations towards this and 
the reasons why they bore no fruit (particularly when it was more usual for such alliances to precede 
d, it s
English crown recognised that the existing league formed in 1515 against France was untenable and so 
to Wolsey]); Sp.ii, 220 (22 September 1515, Maximilian to his ambassador in Rome, Innsbruck). 
military action) remain unclear. From the sources consulte eems that, around 23 December, the 
lobbied its potential allies towards a new agreement. Despite initially enthusiastic responses from 
Maximilian (on behalf of himself and Charles of Burgundy) in late January 1516, nothing materialised 
before the Imperial-Swiss expedition was launched; LPIIi, 1263 (9 December 1515, Maximilian to 
6, Poynings and Tunstal to 
, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1772 (16 April 1517), 1782 
Margaret), 1285 (14 December 1515, Maximilian to Margaret, ‘Imbst’), 1388 (6 January 1516, 
Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1393 (9 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1395 (9 January 
1516, B[russels]), 1396 (10 January 1516, Brussels), 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to 
[Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1412 (18 January 1516, [Melchior Langus] to Wolsey, ‘Ex Duvarrio’), 1419 
(21 January 1516, Melchior Langus to Wolsey, Brussels), 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], 
Constance), 1572 (20 February 1516), 1574 (21 February 1516), 1721 (1 April 1516, [Pace] to 
[Wolsey], [Lodi?]), 1838 (calendared 30 April 1516, [Henry] to Poynings an[d Tunstal]); R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.168-171 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIIi, 1495; 6 February 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). 
 While English negotiations with Charles of Burgundy had been largely conducted under the 
auspices of the latter’s grandfather, Maximilian, this was to change following the latter’s de facto 
inheritance of Spain on Ferdinand’s death on 23 January. On the 24th, a treaty was concluded 
concerning amity and trade, which was reportedly proclaimed in England as a ‘perpetual peace’ on 18 
February. However, by virtue of Ferdinand’s death, a further or renegotiated agreement was finalised 
on 19 April. Part of the original agreement with Ferdinand seems to have been a financial contribution 
towards the hiring of the Swiss, which Charles was reportedly prepared to meet; LPIIi, 1427-1428 
(Sp.ii, 244; 24 January 1516), 1458 (29 January 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 1538 (14 February 
1516), 1574 (21 February 1516), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 1597 (27 February 
1516), 1645 (9 March 1516), 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1665 (13 March 
1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1666 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1668 (14 
March 1516 Poynings and Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 1679 (17 March 1516 Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 1689 (20 March 1516, John Pecche to Wolsey, Calais), 1697 (23 March 1516, Spinelly to 
[Wolsey], Brussels), 1706 (25 March 1516, Poynings and Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 1711 (27 March 
1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1712 (27 March 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Mechelin), 1755 (10 
April 1516, Poynings and Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 1764 (14 April 151
[Henry], Brussels), 1766 (14 April 1516
(18 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1784 (19 April 1516), 1818 (23 April 1516); R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.179-180 (Ven.ii, 688 ; LPIIi, 1558; 18 February 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 189-192 (Ven.ii, 698; LPIIi, 1646; 10 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London); Sp.ii, 245 (calendared February 1516). At the same time, Charles received overtures from 
Francis and this was deemed ominous in England, not least because Charles’ principal advisors were 
generally viewed as pro-French. The French king also threatened his neighbour implicitly through the 
duke of Guelders, the perennial thorn in the side of Burgundy, and the apparent movement of German 
mercenaries towards the region He also leaned on Charles through his claim to the latter’s kingdom of 
Naples and by supporting a rival claimant to the realm of Navarre. For French peace overtures towards 
Charles, see LPIIi, 1447 (28 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 1479 (4 
February 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey). For the 
threat of Guelders, see ibid., 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1516 (calendared 
10 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry), 1541 (14 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1599 
(calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1600 (27 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, 
Brussels), 1666 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1678 (17 March 1516, Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Brussels), 1706 (25 March 1516, Poynings and Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 1727 (2 April 
1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1743 (7 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1755 (10 April 
1516, Poynings and Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 1764 (14 April 1516, Poynings and Tunstal to 
[Henry], Brussels), 1765 (14 April 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1782 (18 April 1516, Spinelly 
to Henry, Brussels), 1822 (24 April 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels); Sp.ii, 246 (8 March 1516, 
Bishop of Badajoz to Cardinal de Cisneros, Brussels). For Francis’ threat to Naples and Navarre, see 
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issued veiled threats to Francis, probably hoping to affect French operations in Italy. 
Wolsey, on his return to London on 25 September 1515, suggested to Giustinian that 
Henry was so angry with Francis, reportedly concerning the return of the duke of 
Albany to Scotland, that he was prepared to breach the Anglo-French treaty and 
invade France within eight days. The Venetian also reported that many around the 
king were putting pressure on him to do so.133 Nevertheless at this stage, the English 
                                                                                                                                            
ibid., 1516 (calendared 10 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry), 1541 (14 February 1516, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 1610 (1 March 1516, Stile to Henry), 
1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1682 (18 March 1516, Spinelly to Henry, 
Brussels), 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1732 (3 April 1516, Stile to Henry), 1764 
(14 April 1516, Poynings and Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 1765 (14 April 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], 
Brussels), 1824 (24 April 1516, Poynings to [Wolsey], Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 
189-192 (Ven.ii, 698; LPIIi, 1646; 10 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 197-199 
, 7(Ven.ii 00; LPIIi, 1654; 12 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 721 (18, 19 April 
1516, Venetian ambassador in France to Signory, Lyons).  
133 This audience occurred perhaps shortly before the English received news that Marignano was a 
significant defeat; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.131 (Ven.ii, 651; LPIIi, 948; 26 September 1515, 
Badoer and Giustinian to the Signory, London). Concerning English ‘secrecy’ about their true anti-
French intentions, even in his tense audience with the French ambassador on 26 October 1515 when he 
was formally notified of the French victory at Marignano, Henry still presented a veneer of friendship, 
stating that he was glad to hear of this result; LPIIi, 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen 
Louise, London). Similarly, there were various denials (from the king and his ministers) that there was 
any foundation to rumours of English naval preparations, that the recent Anglo-Spanish agreement was 
a threat to France, or that substantial sums were being transferred to Germany to finance anti-French 
resistance in Italy. On 2 January 1516, Wolsey even swore on the dignity of his cardinalate that the 
crown had any intention of attacking France. Underlying these rejections, however, the English crown 
was clearly sabre-rattling; notably, Suffolk did not deny that naval preparations were occurring, rather 
that Henry, who favoured peace, intended them to placate his belligerent subjects. Wolsey offered a 
different reason; that they were to please the queen and Henry’s sister Mary. One suspects that the lack 
of a ‘party line’ was deliberate, intended to sow seeds of doubt in France. If this was intended, it 
worked, as the French ambassador was convinced that, if things had gone awry for Francis in Italy, 
then Henry would have invaded France; ibid., 1113 (6 November 1515, de Bapaume to Queen Louise, 
London); Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, 
i , pp.144-148 (Ven.ii, 665; LPIIi, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 148-
151 (Ven.ii, 667; LPIIi, 1294; 17 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 152-153 (Ven.ii, 
668; LPIIi, 1308; 20 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 153-155 (Ven.ii, 669; LPIIi, 
1336; 24 December 1515, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 155-157 (Ven.ii, 671; LPIIi, 1380; 2 
January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
 Henry also continued to react to French interventions in Scotland (through Albany) by 
implying his intention both to attack and to respond positively to Franco-Scottish peace overtures 
LPIIi, 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg). For the English rhetoric, which 
Giustinian at least took seriously, as well as the peace negotiations, which during April were rumoured 
to involve Francis allowing Henry to control Scotland, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.155-160 
(Ven.ii, 671; LPIIi, 1380; 2 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 160-164 (Ven.ii, 673; 
LPIIi, 1386; 5 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 164-168 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIIi, 1421; 21 
January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 168-171 (Ven.ii, 682; LPIIi, 1495; 6 February 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 176 (Ven.ii, 684; LPIIi, 1505; 8 February 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 184-189 (Ven.ii, 695; LPIIi, 1638; 8 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 197-199 (Ven.ii, 700; LPIIi, 1654; 12 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 202-
205 (Ven.ii, 707; LPIIi, 1722; 1 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 214-217 (Ven.ii, 714; 
LPIIi, 1789; 20 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 218-219 (Ven.ii, 719; LPIIi, 1827; 26 
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crown was careful not to break formally with France. Indeed, the targets of the 
offensive, the French and Venetians, while fully aware of the English contribution, 
were faced with vehement denials from Henry and his advisors.134 While the root of 
                                                                                                                                            
correspondence), 1671 (15 March 1516, Dacre and Magnus to Henry, Morpeth Castle) 1672 
Henry, Lyons), 1710 (27 March 1516), 1720 (1 April 1516, [Dacre] to Albany, Morpeth), 1734 (4 
April 1516, Albany to Henry, Edinburgh), 1757 (11 April 1516, Anthony Ughtred to Wolsey, 
April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIi, 1598 (27 February 1516, Dacre’s 
(calendared 15 March 1516, complaints against the duke of Albany), 1681 (18 March 1516, Francis to 
Berwick), 1759 (12 April 1516, Dacre to Henry, Durham), 1779 (18 April 1516, Albany to Dacre, 
Edinburgh), 1797 (21 April 1516, Dacre to Albany, Whittingham), 1837 (calendared end April 1516, 
509 (9 February 1516, Mountjoy to Henry, 
moves, on 21 January, the same Italian ambassador 
vealed
Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai); Ven.ii, 703 (18 March 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 704 (18 March 
1516, Signory to its ambassador in France), 706 (30 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 
711 (12 April 1516), 713 (8, 9 April 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Lyons), 716 
(16 April 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Lyons).  
Finally, he had to contend with Francis I’s ongoing sabre-rattling, both in Scotland, and 
around England’s continental possessions; LPIIi, 1434 (25 January 1516, Knight and Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Brussels), 1478 (4 February 1516, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels), 1479 (4 February 1516, 
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1498 (7 
February 1516, Richard Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 1
Tournai), 1516 (calendared 10 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry) , 1541 (14 February 1516, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels), 1554, 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1621 (5 March 1516, 
Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai), 1622 (5 March 1516, Mountjoy to Wolsey, Tournai), 1655 (12 March 
1516, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Calais), 1664 (13 March 1516, Richard Whettehyll to Wolsey), 
1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1669 (14 March 1516, de Boissy and de 
Bonnivet to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1678 (17 March 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 1766 (14 April 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1780 (18 April 1516, Jerningham to 
[Wolsey], Tournai), 1835 (30 April 1516, news from France). Concerning French threats to act via 
Scotland; ibid., 1478 (4 February 1516, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels), 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly 
to Wolsey, Brussels), 1498 (7 February 1516, Richard Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 1509 (9 
February 1516, Mountjoy to Henry, Tournai), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 
1837 (calendared end April 1516, Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai). De la Pole was thought to be 
involved in these threats and, consequently, was spied upon by English sources; ibid., 1516 (calendared 
10 February 1516, Spinelly to Henry), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1783 (18 
April 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1822 (24 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). 
134 Giustinian, in particular, reported from his audiences with the likes of Henry, Wolsey, Ruthal and 
Norfolk, on the one hand that they were rhetorically hostile towards France and supportive of Imperial 
and Swiss plans to descend into Italy but, on the other, that they repeatedly denied that England was 
funding either of the anti-French parties. Richard Fox may have let the cat out of the bag by admitting 
the latter to the Venetian around 5 January, but one ought to remember that he had retired from the 
‘inner circle’ by this time and so may not have been fully aware of the ‘party line’. Also, around 7 
February, Ruthal reportedly implied that the orator would soon learn the truth. In terms of the inaction 
of the French and Venetians in the face of English 
re  that his French counterpart in England was scared to challenge Henry or his ministers on their 
denials, in case that this would prompt immediate hostilities against France; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i (1854), pp.160-164 (Ven.ii, 673; LPIIi, 1386; 5 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 164-168 (Ven.ii, 678; LPIIi, 1421; 21 January 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 171-
176 (Ven.ii, 683; LPIIi, 1500; 7 February 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 706 (30 
March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 722 (29 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 724 (29 April 1516, Signory to the Venetian ambassador in France). In a bid to circumvent 
any French suspicions of English actions, Pace was at one point instructed to proclaim that he was not 
commissioned by the king, rather he was working as Wolsey’s representative; LPIIi, 1469 (calendared 
end January 1516, instructions [of Pace] to -). Realistically speaking, however, there was no way the 
transfer of large sums of money could be kept secret, given the necessary involvement of third parties. 
William Knight and Thomas Spinelly separately revealed to Wolsey their hearing such rumours 
circulating the Low Countries during early January 1516, the former apparently not having had prior 
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the English response, the Pace embassy, faced teething problems in its mission, it 
ultimately succeeded, recruiting the emperor and a number of the Swiss Cantons 
against France, and facilitating their subsequent descent into Italy during March and 
April 1516 (in spite of the death of Ferdinand of Aragon). Initially, they aimed to 
expel the French from Italy and follow this up with an invasion of France itself.135 
                                                                                                                                            
warning of the king’s intentions to hire the Swiss via Pace; ibid., 1384 (5 January 1516, Knight to 
Wolsey, Mechelin), 1394 (9 January 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For the belief in France and 
Venice that such rumours were true, see for example, Ven.ii, 674 (14 January 1516, Signory to 
Giustinian), 692 (5 March 1516), 696 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France), 697 (8 
March 1516, Signory to its ambassador at the Curia), 702 (17 March 1516), 703 (18 March 1516, 
Signory to Giustinian), 716 (16 April 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Lyons), 723 
(29 Apr
inelly to 
il 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 724 (29 April 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France); 
LPIIi, 1669 (14 March 1516, de Boissy and de Bonnivet to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons). 
From these, one can subsequently detect an element of sarcasm in Francis I’s 20 April notification to 
his representative in England of his troops’ recent forcing of the Swiss back across the Alps, when he 
speculates that Henry VIII ‘will rejoice at his success’ when shown the letter; ibid., 1793 (20 April 
1516, Francis to his ambassadors in England, Colombier). 
135 Pace was confident by the end of January that he could engage the services of at least some of the 
Swiss for the expedition. Similarly, a commitment seems to have been gained from the emperor by 4 
February, as a result of which, Pace speculated, ‘the Swyce…[fly] to him like bees’. The English 
diplomats involved in the negotiations, and their Imperial counterparts (and others), were increasingly 
confident of the expedition’s success during February and, indeed, recruitment was underway by the 
middle of the month among the Swiss. The contingent (accompanied by Pace) entered Italy in early 
March, followed separately by Maximilian; LPIIi, 1377 (1 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey), 
1385 (5 January 1516, - to [Wolsey], Constance), 1392 (8 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 
1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]), 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to 
[Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1413 (18 
January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1415 (18 January 1516, de Castello to 
[Wolsey], Florence), 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich), 1447 (28 January 
1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], 
Constance), 1470 (1 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 1479 (4 February 1516, Sp
[Wolsey], Brussels), 1480 (4 February 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 1489 (5 February 1516, Pace to 
Wolsey, Constance), 1520 (11 February 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Henry, Zurich), 1521 (calendared 
11 February 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to [Henry]), 1522 (11 February 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to 
Wolsey, [Zurich]), 1542 (14 February 1516, [Maximilian] to [Pace], ‘Ex Potnoy’), 1559 (18 February 
1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Wolsey, ‘Ex Valle Montis’), 1560 (19 February 1516, Cardinal Schiner to 
[Wolsey], ‘Sandecz’), 1564 (20 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Coir’), 1565 (20 February 1516, Pace 
to Wolsey, ‘ex civitate Curicensi’), 1566 (20 February 1516, Pace to Burbank, ‘Coire’), 1567 
(calendared 20 February 1516, [Pace] to [Burbank]), 1576 (22 February 1516, Sampson to [Wolsey], 
Tournai), 1592 (26 February 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Village of Crawn in Malsherhaate’), 
1593 (26 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Founce’), 1594 (calendared 26 February 1516, [Wolsey] to 
[Pace], ‘Founce’), 1599 (calendared February 1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1603 (29 February 1516, 
Maximilian to Wolsey, ‘In oppido nostro Marran’), 1609 (calendared end February 1516, [Pace] to 
[Henry]), 1613 (2 March 1516, Cardinal Schiner to [Wolsey], Trent), 1614 (calendared 2 March 1516, 
Maximilian to Henry), 1618 (4 March 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Trent), 1633 (7 March 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to [Henry]), 1634 (7 March 1516, [Pace to Wolsey], ‘Ex Tridenti’), 1644 (9 March 1516, 
Robert Wingfield to [Henry]); LPIIii, 149 – addendum 1929 (calendared before 4 March 1516); J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.60; J. Wegg, Richard Pace: a Tudor Diplomatist (1932), pp.74-88. For 
English fears after the death of Ferdinand, that the campaign might be abandoned, see LPIIi, 1541 (14 
February 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1559 (18 February 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Wolsey, 
‘Ex Valle Montis’), 1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey). 1594 (calendared 26 February 1516, 
[Wolsey] to [Pace], ‘Founce’), 1618 (4 March 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Trent), 1735 (4 April 1516, 
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While the expedition made initial progress, its failure was instigated on 26 March, 
when Maximilian, suddenly withdrew from the gates of Milan, abandoning the Swiss 
and effectively ending the enterprise.136  
 
 Concerning the papacy specifically, the fall-out of the Marignano disaster 
forced England to address two contradictory policies emanating from the pope. While 
on the one hand Leo was forced to seek terms with Francis I, on the other he privately 
tried to allay English fears about these and pledged his continued support for the anti-
French agenda, including Henry VIII’s planned aggressive response. The real 
question was, however, which of these did the English believe to be Leo X’s true 
intention? With regard to the negotiations that were taking place with France in the 
immediate aftermath, the pope made various efforts to suggest to the English crown 
that this was not his real policy. It may well have been for this purpose that he may 
have written to de Giglis on 1 October, declaring his intention to negotiate and to 
claim that this would not be to England’s prejudice.137 Nevertheless, such fears would 
                                                                                                                                            
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.177-178 (Ven.ii, 687; LPIIi, 1534; 
12 February 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 184-189 (Ven.ii, 695; LPIIi, 1638; 8 March 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 192-197 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIIi, 1653; 11 March 1516, Badoer 
and Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
136 The Swiss continued the offensive, but monetary issues and the threat of facing the enemy alone 
combined to cause their return across the Alps in late April. For intelligence received in England as the 
march progressed (including reports of a lack of opposition and misinformed reports about the fall of 
Milan, prior to its actual conquest, see LPIIi, 1678 (17 March 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 
1684 (18 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1696 (23 March 1516, Maximilian to Henry, 
Carravagio), 1697 (23 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1698 (23 March 1516, Francis de 
Taxis to Brian Tuke, Brussels), 1711 (27 March 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1718 (31 March 
1516, Pace to [Robert Wingfield]), 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1728 (2 April 
1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1735 (4 April 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1773 (16 April 
1516, Spinelly to [Henry]), 1837 (calendared end April 1516, Mountjoy to [Henry], Tournai); Ven.ii, 
703 (18 March 1516, Signory to Giustinian), 706 (30 March 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); 
R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.192-197 (Ven.ii, 699; LPIIi, 1653; 11 March 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London), 205-210 (Ven.ii, 708; LPIIi, 1730; 2 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 210-214 (Ven.ii, 712; LPIIi, 1763; 14 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For 
French sources that may have been intercepted and (copies) referred to England, see LPIIi, 1699 (23 
March 1516, Francis de Taxis to Brian Tuke, Milan), 1701-1702. 
137 Given pope wrote in this vein to the Spanish ambassador in Rome on this date, it would be feasible 
that he did the same with the English orator; Sp.ii, 226 (1 October 1515, Leo to the Spanish ambassador 
in Rome). 
 499
probably have been perpetuated, when the English orator sent the ‘heads’ (headings) 
of the accord (yet to be concluded) on 7 October 1515; their arrival in England, 
perhaps around the end of the month, would have caused some consternation given 
at this agreement, if confirmed, would recognise Francis as the principal protector 
misinformation by Francis about a (false) domestic threat to Henry had reached the 
th
of the Church (and of the Medici) and, if a clause from Francis was to be accepted, it 
would bind the papacy to defend Francis’ claim to and possession of Milan. 
Ominously, it also committed both parties to pursue universal peace and crusade, 
which would inevitably seek to undermine the anti-French cause in the first instance. 
If any solace could be found in the terms forwarded to England, it would have focused 
upon the pope’s insistence upon the territorial integrity of the Papal States and that the 
treaty not be prejudicial to his allies (as the pope reiterated verbally to de Giglis). The 
king and his advisors may also have been pleased that, by virtue of his access to these 
‘heads’, de Giglis was being kept well-informed by the papacy, thus suggesting that 
future English support against France was still envisaged by Leo.138 In spite of these 
‘positives’, it would probably have angered the king and his cardinal that 
pontiff, presumably in a bid to raise doubt with Leo about the English crown’s ability 
to support him.139 
 The pope’s confirmation that he had entered negotiations with Francis (and, 
implicitly, that these were near conclusion) was relayed to England towards the 
                                                 
138 LPIIi, 994 (7 October 1515, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Viterbo), 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to 
Wolsey]). For a copy of Louis XII’s initial proposal to Leo and also of the latter’s response (with 
amendments) of 30 September, both of which seem to have been relayed to Spain, see Sp.ii, 219 (20 
September 1515), 223 (39 September 1515, Leo to Francis). Leo did not agree to the treaty until 13 
October and so, it is indicative of the papal desire to reassure England that de Giglis had such in-depth 
advanced warning; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.245; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
pp.126-127. That this treaty was enacted was suggested by Venetian intelligence forwarded to England 
(on 26 October), suggesting that Parma and Piacenza had been ceded by the pope to Francis; Ven.ii, 
657 (20 October 1515, Signory to Badoer and Giustinian). 
139 According to de Giglis, on 17 October, Francis had notified a papal nuncio who, in turn, informed 
the pope that Henry faced a rebellion by his nobles against some fiscal levies. De Giglis rejected this 
allegation in an attempt to reassure the pontiff; LPIIi, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
 500
beginning of November, with his apologies for the rapidity of this action and his 
justification that France and its allies were now dominant in Italy and the Papal States 
were directly threatened. Nevertheless, Leo reportedly claimed, the Church would 
turn against France once again when the opportunity arose.140 Confusingly, however, 
by 6 November, de Giglis speculated that the treaty might come to nothing if Francis 
did not consent to all of the many changes insisted upon by the pope.141 Initial reports 
of the peace reached England by the end of October. In a letter of the 26th, Wolsey 
rapidly conveyed to the pope his (and Henry’s) displeasure with the hasty peace with 
France and stressed how much the pope owed him, presumably in terms of English 
actions against France.142 Interestingly, Henry VIII maintained a public disbelief of 
such intelligence up to 4 November at least.143 Also, there is nothing to suggest that it 
affected the Pace mission.144 Leo replied directly to Wolsey on 20 November, 
acknowledging the cardinal’s ‘increasing devotion’ to papal service and, albeit in an 
indirect communication, he justified his failure to consult with Henry in advance of 
the peace. As far as he was concerned, his amity with Francis would only affect the 
duke of Milan, albeit Sforza had already surrendered. De Giglis confirmed that the 
                                                 
odena and Reggio were threatened by the duke of Ferrara, Bologna by the 
at the duke of Urbino was seeking independence from Church control. In addition, 
eak wi
this missive of the Viceroy of Naples (the Spanish commander in Italy) being berated by Leo X, 
Giglis to Ammonius]). 
141 He also mentioned the pope making a significant financial contribution to the emperor, presumably 
ted Henry VIII to have disbelieved a letter 
140 Leo claimed that M
Bentivoglio and th
he asserted that Medicean control of Florence was at risk. As far as the pope’s continued intention to 
br th France, if the chance arose, the English crown would have been encouraged by a report in 
presumably for his failure in the recent campaign; ibid., 1105 (calendared 1-4 November 1515, [de 
to support his continued resistance of France; ibid., 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
On 26 October, Wingfield confirmed from Germany that Leo X had objected to some of the articles 
insisted upon by Francis; ibid., 1070 (26 October 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Innsbruck). 
142 The contents of this letter are implied later. It seems to have arrived in Rome in 11 days, although de 
Giglis was unable to present it to the pope until around 9 November; ibid., 1111 (6 November 1515, 
[de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1126 (9 November 1515, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 1201 (27 November 
1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
143 Despite apparently accepting that the Franco-papal peace was a done deal, the Spanish ambassador 
in England, who had had audience on 4 November, repor
from Francis (dated 17 October) notifying him of its conclusion; Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa 
to Ferdinand, London). 
144 See below pp.516-518. 
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treaty contained nothing prejudicial to the current peace between England and 
France.145 Nevertheless, the political implications were clear; publicly at least, Leo 
was compelled to observe his new amity with France, while Francis I remained 
dominant in northern Italy, and this would preclude participation in any planned 
expedition or league, at the very least. 
 If the Franco-papal peace alone was not ominous enough for the English 
crown, Leo X’s commitment to meet Francis at Bologna in December would surely 
have raised further anxiety; theoretically, it would be feared that the French king 
could force the pontiff to agree to almost anything. It would have been expected, 
therefore, that Leo X would be forced into various concessions or commitments. Pace, 
citing Cardinal Schiner, voiced such a fear on 8 December; that the papacy had never 
been less able to expel the French from Italy than at that point, without the help of 
England.146 Similarly on the 10th, Sir Robert Wingfield conveyed the emperor’s 
alleged loss of hope that they could act with papal support, now that Leo appeared to 
favour the French.147 Henry and Wolsey may have received initial intelligence that 
such a meeting may take place from around 18 November.148 Confirmation from de 
Giglis possibly arrived, in a letter dated the 6th of the same month, whereby he 
envisaged that Francis intended to gain leverage over the pope concerning the treaty 
                                                 
145 Leo argued that his allies could not be relied upon and the French were fermenting rebellion among 
‘vermin’ within Florence and the Papal States (notably the dukes of Ferrara and Urbino, as well as the 
Bentivoglio of Bologna). Concerning his allies, Leo understood that the Swiss had been bought by the 
y fear, 
and to his ambassador in Germany). 
umour; ibid., 1164 (16 November 1515, Margaret of Savoy to the Spanish 
French (and were now committed to the French cause), that Ferdinand had not acted (and his Viceroy 
was a coward), and that he could not rely upon Maximilian (who had, in any case, urged him to seek 
peace); LPIIi, 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Perhaps around the same time, Leo 
informed Ferdinand that, while he regretted his amity with Francis I, his actions were caused ‘b
and not by friendship’; Sp.ii, 245 (calendared February 1516). 
146 LPIIi, 1258 (8 December 1515, [Pace to Wolsey], Zurich). Ferdinand of Aragon also quickly voiced 
his opposition to this prospect in October 1515 and sought to prevent it from occurring; Sp.ii, 224 
(calendared October 1515, Ferdin
147 Wingfield cited the Imperial chancellor, Matthew Lang, as voicing Maximilian’s opinion; LPIIi, 
1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’). 
148 Spinelly forwarded copied correspondence he had been given by Margaret of Savoy, dated the 16th, 
which mentioned this r
ambassador). 
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between them. In spite of the pontiff being receptive to these overtures, de Giglis 
reassured his English employers that Leo would never become ‘French’.149 The 
prospect of the summit would have become more menacing to the English crown on 6 
December, when Francis I’s correspondence informing Henry of the summit was 
delivered. This declared that universal peace and crusade were to be discussed, before 
of the Pace mission, Wolsey further added that Henry would not oppose any 
the Frenchman returned home to prepare for the latter. To these ends, Francis urged 
Henry’s adhesion.150 While the inclusion of these topics was not revolutionary, Henry 
and his advisors would have been unhappy about them; it suggested that the 
mechanism of universal peace might be refocused against English interests and would 
serve to discourage them from acting against France, certainly in defence of Rome. Of 
further concern would have been Sir Robert Wingfield’s claim of 5 December that 
Francis had requested the pope to arrange lodgings at Bologna for 12,000 horse, a 
considerable force for a meeting between two heads of state officially at peace.151 
 The English response was tempered albeit revealing. On 13 December, 
Wolsey told de Giglis that the king, while satisfied with Leo’s intentions for the 
conference, hoped that the papacy would ‘retain its dignity’. He did, however, fear 
that Francis I would feel encouraged by Marignano to further destabilise 
Christendom. Furthermore, at the same time as notifying the pontiff of the intentions 
                                                 
149 This was probably de Giglis’ first notification of the meeting. Later, on 13 December, he suggested 
that he had told Ammonius of the meeting for the first time (at Bologna) on the 4th; ibid., 1111 (6 
November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, 
Bologna). Only after this date did the meeting become a topic for diplomatic correspondence sent to 
England; ibid., 1162 (16 November 1515, Pace to Wolsey, Innsbruck). Also, see subsequent 
correspondence indicated that the Curia was moving towards Bologna; ibid., 1177 (20 November 1515, 
Leo to Wolsey, Arezzo), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 1216 (29 November 
e crusade was to be discussed in 
at the inhabitants of the 
esyn in Swave’). 
1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Florence). 
150 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, p.146 (Ven.ii, 665; LPIIi, 1250; 6 December 1515, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London). Knight, based in Brussels, also confirmed that th
a letter of 3 December; LPIIi, 1238 (3 December 1515, [Knight] to Wolsey, Brussels). 
151 This was allegedly refused by Leo X, Francis allegedly then demanding th
city be disarmed or that the summit be moved to Modena. Overall, Wingfield hoped that ‘this loving 
and bidding betwtixt them shall breed to a jeffayle’; LPIIi, 1249 (5 December 1515, Robert Wingfield 
to [Henry], ‘Fi
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arrangement made between France and the papacy, on condition that it was 
‘satisfactory’ (whatever that meant).152 The English crown, therefore, recognised that 
Leo X had little room for manoeuvre, although it may have been quietly confident in 
its own plans to resist the French in Italy and that these would gain papal support.153 
On the other hand, there was clear concern implied by Wolsey that Leo would 
henceforth be ‘French’. To ensure that the orator could maintain himself sufficiently 
at the summit and afford couriers, 200l. was remitted to de Giglis during 
December.154 It was envisaged, therefore, that he be present and supply more 
intelligence than usual and, from this, it can be speculated that news of the meeting 
was eagerly awaited in England, not least to give an indication of the degree of French 
power now prevailing over the papacy. Reports of the summit soon arrived from the 
pope himself, in addition to those from the two English curial representatives, 
alluding to the nature of the discussions, although it seems that, generally speaking, 
both parties involved kept most of this a secret.155 The papal notifications were issued 
as soon as negotiations effectively ended, on 14 December, and had presumably 
reached England by the end of the month.156 Initially, Leo sought to reassure Henry 
that Francis had been suitably devout and responsive to papal suggestions that action 
to confront the Turkish threat was needed, provided that other princes rose above their 
differences and combined to this end; in other words, he agreed to a general peace and 
                                                 
152 Ibid., 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’). 
153 Sir Robert Wingfield, seems to have anticipated this attitude when he asserted on 18 October that, 
while ‘the Pope through fear has declined a little from the right way’, he would surely not abandon his 
powerful allies (Maximilian, Ferdinand and the Swiss); ibid., 1043 (18 October 1515, Robert Wingfield 
to Henry, Innsbruck). 
154 LPIIii, p.1469 (December 1515). 
155 The summit took place between 11-15 December and saw a number of quite lengthy interviews 
between pope and king. Concerning the subjects raised, it seems that Leo kept most a secret from even 
99. 
his closest advisors, not even having had the talks or any agreements arising therefrom committed to 
writing; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.49-50; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.134-142. 
156 This takes Parks’ quickest average journey time as a guide (albeit he calculates to/from Rome, 
rather than Bologna); see p.37 n.
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crusade. In pursuit of this, the pope urged Henry to back this plan.157 De Giglis wrote 
his own detailed report on the same date. He reported a conversation the previous 
evening with the pope who disclosed the subjects covered in his meeting with Francis. 
Firstly, Leo conceded a red hat to a French candidate, although he claimed to have 
resisted pressure to award three others. Secondly, they agreed to launch a crusade, in 
relation to which Francis agreed to an 18 month truce and to contribute money. 
Thirdly, Francis complained of the Pace mission (and English behaviour generally), to 
which Leo pledged to act as guarantor. Fourthly, Francis raised Scotland as a reason 
for Henry VIII’s dissatisfaction with him. In response to all of this, Leo promised to 
broker a peace. In response to the latter, de Giglis vigorously questioned French 
intentions, asserting that Francis pursued this course only in order to attack England at 
a more opportune moment. The pope asserted that he would not permit this and that, 
if Francis did attack, he would respond against France with ‘both swords’.158 In spite 
of the negative signals, the pope’s prompt disclosure to de Giglis and his own writing 
to Henry and Wolsey betrays a concern to keep England on-side and to retain the 
crown’s confidence that the papacy was not ‘French’ as a result of the meeting. It is 
probable that this implication was detected in England, although whether it was 
believed is another matter. Hadrian de Castello sent his own despatch to England on 
the same date, with a similar assessment of the subjects raised, the universal 
peace/crusade initiative and the creation of a French cardinal, although he also alluded 
                                                 
157 While Leo claimed to have written more fully to Campeggio, who he then believed to be in 
England, there is no suggestion that he visited the kingdom as early as 1515; another nuncio was surely 
meant; LPIIi, 1282 (14 December 1515, Leo to Henry, Bologna); T. F. Mayer, ‘Campeggi , Lorenzo’, 
 Wolsey, who was also urged by the pope, in a missive 
the Spanish 
ussed; Sp.ii, 245 (calendared February 1516). 
DNB. A copy of the letter to Henry was sent to
of his own, to persuade the king to adopt this policy; LPIIi, 1283 (14 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, 
Bologna).  
158 LPIIi, 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1297 (17 December 1515, [de 
Giglis] to Wolsey, Bologna). De Giglis seems to have been better informed than 
ambassador in Rome, who reportedly asserted (on 19 December) that only ‘general matters’, such as a 
general peace and crusade, were disc
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to an agreement concerning the Pragmatic Sanction.159 Far more negative intelligence 
was received from Cardinal Schiner in Switzerland. Among concessions that he 
alleged were made, the pro-French Cardinal Sanseverino had been restored to 
dignities of which he had been deprived due to his association with the Council of 
Pisa-Milan, an attempt had been made to deprive Schiner himself of his cardinalate, 
and a military leader at the Venetian siege of Brescia (Peter of Navarre) had been 
absolved from an oath not to fight any Christian princes.160 While other matters were 
raised at the conference, there is no evidence to suggest that news of these reached 
England at this time.161 
 Overall, it is difficult to envisage the English being able to interpret news of 
the summit as positive. In particular, the proposed crusade and 18 month truce had the 
potential to scupper English attempts to rally the league against France into action. 
From an English point of view, the papacy could be viewed, to all intents and 
purposes, as ‘French’. It is perhaps indicative of the opinion of all anti-French powers 
at this point that England’s ally, Maximilian, as reported by Spinelly (then in 
Mechelin) on 6 January, ‘hath sharply written’ to the pope about the meeting, 
reminding him of the service he (and the Church) had received from the Empire and 
                                                 
159 LPIIi, 1284 (14 December 1515, de Castello to Wolsey, Bologna). For other intelligence received in 
England, see ibid., 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna), 1342 (26 December 
1515, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘[Ravesbourge] in Swave’), 1346 (27 December 1515, Cardinal 
Wingfield], ‘Ravespurgh’), 1348 (calendared 27 December 1515, - to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 670 (28 
Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravenspurgh’), 1347 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert 
December 1515, Signory to Giustinian). 
160 LPIIi, 1347 (27 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravespurgh’). 
Subsequently, Schiner seems to have believed that the pope was on the French side; ibid., 1352 (28 
December 1515, [Cardinal Schiner] to -, ‘Ravenspurch’). 
Florence, as well as permission to levy a ‘crusading’ tax from the French clergy (which was 
161 On the positive side, as far as England was concerned, Pastor argues that Francis went to Bologna 
intending to gain the pope as an ally against Spain, although Leo insisted on more time to consider this. 
He also reports a number of other concessions probably forced on the pontiff at the summit, including 
the release of an enemy of Cardinal Schiner from Castel S. Angelo, an offer to invest Francis with 
Naples when Ferdinand died on condition that the Frenchman promised to protect the Medici and not 
interfere in 
to net him 400,000 livres from two levies, in 1516 and 1517). Cardinal de’ Medici further revealed to 
the English in later 1516 that Francis had lobbied Leo at Bologna to support his planned conquest of 
Naples; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.49-50; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.142-145; LPIIi, 2393 
(Spinelly to Wolsey, 27 September 1516, Brussels). 
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other allies. Henry and Wolsey would not have been particularly pleased to discover 
that, in reply, the pope claimed that his only intention was universal peace and that 
Maximilian ought to conclude with Francis to this end. Spinelly conveyed further 
pessimistic opinions from the emperor’s secretary Bannisius in the same piece: ‘the 
Pope’s words can be no better than they be’, implying the political context in which 
the decision to crusade was made. The Imperial official also added that ‘his [Leo’s] 
goodwill is altered by the subornations of his brother and nephew, and other being 
about his holiness, and totally inclined to France. In confirmation whereof, I have of 
late heard spoken of a merchant of Florence coming from Lyons, that the Frenchmen 
’. On the other hand, Spinelly, did not advocate that Henry give in, suggesting 
have used such divers means with the said Pope’s brother and nephew that they think 
all their prosperity and sure succession to consist only in the French King. Wherefore 
they study diligently for the advancement of his business, inducing the [Pope unto 
semb]lable opinion’. Spinelly appears to have agreed with this assessment, 
particularly given Giuliano de’ Medici’s earlier French marriage, Giulio’s benefices 
in France and so on, from which ‘it is not m[arvel] though the French King hath 
friends about his holiness’. As a result of this, the English representative advised that 
Henry (as well as Maximilian and Ferdinand) ought not to put his ‘trust in the Pope’s 
saying
that the strength of an Anglo-Imperial-Spanish axis (along with the amity of the 
‘crusading’ powers, such as Hungary, Poland and Portugal to Maximilian and 
Ferdinand), would cause the pope to look towards their perception of universal peace 
over that of the pro-French party around Leo. 162 On the 9th, Spinelly reiterated how 
entwined with France Leo X now was, Florence being owed 150,000 gold crowns by 
Francis, and ‘that great intelligence hath been always between his holiness [through 
                                                 
162 LPIIi, 1388 (6 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin). 
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the pontiff’s brother-in-law, who had a house in Lyons] and the French King, and now 
greater than ever it was, by reason of the meeting’.163 
 A slightly more positive despatch was sent to Wolsey on 7 January by another 
Imperial secretary, Louis Maroton. While Maroton opined that he did not believe that 
much had come of the conference, he believed Francis to have proposed a truce (for 
18 months), so that he could establish himself in Milan and raise money, and to have 
requested the pope to help him engage the services of the Swiss. On the other hand, 
the pope, Maroton believed, was desirous of universal peace ‘that he may govern the 
Church without botheration, and enrich his friends. He is neither good nor bad, and, if 
there were an army in Italy, would turn out the French’. Maroton allocated blame for 
the pope’s relinquishing possession of Parma and Piacenza to Leo’s favourite(s). 
Finally, the Imperial secretary asserted that the pope was not obliged to assist France 
militarily against the latter’s enemies. If anything, Leo would continue to aid the 
resistance to French power, as he now did with the Empire against Venice, in his 
maintenance of 120 lanzknechts at Verona, under the command of Marcantonio 
Colonna.164 Perhaps the next notification of the conference came via Sir Robert 
Wingfield, who forwarded an account by the Imperial ambassador at the Curia, da 
Carpi, on 8 January, although the contents are unclear.165 On the 10th, however, the 
same English ambassador was being positive; ‘though there seemeth to be a great 
conjunction of amity betwixt the Pope and the French King’, Leo still retained his 
nuncio, Filonardi, with the Swiss, attempting to persuade the latter to reject French 
proposals.166 Letters from Francis (and his influential mother) reportedly reached the 
                                                 
163 Ibid., 1393 (9 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). 
164 Ibid., 1389 (7 January 1516, Lewis Maroton to Wolsey, Augsburg). 
165 The correspondence apparently spoke of Francis’ entry into the city and what he subsequently did 
there; ibid., 1392 (8 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
166 Ibid., 1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]). For Filonardi’s relationship with 
Pace, see pp.520-522. 
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French ambassador in England on 21 January, notifying Henry of what occurred at 
Bologna and requesting that he raise a crusading army.167 In reaction to papal 
notification and, perhaps some of the wider news and opinions received, Henry VIII 
seems to have protested to the pope about outcomes of the meeting, including Francis’ 
intention to hire the Swiss (on account of his own desire to employ them), possibly 
towards the beginning of January, to which Leo replied on the 28th (from Florence) 
that he had acted in the best intentions for Christendom.168 He may also have 
conveyed the same sentiment to the pope’s closest advisor, Giulio de’ Medici, who 
reiterated on the same date that Leo wanted to facilitate universal peace.169  
 
 Broadly speaking, Henry VIII’s greatest fear arising from the Bologna 
meeting was that the papacy was now ‘French’. Indeed, such assessments continued 
to reach England in subsequent months from its various diplomatic sources.170 For 
instance, Spinelly reported an Imperial view on 7 February that this had caused Leo to 
lobby the Swiss Confederacy over to France’s side.171 During the same month, 
Spinelly reiterated his belief that the pope was ‘entirely French’, considering that 
Naples would be vulnerable if Verona and Brescia were not in Imperial hands and 
relaying that Francis had contributed troops to the recently begun papal offensive 
against the duke of Urbino.172 Later, on 2 April, Spinelly notified his king of potential 
                                                 
167 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.164-168 (Ven.ii, 678; LPIIi, 1421; 21 January 1516, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
 LPIIi, 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, Florence). Henry’s objection to Francis’ engaging the 
services of the Cantons (because of his own hope to hire them) is revealed by the Venetian ambassador 
168
with the pope, citing a conversation with Cardinal Bibbiena; Ven.ii, 681 (7-26 January 1516, Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Florence). 
169 LPIIi, 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
 that the pope was wholly opposed to 
 the Popes, vii, p.153. 
, he again suggested that the papal enterprise against Francesco Maria della 
170 Pastor implies that this was indeed the case, suggesting
Maximilian’s planned descent into Italy in response; L. Pastor, History of
171 LPIIi, 1496 (7 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For similar reports from Spinelly 
already cited, see above pp.507-508. 
172 Spinelly further mentioned Maximilian’s request that the pope desist this assault on one of his 
‘subjects’. On 13 March
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papal involvement in an imminent French naval attempt on Naples.173 Wolsey was 
also warned by Pace of French pressure on Leo to act more directly against England; 
on 1 February, he wrote that Francis lobbied the pope to encourage Scottish 
aggression.174 
 Such reports would have heightened English concerns, particularly given that 
Leo X had begun to voice a pro-French policy, as he was obliged to do by virtue of 
the Marignano defeat. Calls for an 18 month truce with a view to universal peace and 
crusade arose from the Bologna summit, which could only be interpreted as an 
attempt to forestall a renewed anti-French offensive in Italy. Leo forewarned England 
f this prospect on 27 November, claiming that his underlying motivation for 
rangi
o
ar ng the peace with France was to facilitate the crusade so close to his heart, to 
which he believed Francis would be receptive given that his kingdom was war weary. 
The pope, allegedly enthused by requests for aid from Hungary, planned to lead the 
expedition himself.175 The immediate implication of a papal call to arms against the 
Ottomans would be to withdraw any potential justification for war against France and 
to colour the anti-Gallic powers, including England, as opponents to this ‘holy’ aim if 
they did not desist. Furthermore, it was almost inevitable that the English political 
perception of such a call would be that a vulnerable papacy was being forced to aid its 
new ‘ally’ by attempting to channel military aggression away from Francis I and even 
                                                                                                                                            
Rovere confirmed that Leo X was ‘in the French interest’; LPIIi, 1599 (calendared February 1516, 
cit in preparations for this at 
 1516, 
e Giglis to [Ammonius]); also see p.187. Ferdinand certainly 
Spinelly to [Henry]), 1665 (13 March 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). Henry and Wolsey are 
likely to have received confirmation that Francis contributed troops to the Urbino campaign from 
Venetian correspondence, perhaps by the end of April 1516; Ven.ii, 710 (9 April 1516, Signory to 
Giustinian). 
173 Spinelly claimed that a relative of Leo, ‘John Jordan Ursin’ was compli
Genoa; LPIIi, 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). 
174 Francis had allegedly promised ‘recompense’ for Leo’s doing this; ibid., 1470 (1 February
Pace to Wolsey, Constance). 
175 Ibid., 1201 (27 November 1515, d
recognised the pope’s ‘double game’ during November 1515; Sp.ii, 240 (calendared November 1515, 
Ferdinand to his ambassador in Rome). 
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to turn the crusade against France’s enemies.176 It may well have been in response to 
this that the English crown may have made overtures to Rome towards an anti-French 
general peace, to be enshrined in a coalition, in later December 1515. Although the 
pope rejected this, he did give Henry the impression that he tacitly supported his 
ctions
                                                
a .177 Before this answer would have reached England, however, the threat of the 
pope’s crusading call would also have been made ominous to England by Leo’s 
despatch during December of delegates to the various princes of Christendom to seek 
agreement to the preparatory truce, including the nuncio Francesco Chieregato to 
England.178 Given the papacy’s ‘true’ feelings however, this gesture perhaps lacked 
conviction; if Leo X had really wanted to force Henry’s hand, he could have sent a 
legate (as he did to the Empire). Given the English reluctance to entertain legates a 
latere, Henry would surely have refused him entry, thereby creating a stand-off 
exposing England to potential papal censure.179 Furthermore, Chieregato took four 
months to reach England, at a time when the pontiff was aware that Pace was 
formenting war among the Swiss.180 In response to hearing that the legate Cardinal 
Canisius had spoken to the emperor on this subject, Henry VIII addressed Maximilian 
on 28 January 1516; he advised the emperor to reject Leo’s ‘incantations’, as the 
pope, he argued, ‘is easily misled to believe what he most desires’, but will be 
deceived by Francis and will instead join their own (anti-Gallic) league.181 In terms of 
 
176 This opinion would have been heightened by contemporary indications that Leo remained privately 
de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
 1516 and, even then, seemingly with an alternative agenda; p.515. 
 to the legate’s mission, albeit he wanted to consult with his 
anti-French; see above pp.504, 508. 
177 See below pp.518-520. Reflecting the pope’s vague, non-committal to England, Giulio de’ Medici 
answered the same overture by asserting Leo’s aim for universal peace, although he failed to specify 
which version; LPIIi, 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Florence), 1452 (28 January 
1516, Giulio 
178 LPIIi, 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 1446 (28 January 1516, 
Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich).  
179 By way of comparison, see Campeggio’s experience in 1518; pp.631-634. 
180 Chieregato arrived in April
181 Henry also urged Maximilian to write to Leo, requesting his adhesion to their confederacy; LPIIi, 
1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich). The king was reacting to news that 
Maximilian was apparently sympathetic
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the contradictory papal messages received in England, therefore, Henry was not 
entirely convinced that the pope was on his side, but believed that Leo’s support could 
be induced politically. 
 Further English dismissal of the papal peace strategy probably arose in 
response to Leo’s November notification of this intention, when Wolsey reneged on 
an earlier promise to allow the levying of a crusading tax within the kingdom. Writing 
to the pope on 13 December, Wolsey asked to be excused for his inability to realise 
this pledge. In any case, he argued, his persuading Henry to defend the Church in the 
war currently being organised was worth more than 100 such levies. Wolsey further 
questioned the pope’s desire to crusade in aid of Hungary, given that recent 
correspondence from the Knights of St John failed to mention the frontier state and, in 
any case, he claimed the Turks were more afraid of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt 
and Syria.182 The implication is that, given the current political agreement between 
Rome and France, the English crown would certainly not finance any crusading 
initiative, the need for which, Wolsey now argued, was questionable anyway. The 
pope’s request for a crusading tenth was duly rejected in convocation on 21 December 
1515, which declared that it had already conceded six grants to help ‘defend the 
                                                                                                                                            
allies and also remind the pope of his obligations to the anti-French league. Canisius arrived just a few 
days after another papal embassy, which pledged Leo’s continued support against Franc . That this was e
a deliberate strategy by Leo and that the ‘peace’ mission was intended to represent the public policy of 
Rome is implied by Wingfield in subsequent correspondence when he wrote on the 18th how 
Maximilian was too busy to answer the three papal diplomats and by 28th that their sole mission was to 
roton to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert 
sey] to [de Giglis], ‘My house at London’). For 
ember 1515, Fabrizio del Carretto to Henry, Rhodes), 1320 
ations to the papacy that 
d end 
urge the truce with France; ibid., 1399 (12 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Aws[burgh]’), 
1407 (15 January 1516, Lewis Ma
Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1447 (28 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], Augsburg). 
This papal embassy arrived just a few days after another (consisting of two representantives that 
pledged, as will be seen, to continue its support against France). 
182 Ibid., 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wol
correspondence along these lines from the Grand Master of Rhodes to Henry VIII (albeit dated 21 
December 1515), see ibid., 1319 (21 Dec
(21 December 1515, Fabrizio del Carretto to Henry, Rhodes). For earlier intim
the tax was unlikely, see ibid., 887 (7 September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 966 (calendare
September 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]), 967 (calendared end September 1515, [de Giglis to 
Ammonius]), 968 (calendared end September 1515, Ammonius to Wolsey). Also see W.E. Lunt, 
Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, pp.160-163. 
 512
patrimony of St Peter’ and that Henry’s victories over the French had dissipated any 
threats to the papacy. It also claimed to be fearful of setting a precedent of allowing 
money to be collected for causes that could not be justified.183 While the danger from 
France evidently remained, there was no likelihood that convocation would allow any 
levy once Wolsey rejected Leo X’s application. The pope replied to Wolsey’s 
December missive on 19 January 1516; he reiterated his fiscal request and dismissed 
English arguments that no Turkish threat was perceived from Rhodes by stressing that 
the danger was in fact to Hungary and, in connection with this, had the English orator 
forward letters from Hungary. 184 Doubts about the veracity of this need would have 
again been raised, however, when Wolsey received a letter of 18 January from de 
Castello, who (probably unwittingly) suggested that correspondence received from the 
same Hungarians indicated that the Ottomans sought a three year peace, the decision 
on which had been referred to the pope.185 However, the argument was probably 
academic; the English crown would never hand over money to a ‘French’ papacy, 
                                                 
 LPIIi, 1312 (21 December 1515). Lunt portrays the opposition to this tax as deriving from 
Convocation, in light of the burden from six other clerical tenths granted by the pope for collection by 
183
Henry VIII (two of which were yet to be levied). Equally, however, Lunt links the crown’s initial 
agreement and the bishops’ later refusal with the campaign for Wolsey’s promotion to the Sacred 
College and earlier. Overall, it is probable that ultimate responsibility for denying this fiscal levy from 
oned by May, as it morphed into an 
Rome lay with the crown, who could surely have instructed the episcopate to make an alternative 
decision if it so wished; W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England, ii, pp.160-163. 
184 De Giglis seems to have been convinced by the pope’s argument and recommended that the money 
be sent by the king up front (and for him to recoup it from the next convocations); LPIIi, 1416 (19 
January 1516, de Giglis to Henry, Florence), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey), 1418 (19 
January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius). 
185 Ibid., 1415(18 January 1516, de Castello to [Wolsey], Florence). The situation in Hungary was 
complicated. On the one hand, Leo X wanted a crusade, both to resist the increased Turkish threat and 
to create a platform for his wider crusading project. On the other hand, a papal-inspired expedition, 
approved in later 1513 and preached in April 1514, was aband
uprising within Hungary. The pope, however, focused on the external rather than the domestic threat; 
while he may not have been fully aware of the failure of the crusade, he seems to have pledged more 
money for the defence of the kingdom. It is unclear whether the English crown appreciated these 
developments, although it is worth noting that, at the same time, other contemporary observers were 
sceptical that about the need for crusade in the region; N. Housley, ‘Crusading as Social Revolt: the 
Hungarian Peasant Uprising of 1514’, JEH, 49 (1998), esp. pp.1, 7-8, 22, 25; K.M. Setton, ‘Pope Leo 
X and the Turkish Peril’, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 113, pp.374, 376, 382-
383, 388. 
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potentially for use against English interests, particularly when the Pace expedition 
was believed to be imminent.186  
 
 In spite of of the negative news received from and about Rome post-
Marignano, therefore, the English crown continued to have some cause for optimism 
that the ‘French’ pope still wanted to be defended from Francis I and supported Henry 
VIII’s efforts to react to this. In spite of the drawn-out process whereby Leo X 
submitted to Francis I, the pope also sought to reassure the English that he remained 
committed to the anti-French cause. Even before he received confirmed news of the 
defeat, for instance, the pope moved quickly to confirm his continued adhesion by 
despatching a nuncio to England, Francis of Sassello (around 19-20 September).187 
While the nature of the mission is unclear, its timing suggests that it perhaps involved 
a request of urgent aid from Henry VIII.188 This seems to be supported by a despatch 
                                                 
186 This suspicion had at least some potential grounding. Spinelly had indicated to Wolsey in late 
September rumours that the pope had granted Francis permission to tax the Church in France, on 
account of his lack of funds; LPIIi, 952 (calendared 26-27 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Brussels). Also see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.145. 
he mission comes from Leo X’s recommendation of him, in 
rtedly urging universal peace, although the underlying motive for the latter is unclear 
187 While Leo X did seek terms early on with the French, he was not entirely cowed and still sought to 
cultivate the anti-French powers, who continued to lobby him in Rome. By 7-8 October, the anti-
French elements around the pope were attempting to reassure him that they would act. The Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia reported his Imperial and Spanish counterparts telling Leo that the emperor 
was holding a diet and would come in strength, that the Swiss were acting in the same manner, while 
the king of England would attack France, they having proposed an ‘agreement’ to him, although no 
reply had yet been heard. Ferdinand believed that Francis I could still be forced into seeking terms if 
Henry VIII (as well as the Swiss) invaded France; Ven. ii, 654 (6 and 10 October 1515, Venetian 
ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Viterbo); Sp.ii, 224 (calendared October 1515, Ferdinand to his 
ambassador at the Imperial Court), 225 (calendared October 1515, Ferdinand to his Viceroy of Naples). 
188 The only clue as to the purpose of t
which the pope praises Hadrian de Castello, then involved in a protracted struggle with the crown over 
his position as apostolic collector and in the, perhaps not unrelated, imprisonment of the subcollector, 
Polydore Vergil; LPIIi, 926 (19 September 1515, Leo to Henry, Rome), 928 (20 September 1515, de 
Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); also see above p.34 n.86. While no record has been found of the nuncio’s 
arrival, which one would have expected from around the end of October, this does not mean that he did 
not come to England; if Francis of Sassello’s mission did indeed involve a request for support, then it 
would probably have been sensible for him to remain incognito while Leo himself was also seeking 
terms with Francis I. Furthermore, Francis’ arrival in England may have been deemed unnoteworthy by 
foreign diplomats, given that he had been a suffragan bishop in the diocese of St David’s since 1507 
and apparently held a benefice in the diocese of Bath and Wells prior to this; CPL XIX, 530-534. It is 
also perhaps significant that Maximilian received a papal nuncio in the immediate wake of Marignano, 
albeit repo
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from de Giglis on 17 October, which conveyed the pope’s pledge to continue his 
current alliance with Ferdinand and Maximilian against France, as well as his wish 
at England was closer to Italy, in spite of current Franco-papal peace 
reassurances.192 In spite of continuing news of papal submission to France, therefore, 
th
negotiations.189 The ambassador reiterated continued papal commitment on 6 
November, relaying that Leo had sent 10,000 ducats to the emperor.190 Subsequently, 
after the Bologna summit, the Chieregato mission, originally intended to leave for 
England during December 1515 to promote universal peace, may also have been 
intended to reassure Henry VIII about what was going to happen or what had 
happened at Bologna; this would have been the opportune time to tell the English king 
that, whatever happened at Bologna, Leo would remain both opposed to French 
influence and ambitions in Italy, and supportive of English actions to resist this, even 
if unable to express this publicly.191 Further encouragement that the pope still wanted 
to be ‘protected’ came from Germany where Maximilian received similar diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                            
(whether it was intended to urge the anti-French allies on or to stall their project); LPIIi, 1006 (9 
October 1515, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], [Innsbruck]). 
189 In the same conversation, Leo reportedly mentioned an article that he insisted be inserted into his 
peace with France, which bound it not to be prejudicial against any of his allies, although the pope had 
not yet received a reply from Francis on this; LPIIi, 1042 (17 October 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
Concerning the pope’s pledge to stay true to his current alliance with the Empire and Spain, the 
Spanish orator in England reported that Henry was made aware of this by de Giglis before 4 November 
and that the king believed this over Francis I’s own claims to have arranged a peace with Leo (and the 
Swiss); Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London). 
190 LPIIi, 1111 (6 November 1515, [de Giglis to Wolsey]). 
191 In his original commission, Chieregato’s stated aim was to secure the release of the imprisoned 
deputy collector Polydore Vergil. This would have been a convenient smokescreen for sending a 
nuncio to England, if one was needed. A hidden agenda for his mission may be implied in de Castello’s 
recommendation of Chieregato (on 15 December), suggesting that he was ‘going to England on the 
Pope’s affairs’. If the embassy was intended merely to smooth things over for de Castello and Vergil, 
one may have expected the cardinal to have said so. Chieregato’s mission was apparently delayed, 
given that he did not arrive in England until April 1516; ibid., 1228 (1 December 1515, Leo to Henry, 
Florence), 1229 (SPVI, xix; 1 December 1515, Leo to Wolsey, Florence), 1288 (15 December 1515, de 
Castello to Wolsey, Bologna), 1735 (4 April 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1763 (R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.210-214; Ven.ii, 712; 14 April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
192 Around the same time as Chieregato’s original commission, Leo also sent Egidio Canisio to 
Germany to pledge continued papal allegiance to the anti-French league. The English were 
subsequently informed that, on 7 January, the emperor met secretly with two papal representatives who 
delivered this message, although when pressed, they could not reconcile this with the truce agreed 
between Rome and France. Nevertheless, the English crown was further informed that Leo’s 
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reason for optimism was given to Henry VIII by these signals. Indeed, the king may 
well have perceived that he had some sort of ‘secret understanding’ with Leo X.193 
While one cannot rule out the pope’s motivation here to remain on the winning ‘side’, 
he nonetheless presented himself as a victim of coercion to the anti-French powers.194  
 
 Papal support for England’s anti-French strategy was perhaps strongest in 
relation to Richard Pace’s mission to recruit the Swiss and to maintain or create 
another anti-Gallic coalition. While the Pace mission was seemingly initiated without 
any direct interaction with Rome (and without any clear knowledge of papal 
intentions), papal security appears to have been a fundamental motivation. Wolsey 
notified Leo of the purpose of the embassy in correspondence of 25/26 October, that it 
was ‘for the Pope’s defence’ and may have intended to engage the pontiff’s active 
participation (military or financial), given that de Giglis was sent credentials.195 
Wolsey had also commissioned Pace to encourage the papacy (among other anti-
French powers) to continue in its anti-French endeavours, and even envisaged that 
                                                                                                                                            
commitment remained active, in terms of his retaining troops at Verona and continued financial 
easily be claimed that the pope 
 of or actual) French coercion. Henry and 
ich 
contribution towards German forces; LPIIi, 1388 (6 January 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Mechelin), 1389 
(7 January 1516, Lewis Maroton to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1392 (8 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to 
Henry); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.143. 
193 Sir Robert Wingfield referred to this during his negotiations with Imperial ministers around 10 
December 1515; LPIIi, 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’). 
194 It ought to be noted that a lack of eventual papal support or involvement did not preclude the 
argument that the league was acting to defend of the papacy; it could 
was prevented from voicing its support due to (the threat
Wolsey may well have concurred with Ferdinand’s argument to his ambassador in Rome (in late 1515) 
that, if Leo rejected Spanish ‘assistance’ against Francis I, following his recent peace with France, that 
Ferdinand would carry on regardless, treating the pope as if he was still anti-French, having been 
forced into his alliance. Robert Wingfield may also have commented along these lines on 15 January, 
when he made a recommendation, in case the pope did not sanction an English attack on France 
(although the sense of this is unclear); Sp.ii, 240 (calendared November 1515, Ferdinand to his 
ambassador in Rome); LPIIi, 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg). 
195 This message was conveyed perhaps secretly via Ammonius; LPIIi, 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de 
Giglis to Ammonius]), 1201 (27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). This mirrors Cardinal 
Schiner’s reply to Wolsey’s overtures, following the former’s initial meeting with Pace, wh
attributes the casus belli to the French having ‘dared to rend the unity of the Church’, ensuring that a 
crusade could not take place ‘unless their insolence be repressed’. Similar language was used, about not 
forsaking the pope or the Church, by de Mesa in conversation with Henry VIII on 4 November. He 
would only have spoken thus if Henry was similarly disposed; ibid., 1146 (13 November 1515, 
Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Innsbruck); Sp.ii, 239 (5 November 1515, de Mesa to Ferdinand, London). 
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Pace himself might be sent to Rome to facilitate this.196 Pace accordingly notified Leo 
X of his mission from Innsbruck around 10-12 November.197 In response to Pace, at 
some point during November, Leo appeared cagey, claiming that he would not send a 
commission to England to this end because of his belief that the Spanish had come to 
terms with France, but would honour his pledge (whatever that might be) if Francesco 
Maria Sforza was ‘restored’ to Milan and if Lorenzo de’ Medici was married into the 
English royal family.198 The pope was therefore seeking favourable terms in return for 
his (continued) adhesion to the anti-French league. Upon hearing news of the Pace 
mission in Rome, the French immediately complained to the pontiff about it and were 
still complaining in mid-December, implying that Leo failed to condemn it. In 
response, Wolsey instructed de Giglis (on 13 December) to argue that Pace was sent 
on his authority to explore whether Francis intended any aggression towards Leo X 
and, if so, what arrangements could be made to defend him.199 In spite of Wolsey’s 
argument that this was his and not Henry’s initiative, the pope would almost certainly 
have understood that this was sanctioned by the king. Through this back channel 
communication, therefore, the English crown may have felt encouraged that it could 
gain papal support for this expedition. 
Perhaps recognising the significance of this back channel and taking 
advantage of the secretary’s curial experience and geographical proximity to Rome, 
                                                 
196 Pace never went to Rome in this regard, however; LPIIi, 1095 (calendared end October 1515, 
instructions from Wolsey to Pace).  
197 Pace wrote to de Giglis on 10 and 12 November and to Leo once around the same time; ibid., 1201 
(27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Wolsey originally commissioned Pace to contact the 
pope in this regard upon his arrival in Milan but, given that the duchy had fallen, Pace’s base for 
negotiations had become Innsbruck (initially) and so the initial communications were sent from here; 
ibid., 1065 (calendared 24-25 October 1515, Pace to [Wolsey]). 
198 Ibid., 1224 (calendared end November 1515, Pace to Wolsey). 
199 In early November, de Giglis predicted that the pope would welcome news of Pace’s departure for 
the Cantons. The French complained of the embassy at the Bologna summit during December, but Leo 
refused to recognise its hostile intent; ibid., 1105 (1-4 November 1515, [de Giglis to Ammonius]), 1201 
(27 November 1515, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 1280 (13 December 1515, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis], 
‘My house at London’), 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna). 
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Pace was also expected to keep the pope apprised of developments and preparations 
for the expedition and to lobby Leo to contribute.200 After notifying the pope of his 
mission in early November, Pace kept de Giglis informed of progress, updating him 
on 30 November.201 On 31 January 1516, Pace promised to write to the pope 
concerning French attempts to recruit the Swiss and turn the emperor.202 Shortly after, 
on 5 February 1516, as the expedition became increasingly inevitable, Pace again 
lobbied Leo for assistance.203 This approach may have involved a loan request that de 
Giglis actively sought up to late April.204 
Pressure on the pope to become involved was also applied directly from 
England. Initially, this consisted of positive noises made about Pace’s negotiations; 
Wolsey, for example, conveyed to de Giglis on 13 December that their plans were 
succeeding and that the Swiss were prepared to renew their participation against the 
French with a force of 20,000.205 Despite this, there may have been some sort of 
communication problem, as the pope complained of contradictory rumours about 
English preparations and suspected that the truth was being kept from him.206 Henry 
                                                 
nstructions from Wolsey to Pace). Pace’s pressure on the 
papacy may have been envisaged as part of a broader effort that also included lobbying from Germany. 
The Engl
pope (and
202 Ibid., 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance). 
203 Ibid., 1489 (5 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance). 
204 On 20 April, de Giglis mentioned his failed attempt, at Pace’s behest, to procure a loan of 40-50,000 
Rome). 
s mere presence among the Swiss had 
1 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to 
s threat to the 
200 Ibid., 1095 (calendared end October 1515, i
ish crown would surely have been pleased, for instance, with the emperor’s pledge to urge the 
 others) to assist them, as reported by Wingfield on 18 January; ibid., 1413 (18 January 1516, 
Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg). 
201 Ibid., 1281 (14 December 1515, [de Giglis] to Ammonius, Bologna).  
florins from ‘[Ev]angelita’, probably Leo X’s secretary Andrea Tarasconio Evangelista; ibid., 1794 (20 
April 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius, 
205 There was no mention, however, of the difficulty of gaining a formal Swiss commitment through 
their diet on account of the problems encountered in transmitting money to the Cantons. Nor was there 
any indication that Maximilian’s adhesion was hard to come by; ibid., 1201 (27 November 1515, de 
Giglis to [Ammonius]). Similarly, de Giglis kept the crown appraised of intelligence he received about 
the Pace mission. On 14 December, he wrote that the secretary’
prevented a treaty between the Cantons and the French; ibid., 128
Ammonius, Bologna). 
206 Leo had heard rumours, during early January, that Henry preparing for war and had funded the 
Swiss. When letters arrived from England that contradicted this, he expressed surprise and suspicion, 
and asked of de Giglis ‘how the King is inclined to the peace of Christendom’; ibid., 1418 (19 January 
1516, de Giglis to Ammonius). For Leo’s knowing that Henry was behind the Swis
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and Wolsey made a direct overture to Leo X around 23 December 1515 to gain papal 
involvement in the coming conflict. De Giglis delivered the proposal to Leo around 
19 January and, while the pope wanted time to consider his response, he reassured 
Henry that, if England went to war, Rome would not desert him. The orator explained 
that Leo’s hesitancy stemmed from his promise to help Francis defend Milan. While 
the pope had planned to avoid this (and indirectly oppose the French) by sending 
troops to aid Maximilian’s defence of Verona, he had a number of reservations about 
the English plan: that they could not rely on Charles of Castile, on account of his 
Franco
would carry more weight than his own and that, whatever policy Henry decided upon, 
rincipal (potential) anti-
                                                  
phile council; that the Swiss might gain Milan upon the expulsion of the 
French (to which he was opposed); and that the war would render the planned crusade 
impossible as it would weaken Christendom. De Giglis reassured Leo about Charles 
and about Milan being intended for the next Sforza claimant. In conclusion, Leo 
pledged to observe his alliance with England, but would not openly declare himself an 
enemy of France.207 Apparently having just heard of the direct crown approach to 
Rome, Richard Pace recommended such action on 31 January 1516, as such requests 
the papacy (and other princes) would follow.208 Henry VIII wrote again to the pope in 
response to the death of Ferdinand of Aragon. Perceiving that the pope was in a pretty 
tight bind up to that point, news of the death of one of their p
                                                                                          
Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the 
6, de Giglis to Henry, Florence), 1417 (19 January 1516, 
s well as his own direct approaches to Rome in this behalf; ibid., 1413 (18 
French, around mid-January, see Ven.ii, 676 (16 January 1519, 
Signory, Florence), 677 (16 January 1519, Venetian ambassador at the Curia, Florence). 
207 Concerning the Sforza claimant to Milan, de Giglis asserted that Henry planned to marry him to one 
of his relatives; LPIIi, 1416 (19 January 151
de Giglis to Wolsey), 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius), 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to 
Henry, Florence), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Florence). The crown approach to Rome was 
evidently well-received by others. Robert Wingfield may have been referring to this when, around 18 
January, he promised Maximilian that his king would lobby Leo X (and the other powers in Italy) 
against the French. Similarly, on the 31st, Pace conveyed the emperor’s desire that Henry write to the 
pope for support, suggesting that other princes would then support them (presumably if Leo X’s 
backing was gained), a
January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], 
Constance). 
208 Ibid., 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance). Robert Wingfield gave similar advice 
to Henry in late November; ibid., 1215 (29 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
 519
French allies was evidently of concern to the English king vis-à-vis papal participation 
in the Italian expedition. Henry ‘notified’ Leo of this event on 16 February, also 
commissioning his orator in Rome to transmit his thoughts, presumably seeking to 
reassure Leo that he remained committed to (funding) the expulsion of Francis I from 
Italy, despite the potential loss of Spanish support.209 
In a bid to have the papacy break with France and support the expedition, the 
English crown may also have attempted more subtle moves. On 28 January 1516, 
Henry VIII uged Maximilian to demonstrate his readiness for the expedition, upon 
which he predicted that Leo X would join them against France. He also asked the 
emperor to write to the pontiff, requesting that he join their league which, presumably, 
would involve obligations to participate militarily or financially.210 Thomas Spinelly 
spotted an opportunity for England to secure papal support after hearing of the death 
of Leo’s brother, Giuliano, in early April 1516. He recommended that the pope’s 
nephew, Lorenzo, be prevented from marrying the French widow, Filiberta of Savoy, 
presumably by offering him an attractive marriage into the English royal family.211 
 During the negotiation process, some confidence in the papacy’s continued 
anti-French attitude was doubtless also drawn from the activity of the papal nuncio 
with the Swiss, Ennius Filonardi bishop of Veroli, in Pace and Wingfield’s efforts to 
                                                 
209 Ibid., 1546 (16 February 1516, Henry to Leo). The communication to de Giglis has not been found; 
had died on 17 March; ibid., 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). The pope 
it possibly reassured Leo X that, even if Spain failed to involve itself in the expedition or league, that 
the current coalition was strong enough to defeat Francis I. A possible reply from the English orator on 
13 March, albeit to Wolsey, implies such a message; ibid., 1667 (13 March 1516, de Giglis to Wolsey, 
Rome). 
210 It is possible that the English were encouraging the emperor to act on an earlier promise; back in 
early December, Wingfield notified Henry that Maximilian had pledged to write to the pope to urge 
him against France. Also in the late January letter, Henry further urged the emperor to ignore papal 
overtures to adhere to a truce, so that a crusade could be launched. In addition, he urged Maximilian to 
request Leo’s adhesion to their planned league for this purpose; ibid., 1265 (10 December 1515, Robert 
Wingfield to Wosey, ‘[Fiesyn], in Swave’), 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich). 
211 Giuliano 
had already enquired with Pace about an English marriage for Lorenzo back in November; ibid., 1224 
(calendared end November 1515, Pace to Wolsey). 
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enable this expedition.212 This could only have been interpreted in England as 
evidence of papal support for the anti-French agenda generally and the Pace mission 
more specifically, especially once the Franco-papal peace had been concluded, 
necessitating that Leo be careful of issuing any contra-indications to its observance. 
After reading the nuncio’s correspondence, on 20 November, Pace conveyed back to 
Englan
al 
d Filonardi’s fear that French hegemony in Italy would be achieved if Henry 
did not act quickly.213 This may well have been interpreted as a suggestion that 
continued papal resistance depended on English intervention; if Henry did not 
intervene, Leo would give up on the Swiss and resign himself to the prospect of 
French control over Italy. Certainly on 10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield interpreted 
the nuncio’s actions as indicative of the papacy’s desire to work against France, but 
recommended that his crown display its anti-French intentions more publicly, as this 
would cause the pope (and other Christian princes) ‘to work more firmly’.214 
Similarly, a letter from Filonardi to Henry on 22 January hints that the pope was 
supportive of English moves to gain the Swiss and that the nuncio himself was loy
                                                 
212 seems to have recognised Filonardi’s significance from very early on, requesting that Wolsey 
recommend him to Filonardi from soon after his despatch from England. While he was attempting to 
recruit the Swiss and the emperor, Pace interacted regularly with the nuncio, who appears to have 
Pace (since the latter had arrived in Zurich). He further claimed to be indebted to Henry VII on account 
of some unexplained favour he received as a child and pledged to treat Pace as openly as he would a 
 Pace 
worked to the same end, and Filonardi wrote to Henry on 3 December of his intention to cooperate with 
fellow papal representative. Pace confirmed the nuncio’s support around the same time, claiming that 
Filonardi had instructed that anti-French sermons be preached; ibid., 1065 (calendared 24-25 October 
1515, Pace to [Wolsey]), 1178 (20 November 1515, [Pace to Wolsey]), 1198 (26 November 1515, 
Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Memmingen’), 1215 (29 November 1515, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 
 Schiner to [Robert Wingfield], ‘Ravenspurgh’), 1352 (28 December 1515, [Cardinal Schiner] 
o [Wolsey]). 
1240 (3 December 1515, [Filonardi] to Henry, Zurich), 1241 (3 December 1515, Filonardi to Wolsey, 
Zurich), 1244 (calendared 3-4 December 1515, Pace to Wolsey), 1249 (5 December 1515, Robert 
Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Fiesyn in Swave’), 1328 (calendared 22-23 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to 
Pace), 1341 (25 December 1515, Filonardi to Cardinal Schiner, Zurich), 1346 (27 December 1515, 
Cardinal
to -, ‘Ravenspurch’), 1377 (1 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey), 1422 (22 January 1516, 
[Filonardi] to Henry, ‘Ex Ture[gio]’). The despatch to England of Melchior Langus by Cardinal 
Schiner might also have been an indicator of papal intentions, as Pace described him as a onetime 
chamberlain to Julius II, who was trusted by the late pontiff (although Schiner further reveals that he 
maintained Langus in Rome during this time). Was the secretary implying that Langus may be acting, 
perhaps implicitly or indirectly, on behalf of Leo X? LPIIi, 1327 (22 December 1515, Pace to Wolsey, 
‘Uberlinge’), 1329 (23 December 1515, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, ‘Uberlingen’). 
213 Ibid., 1178 (20 November 1515, [Pace to Wolsey]). 
214 Ibid., 1398 (10 January 1516, Robert Wingfield t
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to the English king.215 Also Pace reported back to Wolsey on 1 February 1516 that the 
nuncio was opposed to Leo X’s adhesion to France and had written to the pope 
advising that he side with England.216 It is unclear whether Filonardi’s actions were 
conducted with the assent of the pope (particularly given the results of Bologna), 
although it is feasible both that this was the case and that the English crown suspected 
as much. In spite of these generally positive indications for England, vis-à-vis Rome 
and the Pace mission, the crown was not prepared to gain Leo X’s support at any cost; 
for instance, Henry and Wolsey discarded Spinelly’s suggestion (in October 1515) 
that the pope’s assistance would be gained if one of his relatives was promised the 
duchy of Milan. 217 
 
Although it is unclear how far the English crown was aware of it, Pace’s and 
Henry’s pressure helped to convince the pope of the likely success of the Imperial-
Swiss expedition. Shortly after returning to Rome in late February, Leo reportedly 
told the Venetian ambassador that he expected Franco-Venetian forces to be defeated 
and that Venice would then have to fight alone, all because of English financial 
support.218 Indeed, until the emperor withdrew from the expedition, Henry and 
Wolsey would have been able to reflect positively on intelligence received about the 
papacy and communications from Rome concerning Leo X’s ‘real’ foreign policy 
intentions. There was plenty from English diplomats to suggest that the pope was, at 
heart, anti-French (in addition to Filonardi’s involvement in the Swiss negotiations). 
                                                 
215 Ibid., 1422 (22 January 1516, [Filonardi] to Henry, ‘Ex Ture[gio]’). 
216 Ibid., 1470 (1 February 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Constance). 
217 Ibid., 1096 (calendared end October 1515, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). Instead, Henry and 
Maximilian pursued the candidacy of Francesco Maria Sforza, duke of Bari; see, for instance, pp.495 
n.132, 530 n.243. 
218 This conversation took place around 7 March, although the Venetian orator Marino Giorgio claimed 
to have had more than one discussion with Leo on these matters; Ven.ii, 693 (28 February, 1-2 March 
94 (7 March 1516, Venetian ambassador in 1516, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 6
Rome to the Signory). 
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Robert Wingfield predicted on 15 January that, now that the emperor definitely 
intended to go to Italy, the pope would ask Henry to attack France.219 On 23 
February, Spinelly, informed Wolsey that the pope continued to contribute financially 
to ‘the entertainment of Verona and Brescia’.220 Similarly, on 18 March, Spinelly 
alerted Wolsey that the expedition having commenced, Leo had offered Maximilian 
assistance.221 Also, on 4 April, he reported that the pope wanted Maximilian’s 
friendship, on account of the current ‘success’ of the expedition, and that the emperor 
had accepted this, on condition that Leo made a financial contribution (presumably 
for the offensive).222 The prospect of economic backing from Rome may have been 
linked with Pace’s approach to Leo for this in February 1516.223 
Even while the expedition was underway, Leo X looked to be supporting the 
anti-French powers. In response to the initial success of the Germans and Swiss, Leo 
despatched a legate to Maximilian (Bibbiena, an intimate of the pope) and a general 
(Marcantonio Colonna) with a small force to join the Imperial army at Brescia.224 One 
also suspects that Giulio de’ Medici’s legatine commission to Verona was possibly 
also intended in defence of the city (for the emperor) against the Venetians.225 
Equally, the pope did not observe his end of the papal alliance with France, to 
contribute troops and to pay for Swiss mercenaries; he said he was unable to do any of 
this, although he reportedly sent a Florentine contingent which marched extremely 
                                                 
219 The ambassador also made a comment about the possibility of Leo not doing this, as he was a 
Florentine, presumably because of the state’s traditional friendship with France, although the sense is 
unclear; LPIIi, 1404 (15 January 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Augsburg). 
al defence of these cities); ibid., 
518. 
rona, Lyons). 
220 One presumes that he meant that Leo was contributing to the Imperi
1581 (23 February 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey). 
221 Ibid., 1684 (18 March 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). 
222 Ibid., 1735 (4 April 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). 
223 See above pp.517-
224 W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.50. For English knowledge of this, see LPIIi, 1684 (18 March 1516, 
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). 
225 A letter to him in this position survives for 18 March 1516; LPIIi, 1685 (18 March 1516, - to Giulio 
de’ Medici, legate in Ve
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slowly towards Bologna.226 On 8 April, Pace notified Wolsey of intercepted French 
correspondence that complained of the pope’s failure to contribute to the defence of 
Milan, particularly by financing the Swiss.227 Indeed, other captured correspondence 
(dated March 1516), that revealed papal procrastination over its obligation to support 
the French defence of Italy, also seems to have been referred to England around this 
time.228 In addition, further news of the pope’s reluctance to aid Francis I seems to 
have been received in England via Spinelly in, perhaps, the second week of May.229 
Francis I suspected that the papacy might defect to the Anglo-Imperial-Swiss 
confederation by the middle of March. By the 17th, despite papal reassurances of his 
support, Francis was recommending that his ally not take heed of ‘bad advice’, before 
giving reasons why the anti-French powers (potential and actual, but excepting the 
Swiss) could not be relied upon; with regard to Henry VIII, Francis claimed that he 
posed no threat as he was ‘beyond the sea’.230 That the pope was actively encouraging 
the expedition was certainly suspected by Venice. In a communication to its 
                                                 
226
227 The Swiss commander Galeazzo Visconti’s confirmation of this also appears to have reached 
England; LPIIi, 1741 (6 April 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Cardinal [Schiner], Lodi), 1746 (8 Ap l 
1516, Pace to Wolsey, Lodi). 
228 According to the intercepted correspondence, it seems that Leo’s reluctance was already apparent to 
and, it seems the pope’s preferred option, recommending the recruitment of the Swiss). Furthermore, 
the French ambassador with the pope had already tried to reason with his crown that they would gain 
more from papal support in name rather than from the actual troops he had agreed to send to Milan. In 
reply, this was agreed, but a financial contribution was still sought towards the hired Swiss mercenaries 
 W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.51-52. 
ri
the French (reportedly suggesting the supply of Florentines instead of a force from the Papal States 
(4,000 as opposed to the previously agreed 2,000). The French crown also placed great pressure on the 
papacy by keeping Leo regularly informed of the scale of its military presence in the peninsula; ibid., 
1669 (14 March 1516, de Boissy and de Bonnivet to the French ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1680 (17 
March 1516, Francis to his ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1685 (18 March 1516, - to Giulio de’ Medici, 
bon] to Cardinal San 
sh archives and other references to the capture of such 
inal [Schiner], Lodi), 1746 (8 April 
telligence from Italy). 
ere requested by Francis to help in the defence of Italy. Such Italian 
4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy). 
ancis to his ambassador in Rome, Lyons). 
legate in Verona, Lyons), 1686 (18 March 1516, de Boissy to Giulio de’ Medici, Lyons), 1699 (23 
March 1516, Francis de Taxis to Brian Tuke, Milan), 1700 (calendared 23 March 1516, Francis to his 
ambassador in Rome, Lyons), 1703 (24 March 1516, Charles [duke of Bour
Severino, Milan). That these communications were intercepted and copies relayed to England is 
suggested both by their being located in Engli
materials; ibid., 1741 (6 April 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Card
1516, Pace to Wolsey, Lodi), 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of in
229 Money and soldiers w
intelligence that reached Imperial sources in the Low Countries was usually forwarded on to England 
by Thomas Spinelly; ibid., 1854 (
230 Francis I also cited the previous actions of the emperor and Charles’ preoccupation with Spanish 
affairs; ibid., 1680 (17 March 1516, Fr
 524
ambassador in France on 8 March, the state warned that, while Leo was publicly 
supportive of their cause, Maximilian would not have crossed the Alps without some 
signal from Leo. In addition, it speculated, the pontiff had unleashed the Swiss and 
persuaded Henry to give his financial backing to the enterprise.231 On the same date, 
the Venetian government wrote to its orator in Rome; it praised the pope’s claim to be 
opposed to the Imperial-Swiss descent, not least because of Maximilian’s ambition to 
acquire the temporal power of the Church. It also commended Leo for sending briefs 
to Henry VIII and trying to maintain the Anglo-French peace. However, the Venetian 
ambassador was instructed to discover the pope’s true intentions, as his commitment 
was suspect; in particular, Leo was believed, through Wolsey, to have induced the 
English king to fund the expedition.232 By the 13th, Venice even sought the pope’s 
intercession with England to cease sending money.233 
 
 In addition to lobbying the papacy for its involvement in the anti-French 
enterprise in Italy, the English crown concurrently sought its membership in a planned 
‘holy league’ to formalise the alliance of the anti-French powers. While a formal 
agreement was not made during these months (between England and other potential 
allies), overtures were made to Rome, this time more directly from the king, although 
also involving the back channel established by Pace.234 It has already been observed 
that the envisaged agreement would aim for universal peace and a crusade against the 
                                                 
231 Ven.ii, 696 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador in France). Papal complicity was also 
suspected by virtue of Filonardi’s activities; ibid., 692 (5 March 1516). 
232 Ibid., 697 (8 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador at the Curia). 
233 Ibid., 701 (13 March 1516, Signory to its ambassador at the Curia). 
234 Papal involvement in this league was deemed integral by Henry VIII; in issuing commissions on 21 
February 1516 to conclude such a treaty, the pope’s name always cropped up as an intended 
ebruary 1516), 1721 
participant. Similarly, the emperor’s commission of his own ambassador in England to this end (on 20 
February), stated the ‘support of the Church’ as one of its intended aims, a sentiment with which his 
English counterpart doubtless agreed; LPIIi, 1572 (20 February 1516), 1574 (21 F
(1 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Lodi?]), 1742 (calendared 6-7 April 1516, [Wolsey] to -), 1838 
(calendared 30 April 1516, [Henry] to Poynings an[d Tunstal]). 
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Turks. This carried an anti-Gallic subtext, whereby the French expulsion from Italy 
would be sought (at least) before any passagium could take place.235 Such an 
emphasis becomes understandable, when one considers that Leo X, in accordance 
with his ‘public’ pro-French policy, was also calling for universal peace, albeit it was 
intended to forestall the impending conflict against Francis I. Indeed, the English 
emphasis on (an anti-Gallic) universal peace may be considered to be a reaction to 
these papal calls. Henry VIII and/or Wolsey wrote to Leo urging him to join the 
alliance (in addition to the expedition) around 23 December 1515. De Giglis received 
this proposal and delivered it to Leo around 19 January 1516; the pope wanted time to 
consider his response, but reassured Henry that, if he went to war, he would not 
abandon him. In also answering a request to join the forthcoming enterprise against 
France, Leo had various doubts about the English plan, including that it would 
eaken Christendom too much for a crusade. As a result, Leo pledged to observe his 
                                                
w
alliance with Henry, but could not openly declare himself an enemy of France.236 
Interestingly, Giulio de’ Medici’s response (as papal confidante, cardinal protector of 
England or both), apparently to the same overture, was far more vague; he merely 
expressed the pope’s desire for universal peace which could have meant anything.237 
Perhaps impatient for a response, on 28 January, Henry urged Maximilian to request 
 
recover the French crown, thereby allaying the threat to Christendom, before any crusade could 
legitimately take place. Similarly, on the 18th Wingfield stated that the emperor’s commitment to the 
expedition, his decision to lobby other powers including the pope to participate, and the intended 
visioned for the coalition when 
on; ibid., 1398 (10 January 1516, 
eld to Wolsey, Augsburg), 1721 
235 Earlier, on 10 January, Robert Wingfield conveyed the emperor’s opinion that Henry ought to 
coronation of Henry at Paris, would be ‘a sure foundation for universal peace and an expedition against 
the Infidels’. Again, in April, Pace alluded to the crusading element en
he referred to being ‘commissioned to treat for a universal confederati
Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey]), 1413 (18 January 1516, Robert Wingfi
(1 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Lodi?]). 
236 Ibid., 1416 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Henry, Florence), 1417 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to 
Wolsey), 1418 (19 January 1516, de Giglis to Ammonius), 1449 (28 January 1516, Leo to Henry, 
Florence), 1450 (28 January 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Florence). Richard Pace claimed to urge the pope 
(via de Giglis) in the same direction; ibid., 1466 (31 January 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance). 
237 Ibid., 1451 (28 January 1516, Giulio de’ Medici to Henry, Florence), 1452 (28 January 1516, Giulio 
de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
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Leo’s adhesion to their league. 238 Ostensibly then, the pope had rejected the English 
proposal, albeit he tacitly supported Henry’s actions, but this must be set in the 
broader context of the failure to form the league at all during the early months of 
1516.239 In spite of this lack of papal commitment, the pope apparently encouraged 
Charles of Castile around this time to join such a league (that would include the 
pope). Two English representatives in the Low Countries notified Henry of this 
approach on 3 April, for which the English king, in reply, took credit and presumed 
that the pope had made an informal approach to the Spanish ambassadors in Rome. 
As a result, Henry VIII now expected a commission to be sent to England with a view 
to the papacy joining a coalition against France.240 This did not materialise and any 
hope that Leo would agree to the proposal probably dissipated with news of the 
emperor’s withdrawal from Milan.  
 
 In reacting to Francis I’s victory at Marignano, therefore, the English crown 
had been relatively successful in bringing a cowed Leo X to the brink of actively 
supporting its enterprise to expel the French from Italy. While the pope had shrunk 
away from any public commitment, reluctant to adhere to any new league or openly 
break with France, he gave Henry plenty of reassurance that he did support his actions 
and made various moves to indicate this, such as through Filonardi’s work with Pace 
and the Swiss, as well as his actions to actively participate in the conflict. This was a 
considerable feat, given that Leo had submitted to Francis I, both in October after 
                                                 
238 Henry alludes to a league recently concluded between England, the Empire, Spain and the Swiss, 
although no such agreement appears to have taken place. In this same letter to the emperor, Henry also 
urged him to act or at least demonstrate his readiness to act, so as to encourage papal support, as well 
as to ignore papal overtures to adhere to a truce (the preliminary to the pro-French ‘universal peace); 
 
il 1516, [Henry] to Poynings an[d Tunstal]). 
ibid., 1446 (28 January 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich). 
239 The rejection is also consistent with a report by the Venetian ambassador at the Curia in early 
February that, in reaction to news that an anti-French league had been proclaimed, Leo had declared his 
intention to remain committed to France and Venice; Ven.ii, 685 (8-9 February 1516, Venetian
ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Florence). 
240 LPIIi, 1838 (calendared 30 Apr
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Marignano and in December at Bologna, and that he had publicly posited a desire for 
universal peace (in the French interest). In light of this, the collapse of the English-
backed Italian enterprise was always likely to cause Leo X to retreat from any support 
for the anti-French agenda generally, as well as to opt more firmly for the French 
amity already established. 
 
England fails to relaunch the Italian enterprise and struggles to form and gain 
commitment to a league ‘in defence of the Church’: April 1516 – July 1517 
News of the emperor’s withdrawal from Milan was followed in England by a 
period of uncertainty about what had actually happened and whether Maximilian 
would return to the battlefield.241 As the English crown became increasingly aware 
                                                 
241 News of Maximilian’s retreat apparently reached England by 10 April, but was kept secret for 
veral weeks, indeed it was actively denied. It was perhaps due to this crisis, however, that Wolsey 
mpted to recall Fox to Court, although the latter refused and, in his reply (dated the 23rd), was under 
e impr
ithdraw
April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Lodi?]), 1727 (2 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1729 (2 
de Costa’), 1746 (8 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Lodi), 1752 (10 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1792 (20 April 1516, Schiner to Robert Wingfield, Male), 1793 (20 
to Henry, Brussels), 1825 (24 April 1516, - to -, Paris), 1831 (27 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, 
Ven.ii, 709 (8 April 1516, Marcantonio Colonna, Captain General of the Imperial army, to 
1516, [Fox] to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.210-214 (Ven.ii, 712; LPIIi, 1763; 14 
 disbelieve rumours that Maximilian 
mbassador claimed that he successfully convinced 
from Maximilian, Pace 
se
atte
th ession that the campaign still progressed. Wolsey seems only to have admitted the emperor’s 
w al around 29 April, attributing it to Maximilian’s lack of funds and supplies; ibid., 1721 (1 
April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Laude’), 1736 (4 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘in…village 
[Henry], ‘Idoll [Eddolo] in the Vale Camonico’), 1753 (calendared 10 April 1516, [Henry] to [Pace]), 
1754 (10 April 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Laude), 1774 (16 April 1516, Maximilian to Wolsey, 
Terzilas), 1775 (16 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey), 1776 (Jerome Prunne to Robert 
Wingfield, Augsburg), 1782 (18 April 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1783 (18 April 1516, 
April 1516, Francis to Mons. De la [Fayette], Captain of Boulogne, and Mons. Le President 
[Bap]ausmes, his ambassador in England, Colombier), 1799 (21 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to 
[Wolsey]), 1813 (22 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Trent), 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to 
[Wolsey], Bergamo), 1817 (23 April 1516, Pace to Burbank, Bergamo), 1822 (24 April 1516, Spinelly 
Brussels), 1833 (28 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry], Trent), 1841 (calendared 30 April 1516); 
Maximilian), 720 (28 April 1516, Bailiff of Crema to the Signory), 722 (29 April 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London); P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard Fox, pp.52-55 (LPIIi, 1814; 23 April 
April 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 214-217 (Ven.ii, 714; LPIIi, 1789; 20 April 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 218-219 (Ven.ii, 719; LPIIi, 827); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, 
pp.135-137; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII (1925), pp.90-91; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.49-51; J.J. 
Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.60-61; J. Wegg, Richard Pace, pp.88-94. The English were still unclear 
about Imperial intentions in early May. They apparently chose to
had been forced to retreat and that he did not intend to return. Part of the reason for this may have been 
that reports of ‘successes’ against the French (and Venetians) continued to filter into the kingdom. 
Towards end of April, letters arrived in England from Francis I claiming that Maximilian had fled, 
which ‘caused great consternation’. The Imperial a
Henry and Wolsey that this was untrue and, in any case, letters soon arrived 
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that the emperor intended to abandon the current Italian enterprise (even if he was 
reportedly enthusiastic to start again), it also learnt around the end of May that the 
Swiss contribution had also collapsed, money again playing a major role.242 
Naturally, the English were unhappy but, once they had confirmation that the 
expedition had failed, Henry and his advisors had to decide whether to abandon the 




 Despite holding reservations about the emperor, the English crown received 
pledges of continued commitment from both Maximilian and the Swiss, and so 
ght behind relaunching the Italian expedition.243 The English crown also 
                                                                                                                                            
and others further contradicting this (presumably arrived to prove false (that Max at gates of Milan); 
LPIIi, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial am assador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 1865 (8 b
May 1516, Henry to Maximilian, Greenwich), 1875 (11 May 1516, extract of news sent to England, 
Mechelin). For other intelligence in England that the expedition was still making progress and that 
Maximilian would resume his involvement, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.221-224 (Ven.ii, 
730; LPIIi, 1864; 8 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Spinelly (at the Spanish Court in 
the Low Countries); LPIIi, 1848 (3 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1853 (4 May 1516, 
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). 
242 Intelligence that reached England (including from Pace and Wingfield) suggested that, in addition to 
facing logistical problems to pay the Swiss, sums were seized by German and Spanish troops (at 
Brescia). Wingfield effectively recognised the end of the expedition in correspondence of 11 May on 
and immediately suggested that he (and Pace) ‘spin’ this setback so that Henry would not be perceived 
in a negative light; LPIIi, 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy), 1871 (11 May 1516, 
[Robert Wingfield] to Henry), 1872 (11 May 1516, duke of Bari to Henry, Trent), 1873 (11 May 1516, 
duke of Bari to Wolsey, Trent), 1877 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1879 (12 May 1516, Pace 
to Wolsey, Trent), 1880 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1884 (13 May 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1885 (calendared 13-14 May 1516, news from Italy), 1998 (4 June 1516, 
Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). The degree of concern within crown 
circles about the expedition is perhaps stressed by the interception of Venetian correspondence around 
this time, which led Giustinian to complain Wolsey (on 30 May); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, 
pp.224-228 (Ven.ii, 737; LPIIi, 1960; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). 
243 During May, Henry VIII refers to ‘the faint and dishonourable dealing of the Emperor’; LPIIi, 1966 
(calendared end May 1516, Henry to -). For Pace’s allegations against Maximilian, including his citing 
a description by Julius II that ‘Imperator est levis et inconstans…’ and is motivated by his desire for 
money, that Wolsey later claimed to believe, see ibid., 1875 (11 May 1516, extract of news sent to 
England, Mechelin), 1877 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 1880 (12 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, 
Trent), 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). The emperor issued his commitment to England to 
restart the campaign from mid-May (in response to Henry and Wolsey’s exhortations of 16 April) and 
this was reportedly believed by the English, see ibid., 1888 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to Henry, 
Trent), 1889 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to [Henry], Trent), 1890 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to 
Wolsey, Trent), 1891 (15 May 1516, Maximilian to [Wolsey], Trent). Also see ibid., 1884 (13 May 
1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1895 (16 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Douay, in Artois’), 
1902 (17 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, 
Arras), 1909 (19 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1921 (21 May 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 1931 (23 May 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 1937 (27 May 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to Henry), 1964 (calendared 31 May 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial 
ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). The Swiss captains pledged their continued 
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reassessed its intentions for the conflict, at least postponing for a year the intended 
invasion of northern France by Henry VIII in person. This refocus is curious 
insomuch that Wolsey appears to have induced a request from Germany (via Pace) for 
such a prorogation. As a consequence of this lack of direct English military action, it 
was further intended that the Imperial-Swiss expedition no longer pursue the French 
into France at this point, with the enterprise ending when Milan was taken and the 
French expelled from Italy.244 In addition, Henry and Wolsey lobbied once more for 
                                                                                                                                            
commitment around 12 May, Galeazzo Visconti followed suit on the 20th and the exiled duke of Milan 
(Francesco Maria Sforza) sent one of his advisors to Henry on the 21st; ibid., 1880 (12 May 1516, Pace 
to Wolsey, Trent), 1881 (calendared 12 May 1516, [Swiss captains to Henry, Trent), 1914 (20 May 
1516, letters of Galeazzo Visconti, Trent), 1922 (21 May 1516, Francesco Maria Sforza to [Henry]), 
1932 (23 May 1516, Francesco Maria Sforza to Henry, Trent), 1933 ([Francesco Maria Sforza] to 
ssels), 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1914 (20 May 
ed on 28 May; 
Wolsey). 
 The English decision was probably swayed by the Franco-Venetian threat to Maximilian’s 
authority in Brescia and Verona; the loss of these cities could mark the end of ultramontane resistance 
to French hegemony within northern Italy and the emperor’s reported dedication to their security may 
have offered further proof of his continued fidelity to the anti-French cause. The fall of Brescia towards 
the end of May did indeed raise such concerns in England, as Maximilian then shifted his focus to the 
relief of Verona (as the starting point for driving the French from the peninsula); ibid., 1853 (4 May 
1516, Spinelly to Henry, Bru
1516, letters of Galeazzo Visconti, Trent), 1921 (21 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 
1931 (23 May 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 1937 (27 May 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry), 1981 (1 
June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, Verona), 1989 (3 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry]), 
1997 (4 June 1516, John Baptist Spinelli and Marcantonio Colonna to [Cardinal Schiner], Verona), 
2014 (7 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, T[rent]), 2016 (7 June 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, 
Augusta), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2027 (10 June 1516, copy of a letter from 
the king’s spy, written at Mechelin), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], 
Louvain), 2052 (calendared 15-16 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, 
Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2081 (23 June 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], 
Brussels); Ven.ii, 735-736 (27 May 1516, Signory to Henry); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.242-
246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIIi, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; 
LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
 The orators charged with arranging the original campaign were recommission
Richard Pace and (apparently) Robert Wingfield were to liaise with the emperor and the Swiss, as well 
as with Galeazzo Visconti, Matthew Schiner and Francesco Maria Sforza, to facilitate the renewed 
engagement; LPIIi, 1942 (28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1943 (calendared 28 May 1516, [Wolsey] 
to Pace), 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial ambassador in England 
to Margaret of Savoy, London). Also see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.224-228 (Ven.ii, 737; 
LPIIi, 1960; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). 
244 The postponement is referred to by Wolsey in his instructions to Pace of 28 May; for the relaunched 
expedition, the cardinal wished the aims to be the taking of Milan and the expulsion of the French. 
Henry, he reasoned, did not intend to raise an invasion force at that point (indeed, was unable to until at 
least August, one presumes in 1517), given that he was the sole financial backer of the Italian 
campaign. Just a few days later (on the 31st), Wolsey happily acknowledged Pace’s notification that 
there was no chance of the Imperials and the Swiss following-up the expedition into France that year, 
once the French had been expelled from Milan. Wolsey further recommended that his secretary ensure 
that this postponement carried with the Swiss until the following year. In explanation of this, 
Scarisbrick convincingly puts Wolsey’s intrigues down to the cardinal’s opposition to the king’s 
enthusiasm for the invasion. Indeed, the Imperial orator (Titonius) cited Henry’s personal drive towards 
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the creation of an anti-French coalition, which would underpin the expedition. 
Negotiations during May and June, concentrated in England, sought to cement such a 
‘holy league’ including Maximilian, Charles, Leo X and the Swiss, although emphasis 
was placed on joint responsibility to finance the Swiss, presumably so that England 
did not bear the brunt of the cost again.245 Perhaps seeking to galvanize the anti-
French powers, it is notable that Henry VIII determined to adopt a far more assertive 
role than he did in the earlier campaign. This time, the cloak of secrecy surrounding 
England’s earlier contribution was lifted and Henry and Wolsey began to openly 
247
voice their anti-Gallic convictions and intentions from late May.246 On 5 June, 
Wolsey clarified the king’s desire for the expulsion of the French from Italy, to 
prevent their hegemony there and, potentially, elsewhere.  Later, on 9 August, 
Wolsey again reportedly voiced his opposition to French hegemony in Italy and 
referred to the pope considering himself as Francis’ ‘chaplain’. Giustinian also cited 
                                                                                                                                            
this end on 6 May, fuelled by news of Maximilian’s successes in Italy; LPIIi, 1863 (6 May 1516, 
Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 1943 (calendared 28 May 1516, 
[Wolsey] to Pace), 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.62-63. 
245 Around 6 May, Henry was apparently attempting to form a league between himself, Maximilian and 
Charles as the central members, with the pope, the Swiss and others also envisaged as joining. Wolsey 
informed Pace on the 28th of his belief that an agreement was close; LPIIi, 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial 
ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 1931 (23 May 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 1942 
(28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1943 (calendared 28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 1998 (4 June 
1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] 
to Pace); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.219-221 (Ven.ii, 725; LPIIi, 1845; 1 May 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 221-224 (Ven.ii, 730; LPIIi, 1864; 8 May 1516, Giustinian to the 
ignory,S  London), 242-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIIi, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). 
For approaches made for Venice to join, see ibid., pp.228-232 (Ven.ii, 738; LPIIi, 1961; 31 May 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 232-239 (Ven.ii, 739; LPIIi, 1991; 3 June 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, Putney), 239-242 (Ven.ii, 740; LPIIi, 2004; 5 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 
242-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIIi, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 254-262 (Ven.ii, 
751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 270-276 (Ven.ii, 758; LPIIi, 2264; 
11 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
246 Furthermore, Giustinian noted that Henry only admitted to funding the Italian expedition for the first 
time on 3 June although he stressed, it was intended for the emperor’s defence and not to injure his 
French ‘ally’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.228-232 (Ven.ii, 738; LPIIi, 1961; 31 May 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 232-239 (Ven.ii, 739; LPIIi, 1991; 3 June 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, Putney). For further comments by Giustinian on this ‘new’ English openness, see ibid., 
pp.242-246 (Ven.ii, 742; LPIIi, 2036; 12 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 254-262 
(Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For previous English 
denials of involvement, see for instance ibid., pp.221-224 (Ven.ii, 730; LPIIi, 1864; 8 May 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
247 Ibid., pp.239-242 (Ven.ii, 740; LPIIi, 2004; 5 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney). 
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the cardinal and his right-hand man Ruthal ‘abusing the King of France without 
reserve’.248 
 While the English crown’s intention to continue ‘defending’ Rome from 
France was clear, it was hampered in all quarters during subsequent months in its 
attempts to form a league and to relaunch the Italian enterprise. Despite the lack of 
trust they had in Maximilian, Henry and Wolsey still envisaged him as part of their 
plans, giving him the impression that he may still gain access to English money, albeit 
keeping it on tight reins.249 They were pragmatic enough not to burn their bridges 
with him partly because of the current threat to the Imperial city of Verona which, 
Tunstal advised, ‘if it be lost, all the passages of Italy will be in the hands of the 
                                                 
earlier despatches when Giustinian described Henry, Wolsey and others as denying their support of 
attempts to expel the French from Italy, the orator subsequently outlined conversations with the same 
characters, publicly supporting the emperor (and others opposing France) and condemning the French. 
For similar sentiments expressed by Wolsey and Ruthal, also see Giustinian’s audience on 22 July; 
ibid., pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
516, 
47 (5 August 1516, Count Decian and Hesdin to 
 Years, i, pp.250-254 (Ven.ii, 750; LPIIi, 2183; 17 July 1516, 
248 Ibid., pp.265-270 (Ven.ii, 757; LPIIi, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory). Contrary to 
249 For the English strategy in action, see for instance LPIIi, 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 
2084 (24 June 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2151 (calendared 10 July 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2152 (10 
July 1516, Pace to Wolsey), 2166 (12 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2176 (16 July 1
[Henry] to [Robert Wingfield]), 2177 (calendared 16 July 1516, [Henry] to [Robert Wingfield]), 2178 
(calendared 16 July 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2186 (17 July 1516, Anchises Visconti to Wolsey, ‘On 
the Moselle’), 2187 (17 July 1516, Pace to [Cardinal Schiner], Zurich), 2188 (18 July 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Fiessen’), 2217 (calendared 26-27 July 1516, Wolsey to [Henry]), 2218 (27 July 
1516, Henry to [Wolsey], Farnham), 2224 (29 July 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Innsbruck), 
2228 (31 July 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Innsbruck), 2277 (14 August 1516, Pace to 
Burbank, Zurich), 2299 (25 August 1516, Pace to Ammonius, Constance), 2319 (30 August 1516, 
[Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Augsburg); Ven.ii, 749 (13 July 1516, Venetian secretary at Milan to 
the Signory), 756 (4 August 1516, the captain and proveditor at Bergamo to his son). For continued 
pressure by Maximilian on Pace to hand over English money and control of the enterprise, see LPIIi, 
2133 (4 July 1516, Pace to Robert Wingfield, Constance), 2153 ([10] July 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to 
[Henry]), 2154 (10 July 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Fyesyn’), 2157 (calendared 10 July 1516), 
2201 (21 July 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Fiessen), 2277 (14 August 1516, Pace to Burbank, 
Zurich), 2231 (calendared end July 1516, [questions proposed to Wolsey] by Anchises Visconti), 2232 
(calendared end July 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -), 22
Wolsey, London), 2249 (6 August 1516, extracts of various letters of [Galeazzo Visconti]), 2286 (18 
August 1516, [Maximilian] to [Hesdin], ‘in Nazaret’), 2298 (25 August 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to 
Henry, Fiessen). There was a demand, however, that the emperor repay money that he had coerced out 
of Pace and Sir Robert Wingfield; ibid., 1892 (calendared 15 May 1516, extracts of letters from 
Galeazzo Visconti), 1896 (16 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent), 2025 (10 June 1516, Margaret of 
Savoy to Henry, Louvain), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]), 2064 (19 June 1516, Cardinal 
Schiner to Henry, Trent), 2095 (26 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2104 (29 June 1516, 
[Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Ove[rlingen]’), 2113 (calendared end June 1516), 2115 (calendared end 
June 1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
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French’.250 Pace and Visconti once again endeavoured to gain a collective agreement 
from the Swiss to cross the Alps (as the focus of the anti-French league), but despite 
financial offers and presentation to diets and faced with French counter-offers, the 
Cantons remained divided.251 Similar approaches were also made to Charles of 
                                                 
250 LPIIi, 2270 (13 August 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey). While Henry objected to funding the defence of 
Verona, he was wholly aware that this was the principal focus of the emperor’s concern now and that 
there was a very real risk that it may fall to Franco-Venetian forces. Indeed, Wolsey even told 
Giustinian on 29 July that England intended to defend the city and subsidise the emperor to achieve 
the Signory, London). For English concerns for Verona and the danger that it was reportedly in, see 
LPIIi, 2154 (10 July 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry, ‘Fyesyn’), 2157 (calendared 10 July 1516), 
2168 (12 July 1516, extracts of letters from -), 2176 (16 July 1516, [Henry] to [Robert Wingfield]), 
2178 (calendared 16 July 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2184 (17 July 1516, Maximilian to [Wolsey], ‘In 
(4 August 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2275 (14 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 
this; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIIi, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to 
Fa[c]ibus Montium’), 2189 (18 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2244 
2303 (26 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2317 (30 August 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], 
Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 276-280 (Ven.ii, 760; LPIIi, 2284; 17 August 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London), 281-284 (Ven.ii, 764; LPIIi, 2294; 24 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
mperor’s 
this that, while negotiations continued for the relaunch of the 
London); Ven.ii, 754 (2 August 1516, Signory to Giustinian). For Pace still stressing the English need 
for him in their anti-French ambitions, despite his falling out with and lack of faith in the emperor; 
LPIIi, 2076 (22 June 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2111 (calendared end June 1516, fragment in Pace’s 
handwriting). Also see ibid., 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Anchises 
Visconti]). Leonard Frescobald, the merchant banker charged with transferring the English money to 
Germany and the Swiss Cantons, even recommended that Henry ought to consider the e
poverty; ibid., 2114 (calendared end June 1516). For the continued entertainment in England of 
Imperial (and Spanish) overtures for money, see; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.250-254 (Ven.ii, 
750; LPIIi, 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIIi, 2222; 
29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see LPIIi, 1998 (4 June 1516, Imperial 
ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). 
251 LPIIi, 2165 (12 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels), 2166 (12 July 1516, 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2214 (26 July 1516, ambassadors of the five Cantons at Zurich to 
Henry), 2206 (23 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2225 (29 July 1516, 
[Galeazzo Visconti] to Henry and Wolsey), 2226 (29 July 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to Henry, Zurich), 
2231 (calendared end July 1516, [questions proposed to Wolsey] by Anchises Visconti), 2232 
(calendared end July 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -), 2249 (6 August 1516, extracts of various letters of 
[Galeazzo Visconti]), 2299 (25 August 1516, Pace to Ammonius, Constance); Ven.ii, 756 (4 August 
1516, the captain and proveditor at Bergamo to his son), 761 (16 August 1516, letter from Tours 
addressed to the secretary of the archbishop of Salerno), 766 (26 August 1516, Venetian secretary at 
Milan to the Signory), 767 (27 August 1516, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory). Negotiations 
among the Swiss and with the emperor were also affected by dissensions between those involved in 
negotiations. Essentially, there was a split between Pace and Galeazzo Visconti (the Milanese captain 
paid by England to lead the Cantons), on the one part, and Maximilian, Matthew Schiner (the 
influential Swiss ecclesiastic who had been integral in winning over some of the Swiss districts to the 
anti-French cause) and Robert Wingfield on the other. Tensions arose from each side attempting to 
attribute blame for the failure of the expedition thus far and, as far as the Visconti-Schiner split was 
concerned, to assume control of the Swiss forces; Henry VIII may have heard about the differences 
between Visconti and Schiner in correspondence from Spinelly (dated 28 May) and, as a result, urged 
the former to reconcile with the Swiss cardinal; in reply on 2 June, the Italian captain claimed to have 
done this, but the cardinal soon began defaming him again; LPIIi, 1938 (27 May 1516, Spinelly to 
Henry, Antwerp), 1939 (27 May 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1982 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo 
Visconti] to Henry, Zurich), 1983 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Wolsey]), 2114 (calendared 
end June 1516). The net effect of 
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Castile who, it was hoped, would help pay to hire the Swiss and honour a pledge to 
contribute (Neapolitan) troops to the expedition. While Charles made positive noises, 
he procrastinated in making any commitment to England. He was also known to be 
receptive to French overtures 252 
                                                                                                                                            
 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, 
expedition and to support the Imperial defence of Verona, in effect, two separate initiatives were being 
pursued, by Pace-Visconti on the one part and Maximilian-Schiner-Wingfield on the other, competing 
for access to English monies and, therefore, for leadership of the renewed campaign. Henry and 
Wolsey clearly had faith in Pace, who refused to hand over any more money to Maximilian without 
express consent from England. As far as the emperor was concerned, Wolsey told Pace on 23 June, the 
king appreciated the secretary’s opinions of him, but believed they ought to take him ‘as he is’ and use 
him to their own ends; ibid., 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2083 (calendared 23-24 April 
1516, Wolsey to [Pace]), 2084 (24 June 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]). For Pace and Visconti’s efforts to 
secure the services of the Swiss and work (as well as continued disagreements) with the emperor 
during June, see ibid, 2003 (5 June 1516, [Pace] to Ammonius), 2008 (6 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, 
Augsburg), 2009 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -, Zurich), 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, 
[Galeazzo Visconti] to [Anchises Visconti]), 2011 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to his son 
[Anchises], Zurich), 2012 (6 June 1516), 2015 (7 June 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Augusta), 2016 (7 June 
1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Augusta), 2024 (9 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2030 (11 June 
1516, Galeazzo Visconti to Pace, Zurich), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]), 2042 (13 June 1516, 
Pace to Wolsey, ‘Myddelham’), 2046 (14 June 1516, Pace to Maximilian, ‘Ex Meinningho’), 2047 (14 
June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Ex Meinningho’), 2052 (calendared 15-16 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Louvain), 2070 (21 June 1516, Pace to -), 2075 (22 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 2076 (22 June 
1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2077 (22 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Henry and Wolsey], Zurich), 
2078 (22 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to Maximilian), 2085 (23 June 1516, Anchises Visconti to 
Burbank, Constance), 2089 (24 June 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Constance), 2090 ([19 June 1516], 
abstract of letter from Anchises [Visconti], Constance), 2100 (calendared 28 June 1516, [Pace] to 
Henry, Constance), 2111 (calendared end June 1516, fragment in Pace’s handwriting), 2114 
(calendared end June 1516). For the Maximilian-Schiner-Wingfield axis, on the other hand, which 
continued to criticise Pace and Visconti, while attempting to secure money from the English secretary 
ostensibly for the defence of Verona, see ibid., 2014 (7
T[rent]), 2026 (10 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, [Trent]), 2035 (12 June 1516, Maximilian 
to [Pace], Erenberg), 2038 (13 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, Trent), 2039 (13 June 1516, 
Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Trent), 2040 (calendered 13 June 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to [Barth. 
Ticcionus]), 2041 (13 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Trent), 2043 (13 June 1516, Jacobus 
[Villenger] to Pace, Augsburg), 2044 (14 June 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Henry, Trent), 2045 (14 
June 1516, abstract of Cardinal Schiner’s letters), 2053 (16 June 1516, - to Cardinal Schiner), 2055 (17 
June 1516, [Cardinal Schiner] to Maximilian, Trent), 2056 (17 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to [Pace], 
Trent), 2064 (19 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Henry, Trent), 2065 (19 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner 
to Wolsey), 2092 (25 June 1516, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Trent), 2093 (25 June 1516, Andreas 
Schiner to Cardinal Schiner, Verona), 2095 (26 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2104 (29 
June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Ove[rlingen]’), 2105 (29 June 1516, Maximilian to Suffolk, 
‘Uberlingen’), 2106 (29 June 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Uberlingen’). 
252 While English overtures to Charles of Castile met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm during May, by 
around 4 June they began to bear fruit, as English representatives at the Burgundian Court began to 
convey the Catholic King’s pledge to act. This was qualified, however, by a reluctance to send money 
to the emperor. Also, by 28 June, Charles was only prepared to commit his troops to ‘defensive’ 
actions (in other words not to actively pursue the expulsion of the French from Italy). It did not take 
long for reports to reach England that the Viceroy of Naples was moving to support the anti-French 
forces; LPIIi, 1853 (4 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1895 (16 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, 
‘Douay, in Artois’), 1904 (18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to 
[Henry], Brussels), 1993 (4 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Louvain), 2052 
(calendared 15-16 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard 
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Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2095 (26 June 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2099 (28 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry] Brussels), 2100 
reassuring noises continued to emanate from Charles’ Court, the Spanish king still appeared not to be 
moving in the right direction for England. In particular, English overtures for money were refused (by 
4 July) and negotiations with France 
particularly at the Noyon conferenc rom
(calendared 28 June 1516, [Pace] to Henry, Constance), 2114 (calendared end June 1516). While 
(along with the contribution of Chièvres and de Sauvage), 
e f  1 August, continued to overshadow diplomatic despatches to 
England, whereby an agreement involving the marriage of Charles to Francis’ infant daughter (when 
she came of age, which Wolsey commented would not be for another fifteen years) was likely, despite 
assurances that this would not be prejudicial to Anglo-Spanish relations and that discussions were 
elly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1963 
reaching an impasse. It was generally recognised, however, that some sort of an agreement was likely 
in order to facilitate Charles’ voyage to Spain to claim his inheritance and to put down a rebellion; 
ibid., 2132 (4 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2136 (5 July 1516, 
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2150 (10 July 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2152 (10 July 1516, 
Pace to Wolsey), 2165 (12 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels), 2166 (12 
July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2175 (calendared 15-16 July 1516, [Henry] to [Tunstal and 
Richard Wingfield), 2189 (18 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2192 
(19 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2206 (23 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to 
[Henry], Brussels), 2213 (26 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2219 (27 July 1516, Tunstal to 
[Wolsey], Brussels), 2220 (27 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2230 (31 July 1516, [Leonard 
Friscobald] to Wolsey, London), 2244 (4 August 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2248 (6 
August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2261 (10 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 
2269 (13 August 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2270 (13 August 1516, 
Tunstal to Wolsey), 2275 (14 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i, pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For 
English observations of French pressure applied on Charles via the duke of Guelders and rumours of an 
intended expedition against Naples, see LPIIi, 2117 (1 July 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2206 
(23 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2269 (13 August 1516, Tunstal 
and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels). 
To join this coalition, Charles wanted a loan from England to pay for his voyage to Spain and 
a commitment of troops to protect Burgundy in his absence. While Wolsey rejected these requests 
towards the start of May, Henry had agreed to the loan by early June; ibid., 2006 (6 June 1516, Tunstal 
and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to 
[Henry], Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels). For 
further indications of Charles’ procrastination, see ibid., 1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in 
England to Margaret of Savoy, London), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to 
[Henry], Louvain), 2050 (15 June 1516, Charles to Henry, Louvain), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and 
Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2080 (23 June 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2087 (24 
June 1516), 2088 (24 June 1516, commission to de Mesa), 2099 (23 June 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], 
Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.250-254 (Ven.ii, 750; LPIIi, 2183; 17 July 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). It was recognised in England that Charles’ reluctance to commit 
was because of concurrent Franco-Burgundian negotiations, through which an agreement seemed 
increasingly likely, particularly given Charles’ concern to secure the Low Countries before he travelled 
to Spain at a time when they were threatened by the French-backed duke of Guelders; LPIIi, 1848 (3 
May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1853 (4 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1862 (6 May 
1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1895 (16 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, ‘Douay, in Artois’), 1904 
(18 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Arras), 1913 (20 May 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Arras), 1938 (27 
May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Antwerp), 1939 (27 May 1516, Spin
(31 May 1516, Jerningham to [Wolsey], Tournai), 1973 (calendared end May 1516, news from 
France), 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1993 (4 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], 
Brussels), 2006 (6 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels), 2027 (10 June 1516, 
copy of a letter from the king’s spy, written at Mechelin), 2063 (19 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard 
Wingfield to Wolsey, Brussels), 2075 (22 June 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey), 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal 
and Richard Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 2080 (23 June 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2081 
(23 June 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels); Ven.ii, 759 (13 August, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; LPIIi, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 265-270 (Ven.ii, 757; LPIIi, 2259; 10 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory). The 
English would have blamed these negotiations on the pro-French sympathies of some of Charles’ 
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 In spite of continued negotiations with its potential anti-French confederates, 
particularly focused in London on the formation of a league, the English initiative was 
gazumped by Francis I’s various counter-offers to the same powers. This began with 
the Treaty of Noyon (13 August 1516), agreed with Charles of Castile.253 The 
defection of Charles was to be followed by that of the Swiss on 24 November and 
Maximilian on 3 December.254 In light of the Franco-Spanish agreement, the English 
                                                                                                                                            
principal councilors, in particular Chièvres and de Sauvage. On 6 May, for instance, Wolsey had tried 
to threaten them with the loss of their English pensions and with a revolution against their authority; 
LPIIi, 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’), 2019 (8 June 1516, 
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Wolsey, on 17 August, predicted that Charles would not go to Spain until 
a treaty was made with France; Ven.ii, 763 (19 August 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
253 According to Noyon, Charles agreed to restore the kingdom of Navarre to its original king and to 
marry Francis I’s daughter; LPIIi, 2271-2272 (calendared 13-14 August 1516); Ven.ii, 765; K. Brandi, 
The Emperor Charles V, p.76; R. Lockyer, Habsburg and Bourbon Europe 1470-1720 (1974), p.223. 
The English crown was notified by various of its diplomats from the 15th onwards; LPIIi, 2279 (15 
August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2303 (26 August 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 
2310 (28 August 1516, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2327 (calendared end August 1516), 2328 
(calendered end August 1516, [Wolsey] to [Tunstal and Richard Wingfield). Certainly, there were 
contemporaries who speculated that this agreement would put paid to any Swiss expedition and English 
ambitions; Ven.ii, 761 (16 August 1516, letter from Tours to the secretary of the archbishop of 
Salerno). 
254 For reports of Imperial adhesion to the Treaty of Noyon, see LPIIi, 2627 (calendared 1-3 December 
1516, - to [Margaret of Savoy]), 2633 (5 December 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2667 (13 
December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw’), 2671 (13 December 1516, Tunstal to 
[Wolsey], Brussels). The English knew from at least early September that Maximilian had also been 
negotiating with the French to join ‘this foul peace’ and, even while negotiating towards an anti-French 
league through Cardinal Schiner, the emperor effectively indicated (on 12 October) that he was likely 
to conclude with Francis; ibid., 2331 (1 September 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 2335 (1 September 1516, Maraton to Robert Wingfield, ‘Ex arche Eerenberg apud Rute’), 
2349 (9 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2357 (12 September 1516, Margaret of Savoy 
to the Imperial ambassadors in England, Brussels), 2358 (13 September 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], 
Brussels), 2363 (14 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2366 (15 September 1516, 
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2372 (17 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2373 (20 
September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2374 (20 September 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 2386 (25 September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Augsburg), 2392 (27 September 
1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2393 (Spinelly to Wolsey, 27 September 1516, Brussels), 2431 
(8 October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2441 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], 
Augsburg), 2442 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Pace], Au[gsburg]), 2444 (13 October 
1516, Da[vid Bastard] d’Emeries to Edward Poynings, Tournai), 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to 
Wolsey, Zurich). Of additional concern to the English (vis-à-vis the prospect of a Franco-Imperial 
rapprochement) were rumours of some sort of convoluted financial arrangement for Maximilian to 
surrender Verona to the French (via Charles). The city was under siege by Franco-Venetian forces and 
the emperor at length gained English funds to help defend it, apparently in return for agreeing to the 
anti-French league. The perceived significance of Verona was such that Tunstal opined to Chièvres 
that, if the city was to be handed over, ‘the French would have Italy’; ibid., 2310 (28 August 1516, 
Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2331 (1 September 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 2374 (20 September 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2387 (calendared 25-26 September 
1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2441 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 2442 
(12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Pace], Au[gsburg]), 2450 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to 
Henry, Brussels), 2495 (calendared end October, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2496 (calendared end October 
1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Zurich]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; LPIIi, 
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crown was pragmatic; it recognised that it could do little about it (particularly given 
the pro-French nature of Charles’ chief councillors) and hoped that Charles’ 
reassurrances that he would still align against France would bear fruit.255 The actual 
                                                                                                                                            
October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
not prejudicial to English interests and would not affect their desire to recruit the Cantons against 
France; LPIIi, 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587 (calendared 23 
2477; 24 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 318-321 (Ven.ii, 798; LPIIi, 2487; 29 
 For Pace’s initial reports back to England reported that the ‘perpetual peace’ of Fribourg was 
November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). Also see R.J. Knecht, Francis I , pp.67-68. Indeed, the English 
had been well-informed about Swiss negotiations with the French, arising from the Cantons’ fears post-
ce to 
wiss were not aided by the defection of Galeazzo Visconti, the condottiero and Milanese 
Noyon and had sought through Pace to counter these; LPIIi, 2334 (1 September 1516, [Pace] to 
Wolsey), 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]), 2351 (9 September 1516, letters of 
Galeazzo Visconti), 2366 (15 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2386 (25 September 
1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Augsburg), 2387 (calendared 25-26 September 1516, [Wolsey] to 
Pace), 2388 (26 September 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2411 (calendared 2-3 October 1516, Pa
[Wolsey]), 2415 (calendared 3 October 1516, [Henry] to [Tunstal and other ambassadors]), 2428 (7 
October 1516, Pace to Burbank, Zurich), 2431 (8 October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2450 (16 October 
1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2495 (calendared 
end October, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2496 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], [Zurich]). 
For Pace’s continued confidence, in spite of Franco-Swiss negotiations, that the services of the Cantons 
could still be secured, see ibid., 2334 (1 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey) (1 September), 2350 (9 
September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]), 2351 (9 September 1516, letters of Galeazzo Visconti), 
2516 (7 November 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Zurich), 2562 (18 November 1516, [Pace] to Robert 
Wingfield, Zurich), 2565 (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich). English hopes for winning 
over the S
exile that they had hired to lead the Swiss contingent; ibid., 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, 
Zurich), 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587 (calendared 23 
November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2601 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 2602 (27 
November 1516, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich). Also see Ven.ii, 824 (3 December 1516, Venetian 
ambassador in France to the Signory, Ambiose). Furthermore, the English were aware (from around the 
start of September) of French approaches to the exiled Sforza claimant to Milan (Francesco Maria), 
with a view to his relinquishing his claim on the duchy. Offers included a red hat, benefices and 
money, although these were rejected and revealed to Pace; LPIIi, 2300 (calendared 25 August 1516, 
Pace to Wolsey), 2301 (25 August 1516, Sforza to Pace, Trent). For an earlier rumour about this from 
the Low Countries (4 July), see ibid., 2132 (4 July 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], 
Brussels). For French overtures to England to join the Treaty of Noyon; ibid., 2340 (3 September 
1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.287-292 (Ven.ii, 774; LPIIi, 2377; 22 September 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
255 LPIIi, 2317 (30 August 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2318 (30 August 1516, Richard 
Wingfield to Wolsey, Brussels), 2327 (calendared end August 1516), 2328 (calendered end August 
1516, [Wolsey] to [Tunstal and Richard Wingfield), 2329 (calendered end August 1516, [Wolsey] to 
[Henry]), 2415 (calendared 3 October 1516, [Henry] to [Tunstal and other ambassadors]), 2431 (8 
October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2450 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels); R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.284-287 (Ven.ii, 769; LPIIi, 2346; 7 September 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). For English hopes that the treaty could not endure because of the bias of its terms 
against Charles and that the latter would align against France, see LPIIi, 2387 (calendared 25-26 
September 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). For an example of the belief that Charles’ councillors were pro-
French, see ibid., 2374 (20 September 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels). For English hopes that the 
emperor, on his ‘descent’ to the Low Countries, would depose Charles’ francophile advisors, meet with 
Henry and coerce the Spanish king to break Noyon, the journey for which England would pledge to 
contribute financially, see ibid., 2334 (1 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey), 2338 (2 September 1516, 
[Wolsey] to [Margaret of Savoy], ‘At his place near London’), 2354 (11 September 1516, Margaret of 
Savoy to Wolsey, Brussels), 2357 (12 September 1516, Margaret of Savoy to the Imperial ambassadors 
in England, Brussels), 2368 (16 September 1516, Imperial ambassadors in England to Wolsey, 
Windsor), 2387 (calendared 25-26 September 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2376 (21 September 1516, 
 537
failure of Henry and Wolsey’s efforts took some months to sink in, however. 
Meanwhile, negotiations continued in London (and elsewhere) and agreement seems 
to have been close but unsuccessful on a number of occasions during September and 
October.256 Some cohesion to discussions was only offered when Maximilian sent 
ember 1516, in a final bid to break the Cardinal Schiner to England in late Sept
impasse in negotiations and to agree a league and a renewed offensive.257 Discussions 
                                                                                                                                            
[Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey]), 2404 (calendared end September 1516), 2405 (calendared end 
September 1516), 2416 (3 October, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, Augsburg), 2441 (12 October 1516, 
[Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Augsburg), 2451 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 
2483 (26 October 1516, Tunstal to [Henry]), 2484 (26 October, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2495 
(calendared end October, [Pace] to [Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.287-292 (Ven.ii, 
774; LPIIi, 2377; 22 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).  
256 Agreement may have been close in early September (when Giustinian understood that a great event 
contrary to Noyon would soon occur), as well as early and mid-October, although the arrival of 
Cardinal Schiner with revised proposals (or, as Giustinian described, ‘to weave some other web’) 
seems to have delayed the agreement; LPIIi, 2450 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels); R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 284-287 (Ven.ii, 769; LPIIi, 2346; 7 September 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London), 301-303 (LPIIi, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 
303-306 (Ven.ii, 789; LPIIi, 2449; 16 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 307-309 
(Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; 
LPIIi, 2477; 24 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
257 Schiner appears to have been sent by the emperor as a last-ditch attempt to break the impasse in 
negotiations before, Maximilian implied, he came to terms with the French. The cardinal passed 
through Burgundy, where he gained Charles’ agreement, before reaching England (in disguise) by 14 
October. Following a preliminary interview on the 18th, the Council was consulted and Wolsey was 
said to be ‘so wrath and excited, that he did not seem to be in his right mind’. Subsequently, the Swiss 
cardinal was locked in negotiations until an agreement was reached by the end of the month; LPIIi, 
2376 (21 September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey]), 2384 (25 September 1516), 2386 (25 
September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], Augsburg), 2390 (27 September 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to Henry, Augsburg), 2391 (27 September 1516, Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg), 2404 
(calendared end September 1516, Wolsey to Robert Wingfield), 2405 (calendared end September 
1516), 2417 (4 October 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2423 (5 October 1516, Tunstal to Henry, 
Brussels), 2426 (7 October 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2430 (8 October 1516, Margaret of 
Savoy to Wolsey, Brussels), 2451 (16 October 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), 
Four Years, i, pp.298-300 (Ven.ii, 781; LPIIi, 2414; 3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 301-303 (LPIIi, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 303-306 (Ven.ii, 
789; LPIIi, 2449; 16 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 307-309 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 
2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 312-316 (Ven.ii, 793; LPIIi, 2472; 22 
October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; LPIIi, 2477; 24 October 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 318-321 (Ven.ii, 798; LPIIi, 2487; 29 October 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 790 (8 October 1516, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, 
Paris). For Ammonius’ comments on how busy he was around this time, see ibid., 2498 (1 November 
1516, Ammonius to Erasmus, Westminster). The emperor’s financial demands and an English 
reluctance to be duped again by these apparently lay at the heart of the impasse in negotiations. 
Maximilian sought the conversion of a previous English loan (for the earlier campaign) into a gift, for 
Henry to support the defence of Verona and to pay for his ‘descent’ into the Low Countries. After the 
Treaty of Noyon, however, the English position began to soften; ibid., 2334 (1 September 1516, [Pace] 
to Wolsey), 2338 (2 September 1516, [Wolsey] to [Margaret of Savoy], ‘At his place near London’), 
2357 (12 September 1516, Margaret of Savoy to the Imperial ambassadors in England, Brussels), 2376 
(21 September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey]), 2404 (calendared end September 1516, Wolsey 
to Robert Wingfield), 2405 (calendared end September 1516), 2406 (calendared end September 1516), 
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resulted in a league ‘for defence of the Church’, concluded in London on 29 October 
1516; it incorporated Henry VIII, Maximilian and Charles, while papal membership 
was anticipated.258 The low key nature of the conclusion and celebration of the treaty, 
as well as the secrecy surrounding its contents, are indication enough of a lack of 
certainty within England that the agreement would be ratified by its members.259 
Possibly because of this, the retired principal minister, Fox, returned to Court by 18 
November, perhaps to add his experience to English efforts.260 In subsequent months, 
the English sought formal approval of the agreement from Maximilian, Charles and 
the Swiss, with varying degrees of success.261 The emperor committed to the anti-
                                                                                                                                            
2441 (12 October 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Augsburg); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, 
pp.284-287 (Ven.ii, 769; LPIIi, 2346; 7 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 292-298 
(Ven.ii, 775; LPIIi, 2382; 23 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
258Integral to the coalition was the collective retention of the Swiss for the Italian enterprise. Among 
other clauses are the protection of Verona (with an English loan to Maximilian for this), that the 
emperor would descend to the Low Countries by Christmas and remove Charles’ pro-French 
councillors, that Henry would go to meet Maximilian shortly after, that the English king would be 
lobbied to accept the Imperial crown offered to him. Concerning Milan, there was a clause by which 
Maximilian would invest his ‘natural heirs’ with the duchy if Henry was ‘willing to undertake the 
defence of Christendom’ but, if not, he would bestow it on Henry’s nominee, as long as the expulsion 
of the French from Italy was aided by England. Concerning the expulsion of the French from the 
peninsula, the cost to England was to be met by Milan and other Italian states; LPIIi, 2462 (20 October 
1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516), 2497 (calendared start November 
1516), 2515 (7 November 1516, Cardinal Schiner and Titonius). 
259 The articles of the league were sworn to by Henry VIII, the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors in a 
Mass on 1 November 1516, in a small chapel usually used by the king. In addition, Giustinian claimed, 
the articles were not published. From this, one can imply that the English crown wished to keep the 
agreement, or at least its details, secret at this stage (perhaps awaiting firm declarations of support from 
its allies). This would explain why Norfolk (at least partially) misinformed Giustinian around 21 
October that Schiner was there to propose universal peace. Also, merchant letters from England of 6 
November failed to mention the treaty. In addition, Henry VIII was to receive an instalment of the 
French pension in November, which he doubtless wanted not to jeapordise; ibid., 2497 (calendared 
start November 1516), 2510 (5 November 1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 309-312 (Ven.ii, 
792; LPIIi, 2470; 21 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIIi, 
2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii, pp.19-20 (LPIIi, 2665; 13 
December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 817 (27 November 1516, letters from 
Venetian merchants in England), 825 (13 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Sp.ii, 
252 (1 November 1516). In spite of English efforts, the league did not remain much of a secret, as 
Francis I knew of it and of Schiner’s involvement by 25 November; Ven.ii, 821 (25 November 1516, 
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Amboise). 
260 Fox certainly seems to have been au fait with the anti-French agreement and foreign affairs more 
generally; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.9-12 (Ven.ii, 811; LPIIi, 2559; 18 November 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
261 Upon conclusion of the treaty, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield were commissioned to receive the 
oaths of confirmation from Charles and Maximilian, respectively. Around 8-9 November, copies of the 
treaty were distributed to Pace and Tunstal, for the benefit of the Swiss and Charles, respectively. One 
would also have expected a copy to be sent to the emperor; LPIIi, 2497 (calendared start November 
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French league on 8 December but, as mentioned, had already pledged himself to 
Noyon.262 On receipt of initial reports of the latter, Henry was ‘marvellously 
anguis[hed] and perplexed’ and believed that, if true, it would not only be ‘to the 
roo[me of all] Christendom, but also to his [Maximilian’s] perpetual shame’.263 
Nevertheless, the English persisted in observing their financial commitments to the 
emperor and appear to have been convinced during December that he remained anti-
French at heart.264 Continued discussions were also conducted with Charles although, 
                                                                                                                                            
1516), 2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2613 (30 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to 
[Wolsey], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace'). 
262 There seems to have been some procrastination to joining the London treaty on the emperor’s part, 
probably because of his concurrent negotiations with the French; ibid., 2605 (28 November 1516, 
Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’), 2613 (30 November 1516, Robert 
ingfield to Henry, 
m to have abandoned the meeting at 
e defection, Henry was reportedly mortified and sought 
nch course if this occurred. The English further continued to push 
Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace'), 2626 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2627 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, - to [Margaret of Savoy]), 2634 (5 
December 1516, Wolsey to Schiner), 2641 (7 December 1516, Robert W
‘Hagenow’), 2645 (7 December 1516, Louis Maroton to Margaret of Savoy, ‘Hagennaw’), 2647 (8 
December 1516), 2648 (8 December 1516, Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenow in the Neethir 
Elsace’), 2661 (11 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Nether Alscace’), 2662 (11 
December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow). The English must have been at least fairly confident of 
success, as Schiner also agreed a supplementary Anglo-Imperial treaty on 2 November, whereby 
Maximilian would go to the Low Countries to remove Chièvres and others from Charles’ Council (the 
journey subsidised by the English), so that Charles could be detached from Noyon, meet Henry at or 
around Calais and would be sent English money for the relief of Verona. While the English met their 
end of the bargain (by advancing money to the emperor), the emperor’s ‘descent’ was repeatedly 
stalled, although Maximilian appeared to be moving towards the Low Countries and continued 
reassurances emanated from Germany. Indeed, the English see
least by early December, although they continued with their financial obligations; ibid., 2501 (2 
November 1516), 2536 (11 November 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Stayn on the Rhine’), 2573 
(21 November 1516, Maximilian to Margaret, Strasbourg), 2585 (calendared 23 November 1516, 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2589 (24 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘Hagenow in 
Nether Alsatia’), 2596 (25 November 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2605 (28 November 1516, 
Robert Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’), 2626 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, 
[Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2627 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, - to [Margaret of Savoy]), 2631 
(calendared 4-5 December 1516, [Henry] to [Wolsey]), 2632 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, Henry to 
Robert Wingfield), 2634 (5 December 1516, Wolsey to Schiner), 2650 (8 December 1516, Margaret of 
Savoy to Henry, Brussels), 2651 (8 December 1516, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Brussels), 2652 (8 
December 1516, [Margaret of Savoy] to [de Hesdin], Brussels), 2661 (11 December 1516, [Robert 
Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Nether Alscace’), 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow). 
263 Ibid., 2678 (Wolsey to Sir Robert Wingfield, 16 December 1516). 
264 Initially, denials were issued from Imperial sources about the agreement, but when these could no 
longer hold water, Maximilian admitted that he had had no choice but to enter the Treaty of Noyon. 
Following the arrival of early reports of th
confirmation from Germany. If it was not true, Wolsey instructed Wingfield to give way to more of the 
emperor’s financial demands. Indeed, his adhesion to Noyon notwithstanding, Maximilian indicated 
that he would continue on an anti-Fre
towards an alliance and meeting with the emperor. By 25 December, Wolsey wrote of his belief that 
Maximilian ‘doth play on both hands’ and that, on this basis, England would retain its faith in him. 
This opinion was repeated by Ruthal; ibid., 2632 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, Henry to Robert 
Wingfield), 2640 (6 December 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2650 (8 December 1516, Margaret 
 540
despite positive noises from Burgundy, he appeared to procrastinate. Despite this, the 
English hoped that the Spanish king would either come around of his own accord or 
would be forced to do so by Maximilian, when he ‘descended’ to the Low 
Countries.265 The Swiss visibly backed off from the anti-French league post-Noyon, 
although Pace indicated that at least some of the Cantons could still be won over, even 
                                                                                                                                            
of Savoy to Henry, Brussels), 2651 (8 December 1516, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Brussels), 2652 
(8 December 1516, [Margaret of Savoy] to [de Hesdin], Brussels), 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner 
to Wolsey, Hagenow), 2667 (13 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw’), 2678 (16 
December 1516, [Wolsey] to Robert Wingfield), 2700 (25 December 1516, [Wolsey] to Tunstal), 2702 
(26 December 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey), 2705 (27 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Wolsey], 
Hagenow), 2706 (28 December 1516), 2707 (calendared 28 December 1516, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]), 
., 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow), 
3 (5 
Wolsey to Schiner), 2640 (6 
2713 (calendared 30 December 1516). Imperial sources continued to assert that Maximilian still 
remained committed against France; ibid
2675 (15 December 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 2679 (16 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] 
to Henry, ‘Hagenow’), 2700 (25 December 1516, [Wolsey] to Tunstal), 2702 (26 December 1516, 
Tunstal to Wolsey), 2707 (calendared 28 December 1516, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]), 2714 (calendared 30 
December 1516, [Henry] to [Robert Wingfield]), 2715 (30 December 1516, Robert Wingfield to 
Henry, ‘Haenau), 2719 (calendared end December 1516, [Henry] to [Somerset and Knight]), 2721 
(calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.20-25 (Ven.ii, 828; LPIIi, 2710; 29 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 25-26 
(Ven.ii, 829; LPIIi, 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
 The Imperial surrender of Verona during December in a deal with France, however, the 
defence of which England had been bound to contribute, must have caused great resentment within 
crown circles (despite Maximilian’s protestations that he had no choice); LPIIi, 2501 (2 November 
1516), 2536 (11 November 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to Henry, ‘Stayn on the Rhine’), 2565 (19 
November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2573 (21 November 1516, Maximilian to Margaret, 
Strasbourg), 2589 (24 November 1516, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘Hagenow in Nether Alsatia’), 
2626 (calendared 1-3 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]), 2662 (11 December 1516, 
Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow), 2667 (13 December 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw’), 
2683 (18 December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2702 (26 December 1516, Tunstal to 
Wolsey), 2707 (calendared 28 December 1516, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]), 2719 (calendared end 
December 1516, [Henry] to [Somerset and Knight]), 2721 (calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 20-25 (Ven.ii, 828; LPIIi, 2710). Another worry for England 
arising from the Franco-Imperial alignment would have been the reported offer by Francis to split Italy 
between himself and Maximilian; LPIIi, 2585 (calendared 23 November 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 2632 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, Henry to Robert Wingfield), 2634 (5 December 1516, 
Wolsey to Schiner), 2635 (5 December 1516, Cardinal [Schiner] to [Wolsey]), 2636 (5 December 
1516, Schiner to Pace, ‘Agnou’); R. Brown, Four Years (trans.), ii, pp.20-25 (Ven.ii, 828; LPIIi, 2710). 
265 See above n.256. Also see LPIIi, 2561 (18 November 1516, Tunstal to [Wolsey]), 2566 (19 
November 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2615 (calendared end 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2713 
(calendared 30 December 1516), 2630 (calendared 4-5 December 1516, Henry to Tunstal), 263
December 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2634 (5 December 1516, 
December 1516, Tunstal to Wolsey, Brussels), 2663 (12 December 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 
2672 (14 December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2678 (16 December 1516, [Wolsey] to Robert 
Wingfield), 2682 (18 December 1516, Charles to Henry, Mechelin), 2685 (20 December 1516, Tunstal 
to Henry), 2700 (25 December 1516, [Wolsey] to Tunstal), 2723 (calendared end December 1516); R. 
Brown, Four Years (trans.), ii, pp. 1-6 (Ven.ii, 807; LPIIi, 2543; 13 November 1516, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 7-9 (Ven.ii, 809; LPIIi, 2547; 15 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 9-12 (Ven.ii, 811; LPIIi, 2559; 18 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London).The 
English also continued to hope that Maximilian would force Charles to ratify the league (and detach 
from Noyon) by virtue of his agreed ‘descent’ to the Low Countries; LPIIi, 2634 (5 December 1516, 
Wolsey to Schiner), 2663 (12 December 1516, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels). 
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after their agreement with Francis I.266 At the close of 1516, therefore, prospects for 
the anti-French league did not look bright, although the English continued to be 
convinced that the other parties would not observe their various agreements with 
Francis I.267 It may have been indicative of this that, at the end of December, 
Giustinian observed a number of Henry’s ministers advocating universal peace.268 To 
protect the papacy from the French, an aggressive course was increasingly unfeasible; 
was this a precursor to the universal peace later advocated in 1518? 
 
The confirmation and enacting of the league ‘to defend the Church’ looked 
increasingly unlikely to the English crown in early 1517, as all of its principal allies 
aligned with France.269 In addition, it was rumoured that a meeting would be held 
between the three ‘Noyon’ monarchs at Cambrai, although this soon changed into a 
conference between their delegates.270 Maximilian had given up Verona, hitherto the 
                                                 
266 For continued English pressure applied to the Swiss and hopes that they could still be turned against 
France, in spite of the French peace, see LPIIi, 2516 (7 November 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Zurich), 
2519 (8 November 1516), 2531 (calendared 9 November 1516, [Robert Wingield] to Henry, Overlynge 
on the Lake of Constance), 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587 
(calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2591 (24 November 1516, [Pace] to Maximilian, 
Zurich), 2601 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 2602 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to 
Wolsey, Zurich), 2615 (calendared end 1516, [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 2675 (15 December 1516, [Pace] to 
[Wolsey], Zurich). 
267 On 7 December, for instance, Wolsey declared that, within two months, England and Spain would 
send ambassadors to France and Venice to demand that they cease their offensive against Verona and, 
by the 13th, it was reported that Knight had been commissioned for this purpose (although Knight went 
to the emperor); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 19-20 (Ven.ii, 825; LPIIi, 2665; 13 December 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory). 
268 Ibid., pp.25-26 (Ven.ii, 829; LPIIi, 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
269 An indicator of the desperation felt in England came in early January, when Wolsey and Ruthal, in 
response to reports of an Imperial-Venetian peace, claimed credit for it by claiming that the anti-French 
league ‘inspired some terror’, inducing parties to come to terms. In the Venetian’s opinion, the English 
would pretend to be happy with the peace and would not act any further. By the end of the month, 
Wolsey was said to be increasingly reserved and Fox refused access to Giustinian, as the Franco-
Imperial accord looked increasingly real; R. Brown, Four Years (trans.), ii, pp.27-28 (Ven.ii, 834; 
LPIIii, 2753; 6 January 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 28-29 (Ven.ii, 837; LPIIii, 2839; 28 
January 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
270 For rumours of such a meeting from early December 1516, see LPIIi, 2633 (5 December 1516, 
Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2634 (5 December 1516, Wolsey to Schiner), 2672 (14 December 1516, 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2683 (18 December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 2709 (29 
December 1516, Erasmus to Ammonius, [Brussels]), 2721 (calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Brussels); LPIIii, 2744 (Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, 1 January 1517, Calais), 2745 (1 
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object of the anti-French cause in Italy.271 Nevertheless, Henry continued to plough 
the anti-French furrow, apparently trusting signals from each of the aforementioned 
parties that they were committed to the October 1516 league.272 To this end, it seems 
that Henry still intended to cross to Calais to meet with Maximilian and Charles.273 
Perhaps the final nail in the coffin of the ‘holy league’ occurred on 14 February, 
however, when the emperor swore adhesion to Noyon. Tunstal and Somerset, 
ambassadors at the Court of Charles, subsequently recommended that Henry ‘draw his 
ot out of the affair gently as if he perceived it not, giving good words for good 
words’
fo
. Vis-à-vis, their failure to gain Charles’ confirmation of the anti-French treaty, 
                                                                                                                                            
2765 (11 January 1517, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 2862 (1 February 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], 
Brussels), 2929 (calendar  15-16 February 1517, [Spinelly] to [Henry]), 2940 (18 February 1517, 
Somerset and Tunstal to [Wolsey], Mechelin). Given that the last Cambrai conference in 1508 (albeit 
not a meeting between monarchs per se), produced a coalition against Venice to which England was 
271 See above n.264. Intelligence suggested that this city’s handover to Charles, then to France and 
finally to Venice, was still in progress. Gi stinian reported that Verona’s surrender caused ‘much 
January 1517, news from France) , 2761 (9 January 1517, [Beaughienville] to [Richard Wingfield]), 
ed
not included and implicitly opposed, this was an ominous prospect; see pp.359-360. 
u
vexation’ at the English Court and Henry, towards the end of February, instructed his ambassadors in 
the Low Countries to say that he was ‘pensive’ when he heard the news; LPIIii, 2767 (Spinelly to 
arent belief that Maximilian would still make his ‘descent’ into the Low Countries, 
ner), 2796 (18 January 1517, Maximilian to [his ambassadors in England), 2803 (20 
9 
 (1 February 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). 
Henry, 11 January 1517), 2830 (26 January 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2849 (29 January 
1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2862 (1 February 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2891 (8 
February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin), 2921 (13 February 1517, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels), 2958 (calendared 23 February 1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]); R. Brown, 
Four Years, ii (1854), pp.28-29 (Ven.ii, 837; LPIIii, 2839; 28 January 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 29-32 (Ven.ii, 839; LPIIii, 2896; 10 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 37-
42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
272 There was an app
replace Charles’ ministers, thereby making the Spanish king more amenable to the league against 
France, as well as meet Henry. The English even continued to subsidise the emperor’s journey; LPIIi, 
2754 (6 January 1517, Robert Wingfield to [Wolsey], [Trevis]), 2755 (6 January 1517, Schiner to 
Wolsey, Treves), 2765 (11 January 1517, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels), 2766 (11 January 1517, Tunstal 
to Wolsey), 2767 (11 January 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 2777 (13 January 1517, Louis Maroton to 
Cardinal Schi
January, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2813 (23 January 1517, Knight to Henry, Brussels), 2849 (2
January 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2856 (calendared end January 1517, Schiner to Imperial 
ambassadors in England), 2862 (1 February 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2891 (8 February 
1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 2909 (12 February 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to 
[Henry]). There were, however, suspicions among English diplomats about the emperor’s commitment; 
ibid., 2830 (26 January 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and 
Tunstal to [Henry]). Charles continued to suggest that he would confirm the October treaty, although 
he still wanted articles amended; ibid., 2813 (23 January 1517, Knight to Henry, Brussels), 2849 ((29 
January 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2862
Pace apparently tried to keep negotiations with the Swiss alive and still gained positive indications 
from the Cantons and these were to continue for some months; ibid., 2783 (15 January 1517), 3039 (21 
March 1517, Magistrates of Zurich to Henry).  
273 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.33-34 (Ven.ii, 840; LPIIii, 2903; 11 February 1517, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
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they recommended that Henry and Wolsey make the best of the accord as it stood, to 
consider it binding to the Catholic King and not to refer anything else to the emperor, 
Margaret of Savoy or Cardinal Schiner.274 Similarly, Knight (in Brussels) informed 
Wolsey that all of his fears had been realised and that, concerning the Cambrai 
conference, Wolsey ought to ‘be on his guard, as he cannot be sure of anything they 
[Charles’ pro-French advisors and the French commissioners] will do’.275 Despite all 
of this, the English crown remained optimistic, contrary advice from its diplomats 
notwithstanding. Even around 23 February, it was still hoped in England that the 
emperor would fulfil his promises, that Charles would adhere to the anti-French treaty 
and that Charles, Maximilian and Henry would meet.276 
                                                 
274 Maximilian took his oath in front of Charles at Brussels. Unconfirmed news of this was sent to 
England by Spinelly on 15-16 February, although formal notifications by Somerset and Tunstal were 
forwarded on the 18th. While the Imperial secretary, Maroton, suggested that the emperor would still 
adors concerning the 
(24 February 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2968 
o Robert Wingfield). For the decreasing likelihood of a meeting between 
entertain English overtures, the English diplomats described these as ‘painted words’ designed ‘to suck 
money from our master’ and further stated that they did not trust him; LPIIii, 2929 (calendared 15-16 
February 1517, [Spinelly] to [Henry]), 2940 (18 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Wolsey], 
Mechelin). Also see ibid., 2862 (1 February 1517, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2891 (8 February 
1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]). Tunstal had warned Wolsey about the ‘dissimulation’ in 
Brussels on 13 February and advised the cardinal to the do the same, to ‘shut the King’s purse’ and 
make the best of the treaty with Maximilian and Charles, ‘or the King will be left without friends’. 
Knight wrote to Wolsey along similar lines on the 16th; ibid., 2923 (13 February 1517, Tunstal to 
Wolsey), 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). 
275 Ibid., 2943 (19 February 1517, Knight to [Wolsey]). 
276 Around 23 February, Henry VIII acknowledged the warnings of his ambass
intentions of England’s ‘allies’. The king claimed to have written to them on hearing of the emperor’s 
intention to ratify Noyon, ‘to express sharply’ his unhappiness. Despite this, Wolsey was convinced (by 
Schiner’s assurances) that Maximilian would come good. Henry, therefore, intended ‘to refrain for a 
time…“Better it is to dissemble for a season till we may see the end, than by such means to provoke his 
further displeasures,” otherwise all their labours will be lost’; ibid., 2958 (calendared 23 February 
1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]). Also see ibid., 2963 (24 February 1517, Wolsey to [Henry], 
Westminster). The English representatives in Brussels felt betrayed by Maximilian that he had ratified 
without fulfilling his pledge to consult Henry first. They were also sceptical that the emperor would 
fulfil his promises vis-à-vis Charles. This feeling even spread among other English diplomats and 
Jerningham and the Council of Tournai even recommended on 1 April that Maximilian and Charles 
were not to be trusted; ibid., 2765 (11 January 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 2922 (13 February 
1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 2964 (24 February 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels), 3059 (27 March 
1517, Somerset and Tunstal, Mechelin), 3090 (calendared 1 April 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey), 3099 (4 
April 1517, Jerningham and the Council of Tournai to [Henry], Tournai). For continued English efforts 
with Maximilian, who still purported to be committed against France, see ibid., 2909 (12 February 
1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 2997 (8 March 1517, Schiner to Wolsey, 
Brussels). For the continued protracted negotiations between Henry and Charles, albeit with positive 
indications from the latter that he would eventually agree, see ibid., 2958 (calendared 23 February 
1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]), 2964 
(26 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3033 
(20 March 1517, Schiner t
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 The English still failed to acknowledge the failure of its anti-French league 
when, on 11 March 1517, the Peace of Cambrai was concluded between Francis I, 
Charles and Maximilian. It stipulated mutual defence and an intention to crusade 
although, of potential concern to England, there were secret clauses that provided for 
the division of Italy between them (excluding Venice).277 One can understand why 
Henry and Wolsey did not panic, however, as the agreement did not change the 
prevailing political status quo.278 Furthermore, the same positive indications still 
emanated from Maximilian and Charles that they would ultimately declare themselves 
against Francis I. Wolsey lost his patience with the emperor’s continued financial 
demands by early April and called his bluff; if Maximilian wanted a ‘rupture’, so be 
it. He also questioned the emperor’s failure to observe his promises to Henry and 
                                                    
asserted that Francis was laughing at the English king for financing Maximilian’s 
‘descent’ to the Low Countries. While Tunstal took the decision not to present this 
missive, he seems to have conveyed the general message that this was the emperor’s 
final chance.279 Subsequently, Maximilian seemed more amenable to helping Henry 
                                                                                        
r’s adhesion to Noyon, see ibid., 2958 Henry, Maximilian and Charles, following the empero
(calendared 23 February 1517, [Henry] to [Somerset and others]), 2964 (24 February 1517, Tunstal to 
[Henry], Brussels). 
277 Ibid., 3008 (11 March 1517). Knecht questions whether the articles concerning Italy were ever 
seriously intended by Francis, given that he was only prepared to follow these up if his amity with 
Venice ended. Indeed, the Franco-Venetian alliance was renewed in October 1517, making this 
academic; R.J. Knecht, Francis I , p.68. 
278 In advance of the peace, on 24 February, Wolsey opined to Henry that there was nothing to fear, 
seemingly in relation to Chièvres and Sauvage’s conference with French commissioners, given that 
Somerset intended to continue ‘in his devices’ in the Low Countries; LPIIii, 2963 (24 February 1517, 
Wolsey to [Henry], Westminster). Following the concusion of the Treaty of Cambrai, Spinelly, on 16 
March, declared that none of the articles that he had seen were prejudicial to England, Schiner notified 
Wingfield that a place in it had been left for Henry and a copy was sent to England on the 27th. 
Concerning the clauses about Italy, the English were only informed (again by Schiner) that Venice had 
been excluded from the agreement; ibid., 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3033 (20 March 
1517, Schiner to Robert Wingfield), 3059 (27 March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal, Mechelin). 
279 Wolsey was careful to issue his ultimatum indirectly through Cardinal Schiner; ibid., 3106 (7 April 
1517, Wolsey to [Schiner]). Henry also wrote to the emperor along these lines, but neither letter was 
presented by the English ambassadors on account of their ‘severe terms’; ibid., 3109 (9 April 1517, 
[Henry] to Maximilian), 3126 (15 April, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3128 (15 April 1517, 
Tunstal to Wolsey). Prior to Wolsey making a stand, the crown apparently continued to believe in the 
emperor’s declarations of support after the Treaty of Cambrai and continued to engage with him; ibid., 
3033 (20 March 1517, Schiner to Robert Wingfield), 3074, (30 March 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and 
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gain Charles’ adhesion to the anti-French league, although he still appeared to 
dissimulate and continue to lobby England for money.280 It is only from the end of 
May that the emperor seems to indicate his intention to fully commit against France; 
this filled the English crown with more optimism.281 This led to negotiations towards 
a reformulated ‘league for the defence of the Church’, which was finalised on 5 July 
1517.282 In wake of this, however, Maximilian reverted to his demands for English 
money.283 Around the same time as Wolsey’s ultimatum to the emperor, English 
representatives in the Low Countries were also instructed to gain Charles’ 
confirmation of the anti-French league, without any further quibbling over its articles. 
                                                                                                                                            
Tournai), 3101 (4 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Antwerp), 3103 (4 
involved (initially, bar Robert Wingfield), who continued to be sceptical about the emperor’s 
Spinelly to Wo ussels), 3099 (4 April 1517, Jerningham and the Council of Tournai to [Henry], 
April 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry, Antwerp), 3103 (4 April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, 
Antwerp); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.88-90 (Ven.ii, 893; LPIIii, 3295; 28 May 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
; LPIIii, 3126 (15 April, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3143 (19 April 1517, 
the emperor emanated from the same representatives, as well 
3301 (29 
Wingfield to Henry, ‘Lyer), 3099 (4 April 1517, Jerningham and the Council of Tournai to [Henry], 
April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Antwerp), 3107 (7 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to 
[Henry]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.42-50 (Ven.ii, 859; LPIIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 50-52 (Ven.ii, 865; LPIIii, 3081; 31 March 1517, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). This policy was at odds, however, with the opinions of the English diplomats 
commitment. It may have been this sustained criticism, as well as the arrival of a copy of the Treaty of 
Cambrai, that finally brought Wolsey around; LPIIii, 3059 (27 March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal, 
Mechelin), 3067 (29 March 1517, Someset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3075 (30 March 1517, Somerset 
and Tunstal to Henry, ‘Llyer’), 3076 (30 March 1517, Spinelly to [Henry]), 3077 (30 March 1517, 
lsey, Br
Tournai), 3101 (4 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Antwerp), 3102 (4 
280 According to Somerset, Maximilian even proposed to resign his position as ‘king of the Romans’ to 
Henry and was once more eager for a meeting with him. Even so, the emperor continued to push for 
more English money
Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3144 (19 April 1517, Somerset to Henry, Brussels), 3174 
(26 April 1517, Somerset to [Henry]), 3178 (27 April 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry), 3180 (27 
April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey), 3191 (calendared end April, [Henry to Somerset and others]). During 
May, continued accusations concerning 
as further indications that England still responded to Maximilian’s positive communications about 
France. By the end of the month, however, Tunstal et al were ready to give up with him; ibid., 3200 (3 
May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3246 
(15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3248 (16 May 1517, Pace to [Burbank], Constance), 3269 
(22 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3271 (22 May 1517, Somerset and 
Wingfield to Henry), 3282 (25 May 1517), 3296 (28 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to 
Henry). 
281 According to Schiner, a change in policy was about to be initiated; ‘the Frenchman thirsts for 
opportunity of aggrandizement’ and England was the only power that could stop this; ibid., 
May 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Antwerp). Also see ibid., 3325 (calendared end May 1517, [Wolsey] 
to [Somerset and others]), 3338 (5 June 1517, Robert Wingfield to Henry, Brussels). 
282 Ibid., 3437 (5 July 1517). It was said to be a defensive alliance against France which, in addition to 
providing for a military offensive, envisaged Leo X using his spiritual weapons; R. Brown, Four Years, 
ii (1854), pp.93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIIii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For 
negotiations up to this, see LPIIii, 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Wingfield, Antwerp). 
283 LPIIii, 3495 (20 July 1517, Schiner to Wingfield). 
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Again, this seems to have been presented as one last push to win over the Spanish 
king and, appreciating this, Charles and his ministers were also amenable. Charles 
declared his willingness to confirm the October treaty around 27 April and, indeed, 
this was done on 11 May.284 Furthermore, Charles, at length, sent a grand embassy to 
England to follow this up (and to seek a loan for his intended voyage to Spain), 
effectively by swearing to the reformulated holy league on 5 July, at which Imperial 
and papal representatives also participated.285 
The ‘league for defence of the Church’, between Henry, Maximilian and 
Charles, stipulated that the Swiss would be retained for 30,000 florins per year (by 
Henry and Charles), one presumes for action in Italy. The other parties ratified by 
                                                 
284 Ibid., 3126 (15 April, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]). The commission to gain Charles’ adhesion 
was issued on 2 April. A sense of the finality of the English offer can be gained from Henry’s 
instruction at the end of April to accept Charles’ confirmation or, if this was difficult, gain this via 
Margaret of Savoy and Maximilian. Failing that, however, the English ambassadors were to retire to 
Tournai; ibid., 3076 (30 March 1517, Spinelly to [Henry]), 3094 (2 April 1517), 3101 (4 April 1517, 
Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Antwerp), 3102 (4 April 1517, Somerset and 
Tunstal to Henry, Antwerp), 3107 (7 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3128 
(15 April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey), 3143 (19 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to 
[Henry]), 3144 (19 April 1517, Somerset to Henry, Brussels), 3174 (26 April 1517, Somerset to 
[Henry]), 3178 (27 April 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry), 3179 (calendared 27 April 1517, 
Charles to Henry), 3180 (27 April 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey), 3183 (28 April 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 3191 (calendared end April 1517, [Henry to Somerset and others]), 3200 (3 May 1517, 
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3210 (7 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry, Louvain), 3212 (7 
r fighting the duke of Guelders), which was granted in July, see LPIIii, 3402 (26 June 
urgh); Sp.ii, 256 
 however; see 
ank], Constance). 
May 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3221 (11 May 1517), 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to 
[Henry]), 3222-3225 (11 May 1517), 3231 (12 May 1517, Margaret of Savoy to [Wolsey], Ghent), 
3232 (12 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels), 3343 (7 June 1517, 
Tunstal to [Henry], Brussels). 
285 It was said by Giustinian that a new oath ceremony was required because of the removal of clauses 
originally inserted by Cardinal Schiner; ibid., 3260 (19 May 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 3270 (22 May 
1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3344 (7 June 
1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3368-3369 (16 June 1517), 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], 
Ghent), 3398 (25 June 1517, [Cardinal of Aragon] to [Wolsey], Bruges), 3399 (calendared at 25 June 
1517, Cardinal of Aragon to Wolsey, Calais), 3417 (calendared end June 1517, Henry to [Tunstal and 
others]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.90-93 (Ven.ii, 908; LPIIii, 3372; 17 June 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIIii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). For Charles’ commitment being linked to a substantial loan for his voyage to Spain 
(as well as fo
1517), 3417 (calendared end June 1517, Henry to [Tunstal and others]), 3439 (6 July 1517, Charles to 
Henry, Middelbourg), 3440 (6 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middelbourg), 3441 (6 July 1517, 
Charles to his ambassadors in England, Middleburg), 3442 (6 July 1517, Charles’ instructions to his 
ambassadors in England), 3513-3514 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleb
(LPIIii, 3491; 18 July 1517, Charles to all persons, Middelburgh) 257 (18 July 1517, Charles to his 
ambassadors in England, Middelburgh), 258 (18 July 1517), 259 (22 July 1517, Charles to all persons, 
Middelburgh); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.103-104 (Ven.ii, 930; LPIIii, 3492; 19 July 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). Charles was still not trusted by English diplomats,
for example LPIIii, 3248 (16 May 1517, Pace to [Burb
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proxy and a letter patent was recited from Charles. The clauses were said to be those 
agreed for the previously agreed league of October 1516, albeit it was a ‘defensive’ 
rather than a ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ coalition.286 Of England’s two allies, Henry 
and Wolsey had good reason to be confident that Charles would ultimately follow-
through with his anti-French commitments. The Spanish king needed Henry as an 
ally, particularly as he felt a pressing need to go to Spain, where a revolt had the 
potential to threaten his authority there.287 To achieve this, he sought an English loan 
for the 
288
voyage (which seems to have been granted in return for his membership of the 
anti-Gallic league), as well as assistance against the growing military threat to 
Burgundy by the (French supported) duke of Guelders, particularly while he was in 
Spain.  For the English, Charles’ need to go to Spain was also a credible reason for 
the continued Franco-Spanish amity which, it was claimed (repeatedly by Chièvres), 
                                                 
286 LPIIii, 3437 (5 July 1517); Ven.ii, 918 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to the Marchioness of Mantua, 
London), 919 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London); R. Brown, Four Years, ii 
(1854), pp.95-103 (Ven.ii, 920; LPIIii, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). It was 
said to be a defensive alliance against France which, in addition to providing for a military offensive, 
envisaged Leo X using his spiritual weapons; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; 
LPIIii, 3415; 30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
287 The English knew of Charles’ need to visit Spain on account of a revolt that appeared to threaten his 
authority there, from at least March 1517; LPIIii, 3069 (29 March 1517, David Bastard d’Em[eries] to 
Poynings, Tournai). 3076 (30 March 1517, Spinelly to [Henry]), 3088 (1 April 1517, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels), 3143 (19 April 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to [Henry]), 3200 (3 May 
1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3210 (7 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to Henry, Louvain), 3212 
(7 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3246 (15 
May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3300 (29 May 
15117, Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, 
Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent); R. Brown, Four Years (trans.), ii, pp.88-90 (Ven.ii, 893; LPIIii, 3295; 28 
May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see H. Kamen, Spain 1469-1714: a Society of 
Conflict (1983), pp.73-74. Charles eventually departed for Spain (a voyage subsidised by England) in 
September 1517 and was to stay there until 1520; LPIIii, 3692 (19 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
‘At sea at the Sell’), 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Spain), addendum 200 (15 October 
1517, A. de la Laing to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.134-135 (Ven.ii, 979; 
LPIIii, 3738; Giustinian to the Signory, London); M.F. Alvarez, Charles V Elected Emperor and 
Hereditary Ruler (1975), pp.20-21, 36-37. 
288 For the loan, see for instance, LPIIii, 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 
1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent). Towards the end of May, Henry was tentatively approached to 
become the protector of Flanders. For this, the threat felt by Charles from Guelders and the belief that 
the duke was being actively backed by Francis I, see ibid., 3300 (29 May 15117, Spinelly to [Henry], 
Ghent), 3453 (9 July 1517, Tunstal to Henry), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3542 
(30 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddelborowe’), 3586 (17 August 1517, Spinelly to Henry), 3608 
(20 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke, ‘Middelburg’), 3647 (28 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 
945 (6 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). 
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would be broken once Charles was secure in his southern territories.289 Despite this 
optimism gained from both the emperor and king of Spain, doubts must still have 
been harboured in England, particularly when one considers that both swore to the 
Treaty of Cambrai as recently as 14 May.290 
 
Returning to the Anglo-papal focus, during the progress of the Pace expedition 
(March-April 1516), the English had failed to gain definitive backing from the 
papacy. From its faltering at Milan, moreover, it was observed that Leo X would not 
support the anti-French cause while it was losing and, also, that he began to meet his 
obligations to support Francis I (in the ‘defence’ of Italy against the Imperial-Swiss 
descent). An indication of this came on 4 April, when Wingfield reported that Leo X 
had made no offer to support the expedition financially.291 In the context of the 
emperor’s retreat, which the English ambassador accompanied, the implication was 
that no such contribution could now be expected. Similarly, around 8 April, Pace 
forwarded intelligence that Francis had sent all of his troops to Bologna, to defend the 
pe, while Leo himself had sent an envoy to Fpo rancis to place himself in the 
Frenchman’s hands.292 The suggestion was that the pope was no longer reluctant to 
observe his alliance with France. On 23 April, as the expedition was clearly 
collapsing, Pace notified Wolsey that the pope (along with Florence and Genoa) 
                                                 
289 Spinelly certainly voiced this opinion; LPIIii, 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 
(19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). 
Further optimism would have been gained from hearing that Charles’ Spanish advisors were opposed 
to the French amity; ibid., 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). That Charles was 
increasingly leaning towards England may also have been interpreted by Wolsey who, in June 1517, 
was granted a pension backdated to July 1516 and, during August, may have had a bishopric tentatively 
offered to him; ibid., 3345 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 3347 (8 June 1517), 3605 (19 
August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke). 
290 On the 17th, Henry’s ambassadors in the Low Countries notified him of this. Charles further issued 
instructions to receive Francis’ oath of observance in mid-June; ibid., 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels), 3251 (17 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to Henry), 3375 (18 June 
1517, Charles’ instructions to -). Also see ibid., 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent). 
291 Neither, he added, had any other Italian state; LPIIi, 1736 (4 April 1516, Robert Wingfield to 
[Henry], ‘in…village de Costa’). 
292 Ibid., 1747 (calendared 8 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey). 
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would not assist them against the French until Milan had fallen. He recommended that 
negotiations needed to be conducted with the pope, ‘who is afraid of the French King 
becoming monarch of the whole world’.293 This was probably too late: as soon as he 
heard that the French were in the ascendancy, Leo X adjusted his stance. The legate 
ibbiena ceased traveling towards Maximilian (pleading sickness) and Leo finally 
agreed 
                                                
B
to pay the wages of the Swiss as requested by Francis (at least for one month 
anyway).294 Furthermore, a letter of uncertain provenance (dated 24 April) that 
apparently reached England, reported that the pope’s nephew (Lorenzo de’ Medici) 
had engaged in an expedition with France against Naples.295 On 6 May, Spinelly 
reported that Leo’s ‘feelings’ towards the emperor had altered, following the latter’s 
departure from Milan.296 By 12 May, Pace informed Wolsey that a papal 
representative had proposed peace between the Empire and France, although the 
emperor’s reaction was somewhat dismissive.297 That the papacy would have 
understood that the expedition had effectively collapsed would have been interpreted 
by a letter to Wolsey from de Castello of 11 May.298 Cumulatively, this intelligence 
about the papacy’s shifting policy towards France surely caused greater uncertainty in 
 
 While Wingfield, on 28 April, reported knowledge of the legate’s arrangement to meet Maximilian 
Italian intelligence that reached Imperial sources in the Low Countries and which was usually 
ziness 
 not likely to break with France; ibid., 1844 (1 May 1516, Thomas 
293 Ibid., 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo). 
294
at Lake Garda, Italian intelligence referred to England at the start of May stated that Bibbiena refused 
to continue towards Maximilian until the latter had departed (again) for Milan. It was said, furthermore, 
by the commander of the Swiss (Galeazzo Visconti), that the papal confidante had no confidence in the 
emperor (one presumes in continuing the expedition as much as anything else). This is contained in 
forwarded on to England by Thomas Spinelly; ibid., 1833 (28 April 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry], 
Trent), 1854 (4 May 1516, extracts of intelligence from Italy); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
p.154; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, p.52. 
295 LPIIi, 1825 (24 April 1516, - to -, Paris). 
296 Ibid., 1862 (6 May 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). 
297 Maximilian reportedly rejected the overture not necessarily because he was averse to peace, but 
rather because he objected to this papal intercession; ibid., 1878 (12 May 1516, [Pace to Wolsey], 
Trent). 
298 In this, de Castello discloses his knowledge of the emperor’s withdrawal and the Swiss’ imminent 
retreat if they were not paid by the next day; ibid., 1874 (11 May 1516, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome). 
Thomas Colman, based in Rome, made a similar assessment on the 1st. He considered the pope to be 
‘entirely French’ and the Florentines adherents to the same. In also suggesting Maximilian’s la
and deeming the French defence of Milan to be successful, Wolsey’s protégé was also suggesting a 
valid reason why the papacy was
Colman to Wolsey, Rome). 
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crown circles. The maintenance of a spy at Amboise to collect information about 
Franco-papal communications in relation to England (among other things), indicates 
the degree of English fear.299 Apparently reflecting on the emperor’s withdrawal from 
Milan and Leo X’s role in the whole episode, Pace asserted (on 2 April) that ‘the Pope 
hath played marvelously upon both hands in this enterprise’, promising the emperor 
that he would not contribute to the French defence of Milan (as he was bound to do by 
treaty), and at the same time telling the Swiss that, as the French were his allies, all 
who waged war against Francis were ‘enemies of the Church’.300 In this context, 
therefore, Henry’s direct approach to Leo on 20 April to agree to the ‘methods of 
security’ that he had recommended to him, most likely an early reaction to 
Maximilian’s retreat from Milan, probably fell on deaf ears. 301 
The English quickly understood, therefore, that Leo X had retracted any 
support hitherto given to the anti-French agenda and that they would have to start 
again with their overtures to Rome. As with the general English strategy towards 
other potential allies, this time the crown was to be more publicly vocal and more 
limited in its focus on Italy.302 Again, the hope was that the pontiff would move 
decisively in their favour when he saw that the anti-French powers were ‘winning’. 
d himself informed of his ‘true’ intentions. He 
                                     
First, however, both England and Rome had to overcome some trust issues; in late 
April, Wolsey received complaints from Leo X about the paucity of communication 
from England. Replying on 22 May, a forthright Wolsey suggested that this would 
e unless Leo kept Henry acontinu n
further added that, if the pope did want Henry’s advice or support on any issue, that 
            
299 Ibid., 1835 (30 April 1516, news from France). 
300 Pace also reported Leo’s release from prison of a Swiss captain who had since recruited for the 
French cause; ibid., 1729 (2 April 1516, Pace to Wolsey, ‘Laude’). 
301 The ‘methods’ are not revealed, as Henry referred the pope to de Giglis for more information and 
the relevant communication to the bishop of Worcester appears not to have survived; LPIIi, 1788 (20 
April 1516, Henry to Leo, Eltham). 
302 See above pp.530-532. 
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he ought to request it directly.303 The implication is that the English crown had found 
it difficult to interpret the pontiff’s ‘real’ foreign policy and called for more clarity. In 
any case, Wolsey instructed Ammonius to write more frequently to Rome, to keep the 
pope informed. He also addressed Leo’s recently relayed concerns about 
Maximilian’s retreat from Milan. While Wolsey regretted this event, he stressed that 
Henry had fulfilled his end of the bargain by supplying the money (indeed, four 
months worth, not the one month that Leo believed), but they had been failed by the 
‘knavery’ of the merchant-banking company responsible for transferring the cash. 
Significantly, Wolsey avoided blaming the emperor, instead asserting the continued 
friendship between Henry and his German counterpart (as well as with the Swiss).304 
This suggests an attempt by the English crown to induce papal support for a renewed 
expedition against the French, which was probably deemed far more likely if Wolsey 
emphasised Anglo-Imperial amity, rather than if he started attributing blame for the 
recent failure.305 
The motivation for Wolsey’s 22 May communiqué was twofold: firstly, he 
sought to reengage the papacy in the planned relaunch of the Italian expedition; 
secondly, he wanted papal backing for the planned holy league that would support the 
invasion. In terms of the former, Wolsey declared Henry VIII’s (continued) 
commitment to attack the French in person, but asserted that his Council had insisted 
that he not cross the Channel until his allies were ready.306 In spite of this 
correspondence, indirect papal overtures were already being made through Richard 
Pace, Leo perhaps being fearful of a complete cessation of anti-French actions by 
                                                 
303 Wolsey begins by attributing the lack of communication to the distance between England and Rome, 
but the sense mentioned above soon takes over; ibid., 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From 
orts placing blame on the emperor, see above n.243. 
6, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’). 
my house in London’). 
304 Ibid., 1928 (22 May 1516, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’). 
305 For Wolsey’s crediting Pace’s rep
306 LPIIi, 1928 (22 May 151
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England. On 21 May, Pace notified Wolsey that Cardinal Bibbiena had contacted him 
and Visconti, claiming that the pope supported the aim to expel the French from 
Italy.307 Furthermore, the English secretary continued to interact with papal 
representatives in the region to this end, notably Filonardi, but also from May/June 
1516 Jacopo Gambaro (da Gambara).308 Gambaro was later reported to have been en 
route to the Swiss to finance them (presumably for the anti-French cause), while the 
nuncio was quoted as saying that Leo was also determined to act militarily.309 By 6 
June Visconti and his secretary were confident about discussions with Cardinal 
Bibbiena and recommended that Henry and Wolsey discuss matters with the pope 
directly.310 Similarly, Pace, who related with Filonardi, was confident by 12 June that 
‘the Pope is very favourably inclined to the King’, as was Bibbiena.311 In response to 
these positive papal indications Wolsey, on 23 June, instructed Pace to negotiate with 
the pope, both directly through correspondence and indirectly through his 
representatives in the region, as well as to send commissioners. He was also to induce 
financial assistance from Rome to secure the Swiss and to encourage the pope’s desire 
for his nephew’s marriage into English royalty, albeit only after the success of the 
Italian expedition.312 
                                                 
307 Pace also referred to Bibbiena as persistently anti-French; ibid., 1924 (21 May 1516, Pace to 
Wolsey, Trent). Visconti had already, on the 15th, recommended that the legate ought to be targeted as 
England and that Henry ought to stir up the papacy; ibid., 1892 (calendared 15 May 1516, extracts of 
Pace also forwarded correspondence from de Giglis, relaying the pope’s continued support. This was 
passed on by Wingfield in early June; LPIIi, 1989 (3 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield to Henry]). 
 Pastor argues that Filonardi did little to contribute towards the earlier Italian expedition on the 
papacy’s behalf and that this remained the case until the arrival of Gambaro with the Swiss; LPIIi, 
a correspondent to keep the papacy on-side. He also mentioned that Leo was sending a nuncio to 
letters from Galeazzo Visconti). For Bibbiena’s near involvement in the earlier offensive, see p.550. 
308
1984 (2 June 1516, [Filonardi] to Pace, [Zurich]); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.155 n.. 
309 LPIIi, 2071 (21 June 1516, John Bapt. Spinelli to Cardinal Schiner, Verona). 
310 Also on 6 June Visconti advised Henry to thank Bibbiena and offer him ‘some good benefice’; 
, [Filonardi] to Pace, [Zurich]), 2034 (12 June 1516, Pace to [Wolsey]). 
at the pope needed to 
ause, back in 
LPIIi, 1983 (2 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to [Wolsey]), 2009 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to -, 
Zurich), 2011 (6 June 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to his son [Anchises], Zurich). 
311 Ibid., 1984 (2 June 1516
312 Ibid., 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). Pace originally recommended th
be induced to make some sort of financial obligation, to ensure his commitment to the c
late April; ibid., 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], Bergamo). 
 553
 Inextricably linked with English actions to gain papal support for a second 
Imperial-Swiss descent into Italy were attempts to draw Leo into some sort of anti-
French alliance, both through a broad ‘holy league’ and via a focused alliance 
between the two of them. While it is difficult enough to distinguish between Anglo-
papal interaction about involvement in an anti-French expedition and membership of 
an alliance, it is tougher still to discriminate between negotiations towards a broad 
coalition and those intended for an Anglo-Roman accord. Concerning a focused 
alliance, an indirect approach towards this was made by Cardinal Bibbiena to Pace 
around 21 May. As well as indicating Leo’s support for the expulsion of the French 
from Italy, he raised an earlier proposition that was surely related to such an amity, by 
asking which of Henry’s relatives would be offered in marriage to Lorenzo de’ 
Medici.313 Wolsey’s response of 23 June, as mentioned, was quite cagey; Pace was to 
encourage Visconti (and, therefore, Bibbiena) that this was possible, but only once the 
Italian enterprise had been completed.314 At the same time, Bibbiena’s approach to 
Pace and Visconti also seems to have envisaged a wider coalition against France; 
Wolsey’s reply was more forthcoming on this, empowering Pace to negotiate with the 
pope and his representatives in the region. 315 
                                                 
313 Ibid., 1924 (21 May 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Trent). While unclear, discussions about a possible 
marriage seem to have continued. By 10 July, Visconti (acknowledging English correspondence of 21 
June) asserted that he had won over Lorenzo, along with Leo and Giulio de’ Medici. Lorenzo’s favour 
can only have related to encouragement of a marriage; ibid., 2155 (10 July 1516, Galeazzo Visconti to 
 the pope be bound in 
same time as Pace and 
 to 
[Wolsey], Zurich). Also see p.549. For negotiations about the renewed expedition between Pace and 
Visconti, on the one hand, and Bibbiena, on the other, see p.553. 
314 LPIIi, 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). 
315 This was probably also a response to Pace’s recommendation in late April that
an alliance to England by financial obligations; ibid., 1816 (23 April 1516, Pace to [Wolsey], 
Bergamo). 2010 (calendared 6 June 1516, [Galeazzo Visconti] to his son-in-law [Anchises Visconti]), 
2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). At the end of May, around the 
Wingfield were re-commissioned to seek the relaunch of the Italian expedition and a formal league
back this, the former was also instructed by Wolsey to encourage this strategy with the Swiss, which 
specified the desire for papal involvement in a broad coalition; ibid., 1965 (31 May 1516, [Wolsey] to 
Pace). 
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 Simultaneously, in England, the crown continued its own overtures to the 
papacy
                                                
 about a holy league. On 22 May, the cardinal responded to papal reservations 
about its content and requested that Leo send any further conditions. He also stressed 
that the pope ‘be candid’ with him (again suggesting English confusion about papal 
intentions thus far).316 Within a fortnight, however, both Henry and Wolsey were 
apparently convinced that they could count on papal support, both writing and 
speaking of this in public.317 This newly discovered confidence in papal intentions 
may well have been engendered by the receipt of a commission by Chieregato to 
negotiate Leo’s membership of a league.318 The timing of this again suggests a move 
by Rome to ensure the continuation of English intrigues, despite the collapse of the 
Italian enterprise. Subsequently, the nuncio was involved in negotiations.319 News of 
the pope’s apparent preparedness to commit to the anti-French powers may well have 
contributed to Henry and Wolsey’s decision to go public with their intentions at this 
 
strength of the anti-French powers; he enclosed a copy of the recent Anglo-Spanish treaty (which 
 Wolsey opined this, apparently in connection with attempts to form a league against France around 
chard Wingfield were informed of this same 
ed o Charles on 4 June; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, i, pp.228-232 (Ven.ii, 738; LPIIi, 1961; 31 May 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney), 232-
239 (Ven.ii, 739; LPIIi, 1991; 3 June 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, Putney); LPIIi, 2006 (6 June 
1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to Henry, Brussels). It even seems that Wolsey was confident that 
Richard Wingfield to [Henry], 
ems to have marked a reversal of how the English 
tney). 
316 Presumably, to help persuade Leo, Wolsey also went to great lengths to emphasise the union and 
Spinelly had recently reported the papacy was prepared to observe), emphasised Henry’s friendship 
with both Charles and Maximilian and wrote of his expectation that the Swiss would remain on their 
side; ibid., 1848 (3 May 1516, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 1928 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1270; 22 May 1516, 
Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘From my house in London’).  
317
the end of May. Similarly, Cuthbert Tunstal and Ri
confidence in letters from Henry that they deliver  t
the conclusion of such a league including the pope was so close towards the end of May, that he 
informed Pace that he was ‘in treaty’ with Leo (and others); ibid., 1942 (28 May 1516, [Wolsey] to 
Pace). 
318 For such a commission, apparently sent from Rome on 4 May, probably having reached England by 
the end of the month, see LPIIi, 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 1989 (3 June 1516, 
[Robert Wingfield to Henry]), 2033 (12 June 1516, Tunstal and 
Louvain). The (re-)engagement of the papacy se
perceived Leo X’s involvement towards the beginning of May, when an Imperial diplomat observed 
that Henry was then attempting to form a league between himself, Maximilian and Charles as the 
central members, with the pope, the Swiss and others also envisaged as joining presumably later; ibid., 
1863 (6 May 1516, Imperial ambassador in England to Margaret of Savoy, London). 
319 On 12 June, Giustinian conveyed a ‘reliable’ report that Wolsey and Ruthal had been involved in 
discussions with Chieregato, as well as representatives of Maximilian, Charles and the Swiss; R. 




                                                
 A setback to the prospect of papal involvement may have been envisaged 
with the fall of Brescia, as on 14 June Henry urged Maximilian to keep Leo X ‘well 
entertained’.321 Still, therefore, it was felt in England that the pope could not be 
counted upon. In spite of this, negotiations continued with Chieregato.322 Perhaps a 
result of both the lack of direct information from Rome and the arrival of a papal 
reaction to the fall of Brescia, Leo X’s commitment to a league may have again been 
questioned in England around mid- to late July, although the English crown continued 
to assert its confidence in him.323 Wolsey reiterated his certainty about the pope on 9 
August; when challenged whether he believed that Leo wished the French to be 
chased out of Italy, the cardinal responded, ‘so long as the King of France is in Italy, 
the Pope considers himself his chaplain’.324 Chieregato was observed to be back in 
daily negotiation at the English Court by mid-August and Giustinian considered it an 
an ominous sign that the nuncio was not forthcoming when questioned about this.325 
 
320 See above pp.531-532. 
 this worry of the consequences of Brescia’s fall. 
in the air’, duplicitously trying to induce Venetian adhesion to the coalition. Leo, he also 
tentions vis-à-vis 
August, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
321 LPIIi, 2095 (26 June 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Henry]). Spinelly warned as early as 1 June his 
fear that the pope would pull back on account of French successes and on the 8th quoted Charles’ 
chancellor (Sauvage) predicting a Franco-Spanish-papal accord as a result of Maximilian’s setbacks; 
ibid., 1978 (1 June 1516, Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels), 2019 (8 June 1516, Spinelly to Henry, 
Brussels). Reference to a letter from Henry to his ambassadors in the Low Countries (Cuthbert Tunstal 
and Richard Wingfield) of 17 June seems to confirm
In addition to the king voicing his fears that Charles would back off from the league as a result of the 
Imperial city’s surrender, the two orators replied (on the 23rd), seemingly responding to the same 
concern vis-à-vis the papacy, that Leo was likely to remain an ally to France, despite earlier papal 
intentions to adhere to the coalition; ibid., 2079 (23 June 1516, Tunstal and Richard Wingfield to 
[Henry], Brussels). 
322 Ibid., 2082 (23 June 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace). 
323 By 17 July, Giustinian had heard that the pope no longer intended to join the league. On the 29th, the 
Venetian asserted that Wolsey’s confidence in Leo’s anti-Gallic intentions exemplified his ‘building 
castles 
opined, was unlikely to break with France while he was pursuing his own territorial ambitions 
(implying Urbino), which Chieregato reportedly confirmed; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.250-
254 (Ven.ii, 750; LPIIi, 2183; 17 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 262-264 (Ven.ii, 753; 
LPIIi, 2222; 29 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
324 Wolsey also implied that he was in a position to apply to Rome to gain a papal absolution that 
would enable Venice to breach its alliance with France and join the anti-French confederates; ibid., 
pp.254-262 (Ven.ii, 751; LPIIi, 2205; 23 July 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). One ought to 
note that the cardinal would have been in regular receipt of positive reports of papal in
the league, for instance from reported statements by the nuncio Jacopo Gambaro on his way to the 
Swiss in a missive dated Verona 21 June; LPIIi, 2071 (21 June 1516, John Bapt. Spinelli to Cardinal 
Schiner, Verona). 
325 Ven.ii, 759 (13 
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  English hopes for papal backing against France would have taken a further 
knock following the defection of Charles of Castile by the Treaty of Noyon (13 
August 1516); on 9 September 1516, Pace advertised Wolsey of his belief that Leo 
would not join without Charles. On the other hand, the secretary opined, if the 
Cantons were won over to their side, Henry would at least have ‘[a b]riddle for all 
other Christian Princes, [and] by the same means be sure of the [Pope’s] Holiness’.326 
This would have been compounded by intelligence sent by Spinelly on the same date 
that the pope had promised a red hat in the next creation to a nephew of Charles’ 
Francophile principal advisor, Chièvres.327 This implied that the papacy was wholly 
supportive of Charles’ defection, which Chièvres had worked towards. That Leo X 
had effectively committed to the French side was suggested in other diplomatic 
communications. The English would have been informed by Giustinian in late 
September that, since this Franco-Spanish accord, ‘the pope has renewed and 
confirmed the peace, and formed a closer alliance with France’; while untrue, it would 
have raised doubts.328 Furthermore, on 25 September, Robert Wingfield notified 
Henry that Swiss negotiations with the French involved an agreement that would 
involve the pope and the Church (among others).329 Certainly, the influence of France 
over the papacy would have been of concern to the English when they received, 
during October, de Giglis’ notification of the difficulties he had experienced in 
                                                 
326 LPIIi, 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]). Also see ibid., 2431 (8 October 1516, 
eptember 1516, Signory to Giustinian). 
ry], Augsburg). 
[Pace] to Wolsey). 
327 Ibid., 2349 (9 September 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). For the subsequent elevation of 
Chièvres’ nephew on 1 April 1517, see C. Eubel, Hierarchia Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.16. A further 
dimension perhaps raised by Spinelly around this time concerning the uncertainty of papal commitment 
came in the form of reports of Leo X’s ill health, although he asserted that the pope was well by mid-
September; LPIIi, 2359 (13 September 1516, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). 
328 Ven.ii, 773 (12 S
329 LPIIi, 2386 (25 September 1516, [Robert Wingfield] to [Hen
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gaining amended briefs concerning Tournai and a legatine commission for Wolsey.330 
present, de Giglis further hinted that the pope was still interested in joining the anti-
French league (concerning his financial contribution to hiring the Swiss, Leo wanted 
ber of troops proposed) and that he could secure papal support, if 
Pace, patently aware of Leo’s double-dealing, urged Wolsey to have Charles join an 
anti-French axis quickly, as when Spain’s amity is assured, ‘the Pope’s holiness can 
no more [v]ary his promises’.331 
In light of this threat to papal participation, Henry and Wolsey wrote to the 
pope concerning the Treaty of Noyon on 4 September, both to reassure him of 
England’s continued hostile intentions against France and to ascertain his reaction. In 
reply (on 4 October), Leo opined that the Franco-Spanish agreement would not last, 
although he could not see it being broken while (Charles’ pro-French minister) 
Chièvres was still ascendant. Meanwhile, the pope believed that the Swiss could 
defect. He also complained that Henry had not notified him earlier of articles, 
presumably for their own treaty, and asked how their defensive league could exist 
when Charles was not allowed to supply troops to anyone other than the emperor. The 
pope was glad to hear of the English crown’s commitment to the crusade (probably, it 
would have been implied, once universal peace was established against France), but 
reiterated his expectation that they would lose the Swiss. Leo promised aid as soon as 
the treaty was concluded between Charles and Henry. In the meantime, he asserted, he 
could not afford to ‘irritate the French’, fearing the loss of various papal territories. 
The pope claimed that he was caught ‘between the French molars’ until a suitable 
opportunity arose to resist. In spite of Leo’s suggestion that he was unlikely to act at 
to know the num
Wolsey pledged that England would not invade France unless it was for the benefit of 
                                                 
330 The orator referred directly to ‘the influence of the French’ and ‘the prosperity of France’ as 
, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). determining his difficulties; ibid., 2394 (27 September 1516
331 Ibid., 2431 (8 October 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey). 
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the papacy and Italy more generally. The pope would be particularly interested if, in 
the process, he could recover Parma and Piacenza, as well as have Lorenzo de’ 
Medici become duke of Milan, supported by England, for which the pope’s nephew 
would provide great service (de Giglis claimed to be breaking a faith by revealing 
this).332 
 Back in England, while Henry and Wolsey awaited a response from Rome, 
negotiations towards the anti-French coalition continued and papal involvement was 
still publicly acknowledged. On 7 September, Giustinian reported a source having 
told him that the articles of the concluded league had been signed by the pope.333 
Furthermore, the arrival of a nuncio, Julio Latino, was expected to conclude on Leo 
X’s behalf.334 By 22 September, Chieregato had told Giustinian that Leo X had 
agreed to the league with England and that Latino was (still) expected imminently in 
England to adhere.335 Other positive news about the pope’s intention to join came 
from Spinelly in the Low Countries, who reported in late September that Raphael de’ 
                                                 
332
of Ferrara, Brescia to the Bentivoglio, the Romagna to Venice and Urbino to Francesco Maria della 
Rovere. He even feared that he could lose Florence. De Giglis ended his despatch by reporting news 
that would not encourage hopes of papal participation; it was said that the French had no plans to move 
against Naples (thereby making resistance to this unnecessary) and that the Swiss had agreed to a peace 
333 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.284-287 (Ven.ii, 769; LPIIi, 2346; 7 September 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
334 On 9 September, Pace notified Wolsey that a nuncio was on his way to England to conclude an 
offensive and defensive league. The secretary predicted that Wolsey would already know of this. Pace 
LPIIi, 2350 (9 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, [Zurich]). The nuncio was named as Julio Latino, 
Brussels during December 1516) and Latino Benassao (who arrived in France in late November 1516, 
and that Colonna was actually meant, as he was part of an embassy intended to gain Charles’ adhesion 
to the league in London. In any case, no nuncio reached England; ibid., 2640 (6 December 1516, 
Tunstal to Henry, Brussels); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.164; also see below p.564. 
335
Giustinian disbelieved all that the nuncio told him, believing that Chieregato was acting under 
instruction from the English crown. The Venetian also reported the next day hearing that Latino’s 
commission had been revoked, thus suggesting early indications of a papal withdrawal; R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.287-292 (Ven.ii, 774; LPIIi, 2377; 22 September 1516, Giustinian to the 
 Leo speculated that, if he offended the French now, he might lose Modena and Reggio to the duke 
with France (as the pope feared); ibid., 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome). 
described the nuncio as a member of the Colonna family and stated that he was an enemy of France; 
although it seems that there was some sort of mix-up between Pompeo Colonna (who arrived in 
 Chieregato also apologised for earlier stating that the pope intended to remain neutral, but 
Signory, London), 292-298 (Ven.ii, 775; LPIIi, 2382; 23 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
IIi, 2384 (25 
London). Maximilian still understood the papacy to be participating in the English discussions on 25 
September, as he commissioned Cardinal Schiner to treat with Leo, Henry and Charles; LP
September 1516). 
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Medici was lobbying Charles to break with France. He also conveyed that Leo X, 
Lorenzo de’ Medici (duke of Urbino) and Florence were well disposed towards Henry 
VIII.336 As at 3 October, Henry VIII (writing to Tunstal) still publicly proclaimed that 
Leo X would be a member of the league.337 At the same time, the possibility of the 
pope not joining was anticipated in an article permitting Leo ‘to enter at his 
retreating from the planned coalition and recommended that, if Leo had not entered 
pleasure’.338 This recognition of a papal withdrawal seems to have been reflected in 
England by Chieregato’s involvement in negotiations; by late October, he was 
perhaps not fully involved in discussions, but was certainly au fait with them.339 
Further papal reticence was conveyed by Pace on 22 October, when he reported 
Gambaro’s request that Wolsey intercede between Henry and Leo concerning the 
latter’s desire to recover Parma and Piacenza (presumably a condition of papal 
membership) and to ensure that the king’s promise that he could enter the league at 
any time still stood, particularly in the face of parties in England believed to be 
briefing against Rome.340 Shortly after, Pace understood that the papacy was 
the league before Henry’s intended meeting with Maximilian, all confederates should 
                                                 
336 De’ Medici allegedly disclosed that Francis, at the Bologna conference with Leo in 1515, had raised 
his intention to move against Naples; LPIIi, 2393 (Spinelly to Wolsey, 27 September 1516, Brussels). 
 the daily 
s papal aim; LPIIi, 2473 (22 October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich). 
337 Admittedly, the king was trying to convince Charles to join the anti-French treaty; ibid., 2415 
(calendared 3 October 1516, [Henry] to [Tunstal and other ambassadors]). Wolsey may have recently 
received a communication from the pope declaring that de Giglis was in his confidence (and expressing 
surprise that the cardinal was using others to conduct business). By implication, this suggested that 
Rome was on-side; ibid., 2361 (14 September 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
338 Tunstal refers to a copy of the treaty sent to him by Wolsey on 3 October; ibid., 2450 (16 October 
1516, Tunstal to Henry, Brussels). 
339 The nuncio seems to have been indiscrete in disclosing the aims of the Schiner mission and the 
nature of the league towards the end of October, although he is not mentioned to be present at
meetings. On 1 November, moreover, Chieregato claimed to be under oath not to reveal the articles of 
the agreement; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.312-316 (Ven.ii, 793; LPIIi, 2472; 22 October 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; LPIIi, 2477; 24 October 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 318-321 (Ven.ii, 798; LPIIi, 2487; 29 October 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London), 321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIIi, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London); Ven.ii, 799 (31 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
340 The nuncio was said to have come to Pace ‘in great haste’ to communicate this. Concerning the 
recovery of the two cities, Gambaro understood that Schiner (and maybe others) were in England 
working against thi
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write to the pope in this regard. The secretary opined that ‘the Pope is naturally very 
fearful’ and would be glad of such missives (and the reassurance that they would 
imply). Indeed, in the same letter, Pace reported the arrival of a bull of 
excommunication from Rome against all confederates of the new league (presumably 
that concluded in London), in response to which Pace went straight to Gambaro and 
Filonardi to ask that Leo either write in favour of the confederates or to remain 
neutral.341 Nevertheless, it was still publicly maintained that papal support would be 
forthcoming. Wolsey was full of bravado in front of the Venetian ambassador, around 
20 October, threatening his state with papal censures if it did not join the league.342 A 
few days later, Chieregato continued to assert that the pope would certainly join the 
coalition. 343 In the final days of negotiations, however, the nuncio is conspicuous by 
his absence.344 
 
Perhaps in light of the papal response to Noyon, it was decided not to wait any 
longer for Leo X to relay his commitment to England and a league ‘for defence of the 
Church’ was concluded in England on 29 October 1516; its initial members were 
Henry, Maximilian and Charles, and it intended the pope to become head of the 
confederacy.345 Leo X would be expected to contribute according to his means 
                                                 
341 Ibid., 2495 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). 
342 Wolsey pledged to lobby Leo X to excommunicate both Venice and France; R. Brown, Four Years, 
ii (1854), pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
 Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.312-316 (Ven.ii, 793; LPIIi, 2472; 
olsey], Rome); R. Brown 
itted that Leo 
343 Not entirely believing him, Giustinian intercepted some of the nuncio’s private correspondence, 
which confirmed his statements; R.
22 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
344 Certainly, Giustinian did not note Chieregato’s presence in talks with Wolsey, Schiner and the 
Imperial representatives; ibid., pp.316-318 (Ven.ii, 795; LPIIi, 2477; 24 October 1516, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London). 
345 See pp.538-539. For the justification of the treaty in defence of the Church, see LPIIi, 2462 (20 
October 1516), 2463 (calendared 20 October 1516), 2486 (29 October 1516). It also seems that this 
coalition intended universal peace and crusade among its aims; ibid., 2387 (calendared 25-26 
September 1516, [Wolsey] to Pace), 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [W
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.1-6 (Ven.ii, 807; LPIIi, 2543; 13 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). If the pope had intended to join, Giustinian argued, Henry would have postponed the signing 
until the arrival of Julio Latino, who was still expected imminently. Chieregato only adm
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(presumably in a financial and military sense), as well as to invoke his spiritual 
weapons (excommunication and interdict were mentioned specifically). The pontiff 
was also bound not to absolve anyone from such censures.346 Papal membership 
(indeed, leadership) was, however, deemed essential.347 A copy was sent to the pope 
around 8-9 November, to induce his adhesion.348 Later in the month, pressure was 
also applied on Leo by Pace and the nuncios with the Swiss, probably following 
receipt of the treaty from Wolsey.349  
 The English may not have been confident of papal backing, however, as the 
conclusion and celebration of the treaty were unusually low key, and the agreement 
itself, or at least its contents, apparently kept secret. While this was probably because 
of a wider uncertainty about the commitment of the various parties, uncertainty of 
papal intentions would have also contributed, particularly given that the league 
laimed to be formed to protect the Church.350 Probably in response to unlikelihood 
           
c
                                                                                                                                 
Colonna) would not cross to England in mid-November; ibid., pp.318-321 (Ven.ii, 798; LPIIi, 2487; 29 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii (1854), pp.6-7 (Ven.ii, 808; LPIIi, 2544; 13 
November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
 LPIIi, 2486 (29 October 1516); Sp.ii, 253-254 (15 November 1516).  
347 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.160-161. Even so, the English continued to be outwardly 
a ‘defiance’ would be issued to France and Venice by the confederates, once signatures had been 
gained, but with t waiting for the pope or the Swiss Cantons; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.7-9 
had not and would not join the league, and that the expected nuncio (by then identified as Pompeo 
October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIIi, 2499; 1 November 
346
confident that papal involvement was not a deal-breaker; by mid-November, Giustinian understood that 
ou
(Ven.ii, 809; LPIIi, 2547; 15 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
348 At the same time that copies were sent for the attention of the Swiss and Charles of Castile; LPIIi, 
e Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
ply that the English crown wished to keep the 
lment of the French pension on 5 November, which he doubtless sought not to 
2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2698 (23 December 1516, d
349 Pace also wrote to de Giglis in this regard; ibid., 2528 (calendared 8-9 November 1516), 2587 
(calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). 
350 The articles of the league were sworn to by Henry VIII, the Imperial and Spanish ambassadors in a 
Mass on 1 November 1516, in a small chapel usually used by the king. In addition, Giustinian claimed, 
the articles were not published. From this, one can im
agreement, or at least its details, secret at this stage. This is supported by the fact that letters from 
Venetian merchants in England of 6 November failed to mention the treaty. In addition, Henry VIII 
was to receive an insta
jeapordise; LPIIi, 2497 (calendared start November 1516); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp. 309-
312 (Ven.ii, 792; LPIIi, 2470; 21 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 321-325 (Ven.ii, 
800; LPIIi, 2499; 1 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii (1854), pp.19-20 
(Ven.ii, 825; LPIIi, 2665; 13 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIi, 2510 (5 
November 1516); Ven.ii, 817 (27 November 1516, letters from Venetian merchants in England). For 
the treaty not remaining secret and Francis I being aware of it by the end of November, see Ven.ii, 821 
(25 November 1516, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Amboise). Concerning the allies’ uncertainty 
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of Leo X’s adhesion, Wolsey, Chieregato and Cardinal Schiner formulated a ‘secret’ 
plan whereby the latter would travel to Rome to induce this by promising that 
Lorenzo de’ Medici would become ‘free lord of Florence’ and would also be invested 
with Urbino, Modena and Reggio. The pope was also to be permitted six months to 
join the league.351 Wolsey wrote to Rome again on 21 November, seemingly to 
encourage papal membership; he certainly pledged Henry’s continued commitment to 
retain the Swiss and to send further ambassadors there.352 Along with Henry, he may 
control of the anti-French negotiations), as was demonstrated by Wolsey’s actions in 
also have proposed the ‘Schiner’ plan, to endow Lorenzo de’ Medici and to marry 
him into English royalty.353 Curiously, perhaps towards the end of November, Wolsey 
notified Pace that the pope had entered the league.354 This was not yet the case, 
however, and may have been a ploy to induce Swiss membership (given the context 
of the missive). 
 Indeed, the English crown was losing patience with the papacy (and losing 
the first week of December. Probably having discovered that Francis was au fait with 
the ‘secret’ plan to send Schiner to Rome, the English cardinal reportedly summoned 
                                                                                                                                            
about papal involvement, Giustinian speculated (on the basis of information from Chieregato) that the 
coalition would not act without Leo X’s adherence, although he understood that a defiance would be 
issued to Francis I without awaiting his membership; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.7-9 (Ven.ii, 
bout 
pp.6-7 (Ven.ii, 808; LPIIi, 2544; 13 November 
809; LPIIi, 2547; 15 November 1516, London). 
351 Chieregato claimed (in divulging this to Giustinian) that only he and the two cardinals knew a
this plan; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.321-325 (Ven.ii, 800; LPIIi, 2499; 1 November 1516, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London); ibid., ii (1854), 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 7-9 (Ven.ii, 809; LPIIi, 2547; 15 November 1516, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). On the same date, Giustinian also notified his counterpart in France of the 
same Schiner mission to induce papal membership. Francis I was reportedly unconcerned, believing 
that Leo X would arrest the cardinal; Ven.ii, 821 (25 November 1516, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, 
Amboise). For a general reference to this mission by Schiner himself, see LPIIi, 2662 (11 December 
1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow). 
352 LPIIi, 2670 (13 December 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey], Rome). 
353 The acknowledgement of this communication makes it feasible that this was part of the 
correspondence sent on 21 November. Also, the fact that the papal nephew was a correspondent 
suggests that the contents related to the proposal earlier agreed with Schiner; ibid., [Wolsey] to [Pace]), 
2689 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Henry, Rome), 2690 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo 
de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome), 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
354 Ibid., 2615 (calendared end November 1516; [Wolsey] to [Pace]). 
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Chieregato ‘into a private chamber, where he laid hands on him’, fiercely demanding 
to know what he had written to the king of France and threatening him with the rack. 
Following a heated discussion, Wolsey seized all of the nuncio’s papers and ciphers, 
but did not find anything incriminating.355 The cardinal was vindicated later that 
month by de Giglis, however, who confirmed that Chieregato ‘does all the bad offices 
he can’ via his correspondence.356 If the English crown was still hoping for papal 
involvement, this would have done little to encourage it. Wolsey’s reaction was 
probably further enflamed by the arrival of news around the same time of the Swiss 
having come to terms with Francis I, as well as the emperor having done so shortly 
after.357 Indeed, English intelligence from the Low Countries asserted that the Franco-
Imperial accord had been concluded mainly at the behest of the pope and that a papal 
representative, Pompeo Colonna, had been involved.358 Henry VIII was certainly 
agreement but, meanwhile, Henry and Wolsey continued to hope that the pope would 
worried about the latter agreement affecting Rome; in instructions to his ambassadors 
going to Maximilian at the end of 1516, he explained his fear that the peace now 
allowed Francis to go to Italy, by which ‘the Pope be imperiled’.359 In retrospect, 
these probably precluded any possibility that Leo would adhere to the London 
                                                 
355 Fox stepped in to have Chieregato released and, as a result, the nuncio was to leave the kingdom 
above pp.525-526. Indeed, the papacy apparently contributed to 
 urged the Cantons towards peace; 
et and Knight). 
(once he had received money to do this). Following this, Chieregato reported his experience to the 
Venetian Giustinian who, in turn encouraged the nuncio to exaggerate the incident to Schiner, as he 
believed that it would annoy both the Swiss cardinal and the pope; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.17-19 (Ven.ii, 823; LPIIi, 2643; 7 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For the 
nuncio disclosing the plan to Giustinian (who then reported it to France), see n.351. 
356 LPIIi, 2698 (23 December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
357 While the English had known of both parties’ negotiations with France, confirmation that the 
Cantons had concluded with France on 24 November and that Maximilian had done so on 8 December 
would have been received badly; see 
the eventual arrangement with Francis I when, on 19 November, Leo
L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.164. 
358 Tunstal cited Charles’ principal minister Chièvres for this information. Colonna’s involvement is 
unclear, although Tunstal does mention his being told that the bishop was sent by the emperor from 
Germany to facilitate his involvement in this agreement; LPIIi, 2640 (6 December 1516, Tunstal to 
Henry, Brussels). 
359 Ibid., 2713 (calendared 30 December 1516, instructions for Somers
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declare himself.360 Furthermore, in the broader context of papal intentions, Wolsey’s 
frustration was not without foundation, as Leo X had been simultaneously conducting 
negotiations with Francis I, although these had hit various difficulties in late 1516. 
Indeed, by late November, the French orators in Rome deemed the pope hostile 
towards France and enthusiastic towards the anti-French coalition.361 News of these 
Franco-papal discussions and all of their difficulties probably reached England via 
Germany by late December.362  
 To muddy the waters, news from Rome of the pope’s reaction to the anti-
French league was broadly positive, but was soon complicated by news of Swiss and 
Imperial defections. De Giglis received notification of the London league by 16 
November and, as the papacy understood, it was intended ‘for the destruction of 
France’.363 The English orator had an audience with Leo by the 19th, which appears to 
have inspired a brief to be issued to Henry VIII on the same date concerning Schiner 
                                                 
proba
Charles’ protestations that he was really anti-French and would break from Noyon once he reached 
the English league on 8 December; ibid., 2647 (8 December 1516), 2648 (8 December 1516, Robert 
Wingfield to [Henry], ‘Hagenow in the Neethir Elsace’). 
 Franco-papal negotiations had reached an impasse reportedly because Leo intended to make his 
nephew Lorenzo duke of the Romagna and was negotiating for him to marry an Englishwoman, that 
360 That the league was not considered dead in the water by December 1516 was bly down to 
Spain (and secured his inheritance there). Also, Maximilian gave the same impression when he ratified 
361
Francis would not allow the Church to ‘recover’ Ferrara (and was insisting on the surrender of Modena 
and Reggio to its duke) and that the French king was insisting upon a loan of 50,000 ducats from 
Florence on the basis that it was his city; Ven.ii, 818 (Andrea Griti, Proveditor in the Venetian Camp at 
Villafranca, to the Signory, 25 November 1516); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.163-164. 
eror’s understanding about these 
obert Wingfield] to [Henry], ‘Hagenaw’). 
pport for Verona from England, the money to be sent to the emperor and the Swiss; 
Around the same time, Leo gave the distinct impression that he was pro-French. Around 19 November, 
for instance, he claimed to the Venetian ambassador that he had been reproached by Francis I for 
having an understanding with Cardinal Schiner (and, by implication, was associated with the anti-
French coalition), which he denied. He also recommended that Venice conclude a new league with the 
French, by virtue of which he believed they would recover Verona within a few days; ibid., 815 (19 
November 1516, Marino Giorgio to the Signory, Rome). 
362 On the 13th, Robert Wingfield notified Henry of the emp
negotiations and their current obstacles, including the French desire for a ‘friendly loan’ of 50,000 
ducats per annum from the pope and 200,000 for four years from Florence, as well as the cessation of 
papal hostilities against Ferrara. Leo, for his part, was said to desire the withdrawal of French support 
from the same duchy, for which he was prepared to drop his other objections and join Francis in a 
league; LPIIi, 2667 (13 December 1516, [R
363 This notification was reportedly dated 2 November and stated that the league (between Henry, 
Charles and Maximilian) was intended for mutual defence and that the pope was allowed six months to 
join (the Swiss eight months). This correspondence also reportedly stated that Schiner had gained two 
months financial su
Ven.ii, 814 (16 November 1516, Marino Giorgio to the Signory, Rome). 
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and ‘a general agreement among the Christians against the Infidels’.364 Given that this 
aim officialy underpinned the treaty, this would probably have been taken as 
encouragement.365 On 22 November, de Giglis informed Wolsey that, while the pope 
was pleased with English actions concerning the treaty, he was surprised to have 
received no letters on this matter, presumably from the cardinal in person.366 News 
arrived at the Curia of the Swiss and Imperial accords with France by the second 
week of December. Vis-à-vis the Swiss, Leo was unsurprised at Wolsey’s warnings of 
to blame for leaving the emperor no choice but to come to terms. Finally, concerning 
French intrigues among the Cantons, given Francis’ ‘wish to dictate to all 
Christendom’ and offered his services to this end. The pontiff was also said to be 
opposed to any subsequent plans for a Franco-Swiss offensive against Naples, as if 
this succeeded, ‘he would then be no better than their chaplain’. Concerning, the 
Franco-Imperial arrangement, Leo was reportedly unhappy with this, although de 
Giglis felt obliged to defend Henry VIII against Maximilian’s accusations that he was 
Spain’s continued adhesion to Noyon, the pope advised Wolsey to ignore Charles’ 
‘lukewarmness’ and to forge a closer alliance with him.367 The implication, therefore, 
was that the pope would be more amenable if he was sure of Spanish support. At 
around the same time, both Leo and Lorenzo de’ Medici were positive towards 
                                                 
364 Ibid., 815 (19 November 1516, Marino Giorgio to the Signory, Rome). Also see ibid., 819 (Marino 
Giorgio, Venetian ambassador at Rome, to Signory, 22 November 1516). This is consistent with Leo’s 
general call to arms against the Turks during October 1516; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.218.  
365 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.160-161. 
366 Wolsey’s of 8th-9th could not yet have arrived; LPIIi, 2580 (22 November 1516, de Giglis to 
ber; ibid., 2669 
[Wolsey], Rome). 
367 De Giglis wrote of the emperor’s defection on 8, 13 and 23 December. Maximilian accused Henry 
of failing to forward sufficient funds to fight the French and of secretly negotiating with Francis behind 
his back. The orator asserted to the pope that Henry ‘had spent 600,000 ducats without satisfying their 
[Imperial and Swiss] greed’ and presumably also disputed the latter accusation. De Giglis’ missive of 
13 December represented the pope’s reply to Wolsey’s communication of 21 Novem
(13 December 1516, Silvester de Giglis to -, Rome), 2670 (13 December 1516, [de Giglis] to 
[Wolsey]). This positive reaction from Rome would have been reinforced by reports from the Low 
Countries, of 18 December, that the papal representative, Raphael de’ Medici, had remonstrated against 
the Franco-Imperial accord and claimed that Leo ‘[would] empeach the said peace’; ibid., 2683 (18 
December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). 
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English overtures apparently linked to the Schiner mission, probably relating to the 
proposal of the papal nephew’s endowment of territories in central Italy and a 
marriage alliance.368 Initial papal enthusiasm was probably also influenced by 
positive intelligence from England that Henry intended to act and that the French 
posed a real threat to Italy.369 Furthermore, around the end of the year, intelligence 
reaching Wolsey from the Low Countries reported that the emperor was in receipt of 
money from the pope (and others).370 All of this news would have found a receptive 
audience in England, but confidence in the papacy’s political backing would have 
wavered in the receipt of contrary news. For instance, Henry and Wolsey would have 
been aware of the failure of the Schiner mission from late December. The Swiss 
cardinal apparently forwarded Wolsey a copy of a brief he had received from Leo, 
purportedly at the behest of the French: ‘his holiness has given him a scorpion in 
return for bread, as Wolsey is wont to say’. However, the Swiss cardinal evidently did 
not see this as a closed door to papal membership in the anti-French league, as he also 
promised to work to induce the pope’s membership and requested that Henry and 
Wolsey write to Rome on his behalf.371 Even worse news was yet to arrive, as the 
                                                 
December 1516, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
369 By the end of November, news was circulating in Rome about England’s intention to act against 
lish diplomats abroad attempted to influence their 
he papal nuncio there of reports that the French had proposed to Maximilian that 
 response, as Pastor claims, to French warnings 
368 Ibid., 2677 (16 December 1516, Leo to Wolsey, Rome), 2689 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ 
Medici to Henry, Rome), 2690 (21 December 1516, Lorenzo de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome), 2698 (23 
France; that Henry had sent substantial sums to both the emperor (for his intention to descend into 
Italy) and the Swiss (for their pension). Henry had reportedly sent 35,000 and 15,000 ducats, 
respectively; Ven.ii, 820 (Marino Giorgio, Venetian ambassador at Rome, to Signory, 29 November 
1516). There is also evidence to suggest that Eng
papal counterparts in this direction. Towards the end of November, for instance, Spinelly in the Low 
Countries, notified t
they divide Italy between them. Henry and Wolsey would doubtless have been satisfied with the 
diplomat’s action; LPIIi, 2585 (calendared 23 November 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). It is also 
known that Wingfield worked with the pope’s ambassador in Germany; ibid., 2613 (Robert Wingfield 
to Wolsey, 30 November 1516, ‘Hagenaw in Nether Elsace’). 
370 Admittedly, this could also have suggested papal support for the emperor’s amity with the French at 
the beginning of the month, but this is unlikely; vis-à-vis the anti-French league, Maximilian had 
always sought money to support his descent into Italy and it is this which is envisaged here; ibid., 2721 
(calendared end December 1516, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). 
371 Ibid., 2662 (11 December 1516, Schiner to Wolsey, Hagenow). This probably related to Leo’s 
formal withdrawal of support for the Schiner mission in
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pope, by 23 December, had recommended that England also join the Treaty of Noyon 
(and offered his intercession), apparently as a result of recent Imperial adhesion, 
although he equally predicted that Maximilian’s defection would ‘produce great 
disturbance in Italy’.372  
 
 A similar, albeit still confusing, picture of papal support for England’s anti-
French measures played out in the Swiss Confederacy, through Richard Pace’s work 
with the papal representatives there (Filonardi and Gambaro). Despite the Treaty of 
Noyon, according to the secretary, both nuncios worked firmly against French 
interests and repeatedly urged Leo X to commit to hiring the Swiss and to their 
consequent expedition to Italy, even after news of Noyon had reached them.373 
Filonardi and Gambaro even wrote to Wolsey during late September in defence of the 
emperor’s accusations that Pace was hindering negotiations.374 News in early 
November that the French had tried to poison Pace and the nuncios would have surely 
confirmed Rome’s anti-Gallic credentials.375As far as the English were concerned, 
this back channel would again have provided some reassurrance, compared to the 
generally positive but non-committal nature of direct communications from Rome. 
                                                                          
Similarly, in spite of the realisation in England that the pope would not join their 
                                                                  
r the emperor to replace his ambassador 
before; Ven.ii, 794 (18 October 1516, 
that Charles and Maximilian planned to strip the papacy of temporal power; L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vii, p.164. Also see Ven.ii, 815 (19 November 1516, Marino Giorgio to the Signory, Rome). 
372 LPIIi, 2669 (13 December 1516, Silvester de Giglis to -, Rome). For Creighton’s agreement that the 
papacy became much quieter about its support for England’s anti-French agenda after Maximilian’s 
joining Noyon, see M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.258. 
373 Pace also portrayed them as having paid out large sums there to influence the Swiss. He must have 
been suspicious of papal intentions, however, as on 15 September, he asked them to gain from Leo ‘an 
explicit declaration of his mind against the common enemy’; LPIIi, 2334 (1 September 1516, [Pace] to 
Wolsey), 2366 (15 September 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey).  
374 Ibid., 2385 (25 September 1516, Filonardi and [Gam]baro to [Wolsey?], Zurich). Also, during 
October, Pace described the nuncios’ assistance in lobbying fo
in Zurich, on account of his having recommended the Swiss to accept French overtures; ibid., 2473 (22 
October 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2495 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). For a 
third party’s perspective, on 18 October, Venetian sources in Milan understood that, if the Swiss 
rejected French overtures, the pope would pay them more than 
Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory). 
375 LPIIi, 2516 (7 November 1516, [Pace] to Wolsey, Zurich), 2517 (calendared 7 November 1516). 
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league ‘for defence of the Church’, continued papal commitments continued to 
emanate from the Swiss Cantons, at least on behalf of the nuncios.376 Indeed, at some 
point in late October or early November, Henry and Wolsey wrote personally to the 
nuncios to praise their work and urge their continued service.377 Probably in response 
 positive papal actions with the Swiss and in a bid to prompt papal action in this 
ctor 
                                                
to
se Wolsey, writing to the pope on 21 November, committed the English to 
retaining the Cantons (for which purpose, ambassadors were to be sent there) and, 
presumably, warned of French intrigues to scupper this. Replying on 13 December, 
Leo was unsurprised at hearing of Francis’ efforts to hire the Swiss, ‘as they wish to 
dictate to all Christendom’. The pope also offered his services there and further 
suggested that Henry maintain an ambassador with the Swiss.378 
 At the same time and within the same correspondence, Pace advised that they 
were losing the support of the papacy, post-Noyon.379 Significant among these was 
the arrival from Rome, around the end of October, of a bull of excommunication from 
Rome against all confederates of the league to be concluded in London (as he 
believed). The secretary went straight to Gambaro and Filonardi to ask that Leo either 
write in favour of the confederates or that he remain neutral. 380 Similarly, on 19 
November, Pace revealed that the French delegate in Zurich had been instructed to 
 
ors 
, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2568 (19 
01 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, 
i and Gambaro) to avoid behaving in any way that might 
376 On 19 November, Pace forwarded letters from the papal ambassadors to Wolsey, pledging the 
papacy’s continued amity with England. By the 23rd, Pace notified Wolsey that the papal ambassad
had urged Leo X to join the new league and stated that he had written to de Giglis in the same vein. On 
15 December, Pace suggested that he was still working with the papal ambassadors to launch the 
expedition and win over the Swiss; LPIIi, 2567 (19 November 1516
November 1516, Filonardi and Gambaro to Wolsey, Zurich), 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from 
Pace’s letters, Constance), 2587 (calendared 23 November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 2675 (15 
December 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Zurich). 
377 These are indicated by Filonardi’s replies; ibid., 26
Zurich), 2602 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich). 
378 Ibid., 2670 (13 December 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
379 Indeed, Pace’s concerns that the Treaty of Noyon would cause the papacy to not join the English 
coalition have already been cited; see above pp.560-561. 
380 LPIIi, 2495 (calendared end October 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). Pastor dates the pope’s change of 
tack from September, by which time he claimed that Leo was prepared to recall a nuncio from the 
Swiss and had instructed both there (Filonard
offend the Most Christian King; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.162-163. 
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read the Franco-papal concordat of 1515 (Bologna) to the Swiss.381 In other words, it 
was being asserted, the pope was still pro-French. Anticipating the negative message 
that this intelligence would send to England, however, Pace also forwarded letters 
from the papal ambassadors to Wolsey on the same date, pledging the papacy’s 
continued alignment with England.382 A few days later, Pace wrote of provision in the 
Franco-Swiss agreement for the pope (and emperor) to still be able to recruit from the 
Cantons. He further notified Wolsey that the papal ambassadors had reacted by urging 
Leo X to join the new league and that he had written to de Giglis in the same vein.383 
Overall, Pace described the papacy as indirectly supporting the English strategy 
through its nuncios, although there was plenty of reason to suspect that this was not 
the only policy being pursued by Rome. It is difficult to understand how the crown 
interpreted this news, although it must have remained positive, as Pace’s mission 
continued. 
 
 By the turn of 1517, therefore, Henry and Wolsey must have felt that the 
prospects for papal involvement in their league ‘for defence of the Church’ were 
receding. They had been outmanoeuvred politically by Francis’ Treaty of Noyon and 
the apparent defection of their allies (Charles and Maximilian’s continued claims to 
be committed against France notwithstanding). Leo X had already drawn back from 
joining the English coalition, although he still indicated his tacit support, if conditions 
                                                 
381 Ibid., 2565 (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich). 
382 Ibid., 2567 (19 November 1516, Pace to Wolsey, Zurich), 2568 (19 November 1516, Filonardi and 
’s letters, Constance), 2587 (calendared 23 
Gambaro to Wolsey, Zurich). 
383 Ibid., 2586 (23 November 1516, extracts from Pace
November 1516, [Pace] to [Wolsey]). For subsequent indications of Pace continuing to work with 
Filonardi and Gambaro to the same end, see ibid., 2601 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Henry, 
Zurich), 2602 (27 November 1516, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich), 2675 (15 December 1516, [Pace] to 
[Wolsey], Zurich). 
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changed.384 Unwilling to give up on the anti-French agenda, the English crown, 
therefore, continued to seek commitment from Leo, as well as from the emperor and 
king of Spain. Events, however, saw the prospect of this decline further, as Verona 
was handed over to the French in mid-January and negotiations between the Noyon 
powers at Cambrai resulted in a treaty on 11 March.385 Contemporary to this, Leo X 
was (and had been since late 1516) also calling for universal peace and a crusade 
against the Turks, the underlying political agenda for which was unclear. In addition, 
one needs to take into account the pope’s domestic concerns that would affect his 
commitment. Firstly, the resurgent threat of Francesco Maria della Rovere, whom Leo 
had ousted as duke of Urbino in favour of his nephew, Lorenzo. Secondly, the pope 
faced an attempt on his life from within the Sacred College; the Petrucci Plot. As will 
be seen, the overall picture of papal intentions from the English perspective would 
have been confusing at best.  
Dealing firstly with the ‘domestic’ threats that demanded papal insularity, 
                                                
 
Francesco Maria della Rovere, the ousted duke of Urbino, had marched on his old 
duchy on 16 January 1517 and this sparked a costly war that dragged on for the next 
eight months, resulting in Leo’s failure to rid himself of this enemy.386 The conflict 
was extremely expensive for Leo X to bear and the pope ultimately failed to defeat his 
 
384 In the wake of Maximilian’s joining Noyon the pope, in mid-December, recommended that Henry 
make a close alliance with Charles and, a few weeks later, advised that he join the Treaty of Noyon; see 
above pp.567-568. 
385 See above pp.542-547. 
lt of Maximilian’s adherence to 
 new employer and della Rovere seized the moment. There 
78; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.165-169, 210. 
386 Della Rovere’s resurgence seems to have been the indirect resu
Noyon. As he had surrendered Verona in connection with this, the troops that he had retained to defend 
the disputed city were in the market for a
were rumours that the French and Venetians had colluded in the Urbino offensive and these were given 
credence in Rome. The city of Urbino itself fell on 8 February (which was prematurely reported in 
Rome on the 4th). In its failure to overcome della Rovere, the papacy was mocked for its defeat by ‘un 
duchetto’; D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War, pp.139-140; M. Creighton, History of the 
Papacy, v, pp.277-2
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foe.387 News of the papal campaign reaching England over the next few months sent 
mixed messages, at one point (during March) incorrectly notifying Henry that della 
Rovere had been captured and at another (early April) that Lorenzo de’ Medici had 
been killed.388 Despite this, the net result of such intelligence was recognition that the 
papacy was sidelined by Italian politics. In terms of the English crown’s perception of 
itself as defender of the Church, Henry VIII would have been concerned with rumours 
that della Rovere was backed by the Franco-Venetian axis. Indeed, around 8 
February, Leo informed the English crown of this and that the underlying intention 
was ‘to bring the Pope to their feet’ and to ‘have him for their vassal’.389 Further 
alarm would have been engendered from mid-May when it was reported that the pope 
                                                 
 Guicciardini estimated that the war cost the pope 800,000 ducats. In the end, Leo had to meet the 
full cost of the war, including della Rovere’s expenditure. While Lorenzo de’ Medici was restored to 
p.140; M. Creighton, History of the
Schiner spoke to two English am
387
Urbino in the final agreement, it had cost Rome dear; D.S. Chambers, Popes, Cardinals and War, 
 Papacy, v, p.278; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.209-212. 
bassadors about the pope having spent his legacy from Julius II, 
0,000 
Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin). 
from the papacy; LPIIii, 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 2889 (calendared 8 
Ammonius to Wolsey, Wesminster), 3085(31 March 1517, de Castello to [Henry], Rome), 3089 (1 
to Wolsey), 3116 (11 April 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to 
[Wolsey], Rome), 3168 (25 April 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 3200 (3 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
Brussels), 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3277 (23 May 1517, de Castello to 
Wolsey, Rome), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
Ghent). Also, for Wolsey’s direct interest in the affair, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.42-50 
(Ven.ii, 859; LPIIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
ary 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius), 2921 (13 February 1517, 
s), 3085 (March 1517, de Castello to [Henry], Rome), 3246 (15 May 1517, 
50 ducats ‘and being much behindhand’ as early as 8 February 1517, although they would have 
known little about the della Rovere conflict at this stage; LPIIii, 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and 
388 In mid-February, there was even an unconfirmed report that the Bentivoglio had recovered Bologna 
February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome), 
2921 (13 February 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2985 (4 March 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Brussels), 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3040 (21 March 1517, de Castello to 
Wolsey, Rome), 3072 (29 March 1517, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich), 3083 (31 March 1517, 
April 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey), 3092 (1 April 1517, Lancelot Colyns to [Wolsey], Bologna), 3095 (2 
April 1517, - to [Wolsey?], Rome), 3108 (8 April, Spinelly to Henry), 3110 (9 April 1517, de Castello 
389 LPIIii, 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Also see ibid., 2866 (3 
February 1517, Robert Wingfield to Henry), 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 2890 
(calendared 7 Febru
Spinelly to Henry, Brussel
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3276 (23 May 1517, [Pace] to –, Constance), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly 
to Henry, Ghent), 3367 (17 June 1517, report of Richard Wingfield from Calais of news from France). 
In early March, Henry accused Venice of having agreements with della Rovere, as well as with other 
papal adversaries (the duke of Ferrara and marquis of Mantua), and itself of having taken ‘papal’ 
territories (Ravenna, Cervia, Rimini and Faenza), but Giustinian rejected these; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For 
Filonardi’s suggestion that the Urbino war was affecting the pope’s commitment against France, see 
LPIIii, 3072 (29 March 1517, Filonardi to Wolsey, Zurich). 
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would be forced to do a deal with Francis in order to beat della Rovere; namely the 
concession of Modena and Reggio to the duke of Ferrara.390 Leo approached England 
for support in this campaign during June 1517, when the nuncio von Schőnberg 
appealed directly to Wolsey to urge the king to defend the Church as he had done 
before ‘by rescuing two Popes from danger’. Specifically, he asked for money to help 
Leo with his enemies, presumably della Rovere.391 This request was to provide the 
English with the political leverage required to gain the papacy’s commitment to the 
French.392 
 Another domestic issue for the pope during 1517 was the Petrucci plot within 
the Sacred College (from March onwards).393 While Cardinal Petrucci apparently 
planned to kill Leo, motivated by a desire to restore his brother to Siena, this 
conspiracy was uncovered quite easily and resulted in what appears to have been a 
deliberate overreaction by the pope. When Petrucci returned to Rome in May to meet 
with the pope (with a safe conduct), he was arrested and imprisoned. Also, several 
other cardinals were implicated in the fall-out, some perhaps unfairly, including the 
Anglophile Hadrian de Castello, at which point the pope imposed large fines on them 
and took the opportunity to pack the Sacred College with ‘supporters’ on 1 July, when 
he created 31 cardinals. In the latter actions, it is widely agreed that the pope took 
advantage of the plot to raise money to pay for the War of Urbino.394 The English 
                                                 
390 There were also alleged issues concerning the payment of Spanish troops from Naples, who were 
y of the Popes, vii, pp.170-207. For de 
supporting the pope; LPIIii, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, 
Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3307 (30 May 1517, letter to von Schőnberg from Giulio de’ Medici, dated 
20 May, sent to England by Spinelly). 
391 Spinelly was to go to England to relay these overtures; ibid., 3350 (10 June 1517, Nicholas von 
Schőnberg to Wolsey, Ghent). A few days earlier, Spinelly had reported hearing that the pope could 
win this war, if he held out until the Viceroy of Naples arrived. He had also been informed that Charles 
had asked Henry to aid the pope by engaging the Swiss; ibid., 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
Ghent). 
392 See below pp.579-580. 
393 For the Petrucci plot, see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.170-208. 
394 S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco Guicciardini, pp.294-298; M. Creighton, 
History of the Papacy, v, pp.279-287; L. Pastor, Histor
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crown was informed of the details from Rome from May onwards.395 Both of these 
‘internal’ issues added to the context in which Leo X’s reaction to English overtures 
to back the anti-French agenda was framed. 
 As in late 1516, the English continued to be no clearer about whether they 
would gain Leo X’s adhesion to its league ‘for defence of the Church’ during the 
early months of 1517. Contradictory signals continued to emanate from Rome. On the 
one hand, Leo indicated support for England, both in correspondence and in 
diplomatic actions. Having recommended a closer Anglo-Spanish relationship, the 
pope was apparently involved in the intricacies of negotiations between the two 
powers.396 In talks with the Swiss, during mid-January 1517, Pace still envisaged 
papal involvement in hiring the Cantons against France.397 Later in the month, the 
pope had also reportedly written to Maximilian of his fears for Naples (presumably 
from the French threat).398 Finally, in England, Chieregato remained in place as 
                                                                                                                                            
902 (9 June 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 909 (18 June 1517, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 911 (22 June 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). On discovering de Castello’s ‘involvement’, the English took advantage of the situation to 
press for the cardinal’s deprivation from the Sacred College and from his English see of Bath and 
King’s Mother’, in B. Thompson (ed.), The Reign of Henry VII, p.80; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal 
Protectors, pp.106-110. 
395 LPIIii, 3261 (19 May 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome), 3277 (23 May 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, 
Rome), 3307 (30 May 1517, letter to von Schőnberg from Giulio de’ Medici, date 20 May, sent to 
Castello’s dubious implication and de Giglis’ apparent realisation of this from the outset, see Ven.ii, 
Wells; P. Gwyn, The King’s Cardinal, pp.102-103; M. Underwood ‘The Pope, the Queen and the 
d 
England by Spinelly), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3373 (17 June 1517, Tunstal to 
Wolsey, Ghent). The nephews of one of the imprisoned cardinals, Raphael Riario, even sought Henry 
VIII’s intercession; ibid., 3319 (31 May 1517, Cesar archbishop of Pisa, Oct. bishop of Viterbo, Gal. 
e Spanish king’s assertion that it ought to be a defensive 
III in their peace with France by approving of their intention to observe their promise to the 
c King. It is unclear what is meant here but, if it referred to their collective 
n that the papacy ought 
Visconti de Reario and Francis Sforza to [Henry], Rome), 3341 (5 June 1517, Caesar archbishop of 
Pisa, and others to [Henry], Rome).  
396 For instance, Leo seems to have been consulted on the English desire for an offensive clause, to 
which Charles objected, and backed th
alliance. The pope was also apparently involved in other ways; ibid., 2765 (11 January 1517, Tunstal to 
[Henry], Brussels), 2784 (16 January 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 2849 (29 January 1517, 
Spinelly to [Henry], Brussels). 
397 In his negotiations of mid-January, Pace responded to a Swiss declaration that they had included 
Henry V
pope, emperor and Catholi
attempts to hire the Cantons against France, it indicates the English perceptio
still to be involved; ibid., 2783 (15 January 1517). 
398 Ibid., 2866 (3 February 1517, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
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nuncio, despite having fallen out with Wolsey in December.399 On the other hand, 
there were also signals that Leo X was not dealing plainly with the English. Among 
these was the mid-January report that the pope was in negotiations with France to 
range
the protection, umbre and chadow, of the said m[ost] virtuous King”’. Once French 
fortunes changed, he continued, Leo would uphold Wolsey’s claim.402 The orator 
ar  a marriage for Lorenzo de’ Medici.400 Perhaps most damningly, in mid-
February, William Knight advised Wolsey that ‘the Pope is French, and all from 
Rome to Calais’.401 
 De Giglis outlined the papacy’s difficult position in early February 1517. In 
defending the pope’s recent actions in upholding the French candidate’s claim to 
Tournai (against Wolsey’s), he outlined the role played by French influence compared 
to the lack of English leverage. The orator claimed that ‘divers times I have seen him 
[Leo] holding up his [hands] towards the heaven, saying those words, “O Almighty 
God, ut[inam] ille rex Angliae war somewhat nerer to us for to have this f[avor] and 
succor in our occurrents. Then the Holy Church would be in more….and surety under 
further communicated Leo’s feeling of vulnerability in the political sphere. The pope 
had told him that he still wanted the Anglo-Imperial-Spanish league to come to 
fruition; he was anxious for Charles’ confirmation of this and believed that this would 
be achieved if Maximilian was urged to change his grandson’s (pro-French) 
                                                 
399 He had not apparently learnt from his previous indiscretions, however, and continued to divulge 
information to Giustinian, who described him as ‘the faithful friend’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.33-34 (Ven.ii, 840; LPIIii, 2903; 11 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
400 The match was to be with the daughter of the (ousted) king of Navarre; LPIIii, 2784 (16 January 
due a lack of money; ibid., 2767 (11 January 1517, Spinelly to 
lendared 8 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ 
1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). On 11 January, Spinelly quoted a source in the Low Countries 
telling him that, if the pope and England would finance the defence of Verona, that the peace with 
France may still be scuppered, although by the 26th, he cited Raphael de’ Medici as saying that Leo 
would not contribute to this. By early February, English diplomats observed that the pope had 
distanced himself from the emperor, 
Henry), 2830 (26 January 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and 
Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin). 
401 Ibid., 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). 
402 Ibid., 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). Also see, ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 
February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2890 (ca
letters] to Ammonius). 
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councillors.403 However, de Giglis warned that, if the emperor procrastinated or 
wavered in his commitment, ‘the Pope must fall into the hands of the French, and then 
he can do nothing for England’.404 The orator expanded in further communications 
made to England around the same time. The pope had heard that Maximilian did not 
intend to remain tied to France and, consequently, had commissioned a nuncio, von 
Schőnberg, to ensure that a breach occurred. Leo feared, however, that the restoration 
of Verona to the French would induce the emperor’s continued alliance with 
France.405 Yet in contradiction, de Giglis also reported the pope having recent 
information from the Low Countries that Maximilian would side definitively with the 
French.406 As a result of this uncertainty, the pope urged Henry to stay allied to 
Maximilian (as well as to induce the removal of Charles’ principal councillors). 
Furthermore, he pledged that, if an Anglo-Imperial-Spanish coalition existed, he 
would join it. Leo further asked England to disrupt the Cambrai negotiations and, 
finally, Leo promised not to withdraw Filonardi from the Swiss Cantons, despite 
being urged to do so by the French. 407  
In England, the crown was clearly worried about the impact that political 
developments in favour of France were having on the papacy. For instance, 
concerning the surrender of Verona, Wolsey warned Giustinian in mid-February 
about any subsequent focus on the Papal States; ‘I pray you do not molest the 
                                                 
403 Ibid., 2886 (8 February 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome). Also see, ibid., 2888 (calendared 8 
February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to 
[Ammonius]). 
404 Ibid., 2888 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
405 Ibid., 2889 (calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). Around the same time, Cardinal 
Schiner put a more optimistic spin on the predicted papal reaction to the handover of Verona; while 
‘the Pope’s neutrality leaves him prey to both parties’, he argued that the vulnerability of Naples and 
threat of Franco-Venetian hegemony in Italy had caused Leo to write to Maximilian for support and the 
d., 2869 (4 February 1517, Schiner to 
ed 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]). 
pope would soon, he opined, demand an anti-French league ibi
Wolsey). 
406 Ibid., 2890 (calendared 8 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius). 
407 Ibid., 2889 (calendar
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Church;- touch not the hem of Christ’s garment’.408 Henry and Wolsey must have felt 
at least partial reassurance, therefore, at receipt of de Giglis’ February notifications of 
reserved papal support, not least at the prospect of a nuncio, Nicholas von Schőnberg, 
visiting the Cambrai conference in a bid to scupper it. Leo feared a repeat of the 1508 
Cambrai agreement, whereby the parties agreed to divide Italy between them and 
Wolsey, at least, shared these concerns.409 Furthermore, the pope again reassured the 
English crown of his willingness to join the anti-Gallic league in indirect, encrypted 
communication through Cardinal Schiner in early March.410 The conclusion of the 
Treaty of Cambrai between Francis, Charles and Maximilian on 11 March made this 
unlikely, however; faced with a powerful francophile coalition, Leo could not 
conceivably remain outside its sphere of influence. As de Giglis predicted on the 9th, 
when rumours of an agreement were already circulating, if reports were true, then ‘the 
Pope will be left at their mercy’.411 As notification of the agreement began to arrive in 
England, Henry VIII soon became aware that places were left in the treaty for both his 
own and Leo’s admission.412 This would have raised further doubts in England, given 
                                                 
408
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.35-37 (Ven.ii, 844; LPIIii, 2925; 14 February 1517, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London). For notification to England of the papacy’s awarenes of the city changing hands, see 
LPIIii, 2895(9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome). 
409 The papal fear was well-founded, as the eventual Treaty of Cambrai (11 March 1517) secretly 
 The Church’s temporal lands were often described as ‘Christ’s garment’ or something similar; R. 
provided for the division of Italy, including the takeover of Medicean Florence; L. Pastor, History of 
the Popes, vii, pp.167, 458. Reports of Wolsey voicing similar beliefs at the beginning of March were 
feasibly in reaction to his receipt of de Giglis’ correspondence from early February. One discrepancy 
lies in the cardinal’s suggestion to Giustinian that the nuncio attended as a willing participant in the 
en.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 42-50 
, London), 56-62 (Ven.ii, 870; 
895(9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome). Knecht considers that the peace of 
talks, with a view to splitting Italy between them, but this was probably motivated by a desire to detach 
Venice from France, given that he argued that the republic would be excluded; R. Brown, Four Years, 
ii, pp.37-42 (V
(Ven.ii, 859; LPIIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory
LPIIii, 3119; 13 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For a declaration of continued English 
commitment made to Rome by Cardinal Schiner in early March, in spite of ‘late untoward events’, see 
LPIIii, 2997 (8 March 1517, Schiner to Wolsey, Brussels). 
410 Schiner claimed that Leo was ‘very anxious to join’; LPIIii, 2997 (8 March 1517, Schiner to 
Wolsey, Brussels). 
411 Ibid., 2
Cambrai left the pope ‘subservient’ to France; R.J. Knecht, Francis I , p.68. 
412 LPIIii, 3033 (20 March 1517, Schiner to Wingfield, ‘Termont’). 
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the subsequent pressure on Rome that would have been anticipated towards this 
end.413 
 Nevertheless, Henry and Wolsey continued to be given hope of Leo’s backing. 
By the end of March, it was known in England that the pope was outraged by the 
Treaty of Cambrai and that, understanding that Henry would be invited to join, 
advised him to remain aloof of it.414 In addition, von Schőnberg was sent to England 
at this time, presumably in reaction to the concordat.415 As far as Giustinian could 
understand, the nuncio’s mission was a response to a complaint from Henry about the 
pope not joining the anti-French coalition (as well as his having issued a bull 
effectively depriving Wolsey of the see of Tournai). As Leo had not been involved in 
the Cambrai conference, the Venetian continued, he had decided to reconcile himself 
with England and, thus, von Schőnberg had received two commissions to join Rome 
to an Anglo-Spanish axis then being negotiated.416 This papal overture was probably 
related to a request to aid Lorenzo de’ Medici’s defence of Urbino against della 
Rovere.417 Furthermore, Filonardi continued to demonstrate his service (alongside 
                                                 
413 Wolsey was informed at the end of March of Imperial communications with Rome apparently 
., 2964 (24 February 1517, Somerset 
, ii, pp.56-62 (Ven.ii, 870; LPIIii, 3119; 13 
rench ambassador in Rome; Ven.ii, 873 (17 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in 
ber of the Medici family. 
r Lorenzo de’ Medici; LPIIii, 3079 
concerning the Treaty of Cambrai. De Giglis had accused Cardinal Lang of being ‘the ringleader of this 
abominable alliance’ (having given in to various bribes); ibid., 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to 
Wolsey, Wesminster). For an English report in late February, that Imperial pressure was applied to Leo 
to urge Charles not to confirm any amity with England, see ibid
and Tunstal to [Henry], Mechelin). The contents of the agreement seem to have remained secret from 
both England and Rome, initially at least, and the ‘secret’ clauses concerning the division of Italy 
between the confederates remained so; ibid., 3015 (16 March 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). 
414 Ibid., 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey, Wesminster). 
415 The anti-French Schiner recommended him to Wolsey at this point; ibid., 3079 (30 March 1517, 
Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Antwerp). 
416 The nuncio was followed by the arrival of a flurry of couriers from Rome (three within a matter of a 
few days) and had left by 13 April. In terms of Leo’s discomfort with the Cambrai conference, the 
Venetian wrote that ‘pontiffs are ever wont to be disquieted by conferences between the great powers, 
as the first thing they discuss in such interviews is the reformation of the Church, that is to say, of the 
Pope and Cardinals’. Some confidence ought to be put in Giustinian’s speculation on papal affairs, as 
he was close to Chieregato; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years
April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). News of von Schőnberg’s mission certainly raised the 
suspicions of the F
Rome to the Signory). 
417 Schiner asserts that the nuncio was ‘high in the confidence’ of this mem
Also, by 24 March, Wolsey had already sent a letter to de Giglis fo
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Pace) in Zurich, thereby implying papal support. On 29 March, the nuncio, 
presumably forwarding the pope’s opinion, wrote that Henry was their only hope 
gainst
papal focus turned, therefore, to negotiations with Charles of Castile.421 Indeed, it 
a  French attacks.418  
 The von Schőnberg mission, therefore, marked the opening of an opportunity 
for England to secure papal support against France. At its heart lay a loan request 
from Leo for the fight against della Rovere and, knowing that Henry would demand 
concessions in return, he declared that he was prepared to join an English coalition. 
The pope had first asked for 20,000 ducats towards the end of February 1517.419 No 
response could have been issued, as a second request reached England (following the 
Treaty of Cambrai) by the end of March. Wolsey was to persuade the king to lend 15-
20,000 ducats, ‘by which he will not only have obliged but bought the Pope’.420 This 
must have been discussed, therefore, with von Schőnberg. 
Judging by subsequent developments, it seems that an English loan would 
only be issued after Leo X’s commitment to the English coalition and that the pope 
would only declare himself if an Anglo-Spanish axis were to be forged. The Anglo-
                                                                                                                                            
(30 March 1517, Cardinal Schiner to Wolsey, Antwerp), 3045 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1275; 24 March 1517, 
Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘from my house at London’). 
418 Ibid., 3071 (29 March 1517, Filonardi to Henry, Zurich), 3072 (29 March 1517, Filonardi to 
Wolsey, Zurich). 
419 While the purpose is not stated, it is likely, as Pastor agrees, that this was needed for the war to 
defend Urbino against della Rovere. It seems that Henry had already replied positively to a papal 
request to promote indulgences in England, the declared intention being, perhaps euphemistically, for 
at the end of April 1517 that the 
 on Henry’s behalf, recommending that the king’s permission 
ess was by no means clear for the pope and this must have affected his thoughts 
the building of St Peter’s. Incidentally, de Giglis notified England 
pope was about to send ambassadors to promote the latter (as he had already done for France, Germany 
and Spain), although the orator objected
be sought and a proportion of the proceeds be offered to him. Leo’s response was to offer the king 
25%, although de Giglis suggested to Wolsey that he might be able to increase this to 33%; ibid., 2890 
(calendared 8 February 1517, [extracts from de Giglis’ letters] to Ammonius); L. Pastor, History of the 
Popes, vii, pp.209-210. Indeed, English king would have known already that Leo was struggling 
financially; LPIIii, 2891 (8 February 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 35 app. (calendared end 
April 1517, [de Giglis to Vannes]). 
420 This time, the approach was made through de Giglis; LPIIii, 3083 (31 March 1517, Ammonius to 
Wolsey, Wesminster). 
421 The prospect of succ
on whether he would actually follow through with this. While, by the end of March, the prospect of 
Charles’ commitment looked positive, as Chièvres was said to be increasingly inclined against the 
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may well have been English faith in papal intentions that gave Henry and Wolsey 
confidence enough to start delivering ultimatums to Charles and Maximilian to 
commit to an anti-French league around the end of April.422 By this time, a rumour 
ircula
o X join the league.427 
Neverth
c ted in Rome that Henry intended to declare war on France.423 Von Schőnberg 
worked closely with English diplomats in the Low Countries towards the formation of 
the anti-French league and also corresponded with Wolsey on this.424  
The breakthrough came with Charles’ adhesion to the treaty to protect the 
Church (29 October 1516) on 11 May, albeit it was now a defensive rather than an 
offensive and defensive coalition.425 That same evening, Nicholas von Schőnberg 
produced his bull declaring papal membership of the same.426 The following day, 
however, the nuncio was reportedly unhappy with the English representatives for not 
having formally announced Henry’s approval that Le
eless, in English eyes, a major turning-point had been reached. Somehow, 
                                                                                                                                            
papal doubts are indicated by Leo’s declaration to the Venetian ambassador that he was happy that the 
Tournai. Leo X’s understanding of the anti-French negotiations was no clearer by early May. At this 
point, he had intelligence from France claiming that Henry, Charles and Maximi n would swear to 
French alliance, by April, Leo understood that Anglo-Spanish negotiations were at a standstill. Further 
Treaty of Cambrai ‘contained no mischief’ and also that he was aware of French threats to English-held 
lia
their league ‘to defend the Church’, but this was postponed because of Spanish objections to a clause 
that made this an offensive league. While a nuncio confirmed that that the ratification was yet to take 
middle of the month, rumours circulating Rome 
 de Giglis’ letters); Ven.ii, 868 (8 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
0 May 1517, letter to von Schőnberg from Giulio de’ Medici, dated 
ador in Rome to the Signory). 
place, various diplomats in Rome, as well as correspondence from the Low Countries, claimed that it 
had occurred as a defensive coalition. By the 
confirmed that the league was yet to be sworn, although this would take place; ibid., 3080 (30 March 
1517, extracts from
Signory), 872 (16 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 873 (17 April 1517, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 880 (6 May 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory, Rome), 882 (9 May 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 885 (13 May 1517, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
422 See above pp.545-547. 
423 Ven.ii, 877 (23 April 1517, Lippomano to -, Rome). 
424 The nuncio may also have visited England again around late April/early May. At one stage, von 
Schőnberg, whom Spinelly described as being ‘for the Pope in England’, was suspicious about 
contradictory messages emanating from Maximilian and Charles’ councillors about Spanish objections 
to an agreement and warned his English colleagues to beware the emperor trying to trick Henry out of 
money; LPIIii, 3183 (28 April 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 3210 (7 May 157, Somerset and 
Tunstal to Henry, Louvain), 3307 (3
20 May, sent to England by Spinelly), 3310 (30 May 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 882 (9 May 
1517, Venetian ambass
425 See above p.547. 
426 LPIIii, 3232 (12 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Robert Wingfield to [Henry], Brussels). 
427 Ibid., 3234 (12 May 1517, Tunstal to [Wolsey]), Brussels). 
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however, the nuncio’s proclamation did not represent definitive papal ahdesion to the 
coalition. Focus now moved back to England where, by the 19th, Chieregato had 
briefs instructing him to swear an oath to observe the league, as long as Henry lent 
him 50,000 ducats for six months.428 The English were sufficiently satisfied with the 
papacy’s commitment to send the agreed sum on the 25th, although probably in a bid 
to ensure papal adhesion, oaths were also to be sworn by representatives of the 
confede
English money, would succeed. Von Schőnberg implied the severity of the situation 
rates in front of Leo X, de Castello to perform this role for England. 
Presumably, it was also intended that the pope would voice his commitment in this 
way, thereby tying him openly to an anti-French course.429 This swift reaction by the 
English and their bid for an insurance policy may have been partly encouraged by 
intelligence that Francis had made overtures to Leo to support him in the Urbino 
conflict and that these looked as if they might succeed.430  
 Meanwhile, the English had to wait to see if its leap of faith, by pledging 
in Urbino when he did not deny that French approaches were being made to Leo, who 
was reported to be looking for the means to employ 6,000 Swiss to come to his aid.431 
Back in Rome, there was increasing confidence that Charles had sworn to the anti-
French league and the pope was sure that this had taken place at least by 26 May.432 
                                                 
428 It was asserted by English ministers that the pope was joining because of the Urbino war and 
Francis’ support for della Rovere; Ven.ii, 887 (19 May 1517, Chieregato to Vigo da Campo San 
Pietro), 888 (19 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
 Years, ii, pp. 83-88 (Ven.ii, 890; LPIIii, 3275; 23 May 1517, Giustinian to 
7; 26 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, 
it was claimed that the realisation of the league would win over the Swiss. On the 
6 (16 
 (27 May 1517, Venetian ambassador in 
429 R. Brown (trans.), Four
the Signory, London), 88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; LPIIii, 328
London). Correspondence of 16 and 26 May from England to the pope also reportedly contained 
Henry’s commitment against France; Ven.ii, 903 (12 June 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). 
430 Francis wanted Modena and Reggio to be restored to the duke of Ferrara. On account of Leo’s lack 
of money, it was reported that he was likely to agree; LPIIii, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent). 
431 Ibid., 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
Ghent). 
432 During mid-May, 
26th, Leo understood that it was a defensive league that also named him and the Swiss; Ven.ii, 88
May 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 892
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This may have caused him to apply pressure to de Castello a few days earlier to 
ensure that his loan request was now granted.433 Combined with the papacy’s 
financial need, it was also the reason that de’ Medici instructed von Schőnberg to visit 
England once again.434 Accordingly on 10 June, von Schőnberg appealed directly to 
Wolsey, albeit in writing, to urge the king to defend the Church as he had done 
before, for which purpose he was sending Spinelly to England. Specifically, he asked 
for money to help Leo against his enemies.435 By not naming the foes, de’ Medici was 
perhaps deliberately ambiguous; while della Rovere was meant, Francis I was 
implied. 
 While the English were happy enough to issue the money on account of 
Chieregato’s actions in England, they were still not entirely happy with the pope’s 
commitment. Consequently, on 27 May, Wolsey summoned von Schőnberg to 
would explain more when he saw him, at which point the cardinal would agree with 
England to join on the pope’s behalf (presumably by swearing an oath). In reply, von 
Schőnberg was reluctant to go to England at that point, arguing that he had already 
demonstrated sufficient papal commitment on the 11th and advised that Leo would 
personally ratify the league intended to defend him within three months, although 
perhaps not in the manner that his English counterparts in the Low Countries wanted. 
The nuncio further hinted at secret matters underlying this, telling Wolsey that he 
                                                                                                                                            
Rome to the Signory). For papal knowledge of the articles, see ibid., 895 (29 May 1517, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
433 On the rd23 , de Castello notified Wolsey that ‘the Pope is put to great expence in defending the lands 
y, Rome), 3265 (20 May 1517, Giulio de’ 
 is suspected that a similar commission from Leo X to the same nuncio, calendared 20 June, 
of the Church’; LPIIii, 3277 (23 May 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome). 
434 The cardinal claimed to be delegating his message to the nuncio on account of his lacking a cipher; 
ibid., 3253 (17 May 1517, Giulio [de’ Medici] to Wolse
Medici to Henry, Rome). Given the timing of Cardinal de’ Medici’s instructions indicated in two 
letters, it
was actually issued the previous month. It is also worth noting that the pope also sought Henry’s aid 
‘against the enemies of the Church’; ibid., 3382 (20 June 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
435 Ibid., 3350 (10 June 1517, Nicholas von Schőnberg to Wolsey, Ghent). 
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his decision not to go to England earlier.436 Tunstal reiterated von Schőnberg’s 
answer to Wolsey, agreeing that, instead of the nuncio going to England, it would be 
worth seeking Leo’s personal adhesion to the league through de Giglis.437 
 Nevertheless, von Schőnberg did return to England by the end of June to 
participate, along with the other confederates, in a new ceremony taking the oaths of 
the English and Spanish participants and proclaiming the anti-French league.438 This 
formal declaration of the ‘league for defence of the Church’, with the pope as its head, 
took place on 5 July at Westminster and, as Chieregato subsequently wrote, it now 
ought to be considered ‘most holy’. Von Schőnberg was summoned to Henry’s 
                                                
presence (along with the Imperial ambassador) after the English and Spanish oaths 
were taken and announced the pope’s approval of the league, displaying written 
confirmation that Leo would join. Notably, however, no oath was sworn on the pope’s 
behalf, although Giustinian believed that this would take place in Rome.439 While the 
agreement had been diluted to a defensive league, it was still clear that France was the 
target, although this merely meant that provocation was now technically needed for 
war with Francis, rather than this being an automatic aim. Shortly before the 
proclamation of the league, it seems that Wolsey already knew what this French 
‘provocation’ would be; on 28 June he told the pope how he had challenged a 
recently-arrived French embassy by accusing Francis of having stirred Francesco 
 
436 Tunstal reached the nuncio at Ghent on 9 June and delivered this message the following day; ibid., 
3349 (9 June 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Ghent), 3355 (13 June 1517, Nicholas von Schőnberg to 
at a personal pledge would carry more weight than a bull; ibid., 
mid-June, it seems that this 
 Years, ii, pp.95-
don). 
Wolsey, Ghent). 
437 The English ambassador opined th
3373 (17 June 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Ghent). 
438 As representatives from all participants were expected in England from 
was Wolsey’s reason for summoning the nuncio; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.90-93 (Ven.ii, 
908; LPIIii, 3372; 17 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIIii, 3415; 
30 June 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see LPIIii, 3417 (calendared end June 1517, 
Henry to [Tunstal and others]). 
439 LPIIii, 3437 (5 July 1517); Ven.ii, 918 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Isabella d’Este, London), 919 
(10 July 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four
103 (Ven.ii, 920; LPIIii, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Lon
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Maria della Rovere against the Church. The French diplomats reportedly did not deny 
this, arguing that Leo had brought it upon himself by failing to observe his promises 
to the duke of Ferrara (to restore Modena and Reggio).440 In other words, there were 
to backing an anti-Gallic coalition with a declared aim to defend him. While an 
already legitimate grounds to invoke the league about to be proclaimed ‘for defence 
of the Church’, as its ‘defensive’ provision obliged the confederates to mobilise when 
one of their allies was attacked. 
If there was any English suspicion at the lack of oath from the pope, this 
would have been well-founded, as in Rome on 13 June, Leo admitted to the French 
ambassador that a nuncio had signed the league in his name but argued that he would 
not swear to it: ‘should such be the will of the King of France, we will not join it.’441 
At the same time, the pope’s actions concerning the see of Tournai indicated to de 
Giglis that he was still subject to French political influence; on the 12th, the orator 
reported that his lobbying for Wolsey to be restored as administrator of the see of 
Tournai would be unsuccessful until the pope was ‘safe from the French shears’.442 
 
While the English crown sought papal backing for its league against France, 
the papacy caused further uncertainty by its pursuit of another strategy that could be 
both interpreted as pro- and anti-French. From late 1516, Leo X increasingly 
envisaged his own safety by focusing on universal peace and crusade as an alternative 
apparently genuine concern with the Turkish threat underlay the call, it was not 
                                                 
440 Ven.ii, 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). Concerning French pressure 
for Leo to restore these two cities to the duke of Ferrara, see above p.581 n.430. 
441 Ven.ii, 904 (LPIIii, 3356; 13 June 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
442 Leo also feigned belief that the English were disinterested in this issue, on account of a lack of 
communication in the last three months; LPIIii, 3352 (12 June 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters, 
Rome). This sense of French pressure on the papacy would have been reinforced by Leo’s approach to 
Charles for support in his continued difficulties in Urbino; ibid., 3331 (1 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, 
Ghent). 
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difficult to see that papal security in Italy would be increased by the distraction of 
princes with the eastern question.443 This can be traced back to October 1516, when 
Leo made an appeal to Christian princes to this end: ‘it is time that we woke from 
sleep lest we be put to the sword unawares’. The Sacred College followed this up in 
November by proposing a crusade to be led by Francis and Maximilian.444 Vis-à-vis 
England, an earlier approach may have been made to Henry VIII in this regard.445 The 
problem
                                                
 for England, however, lay in how to interpret this; should the appeal be taken 
at face value, was it an indication that it would support anti-French actions or was 
there reason to suspect that it would be a blind for some French offensive?446 For the 
most part, however, the king and his ministers rejected the Turkish threat. In early 
October, for instance, Wolsey disclosed the English motivation for doing this when he 
 
y d 
Wolsey continued to intend a crusade; LPIIi, 2420 (4 October 1516, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). Indeed, 
ardinal Carvajal notified Wolsey of the increasing danger posed by the Ottomans, as they had 
defeated the Mamluks; ibid., 2362 (14 September 1516, Cardinal [Carvajal] to Henry, Rome). 
446 In ad
from a n
Christendom and allowing a crusade to occur. Venice, as the ally of Francis I, was thereby attempting 
September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory), 298-300 (Ven.ii, 781; LPIIi, 2414; 3 October 1516, 
London); ibid., ii (1854), pp.9-12 (Ven.ii, 811; LPIIi, 2559; 18 November 1516, Giustinian to the 
28 (Ven.ii, 834; LPIIii, 2753; 6 January 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 29-32 (Ven.ii, 839; 
LPIIii, 2896; 10 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 35-37 (Ven.ii, 844; LPIIii, 2925; 
14 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory), 63-68 (Ven.ii, 876; LPIIii, 3163; 23 April 1517, 
tober 1516, Giustinian 
 any other 
ney out of Henry; LPIIii, 3059 (27 March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal, Mechelin). 
443 For Leo’s concern with Ottoman progress against the Mamluks (having taken Syria the previous 
August and, by early 1517, Egypt as well), see L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.213-219.  
444 R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.69; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.217-218. 
445 This could be implied from the orator’s comment that Leo was pleased to hear that Henr  an
C
dition to Leo’s overtures, Henry VIII had been under pressure to be open to universal peace 
umber of quarters, albeit with different motivations. Notably, the Venetians lobbied him in this 
direction from September, urging English adhesion to join the Treaty of Noyon, declaring that Francis 
would not now try to become ‘lord of Italy’ (by attacking Naples), thereby bringing peace to 
to counteract the current anti-French negotiations, but one could easily understand if the English 
suspected that the subsequent papal appeal was linked to this; Ven.ii, 773 (12 September 1516, Signory 
to Giustinian); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.292-298 (Ven.ii, 775; LPIIi, 2382; 23 September 
1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see ibid., pp.294-298 (Ven.ii, 780; LPIIi, 2401; 30 
Giustinian to the Signory, London), 301-303 (LPIIi, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
Signory, London), 12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 25-26 (Ven.ii, 829; LPIIi, 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 27-
Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 796 (24 October 1516), 797 (25 October 1516, Signory to 
Giustinian), 803 (7 November 1516, Signory to Giustinian); Ven.iii, 1487 (3 Oc
to the Signory, London). The Grand Master of Rhodes made similar calls, although
motivation is unclear; LPIIi, 2457 (18 October 1516, Fabrizio [del Caretto] to [Henry], Rhodes). In late 
March 1517, Somerset and Tunstal conveyed Schiner’s message that the Ottomans were threatening 
Croatia, but they believed this to be untrue. In cipher, they advised that this was either a story created 
by Francis and Charles’ councillors to induce Maximilian back into Germany, or by the emperor to get 
more mo
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declared, after being pressed by Giustinian, ‘Domine orator, for the love of God, let 
us first free ourselves from the peril which threatens us from the King of 
France…’.447 Something had changed by late October, however, when the duke of 
Norfolk indicated to the Venetian that current negotiations (with Cardinal Schiner) 
did aim towards universal peace.448 In other words, the subsequent league ‘for 
defence of the Church’ would incorporate an intention to crusade, which it did.449 
Given the noted change of emphasis placed on universal peace in England towards the 
end of October, it is feasible that the papal call to arms may have encouraged lip 
service. By virtue of this declaration, the English could be seen to be responding 
positively to Leo’s call, albeit shaping its response within the anti-French terms and, 
potentially, pre-empting any pro-French hidden agenda that it may have suspected. 
Despite Henry VIII’s crusading commitment according to the league, however, 
Giustinian was never fooled that this league would fail to be directed against Francis 
I.   
 This was only the beginning of the papacy’s universal peace initiative. A sign 
450
of things to come for England came via de Giglis’ notification, of 23 December 1516 
                                                 
447 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.298-300 (Ven.ii, 781; LPIIi, 2414; 3 October 1516, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London); Ven.iii, 1487 (3 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). By mid-
October, moreover, the Venetian ambassador believed that the English merely did not acknowledge the 
Turkish threat, as it was too far away and they were not motivated by any religious impulse; R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, i, pp.301-303 (LPIIi, 2445; 14 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
Also see ibid., pp.292-298 (Ven.ii, 775; LPIIi, 2382; 23 September 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). 
448 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, i, pp.309-312 (Ven.ii, 792; LPIIi, 2470; 21 October 1516, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
449 Indeed, the treaty of 29 October did stipulate this as an aim; p.244 n.236. In reply to Giustinian 
raising the Turkish threat to Christendom in an audience on 13 November, Wolsey replied that Henry 
VIII had already understood this and provided a ‘remedy’ in the form of this coalition; R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.1-6 (Ven.ii, 807; LPIIi, 2543; 13 November 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). Also see LPIIi, 2564 (‘A List of Original Papal Bulls and Briefs in the Department of 
Manuscripts, British Museum [Continued], EHR, 36 [1921], p.559; 19 November 1516, Leo to Henry, 
Rome). 
450 In early December, for instance, he visited Henry and Wolsey to press the Ottoman threat and 
reported that the king took little heed, being preoccupied with Italian and French affairs. Similarly, on 
30 December, the orator reported claims by the likes of Norfolk and Ruthal that England sought 
universal peace, but he disbelieved that such a u-turn had really taken place; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, ii, pp.12-16 (Ven.ii, 791; LPIIi, 2464; 20 October 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 25-
26 (Ven.ii, 829; LPIIi, 2712; 30 December 1516, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
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that, since the death of the Mamluk sultan, Selim I (1512-1520) had gained control of 
most Mamluk territories and was now expected to prepare for an assault on Hungary; 
‘that done you may bid goodbye to Italy’, he opined. 451 Early in 1517, Leo resolved 
on launching a passagium incorporating England, although some argue that this was 
soon to be overshadowed by the pope’s concentration on the re-ignited conflict with 
Francesco Maria Della Rovere.452 While the latter may be true in terms of an actual 
expedition, papal pressure for the crusade as a political initiative remained strong, at 
least as far as the Anglo-papal relationship was concerned.453 The pontiff implored 
Henry to participate on 4 January, requesting that he send a delegate to Rome to 
participate in discussions. Leo, for his part, had already sent Nicholas von Schőnberg 
to England to lobby for English participation in the passagium.454 While the nuncio 
did not visit Henry and Wolsey until the end of March and, then, to support the anti-
French agenda, this would not have been known at the time.455 
                                                 
452 News of the Ottoman threat was relayed regularly through English diplomats in Rome; LPIIii, 2888 
[Ammonius], Rome), 3110 (9 April 1517, de Castello to Wolsey), 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to 
[Wolsey], Rome), 3241 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, [de Castello] to [Wolsey]), 3277 (23 May 1517, 
451 LPIIi, 2669 (13 December 1516, Silvester de Giglis to -, Rome). 
(calendared 8 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius]), 2895(9 February 1517, de Giglis to 
de Castello to Wolsey, Rome); R. Brown, Four Years, ii (1854), pp.88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; LPIIii, 3287; 26 
rmon delivered by Giles of Viterbo, it was hoped that Francis, Henry and Charles would 
bruary that the nuncio would visit England, see ibid., 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to 
lies’ and seeking 
May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). A papal representative was commissioned in late April 
to visit England with Ottoman news; LPIIii, 3164 (23 April 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). England was 
also kept abreast of news from the Levant by other sources; ibid., 3200 (3 May 1517, Spinelly to 
Henry, Brussels) , 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Brussels), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to 
Henry, Ghent); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.88-89 (Ven.ii, 891; LPIIii, 3287; 26 May 1517, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
453 In a se
attend to the danger in the east; R.J. Knecht, Francis I , p.69; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
pp.219-221. 
454 The pope reiterated information from an earlier letter that the Mamluk sultan had died and had been 
defeated by the Turks. He further outlined the danger of the Ottomans, how previous warnings had 
been ignored and that, if England did not support the crusade, the maritime states of Christendom 
would be imperilled. Leo seems to have written to other princes in this regard as well; LPIIii, 2749 (4 
January 1517, [Leo] to [Henry], Rome), 2752 (5 January 1517, Leo to Nicholas von Schőnberg, 
Rome), 2759 (8 January 1517, College of Cardinals to Henry, Rome). For de Giglis only hearing in 
early Fe
[Ammonius], Rome). Henry would soon know that Leo had also made overtures to Maximilian 
towards universal peace; ibid., 2866 (3 February 1517, Robert Wingfield to Henry). 
455 The nuncio was sidelined by the Cambrai conference, which he had been instructed to prevent or 
frustrate and to push the crusading initiative. Following his failure to achieve the former and (sort of) 
success to have the crusade included as a declared aim of the Treaty of Cambrai, he eventually moved 
on to England, indicating papal support English efforts to align its anti-French ‘al
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 For England, however, increasing indications arrived that the papal initiative 
would be tied in with the French interest, thereby potentially becoming a mechanism 
for Francis to achieve his Italian ambitions (with papal support). By the end of 
January 1517, Henry VIII had received two communications from Leo regarding 
Maximilian’s entry to the Treaty of Noyon, both urging him not to obstruct the natural 
result of this peace, a crusade.456 Concerning von Schőnberg’s attendance at the 
conference, at which the English were initially informed of the intention to promote 
universal peace, Wolsey argued at one point to Giustinian that the nuncio’s presence 
indicated papal participation in a plot to divide Italy among the powers present at 
Venice’s expense.457 While it is unlikely that the cardinal was really convinced of 
papal involvement at this point, he would have been opposed to Leo seeking a 
commitment to crusade from the Noyon powers there. Even as early as 8 January, 
Wolsey was said by an English spy in France to be ‘wonderfully scandalised’ by his 
French adversaries on account of this.  Similarly, as Wolsey responded to 
Giustinian around 10 February, when the Venetian voiced his hope for universal 
peace following the surrender of Verona, he was positive, although it was said that ‘he 
                                                                                                                                           
458
 
financial aid for Leo’s conflict in Urbino; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.276-277; L. 
Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.167, 219-221, 458. Leo’s fear was not without grounds, as this was 
) in its attempts to convince the republic of their need to fear the conference; R. Brown 
e, further asserting 
what was ‘secretly’ agreed at Cambrai. Even the takeover of Medici Florence was planned. The 
English crown also argued that the Noyon were powers were plotting against Venice (just as they had 
done in 1508
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London), 42-50 (Ven.ii, 859; LPIIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); M. 
Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, p.277. 
456 One of these was presumably de Giglis’ letter of 23 December. Leo was also said to be concerned 
that some impediment to peace might still arise through Scotland. Papal fears in this respect were 
confirmed by James V’s complaints about Henry’s belligerent intentions in late January 1517; R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.28-29 (Ven.ii, 837; LPIIii, 2839; 28 January 1517, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London); LPIIii, 2800 (20 January 1517, James V to Leo). 
457 By alleging this, Wolsey was trying to win over Venice to the anti-French caus
that the conference was intended to facilitate hostilities against the republic. As this is suspiciously 
similar to von Schőnberg’s commission for preventing the meeting, it is possible that Wolsey was 
being disingenous when alleging his belief in papal involvement; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 42-50 (Ven.ii, 
859; LPIIii, 3030; 19 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
458 LPIIii, 2761 (9 January 1517, [Beaughienville] to [Richard Wingfield]). 
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spoke coldly, like one who expresses that with his lips to which his heart is a 
stranger’.459 Further English concern would have been engendered a week or so later 
when Henry was informed that the emperor was induced to take part in the 
negotiations on account of various offers linked to a potential crusade, including papal 
permission to levy clerical tenths in Germany, which thereby implied Leo’s 
involvement.460  
 More papal pressure in this direction came in early February, when Leo 
complained that a promise of half a tenth had not been kept by England. De Giglis 
implies that the promise came via Tuke, who he earlier calls a ‘scoundrel’.461 It is 
unclear why this would ever have been agreed at a time of French political 
dominance, although Tuke’s involvement may be a clue; it is possible that it was 
intended as a sop to the original papal overture for a crusade, when Henry VIII had to 
show willing, but not enough to commit to anything, except via a servant (the clerk of 
the signet) low enough to be blamed for acting without approval or for 
misunderstanding instructions.462  
 Leo X made another bid to promote his crusading initiative across Europe 
during March 1517. He apparently gave Henry prior warning of this on the 5th; having 
received pledges from Francis, Maximilian and Charles to launch an expedition, as 
                                                 
459 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.29-32 (Ven.ii, 839; LPIIii, 2896; 10 February 1517, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
460 Spinelly also claimed that the emperor was drawn into the negotiations by virtue of the offer that he 
would lead the passagium, as well as that any expedition would secure Hungary (where his niece was 
 the Turks, given that an English 
sure that it was not confirmed; 
married), as well as his own provinces of Carinthia and Croatia; LPIIii, 2921 (13 February 1517, 
Spinelly to Henry, Brussels). Henry and Wolsey would also have been suspicious of papal crusading 
overtures on account of similar Venetian pressure to this end; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.29-
32 (Ven.ii, 839; LPIIii, 2896; 10 February 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). On the other hand, 
they must have recognised that a real danger was perceived from
knight of St John at Rhodes, Sir Thomas Newport, passed on the same information about Ottoman 
conquests and also recommended a crusade; LPIIii, 2760 (8 January 1517, Thomas Newport to 
[Wolsey], Rhodes), 2898 (10 February 1517, Thomas Newport to [Wolsey], Rhodes). 
461 LPIIii, 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome). 
462 Even in the unlikely event that this pledge was genuine, concern for the papacy that arose from the 
emperor’s recent surrender of Verona would have been sufficient to en
see above pp.542-543. 
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well as encouraging letters from Henry and statements from his ambassadors, Leo 
declared his intention to proclaim a five year truce. He enclosed a crusading proposal 
from the emperor and stated that he would send a legate to England (as well as to 
other powers) to promote this. Finally, Leo advised Henry ‘to ponder this matter day 
and night’.463 Subsequently and perhaps in a bid to retain control of the crusading 
e loss of any potential influence over the direction 
 the 
                                                
process that was to become central to the Treaty of Cambrai (11 March), Leo 
attempted to asserted his authority over this in the final session of the Lateran Council 
(16 March 1517), having it decree that a crusade should take place, for which it 
proclaimed a three year clerical tax across Christendom. At around the same time, 
Leo issued a bull calling for a five year truce.464 Both actions formalised the papal 
‘peace’ initiative. 
 The inclusion of a provision for universal peace in the Franco-Imperial-
Spanish agreement at Cambrai (11 March) also caused concern in England, as through 
this Henry VIII may have feared th
of papal initiative.465 The English were clearly uncomfortable with the perceived 
‘French’ control of this; Wolsey was said to agree that a general peace was needed, 
but stipulated that, first, ‘every other passion’ ought to be extinguished. Henry 
reasoned ‘that he was remote from the danger, but that should he perceive the others 
 
463 LPIIii, 2988 (5 March 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). For further reports to England that this policy 
e). For the prospect that there would be English resistance to the coming of a 
tegy developed 
was to be implemented, see ibid., 3080 (30 March 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters), 3095 (2 April 
1517, - to [Wolsey?], Rom
legate a latere, see below pp.632-634. 
464 No English representative was present at this session of the Lateran Council, however, de Giglis 
being ill; LPIIii, 3040 (21 March 1517, de Castello to Wolsey, Rome), 3085 (31 March 1517, de 
Castello to [Henry], Rome); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.220; R.J. Schoeck, ‘The Fifth 
Lateran Council’, in G.F. Lytle (ed.), Reform and Authority in the Medieval and Reformation Church, 
p.111; N.P. Tanner (ed.), Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i, pp.650-655. The crusade was one of 
the founding aims of this general council. The need for Leo to assert control was required on account of 
universal peace being pronounced as the aims of both the anti-French league in London (October 1516) 
and the Treaty of Cambrai (March 1517). Both ‘sides’ had attempted to dominate the direction of the 
crusading aim and Leo X probably felt obliged to regain control, to ensure that this stra
in his own interests. 
465 Giustinian opined to Wolsey in early March that negotiations might be conducted towards universal 
peace; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.37-42 (Ven.ii, 855; LPIIii, 3001; 9 March 1517, Giustinian 
to the Signory, London). 
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[princes] to bestir themselves he also would do the like’. In other words, the cardinal 
believed that all princes’ political ambitions (implicitly, Francis’ in Italy) needed to be 
renounced before he would support this, while the king, along the same lines, did not 
intend to commit himself until he saw other kings (implicitly, Francis again) do the 
same.466 Wolsey subsequently enclosed letters to Leo and the Sacred College 
containing ‘secret matters’ about the crusade on 24 March 1517.467 In the only 
reference to the contents of these, the pope told the Venetian ambassador that Henry 
pledged to go in person.468 While this is likely, given the imperative that the king 
show willing, it also probable that Henry expressed his reservations about the 
commitment of other powers (notably France), particularly in the light of English 
concerns following the Treaty of Cambrai.469 Justification of this fear that the French 
would subsequently ‘shape’ the universal peace was sent to England shortly after by 
de Giglis who reported that, while Leo understood that he would have Francis’ full 
support for whatever crusading proposal he made, the French king had reportedly 
requested Swiss troops as a ‘pretext’, presumably for acting in Italy.470 
 Reassurance about papal crusading intentions would have probably been 
provided by the arrival in England of von Schőnberg around the end of March 1517. 
While part of the nuncio’s original commission had been to promote this initiative in 
England, the Cambrai agreement seems to have morphed this into a papal offer to 
                                                 
466 Giustinian further noted that Wolsey ‘never says what he means, but the reverse of what he intends 
to do’; ibid., pp.50-52 (Ven.ii, 865; LPIIii, 3081; 31 March 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
467 LPIIii, 3045 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1275; 24 March 1517, Wolsey to de Giglis, ‘from my house at 
London’). 
468 Ven.ii, 868 (8 April 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
469 When the pope also opined that other princes would declare the same intention as Henry, the 
Venetian orator noted that he did not seem convinced that Francis would follow suit. This could have 
been based on English arguments from the same correspondence; ibid., 868 (8 April 1517, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
470 LPIIii, 3080 (30 March 1517, extracts from de Giglis’ letters). In the same context, the English 
ay 1517, Albany to Leo, Edinburgh). 
would also have bristled at the duke of Albany’s willingness, by the start of May, to pursue the 
crusading intentions of the Treaty of Cambrai by sending ambassadors to England to treat for peace; 
ibid., 3194 (calendared 1 M
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back the anti-French league in return for English financial aid against Francesco 
Maria della Rovere.471 Given the wider universal peace strategy and its inclusion 
already in the Treaty of London (October 1516), it is likely that von Schőnberg 
invoked this within an anti-French context, pledging that Leo would back England in 
effectively by ‘forcing’ France into a general peace.472 In such a case, it would have 
been equally as likely that the English crown would have agreed to back the papal 
strategy within the confines of a renewed or new anti-French coalition. 
 As von Schőnberg returned to the Low Countries to liaise with English 
representatives in seeking an Anglo-Spanish accord, to facilitate papal involvement in 
an anti-French league and thus an English loan for use in the Urbino war, Henry VIII 
became more belligerent about the anti-French prospects for the papacy’s universal 
peace initiative. In late April, when reflecting on Turkish news from Rhodes, he 
opined that ‘from the Turk there was little to fear, but that more might be dreaded 
from bad Christians’.473 The implication was clear. Following Charles’ adhesion to 
outcome. As de’ Medici reported to von Schőnberg on 20 May, ‘considering how 
                                 
the Treaty of London (1516) and von Schőnberg joining on Leo’s behalf, English 
crusading intentions grew louder. On 19 May 1517, Giustinian predicted the alliance 
between Charles and Henry might easily be turned into a general league against the 
Turks.474 A few days later, Ruthal was predicting a general peace, that would lead to 
crusade.475 In Rome, on the other hand, the papacy was less confident of such an 
little Christian Princes set by his admonitions [about the Turks], he will be compelled, 
                
tinian to the Signory, London). 
471 See above pp.579-580. 
472 Giustinian quoted Henry as telling him that the nuncio was in England to form a league against the 
Turks. Chieregato was more sceptical, however, opining that ‘our masters here are incessantly plotting 
confederacies and frauds, but never effect anything’; R. Brown, Four Years, ii (1854), pp.56-62 (Ven.ii, 
870; LPIIii, 3119; 13 April 1517, Gius
473 Ibid., pp. 63-68 (Ven.ii, 876; LPIIii, 3163; 23 April 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
474 Ven.ii, 888 (19 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
475 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.83-88 (Ven.ii, 890; LPIIii, 3275; 23 May 1517, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London). 
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if they land in Italy, to abandon the residence of St Peter’s, “with such saint reliques 
as he might assemble”, and flee to some safe place’.476 This would have been 
reinforced by news from Rome. Around this time, a papal representative would have 
arrived in England, instructed to communicate Ottoman news to the king.477 Also, 
Wolsey would have been informed of a commission of cardinals established by Leo to 
discuss an expedition.478 
 
Lacking support from Rome (and elsewhere) to form a league ‘in defence of the 
Church’, Henry VIII responds to French peace overtures, combining these with 
a papal crusading initiative, to straitjacket Francis I from making further 
progress in Italy: July 1517 – October 1518. 
 While the reformulated treaty ‘for defence of the Church’ had been sworn to 
by England and Spain at least, its ‘defensive’ nature seems to have ended any realistic 
hope of attacking France, despite Wolsey’s idea to use Francis’ backing of Francesco 
Maria della Rovere against the papacy as a pretext.479 Nevertheless, there continued 
to be indications that the English crown was pushing in this direction with its 
confederates, but these were far fewer than previously. One can understand this 
arising from English doubts generated by the fear that both Charles and Maximilian 
were still committed to the Treaty of Cambrai, which both swore to on 14 May 
1517.480 Vis-à-vis Charles specifically, it was probably already accepted that, even if 
he was committed to the English coalition, he would not act in any provocative sense 
                                                 
476 LPIIii, 3307 (30 May 1517, letter to von Schőnberg from Giulio de’ Medici, dated 20 May, sent to 
ssued 
IIii, 3246 (15 May 1517, Spinelly to 
ons to -). Also see ibid., 3378 (19 June 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent). 
England by Spinelly). 
477 Alexander Geraldine, bishop of St Dominic was instructed to visit England on his way to visit 
Charles; ibid., 3164 (23 April 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome). 
478 Ibid., 3165 (23 April 1517, de Castello to [Wolsey], Rome). 
479 See above pp.583-584. 
480 On the 17th, Henry’s ambassadors in the Low Countries notified him of this. Charles further i
instructions to receive Francis’ oath of observance in mid-June; LP
Henry, Brussels), 3251 (17 May 1517, Somerset, Tunstal and Wingfield to Henry), 3375 (18 June 
1517, Charles’ instructi
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prior to his imminent voyage to Spain, to which Henry VIII had contributed in order 
to buy his alliance. There does, however, seem to have been some scheme whereby 
the English king pledged to defend the Low Countries in Charles’ absence, 
specifically against the French-backed duke of Guelders.481 Furthermore, it had been 
hoped that Charles would keep his promise to split with France once he had arrived in 
pain and secured his territories there.482 If this did not take place, the English S
anticipated that a resurgent Spanish nobility would oust Charles’ francophile 
                                                 
481 Charles’ need to go to Spain to put down a revolt and secure his inheritance there, see pp.534-536 
n.252. Ultimately, it was the promise of an English loan to finance his voyage that induced Charles to 
increasingly on his departure and on getting hold of the
swear to the league against France in May (and July) 1517. In the following months, Charles focused 
 promised English money. At length, the loan 
was delivered in mid-August and the Spanish king left Burgundy in September. He was to remain in 
pain un
pinelly
1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburg), 3514 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburgh), 3524 
1
Middleburgh), 3574 (10 August 1517, de Mesa to Wolsey, London), 3575 (12 August 1517), 3606 (19 
‘Middelburg’), 3641 (27 August 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, ‘Mydelborgh’), 3666 (7 September 1517, 
(1854), pp.88-90 (Ven.ii, 893; LPIIii, 3295; 28 May 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 113-116 
4.
of Flanders towards the end of May 1517. It was widely believed that the duke was again supported by 
towards the end of July and pledging that he would fulfil this role in early October; LPIIii, 3300 (29 
to Henry, Bruges), 3542 (30 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddelborowe’), 3560 (6 August 1517, 
 to Henry), 3608 (20 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke, ‘Middelburg’), 3647 (28 
.  
517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 
Henry], Ghent), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels). That 
S til 1520; ibid., 3233 (12 May 1517, Somerset and Tunstal to [Henry]), 3246 (15 May 1517, 
S  to Henry, Brussels), 3283 (25 May 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3300 (29 May 15117, 
Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3344 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Ghent), 3378 (19 June 1517, 
Tunstal to [Henry], Ghent), 3509 (24 July 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, ‘Mydelborgh’), 3513 (25 July 
(28 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddilborowe’), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], 
Brussels), 3539 (29 July 1517, Bernard Stecher to Wolsey, Antwerp), 3540 (calendared 29 July 1517, 
Bernard Stecher to Robert [Wingfield]), 3542 (30 July 1517, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Myddelborowe’), 
3555 (4 August 1517, de Hesdin to Wolsey, London), 356  (6 August 1517, Charles to Wolsey, 
August 1517, Chièvres to Wolsey, ‘Middleborowe’), 3608 (20 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke, 
Tunstal and Spinelly to Wolsey, Middelburg), 3672 (8 September 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, 
Middelburg), 3692 (19 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, ‘At sea at the Sell’), 3692 (19 September 
1517, Spinelly to Henry, ‘At sea at the Sell’), 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Spain), 
addendum 200 (15 October 1517, A. de la Laing to Wolsey, Brussels); R. Brown, Four Years, ii 
(Ven.ii, 944; LPIIii, 3558; 6 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 117-120 (Ven.ii, 951; 
LPIIii, 3581; 15 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 134-135 (Ven.ii, 979; LPIIii, 3738; 
10 October 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see H. Kamen, Spain 1469-1714 (1983), 
pp.73-7  Concerning the Guelders pretext, Henry was tentatively approached to become the protector 
France and Henry VIII was apparently willing to adopt this role, even sending archers to Charles 
May 15117, Spinelly to [Henry], Ghent), 3453 (9 July 1517, Tunstal to Henry), 3508 (24 July 1517, 
Tunstal to Henry), 3513 (25 July 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburgh), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly 
Charles to Wolsey, ‘Midelbourg’), 3561 (6 August 1517, Charles to Wolsey, Middleburgh), 3586 (17 
August 1517, Spinelly
August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey), 3723 (6 October 1517, extracts from de Mesa’s letters); Ven.ii, 945 
(6 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London)
482 Spinelly certainly voiced this opinion; LPIIii, 3344 (7 June 1
(19 June 1517, Tunstal to [
Charles was increasingly leaning towards England may also have been interpreted by Wolsey who, in 
June 1517, was granted a pension backdated to July 1516 and, during August, may have had a 
bishopric tentatively offered to him; ibid., 3345 (7 June 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 3347 (8 June 
1517), 3605 (19 August 1517, Spinelly to Tuke). 
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councillors.483 Any such expectations would have been dissipated, however, when 
Spinelly reported no prospect of either outcome in Spain by late September.484 
Concerning Maximilian, the emperor had proved during 1516 that he could not be 
relied upon and reverted to demanding money from England. In addition, he had 
recently suffered a stroke, although it is unclear whether this was known in England 
or affected the crown’s perception of him.485 The only realistic chance of action was 
through the raising of the Swiss, a provision of the league, for which Pace had 
remained in the Cantons and had subsequently resumed his negotiations there.486 
While Pace was pessimistic from the outset, it seems that, again faced with French 
counter-offers to the Swiss and a reluctance by his crown to hand over money in 
advance (in contrast to 1515-1516), he increasingly recognised that his prospects for 
success were slim and appears to have left in early October.487 
                                                 
483 Wolsey had been informed back in February 1517 that Charles’ Spanish advisors were opposed to 
the French amity; ibid., 2930 (16 February 1517, Knight to Wolsey, Brussels). 
484 Ibid., 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, St Vincent). 
485 Maximilian seems to have suffered a stroke during May from which, one Venetian reporter 
speculated, those afflicted rarely survived beyond a year; Ven.ii, 892 (27 May 1517, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Towards the end of July, Spinelly (in the Los Countries) searched 
for ways to make the Treaty of Cambrai ‘less mischievous’, although he admitted that Maximilian was 
difficult to manage. The English, however, were reluctant to entrust the emperor with any more money, 
despite further requests for English money (at one point desired to pay for Maximilian’s descent to 
Flanders, so that he could bestow the Imperial crown on Henry VIII, as he claimed). Indeed, Robert 
Wingfield’s mission at the Imperial Court must have proved untenable probably on this basis, as he 
was back in England by mid-August. Similarly, a letter from Pace reportedly suggested that the 
friendship between England, the Empire and the Swiss was not that close, as the latter two powers 
sought money and Henry VIII had closed his purse strings; LPIIii, 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to 
[Wolsey], Constance), 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3537 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to 
[Wolsey], Brussels), 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3599 (18 August 1517, 
Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, Wenham Hall), 3604 (19 August 1517, Robert Wingfield to Wolsey, 
Wenham Hall), 3685(15 September 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 3724 (calendared 6 October 
1517, [Pace] to -); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.126-128 (Ven.ii, 958; LPIIii, 3638; 27 August 
1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). Also see LPIIii, 3495 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Robert 
Wingfield]), app.37 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.128-
129 (Ven.ii, 966; LPIIii, 3675; 12 September 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
486 Pace advocated the need for an ‘offensive’ league; LPIIii, 3247 (16 May 1517, Pace to Wolsey, 
Constance), 3358 (14 June 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey). For his continued observation of diplomatic 
o turn him; ibid., 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to 
negotiations there, see ibid., 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3536 (29 July 1517, 
Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3557 (4 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance). 
487 Pace acknowledged his being instructed to resume negotiations with the Swiss in the middle of 
August, although he did not think the prospects were good; he predicted that the process would be 
expensive and that it would take a lot of time. Pace worked again with Cardinal Schiner, the latter who 
was also reportedly subject to French attempts t
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  The lacklustre response of England’s allies to the reconstituted league ‘for 
defence of the Church’ was probably the reason why Henry and Wolsey became 
receptive to French peace overtures that began in May. Negotiations with Francis I 
could only benefit the English interest at this stage; either they would prompt a 
positive response from the Empire and Spain to act against France (given that Anglo-
French amities tended to free up French kings to act in Italy) or, at worst, Henry VIII 
would benefit from his inability to act against Francis through pensions, as he had in 
1514.488 Francis made indirect peace overtures via Pace, then in Constance, during 
mid-May 1517.489 The reply must have been positive as, by June, a French embassy 
arrived in England and English representatives were sent to discuss mercantile 
disputes.490 Observers quickly assessed both sets of discussions as efforts towards an 
Anglo-French accord, involving the restitution of Tournai.491 They seem to have been 
                                                                                                                                            
Schuitz’), 3590 (17 August 1517, 
, Giustinian to 
[Wolsey], Constance), 3589 (17 August 1517, [Schiner] to Pace, ‘
Schiner to Pace, ‘Schuitz’), 3591 (calendared at 17 August 1517, [Schiner] to -), 3592 (17 August 
1517, Schiner to Ammonius), 3593 (calendared at 17 August 1517, Matthew Beccharia to [Cardinal -]), 
3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3685 (15 September 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], 
Zurich), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, Constance), 3721 (6 October 1517, Pace to 
[Wolsey]), 3722 (6 October 1517, Pace to Wolsey), 3724 (calendared 6 October 1517, [Pace] to -); 
Ven.ii, 952 (12 August 1517, Gian Giacomo Caroldo to the Signory, Milan), 968 (13 September 1517, 
Minio to the Signory, Rome). Wegg has Pace back in England by Christmas 1517; R. Brown (trans.), 
Four Years, ii, pp.126-128 (Ven.ii, 958; LPIIii, 3638; 27 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London); J. Wegg, Richard Pace, pp.113-116. A replacement may have arrived in September, but this 
is unclear and their work, if any, is unrecorded; Ven.ii, 968 (13 September 1517, Venetian ambassador 
in Rome to the Signory). For Giustinian interpreting Pace’s return as an indication by the English that 
they had abandoned their anti-French plans, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.146-150 (Ven.ii, 
1002; LPIIii, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
488 These could also begin to recoup monies laid out in 1516-1517 to Maximilian and Charles in a bid 
to secure their support. 
489 Anchises Visconti approached the secretary in this regard and, consequently, Pace advised that this 
overture be deemed genuine; LPIIii, 3247 (16 May 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3358 (14 June 
1517, Spinelly to Wolsey).  
490 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.93-95 (Ven.ii, 913; LPIIii, 3415; 30 June 1517
the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 919 (10 July 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). For an 
agreement reached over mercantile disputes in late July, see LPIIii, 3520 (26 July 1517), 3521 
(calendared 26 July 1517); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.111-113 (Ven.ii, 941; LPIIii, 3544; 31 
July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); R.J. Knecht, Francis I, pp.68-69. 
491 LPIIii, 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Wingfield, Antwerp), 3666 (7 September 1517, Tunstal and 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Middelburg); Ven.ii, 972 (17 September 1517, Gian Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian 
secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.95-103 (Ven.ii, 920; 
LPIIii, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 921 (9 July 1517, Gian 
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correct, as Henry had apparently agreed, in principal, a price for the surrender of the 
city by mid-July.492 Further French overtures in August, desired that the agreement be 
in the form of universal peace, although Wolsey rejected the offer for Tournai as 
insufficient.493 By late September 1517, however, Wolsey had indicated to a French 
representative that he wanted an agreement with France above everything else.494 
This seems to coincide with Pace losing hope of recruiting the Swiss and leaving them 
within weeks.495 
 As for knowledge of the peace negotiations among England’s anti-French 
allies, it seems that, on the one hand, the details and progress of these seem to have 
remained a secret, on the other, Henry and Wolsey admitted that such talks were 
being conducted and alluded to the rejection of French offers.496 This ambiguity 
seems to have caused, indeed was perhaps intended to cause, much uncertainty among 
the Spanish and Imperialists, probably hoping that it would provoke action against 
                                                                                                                                            
Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan), 931 (7 July 1517, Giovanni 
Badoer to the Signory, Abbeville), 942 (1 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gonzaga, London). 
492 Ven.ii, 955 (14 July 1517, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, France). For further Anglo-French 
diplomatic developments (in both England and France) from which one can see Wolsey moving 
towards peace, see LPIIii, app.40 (28 September 1517, de la Guiche to Wolsey, Boulogne), app. 50 (16 
August 1517, de Neufville to Wolsey, Sandwich), 3739 (11 October 1517, Bonnivet to Wolsey, 
‘Argentan’), 3766 (calendared end of October 1517, Richard Wingfield and More to Wolsey and the 
Council), 3772 (4 November 1517, Richard Wingfield and More to [Wolsey]), 3803 (20 November 
1517, Richard Wingfield, Knight and More to the French commissioners at Boulogne, Calais), 3805 
(24 November 1517, Brian Tuke to John Bennolt, the king’s secretary at Calais, Hampton Court), 3858 
(calendared end December 1517, [Wolsey] to -); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.126-128 (Ven.ii, 
dor in France to the Signory). A French embassy in England during November 
ber 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
958; LPIIii, 3638; 27 August 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 977 (19 September 
1517, Venetian ambassa
appears to have negotiated closer to an agreement. R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.135-137 
(Ven.ii, 987; LPIIii, 3788; 11 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 136-139 (Ven.ii, 
992; LPIIii, 3804; 21 Novem
493 LPIIii, app.38 (calendared end August 1517, [Wolsey] to [Henry]). 
494 Ibid., 3714 (calendared end of September 1517, de la Guiche to [Wolsey]). Also see ibid., 3701 (28 
September 1517, Stephen Poncher and – to [Wolsey], Boulogne); Ven.ii, 972 (17 September 1517, 
Gian Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan). 
495 See below pp.607-608. 
496 For the secrecy surrounding the actual negotiations, see LPIIii, 3714 (calendared end of September 
1517, de la Guiche to [Wolsey]). For the English admitting to French approaches for peace, albeit 
claiming to have rejected their terms, see ibid., 3566 (7 August 1517, Spinelly to Wolsey, Middelburg), 
3666 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg). 
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France.497 Charles V actively sought to prevent the peace by requesting that he be 
allowed to buy Tournai from England, a measure which, if carried out, would be 
extremely provocative given that both Charles and Francis laid claim to the town. 
This gesture seems to have been treated with scepticism in England, however; 
Wolsey’s response mirrored the Spanish king’s political intrigues over the last few 
years; he suggested that, for a small sum, Henry would retain it, while for a larger 
amount, he would hand it over to him. Nevertheless, the English were apparently 
tent o
during the early months of 1518, nothing tangible seems to have been on the table.499 
There was, moreover, a fear in England that Francis I’s overtures were disingenuous 
in n peace with France.498 
 It ought to be stressed, however, that such an agreement was by no means 
inevitable and that Henry and Wolsey’s continued fostering of their anti-Gallic allies 
suggested that they were just as prepared to implement a more belligerent strategy, if 
Charles and Maximilian showed sufficiently willing or if the pacific intrigues with 
Francis failed. Indeed, while Anglo-French negotiations continued towards peace 
and that he actually planned to attack England in some form, probably via Tournai. 
This apparently brought Anglo-French talks to the brink of collapse by February-
March.500 Significantly for this study, Henry and Wolsey were also concerned that 
                                                 
497 Ibid., 3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3666 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to 
[Wolsey], Middelburg), 3764 (31 October 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘Bezzarryll’). By December, 
Maximilian claimed to be enthusiastic about hearing that an Anglo-French treaty was close; ibid., 3845 
(24 December 1517, [Count Decian] to Wolsey, Linz); 3846 (29 December 1517, Maximilian to 
Henry, Linz). 
498 For the proposal that Charles be given first offer of Tournai apparently emanating via Tunstal in the 
first instance, see ibid., 3672 (8 September 1517, Tunstal to Wolsey, Middelburg). For Wolsey’s 
etters). For other indications of 
ry; Ven.ii, 998 (1 January 
o the Signory, Tours); LPIIii, 3968 (25 February 1518, Richmond [H]erald 
nto Burgundy and to recover Tournai, to 
proposal, see ibid., 3723 (6 October 1517, extracts from de Mesa’s l
Charles attempting to forestall a peace (and the handover of Tournai), see ibid., 3764 (31 October 
1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘Bezzarryll’). 
499 A French embassy was sent to England to conclude at the start of Janua
1518, Antonio Giustinian t
to [Wolsey], Paris), app.43* (6 February 1518, Francis to Henry); addendum 1929: 209 (calendared 
between February and May 1518, instructions to Clarencieux). 
500 There were constant rumours of a French military build-up in northern France, although the English 
crown was unsure of its intention; whether to make a move i
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any Anglo-French agreement might facilitate an attempt by Francis to achieve 
hegemony in Italy.501 Even in the weeks leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty of 
London (2 October 1518), there was some lingering scepticism about Francis’ 
intentions.502 It must not be forgotten that, while a peace with France did emerge from 
this phase, forced upon him by a lack of commitment from his allies, Henry VIII’s 
                                                                                                                                            
lp Alb
 have b
enough to advise Wolsey on a response, while an English herald was instructed to question Francis on 
have anticipated this threat in mid-March and, by April, even went as far as to ask Charles for support 
February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIIii, 3976; 28 February 
i)
app.43** (calendared February 1518, intelligence from France). There was also concerted Spanish 
Henry, Valladolid).  
 
January 1518, Wolsey to Jerningham), 3958 (19 February 1518, Jerningham to Henry, Tournai), 4004 
, 415
the Council of Tournai to Wolsey, T[ournai]), 4201 (31 May 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 
4428-4429 (12 September 1518), app.45 (28 March 1518). The English also maintained at least one 
ill intended to stir up Scotland. Even as late as 19 December 1518, Henry and Wolsey 
p.166-173 (Ven.ii, 1015; LPIIii, 4009; 15 March 1518, 
m Sandys to [Wolsey], Calais); R. 
he any return to Scotland or even to attack England. From January-February 1518 on, these seem 
to een given particular credence by Henry and Wolsey. The retired Fox deemed the issue grave 
this issue and Wolsey commented on this matter several times to Giustinian. Henry was still said to 
in case of invasion; LP, addendum 1929: 209 (calendared between February and May 1518); LPIIii, 
4135 (calendared April 1518, Henry to Kite and Bourchier); P.S. and H.M. Allen, Letters of Richard 
Fox, 65 (LPIIii, 3952, 15 February 1518, Fox to Wolsey, Winchester); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, 
ii, pp.151-155 (Ven.ii, 1006; LPIIii, 3918: 2 February 1518), 155-157 (Ven.ii, 1009; LPIIii, 3954; 17 
1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 166-173 (Ven.ii, 1015; LPIIii, 4009; 15 March 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). For intelligence received in England about the French threat 
throughout these months, see LPIIii, 3923 (4 February 1518, intelligence from Flanders), 4154 (11 
May 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 4201 (31 May 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, Tourna , 
pressure to convince the English of the veracity of this danger; ibid., 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to 
That this threat was taken seriously in England is indicated by a building project aimed at 
strengthening Tournai’s defences and by the city’s governor remaining on a high state of alert. Indeed, 
on 29 January, Wolsey instructed Jerningham to keep Tournai defended, warning him that the French
were raising troops in the region; ibid., 3886 (16 January 1518, Wolsey to Jerningham), 3907 (29 
(11 March 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 4153 (10 May 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, 
Tournai) 4 (11 May 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, Tournai), 4158 (12 May 1518, Jerningham and 
spy around this time, observing any indications of a military build-up. Wolsey instructed Jerningham to 
employ such methods in late January 1518; ibid., 3907 (29 January 1518, Wolsey to Jerningham), 4026 
(26 March 1518, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Calais), 4153 (10 May 1518, Jerningham to Wolsey, 
Tournai), 4359 (1 August 1518, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Calais). The English further understood 
that Francis st
received intelligence from France that Albany had a licence to go to Scotland the following Easter 
‘well accompanied’; ibid., 4666 (19 December 1518, Calais). For earlier concern about Albany’s 
movements, see ibid., 3940 (12 February 1518, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Calais), 3978 
(calendared February 1518, Jerningham and the Council of Tournai to [Henry], Tournai). 
501 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p
Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIii, 4205 (calendared 1 June 1518, - to [Wolsey]). Also see 
below pp.619-627. 
502 The French ambassador going to England to conclude the final agreement in September 1518 was 
assessed in this sense; LPIIii, 4432 (14 September 1518, Willia
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.215-218 (Ven.ii, 1072; LPIIii, 4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian 
to the Signory, Lambeth). 
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underlying anti-French agenda remained undimmed; he continued to regard France as 
his ‘enemy’, describing Francis as such in mid-April 1518.503 
 Insofar as the English crown still sought to cultivate an anti-French policy, this 
can be observed in various ways, particularly in its attempts to demonstrate to Charles 
of Castile (and, to a lesser extent, Maximilian) its ongoing anti-Gallic commitment 
and desire to hire the Swiss for this purpose. To keep this ‘option’ open, Henry VIII 
played down his negotiations with France to the Spanish, ensuring that Charles was 
aware of his refusal of Francis’ overtures, at least up to April 1518.504 This may have 
been linked to Henry’s fears that France actually planned to attack English interests. 
The Spanish tried to play on this perceived threat in a bid to pressure England to break 
with France, offering their support in case of an attack, and Henry gave Charles hope 
of this in late March 1518, when he welcomed Spanish overtures to negotiate a 
‘stricter alliance’. Charles sent an embassy to England for this purpose, which had 
‘many consultations’ with Henry by late May.505 The English crown also encouraged 
Charles to believe that he would participate in intrigues to recruit the Swiss (in 
accordance with their treaty ‘for defence of the Church’ of 1517), implicitly for use 
                                                 
503 LPIIii, 4082 (14 April 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Abingdon). 
504 The number of occasions that Charles was familiarised with the English rejection of French offers 
for Tournai suggests a deliberate strategy on Henry and Wolsey’s part to reassure Spain of their 
continued commitment against the French; ibid., 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 
4027 (26 March 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin), 4135 (calendared April 1518, Henry to Kite and 
Bourchier). 
505 Spinelly indicated some scepticism and Henry claimed to disbelieve Spanish claims about the 
French threat to Tournai around 12 April; LPIIii, 3868 (5 January 1518, Charles to Henry, Valladolid), 
3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 4022 (23 March 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4056 
(2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4057 (3 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, 
Abingdon), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4155 (11 May 1518, Chièvres and le 
Sauvage to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4171 (18 May 1518, Tunstal to Wolsey, Oxford), 4187 (25 May 1518, 
Henry to Charles, Woodstock); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.185-187 (Ven.ii, 1030; LPIIii, 
4157; 12 May 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Maximilian recognised the importance of 
. For indications that Charles attempted to stir up hostility in France by issuing 
such an arrangement to the continuation of the anti-French agenda when, in late May he urged his 
grandson to conclude an alliance with England quickly; LPIIii, 4186 (24 May 1518, Maximilian to 
Charles, Innsbruck)
ultimatums regarding the perceived threat by Francis to Tournai, see ibid., 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly 
to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4164 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, [Kite and Bourchier] to 
Henry), 4207 (calendared 1 June 1518). Also see Ven.ii, 1020 (9 March 1518, Francesco Cornaro to the 
Signory, Valladolid). 
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against France. However, while the Spanish king repeatedly urged his English 
counterpart to send someone to the Alpine confederacy from April 1518 and received 
English pledges that they would do so, this did not occur. By July, Wolsey had told 
the Spanish that, if all went well with Anglo-French negotiations, they would have no 
need to hire the Swiss, although Charles still sought this.506 Finally, Henry and 
Wolsey must have given Charles at least some hope that they could comply with his 
desire for Tournai to be handed over to him instead of Francis, as the Spanish king 
pursued this end throughout 1518.507  
                                                 
to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4208 (calendared 1 June 1518, Charles’ instructions to his ambassadors in 
Saragossa), 4246 (21 June 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4277 (30 June 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], 
Saragossa), 4282 (2 July 1518, Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and 
Bourchier to Henry), 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 
4341 (26 July, 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Bruges). Maximilian also expected English assistance to 
someone there from early April and this pressure was repeated on several occasions. By June, he had 
despatched a representative of the Sforza claimant to Milan to England to seek a pension; ibid., 4057 (3 
April 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4172 (18 May 1518, Maximilian to Charles, Innsbruck), 4186 (24 May 
1518, Maximilian to Charles, Innsbruck), 4236 (18 June 1518, Knight to [Wolsey], Ghent), 4239 (19 
(2 July 1518, Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4344 (27 July 1518, Maximilian to Henry, Augsburg). 
507
rejected in England, it did not stop him making the same overture to the French king; ibid., 3872 (6 
January 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Valladolid), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 
506 LPIIii, 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace 
France), 4209 (1 June 1518, de Mesa to Wolsey), 4228 (14 June 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Wolsey, 
recruit the Swiss, according to their 1517 agreement. Henry was in receipt of Imperial pressure to send 
 
June 1518, de la Laing to Wolsey, Ghent), 4277 (30 June 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Saragossa), 4282 
 Charles even offered to ‘mediate’ between Henry and Francis on this issue and, although this was 
4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry), 4336 (24 July 1518, instructions from Charles to de 
la Sauch, sent to England), 4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4385 (16 August 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa). Up to 
d about how to respond to Imperial and Spanish pressure in this direction, causing the 
[Wolsey], Abingdon), 4085 (16 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon). For 
1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4503 (15 October 1518, 
18 March, it seems that the English crown did plan to send Pace back to the Swiss although, from this 
date, but Henry wished to postpone this. This seems to have been linked with the arrival of a French 
herald announcing the birth of Prince Francis, which marked a watershed for Anglo-French peace 
negotiations becoming more serious (see p.604). Over the next few weeks, Henry and Wolsey seem to 
have disagree
king to change his mind on several occasions about how to approach this. At its heart, Wolsey appears 
to have favoured Pace’s return, in observance of England’s membership of the 1517 ‘anti-French’ 
league. Henry, on the other hand, did not want to send anyone, wary of provoking a war with Francis 
by virtue of such a mission when he was currently engaged in peace negotiations with him and trying 
to work out whether his French counterpart was genuine in his response. Henry was also wary about 
making such a gesture, when he was sceptical about Imperial and Spanish intentions to hire the Swiss. 
By 4 April, Henry had finally agreed to despatch a diplomat to the Swiss, but only when all of his allies 
against France were agreed and on condition that this would not be at odds with his negotiations with 
France. By the 14th, Henry had agreed to Pace’s departure, albeit in secret, known only by themselves 
and Ruthal (but only as long as the Swiss were prepared to accept the 1517 league ‘for defence of the 
Church’). In spite of this, neither Pace nor any other English representative was sent to the Swiss, as 
became clear from the repeated requests from Germany and Spain; ibid., 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to 
Wolsey, Richmond), 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 4057 (3 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 
4058 (4 April, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4071 (11 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4082 (14 
April 1518, [Pace] to 
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  In spite of the English crown’s various indications to Spain that it still 
ploughed an anti-French furrow, it seems that Henry VIII did not trust Charles’ 
pledges to the same end.508 Indeed, the Spanish king’s ‘pro-French’ councillors, 
Chièvres and de Sauvage, still retained power despite hopes that they would be 
replaced when they reached Spain.509 While reports back to England began to 
contradict this assessment of Charles’ ministers from mid-May and, shortly after, 
Henry and Wolsey were notified of de Sauvage’s death, it is difficult to identify any 
change in attitude from the English crown that it fully trusted Spain’s anti-French 
rhetoric, at least enough to abandon the peace negotiations.510 To support its attempt 
to reassure Spain about the French talks and to encourage Charles that the anti-Gallic 
                                                                                                                                            
Wolsey’s declaration to Giustinian that he hoped to arrange a marriage agreement with France, see R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.173-178 (Ven.ii, 1019; LPIIii, 4047; 29 March 1518, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London). On 8 June, Spinelly reported the French to be angry at hearing that Henry had 
sent someone to the Swiss. It is probable that Spanish sources told them this, given that Charles 
understood that an English diplomat would be sent; LPIIii, 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, 
Saragossa). The English also maintained close relations with Matthew Schiner, the cardinal 
maintaining a representative in England and, at one stage, Henry proposed that he be commissioned to 
represent England with the Swiss instead of Pace; ibid., 3880 (13 January 1518, Schiner to Pace, 
Zurich), 4000 (9 March 1518, Schiner to Henry, Zurich), 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], 
Reading), 4118 (26 April 1518, Schiner to Wolsey, Zurich), 4168 (16 May 1518, Schiner to Henry, 
Zurich), app.47 (30 May 1518, Matthew Beccaria to Wolsey, Abingdon); Ven.ii, 1037 (30 May 1518, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
508 LPIIii, 4074 (12 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon). 
509 English diplomats in Spain implied the disappointment at this in their correspondence. In February, 
for instance, Stile wrote that Charles was governed by francophile Burgundians, to the discontent of the 
Spanish. Also, Knight notified Wolsey in late March, that the two advisors in question were still 
‘omnipotent in Spain’; ibid., 3937 (11 February 1518, John Stile to [Henry], Valladolid), 4027 (26 
March 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Mechelin). 
510 Kite and Bourchier described finding Chièvres less ‘French’ than they expected around 12-13 May 
and Kite reiterated this opinion on 21 June, although he claimed the Spanish disagreed with him and 
admitted that there were no Spaniards in Charles’ confidence; ibid., 4164 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, 
[Kite and Bourchier] to Henry), 4246 (21 June 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Saragossa). For de Sauvage’s 
death and his possible replacement by the dean of Besançon and the archbishop of Palermo, see ibid., 
4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4219 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to [Wolsey], 
Saragossa), 4228 (14 June 1518, Kite and Bourchier to Wolsey, Saragossa). There were also 
encouraging reports sent back to England from mid-April about Charles’ deteriorating relations with 
and increasing hostility towards France. For instance, Bourchier reported by 2 July that the Spanish 
wanted a breach between Francis and Charles and that he believed this to be feasible; ibid., 4091 (18 
April 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Aranda de Duero, Spain), 4164 (calendared 12-13 May 1517, [Kite 
and Bourchier] to Henry), 4178 (20 May 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4218 (8 June 1518, 
Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4277 (30 June 1518, Spinelly to [Henry]), 4282 (2 July 1518, Bourchier 
to Henry, Saragossa), 4342 (26 July 1518, Bourchier to Wolsey), 4383 (Kite to Henry, 16 August 1518, 
Saragossa). 
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agenda was still alive, Henry and Wolsey attempted to keep the nature of these 
discussions a secret. While only a handful of Henry’s councillors were privy to them, 
however, this did not stop details leaking out.511 By the end of July an Anglo-French 
agreement became increasingly likely and, from this point, the English began to 
disclose their intention to conclude with France. Subsequently, Charles (and 
Maximilian) became increasingly concerned with its implications.512 While, during 
August, Wolsey told Charles not to listen to rumours about the treaty, the Spanish 
king was sufficiently worried by the 16th to request that Henry ‘keep the alliance 
strictly’ between them. Charles even asked for a delay in its conclusion and offered 
money for this.513 By mid-September Charles was not completely convinced about 
the imminent Anglo-French agreement, but he was said to be reassured of Henry’s 
                                                 
511 The veil of secrecy is indicated by Giustinian, although he does seem to have been au fait with most 
of the issues being discussed, particularly the marriage, restoration of Tournai and universal peace. 
Apart from Wolsey, Ruthal and Pace seem to have been involved, although in mid-September, Thomas 
More claimed that the cardinal ‘most solely’ conducted negotiations ‘so that the King himself scarcely 
knows in what state matters are’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.195-199 (Ven.ii, 1042; LPIIii, 
4243: 21 June 1518), 200-202 (Ven.ii, 1046; LPIIii, 4332; 22 July 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, 
Lambeth), 204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPIIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 
ian to the Signory, Lambeth), 210-212 
egotiations, see LPIIii, 4364 (4 August 1518, Jerningham 
208-210 (Ven.ii, 1063; LPIIii, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustin
(Ven.ii, 1067; LPIIii, 4412; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 213-215 (Ven.ii, 
1071; LPIIii, 4424; 10 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 215-218 (Ven.ii, 1072; 
LPIIii, 4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1025 (20 April 1518, 
Doge and College to Giustinian), 1070 (7 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For 
Jerningham’s lack of knowledge about the n
to Wolsey, Tournai). 
512 Wolsey initially tried to reassure Charles by assuring him that Francis would not consequently 
launch any enterprise in Italy. The response from Spain and the Low Countries was negative and 
Knight recommended that Henry and Wolsey write to convey further reassurance; LPIIii, 4336 (24 July 
1518, instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 4341 (26 July, 1518, Knight to 
Wolsey, Bruges), 4341 (26 July, 1518, Knight to Wolsey, Bruges). 
513 To reassure Charles about the negotiations with France, the English gave implied support of 
Charles’ candidacy for the Imperial crown, doubtless intended as a demonstration of faith. Some sort of 
bond may also have been paid to Spain for the same end. Nevertheless, the Spanish king feared the 
prospective loss of Naples as a result of any Anglo-French amity; ibid., 4336 (24 July 1518, 
instructions from Charles to de la Sauch, sent to England), 4369 (10 August 1518, de la Sauche to 
Wolsey, London), 4407 (calendared end of August 1518, [Wolsey] to [Charles], Hampton Court). In 
terms of Charles’ fear of any conclusion, the offer to Wolsey of a bishopric was also resumed; ibid., 
4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4385 (16 August 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Saragossa). 
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good faith, although on 15 October, Spinelly still recommended that Henry needed to 
placate the Spanish king.514 
 The watershed moment for English foreign policy vis-à-vis France came with 
the arrival of news that an heir was born to Francis I on 28 February 1518. Wolsey 
had already anticipated this possibility and had proposed a potential marriage alliance, 
involving Princess Mary, prior to this. The birth of Prince Francis was known in 
England by 18 March and, a few days later, Giustinian noted that Wolsey no longer 
abused Francis and declared, ‘if I perceive the King of France to mean well towards 
his Majesty, and administer justice to our subjects, I will at any rate conclude this 
union;… The King of France has now got a son, and his Majesty here has a daughter 
– I will unite them by these means’. French agreement to this proposal was issued on 
8 April.515 By 21 June Wolsey, then a legate, proclaimed his hope that the presence of 
a French secretary and herald would result in universal peace.516 A preliminary treaty 
providing for the marriage of Mary to Prince Francis and the restitution of Tournai 
was initially settled on 9 July, following which there was a delay as a high-ranking 
embassy was awaited to conclude the agreement. This arrived in England by late 
                                                 
514 On the positive side, Charles wanted to be privy to all articles about the treaty, but on the negative, 
he still feared a possible French move against Naples; ibid., 4436 (17 September 1518, Kite and 
Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa), 4439 (18 September 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Saragossa), 4440 (18 
September 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Saragossa), 4503 (15 October 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
don), 4063 (8 April 1518, Stephen 
y, Lambeth). 
Saragossa). Also see ibid., 4505 (16 October 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa). 
515 Wolsey’s initial offer of Princess Mary’s hand in marriage to the dauphin, if a son was born to 
Francis, was apparently made during Stephen Poncher’s last visit to England and seems to have been 
first acknowledged in France around the middle of March; ibid., 4014 (18 March 1518, Pace to 
Wolsey, Richmond), 4061 (7 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abing
[Poncher] to [Wolsey], Paris), 4064 (8 April 1518, instructions from Poncher to his secretary), 4166 
(14 May 1518, Poncher to [Wolsey], Amboise); Ven.ii, 1018 (11 and 13 March 1518, Antonio 
Giustinian to the Signory, Amboise); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.173-178 (Ven.ii, 1019; 
LPIIii, 4047; 29 March 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For this news causing Henry to 
postpone an English embassy to the Swiss, see above p.591 n.506. Giustinian was convinced by mid-
March that Henry was predisposed to peace rather than war; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.166-
173 (Ven.ii, 1015; LPIIii, 4009: 15 March 1518). 
516 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.195-199 (Ven.ii, 1042; LPIIii, 4243; 21 June 1518, Giustinian 
to the Signor
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August-early September.517 At this point, Wolsey was confident of success as the 
final bout of negotiations began, although the cardinal subsequently reported French 
resistance to the inclusion of the Empire and Spain.518 A final French embassy 
travelled to England in mid- to late September, although it seems that there was still 
some lingering scepticism in advance of its arrival about whether Francis I was still 
genuine in his intention for peace. The Treaty of London was finally proclaimed on 2 
October 1518 amidst great pomp and celebration. At its heart was an Anglo-French 
amity centred on the marriage of Princess Mary to the dauphin and the restoration of 
Tournai to Francis I for a price. The other significant dimension to this agreement was 
its provision for universal peace as a precursor to crusade against the Ottomans.519 
                                                 
 LPIIii, 4254 (23 June 1518, Francis to Wolsey, Angers), 4255 (23 June 1518, Stephen [Poncher] 
Bishop of Paris to Wolsey, Angers), 4275 (30 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock), 4276 (30 June, 
1518, Poncher to [Wolsey], Angers), 4351 (31 July 1518), 4352 (31 July 1518), 4353 (31 July 1518), 
4357 (calendared end July 1518), 4358 (calendared end July 1518), 4360 ( gust 1518, Budaeus to 
Pace, Paris), 4401 (28 August 1518, Stephen [Poncher] Bishop of Paris to Wolsey, Sandwich), 4405 
(31 August 1518, Francis to Wolsey, Angers), 4421 (8 September 1518, Budaeus to More, Paris), 4422 
1046; LPIIii, 4332; 22 July 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPIIii, 
August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 208-210 (Ven.ii, 1063; LPIIii, 4392; 20 August 
1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 210-212 (Ven.ii, 1067; LPIIii, 4413; 2 September 1518, 
517
1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4303 (9 July 1518, Westminster), 4304 (10 July 1518, London), 4339 (25 July 
1 Au
(8 September 1518, Budaeus to Linacre, Paris); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.200-202 (Ven.ii, 
4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 206-208 (Ven.ii, 1057; LPIIii, 4371; 11 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1047 (18 July 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, 
Angers), 1055 (21-25 July 1518, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory, Angers), 1068 (21 
August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes), 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to 
the Signory, Nantes). 
518 Negotiations also related to money and Wolsey claimed to have gained a higher sum in advance of 
ns.), Four Years, ii, 
518), 4483-4484 (8 October 1518); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 
October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth); R. Brown 
the marriage and better terms regarding Scotland; LPIIii, app.51 (28 August 1517, Wolsey to Henry), 
app.52 (calendared after 28 August 1517, Wolsey to Henry). Giustinian understood by 2 September 
that negotiations were pretty much concluded, although the final ratification would not take place 
before the end of the month. By the 7th, the Venetian believed that a conclusion was expected in a week 
or so and prematurely visited Henry on the 18th to congratulate him; R. Brown (tra
pp.210-212 (Ven.ii, 1067; LPIIii, 44123; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); 
Ven.ii, 1070 (7 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 215-218 (Ven.ii, 1072; LPIIii, 
4438; 18 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
519 The French delegation entered London on 23 September and was formally received by Henry VIII 
on the 26th. Giustinian believed the agreement to be practically settled, although he still understood that 
there were some final issues to sort out; LPIIii, 4432 (14 September 1518, William Sandys to [Wolsey], 
Calais); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.215-218 (Ven.ii, 1072; LPIIii, 4438; 18 September 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to 
Alvise Foscari, Lambeth). For the Treaty of London and its celebrations, see LPIIii, 4467 (1 October 
1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469-4471 (2 October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518), 
4475-4477 (4 October 1518), 4480 (5 October 1
October 1518, anonymous account of the entertainments in England on the conclusion of the treaty), 
1095 (30 September, 10 
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  Returning to the Anglo-papal focus, the English crown had gained papal 
support for its league ‘in defence of the Church’ through von Schőnberg by 5 July 
1517, but the nuncio did not swear membership on the pope’s behalf. It was 
understood that Leo would ratify later in Rome in front of his allies’ ambassadors.520 
To buy papal support (and probably explaining the ambiguity of papal adhesion), 
Henry agreed to supply the pope with 100,000 ducats of the 200,000 requested for the 
Urbino conflict, on condition that this could at least be subsidised by a clerical tenth 
in England.521 News of the league’s proclamation reached Rome by the end of July, 
along with von Schőnberg’s report that Henry was enthusiastic about going to war, as 
long as his allies joined it. The pope was reportedly delighted and, after speaking with 
the Imperial and Spanish representatives, declared that the league should be ‘etiam ad 
offensionem’.522 All that remained was for the pontiff to ratify his membership 
personally and send that back to England. While Leo did confirm the league during 
August (perhaps on the 11th), this was withheld from de Giglis for some months.523 
                                                                                                                                            
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.224-228 (Ven.ii, 1085; LPIIii, 4481; 5 October 1518), 228-235 (Ven.ii, 1089; 
LPIIii, 4491; 10 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For the continued focus upon 
Tournai throughout, see for instance Ven.ii, 998 (1 January 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, 
Tours), 1025 (20 April 1518, Doge and College to Giustinian); LPIIii, 4255 (23 June 1518, Stephen 
[Poncher] Bishop of Paris to Wolsey, Angers), 4275 (30 June 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Woodstock). The 
duke of Suffolk was accused in early April of having offered to secure Tournai for Francis, in return for 
a pension, which he denied and was still fighting in July. Wolsey, however, seems to have already 
made positive noises about this to Stephen Poncher (bishop of Paris); ibid., 4063 (8 April 1518, 
Stephen [Poncher] Bishop of Paris to [Wolsey], Paris), 4308 (11 July 1518, Pace to Wolsey, 
Woodstock). For the universal peace aspect, see for instance R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.223-
224 (Ven.ii, 1081; LPIIii, 4466: 1 October 1518) and below pp.628-644. 
520 R. Brown, Four Years, ii (1854), pp.95-103 (Ven.ii, 920; LPIIii, 3455; 10 July 1517, Giustinian to 
the Signory, London). 
521 Ven.ii, 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
522 Ibid., 937 (28 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Such news had been 
expected since the 22nd, although rumours circulating Rome were at odds about whether Henry would 
actually break with France; ibid., 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 939 
(30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
523 While Pastor asserts that Leo ratified the treaty on 11 August, de Giglis was still said to be seeking 
to obtain Leo’s pledge/signature up to the 31st of this month. By the 22nd, for instance, de Giglis was 
said to be trying to convince Leo on the basis of his losses to della Rovere in the Romagna, whereas his 
French counterpart was attempting to prevent this. Some indication from Leo must have been issued by 
the 24th, however, as he appointed Wolsey along with at least three other bishops as collectors of the 
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Papal procrastination meant that Leo did not release his ratification until 18 
ovem
English had largely given up making any tangible moves in this direction by 
N ber but, even then, he requested that this remain secret.524 By this time, 
however, the anti-French coalition was effectively dead in the water and, although 
communication channels between England and Rome had and did remain open on this 
subject, no further progress was apparently made. Indeed, the English crown does not 
appear to have made any direct attempts to realise papal involvement. While in early 
August, von Schőnberg still remained confident that the coalition would begin to turn 
against France, having urged Charles to lobby Henry to assist a pope who wanted to 
be ‘protected from wrong and oppression’, little is known about the nature of the 
nuncio’s subsequent exchanges with Wolsey .525  
As far as Henry and Wolsey were concerned, this papal reluctance to finally 
commit to the league may not have been surprising, given the wider political context 
of foreign affairs. The English by this time had little faith in their other allies taking 
the next ‘step’ to direct the league against France, by recognising a French 
transgression of the ‘defensive’ coalition that would induce action. Indeed, the 
September-October 1517, particularly as Pace returned home from the Swiss and 
there was little indication of Charles honouring his pledge to break with France 
                                                                                                                                            
tenth insisted upon by Henry, if he was to financially assist the pope against della Rovere, ‘the son of 
to commit to the league; ibid., 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in 
o the Signory); LPIIii, 
have been called upon to help gain the 
iniquity and child of perdition’. One cannot imagine Leo as envisaging crown cooperation in this if he 
was still not prepared 
Rome to the Signory), 956 (22 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome t
3617 (24 August 1517, Leo to Wolsey), 3618 (24 August 1517, Leo to the bishop of Exeter), 3619 (24 
August 1517, Leo to the bishop of Coventry and Lichfield), 3620 (24 August 1517, Leo to Fox), 3658 
(31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.209-210. The 
Spanish ambassador in Rome, Hieronymo de Vich, may also 
pope’s oath; ibid., 3616 (23 August 1517, Hieronymo de Vich to Henry, Rome). 
524 LPIIii, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
525 Ibid., 3536 (29 July 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Bruges), 3556 (4 August 1517, Tunstal and Spinelly to 
[Henry]), 3567 (7 August 1517, Schomberg to Wolsey, Middelburg), 3587 (17 August 1517, Spinelly 
to Wolsey), 3667 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg). 
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following his reaching Spain.526 Of these, it may well have been understood in 
England that Charles’ declaration was of paramount importance to Rome, as Leo’s 
initial commitment in July was made conditional on this.527 Equally the pope believed 
that Henry VIII’s intention to act was dependent on the direct involvement of his 
allies, including Charles.528 In this context, therefore, Leo X’s reluctance to handover 
his ratification of the anti-French league until he could be confident of the likes of 
Spain also committing is entirely understandable. Indeed, by 31 August, the pope had 
advised de Giglis that he would ratify soon, as he had heard that the Spanish king had 
embarked for Spain.529 It was eventually on account of the Spanish king’s inaction 
and continued influence of his ‘pro-French’ councillors that de Giglis attributed Leo’s 
desire to keep his November ratification secret.530 Charles’ failure to follow-through 
                                                 
526
964 (10 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 968 (13 September 1517, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For reports from the Curia and elsewhere that the Swiss 
had joined France, see LPIIii, 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes), 3685 (15 September 
1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, Constance). Around 
intrigues with the Swiss ‘for the sake of general tranquility’, but this was too late, given Pace had 
527 See above pp.579-580.  
528 At the same time as he notified Leo of his adhesion to the English treaty, von Schőnberg reported 
Henry’s commitment to go to war, as long as his allies also participated; Ven.ii, 939 (30 July 1517, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
529
Henry was still attempting to facilitate this; by 9 September, Leo had received intelligence from France 
that Henry had supplied Charles with 3,000 troops, presumably for the defence of the Low Countries 
 For positive intelligence in Rome that England was acting in the Cantons up until then, see Ven.ii, 
the end of November, de Giglis passed on a request from the pope for Henry to counter French 
already departed; ibid., 3813 (calendared end November 1517; [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
 LPIIii, 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). To the pope, there was a hope that 
and 300,000 ducats for his voyage. The following day, Imperial intelligence circulating Rome 
suggested that Henry VIII would turn against France when Charles arrived in Spain; Ven.ii, 962 (9 
September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 964 (10 September 1517, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 968 (13 September 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). Contemporaneous to this, Leo and Charles concluded a secret league during August 1517 
 Francis, for which he 
ources, however, that this was false. He 
s, were unfounded; ibid., 
that was based on the pope’s earlier alliance with Ferdinand ‘for the preservation of the Church’. In 
addition to the Church, Florence and Lorenzo de’ Medici were included and its aim was probably to 
support the papal effort in Urbino. While Wolsey was informed of its existence, the English crown was 
neither involved, nor did it even broach the subject with Rome; LPIIii, 3495 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to 
[Robert Wingfield]), 3591 (calendared at 17 August 1517, [Schiner] to -), 3660 (calendared at the end 
of August 1517), app.37 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]). 
530 LPIIii, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). As early as 14 September, there were 
suspicions in Rome that a Spanish rupture with France would not materialise; de Giglis conveyed the 
pope’s unhappiness at hearing of a purported ‘new’ alliance between Charles and
blamed Chièvres. The English orator had heard from Imperial s
also wrote of having been approached by Charles to urge Chièvres’ elevation to the Sacred College; in 
other words, hopes that this pro-French principal councillor would be removed from power once 
Charles was in Spain, thus enabling the Spanish king to break with Franci
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with his membership of the anti-French coalition, therefore, would have given the 
English crown little hope of inducing an oath from Leo X. 
 
 Secondly, Leo’s campaign against Francesco Maria della Rovere continued to 
drain papal coffers and divert his focus away from the broader anti-French agenda.531 
Initially, however, Wolsey identified this conflict as a potential casus belli, through 
which the ‘defensive’ league could be activated against France. He tentatively 
sounded out the papacy on 28 June, claiming to have protested to a recently-arrived 
French embassy about Francis’ backing of the ex-duke against the Church, asserting 
that Henry would not tolerate this.532 This did not apparently elicit a response from 
Rome and was not pushed any further as a motive to declare war on France. The 
pope’s concentration on this ‘domestic’ concern overrode any commitment to the 
Venetian ambassador.  Around mid-August, 
English league. Indeed, around 24 July, prior to hearing about the proclamation of the 
league on the 5th, Leo X’s main concern was whether the condition that he had 
imposed on his membership had been met by Henry VIII: ‘we are expecting to hear 
wh gland will accommodate us with money, for to this effect have 
we made a demand of him’, he told the 533
ether the King of En
for instance, it was rumoured in Rome that, despite de Giglis’ pressure for papal 
ratification of the London treaty, Leo would not do so until he heard the result of 
                                                                                                                                            
3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes). For reports in Rome along the same lines, that 
Chièvres would remain in control, despite Charles reaching Spain, see Ven.ii, 969 (16 June 1517, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For earlier indications that the English hoped for the 
replacement of Charles’ councillors, see pp.537-538 n.255. 
531 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.208-209. 
532 The ambassadors reportedly did not deny the accusation, but argued that the pope had brought it 
upon himself by failing to observe his promises to the duke of Ferrara (to restore Modena and Reggio); 
Ven.ii, 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). For Wolsey previously raising 
the French-backed della Rovere as a reason for war, see above pp.583-584. 
533 Minio replied that he did well to ask Henry for this and that, given the Englishman’s wealth, he 
would surely grant it. The pope laughed and replied ‘We shall see’. By virtue of his discussing this 
with an ally of France, Leo effectively indicated that his actions vis-à-vis England were deceptive and 
financially motivated. It was also said that Francis had protested that Leo had written to England 
alleging that della Rovere was supported by France in his war against the Church; Ven.ii, 935 (24 July 
1517, Minio to the Signory). Also see ibid., 936 (24 July 1517, Minio to the Council of Ten). 
 609
Cardinal Schiner’s negotiations with the Swiss, presumably to support him against 
della Rovere.534 The English remained informed about developments in this war and, 
hile these were not entirely negative, rumours about how Francis I’s support for the w
ex-duke might force or already have forced Leo to take up French offers of 
‘assistance’ and how he was finding it difficult to recruit troops from the Swiss must 
have raised concerns.535 Among recommendations made to the English crown to 
support the pope was Pace’s advice of 17 August to have Francis to apply pressure on 
della Rovere to cease hostilities, thereby withdrawing French support. Also, the 
secretary suggested that Henry write directly to della Rovere.536 Similarly, Cardinal 
Schiner, reporting the prospect of Filonardi’s recall from the Swiss Confederation as 
an indicator of Leo X’s inclination towards the French, advised Pace on the same date 
to urge his king and cardinal to write to the pope to prevent this.537 There was even a 
                                                 
534 Ibid., 954 (18 August 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Prior to this, by 27 July, 
Ammonius had heard from de Giglis that there was a very real possibility that Leo would side with the 
in the Urbino war; LPIIii, 3535 (29 July 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey). 
535
to Francis and by using Filonardi to recruit the Swiss. On the other hand, despatches were more 
emphatic that the pope was ‘in great extremity’ in this conflict, having no money (as Pace reported on 
11 July) and would either be forced to resort to French offers or had already done so. Robert Wingfield, 
in early July, even portrayed the offer of French support as a ‘pretext [for Francis] to get possession of 
Cantons for troops and the latter’s wittholding of those troops for the campaign. Complicating matters 
was the emperor’s unclear role, where the secretary understood that Maximilian was not allowing Leo 
to recruit the Swiss, instead trying to take advantage of the pope’s desperation and trying ‘to pluck 
some money from him’. By mid-August, Cardinal Schiner portrayed the pope as having already sided 
French, unless Henry fostered the Swiss. This would have been linked with the pope’s need for support 
 On the one hand, there were positive reports that Leo was trying fight della Rovere without resorting 
Italy’. From the Swiss Confederacy, Pace sent despatches describing the papacy’s failure to pay the 
with Francis, as he had (as the cardinal understood) recalled Filonardi because he was anti-French/pro-
olsey], Constance), 3587 (17 August 1517, 
iner] to Pace, ‘Schuitz’), 3590 (17 August 1517, 
], Middelburg), 3685 (15 
English; LPIIii, 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Robert Wingfield, Antwerp), 3463 (calendared 11 July 
1517, [Pace] to Wolsey), 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance), 3535 (29 July 1517, 
Ammonius to Wolsey), 3550 (1 August 1517, news from France), 3557 (4 August 1517, [Pace] to 
[Wolsey], Constance), 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to [W
Spinelly to Wolsey), 3589 (17 August 1517, [Sch
Schiner to Pace, ‘Schuitz’), 3593 (calendared at 17 August 1517, Matthew Beccharia to [Cardinal -]), 
3615 (23 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance), 3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, 
Constance), 3658 (31 August 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 3666 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to 
[Wolsey], Middelburg), 3667 (7 September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey
September 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey], Zurich), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, 
Constance), 3721 (6 October 1517, Pace to [Wolsey], Constance).  
536 If this worked, Pace reasoned, the pope would be obliged to Wolsey. He also described the need to 
end the Urbino war as ‘an interprise godli’, on account of Wolsey occupying ‘one of the most hyghe 
posts of the Churche’; ibid., 3578 (14 August 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Constance). 
537 Ibid., 3590 (17 August 1517, Schiner to Pace, ‘Schuitz’). 
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report in Constance during late August that peace negotiations between Leo and della 
Rovere were being conducted in England, although there is no other indication that 
this was true.538 While it is difficult to identify any clear English reaction to the 
Urbino war’s impact on gaining Leo X’s final oath as an ally, Henry and Wolsey 
could not have been optimistic.539 Even when the conflict ended in September 1517, 
the lack of outright victory and its sheer expense would not have assuaged their 
uncertainty.540 At the end of November, for instance, de Giglis advised Wolsey of his 
belief that the French would soon encourage della Rovere to reignite the conflict.541 
 Thirdly, and inextricably linked to the Urbino war and Leo X’s desire to 
secure his nephew in the duchy of Urbino, the papacy entered into negotiations with 
both Francis and Charles to secure a matrimonial match for Lorenzo de’ Medici.542 
The advantages for the papacy were twofold; it would secure Lorenzo in Urbino and 
ally him with France or Spain. For the English, however, the latter decision was of 
rting this possibility from 
most concern, as if Leo opted for France, this would certainly preclude papal 
ratification of the London coalition. De Giglis began repo
                                                 
538 Ibid., 3628 (25 August 1517, Pace to Wolsey, Constance). 
539 The financial implications of the war alone would have been sufficient for them to be sceptical; 
ibid., 3463 (calendared 11 July 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey). It was probably intended that Pace, 
reactivated by mid-August to recruit the Swiss, work with the nuncios Filonardi and Gambaro to ensure 
that the papacy hired sufficient mercenaries to overcome della Rovere, but the English secretary was 
pessimistic about his overall mission from the start and more so, vis-à-vis the papacy, when Filonardi 
was recalled; see above pp.595-596.  
540 French commissioners negotiating with their English counterparts at Boulogne notified Wolsey on 
28 September of the war ending; LPIIii, 3701 (28 September 1517, Stephen Poncher and – to [Wolsey], 
Boulogne). For the contribution of Charles (or, as Pace portrayed it, ‘the falseness of the Spanish’), 
instructing Spanish troops to leave della Rovere, shortly after making an agreement with pope ‘for the 
preservation of the Church’ see ibid., 3591 (calendared at 17 August 1517, [Schiner] to -), 3667 (7 
September 1517, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Middelburg), 3693 (19 September 1517, [Pace] to Wolsey, 
Constance), 3705 (29 September 1517, Spinelly to Henry, Spain), 3721 (6 October 1517, Pace to 
[Wolsey]), app.37 (20 July 1517, [Schiner] to [Wolsey]). Nevertheless, Wolsey sought to take at least 
partial credit for this; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.132-134 (Ven.ii, 978; LPIIii, 3733; 8 
October 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, Westminster). For accounts of the end of the Urbino conflict, 
see M. Creighton, History of the Papacy, v, pp.278-279; W. Roscoe, Leo the Tenth, ii, pp.68-69. 
541 LPIIii, 3813 (calendared end November 1517; [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
542 The first suggestion of Franco-papal negotiations came towards the end of July, although a marriage 
 Constance), 3535 
for Lorenzo is not mentioned; Ven.ii, 938 (30 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). In England, there were rumours around the same time that Francis I intended to move against 
Naples, possibly with papal approval; LPIIii, 3523 (27 July 1517, [Pace] to [Wolsey],
(29 July 1517, Ammonius to Wolsey). 
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mid-September, although he was not initially worried about it, particularly (by mid-
November) as the pope had approached Charles for an alternative match.543 At some 
point, Wolsey instructed the orator to lobby in favour of the Spanish option but, by 
the end of November, Leo was suggesting that he had no choice but to conclude with 
Francis, as he had received nothing tangible from Charles.544 The pope reiterated this 
by 10 December 1517, blaming Chièvres’ French sympathies for this.545 This again 
hints at disappointment in Rome that the expected replacement of Charles’ 
francophile councillors upon their reaching Spain failed to take place and that, 
consequently, Charles was unlikely to break with France. Given that Leo X had made 
his commitment conditional on such a Spanish commitment, Henry and Wolsey 
would probably have despaired of gaining a public declaration by this point. 
 
 Finally, the prospect of firm papal commitment to the English coalition could 
not have been deemed particularly great, given that the crown had already engaged in 
peace negotiations with France. That Henry and Wolsey began to respond to French 
overtures even before the ceremony proclaiming the anti-Gallic coalition on 5 July 
1517 and that a French delegation was already in England by this stage suggests that 
Leo X’s support was not thought to be guaranteed.546 Given the subsequent lack of 
conviction displayed by the English in lobbying their confederates against Francis I, 
including Leo X, it may well be that they had already despaired of any plan to 
                                                 
543 In mid-September, de Giglis reported that no decision had been made about a French marriage for 
Lorenzo. By 18 November, in spite of heavy French pressure, he wrote that Leo will ‘not throw himself 
into their hands’; LPIIii, 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes), 3801 (18 November 1517, 
[de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). Nevertheless, the English were still informed that Leo X continued to fear the 
realisation of French political ambitions in Italy ibid., 3427 (2 July 1517, Banissius to Robert 
Wingfield, Antwerp). Also see Ven.ii, 921 (9 July 1517, Gian Giacomo Caroldo, Venetian secretary at 
Milan to the Signory, Milan). 
544 De Giglis also implied that Leo was already ‘French’ because of a legatine commission conceded to 
Cardinal de Boissy on the pretext of the crusade; LPIIii, 3813 (calendared end November 1517; [de 
Giglis] to [Wolsey]).  
545 Ibid., 3828 (10 December 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
546 See above pp.596-597. 
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develop the anti-French agenda through this league. If this was at least partially the 
case, then the English would have been relatively unconcerned by the effect that 
subsequent rumours of these discussions were having on the pontiff and his handing 
over to de Giglis of his final ratification of its league. Leo X knew from early July that 
Henry had entered into negotiations with Francis and, by the end of the month, 
understood that an agreement was under discussion.547 Even when Leo was said to be 
‘delighted’ about von Schőnberg joining the league on his behalf, this was tempered 
with suspicions about Wolsey’s regular and secret meetings with French envoys 
which, it was speculated, must concern some sort of arrangement.548 This explains 
why rumours circulating Rome around this time were at odds about whether Henry 
would actually break with France.549 Further news of Anglo-French negotiations were 
layed to Rome on 1 August, when Chieregato wrote that all disputes between Henry re
and Francis had been settled and that perpetual peace was rumoured.550 At this point, 
the nuncio had identified an agreement on mercantile differences from late July, but 
he had assessed the preliminary peace discussions correctly.551 Given that Henry’s 
positive response to French overtures was an apparent reaction to his losing faith in 
his anti-Gallic allies, one could also argue that the lack of firm papal commitment 
hitherto also contributed to this. The English crown appears neither to have involved 
the papacy in its intrigues with France or have even informed Rome of these. It was 
only around mid-October that Wolsey even implied to the pope that an Anglo-French 
arrangement was on the cards, when he promised that nothing would be negotiated to 
                                                 
547 Ven.ii, 916 (Leo to Henry, 4 July 1517, Rome). By the 9th, a Venetian source in Milan reported the 
pope having ‘thrown himself into the arms of King Francis’; ibid., 921 (9 July 1517, Gian Giacomo 
Caroldo, Venetian secretary at Milan to the Signory, Milan). Also see ibid., 929 (17 July 1517, Minio 
to the Signory, Rome). 
548 Ibid., 937 (28 July 1517, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 939 (30 July 1517, 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
549 Ibid., 933 (22 July 1517, Marco Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). 
zaga, London). 550 Ibid., 942 (1 August 1517, Chieregato to Francesco II Gon
551 See above pp.596-597. 
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Leo’s prejudice.552 While the pope was said to be happy with this, Wolsey made no 
further effort to keep the pope informed and, by 10 December, Leo was still on 
tenterhooks about the French embassy in England; de Giglis reported that the pope 
had been waiting for letters on this subject and was afraid of a rapprochement. He had 
heard various rumours that this was close, including that a figure had been agreed for 
Tournai. De Giglis had tried to reassure the pontiff about Wolsey’s lack of 
communication, again blaming the sweating sickness then prevalent. The pope even 
seems to have hinted that the negotiations would force him to come to his own 
arrangement with Francis I, vis-à-vis a match for Lorenzo de’ Medici.553 By the end 
of December, while rumours in Rome circulated that the French embassy had left 
England empty-handed, it was still believed that an arrangement was possible.554 The 
English crown, therefore, had contributed towards papal reticence to confirm 
membership of the anti-French coalition by virtue of these negotiations; it had 
encouraged a self-fulfilling prophecy by sending confusing messages to Rome about 
its intentions vis-à-vis France.  
 
 In addition to probable English scepticism about the papacy’s commitment to 
the anti-French agenda, the crown also had to contend with Leo X’s ‘other’ (ongoing) 
strategy for dealing with the threat of Francis; universal peace. On 2 July, Leo 
forwarded Henry a letter from the Grand Master of Rhodes with intelligence of 
Turkish successes in Egypt. As a result, the pope urged the king ‘to hasten the Turkish 
                                                 
552 In this letter, Wolsey apologised for not writing very often, blaming this on the sweating sickness 
ived a secret message from a nuncio in France that Wolsey was negotiating a 
 [Wolsey]). 
 them, yet may have been 
to them; Ven.ii, 997 (31 
mbassador in Rome to the Signory). 
then sweeping England. The cardinal implied that negotiations towards an Anglo-French agreement 
were afoot when he notified Leo of the arrival of a French embassy, for which the pope was grateful; 
LPIIii, 3781 (8 November 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Earlier, on 14 September, de Giglis told 
Vannes that he had rece
treaty; ibid., 3682 (14 September 1517, de Giglis to Vannes). 
553 Ibid., 3828 (10 December 1517, [de Giglis] to
554 Henry had reportedly rejected the French offer to buy Tournai from
prepared to give the city to Charles, so that Charles could hand it over 
December 1517, Venetian a
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expedition’ and had Chieregato apply further pressure.555 On the 12th, de Giglis 
forwarded news of the Ottoman threat, along with Leo’s concerns about this and a 
request that an English envoy be sent to Rome to advise on the matter.556 Around 23 
July, a nuncio charged with promoting the crusade (perhaps instead of the legate 
promised in March) arrived in England. Wolsey, however, was reported to have held 
Alexander Fitzgerald in little regard, despite claiming to be in favour of peace.557 
Indeed, Giustinian observed a few days earlier, despite understanding that Anglo-
French negotiations were under way, that little was said in England about the 
crusade.558 English reticence was understandable, given the underlying anti-French 
agenda; existing French political influence over Rome could still force such an 
initiative to work against the English ‘interest’. By the end of July, Wolsey received 
intelligence that the French were pretending to prepare for the crusade, yet were 
actually intending to expel the Spanish from Naples.559 By supporting the papal 
strategy, therefore, Henry VIII would have been in danger of helping to cement 
French hegemony in Italy and Francis’ political influence over Rome. This fear of the 
apacy being too weak to control the political direction of any universal peace p
probably explains why the English crown was reluctant to encourage this papal 
                                                 
555 Ibid., 915 (Leo to Henry, 2 July 1517, Rome). 
556 LPIIii, 3469 (12 July 1517, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 3470 (12 July 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, 
Rome). Henry was also lobbied in this direction by the Grand Master of Rhodes; ibid., 3607 (19 
Carretto] to Henry, Rhodes). The Venetians were also eager to transmit eastern news to England, albeit 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.128-129 (Ven.ii, 959; LPIIii, 3655; 31 August 1517, Giustinian to the 
Signory, London), 135-137 (Ven.ii, 987; LPIIii, 3788; 11 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, 
August 1517, Fabrizio [del Carretto] to Henry, Rhodes), 3695 (23 September 1517, Fabrizio [del 
probably motivated by the desire to encourage Henry’s peace negotiations with their ally France; R. 
London); Ven.ii, 973 (21 September 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London), 982 (24 October 1517, 
LPIIii, 3492; 19 July 1517, Giustinian to 
st 1517, news from France). 
Signory to Giustinian), 990 (16 November 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
557 The nuncio was instructed to communicate Ottoman news to the king, en route to visiting Charles; 
LPIIii, 3164 (23 April 1517, Leo to Henry, Rome); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.104-111 
(Ven.ii, 934; LPIIii, 3504; 23 July 1517, Giustinian to the Signory, London). For the papacy’s original 
intention to send a legate a latere, see pp.589-590. 
558 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.103-104 (Ven.ii, 930; 
the Signory, London). 
559 LPIIii, 3548 (calendared end July 1517, - to Wolsey). Other intelligence from France, at the start of 
August, even opined that the English were ‘the Turks they will attack’ and advised the crown to be 
alert around Tournai and the Scottish borders; ibid., 3550 (1 Augu
 615
policy, yet simultaneously albeit cautiously receptive to similar overtures from 
Francis I himself. With direct involvement in any agreement, Henry and Wolsey may 
have felt more able to affect this outcome.560 In early October 1517, for instance, 
Wolsey was observed to receive news from Constantinople ‘with a troubled 
countenance’. Furthermore, on speaking of his and Francis’ contribution to the pope’s 
‘victory’ over della Rovere, the cardinal spoke of his hope that a general peace might 
now be achievable.561  
 In response to earlier papal pressure, Wolsey told de Giglis around the end of 
November 1517 that he and Henry were now convinced of the need for universal 
peace. Henry was willing to comply with this, ‘notwithstanding the insults he has 
received from France’. Consequently, de Giglis was instructed to induce the pope to 
demand peace between England and France. To avoid any war in Italy that might 
result from this, a defensive and offensive peace was also to be urged, including 
England, the papacy, France, Venice and the Swiss. This proposal was evidently 
tentative, as the orator was not to mention them to the pope until he had got him to 
raise the subject and bound him to silence. De Giglis was further advised that the 
matter be ‘managed with great dexterity, for reasons Wolsey cannot write’ and that 
562 This was clearly an early indicator that the English no-one else knew about this.
crown viewed the possibility of peace with France seriously and, to avoid the usual 
consequence of such agreements, the reactivation of French ambitions in Italy, spotted 
                                                 
560 If so, this was the precursor to such an approach that later led to the Treaty of London (October 
1518). For French overtures from August that any arrangement be in the form of universal peace, see 
p.597. 
561 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.132-134 (Ven.ii, 978; LPIIii, 3733; 8 October 1517, Giustinian 
to the Signory, Westminster). 
562 Wolsey suggested that he was responding to de Giglis’ notification of Turkish successes. The 
French ‘insults’ to which Wolsey alluded related particularly to Francis’ interference in Scotland; 
ould not have been much of a secret, however, as Giustinian reported on 10 
LPIIii, 3812 (calendared end November 1517, [Wolsey] to [de Giglis]). The possibility of universal 
peace as an outcome c
December that peace with France was talked of in England and that he hoped to see ‘this confederacy 
between all the Princes of Christendom’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, p.139 (Ven.ii, 994; LPIIii, 
3827; 10 December 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
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an opportunity to provide for this; the papal crusading initiative. If the call was to 
come from the pope, Francis would be unable to resist the sentiment at least. Also, an 
offensive and defensive peace could be more aggressively imposed than if it was 
merely defensive. It is unclear whether de Giglis ever made this approach, as the pope 
was in the process of formalising the call to arms against the Turks. 
 
 Perhaps sensing that he could lose control of the universal peace initiative 
more generally, Leo X took further decisive steps towards a crusade in the later 
months of 1517. On 4 November, a congregation of cardinals was appointed to 
discuss a response to the Turks, to which ambassadors were allowed entry. By the 
12th, this group had produced a memorandum which, among other things, called for 
universal peace among the princes of Christendom, so that a crusade could be 
launched forthwith. Leo subsequently distributed copies of this to Henry and his 
fellow princes.563 He further lobbied Henry to ratify the preparatory five year truce on 
18 November.564 De Giglis gave Wolsey some forewarning of this decision on the 8th; 
he further lamented that he was the only orator that lacked a commission to negotiate 
such an agreement and that he told the pope that this was due to the effect that the 
sweating sickness then sweeping England. Presumably, he meant that the king’s 
attempts to avoid the epidemic was hampering the speed of business conducted. De 
Giglis did, however, voice his suspicion of French enthusiasm for this course, stating 
to his Gallic counterpart that ‘it was important that it [the crusade] should be sincere 
                                                 
563 As far as an English contribution was envisaged, it was specified that Henry contribute towards 
shipping, although one presumes that troops were also expected; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, 
pp.223-227. Also see LPIIii, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]), 3815 (calendared end 
November 1517), 3816 (calendared end November 1517), 3817 (calendared end November 1517). 
564 LPIIii, 3801 (18 November 1517, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
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and unfeigned, and not a pretext for injury’.565 Despite Wolsey’s November proposal, 
the English reluctance to commit to the papal appeal continued and there was no 
urgency to reply to Leo X’s renewed call.  
 
 By the turn of 1518, despite an apparent Anglo-papal alignment against 
rance, the papacy having issued its ‘secret’ ratification of the English league ‘for 
the papal crusading initiative, fearing the implications that this may have if, as was 
expected, Francis used it as a blind to pursue his ambitions in Italy. English 
                                                
F
defence of the Church’, following two declarations of commitment by Nicholas von 
Schőnberg earlier in the year, both Henry and Leo were far from allied to each other 
against France. To confuse matters, neither party seemed to know in which political 
direction it was heading, sending out mixed signals to each other about their attitudes 
towards France. The English crown was still expounding anti-French sentiments, yet 
had been involved in peace negotiations with Francis I for some months, as it could 
not rely upon its allies to act against France.566 As will be seen, the papacy still voiced 
its anti-French sympathies to the English, yet was moving towards its own agreement 
with Francis. At the same time, Leo X was increasingly vocal about his crusading 
intentions, for which some sort of general peace would be required. Juggling two 
contradictory policies Henry and Wolsey continued to pursue as strong an anti-Gallic 
agenda as they could vis-à-vis the papacy. Firstly, they sought to steer Leo X away 
from any agreement with France. Secondly, they tried to give the impression that 
peace talks were stalling, that they still envisaged Francis attacking them and would, 
if necessary, make a robust response. Thirdly, they remained reluctant to subscribe to 
 
565 Ibid., 3781 (8 November 1517, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). It seems that the Venetians instructed 
Giustinian to back the papal proposal; Ven.ii, 989 (13 November 1517, Signory to the Venetian 
ambassador in Rome). For the pope requesting in July that Henry send someone to Rome to advise on 
the crusade, presumably in this forum, see p.615. 
566 See above pp.598-604. 
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enthusiasm for this course changed only when Wolsey identified an opportunity to 
hijack the initiative, by forcing Leo to commission him as one of the legates a latere 
sent out to promote the call to arms. 
 
 In spite of its own negotiations with France, the English crown sought to 
prevent any Franco-papal arrangement, in particular via the increasingly likely 
marriage for Lorenzo de’ Medici, which had been under negotiation for some months. 
It was feared that French threats may cause the pope to buckle and choose this option 
and that, subsequently, Francis would be able to make his planned move against 
Naples and have the papacy politically under his control.567 In light of Leo’s 
December notification that he might be forced to agree to this, as tangible Spanish 
counter-offers were not forthcoming, the English sent an envoy to the duke of Urbino 
(‘Johannes Anglicus’) during mid-January, presumably to urge him against the French 
and towards the Spanish marriage.568 By 20 February, however, de Giglis had written 
from Rome that the marriage had been agreed and that the failure to prevent it was 
down to a lack of communication from England, which the pope had interpreted as 
indifference. If Henry or Wolsey had written earlier or if they had sent an embassy to 
Spain earlier, the orator believed, this would have prevented the French success. 
Implicit is papal uncertainty about England’s intentions vis-à-vis France. Giulio de’ 
Medici attempted to reassure Henry on the same date that he ought not to worry about 
                                                 
Spanish feared that ‘the French will have entire sway in Italy’ and, in another, that it ought to be 
Christendom will be secured’; LPIIii, 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 4022 (23 
ke; ibid., 4177 (19 May 1518, Lorenzo de’ Medici to 
567 In one despatch that reached England, Henry VIII was informed that, if the wedding took place, the 
stopped in order ‘to prevent the increase of the French feathers’. If they did prevent it, Spinelly 
conveyed in January 1518, the pope would join the Anglo-Spanish alliance and ‘the peace of 
March 1518, Spinelly to Henry).  
568 Ibid., 3882 (15 January 1518, Henry to Lorenzo de’ Medici, Greenwich). Also, a ‘Dominus 
Hadrianus’ seems to have resided with de’ Medici until mid-May. It is unclear, however, whether this 
was the same or a second English envoy to the du
Henry, Amboise). 
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the agreement; it was just an attempt to increase the power of the Church.569 Ignorant 
of this fait accompli, Wolsey, writing on the 27th, urged de Giglis to promote the 
Spanish option and also informed him that ambassadors had recently been sent to 
pain to urge Charles’ compliance. While Henry, he claimed, had heard rumour that S
the Gallic match had already been agreed, he had sufficient faith in the pope to 
disbelieve it (indeed, he did deny reports to Giustinian around the 28th).570 Further 
confirmation of the pope opting for the French match came from Rome on 10 April, 
by which time de Giglis presumed that Pace had already heard of the duke’s departure 
for France and reassuringly commented that no-one approved of it.571 In spite of the 
apparent (or rumoured) failure to prevent a Franco-papal marriage agreement, Henry 
VIII continued to press Charles to further his counter-offer. On the positive side, he 
emphasised that a successful outcome could only strengthen their league against 
France. On the other hand, he warned that, if the French match occurred, ‘the Pope 
will lean entirely on France, which will thus have Milan, Genoa, Venice, Ferrara, and 
all Italy at her beck’. Furthermore, it would effectively withdraw Rome from their 
defensive league and place Naples in danger.572 This pressure came too late, however, 
as the English ambassadors reported Charles’ principal councillors conceding defeat 
on this matter by 12 May.573 Indeed, English intrigues to prevent a Franco-papal 
                                                 
Rome). 
570
569 Ibid., 3961 (20 February 1518, [de’ Medici] to Henry), 3963 (20 February, de Giglis to Vannes, 
 Ibid., 3973 (Mart. Amp. iii, 1277; 27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, ii, pp.157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIIii, 3976; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, 
London). The English crown would also have been confident of Charles’ support in  this; LPIIii, 3874 
(7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid). For intelligence reaching England that the French 
 crown was reacting to the papacy’s call for a five year truce and 
 admitted ‘their sloth and negligence’ in the matter. They also asserted that Leo now 
marriage had been agreed, see ibid., 3923 (4 February 1518, intelligence from Flanders). 
571 Ibid., 4068 (10 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace). For other intelligence reaching England that the pope 
had chosen the French marriage, see ibid., 3992 (calendared 5 March 1518, Erasmus to Colet, 
Louvain), 4022 (23 March 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de 
Duero, Spain), 4091 (18 April 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Aranda de Duero, Spain). 
572 At the same time, the English
beginning to implement a strategy to usurp it, at least partly on account of this fear; ibid., 4135-4136 
(calendared end April 1518, Henry to Kite and Bourchier). Also see below pp.635-636. 
573 The orators only managed to see Charles towards the end of April. By this time, Chièvres and le 
Sauvage reportedly
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agreement had failed and Lorenzo’s marriage to Madeleine de la Tour took place at 
Amboise on 28 April 1518.574 Wolsey must have made some sort of indication that he 
accepted the agreement, as on 1 May, the pope conveyed that he was pleased to hear 
this.575 Finally, de Giglis only seems to have replied to Wolsey’s letters to oppose the 
marriage around the beginning of June, at which point he advised that such a message 
would have hindered the Franco-papal agreement if it had arrived before its 
conclusion (especially if he had caused Charles to make counter-offers). In fact, the 
orator explained, Leo X would have preferred a Spanish match, but various factors 
caused him to accept Francis’ offer, the weight of French pressure being one. Despite 
this, the pope pledged not to allow the marriage to affect his membership of the anti-
French treaty nor to affect the English crown. Nevertheless, de Giglis warned, due to 
the weight of French pressure, there was ‘danger of his [Leo’s] falling into many 
errors through French practices’. In particular, the orator claimed to have warned the 
pope against making any ruling in favour of the French claimant to Wolsey’s disputed 
see of Tournai. Finally, de Giglis recommended that Henry and Charles ‘keep their 
eyes open, and not trust too much to his [Leo’s] words’. Also urging them to retain 
the Swiss as a matter of urgency, the ambassador believed that this was the only way 
that Francis could be stopped from moving against Naples.576 In spite of papal 
                                                                                                                                            
regretted the agreement; LPIIii, 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]). Also see ibid., 4164 
(calendared 12-13 May 1518, [Kite and Bourchier] to Henry, [Saragossa]). 
574 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.240-241. 
575 LPIIii, 4139 (1 May 1518, de Giglis to [Vannes], Rome). 
576 Ibid., 4206 (calendared 1 June 1518, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). Guicciardini was another who 
believed that the marriage indicated a papacy that would be politically amenable to France; when 
ddition, 50,000 
Lorenzo de’ Medici went to France for his wedding, the Florentine historian described how the duke 
took a brief with him that allowed Francis to appropriate the clerical crusading levy until such time a it 
was required for use against the Turks (at which point Francis was to repay it). In a
scudi of this was ring-fenced for Lorenzo; S. Alexander (ed.), The History of Italy by Francesco 
Guicciardini, p.302. 
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pledges to the contrary, Franco-papal marriage cemented English fears that Rome was 
now politically dominated by Francis I.577 
 By virtue of the Franco-papal marriage, the English crown understood that its 
interests would be or were being threatened on a number of fronts. At its broadest 
level, this lay in its perception of the French intention to move against Naples, thereby 
establishing hegemony in Italy and making permanent its existing political influence 
over the papacy. The ‘French’ papacy that the marriage was expected to engender 
would also be expected to be amenable to Francis’ requests and make concessions in 
his interests. While Henry VIII would have baulked at his counterpart having such 
influence over Rome per se, this would have been deemed particularly abhorrent in 
terms of matters directly affecting England, as de Giglis’ warning to Leo about ruling 
against Wolsey concerning the see of Tournai has already demonstrated.578 Also, the 
orator had already warned about French counter-pressure against the English 
campaign to deprive Hadrian de Castello back in mid-April. At this point however, de 
Giglis did not perceive this to be ‘dangerous’, as it had ‘incensed’ the pope.579 In the 
broader field of European politics, the English crown moved to oppose Francis’ use of 
the papacy to further his early intrigues to influence the expected Imperial election.580 
Indeed, a letter of French intelligence sent to England around the end of July stated 
                                                 
577 This view would have been further reinforced by third party intelligence reaching England. On 26 
April, Knight reported from the Low Countries hearing that the papacy (through Lorenzo de’ Medici) 
may be involved in an assault on Naples currently being planned by Francis I. The diplomat also 
implied his belief that Leo X had used the Turkish threat as a means to raise money through an 
indulgence to this end. Furthermore, on 8 June, Spinelly reported Lorenzo de’ Medici to have pledged 
to ‘be friend to friend, and enemy to enemy with the French King’, which had prompted Charles to 
 (26 April 1518, Knight to 
 Henry, Saragossa). 
ing to sway the inevitable election in their direction. See above p.595. 
write a letter of complaint to the pope but, on the positive side, the pope had allegedly refused his 
nephew permission to conclude a closer alliance with France; LPIIii, 4117
[Wolsey], Mechelin), 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to
578 See above p.621. 
579 He reported that the French ambassador had been instructed to act in this matter; LPIIii, 4084 (15 
April 1518, de Giglis to Pace, Rome). The English crown sought to deprive de Castello from both Bath 
and Wells and from his cardinalatial dignity as a result of his role in the Petrucci Plot against the pope, 
although the roots of English attempts to destroy his career can be traced back to 1514; W.E. Wilkie, 
Cardinal Protectors, pp.105-110. 
580 It was no secret around this time that Maximilian’s health was failing and, as a result, both Charles 
and Francis were seek
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that Francis did indeed hope to gain the Imperial crown with the assistance of Leo 
X.581 In a bid to win over one elector, Francis applied pressure on the pope to elevate 
the archbishop of Mainz to the Sacred College. While, during April 1518, Wolsey was 
informed that Leo had followed his counsel against this, the pope had in fact already 
conceded the promotion. The reason for the pope ultimately backing down was hinted 
at in the same missive; Francis could ‘kindle a fire’ at any time in the Papal States.582 
While the elevation seems to have remained secret for some months, English 
diplomats in Spain were confident that French pressure would succeed and that 
Francis would thereby be one step closer to the Imperial crown.583 Finally, the 
English crown would have held politically-motivated reservations about the marriage 
on account of the Scottish connections of the bride; Madeleine de la Tour’s brother-
in-law was the French-backed duke of Albany, who had been a thorn in England’s 
side in its attempts to control Scotland since the accession of James V (1513). With 
particular relevance to the papacy, following his victory at Flodden, Henry VIII had 
tried to assume control of nominations to the Scottish episcopate, albeit with little 
success. Albany, who had himself gained control of this process, following his 
becoming governor of Scotland in 1515, inevitably resisted this.584 Even if the 
English still harboured any hopes in this area, they would have been disappointed that 
Albany could potentially benefit from a familial connection with Leo X (however 
distant). This fear, if it existed, would have been well-founded, as there is evidence to 
                                                 
581 LPIIii, 4356 (calendared end July 1518, letter of intelligence concerning France). 
582 The archbishop was elevated on 24 March 1518; ibid., 4133 (calendared end April 1518, - to ); C. 
Eubel, Hierarchica Catholica Medii Aevi, iii, p.19. 
583 See above p.333. 
584 For Albany’s taking the lead of the Scottish government from July 1515 and the battle with England 
for control over episcopal (and other) benefices in the kingdom, see for example LPIIi, 560 (calendared 
6 June 1515, Albany to Leo), 604 (21 June 1515, Albany to Leo, Edinburgh), 654 (3 July 1515, James 
V to Leo and the College of Cardinals, Edinburgh), 707 (calendared 14 July 1515, Albany to Leo), 777 
(calendared end July 1515, James V to Leo and the College of Cardinals), 778 (calendared end July 
1515, [Albany] to Leo, Edinburgh), 779 (1 August 1515, Dacre to [the Lords of the Council], 
Kirkoswald). For the background to this, see C. Bingham, James V, pp.32-39. 
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suggest that the duke (through Francis) sought papal recognition of his right to 
exercise the privileges of the kingdom by virtue of their kinship even before the 
marriage was agreed.585 Furthermore, if Albany could benefit from his links to the 
Medici in the ecclesiastical sphere, it was conceivable that he could also call upon this 
in the continuing political struggle with England. These are just instances of how the 
implications of the Franco-papal marriage agreement began to affect English interests. 
As will be seen, these were to affect the Anglo-papal political relationship more 
directly, particularly in terms of Henry and Wolsey’s attitude towards Leo X’s 
crusading initiative.586 
 
 At the same time as it attempted (and failed) to influence Leo X away from an 
agreement with France, the English sought to reassure the papacy about their own 
peace talks with Francis I. As they were still not confident that this would be the 
eventual strategy adopted, given they still did not trust the French king and anticipated 
his attacking English territory particularly around February-March 1518 on, Henry 
and Wolsey continued to foster the pope (among others) as an ally against France.587 
Towards the end of February, for instance, Wolsey played down negotiations when he 
told Leo that Henry had refused Francis’ overture for Tournai, which had reportedly 
angered the French king. He also wanted de Giglis to enquire discretely whether the 
pope believed the French intended peace or war, Henry being ready to respond to 
either scenario.588 By the end of March, the pope reportedly understood that Henry 
                                                 
585 LPIIii, 3889 (18 January 1518, Leo to Albany, Rome), 3996 (5 March 1519, Leo to Francis, Rome). 
For references to de la Tour as Albany’s sister-in-law, see for example ibid., 3923 (4 February 1518, 
intelligence from Flanders); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIIii, 3976; 
28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
586 See pp.627 ff. 
587 See above, pp.598-601. 
588 LPIIii, 3973 (27 February 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis). 
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was ill-disposed towards France and had raised several thousand troops against the 
perceived French threat.589 
 Just as Henry VIII continued to demonstrate his ongoing commitment to the 
anti-French league to Charles of Castile, albeit to a far lesser extent than previously, 
he also sent the same message to Rome.590 Gaining firm papal commitment still 
seems to have been dependent upon Charles making a public declaration of his 
support for this course. The pope may have heard of early Anglo-Spanish discussions 
towards ‘a stricter alliance’, as he was said to be awaiting articles for a new agreement 
between England Spain and Rome on 1 and 19 March. Having not received them, Leo 
rmised that Charles had not committed himself, nor was he likely to do so while su
Chièvres remained influential.591 Even at the beginning of May, there was speculation 
in Rome about an Anglo-Spanish agreement and de Giglis was quoted as saying that 
the English king was ready for both peace and war with France.592 Leo X gave a 
curious indication that he was prepared to support the anti-French league on 15 
February, when he issued (another) ratification of the July 1517 treaty to Henry 
VIII.593 While the context of this declaration is unclear, it may have been intended 
either as reassurance to England, in spite of the Lorenzo de’ Medici marriage that had 
been agreed with Francis, or as a sop to induce Henry’s backing for the five year truce 
that Leo was shortly to proclaim.594 Whatever the intention, Henry VIII exhibited this 
ratification to Charles when he sought the latter’s complicity in seizing control of the 
                                                 
589 Ven.ii, 1021 (29 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). 
590 See above pp.598-601. 
591 LPIIii, 4015 (19 March 1518, de Giglis to [Vannes]). For Anglo-Spanish discussions in this 
direction, as well as the hope that Charles’ foreign policy would become anti-French once he reached 
 it is reasonable to surmise from the language 
 referring to the 1517 coalition and was joining then (because, as he said, of Henry’s 
 LPIIii, 3953 (15 February 1518, Leo to Henry). 
Spain and Chièvres and de Sauvage would be replaced, see above pp.598-601. 
592 Ven.ii, 1027 (1 May 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
593 It is unclear from the abstract which league the pope had joined and whether he was joining at that 
point or referring to an earlier adhesion. Nevertheless,
used that Leo was
‘zeal for the Holy Church’);
594 See below p.630. 
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papal crusading initiative during April 1518.595 The English crown also seems to have 
built up the impression that it remained committed to the anti-French league with 
signals given to Rome that it was still interested in retaining the Swiss and was taking 
action to ensure this.596 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the king envisaged a 
papal contribution to retain the Swiss (then being proposed), which was incumbent on 
papal membership of the coalition, apparently based on his reading of the February 
papal communiqué.597 It is completely understandable, therefore, why Leo X, around 
                                                 
reportedly sent a blank form of amity to the Spanish, to be expanded as Charles saw fit and with 
596 Intelligence circulating Rome had Pace still in the Cantons lobbying the Swiss during January 1518. 
While Pace was already back in Engl nd by this stage, Henry VIII intended to send him back to the 
Alps during the early months of 1518. Perhaps in a bid to encourage the king in this direction, during 
mid-March, the pope showed de Giglis correspondence that the Swiss still might be bought and a few 
During April, at a time when the English crown remained undecided over whether to send anyone to 
the Swiss and the Anglo-French peace negotiations became more serious, there were internal 
discussions in England about whether Henry would be obliged (by the terms of the 1517 treaty) to 
despatch an embassy to the Cantons if Leo did the same. In response, however, Wolsey recommended 
pope agreed and would also comply with the request to keep this a secret. Reportedly, the pope 
alternative, secret route to transmit this information; while the correspondent is unknown, it is stated 
that it would be sent via the papal ambassador with Maximilian and Raphael de’ Medici. In subsequent 
months, there were various reports that Leo had indeed sent a representative to the Swiss and even, 
around the end of May, that he had offered a pension to the exiled duke of Milan, Francesco Maria 
reached England that Leo X was lobbying against French interests with the Swiss. In spite of papal and 
wider pressure to send someone to the Swiss Confederacy, however, no-one was despatched from 
England. Nevertheless, the pope continued to labour under the impression that the English crown 
would act with the Swiss and send an a bassador to them all the way up to the Treaty of London in 
promised an English subsidy for their retention, which probably caused de Giglis to recommend an 
595 Also apparently by way of ‘apology’ for the French marriage of Lorenzo de’ Medici, the pope 
Henry’s agreemen; LPIIii, 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]). 
a
weeks later had the orator urge that an English embassy be sent to them (to oppose French intrigues). 
that Leo intercede with the Swiss to prevent them from making any agreement with the French; the 
responded flatteringly that he placed his faith more in Henry than in other princes. Leo also used an 
Sforza and, by late June, that he had sent money to the Swiss. Even during September, intelligence 
m
October. By 30 May, for instance, it was rumoured in Rome (through Schiner) that Wolsey had 
Anglo-Spanish alignment with the Swiss on 1 June (to prevent a French assault on Naples); Ven.ii, 999 
(12 January 1518, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1001 (17 January 1518, Minio to the Signory, 
Rome), 1033 (19 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1037 (30 May 1518, 
bassador in Rome to 
518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1061 (19 August 1518, 
red end April 1518, - to 
182 (22 May 1518, Maximilian to Henry, 
ril 1518, Pace to Wolsey). 
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1040 (8 June 1518, Venetian am
the Signory), 1044 (5 July 1
Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1069 (4 September 1518, Venetian ambassador in 
Rome to the Signory); LPIIii, 4015 (19 March 1518, de Giglis to [Vannes]), 4040 (28 March 1517, de 
Giglis to [Vannes], Rome), 4058 (4 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey), 4133 (calenda
- ), 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Bourchier to [Henry]), 4
Innsbruck), 4206 (calendared 1 June 1518, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]), 4218 (8 June 1518, Spinelly to 
Henry, Saragossa), 4244 (21 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa). 4336 (24 July 1518, 
instructions for Spanish ambassador sent to England, Bruges), 4440 (18 September 1518, Spinelly to 
[Henry], Saragossa). 
597 LPIIii, 4057 (3 Ap
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10 April, was anxious to know why a French herald had gone to England.598 It 
contradicted the current understanding of the English position vis-à-vis France, 
although the pope continued to understand that Henry VIII would honour his 
obligation to retain the services of the Swiss.  
 
 Also consistent with the English crown’s continued anti-French agenda was its 
treatment of the papal crusading initiative. Up to 1518, Henry VIII had been visibly 
reluctant to commit to this, in spite of increasing pressure from Rome. While it 
seemed a viable option to Leo X for ‘defending’ himself against Francis I’s Italian 
ambitions, the English did not agree. Indeed, Wolsey’s unsubmitted or unanswered 
proposal of November 1517 to ensure that any universal peace be ‘watertight’ 
revealed a fear that the French would use the crusade as a blind to gain Naples and, 
thereby, hegemony in Italy. He implied, moreover, his belief that the papacy was too 
weak politically to retain control of this initiative.599 Neither was the papacy strong 
enough militarily to defend itself against French ambitions; it was not long since Leo 
X (through Lorenzo de’ Medici) had struggled to oust Francesco Maria della Rovere 
from the duchy of Urbino in a costly war.600 In addition, Henry and Wolsey feared the 
                                                 
598 At the same time, de Giglis conveyed the pope’s complaints about the lack of English 
correspondence reaching Rome (demanding a reason for this on ten occasions over two days); ibid., 
4068 (10 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace). For the reiteration of papal concerns about the lack of crown 
communications, see ibid., 4084 (15 April 1518, de Giglis to Pace, Rome). 
599 See above pp.616-618. Wolsey was not alone in this fear; Erasmus voiced his scepticism about the 
declared crusading intentions generally, when writing to various contacts in England. To William 
Warham, he described it as ‘a mere blind’, before outlining Lorenzo de Medici’s attempts to occupy 
Campagna, while to Colet he outlined how the crusade really intended to oust Charles from Naples; 
LPIIii, 3987 (5 March 1518, Erasmus to Warham, Louvain), 3989 (calendared 5 March 1518; Erasmus 
to Fisher, Louvain), 3991 (5 March 1518, Erasmus to More, Louvain), 3992 (calendared 5 March 1518, 
Erasmus to Colet, Louvain). For a comment on Wolsey’s belief that the strategy, if it remained in the 
pope’s hands, may have caused a crusading army to move against Naples, as a result of French political 
influence over Rome, see G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, p.12. 
600 While Wolsey had heard reassuring news that Urbino was quiet and that the peace with della Rovere 
was holding in late January 1518, this would remain a potential faultline. That this was clear to 
contemporaries is suggested by Spinelly’s conveying intelligence during June 1518 (from France via 
Spain), that della Rovere intended to serve the French in Italy and had offered to besiege Ferrara, 
his was untrue; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, although the Florentine diplomat guessed that t
 627
prospect of a French attack on English interests in some other quarter and that the 
crusade would again be invoked as cover for this. News from France dated 1 
December, for instance, described Francis’ enthusiastic response to the papal call for 
crusade, with preaching and money being raised all over the kingdom. The source 
arned, however, that the money would not be used against the Turks, but against 
honour of the Holy See’.605 This may have been offered as an additional quid pro quo 
w
England.601 
 Given this context, the English crown continued to remain aloof of the papal 
initiative, procrastinating in its reply to official proposals from Rome issued in 
November.602 Meanwhile, Leo X received answers from Francis, Maximilian and 
Charles towards the end of December 1517.603 That from the emperor, Henry was 
later said to have laughed at; Maximilian suggested that he lead an enterprise paid for 
by others, which the English king believed would ‘be only an expedition of 
money’.604 Leo perhaps recognised Henry’s reservations about the initiative on 15 
February, when he appealed for Henry’s support in the crusading initiative, also 
confirming his membership of the anti-French coalition of 1517 because of Henry’s 
‘zeal for the Holy Church’. The pope also indicated that he would comply with the 
king’s request to deprive Hadrian de Castello, but only in a manner appropriate to ‘the 
to induce England to support the crusading initiative. At length, Wolsey replied on 
                                                                                                                                            
pp.146-150 (Ven.ii, 1002; LPIIii, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London); LPIIii, 
 notifying the 
4244 (21 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry). 
601 Consequently, they recommended that Henry VIII attack France. It was also asserted that Francis 
would blame Henry if he did not attack the Turks; LPIIii, 3818 (1 December 1517, Tours). 
602 See pp.616-618. 
603 While Francis, when pushed, agreed in principle, he wished to retain control of the taxation raised 
for the expedition. Maximilian outlined an elaborate three year plan, while Charles proposed a focus on 
the defence of Italy’s extremities; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.228-230; LPIIii, 3823 (6 
December 1517, ‘summary of [the answer] of the [French king] to the legate [Cardinal Sta. Maria in 
Porticu] at Paris on 6 December 1517’), 3830 (14 December 1517). For the emperor
English crown that he was enthusiastic about the pope’s recent call to arms, see ibid., 3845 (24 
December 1517, [Count Decian] to Wolsey, Linz); 3846 (29 December 1517, Maximilian to Henry, 
Linz). 
604 LPIIii, 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Reading). 
605 Ibid., 3953 (15 February 1518, Leo to Henry). 
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Henry’s behalf towards the end of February 1518, justifying delay by the king’s need 
to seek advice from his councillors and also to speak to Charles of Castile. If the 
crusade was Leo’s genuine intention, Wolsey advised, he must first procure universal 
peace which, he argued, would already be in existence if it was not for ‘the 
immoderate ambition of certain Princes’. Francis I’s ‘ambition’ must be curbed by 
such an agreement which, if unobtainable by diplomacy, ought to be enforced by 
ecclesiastical censure.606 In other words, Henry VIII was willing to back the papal 
crusading initiative but only as long as the preparatory peace was strictly imposed, so 
that France would be unable to adapt it to his own interests, particularly in light of 
rumours of the Franco-papal marriage agreement.607 In effect, Wolsey had reiterated 
his November overture. The English crown’s prioritisation of the threat of France 
over that of the Turks was confirmed by Giustinian shortly after. Laughing at the 
Venetian’s protestations about the danger posed by the Ottomans, Henry opined that 
they would not act against Christendom during 1518. Venice, moreover, ought to be 
concerned with ‘one who devises worse things against Christendom’, Francis. Henry 
predicted that his French counterpart was raising troops using the crusade as a pretext, 
but would use them to ‘subjugate Italy, whereupon the Pope, and yourselves [Venice], 
                                                 
606 Wolsey expanded upon his belief that the French were raising a large army intent on disturbing 
ncis had designs on Italy and, in keeping ‘all the potentates of 
i, 4076: 12 
her gave the impression of English support for this initiative through the despatch 
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.146-150 (Ven.ii, 1002; LPIIii, 3896; 24 January 1518, Giustinian to 
Christendom, despite Francis’ claiming to be pro-peace. He talked in similar terms to the Venetian 
ambassador on 11 April, alleging that Fra
the world in great anxiety’, threatened the pope with ‘various devices’; ibid., 3973 (27 February 1518, 
Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.178-181 (Ven.ii, 1022; LPIIi
April 1518). He furt
of an embassy of Spain apparently to urge Charles’ compliance. There may have been an earlier, 
tentative English response, as Charles had reportedly heard by early January that Henry had offered to 
go in person as ‘captain of the sea’. If true, it was unlikely that this was a formal reply, as the pope was 
reportedly unhappy, by 19 January, that he had still received no word from England about his appeal; 
LPIIii, 3874 (7 January 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Valladolid), 3891 (19 January 1518, de Giglis to 
Wolsey, Rome); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.239. For an indication that Henry was 
considering ‘certain articles for the Christian expedition’ towards the end of January 1518, see R. 
Brown 
the Signory, London). 
607 See above pp.619-622. 
 629
will be compelled to what you cannot resist’.608 Given this motivation, Wolsey’s 
response to the papal appeal marked the beginning of what would become the English 
hijacking of the papal crusading initiative that would culminate in the Treaty of 
London (2 October 1518). 
 Without waiting for the English response to his November proposition, the 
pope had already acted vis-à-vis the crusade. On 6 March 1518, he took the next 
formal step by proclaiming a preparatory five year truce. To preach this, four legates a 
latere were to be despatched to the principal powers of Christendom.609 One of these 
representatives was planned for England, which made this a provocative move by the 
papacy; not only was the truce to be promoted by someone in whom papal authority 
was invested, but Leo X would have known of a traditional reluctance by the English 
crown to entertain the presence of legates a latere on English soil.610 It was shortly 
after this that the pontiff received Wolsey’s conditional support and warning about 
French intentions; the only record found of this suggests that it was well received by 
the pope.611 
 
The potential implications of this crusading initiative vis-a-vis the papacy and 
France, as well as the likelihood that a successful response would sideline Henry 
                                                 
608 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.166-173 (Ven.ii, 1015; LPIIii, 4009; 15 March 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
609 Leo X’s five year truce was proclaimed on 10 March. Briefs to this effect were sent out to all 
princes on or around 6 March; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.232-235; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry 
VIII, p.69. De Giglis did not attend the ceremony due to illness; Ven.ii, 1016 (15 March 1518, Venetian 
ambassador in Rome to the Signory), 1017 (15 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the 
Signory). 
610 For the English crown’s discomfort with the presence of such ‘papal’ authority to rival its own, see 
for instance LPIIii, 4055 (1 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon), 4073 (11 April 1518, Wolsey to 
de Giglis, London). 
611 De Giglis also cautiously informed the Venetian orator that Henry would be fully supportive ‘should 
the Christian expedition be effected’; ibid., 4040 (28 March 1517, de Giglis to [Vannes], Rome); 
, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Ven.ii, 1017 (15 March 1518
 630
VIII’s involvement in European politics, demanded that it be taken seriously.612 It 
was also Henry’s duty as a king, as a loyal son of the Church, to be positive in his 
response, now that the call to arms had been formally issued.613 Procrastination, 
therefore, was no longer an option; English foreign policy now had to be shaped 
e to ensure that any eventual universal peace (or truce) would suit 
                                              
within the context of saying ‘yes’. Given that the English crown was not yet clear 
which of its strategies concerning France would bear fruit, the anti-Gallic league or 
the peace negotiations with Francis, support for the crusading ideal was incorporated 
into both.614 
 The arrival in England of news of the papal five year truce coincided with that 
of the birth of an heir to Francis I. Wolsey had earlier proposed to French 
representatives that, if a son was born, that a marriage agreement should then be 
negotiated for Princess Mary and they had also discussed the prospect of this 
becoming a universal peace agreement.615 As the Anglo-French peace policy became 
increasingly convincing from this point, Wolsey had to gain control of the papal 
crusading initiativ
   
612 A pos
of Europ
least northern Europe), with the anti-French league and their negotiations with Francis. The adhesion of 
613 Shortly prior to this, Wolsey indicated the king’s recognition of his obligation to the crusade. Henry, 
he declared, just wanted ‘to live peaceably and tranquilly with all Christians’, so that ‘he may expend it 
against the infidels, as is the duty of every Christian potentate’; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIIii, 3976; 28 February 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, London). It is 
unlikely that this was wholly rhetoric, as it tied in with Henry VIII’s chivalric commitment, which 
his assertion at some point, while Tyerman stresses the broad 
 and (to a lesser extent given the state of his health) Maximilian still gave the impression that 
ld be trusted and had indicated to the pope in late February that England was 
itive response (as already suggested by Francis, Charles and Maximilian) could shift the focus 
ean politics to Rome. Up to this point, Henry and Wolsey had tried to keep it in England (or at 
the other powers to Leo’s five year truce and concentration then on a crusade would consequently 
reduce Henry’s political centrality hitherto achieved concerning the French threat to Italy. 
stressed the crusade to be the most laudable form of warfare in which he, as a knight, could participate. 
Indeed, Gunn refers to Henry making t
chivalric enthusiasm for crusade at his Court; S. Gunn, ‘The French Wars of Henry VIII’, in J. Black 
(ed.) The Origins of War in Early Modern Europe, p.36; C. Tyerman, England and the Crusades 1095-
1588 (1996), pp.346-347. For another historian who implies his belief in this idea, see R. Schwoebel, 
The Shadow of the Crescent: the Renaissance Image of the Turk (1967), pp.82-83. 
614 Charles
they were prepared to go to war against France, but recent experiences gave the English cause to pause 
for thought. Despite the peace negotiations with France, Henry and Wolsey continued to be sceptical 
whether Francis cou
prepared for both war and peace; LPIIii, 3973 (Mart. Amp .iii, 1277; 27 February 1518, Wolsey to de 
Giglis); also see above pp.593-601. 
615 See above pp.604-606. 
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the English interest and could not be adapted by the French to achieve their Italian or 
other ambitions. The means to do so were provided by the pope himself, in 
commissioning legates a latere to facilitate this strategy; if Wolsey could become a 
legate, he could thereby ensure that the talks he planned be focused in London and 
control their direction. When news arrived in England on 26 March that a legate 
would be sent to England, therefore, Henry’s first reaction was to make his entry 
conditional on the limitation of his commission to treating against the Turks.616 This 
was a demonstration of the English reticence to allow such officials, invested with 
approached the papacy in this regard; while it was not normal for foreign legates to 
such a degree of papal authority, to enter the kingdom. Within days, however, Wolsey 
had put his own proposal to the king, that they insist he be commissioned as a second 
legate. Henry approved this on 1 April, happy that the visiting Italian cardinal ‘will 
not then be able to attempt anything against the King’s laws’.617 That this coincided 
with Wolsey revealing to Giustinian that he hoped to negotiate a marriage alliance 
between England and France suggests that his intention to appropriate the papal truce 
strategy to English ends was already formulated.618 Thus, on 11 April, Wolsey 
enter England, Henry was prepared to make an exception, he argued, as long as 
Campeggio’s legal faculties were withheld and that Wolsey was appointed co-legate. 
Otherwise, the king would refuse the Italian legate admission.619 This was an astute 
move by the English crown, as Leo had little choice but to concede if he wanted his 
crusading initiative to be successful. The pope initially tried to fob Wolsey off, asking 
that he delay this request, as he did not want to offend Francis I, for whom he had 
                                                 
616 LPIIii, 4034 (27 March 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon). 
617 Ibid., 4055 (1 April 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Abingdon). 
618 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.173-178 (Ven.ii, 1019; LPIIii, 4047; 29 March 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
619 LPIIii, 4073 (11 April 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). 
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(reportedly) refused a similar demand.620 Polydore Vergil, however, states that 
Wolsey was eventually successful partly because of the support of the French king.621 
The pope seems to have changed his mind by 12 May, possibly because the emperor 
had made a similar demand for Matthew Lang, and the pope was quoted as saying 
‘these two Cardinals are themselves the Kings, so that we must content them’.622 
Accordingly, the pope commissioned Wolsey to be co-legate to Lorenzo Campeggio 
in Consistory on 17 May, ‘considering Wolsey’s influence with the King’.623 Leo, 
therefore, did not wait for Henry’s reply to his refusal, but made clear the political 
grounds on which he made the concession. Wolsey knew of his commission by 7 June 
and reportedly gave the courier a generous gift.624 By the 21st, however, it was said 
that the cardinal was unhappy with the temporary nature of the appointment. His 
victory in forcing this concession from the pope was evidently limited. Despite this, 
Wolsey was ready to put his universal peace plan into action; as he reportedly told 
Giustinian, ‘he would prove to the world what it may be in his power to effect for the 
furtherance of this holy alliance’.625 While Campeggio reached Calais by the end of 
                                                 
 To prove that he would have granted such a commission, if he was not in such a difficult position, 
Leo claimed to have had a brief composed for Wolsey a credentials for the unknown author/recipient of 
April 1518, - to - ). 
621 Vergil states that the cardinal became a legate partly because of Francis and ‘partly as a result of 
Henry’s persistent demands and requests’; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, pp.253-257. 
622 Ven.ii, 1031 (12 May 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory)
advisor Matthew Lang were subsequently discussed in consistory and, on the 20th, de Giglis confirmed 
English employer, Francis and Maximilian were unable to gain the same concession for Cardinals de 
Boissy and Lang, respectively; Ven.ii, 1033 (19 May 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome); LPIIii, 4179 
(20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). For Campeggio’s notification to Wolsey of the same, see 
ibid., 4193 (28 May 1518, [Campeggio] to [Henry], ‘ex Palizia’), 4194 (28 May 1518, [Campeggio] to 
620
this letter, but the former was said to be delayed as the pope had left Rome; ibid., 4133 (calendared end 
. 
623 LPIIii, 4170 (17 May 1518, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). Commissions for both Wolsey and the Imperial 
to the former that he had been successful in gaining the commission. Significantly, he notified his 
[Wolsey], ‘La Palice’). 
624 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.190-191 (Ven.ii, 1039; LPIIii, 4215; 7 June 1518, Giustinian to 
the Signory, Lambeth). 
625 Giustinian reported Wolsey to be visibly disappointed with his legatine commission and ‘seems to 
o’s departure; ibid., pp.195-199 (Ven.ii, 
ory, Lambeth). In response, perhaps on 21 
nglish see to him), in return for Leo being given full credit for the 
 Leo refused, however, instead offering, 
hold [it] in small account’, as it would expire on Campeggi
1042; LPIIii, 4243; 21 June 1518, Giustinian to the Sign
July, Wolsey apparently demanded that the post be granted ‘in perpetuo’ (in addition to the deprivation 
of de Castello and conferral of his E
Anglo-French treaty that was then deemed close to conclusion.
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June, he was not permitted to cross the Channel until the following month. Wolsey 
had again taken advantage of the situation by levering other concessions from Rome; 
the deprivation of de Castello and, associated with this, provision to Bath and 
Wells.626 Once confirmation of the former was received, Campeggio was granted 
access to the kingdom and was received magnificently in London on 29 July and 
(alongside his co-legate Wolsey) by the king on 3 August.627  
 
 In addition to gaining control of the peace initiative via Wolsey’s legatine 
commission, the English crown also needed to engage the complicity of the other 
‘superpowers’ that would be involved in any universal peace, namely Spain and the 
Empire. Henry and Wolsey continued to cultivate them as ‘anti-French’ allies during 
1518, albeit less so than in previous years, due to the unlikelihood that they would 
                                                                                                                                            
by way of compromise, to re-confirm his legatine status on a rolling basis on a rolling basis. This was 
to mark the beginning of Wolsey’s attempts to lever a permanent legatine commission out of Rome; 
Ven.ii, 1054 (5 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). For the possible dating of 
399
626 De Giglis recommended that Wolsey should take this course when he originally notified the cardinal 
Wolsey’s request to 21 July, see LPIIii, 4  (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
of his commission in late May. Campeggio had apparently reached Calais by 21 June and was expected 
in England any day soon. Henry questioned Wolsey about this on the 24th. On 29 June, Campeggio 
wrote to Wolsey from Calais, understanding that the king would not let him into England until de 
uld continue for some time. By the middle of the month, however, confirmation of 
an original bull 
it; LPIIii, 4179 (20 May 
ry VIII, p.70. For various descriptions of the receptions of Campeggio on his 
 Giglis), 4361 (3 August 1518); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.202-204 
Castello’s deprivation was confirmed. The Italian argued, however, that as he had written to Leo on 
this matter three times and that the pope would surely agree to this, this delaying tactic was 
unnecessary. Writing on 3 July, however, Giustinian wrote of Campeggio’s still being detained at the 
port and that this wo
the deprivation had been received in England and that the Italian cardinal crossed the Channel on the 
14th (escorted by a knight of the Garter). On the 24th, Pace requested that Wolsey bring 
with him, feasibly confirming the deprivation, as Henry had been asking about 
1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 4257 (24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Woodstock), 4271 (29 
June 1518, Campeggio to Wolsey, Calais), 4335 (24 July 1518, Pace to Wolsey, Enfield), 4348 (29 
July 1518, Wolsey to de Giglis); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp. 195-199 (Ven.ii, 1042; LPIIii, 
4243; 21 June 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 199-200 (Ven.ii, 1043; LPIIii, 4284; 3 July 
1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 200-202 (Ven.ii, 1046; LPIIii, 4332; 22 July 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.253; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry 
VIII, p.69. 
627 J.J. Scarisbrick, Hen
journey from Sandwich to London, thence to Greenwich, see LPIIii, 4333 (23 July 1518), 4348 (29 
July 1518, Wolsey to de
(Ven.ii, 1052; LPIIii, 4361: 2 August 1518), 204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPIIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Wolsey wrote to the pope, either on 21 July or 5 August, 
according to de Giglis, ‘remitting himself wholly to his holiness’s pleasure’. Given the timing, it is 
likely that this related to the cardinal receiving news of the deprivation and thus being prepared to act 
as legate alongside Campeggio to foster the crusade; LPIIii, 4399 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to 
Wolsey, Rome). 
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commit to breaking with France.628 Nevertheless, Charles and Maximilian initially 
gave the English the chance to wrest the crusading initiative from Rome. When the 
papal truce was proclaimed in March, both Charles and Maximilian initially chose not 
to answer Leo until they had consulted Henry, intending then to reply in unison.629 
Perhaps not taking the emperor that seriously, the English crown concentrated on 
Spain, commissioning Kite and Bourchier to go to Charles to respond to his request. 
pecifically, they were to urge the Spanish king to send or empower a representative S
to join a treaty of universal peace to be concluded in England and to urge that he not 
reply to the papal truce proposal via the legate in Spain until this had been finalised. 
The implication from their instructions was that the English were fostering a universal 
peace that would be directed against France.630 Furthermore, presumably to convince 
Charles that they had papal backing, the orators were to exhibit a bull by which Leo 
                                                 
628 See above pp.593-601. 
629 On 2 April, Charles sent word to Henry that he would not answer the pope’s request to ratify the 
five year truce until he knew his and Maximilian’s opinions; if agreed, the Catholic King wanted to 
answer the pope together and, if they accepted the truce, it would contain ‘such clausis that may repress 
the ambition and tyranny of the Frenchmen’. Later, on 24 April, Maximilian asked Henry VIII to send 
an envoy to him to disclose the answer he intended to send the pope, as well as with sufficient power to 
debate the expedition at a forthcoming diet; LPIIii, 4056 (2 April 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Aranda de 
Duero, Spain), 4112 (24 April 1518, Maximilian to [Henry]), 4135-4136 (calendared end April 1518, 
Henry to Kite and Bourchier). 
630 The orators were commanded to discuss the pope’s crusade proposal, to which Henry objected in 
the first instance because England and Spain’s contribution had barely been considered. The 
commission and a list of minutes compiled by Ruthal that also seem to be directed to the same pair 
appear to advocate a general peace hostile to France. It was suggested that Anglo-French negotiations 
had collapsed, that Francis was preparing to recover Tournai by force, and that England sought Spanish 
support, if necessary. The Anglo-Spanish alliance itself was portrayed as intending to to protect 
Christendom. According to Giustinian, the envoys were sent to Spain by 28 February 1518, while the 
commission and Ruthal’s minutes are calendared at the end of April 1518; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
Years, ii, pp.157-165 (Ven.ii, 1010; LPIIii, 3976: 28 February 1518); LPIIii, 4135-4137 (calendared 
April 1518), 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]). In terms of the English crown perhaps 
arles, Innsbruck). 
dismissing Maximilian’s commitment, it was only in late March that Henry was said to have laughed at 
his crusading proposal and it was only in late February that the emperor had urged England towards 
such an enterprise, have already pledged his own commitment to Rome. In any case, Maximilian barely 
waited for a reply to his overtures to England for a joint response to the papal initiative, as on 18 May 
he told Charles that he had issued instructions to conclude a treaty with the pope for five years. This 
was to exclude Venice but, in order to expedite the crusade, had agreed with Francis I to form a truce 
with the republic for five years, if possible; ibid., 3964 (21 February 1518, Titonius to Wolsey, ‘Ex 
Augusta Vindelicha’), 4023 (24 March 1518, Pace to [Wolsey], Reading), 4172 (18 May 1518, 
Maximilian to Ch
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adhered to the 1517 league between England, Spain and Germany.631 This approach 
was successful and Charles’ response, on receiving the embassy around 12 May, was 
positive; he was happy to go along with whatever Henry wished, including his answer 
to Leo about the crusading articles, and would aid England if France attacked.632 In 
effect, the Spanish king, convinced of the underlying anti-French intentions of Henry 
VIII, indicated his complicity in the English plan to usurp the papal crusading 
initiative and helped Wolsey to facilitate this. That this began with an approach to 
Charles during April 1518 clearly indicates that Wolsey had formulated a plan to do 
this and to focus it around an Anglo-French agreement at the same time as he received 
news of the papal truce initiative and at a point when the birth of an heir to Francis I 
raised the likelihood of a peace with France.633 
 
 By virtue of his becoming a legate a latere and having the support of Francis 
and Charles, Wolsey was now well-placed to begin his usurpation of the papal peace 
t the Englishman was described as the senior of the two 
initiative. The only potential obstacle was that Leo X still held the reins, at least 
partially, through Cardinal Campeggio. The English had already circumvented this, 
however. De Giglis offered a solution when he originally notified Wolsey of his 
commission, claiming tha
                                                 
631 Another, perhaps more attractive, inducement offered to Charles was Henry’s implied support of his 
candidacy for the Imperial crown (Charles and Francis at that point manoeuvring to influence the 
election that was soon expected, as Maximilian’s health was failing); LPIIii, 4135-4137 (calendared 
April 1518), 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]).  
632 Ibid., 4160 (12 May 1518, Kite and Berners to [Henry]). In late June, Spinelly reported that Henry’s 
reaction to the pope’s request of the truce was received well by the Spanish Court. He also added that 
Charles would take Henry’s advice concerning the pope and had spoken to his ambassadors about 
concluding an alliance with ‘you four’ (England, Spain, the Empire and the papacy) and the Swiss. It is 
unclear whether Spinelly was referring to a subsequent approach by Henry VIII or the initial April 
communication. In any case, it further indicates that the English crown was successful in gaining 
Spanish complicity for its hijacking the papal peace initiative. Charles of Castile’s continued support of 
the English usurpation of the peace plan was again indicated on 11 July, when the Spanish king 
conveyed his wish that they adopt a common strategy with the legates resident in their kingdom. 
Charles was also said to have been unhappy with the pope’s five year truce, perceiving it to be 
motivated by ‘mischief’; ibid., 4244, (21 June 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa), 4313 (12 July 
1518, Kite and Bourchier to Henry, Saragossa). 
633See above pp.602-606. 
 636
legates and that Campeggio was not to act without him.634 This advice was rigorously 
followed and no opportunity was lost to demonstrate Wolsey’s seniority; from the 
legates’ official reception by Henry VIII on 3 August, when the Englishman had a 
bigger chair than his counterpart, to the mass celebrating the Treaty of London on 3 
October, where Wolsey’s chair was raised six steps and Campeggio’s only three, the 
Cardinal of York always took the lead, while his colleague seems to have been little 
more than a reinforcing presence.635 These were significant actions in an age of visual 
symbolism, particularly in ceremonies and the like. They also help to contextualise 
the English cardinal’s sidelining of his co-legate in negotiations, as he seized the 
papal peace strategy. 
 In subsequent negotiations, centred around Anglo-French discussions, Wolsey 
as the guiding force, while Campeggio had little practical involvement. There does w
not seem as if there was a lot for the Italian to do, as the Anglo-French agreement, to 
which the universal peace was to be anchored, was already in the final stages of 
negotiation.636 Indeed, on or shortly after his arrival in England, Campeggio seems to 
have notified his French counterpart, Bibbiena, about the form of the treaty and some 
                                                 
634
May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
635 Also at the initial audience, Wolsey delivered the first oration , while Campeggio’s brother gave the 
 De Giglis asserts that Wolsey was stipulated to be ‘prae omnibus aliis legatis’; LPIIii, 4179 (20 
second; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.204-206 (Ven.ii, 1053; LPIIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, 
 se; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia of, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For Wilkie’s 
peggio’s lack of involvement, see W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.111. 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518). If one rises above the critical tone, 
Polydore Vergil agrees with this assessment, describing how the Cardinal of York appropriated all 
ceremonies and used every opportunity to pull rank as legate, although admittedly he was referring to 
Wolsey’s general behaviour and not to the treaty negotiations per
p.255. 
636 For Anglo-French negotiations being at quite an advanced stage see, for instance, what are 
apparently English plans for a league (‘pax universalis’) which would include the pope, the articles of 
which were to be drawn up by Wolsey; LPIIii, 4357 (calendared end July 1518). From the French end, 
on 31 July, the Most Christian King had commissioned a high-ranking embassy to go to England to 
negotiate with the pope, Henry and other princes towards a league of mutual defence. The fundamental 
Anglo-French elements that were to appear in the eventual treaty (Mary’s marriage to the dauphin, the 
restoration of Tournai and a meeting between Henry and Francis) were all cited. Also, Wolsey was 
awarded an annual pension 12,000 livres Tournois as compensation for the see of Tournai, which one 
can only interpret as a reward for his actions thusfar; ibid., 4351 (31 July 1518), 4352 (31 July 1518), 
4353 (31 July 1518), 4354 (31 July 1518). Also see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.204-206 
(Ven.ii, 1053; LPIIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, 
agreement concerning Cam
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of its terms.637 It ought to be emphasised that the Italian legate was not entirely shut-
out by Wolsey, as it seems that he was au fait with most of the terms of the eventual 
Treaty of London and the progress of negotiations in the final months.638 He also 
seems to have been kept entertained by Wolsey, as befitted his status.639 Nevertheless, 
it seems that the English cardinal deliberately kept Campeggio out of the talks, 
perhaps to disguise the true intention of universal peace for as long as possible.640 
Certainly, it was Wolsey alone who, declaring ‘his desire to compose the dissensions 
of Christendom’, asked the emperor to send someone to England negotiate on 18 
August.641 Furthermore, various rounds of talks are reported between the English 
                                                 
league and some of its terms (some of which he said were still under discussion) during early August; 
Alvise Foscari beth); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp. 210-212 (Ven.ii, 1067; LPIIii, 4413; 2 
September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
how far the decorum of the Apostolic chair was preserved on this occasion…, it may suffice for me to 
say, that less respect for the holy chair could scarcely have been shown’; R. Brown (trans.), Four 
8, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Campeggio was also 
nd 10 September, for instance, Giustinian, reporting his inability to gain access to Wolsey, also 
637 Campeggio himself reportedly advertised his French counterpart, Bibbiena, of the form of the 
Ven.ii, 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes). Also see LPIIii, 4384 (16 
August 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Saragossa). 
638 Ven.ii, 1066 (1 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 1087 (9 August 1518, 
Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes), 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to 
, Lam
September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 213-215 (Ven.ii, 1071; LPIIii, 4424; 10 
639 Giustinian commented on the magnificence of a mass and banquet, shortly after Campeggio’s 
arrival, but equally commented on the lack of deference shown to the papacy: ‘I will not now write 
Years, ii, pp.206-208 (Ven.ii, 1057; LPIIii, 4371; 11 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
Also see Ven.ii, 1066 (1 September 151
notably present at various ceremonial occasions, for instance at the arrival of the final French embassy, 
as well as at the public proclamation of the Treaty of London (albeit visibly subordinate to Wolsey); R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.221-222 (Ven.ii, 1075; LPIIii, 4457; 26 September 1518, Giustinian 
to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518, anonymous account of the conclusion of the 
Treaty of London), 1095 (30 September, 10 October 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, 
Lambeth). Also see W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, pp.111-112. 
640 Arou
commented that Campeggio was finding the same difficulty. There was also a definite attempt by the 
English to keep the details of the negotiations a secret; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.204-206 
(Ven.ii, 1053; LPIIii, 4366; 5 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 210-212 (Ven.ii, 
1067; LPIIii, 4413; 2 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 213-215 (Ven.ii, 1071; 
LPIIii, 4424; 10 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 221-222 (Ven.ii, 1075; LPIIii, 
4457; 26 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). There is some evidence to suggest that 
Lorenzo Campeggio may have been aware of Wolsey’s hijacking of the papal truce initiative with his 
own universal peace, but it is unclear whether he understood this or if he reported this back to Rome; 
ibid., pp.208-210 (Ven.ii, 1063; LPIIii, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); 
Ven.ii, 1087 (9 August 1518, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Nantes). 
641 LPIIii, 4462 (30 September 1518, Maximilian to Wolsey, Kaufbeuren), 4463 (30 September 1518, 
Maximilian to de Mesa, Kaufbeuren). 
 638
crown and French delegations without the presence of Campeggio.642 In the days 
leading up to the conclusion of the Treaty of London, the Italian’s peripheral role in 
proceedings was further emphasised. When Henry VIII received a final French 
embassy on 25 September, the ceremony recognised Campeggio, as he and Wolsey 
were sat at the king’s right hand. At the end of this, however, the king, Wolsey and 
the French delegation retired to a private chamber (where, Giustinian believed, they 
discussed the articles of the agreement), but Campeggio was noted to have remained 
outside with the other ambassadors. Similarly, after the conclusion of the Treaty of 
London and, specifically the espousals on 5 October, Henry, Wolsey and the French 
ambassadors again, reportedly, retired to a private room (after dinner), to conclude 
some matters yet to be settled; notably, again, Campeggio did not join them.643 This 
experience seems to have been indicative of Lorenzo Campeggio’s contribution to the 
Treaty of London. 
 It is unclear at which point, if any, the pope approved Wolsey’s plan for 
universal peace instead of his own five year truce. Given the attempted secrecy 
imposed by the English upon the Anglo-French negotiations, in addition to 
Campeggio’s lack of tangible involvement, it is possible that Leo X never fully 
understood the implications of what Wolsey was trying to do until it was too late; the 
pope may have envisaged that the Anglo-French amity would be a preliminary to a 
separate agreement to subscribe to his five year truce, that would be negotiated with 
full papal involvement (via the legates). As late as 20 May, the pope apparently 
believed that the five year truce remained a going concern, as on this date he 
                                                 
642 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.210-212 (Ven.ii, 1067; LPIIii, 4413; 2 September 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
643 Ibid., pp.221-222 (Ven.ii, 1075; LPIIii, 4457; 26 September 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, 
r 1518, Nicolo Sagudino to Alvise Foscari, Lambeth). 
Lambeth), 224-228 (Ven.ii, 1085; LPIIii, 4481; 5 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); 
Ven.ii, 1095 (30 September, 10 Octobe
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conveyed his desire for Henry to ratify it jointly with Charles.644 Certainly by the end 
of July, Leo was becoming aware that Anglo-French negotiations were likely to 
succeed.645 By late August, he knew both that Campeggio had been received in 
England and that Henry and Wolsey were enthusiastic for the crusade, as well as that 
an Anglo-French amity was being arranged, although no indication is made that they 
were to be associated.646 Indeed, on 27 August, the pope believed himself to be fully 
involved, as he reportedly declared that he had helped draw up the exordium for the 
expected treaty, although it is unclear what this contained.647  
 Perhaps in response to hearing that an Anglo-French agreement was close and 
that the English were also enthusiastic for a passagium to the east, Leo X effectively 
condoned the English assumption of the initiative from mid-August, although 
probably unintentionally. While on the 13th, he urged the English cardinal to organise 
a league against the Turks, he formalised this a week later, when he commissioned 
olseyW  and Campeggio to treat with the principal powers for such a confederacy. 
Significantly, the pope wanted this to be offensive as well as defensive, thereby 
                                                 
 The pope was reportedly pleased at the good reception of an English embassy in Spain although, 
unbeknownst to him, it had been instructed to lobby Charles to support Wolsey’s usurpation of his 
applied pressure on Henry VIII towards the truce and crusade via John Grygge during June 1518, as 
this Englishman in Rome claimed to send treaties between the pope and other Christian princes towards 
the crusade. The nature of this approach is uncertain, however, as he does not seem to have been a part 
of the crown diplomatic setup in Rome per se, rather a servant of William Warham, whom de Giglis 
4229 (15 June 1518, John Grygge to Henry, Rome). 
645
negotiations by the end of July 1518, although he was apparently hesitant to reveal these to the 
Venetian ambassador when challenged. Leo was reportedly pleased about the agreement. 
Correspondence about this arrived in Rome from Wolsey around this point, coinciding with similar 
disclosures to Charles and Maximilian; Ven.ii, 1048 (30 March 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to 
644
crusading strategy; LPIIii, 4179 (20 May 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Also, the pope may have 
seems neither to have liked nor trusted; ibid., 2895 (9 February 1517, de Giglis to [Ammonius], Rome), 
 The pope knew about the prospect of the restoration of Tournai and the matrimonial element of 
the Signory), 1054 (5 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). Also see ibid., 1056 
(7 August 1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory); LPIIii, 4384 (16 August 1518, Spinelly 
to Henry, Saragossa). 
646 Ven.ii, 1062 (20 August 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). By 4 September, the pope had heard 
d that this may undermine his five year truce; ibid., 1069 (4 
from England that the peace would be confirmed by both Henry and Francis, but again there is no 
reason to believe that he understoo
September 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome).  
647 Leo again stated that Henry and Francis were intent on crusade; ibid., 1065 (27 August 1518, Minio 
to the Signory, Rome). 
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envisaging his own protection in Italy against any French incursion.648 While these 
communications do not refer to universal peace or the papal truce, it seems probable 
that Leo envisaged a league against the Turks arising from the Anglo-French 
concordat which subscribed to his own initiative, while in reality, the commission 
unintentionally empowered Wolsey to pursue his own agenda. The critical moment 
where Wolsey’s plan could no longer be concealed apparently came some time in 
September, when the cardinal sent ‘urgent’ letters to the pope about his hope that a 
general peace would occur. Reaching Rome by 29 September, Leo was sceptical (at 
ast to
involvement.650 Leo X responded on 2 October by commissioning Wolsey and 
le  his Venetian audience) that Francis would agree, particularly given his 
insistence that Charles should restore Navarre to its French-backed claimant. Despite 
this, the pope was optimistic about an Anglo-French agreement, even if it was to be 
universal peace.649  
By this time in England, however, the conclusion and proclamation of the 
treaty as one of universal peace was all but inevitable; one can only envisage, 
therefore, that Wolsey was notifying the pope of a fait accompli and inviting his 
                                                 
648 The coalition was to be negotiated between Germany, England, France and Spain. Around the same 
time, Leo put further pressure on Wolsey to pursue the crusade by relaying news of the Turkish threat 
through de Giglis; LPIIii, 4375 (13 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey), 4393 (20 August 1518, Leo to 
Wolsey and Campeggio), 4399 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); Ven.ii, 1062 (20 August 
1518, Venetian ambassador in Rome to the Signory). That the pope had decided not to oppose 
Wolsey’s moves to control the peace process was also suggested by de Giglis around the same time, 
when he suggested that little was going to happen in Rome over the next few months; the pope was to 
ed with the English crown at some point that a crusade would be more likely if 
pregnant, hoping that it would be a prince who could 
spend part of September and October away from Rome, as a result of the heat. While this was not 
unusual, de Giglis’ request that he visit his hometown of Lucca during this time implies that there was 
little going on, diplomatically speaking; LPIIii, 4375 (13 August 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
649 Ven.ii, 1080 (29 September 1518, Venetian ambassador at the Curia to the Signory, Viterbo). 
Curiously, Giustinian claims that Wolsey spoke openly about his insistence on universal peace as part 
of the Anglo-French agreement on 20 August; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.208-210 (Ven.ii, 
1063; LPIIii, 4392; 20 August 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Furthermore, Pastor states 
that Leo X remonstrat
the peace was limited like his, rather than permanent like Wolsey’s, but the date of this approach is not 
stated; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.242. 
650 One important piece of contradictory evidence, dated towards the end of August, cites the pope, 
when discovering that Catherine of Aragon was 
be ‘the prop of the universal peace of Christendom’; LPIIii, 4398 (27 August 1518, de Giglis to Henry, 
Rome). 
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Campeggio again, this time to make arrangements on his behalf with the various 
parties for the crusade itself.651 By implication, it seems that the pope, while not 
expecting universal peace, still anticipated his five year truce to succeed as a result of 
the Anglo-French accord. In this context, therefore, one can understand the pope’s 
later anger at Wolsey’s actions when he heard about the Treaty of London as a 
universal peace agreement, which negated his own truce initiative.652 
 Even if the pope did not really grasp what Wolsey was doing, it is still curious 
that Campeggio did not apparently voice any objection to his exclusion from 
negotiations in England.653 The legate was compliant perhaps because the Anglo-
French accord did not come within his remit; this was a matter for these two states, 
upon which Leo’s five year truce (or universal peace) could be added. In the final 
stages of negotiations, Campeggio seems to have been present for the public elements 
and ce
principal celebrant.655 One gets the impression that, despite Wolsey being 
remonies, but was at no point integral.654 The same was true at the final 
proclamation of the treaty (as alluded to earlier); at the celebratory mass of 3 October 
and at the espousals of Princess Mary (to the dauphin of France) on the 5th, 
Campeggio was in attendance and participated at times, but Wolsey was clearly the 
commissioned as legate a latere for these negotiations, he acted principally as Henry 
VIII’s minister. This idea is reinforced when one considers that, despite his ‘papal’ 
power at this point, he did not have the authority to ratify on behalf of Leo X (nor 
would one have expected him to possess this). Giustinian congratulated Wolsey on his 
                                                 
651 Ibid., 4472 (2 October 1518, Leo to Wolsey and Campeggio). 
652 See below pp.645-649. 
653 Wilkie does have Campeggio complaining about the lack of provision for crusade in the treaties 
although the source for this is not clear and nor is whether this came before or after the conclusion of 
the Treaty of London; W.E. Wilkie, Cardinal Protectors, p.111. 
654 See above pp.637-639. 
655 Again, after a dinner on the 5th, both legates were sat alongside the king but, at the end, Henry, 
Wolsey and the French envoys retired to a different room to finalise some matters. Again, this did not 
include Campeggio; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.224-228 (Ven.ii, 1085; LPIIii, 4481; 5 
October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
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diplomatic achievement on 23 September; ‘for that the Pope had laboured to effect a 
quinquennial truce, whilst his lordship made perpetual peace; and that whereas such a 
union of the Christian powers, when joined by the Pope, was usually…concluded at 
Rome, this confederacy had been settled in England, his Holiness, nevertheless, being 
its head’. In reply, the English cardinal produced a papal bull from his desk, 
authorising him to conclude the league there.656 
 
 The Treaty of London was finally concluded on 2 October 1518. The Anglo-
French focus stipulated the marriage of Princess Mary to the dauphin Francis, the 
restoration of Tournai to France and an agreement for Henry and Francis to meet.657 
Magnificent celebrations were subsequently held and, when it was proclaimed at St 
Paul’s Cathedral on the 3rd, Wolsey celebrated the mass ‘with so many pontifical 
ceremonies, and of such unusual splendour, as to defy exaggeration’.658 At the same 
time, accounts of the celebrations emphasise crown over papal authority; in the mass 
of 3 October for instance, the choir was decorated with gold brocade that was 
emblazoned with the king’s arms.659 The treaty provided for universal peace and the 
intention to crusade. The preliminary oration referred to the Turkish threat originally 
highlighted by the pope and Leo was recognised as the instigator of the peace and was 
to be its head. More significantly, however, Wolsey had succeeded in ensuring that 
this agreement was fully in the English interest, in particular that it would constrain 
Francis I’s Italian ambitions and, thus, relieve the French political pressure hitherto 
                                                 
er 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, 
ce; LPIIii, 4479 (4 October, French 
ancis], London), 4480 (5 October 1518), 4483 (8 October 1518). 4484 (8 
 of the conclusion of the Treaty of London). 
656 Ibid., pp.218-221 (Ven.ii, 1074; LPIIii, 4453; 24 Septemb
Lambeth). 
657 The meeting was to be held before the end of May initially, then by the end of July 1519 (from 8 
October). According to the French ambassadors, the English failed to have any provision for France to 
withdraw its support for Scotland and to keep Albany in Fran
ambassadors in England to [Fr
October 1518). 
658 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.224-228 (Ven.ii, 1085; LPIIii, 4481; 5 October 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
659 Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518, anonymous account
 643
 644
ear truce which he feared would be 
dapted by Francis I as a ruse to conquer Naples and thereby dominate Italy and 
ome, 
                                 
felt by Rome. It cannot have been any coincidence that the defence and protection of 
the papacy was mentioned in the agreement, a concept which had hitherto been 
included in English treaties against France. Furthermore, the English had Lorenzo de’ 
Medici (as duke of Urbino), the house of Medici and Florence incorporated into the 
peace, which effectively signalled their protection under this umbrella.660 Wolsey had, 
therefore, avoided the risk of a papal-led five y
a
R instead fostering a peace that would straitjacket France and avoid this. Given 
that England’s ‘allies’ against France had shown no sign of acting on this 
commitment, this was the best possible scenario for Henry VIII vis-à-vis defending 
the papacy. The only nod towards compromise, however, was the inclusion of Ferrara 
within the treaty, thereby precluding the papacy from making any moves against this 
duchy. 
                
ecognised the pope as ‘the commencement of this peace’; LPIIii, 4467 (1 October 
), 4475-4477 (4 October 1518); Ven.ii, 1088 (9 October 1518); G. 
660 Despite the treaty already having been, to all intents and purposes, agreed, Norfolk, Ruthal and 
Somerset were commissioned on 1 October to treat for peace with Leo, Francis and any other willing 
prince. The pope was expected to confirm his membership within four months. Concerning the 
bestowal of credit for the treaty upon Leo X, a comedy performed after a celebratory supper (for the 
marriage) also r
1518), 4468 (calendared 1-2 October 1518), 4469 (Ven.ii, 1083; 2 October 1518), 4470-4471 (2 
October 1518), 4473 (3 October 1518
Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, pp.7, 12. 
PHASE III  
THE HAPSBURG-VALOIS RIVALRY GIVES RISE TO THE OPPORTUNITY FOR 
HENRY VIII TO RESUME HIS ACTIVE ‘DEFENCE’ OF ROME FROM FRANCE: 
1518-1522 
 
Early English attempts to enforce the Treaty of London and gain papal backing, to 
prevent a French descent into Italy: October 1518 – January 1519 
If the Treaty of London was intended to restrain Francis I from turning to his Italian 
ambitions, Henry VIII needed to follow this up by ensuring that this straitjacket could be 
enforced.  In general terms, this saw the English crown seek ratification of the universal 
peace by all of the principal parties, thereby binding Francis to non-aggression within 
Christendom and providing an implicit threat against this through the commitment of the pope 
and other princes to act against him if he did.2 Francis I’s confirmation came quickly, by mid-
December 1518. 3 Maximilian, on the other hand, was initially unhappy with the surrender of 
Tournai and still apparently hoped for English cooperation to hire the Swiss. Following some 
                                                
1
 
1 Historians have disagreed on Wolsey’s underlying intention for the Treaty of London; was it a true attempt to 
secure peace within Christendom, a blind for the new Anglo-French alliance, an attempt to assume a prominent 
position in European politics, a means by which he could scupper the crusade, or something else? The intention 
here is not to challenge these views directly, rather to envisage how the agreement was seen in terms of 
England’s relationship with the papacy. Given that previous attempts at war and peace had failed, the hijacking 
of the papal peace initiative provided a rare opportunity to restrict French political ambitions, potentially without 
costly recourse to a military solution; G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, p.10. 
2 Mattingly highlights a weakness of the agreement to be the inability of parties to determine and react (with any 
speed) to any perceived breach in the agreement, for example if Francis did decide to cross the Alps, but this was 
pretty much the case for most treaties; blame was subjective and communications difficult. The clauses of 
mutual defence were probably envisaged as sufficient deterrent to the Most Christian King to risk the wrath of 
Christendom in the first place; ibid., pp.13-14. 
3 A grand English embassy was sent to France during November for this purpose and to tie up a number of loose 
ends with the agreement; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii (1854), pp.235-238 (Ven.ii, 1093; LPIIIi, 4529; 25 
O  1518, 
G 52 (15 
D West, 
D n to –, 
P 30 (17 
D  1518, 
V
ctober 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 238-239 (Ven.ii, 1102; LPIIii, 4563; 9 November
iustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); LPIIii, 4564 (9 November 1518), 4649 (14 December 1518), 46
ecember 1518, Somerset, West, Docwra and Vaux to Wolsey), 4653 (15 December 1518, Somerset, 
ocwra and Vaux to Wolsey), 4655 (16 December 1518), 4675 (23 December 1518, Antonio Giustinia
aris). Also see Ven.ii, 1129 (17 December 1518, Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 11
ecember 1518, secretary to the Venetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 1132 (23 December
enetian ambassador in France to the Signory), 1133 (9 January 1519), 1134 (23 December 1518). 
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confusion over whether the emperor would adhere, an English envoy was sent to Germany 
d  
t  
unhappy with the league and needed rep ance that it did not oppose his interests. 
hile positive noises emanated from Charles about his intention to join, he procrastinated 
 physically away from 
Italy by
uring December but, when he arrived, Knight found Maximilian ‘diseased’ and unable to
alk at length. The emperor died shortly after.4 Charles of Castile was also suspected to be
eated reassur
W
until giving way on 20 March 1519.5 
Henry and Wolsey also began making moves to keep Francis
 the prospect of an Anglo-French conference in the Calais border region, as agreed in 
the Treaty of London, and active negotiations towards this began by the end of July 1519.6 
                                                 
 LPIIii, 4531 (25 October 1518, Maximilian to Wolsey), 4544 (31 October 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 
4588 (18 November 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza); LPIIIi, 25 (14 January 1519, [Knight] to Wolsey, 
1518), 243-246 (Ven.ii, 1106; LPIIii, 4577; 12 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 
5 Initially, it appears that Charles had sent a commission to join the league that arrived in England two days after 
its conclusion. On receipt, the Spanish orator never used it, asserting that it was because he was not privy to 
negotiations. Other reasons for this offered from Spain were that the Spanish ambassador did not have enough 
authority and that he was commissioned not to join after its conclusion; LPIIii, 4553 (4 November 1518, Henry 
Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4669 (21 December 1518). For Charles’ dissatisfaction with the agreement, see R. 
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii (1854), pp.238-239 (Ven.ii, 1102; LPIIii, 4563; 9 November 1518, Giustinian to 
4
‘W[els] in Awstrigne’); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.240-243 (Ven.ii, 1105; LPIIii, 4574; 11 November 
1127 (12 December 1518, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Zaragoza). 
to Kite), 4588 (18 November 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4658 (17 December 1518, Kite, Berners and 
the Signory, Lambeth). While it was repeatedly stated that Charles intended to send (someone with) his power to 
England, the Spanish king also sought and received reassurance on a number of matters, including English 
18, Charles 
quent ceremony on 19 March, see LPIIIi, 90 (22 February 1519, 
 the Signory, 
goodwill generally, the handover of Tournai, the defence of Charles’ territories in case of attack from France and 
the wording of clauses. The three English diplomats in Spain (Kite, Bourchier and Spinelly) seem to have 
worked hard in this respect. The Catholic King also seems to sought confirmation that the emperor and the pope 
would join as well; LPIIii, 4492 (10 October 1518, Knight to Wolsey), 4553 (4 November 1518, Henry to Kite), 
4588 (18 November 1518, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4590 (20 November 1518, Kite and Bourchier to 
Henry, Zaragoza), 4615 (29 November 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, Zaragoza), 4626 (6 December 1518, Henry to 
Margaret, Greenwich), 4629 (6 December 1518, Kite to Wolsey, Zaragoza), 4656 (16 December 15
to Henry, Zaragoza), 4658 (17 December 1518, Kite, Berners and Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 4660 (17 
December 1518, Kite to [Wolsey], Zaragoza), 4678 (23 December 1518, Philibert Naturelli, Provost of Utrecht, 
to Charles), 4683 (27 December 1518, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Mechelin). Also see Ven.ii, 1121 (11 
December 1518, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, 13 November 1518). For the Spanish embassy sent to 
England in late February to ratify and the subse
Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey, Mechelin), 97 (25 February 1519, de Berghes to Wolsey, Mechelin), 128 (19 
March 1519, London); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.253-255 (Ven.ii, 1168; LPIIIi, 117; 26 February 
1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 259-262 (Ven.ii, 1180; LPIIIi, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the 
Signory, Lambeth). Incidentally, Venice also adhered to the Treaty of London on 15 April 1519; Ven.ii, 1196 
(LPIIIi, 186; 15 April 1519), 1197 (15 April 1519). 1201 (18 April 1519). 
6 The meeting was to be held initially before the end of May, but this date was repeatedly delayed; LPIIii, 4483 
(8 October 1518); LPIIIi, 111 (5 March 1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Paris), 118 (11 March 1519, Boleyn to 
Wolsey, Paris), 121 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to [Henry]), 122 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey); Ven.ii, 1142 
(8 January 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris), 1168 (26 February 1519, Giustinian to
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Indeed, the English embassy sent to France to gain Francis’ ratification of the universal peace 
in November 1518 was commissioned to treat on this matter.7 The papacy may have been 
informed that the meeting was also intended to make arrangements for the crusade.8 In these 
senses, therefore, Wolsey was genuine when he spoke of his hope that ‘this alliance will 
promote the peace of Christendom’, while writing to the English ambassadors in France 
during January 1519.9 
 
seen in the agreement itself; not only did he nominate the papacy, Florence, Urbino and the 
The English envisaged Leo X integral both as beneficiary of and contributor to the 
Treaty of London’s restraint of France. Henry VIII’s consideration for papal security can be 
house of Medici by name for inclusion, but Leo was also to head the league and there was 
direct reference to the defence and protection of the Church.10 If the universal peace was to be 
observed and Francis I was to become subject to sanctions if deemed to be threatening the 
Papal States, therefore, Leo X’s adhesion was needed. That the pontiff fully understood the 
underlying English position vis-à-vis France is indicated in a discussion he had with the 
Venetian ambassador on 22 January 1519; Leo commented that he did not believe that Francis 
                                                                                                                                                        
Lambeth), 1171 (21 February, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris), 1172 (26 February 1519, Antonio 
Giustinian to the Signory, Paris); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.253-255 (LPIIIi, 117; 10 March 1519, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
7 LPIIii, 4564 (9 November 1518). For mutual enthusiasm about the conference, see for instance ibid., 4580 (13 
November 1518, Stephen [Poncher] to [Wolsey], ‘Carnoti’), 4664 (18 December 1518, [West] to [Wolsey], 
Paris). 
8 Campeggio spoke to Giustinian of his understanding that this was the purpose of the conference on 12 
November 1518; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.243-246 (Ven.ii, 1106; LPIIii, 4577; 12 November 1518, 
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
9 LPIIIi, 24 (calendared 14 January 1519, Wolsey to West and others). 
10 LPIIii, 4469 (2 October 1518); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.228-235 (Ven.ii, 1089; LPIIii, 4491; 10 
October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, 
p.12. 
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would attack Naples partly because Henry would not permit him ‘to become greater than he 
was’.11 
The papal power to join the Treaty of London may have been expected by Henry and 
Wolsey shortly after its conclusion, but this appears to have been a false report.12 News of the 
agreement’s conclusion, however, reached the pope quickly (by 19 October 1518), although 
he reportedly sneered at the requirement that he ‘request and pray’ for admission.13 By this, it 
ems that the pope objected to the stipulation that he had to apply for membership of an 
initiativ
November, who reported that Leo thought himself ‘slighted’ by the method used to bring 
                                                
se
e that he had instigated. Indeed, there soon arrived in England several indications that 
the papacy was unhappy with the concluded treaty. Initially, Giulio de’ Medici writing to 
Campeggio on 6 October, conveyed ‘with great displeasure has His Holiness learned that 
Wolsey has set aside the proposal of a five years’ truce, because he does not wish to leave the 
final position of affairs in the hands of the Pope. No Christian – far less a Cardinal – should 
venture to express himself in that way, and least of all Wolsey, who has received so many 
honours and favours from the Holy Father. From this we can see what the Holy See and the 
Pope have to expect from the English Chancellor’.14 These were strong words from the 
pope’s principal advisor. This complaint was confirmed by Spinelly (from Spain) on 29 
 
11 Ven.ii, 1143 (22 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For rumours in England of French interference in 
ars, ii, pp.246-248 (Ven.ii, 1117; LPIIii, 4621; 3 December 1518, 
er 1518, Spinelly to [Henry], Zaragoza). 
dherent rather than as a principal. This meant that, if attacked, the papacy 
pense; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
astor, History of the Popes, vii, p.243. 
the peninsula, specifically Francis’ backing of an uprising in Genoa and Charles’ movement of troops to Naples, 
officially to defend against the Turkish threat but believed to be intended to forestall a French descent into the 
peninsula, see R. Brown (trans.), Four Ye
Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
12 Intelligence gained from the nuncio in Spain suggested that such a commission had been sent; LPIIii, 4440 (18 
Septemb
13 Ven.ii, 1092 (19 October 1518, Marco Minio to Signory, Corneto). Talking to Giustinian around 10 October, 
Campeggio also understood that papal ratification was sought within four months although, if Leo did not 
adhere, he would be included as an a
would be defended by the allies at his own rather than at common ex
pp.228-235 (Ven.ii, 1089; LPIIii, 4491; 10 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1090 (12 
October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
14 L. P
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about the treaty.15 This can only refer to Wolsey’s hijacking of his five year truce under cover 
of the Anglo-French amity. 
peace agreement, Campeggio allegedly remonstrated against the lack of a clause for the 
                                                
Perhaps recognising that England had overstepped the mark and potentially that papal 
support of the Treaty of London may not be forthcoming, Henry VIII duly issued his 
ratification of the pope’s five year truce by the end of December 1518, thereby implying 
deference to the original papal initiative, Leo X’s role as arbitrator and the ‘pressing’ need for 
a crusade.16 It ought not to be forgotten that Wolsey’s Treaty of London had evolved from the 
pontiff’s five year truce and that the aim for an enterprise against the Turks underscored both 
initiatives. Indeed, the English crown gave every impression that it was committed to a 
passagium as the eventual outcome of the Treaty of London. As far as Campeggio understood 
on 12 November, the preamble of the league referred to such an expedition, he believed that 
Henry intended to go on crusade and that an interview with Francis (stipulated in the 
agreement) would arrange this.17 Also, Henry pushed this aspect of the universal peace when 
trying to convince the emperor to join the Treaty of London; he expounded upon an 
expedition to the east as being his duty and wanted Maximilian’s opinion on how this ought to 
be launched.18 On the other hand, indications emanated from England that the crown was not 
as fervent about this cause as it claimed. In the days after the conclusion of the universal 
 
 omnibus’, albeit this was already acknowledged to be the case. The king 
 March 1518), 4680 (24 December 1518, Pace to [Wolsey]), 
ight). 
15 Nevertheless, the pope was said to be happy with the contents of the agreement. Concerning Leo’s 
dissatisfaction, Spinelly advised that nothing be said; LPIIii, 4615 (29 November 1518, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Zaragoza). 
16 On 24 December, Henry was happy with the form of the commission made out for this purpose, on condition 
that a clause was inserted ‘salvis aliis
was concerned, therefore, that this truce really did mean peace and protected all parties against aggression, 
probably from France; ibid., 4003 (calendared 10
4688 (calendared end December 1518). The English adhesion may also have been prompted by Francis’ 
approach to Henry to do this jointly. Indeed, by 6 January 1519, Leo X was under the impression that Anglo-
French membership was imminent; ibid., 4596 (23 November 1518, Francis to Henry); Ven.ii, 1131 (6 January 
1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
17 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.243-246 (Ven.ii, 1106; LPIIii, 4577; 12 November 1518, Giustinian to the 
Signory, Lambeth). 
18 LPIIii, 4687 (December 1518, Henry to Kn
 649
defence of the Mediterranean against the Turks, to which Wolsey replied that Ottoman affairs 
would be discussed at another time.19 Also, the Venetian ambassador reported on 20 
November that Wolsey, on receipt of news from the Levant, was concerned but warned, if no 
moves were ‘made by England to avoid the common peril, the reason was that it did not much 
affect her’.20 Nevertheless, the papacy still sought to push the crusading agenda. This can be 
first interpreted from the aforementioned complaint from de’ Medici to Campeggio about 
Wolsey’s having undermined the five year truce (6 October).21 Further papal pressure was 
applied via Silvester de Giglis on 9 November. Stress was laid on the need to prevent an 
agreement between Hungary and the Ottomans, and Leo requested 70-80,000 ducats to help 
finance an expedition (to which Charles and Francis, he claimed, were already committed).22 
Thus, when Henry VIII ratified the five year truce at the end of 1518, he effectively gave a 
positive response to the pope’s request for English participation in the crusade (albeit without 
mentioning the financial request).23 By 22 January 1519, the pope was expecting England and 
France to join his truce.24 
 Despite Henry VIII’s apparent olive branch that was probably intended to placate the 
papacy and induce Leo to ratify the Treaty of London, English confirmation of the five year 
                                                 
19 Ven.ii
20 Ibid., 1111 (20 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
21 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, p.243. 
 , 1090 (12 October 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
22 From the two relevant letters, one presumes that the 70-80,000 ducats to be raised by England was part of the 
12 million said to be required for the two year project; LPIIii, 4565 (9 November 1518, de Giglis to Wolsey), 
1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome). There was also implicit pressure in this direction from Venice 
s and Charles to supply troops in case the Turks invaded Italy; the Italian 
IIIi, 20; 13 January 1519, Lambeth). 
ry, Rome). 
4566 (calendared 9 November 1518, [de Giglis] to Henry). Similarly, around 15 December, the pope voiced to 
the Venetian ambassador his hope that Henry (and Francis) would now move against the Ottomans; Ven.ii, 1124 
(15 December 
and Spain, the former who continued to furnish the English with news from the east and the latter who notified 
Charles’ intention to send troops to Naples to defend against the Turkish threat. For Venetian communications, 
see R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.238-239 (Ven.ii, 1102; LPIIii, 4563; 9 November 1518, Giustinian to 
the Signory, Lambeth), 240-243 (Ven.ii, 1105; LPIIii, 4574; 11 November 1518); Ven.ii, 1111 (20 November 
1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For Charles’ actions, LPIIii, 4590 (20 November 1518, Kite and 
Bourchier to Henry, Zaragoza). 
23 LPIIii, 4688 (calendared end December 1518). If Campeggio is to be believed, he and probably Wolsey had 
also coordinated a pledge by Franci
legate disclosed this to Giustinian over dinner during January 1519; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.248-
250 (Ven.ii, 1136, LP
24 Ven.ii, 1143 (22 January 1519, Minio to the Signo
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25 The situation apparently did not change, as on 18 May the pope was still 
expecting Henry to ratify his truce.26 By this point, however, it would not be surprising if 
English enthusiasm in making this concession had waned; as will be seen, continental politics 
was now dominated by the Imperial election process and the Treaty of London was on the 
backburner. 
 If one takes, therefore, Henry VIII’s intention to join the papal truce as a gesture to 
induce papal ratification of the Treaty of London, was it successful? Despite the pontiff’s 
displeasure, as details of the Treaty of London filtered to him, Leo X seems to have been 
autiouc sly prepared to join at around the same time.27 Perhaps fearful of joining what could 
                                                 
25 Francis approached Henry in this regard in late November 1518. De Giglis also claimed to have written to 
Wolsey on this subject on the 19th. In slight contradiction to what de Giglis said, however, the pope understood 
e in Rome to confirm the five year truce, 
re; LPIIii, 4596 (23 November 1518, 
9, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome); Ven.ii, 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio 
, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also, details about the nature and contents of the 
io to the Signory, Rome), 1112 (24 November 1518, 
to the Signory, Rome), 1115 (1 December 1518, 
around 3 March that Francis had sent a commission to his representativ
but had instructed its delay in order to scare Charles into giving up Navar
Francis to Henry); LPIIIi, 149 (29 March 151
to the Signory, Rome).  
26 Ven.ii, 1221 (18 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
27 A copy of the league had been sent to Rome and, although it was noted that this had not been received by 14 
November, it seems to have reached the Holy See by 1 December. While the Venetian orator in Rome suspected 
that not all of the clauses had been sent, the pope disagreed, although he admitted that secret promises may have 
been made between England and France. Giustinian later (in March 1519) confirms that that sent to Rome was 
the full version, when he compared it with other copies; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.243-246 (Ven.ii, 
1106; LPIIii, 4577; 12 November 1518, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth), 253-255 (Ven.ii, 1168; LPIIIi, 117; 
10 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, 
Rome), 1115 (1 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1118 (3 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, 
Rome), 1120 (5 December 1518
league (both true and false) gradually permeated through to Rome. Around 14 November, for instance, it was 
believed that nothing had been settled at that point about universal peace, as other princes had not yet sent their 
powers to join. Also, by the 24th, it was rumoured that the English and French had agreed in their amity to 
destroy the Swiss; Ven.ii, 1108 (14 November 1518, Min
Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1114 (27 November 1518, Minio 
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develop into a partisan axis (which could drag him into war with one or more of the 
‘superpowers’), the pope’s power to Campeggio to join the league on his behalf was 
reportedly conditional on the emperor and king of Spain also adhering.28 The English crown 
appears to have been confident that this would occur, however, at least by December.29 The 
pope issued his ratification of the Treaty of London on 31 December 1518.30 It is not known, 
however, when it left Rome, as there is no indication of its arrival prior to mid-March; around 
17th of this month, on account of their receipt of this commission, Wolsey and Campeggio 
were ceremonially received by the king as if they had just arrived from Rome. In reply to the 
oration given on behalf of the two cardinals, Pace praised the pope for having sent the power 
of ratification to England. A Venetian commentator present observed that the English crown 
was in control of the Treaty of London and that Henry could be described as head of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
league rather than Leo, such were the expressions of honour bestowed on him by the pope ‘to 
the disparagement and degradation, perhaps, of the Apostolic chair’.31 Subsequently, 
Rome). 
28 The Venetian Minio reported that it was dependent on other sovereigns adhering, while Kite and Bourchier 
 Pact’, JMH, 10, p.12. 
join), Henry claimed that the pope consented to the 
Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1116 (27 November 1518, Rome), 1118 (3 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, 
Rome), 1120 (5 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1124 (15 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, 
(based in Spain) stated that it was conditional on Maximilian and Charles. The latter English ambassadors also 
reported hearing (by 17 December) that the pope had joined the Treaty of London; Ven.ii, 1108 (14 November 
1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome); LPIIii, 4658 (17 December 1518, Kite, Berners and Spinelly to Henry, 
Zaragoza). Incidentally, the Medici pontiff also had reason to be wary of the Treaty of London insomuch that it 
comprised the duchy of Ferrara (and its duke), which he coveted and later made a move against; G. Mattingly, 
‘An Early Nonaggression
29 In his commission to Knight (to convince the emperor to 
peace and that Campeggio confirmed this. Also implying papal backing, the English king proposed that, 
concerning the perennial Imperial-Venetian conflict (as an obstacle to German membership of the universal 
peace), Knight was to propose arbitration by Henry, Leo and Charles (or any two of them); LPIIii, 4687 
(December 1518, Henry to Knight). 
30 LPIIii, 4686 (31 December 1518, Leo to Henry, Rome). By about a week later, the pope understood from the 
legates in England that the amity between England and France was to become closer and another ‘more 
stringent’ treaty to be negotiated. There also seems to have been some ambiguity about the clause in the peace 
confirming previous alliances, which the pope interpreted to mean that the peace made with other powers was to 
be observed (whereas Maximilian perceived it to refer to the continuation of the Treaty of Noyon); Ven.ii, 1131 
(6 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
31 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.256-259 (Ven.ii, 1178; LPIIIi, 125; 17 March 1519, Giustinian to the 
Signory, Lambeth). In France, by 11 February, the papal legate there, Bibbiena, had received a similar bull 
empowering him to join the league on Leo’s behalf; Ven.ii, 1164 (11 February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the 
Signory, Paris). 
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Campeggio and Wolsey confirmed papal membership of the Treaty of London in a ceremony 
on 20 March 1519, at the same time as Charles.32 It is a coincidence that papal and Spanish 
adherence occurred simultaneously, given the concern of both that each other join. Curiously, 
however, when Wolsey notified the pope of Spanish adhesion to the universal peace on 25 
March, he suggested that he still awaited papal confirmation. It seems that the commission 
that they had received included a number of amendments, upon which the legates then 
advised Leo X and were yet to receive a reply. Nevertheless, Wolsey asserted that both he and 
his co-legate participated in this ceremony in order to lend the treaty more authority.33 While 
interpretation of this is difficult, it seems that the impression given, intentionally or not, was 
that the papacy joined the universal peace on 20 March; French, Spanish and Venetian 
diplomats were united in reporting this to their governments after attending the ceremony. It is 
unlikely that all three misinterpreted the situation. A feasible explanation is that Wolsey and 
Campeggio, as legates a latere, joined on the pope’s behalf without having sufficient power to 
do so; as already mentioned, they had been sent a commission but, while this required 
amendment, these corrections were perhaps deemed minimal and the pontiff’s commitment 
considered inevitable enough to go-ahead anyway. Furthermore, the ruse may have been 
required to ensure Charles I’s adherence, as he had previously indicated that he was not 
prepared to do so without Leo X doing the same. 
 
Henry VIII attempts to prevent Francis I’s victory in the Imperial election and tries 
unsuccessfully to work with Rome to achieve this: January 1519 – June 1519 
                                                 
32 R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.259-262 (Ven.ii, 1180; LPIIIi, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the 
Signory, Lambeth); LPIIIi, 145 (28 March 1519, [Boleyn] to [Wolsey], Poissy), 184 (13 April 1519, Spinelly to 
March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis). 
Wolsey, Barcelona). Leo X’s insistence that papal ratification was conditional upon Charles and Maximilian 
doing the same probably explains the delay of nearly three months between the pontiff sending his commission 
and the aforementioned ceremony. One also ought to note that Maximilian was, by this time, dead. 
33 LPIIIi, 137 (25 
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The English strategy to restrain Francis I from Italy by the Treaty of London was 
unavoidably interrupted by the death of Maximilian I on 12 January 1519. This had been 
anticipated for some time and intrigues had been under way to secure the subsequent Imperial 
election by Maximilian and Charles (for the latter’s ‘succession’) on the one part and Francis 
(for himself) on the other; these efforts were well-known in both England and Rome. At an 
early stage (during 1518), Henry VIII offered his backing to the Spanish king, while Leo X 
grumbled about the prospect of the Catholic King succeeding. Towards the close of 1518, 
Maximilian tried to bring things to a head by seeking the selection of Charles at a specially 
convened diet. To this end, Maximilian had requested the Imperial crown to be sent from 
Rome, but the pope, at length, refused, claiming this to be harmful to the papal dignity and a 
dangerous precedent.34 In response, while the emperor reportedly threatened to descend into 
Italy to retrieve the crown and Charles complained vociferously about it being withheld, Leo, 
speaking after the emperor’s death, considered that ‘Italy had been spared some great 
catastrophe’.35  
 To understand Henry’s and Leo’s responses at this watershed moment, they ought to 
be envisaged as implementing ‘public’ and ‘private’ policies in a bid to secure their interests 
in the Imperial election. On the one hand, Henry VIII ‘publicly’ responded positively to the 
approaches of Charles and Francis, indicating (individually) his backing to both candidates.36 
                                                 
, Minio to the 
had some sort 
of stroke, see above p.279. 
35 Ven.ii, 1148 (29 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For another indication of Leo’s belief that an 
Imperial descent into Italy would cause Francis I to follow and his doubt that Maximilian would make the 
n.ii, 1163 (8 
aris), 1172 (26 February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the 
34 Ven.ii, 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1120 (5 December 1518, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1124 (15 December 1518, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1131 (6 January 1519, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1135 (11 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1143 (22 January 1519
Signory, Rome). For Maximilian’s health being a concern since May 1517, around which time he 
journey anyway, see ibid., 1137 (15 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
36 For indications to the pro-Charles camp that it had England’s backing, see LPIIIi, 84 (20 February 1519, 
Spinelly to Wolsey), 252 (24 May 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Brussels); Ven.ii, 1228 (7 May 1519, 
Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Barcelona), 1236 (16 June 1519); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression 
Pact’, JMH, 10, pp.15-16. For signals sent to Francis that Henry supported his candidacy; Ve
February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, P
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As rumours of this circulated, both candidates suspected English intentions at various times.37 
Privately, on the other hand, the English pursued a more complex strategy; first and foremost 
they firmly opposed the elevation of Francis I (although this was never to become public 
knowledge to their ‘ally’);38 secondly, they were against the selection of Charles, if possible, 
with the preference of a third party, possibly Henry himself.39 These strategies culminated in 
the Pace mission to Germany from May onwards, where the secretary was to walk a 
diplomatic tightrope, taking all of these contradictions into account.40  
                                                                                                                                                        
Signory, Paris); LPIIIi, 70 (9 February 1519, [Boleyn] to Henry, Paris), 121 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to [Henry], 
Paris), 122 (14 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris). 
37
Germany, Barcelona), 312 (16 June 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.264-265 (Ven.ii, 1211; LPIIIi, 203; 29 April 1519, Giustinian to the Signory). For reports of English 
insincerity reaching Francis, see LPIIIi, 118 (11 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris), 142 (26 March 1519, 
Boleyn to [Wolsey], Poissy), 145 (28 March 1519, [Boleyn] to [Wolsey], Poissy); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, 
June 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, London). 
38
Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.266-267 (Ven.ii, 1213; LPIIIi, 211; Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
39 It ought to be stressed that English opposition to Charles was nowhere near as firm as that against Francis. 
Henry implied suppo
he advised them that
 For Charles’ suspicion of Henry, see for example LPIIIi, 188 (16 April 1519, Charles to his deputies in 
ii, pp.264-265 (Ven.ii, 1198; LPIIIi, 187; 29 April 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1237 (17 
 As at 6 May, Giustinian understood that neither Henry nor his ministers wished Francis to become emperor; R. 
rt for a third party and his opposition to Charles in a letter to the electors during May, when 
 Germany had always been ‘a bulwark against those who were covetous of power’; LPIIIi, 
216 (11 May 1519, Henry to the Electors, Greenwich). By mid-May, Campeggio speculated that the Pace 
ission i
in, not
(Ven.ii, 1220; LPIIIi, 235; Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth); Ven.ii, 1237 (17 June 1519, Giustinian to the 
that he has rejected overtures from the electors and Cardinal Schiner to stand; , 1163 (8 February 1519, 
e
Pace mission, although there seems some disagreement between Henry and Wolsey during June over this; ibid., 
302 (13 June 1519, John Clerk to Wolsey, Windsor), 344 (calendared end June 1519, instructions to John Clerk). 
The ‘opportunity’ for Henry VIII to become emperor was not entirely unprecedented; Maximilian had offered 
, for instance, see LPIIIi, 3174 (26 April 1517, Somerset to [Henry], Antwerp), 3724 
ace to Wolsey, Bruges), 301 
m ntended a free election and Norfolk confirmed this, further revealing his belief that a third party would 
w  the two main contenders. This result, Giustinian wrote, seems to have been universally believed and 
hoped for. A month later, the Venetian reported anxiety in England concerning the election and ministers’ 
unspoken opposition to the French and Spanish candidacies; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.269-273 
Signory, London). Henry’s ‘candidacy’ is first mentioned during February when the king claims to the French 
ibid.
Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris), 1172 (26 February 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Paris); 
LPIIIi, 100 (28 February 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris). The English tentatively pursued this option through th  
Henry the Imperial crown in 1513, 1516, 1517 and 1518, although it was never seriously considered. In 1519, 
many historians believe that it was never really a serious policy on the part of England, although Scarisbrick is 
convincing in positing that the English crown deemed it worth taking a chance (however unlikely the chance of 
success); A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.99, 102; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.97-98, 99-100. For reference to 
Maximilian’s offers in 1517
(calendared 6 October 1517, [Pace] to -). 
40 For measures taken to keep the mission secret from the French, see LPIIIi, 218 (12 May 1519, Pace to Wolsey, 
London), 222 (14 May 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Calais), 234 (17 May 1519, P
(calendared 12-13 June 1519, Pace to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.269-273 (Ven.ii, 1220; 
LPIIIi, 235; Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For Charles being given the impression that the Pace mission 
would back his candidacy; LPIIIi, 312 (16 June 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona). Also see ibid., 252 (24 
May 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Brussels), 274 (30 May 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey), 279 (1 June 1519, de 
Hesdin to Wolsey, Brussels). Finally, a veneer of neutrality was to be observed to the electors that Pace visited in 
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In terms of Leo X’s strategies for securing his interests at the Imperial election, 
publicly he initially leaned towards a third party, while simultaneously in negotiation with 
both Francis and Charles.41 From the turn of February/March 1519, however, the pontiff 
increasingly leaned towards the French king and this, combined with active opposition to 
Charles, was apparent during the election process.42 Privately, however, the pope adopted a 
three pronged strategy; firstly, to prevent the election of Charles at all costs,43 secondly, he 
would have preferred that Francis was not successful, but envisaged him as the lesser of two 
                                                                                                                                                        
Germany, unless they were deemed amenable, in which case the secretary was to test the water concerning the 
hough this was too late; LPIIIi, 240 (calendared 20 May 1519, 
 then 
21 ; Ven.ii, 1165 (24 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 
selection of a third party. Pace was initially despatched with two sets of instructions: the first ordered him to 
consult with the electors and, if he was sure that any would vote for Henry, he could make them promises; the 
second urged Pace to discover who was pro-French and pro-Spanish and to pledge Henry’s support in 
accordance with these beliefs, albeit in general terms and without indicating firm backing for Charles or Francis. 
The latter instructions also alluded to the prevention of the French and Spanish kings from being elected, in 
favour of Henry or a German prince. These were supplanted by a further commission on 20 June, instructing 
Pace to overtly pursue Henry’s nomination, alt
Pace’s instructions), 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s instructions), 318 (20 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, 
Mainz), 326 (24 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey). For other indications of English opposition to Francis,
Charles, and support for a third party, see ibid., 215 (11 May 1519, Henry to Elector of Saxony, Greenwich), 216 
(11 May 1519, Henry to the Electors, Greenwich), 253 (calendared 21-22 May 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Mechelin), 
254 (calendared 21-22 May 1519, Pace to [Wolsey], Brussels), 255 (calendared 21-22 May 1519, Pace to 
[Wolsey]), 274 (30 May 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.269-273 (Ven.ii, 1220; 
LPIIIi, 235; 18 May 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). For broad agreement on this assessment of the 
Pace embassy, see A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.102; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.100-101. 
41 On initial receipt of news of Maximilian’s death, Leo instructed Cajetan to pursue the selection of a German 
prince and around the same time wrote to the electors, urging them to choose one of their own and to do so 
‘peaceably and quietly’. In response to French and Spanish overtures for support, however, the pope kept his 
options open and negotiated with both sides without committing to either. When asked around 13 February what 
answer he gave to these approaches, the pontiff replied ‘that we shall not fail them where we can with propriety 
give our assistance’. Also, in responding to Spanish complaints about French opposition to Charles’ candidacy 
around 3 March, the pope asked the latter’s orator ‘how he himself would act under similar circumstances, and 
told him to put himself in our place, and think what he would do, as the like would be done by us’. At the same 
time, the French ambassador was given papal support for Francis’ nomination, although he was sceptical about 
its veracity, given the pope spoke in such generalities and was in constant communication with the Spanish 
orator; Ven.ii, 1148 (29 January 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1157 (13 February 1519, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); LPIIIi, 116 (9 March 1519, Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Barceclona); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.272-273. 
42 The first mention of Leo’s decision to back Francis derives from the Venetian ambassador in Rome on 22 
February, although he only begins to note this with any frequency from 10 March and only in terms of a firm 
change in attitude in this direction on the st
1173 (10 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
43 For clear indications that the pope sought to prevent Charles’ election; ibid., 1169 (29 February 1519, Minio to 
the Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1219 (13 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, 




Spanish were convinced that he had contributed to their victory which, to all intents and 
 one of the two was unavoidable,44 and thirdly, his favoured choice was to induce the 
selection of a third party if possible. In achieving the latter, the pontiff even envisaged 
adapting his public backing for the French king; once Francis realised that he could not win, 
they could both throw their weight behind an alternative candidate.45 Ultimately, the English 
strategy had mixed results; while it contributed to the prevention of Francis’ elevation, it was 
unsuccessful in facilitating the selection of any third party (and did not come close to doing 
so). Nevertheless, Henry VIII came out of the election process ‘smelling of roses’, as the 
purposes, he had supported. The papal policies, on the other hand, were unsuccessful; not 
only did Leo fail to advance a third party or Francis with any effect, but he also failed to 
obstruct his worst-case scenario, Charles. In fact, anticipating his failure in this matter from 
around the end of May, the pontiff came to an eleventh hour agreement to support the 
Catholic King’s candidacy, thereby ensuring that the papacy was on the ‘winning’ side.46  
                                                 
44 The pontiff voiced his opinion that Francis would be the ‘lesser evil’ to the Catholic King as early as 13 
February; Ven.ii, 1157 (13 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For other indications of this belief and 
had not realised earlier the advantages of 
gnory, 
story of the Popes, vii, pp.283-285. 
of suggestions that he would, at heart, prefer Francis not to be elected at all, see ibid., 1157 (13 February 1519, 
Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1165 (24 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, 
Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). For Leo envisaging his 
support for the French king as a means to block Charles and would rather not see him elected, see ibid., 1169 (29 
February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1175 (13 
March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1219 (13 May 
1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
45 For indications that the pope also continued to favour a third party, see ibid., 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to 
the Signory, Rome), 1204 (25 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1231 (5 June 1519, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome). There are also a number of suggestions that Leo claimed to back Francis because he hoped that, 
when the Frenchman realised the impossibility of his candidacy, they could combine in support of a third party. 
These culminated on 29 May, when the pope, on receipt of intelligence that Francis did indeed have no chance of 
success, complained that Francis had let matters reach this stage and 
backing another anti-Charles candidate. In the end Francis I withdrew his candidacy on 26 June and threw his 
weight behind two German princes (one of whom did not want to be considered, the other of whom had no 
chance). This was far too late to benefit Leo X, however; LPIIIi, 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, 
Barcelona); Ven.ii, 1219 (13 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Si
Rome); R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.76. In terms of historians’ opinions of the papal election strategy, Knecht and 
Pastor broadly agree with this assessment, while Pollard agrees that Leo would have preferred a third party. 
Scarisbrick, on the other hand, believes the pontiff rather ‘wobbled from one policy to another’; R.J. Knecht, 
Francis I, p.74, 76; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.273-278, 280-281; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.101; 
J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.99. 
46 L. Pastor, Hi
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  The implications for England of the death of the emperor had direct relevance to 
Henry VIII’s underlying motivation to prevent French political control of the papacy and go a 
long way to accounting for the English crown’s ‘private’ strategy for the election campaign.47 
At the heart of the latter was the king’s fervent opposition to his rival’s attainment of what 
was essentially the ‘monarchy of Christendom’.48 With such potential power, access to 
resources and even more Italian interests (than Milan and Genoa that he already possessed), 
there would be nothing to stop Francis achieving his Italian ambitions (particularly Naples) 
and thereby dominating the papacy.49 In a similar way, the papacy shared the English crown’s 
fears for the potential influence that the prospective emperor would exercise over Rome if 
Charles or Francis were to succeed although, without the blinkers of the inherent anti-French 
                                                 
47
that it be ratified and observed, limited his actions in the public sphere and accounts for why he sough
reassure both principal candidates of his support for them. For Charles’ ratification in March, see above p 646.
 Henry VIII’s commitment to the Treaty of London, particularly as a means to straitjacket France, and desire 
t to 
.  
48 The English crown’s inherent opposition to Francis’ candidacy can be traced back to 1518. On 4 May, Thomas 
Spinelly summed up English fears when he opined in May 1518 that ‘all Christendom will suffer if the French 
King is elected’. Henry’s own hostility towards this prospect was cited by Pace during June of the same year 
 Christendom’ rested on this election, see the king’s comment on this when 
the English or rather, for the sake of this study, the king’s psyche; see above 
when he informed Wolsey of the king’s belief that ‘this… must be “growndly looked [to] and as great remedies 
used against it”’. He repeated this sentiment in another letter and delegated Wolsey to respond to this threat; 
LPIIii, 4146 (4 May 1518, Spinelly to Henry), 4257 (24 June 1518, [Pace] to [Wolsey]), 4266 (28 June 1518, 
Pace to Wolsey). Furthermore, Charles of Castile was doubtless applying pressure to what he already knew was 
a raw nerve when he urged Henry in April 1519 to ‘beware of allowing the most Christian King to obtain a 
dignity which would render him irresistible’, a sentiment that he had already conveyed to the English king 
during July 1518; LPIIii, 4313 (12 July 1518, Kite and Berners to Henry); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 
pp.264-265 (29 April 1519; Ven.ii, 1211; LPIIIi, 203; Giustinian to the Signory). Concerning Henry VIII’s 
understanding that the ‘monarchy of
giving Francis his support during early February 1519; LPIIIi, 70 (9 February 1519, [Boleyn] to Henry, Paris). 
Incidentally, Mattingly detected the English nobility’s prejudice against France as a motivation for the crown’s 
opposition to Francis’ candidacy (and ultimately siding with Charles); G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression 
Pact’, JMH, 10, pp.14-15. 
49 Attainment of the Imperial crown would provide both principal candidates with the opportunity to establish de 
facto hegemony in Italy; G. Mattingly, ‘An Early Nonaggression Pact’, JMH, 10, p.14. It must be stressed that 
the English crown also opposed, although to a far lesser extent, the nomination of Charles I (hence its preference 
of a third party), doubtless because of the massive expanse of territories that he would control if he were to be 
elected, which would add Imperial fiefs in Italy (or the claim thereto) to his existing rule over the kingdom of 
Naples and, similarly gift a Hapsburg emperor with untold influence over Rome. This explains Henry VIII’s 
actual preference for the election of a third party and his preparedness to accept the Catholic King as the ‘lesser 
evil’, if the former was impossible. While this is not the place to compare Henry VIII’s fear of the papacy 
becoming politically subordinate to France with its being subject to Hapsburg influence, it has been argued 
elsewhere that the English view of the French as the ‘ancient enemy’, with all the historical baggage that that 
carried, was deeply entrenched in 
pp.64 ff. 
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prejudice, the pope was more alarmed at the thought of the former than the latter. Accounting 
in Italy.53 Finally, Leo may have adopted a publicly pro-French course without the guiding 
for his opposition to the prospect of a Spanish victory in mid-March 1519, Leo X exclaimed 
to the Venetian ambassador, ‘do you know how many miles hence the borders of his 
[Charles’] territory are? 40 miles!’, referring to Naples.50 Despite this, the papacy also 
dreaded similar consequences in the event of a French victory.51 However, Leo may have 
believed that a French descent into Italy was more unlikely, as Henry VIII would not tolerate 
this.52 Furthermore, the prevailing French influence in the peninsula (that had affected the 
papacy since the Battle of Marignano in 1515) may have contributed to Leo’s ‘public’ 
backing of Francis; it was most expedient for him to be seen to be supporting the French king 
as, if he was elected, the pontiff had backed the winning horse but, if he was not and there 
were to be any subsequent political fall-out, the papacy remained close to the dominant power 
                                                 
50 Also, on 12 April, the pontiff told the same diplomat that he opposed Charles first and foremost ‘from fear lest 
such vicinity should cause much and serious disturbance to the Papal States’; Ven.ii, 1175 (13 March 1519, 
Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Part of the formal argument 
that Leo X employed to justify his opposition to Charles’ candidacy was that the latter was precluded from the 
election in the first place, due to the oath that he swore on being invested with Naples not to pursue the Imperial 
crown. Knecht frames this objection in the context of a wider policy pursued by the papacy since the thirteenth 
century, to ensure that the Holy Roman Empire and Naples remained in the hands of separate rulers. Charles was 
aware of this technicality prior to the death of Maximilian and sought dispensation from this oath when he asked 
to be invested again without the relevant clause in November 1518; ibid., 1108 (14 November 1518, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome), 1194 (12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.74. 
51 That the papacy feared the political implications of both contenders becoming emperor is indicated towards 
the end of February, when the election was said to have been the most talked about issue in Rome for years and 
that there was universal disapproval of the prospect of either Charles or Francis winning, ‘on account of the great 
danger which would thus threaten the Apostolic See and all Italy’. Leo’s right-hand man, Cardinal de’ Medici, 
made a similar observation at the end of March that, if either won, ‘all other powers must yield to him’. There 
was also said to be a general feeling in Rome towards the beginning of March that, if Francis won the ballot, 
, vii, pp.277-278. 
nobody would be able to oppose him in Italy; Ven.ii, 1169 (29 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 
1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1185 (30 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also 
see ibid., 1170 (3 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1187 (2 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
52 Ibid., 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
53 Papal uncertainty can be observed on 12 March, when the pope voiced his fear that a Franco-Spanish 
agreement would be concluded to secure Charles’ elevation, which would leave him, the pope, high and dry. Leo 
X is also recorded to have made several comments of his hope that Francis, if elected, would demonstrate his 
gratitude for papal support and, even if he did not, would acknowledge proof of the pontiff’s good will; ibid., 
1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 (21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1194 
(12 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also, Pastor argues that nepotistic links between Leo X and 
Francis I may have contributed to the papacy’s publicly pro-French attitude in the election; L. Pastor, History of 
the Popes
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hand of his principal minister Giulio de’ Medici, who was in Florence when his cousin 
declared his hand.54  
 In terms of the English crown’s relationship with Rome during the election process, it 
can be agreed therefore that both shared, to a large extent, a broad desire for neither Francis 
nor Charles to become emperor and, thereby, potentially dominate Rome. They disagreed, 
however, on who was the lesser of the evils, if their private preference of a third party proved 
impossible. In practice, the attempt by Henry and Wolsey to reach some sort of alignment 
with Leo X on this matter proved difficult (if not impossible), on account of intriguing by 
both England and Rome. For the English crown, a large part of the difficulty lay in 
understanding what the pope really intended. It was doubtless reassured in the months leading 
up to Maximilian’s death that the pope was unlikely to support Francis in the planned 
election.55 Alternatively, Henry and Wolsey would have been wary of Leo’s intentions from 
March 1519 onwards, given their receipt of intelligence that he was leaning towards Francis, 
their worst-case scenario.56 Equally, it will be seen that the English king and his cardinal also 
confused the papacy by its implementation of their own ‘public’ and ‘private’ strategies. If the 
crown and papacy did want to work together on this, they first had to assess if they could trust 
each other and, second, one party had to make a leap of faith in disclosing their ‘true’ 
intentions. 
                                                 
54 Certainly the Venetian orator Minio interpreted de’ Medici’s reaction to the pope’s Gallic commitment in this 
way, when the cardinal returned to Rome by the end of March. The Venetian ambassador made a similar 
comment on de’ Medici’s attitude in late April; Ven.ii, 1185 (30 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1210 
omplaint about it; Ven.ii, 1187 (2 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
(28 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
55 LPIIii, 4465 (calendared end September 1518). 
56 Spinelly (based in Spain) notified the English crown of this (and the anti-Charles) bias from 9 March and of 
the mission of Robert Orsini to Germany in pursuit of this from 4 April. Prior to this, the English diplomat 
advertised Wolsey of Leo’s intended neutrality; LPIIIi, 130 (20 March 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona), 
158 (4 April 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, Barcelona), 192 (20 April 1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona), 195 (22 
April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona), 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona). De Giglis 
probably conveyed similar intelligence to England, given that he certainly knew of the aforementioned 
nunciature and of Charles’ c
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In the first instance, Henry and Wolsey had little choice but to be (at least partially) 
duplicitous towards Leo X by lobbying him to support Charles’ candidacy, in response to the 
latter’s specific request to do this.57 Wolsey agreed by 4 February 1519, soon after hearing of 
Maximilian’s death, that this overture be made secretly via Campeggio.58 This English 
declaration (which reached Rome by 19 February) may not have been overly convincing, 
however, as while Leo was said to have rejected it by 3 March (as one would have expected), 
it was also said that Campeggio had only written the king’s intention and how Wolsey had 
‘cast the stone and led the arm’. By inference, the Spanish were unhappy that the approach 
was said to be induced by Wolsey, rather than being the king’s own initiative, thus suggesting 
that Henry’s ‘true’ mind may still be unknown and that the papal rejection was made with 
knowledge of this.59 Perhaps shortly after the half-hearted English communiqué of support for 
                                                 
57 Charles first seems to have asked Henry to write to the pope for his favour in the election on 20 January. At 
some point, probably during the same month, the English king encouraged his Spanish counterpart to write to 
Leo for the same reason, which Charles did; LPIIIi, 36 (20 January 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Zaragoza), 50 
58 The English cardinal claimed to have persuaded Henry to delay from interceding on behalf of Francis to 
support Charles instead. This approach to the papacy (to consist of letters from Wolsey and Campeggio) was to 
seek Leo’s support for Charles and to propose that Cardinal Schiner act on the latter’s behalf in Germany (which 
the pontiff also rejected). The date of Wolsey’s correspondence to Spinelly is cited in this reply; ibid., 84 (20 
1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona), 88 (22 February 1519, Charles to Wolsey, Barcelona), 89 (22 February 
Maximilian d
communication was 
(calendared 28 January 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey). 
February 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey). For other references to this (anticipated) action, see ibid., 87 (22 February 
1519, Charles to Margaret of Savoy and Council, Barcelona), 108 (4 March 1519, Margaret of Savoy to 
e Zevemberghes, Mechelen), 180 (12 April 1519, Margaret of Savoy to Charles, Mechelen). This 
probably made by Campeggio in his despatches of 31 January-2 February 1519, which 
consisted of three letters to Cardinal de’ Medici and one to Leo himself; Guasti, ‘I Manoscritti Torrigiani Donati 
al R. Archivio Centrale di Stato di Firenze’, Archivio Storico Italiano, 3rd series, xxvi (1878), p.199. As the 
Spanish understood, however, this correspondence had not reached Rome by 26 February, so they anxiously 
asked that Wolsey write again. By 13 April, Charles’ advisors were apparently unhappy with the English 
 Germany to the contrary). The Catholic King must also have 
 his behalf in Rome, as on 18 May he thanked de Giglis for 
e on 12 
overture via Campeggio (the English claiming that the Treaty of London prevented any more direct support), 
claiming that a letter in Henry’s hand would have clinched it with the pope. Nevertheless, Charles seems to have 
been informed from England by mid-April that the pope had indicated his intention to support his candidacy 
(despite being in receipt of intelligence from
understood that the English did, eventually, act on
promoting his candidacy (as he understood from Spinelly); LPIIIi, 116 (9 March 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Barceclona), 184 (13 April 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, Barcelona), 188 (16 April 1519, Charles to his deputies in 
Germany, Barcelona), 192 (20 April 1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona), 236 (18 May 1519, Charles to de 
Giglis, Barcelona). For de Giglis’ knowledge of the Campeggio approach by 19 February 1519, see ibid., 137 
(25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London).  
59 LPIIIi, 130 (20 March 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona). That Leo X may have understood that the 
English crown may oppose the two main candidacies is suggested by the Venetian ambassador in Rom
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Charles
A positive reply from Rome to this overture was received in England by 22 March.62 
, the English crown seems to have taken a leap of faith to secure papal support for the 
Imperial election by disclosing at least one element of Henry’s ‘private’ strategy. 
Communicating again through Campeggio, perhaps during February, Henry recommended 
that Francis I be opposed and that Leo send Nicholas von Schőnberg to the Swiss in pursuit of 
this. It probably also recommended joint pursuit of a third party.60 As Wolsey would later 
explain to a disgruntled de Giglis (on account of his being undermined as ambassador), he and 
Henry were unable (or rather unwilling) to put their opinions in writing until they knew the 
pope’s intentions, as the election was so important and England was officially allied with 
France. If they had disclosed their ‘real’ views and Leo had then leaned towards Francis, 
English views could then have reached the French and this risked their recent efforts to 
straitjacket the French through the Treaty of London.61 
Leo X seems to have concurred that a third party would be in both their interests, Campeggio 
even hinting that the pope may support Henry in this role, and agreed to conduct secret 
negotiations to this end. Wolsey, responding through de Giglis on the 25th (whom he now 
wished to involve in the negotiations), outlined his and Henry’s ‘private’ thoughts on the 
                                                                                                                                                        
March, who cited the pope as believing that Henry not approve of a rumoured Franco-Spanish conference to 
decide the election; Ven.ii, 1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
60 Acknowledging its arrival, de Giglis refers to this despatch as having arrived very late. Given Wolsey’s later 
admission to double-dealing in his claim to support candidates and his encouragement of the pope to do the 
same, it is likely that this letter was intended as a follow-up to the pope to divulge more genuine intentions; 
LPIIIi, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London), 149 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
61 Ibid., 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). De Giglis’ subsequent involvement was to reflect 
the wider double-dealing of the English crown on this matter. While, on the one hand, he performed the go-
between role in secret negotiations between Wolsey and Leo to join forces in pursuit of a third party, on the 
other, publicly, he gave the impression to the French and Imperial parties that England was either neutral or 
supported their candidate; Ven.ii, 1187 (2 April 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); LPIIIi, 236 (18 May 1519, 
Charles to de Giglis, Barcelona). 
62 This is apparently indicated by Giustinian’s discovery by this date that Campeggio and his entourage 
supported the election of a third party which, it will be demonstrated below, Leo X had disclosed was the 
‘genuine’ papal position. While the legate himself was quoted as cagily telling the Venetian orator that the 
election was ‘a very momentous event, considering the power of the candidates’, one of his relatives went a step 
further and revealed their support of the king of Poland, as Charles and Francis were far too powerful; R. Brown 
(trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.259-262 (Ven.ii, 1180; LPIIIi, 133; 22 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, 
Lambeth); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.99. 
 662
principal contenders. The cardinal understood that Francis was trying to win election by any 
means possible ‘and succeed in his unbridled desires’, in response to which he believed that 
they should try everything to prevent this, ‘for if he were successful he would revive many 
obsolete pretensions, and endanger the independence of the Holy See’. Wolsey claimed that 
Henry also deemed Charles’ election to be dangerous and would result in his ‘overgrown 
power’, although he was considered to be ‘the less evil’. As to a third candidate, the English 
monarch claimed to be prepared to back a Franco-papal nominee (a proposal by Leo), if 
Francis withdrew from the hustings. Wolsey also referred to Campeggio’s insinuation that 
Henry might forward his own candidacy (as a means to obstruct Francis and Charles). In 
response, de Giglis was to sound out the pope but, given that Henry had already turned down 
the offer once and may give the same answer, Leo should write to Wolsey to influence the 
king in
sending secret messengers, presumably to Henry, to contradict this correspondence, ‘ne 
ns for the Imperial election and Wolsey must have been largely 
 this direction. The cardinal also disclosed how the English intended to pursue their 
‘private’ strategy while still being seen to issue ‘public’ support to both Charles and Francis, 
and recommended that the pontiff do the same. As it was expected that the pope would 
receive requests for written support from both the French and Spanish candidates (as England 
had done), Henry advised that Leo ‘use dissimulation’ and issue such pledges, albeit also 
hujusmodi litteris fides ulla habeatur’. The English king promised to do the same for Leo. 
Finally, when presenting Henry and Wolsey’s opinions and thoughts to Leo X, de Giglis was 
instructed to observe the pope’s reactions closely and to seek to find out ‘his secret 
thoughts’.63 The English crown, at this point, appears to have really opened up to the papacy 
concerning its ‘true’ intentio
                                                 
63 LPIIIi, 137 (25 March 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). 
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convinced that the pope did intend to collude with England; yet, to have enlisted de Giglis’ 
observational skills, he could not have been completely sure. 
 Wolsey’s doubt was well-founded, as before his message had a chance to reach Rome, 
the bishop of Worcester notified him on 29 March of the shifting political sands in Rome 
concerning the election. Firstly, French pressure was arriving in regular waves and Francis 
had even claimed English support (including a promise of money and Henry turning down the 
opportunity for election himself). The English orator claimed that Leo favoured the 
Frenchman at this stage, as he could not decide who ‘would be the less evil’. De Giglis also 
claimed that there were problems with the idea of backing a third party, as the electors were 
reportedly divided on who to choose. In sum, Leo X wanted Wolsey’s opinion about the 
danger of either Francis or Charles being elected. In reply to the late arrival of Henry’s letter 
urging that Francis’ election be opposed and that von Schőnberg ought to be sent to Germany, 
Leo told de Giglis that he was not prepared to interfere on account of the danger, instead 
advising Henry to lobby for one of the electors. Nevertheless since saying that, the pontiff’s 
stance had reportedly softened and von Schőnberg was now to go to Germany to obstruct 
Charles and Francis, although his mission was to be disguised by his travelling via Hungary.64 
Notably, Henry VIII’s candidacy was not mentioned. 
 A further communication from Leo X (via de Giglis) may have reached Wolsey by 
around 11 May 1519, again reiterating his apparently true aims for the Imperial election. If the 
English interpretation of this can be believed, the pope desired that Francis and Charles be 
opposed and that Henry be elected or, failing that, one of the electors themselves. This 
correspondence seems to have encouraged, if not prompted, Richard Pace’s despatch to 
                                                 
64 The summary cites the request that the Franciscan ought to be sent to the Swiss, but this makes no sense and, 
9 (29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). in any case, von Schőnberg was later sent to Germany; ibid., 14
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Germany to these ends. 65 That the papal communiqué was perhaps not as encouraging of the 
English king’s candidacy as claimed can be interpreted from another secret approach made by 
olseyW  to Leo X (via de Giglis) in early May. Here the cardinal requested papal support for 
the English plan, which was doubtless that mentioned above. In response, by the end of May, 
de Giglis conveyed an account of a conversation with Leo; that, prior to Maximilian’s death, 
the pope envisaged Charles as the lesser of two evils but, since the emperor’s demise, he had 
repeatedly asked whether Henry and Wolsey would favour Francis (given the Treaty of 
London), which de Giglis denied. As at that moment, Leo reiterated that he did not wish 
Charles to be victorious and recommended one of the electors. However, news from France, 
that Francis may have pulled out, gave Leo cause for optimism; that, if he, Henry and Francis 
now united, they could secure the election of a third party. Nevertheless, since Leo hears that 
Henry and Wolsey favour Charles as the lesser evil, the pope claimed that he would follow 
this course.66 This was not a particularly clear declaration of papal intent; at the very least, the 
English would have recognised that further negotiations were required before an Anglo-papal 
alignment for the Imperial election could be finalised. 
                                                 
 Scarisbrick believes that it is impossible to decide whether this reference to refers to a new papal missive (now 
lost) or the 29 March communication; ibid., 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, instructions to Pace); J.J. Scarisbrick, 
Spain), confirming that the pope’s hidden agenda in backing Francis; that he really sought the French king’s 
favour for a third party. It was also claimed that Leo was motivated by a desire ‘to increase the dominion of the 
Duke of Urbin and his’; LPIIIi, 195 (22 April 1519, Spinelly to Henry, Barcelona). The perceived need in 
England for an alignment with Rome, particularly to prevent Francis being successful, may also have been 
electors failed to select someone by 6 June. Indeed, there may have been some basis of truth in this, as it seems 
65
Henry VIII, p.99. This decision may also have been encouraged by the receipt of intelligence from Spinelly (in 
underscored by receipt of intelligence from France that the choice of emperor would default to the pope, if the 
that the pope had been encouraged (by an unknown source) to wield papal authority during the Imperial 
interregnum (as apparently accorded by the bull ‘extravagans’ issued by John XXII [1316-1334]), although Leo 
rejected this suggestion. Nevertheless, a brief of 4 May sent to the legate in Germany appears to tell another 
story; Cajetan was empowered to ‘approve’ the election if three electors were unanimous; ibid., 170 (9 April 
1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Poissy); Ven.ii, 1169 (29 February 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); L. Pastor, 
History of the Popes, vii, p.280. 
66 LPIIIi, 277 (calendared end May 1519, de Giglis to [Wolsey]). 
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 Therefore, without being sure of papal support, Pace was sent to the Empire to 
facilitate a favourable outcome to the election.67 According to his commission, Pace was to 
cite Leo X as having urged Henry to send someone to Germany to lobby the electors to think 
about preserving the peace of Christendom.68 When in Germany, part of Pace’s ‘secret’ 
mission was to consult the papal ambassador and, if he took him to be ‘substantial and sure’, 
he may discuss his mission and also the pope’s recent letters (via de Giglis to Wolsey), copies 
of which he was to take with him; that they were to jointly prevent the election of Francis and 
Charles and to find a way to direct electors towards Henry or to choose a German.69 When he 
arrived, however, Pace found it difficult to pursue this policy.70 Having spoken with Cardinal 
Cajetan by 10 June, the secretary, despite purporting to like the cardinal personally, reported 
that the legate had not been notified of his coming and, therefore, had no knowledge of his 
mission. The implication is that Pace did not disclose his mission to Cajetan as a result. 
Indeed, he commented that the legate and papal ambassador (possibly Caracciolo) were held 
‘in great odium’ as a result of their anti-Spanish practices. Also, it is suggested that an English 
request for the pope to urge a delay in the election had not materialised; in fact, Pace claimed, 
Leo had encouraged the process to be speeded up.71 Pace further reported on the night of the 
                                                 
67 Indeed, if Campeggio’s statement to Giustinian is to be believed, as at 18 May, the legate had neither been 
informed about the Pace mission nor its purpose; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.269-273 (Ven.ii, 1220; 
f the country if he did not desist from these intrigues; ibid., 297 (10 June 1519, 
Magunce”’). While there were three papal 
LPIIIi, 235; 18 May 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). 
68 LPIIIi, 239 (20 May 1519, Pace’s commission, London). 
69 In addition to Cajetan, there were two other papal representatives in Germany at this time: Caracciolo and 
Orsini; ibid., 241 (calendared 20 May 1519, Pace’s instructions). 
70 It took a few weeks for Pace to get a handle on what the papal representatives were actually doing. Initially 
(around 21-22 May), he was informed by Margaret of Savoy and others that the nuncio Orsini was praising 
Francis and ‘depraving’ Charles, but had also been told by another source that the pope had changed his mind 
recently from Francis to Charles. By the end of the month, the English secretary understood that everyone was 
unhappy with the conduct of the papal representatives in Germany, lobbying for Francis (referring to the legate 
Cajetan and an ambassador, either Orsini or Caracciolo). A few days later (3 June), Pace conveyed that Cardinal 
Cajetan had addressed four electors at a meeting to promote the Most Christian King, an appeal which three 
allegedly rejected; ibid., 255 (calendared 21-22 May 1519, Pace to [Wolsey]), 274 (30 May 1519, [Pace] to 
Wolsey), 283 (3 June 1519, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Cologne). 
71 Cajetan told Pace of an incident whereby a number of notable German supporters of Charles entered his house 
and threatened to drive him out o
[Pace] to [Wolsey], ‘on the Rhine within two miles of “
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10 t the nuncio Orsini had fled because of his pro-French and anti-Spanish intrigues, the 
secretary believing this to have been the best course to avoid ‘his destruction’. Pace also 
added that Cajetan would like to have followed suit, but was bound to stay until the election, 
according to his commission.
th tha
to part of Leo’s understanding with Henry over the election.74 Finally, over the following few 
ther this was to be Henry). Confirmation of 
72 This intelligence would have been of great concern in 
England that the papacy was perhaps being duplicitous and may not align with the crown in 
pursuit of the notional third party or, alternatively, was being prevented from doing so. In 
addition, the ‘secrecy’ of the embassy’s aim to secure such a favourable election, at least from 
Charles, seems to have been compromised from the start; the Catholic King was reportedly 
mortified to hear of an Anglo-papal back-up plan to favour a third party. Hearing rumours of 
Henry’s inclination towards Francis (which they disbelieved) and of English money being 
sent to Frankfurt, the Spanish warned that, under cover of claiming to support someone else, 
the French would ‘beguile’ England and Rome and thereby secure the election for 
themselves.73 Nevertheless, in Germany, the English ambassador continued to seek a joint 
strategy with papal delegates; on 14 June, he spoke with Caracciolo, who had still received no 
communication from Leo and believed his correspondence to have been intercepted by 
Charles’ supporters. He did, however, consider the nuncio to be ‘a very honest man’ and privy 
days, Cajetan and Caracciolo did receive orders that they were to assist Pace, presumably in 
pursuit of a third party (although it is unclear whe
th  late, however, and the diplomats no 
                                                                                                                                                        
is also came from de Giglis, but this had come too
representatives in Germany, Cajetan, Caracciolo and Orsini, it seems that the first two worked together 
ostensibly against Charles’ candidacy, while Orsini also lobbied in favour of Francis (such was his commission). 
For Orsini’s ‘French’ commission, see for instance Ven.ii, 1173 (10 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 
1175 (13 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1176 (14 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1179 
(21 March 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also see P.G. Bietenholz and T.B. Deutscher (eds.), 
Contemporaries of Erasmus, vols. 1-3 (2003), pp.264-265. 
72 LPIIIi, 299 (11 June 1519, [Pace] to [Wolsey], Mainz). 
73 Ibid., 312 (16 June 1519, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Barcelona). For the secrecy surrounding Pace’s real mission to 
Germany, see above p.655. 
74 LPIIIi, 307 (14 June 1519, Pace to [Wolsey], Mainz). 
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longer had access to the electors. Nevertheless, Pace said he would try. There were also other 
indications that the pope was hedging his bets. The secretary implied that Leo was still 
working against Charles when he conveyed that one elector had promised Cajetan that he 
would raise the invalidity of the Spanish king’s nomination by virtue of the oath he took on 
his investiture with Naples. Pace also referred to secret intelligence that the pontiff, fearing 
that Charles would still be elected, was seeking to come to terms with him.75 The Englishman 
further confirmed his suspicion that the papacy was being deceitful on 20 June, when he 
claimed that neither Cajetan nor Caracciolo responded to his overtures to work together, in 
spite of the legate’s commission.76 Two days later, Pace reported a possible reason for this, 
that Cajetan had a bull to publish Francis’ election as soon as he heard that the latter had three 
votes, motivated by the pope’s fear of the French king (and in spite of Leo’s promises to 
Henry).77 The following day (the 23rd), however, the papal position had changed yet again; 
both papal delegates had received instructions to proceed no further against Charles.78 On the 
27th, Pace advertised Wolsey that the pope had made an arrangement with Charles in this 
respect that would finally draw together the electors.79 This news would have taken some 
days to reach England as, up to 25 June, Henry and Wolsey were telling Campeggio that 
matters in Germany were proceeding well (since Pace’s arrival) and that, according to the 
English cardinal, ‘everything will tend to the weal of Christendom’. The Italian legate’s 
agreement implies a belief in Anglo-papal cooperation on this.80 Even on the 28th, Wolsey 
remained optimistic that this alignment would bear fruit; he wrote to Pace announcing that the 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 308 (calendared 14-16 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Mainz).  
76 Ibid., 318 (20 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Mainz). 
77 Ibid., 323 (22 June 1519, Pace to Wolsey). 
78 Ibid., 326 (24 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey). 
79 According to the secretary, the agreement concerned Leo’s absolving Charles from an oath. This was 
, Mainz). 
sor). 
doubtless linked to his investiture with Naples, which precluded him from obtaining the empire; ibid., 339 (28 
June 1519, Pace to [Wolsey]
80 Ibid., 331 (25 June 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Wind
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pope had instructed his legate and nuncio to induce a prorogation of the election.81 Little did 
he know, however, that Charles had already been selected. Ultimately then, despite Pace’s 
overtures, the papal representatives in Germany did not align with the English in pursuing the 
election of a third party. While they apparently received instructions to do so (quite late in the 
day), one can only presume that they were overridden by alternative orders to continue Leo’s 
anti-Spanish/pro-French strategy. Finally, the last shift of the papal representatives to back 
Charles (contrary to the course agreed with England) took place the day before the Catholic 
King was elected and was surely too late for them to have had much effect. 
 
 It ought to be noted that English concern with and commitment to the papal crusading 
initiative subsided somewhat during the Imperial election, as all parties looked inwards 
towards their own interests in the short-term.82 As mentioned earlier, Henry VIII’s earlier 
decision to join Leo’s five year truce was not enacted in Rome, for which an expedition to the 
East was the implicit intention.83 On the other hand, a passagium remained the eventual aim 
for the Treaty of London. When Henry VIII received legates Wolsey and Campeggio on 17 
March 1519, apparently upon their receipt of a commission to join the concordat on Leo X’s 
behalf, the king was praised in their oration for his enthusiasm for the crusade and urged to 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 353 (4 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Mainz). Wolsey may well have been reacting to intelligence relayed 
by the secretary on 22 June that, according to the Spanish orators, the electors had decided to postpone for 10-12 
days. By 24th, however, Pace reported contradictory information, that the election would be held on the 27th; 
ibid., 323 (22 June 1519, Pace to Wolsey), 326 (24 June 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey). 
 as his intention as part of his election 
 late February, the orator claimed that the French king 
, and laid his other hand upon his breast, and swear to me on his 
e years after he [would] be in Constantinople, or he would die by 
 Wolsey, Paris), 118 (11 March 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Paris). 
82 The exception seems to have been Francis I, who pledged this
‘manifesto’. When questioned about this by Boleyn in
‘took me hard by the wrist with the one hand
faith, if he attain to be Emperor, that within thre
the way’. He intended to begin by invading Greece and would leave his son in France, entrusting Henry not to 
attack France in his absence. Francis expressed a similar sentiment to the same ambassador a few weeks later; 
ibid., 100 (28 February 1519, Boleyn to
83 See earlier, pp.650-651. 
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realise this ambition.84 There is no indication during these months, however, that the English 
crown intended to pursue this policy; in fact, on 11 April, Giustinian commented that the king 
and his ministers did not care about news from the Levant.85 This may well have been based 
on a perception that the Turkish threat was, at that point, receding.86 Nevertheless, the English 
still appear to have employed the notion of crusade for their own political purposes during the 
election process. Pace, was instructed to raise the spectre of the Ottomans when trying to 
influence the electors from late May on; he was to warn them that the peace of Christendom 
was in danger (from the Turks) as a result of Maximilian’s death and that his embassy 
tended to preserve union within Christendom and to prevent any discord arising as a result in
of the election.87 It is likely, however, that this crusading rhetoric was just talk; an argument 
employed to further English objectives. 
 The English crown would have received notification of Charles’ election (28 June) by 
the end of June or the start of July 1519.88 While not necessarily a perfect outcome for 
English interests vis-à-vis Rome, it was preferable to a French victory.89 Notification of the 
                                                 
 The papal representatives had just received a new commission from Rome which was deemed to require that 
they be formally received by the king (again) as they had just arrived; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.256-
85 Ven.ii, 1193 (11 April 1519, Giustinisn to the Signory, London). 
86
84
259 (Ven.ii, 1178; LPIIIi, 125; 17 March 1519, Giustinian to the Signory). 
 On 13 January 1519, Henry was pleased to hear (from Giustinian) that the Turks were expected to approach 
Hungary for a peace, as it proved that the Sultan was not planning to attack Christendom; R. Brown (trans.), 
Four Years, ii, pp.248-250 (Ven.ii, 1136, LPIIIi, 20; 13 January 1519, Giustinian to the Signory, Lambeth). Also 
see LPIIIi, 274 (30 May 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey). 
87 LPIIIi, 239 (20 May 1519, Pace’s commission, London). 
88 The electors notified Pace on the 28th and Pace reported immediately back to Wolsey, the latter, who it will be 
seen, complained immediately to the pope on 1 July. Henry confirmed intelligence of this from the Spanish 
e, Hoest), 339 (28 June 1519, 
 
ncis I to have been elected; Ven.ii, 1227 (29 May 1519, Minio to the Signory). 
ambassador by the 6 July. That the king believed the latter is suggested by his instruction that Wolsey draw up 
letters of congratulation. Boleyn also notified this news from France on the 4th; ibid., 338 (28 June 1519, 
Matthew Cardinal of Salzburg, Frederic Count Palatine, Casimir Marquis of Brandenburg, Erard Bishop of 
Liege, B. Bishop of Trent, H. Count of Nassau, and the Cardinal of Mainz to Pac
Pace to [Wolsey]), 352 (4 July 1519, Boleyn to [HVIII], Poissy), 357 (6 July 1519, More to Wolsey, Oking), 393 
(calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 1249; 
LPIIIi, 371; 9 July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). Charles himself notified the English 
crown of his success on 7 July; LPIIIi, 359 (7 July 1519, Charles to Wolsey, Barcelona), 360 (calendared 7 July 
1519, Charles to Henry, Barcelona). 
89 Vergil noted Henry’s rejoicing at the news (although he indicated no anti-French subtext); D. Hay (ed.), 
Anglica Historia, p.261. The papal diplomats present earlier reported that, in the event, the electors and people
would not have allowed Fra
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same news began to reach Rome from 29-30 June and, although the pope initially did not 
believe it, he was increasingly convinced over subsequent days and began to make 
arrangements with the Spanish.90 As was demanded by the mores of the time, however, when 
the news was confirmed, it was celebrated in both England and Rome, although there were 
signals that neither crown nor papacy were entirely pleased with the result.91 Subsequently, 
England and Rome blamed each other for the failure of their joint policy. Henry and Wolsey 
seem to have been convinced of this by reports from Pace in Germany. On 3 July, the 
secretary attributed the rapidity of the election to the pope’s absolution of Charles from his 
                                                 
90
French ambassador had rejected a similar report that reached the Holy See the previous afternoon. Papal 
scepticism was understandable, given that rumour of the Catholic King’s success had swept Rome on 18 May, 
causing the Spanish ambassadors to go to the po
Rome), 1245 (1 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Ro
 News of Charles’ election reached Rome at 2 p.m on 30 June and was taken as confirmed by the Spanish The 
pe with news; Ven.ii, 1222 (19 May 1519, Minio to the Signory, 
me), 1246 (4 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). The 
English would have been aware that, circa 15 July, the new King of the Romans had acknowledged that he had 
ceived
that forbade their selection of Charles; , 385 (15 July 1519, [Spinelly] to Wolsey, Barcelona). 
u
apology was profered by the council, who also denied that Henry or Wolsey had any knowledge or involvement 
in the affair. Also, the cardinal proposed an official celebration at St Paul’s for the following Sunday. In 
response, Henry approved the measures taken and the Spanish ambassador appears to have forgiven the insult 
ng of Arms, to show to Margaret of 
9; LPIIIi, 371; 9 July 1519, Giustinian and 
o in Rome that de Giglis did not attend the mass to mark the 
 ibid., pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 1249; LPIIIi, 371; 9 July 
eremonies. Subsequently, papal celebrations were held over two nights 
re  papal support in the election and that Leo had revoked an earlier instruction to the electors in Germany 
LPIIIi
91 In England, the crown acted quickly to smooth over a diplomatic ‘incident’ around 8 July, when Spanish 
celebrations were stopped by the London authorities d e to fears that a riot may erupt (along the lines of the May 
Day riot of 1517, Wolsey claimed). Wolsey took steps to prevent this from escalating, including a blockade of 
correspondence at the ports, to stop Charles’ aunt, Archduchess Margaret, from finding out. Some sort of 
soon after; LPIIIi, 364 (calendared 8 July 1519, Wolsey to Henry), 368 (9 July 1519, More to Wolsey, Oking), 
369 (calendared 9-10 July 1519, de Hesdin to Wolsey), 377 (12 July 1519, de Hesdin to Wolsey, London), 403 
(cald end July 1519, instructions of Thomas William [Wall?], Norroy Ki
Savoy); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 124
Surian to the Signory, London). In terms of the ‘private’ reaction of Henry and Wolsey, the king did not attend 
the celebratory mass performed by his cardinal and Wolsey was noted by the Venetian ambassador to have 
appeared displeased with the result (although their presumption that this was because he had favoured the French 
was wide of the mark). It was also noted by Mini
election, nor did he make any other display of celebration;
1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London), 286-287 (Ven.ii, 1252; LPIIIi, 383; 15 July 1519, 
Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London); Ven.ii, 1260 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). In 
Rome, Leo X finally accepted news of Charles election on 5 July, but could not hide his disappointment from the 
Venetian Minio; if Francis had acted according to his advice, he lamented, a third party would have been elected. 
At the same time, there were great celebrations by the Spanish in Rome, while the French and their adherents 
were despondent. In contrast to the reaction in England, it was noted that the pope deliberately chose not to act 
against the Spanish celebrations there (even though there were substantial processions in battle array), just in 
case he was interpreted to be unhappy with the election result, as some Spanish were already saying. It was 
further reported by the Venetian ambassador on the 9th that there had been no sign of papal celebrations either at 
the Vatican or at Castel S. Angelo but, by the 19th, Leo had received formal notification from Charles himself 
with a demand for the customary c
(including at the two locations cited) and a mass on the 20th; Ven.ii, 1247 (5 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, 
Rome), 1250 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1251 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, 
Rome), 1260 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome); L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.287-289. 
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oath from the investiture of Naples (which, it had been argued, prevented him from 
standing).92 By the 4th, the secretary reported that, despite Wolsey’s last minute despatch of 
the 28th, telling him that the pope had promised to have his representatives lobby for the 
prorogation of the election, they had in fact done the opposite and, instead, wrote in favour of 
Charles (in their correspondence of the 25th). In Pace’s opinion, such ‘double practices like 
these are not laudable’.93 This was the culmination of a broadly negative experience for the 
English in trying to align themselves with the papacy in the election. Probably based on an 
earlier report from Pace, Wolsey conveyed his displeasure with the pope’s role immediately 
on hearing of Charles’ success, on 1 July, alleging that the pontiff’s conduct was 
‘misrepresented to the King’.94 When faced with this hostility, Leo claimed to be astonished 
that his integrity was being questioned; he asserted that he had never been anything other than 
open about his opposition to Charles’ candidacy. The pontiff also regretted ‘that Henry gave 
no attention to a project which would have made him a near, instead of a distant neighbour of 
the papal states’. He further explained his support of Francis in terms of the French king being 
the only real alternative to Charles and that he hoped, by so doing, that a third party would be 
selected. Leo then accused the English of not communicating with him about how they could 
work together, not from Pace nor anybody else. Finally, the pope accounted for his last 
                                                 
92 LPIIIi, 351 (3 July 1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Frankfurt). 
93 Ibid., 353 (4 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Mainz). The English were not the only ones to blame the pope for 
Charles’ success; by 18 July, the French embassy in Rome threw Leo into a rage because of such an accusation. 
It seems that the pontiff felt a little misunderstood in his actions; speaking to the Venetian orator, Leo explained 
that he had instructed Cajetan (in Germany) to cease his opposition to Charles if he thought the election was 
inclining towards Spain, ‘as it was no use knocking one’s head against the wall’. He also admitted that the legate 
may have exceeded his commission a little. However, he wholly rejected French accusations and asserted that he 
had done all that he could to support Francis; Ven.ii, 1257 (18 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). In 
Spain, by contrast, the papacy’s role in Charles’ success seems to have been recognised; the resident nuncio 
apparently celebrated and praised the result so much that it was noted and praised by many, including by the 
emperor elect himself; ibid., 1265 (6 July 1519, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Barcelona). 
94 LPIIIi, 393 (calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey). Wolsey probably felt vindicated when he later 
received confirmation from Spain of the pope’s role in the election and Charles’ recognition of this; ibid., 385 
(15 July 1519, [Spinelly] to Wolsey, Barcelona). 
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minute volte-face to support Charles, because of intelligence that the latter was certain to be 
elected, with or without papal support.95 
 
Henry and Wolsey resume attempts to restrain Francis I from descending into Italy via 
the Treaty of London, to the exclusion of Rome: June 1519 – May 1520 
The Imperial election resolved, the English crown could now resume its attempts to 
constrain France through the Treaty of London. The ‘balance’ of European politics had 
changed as a result, however. There were now two distinct, rival ‘superpowers’; France and 
the Hapsburg territories, the latter comprising the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Burgundy and 
Naples. With the addition of Germany to his portfolio, Charles appeared to rise out of the 
geographical constraints that had been placed on him by his possession of the disparate 
Hispano-Burgundian territories and from the consequent leverage that Francis had previously 
wielded over him.96 Francis I now felt threatened by his neighbour. One of the main Franco-
Imperial flashpoints that now existed arose from Charles’ aim to be crowned by the pope in 
Rome.97 The prospect of an Italian descent by the emperor-elect caused insecurity in France, 
particularly concerning Francis’ Italian possessions (Milan and Genoa) and claims (Naples) 
and would prompt a military response.98 It also threatened the prevailing political influence 
that the French had held over the papacy since the Battle of Marignano in 1515. While there 
                                                 
95 Ibid., 393 (calendared 22-23 July 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey). 
96 For the Treaty of Noyon, see above pp.536-537. For the death of Charles’ francophile advisors, de Sauvage 
(1518) and Chièvres (1521), and the new ‘expansion’ policy advocated by Gattinara, see M. Rady, The Emperor 
Charles V (1988), p.39. 
97 In the tradition of Charlemagne, the coronation of an emperor necessitated a visit to Rome for this to be 
performed in person by the pope. Charles, therefore, was looking to cross the Alps in pursuit of this from the 
moment he was elected (although, admittedly, he needed to be crowned king of the Romans at Aachen first). 
Despite this being an apparently genuine intention, however, it ought to be noted that Charles V was not 
crowned until 1530, by Clement VII at Bologna; M.F. Alvarez, Charles V (1975), pp.86-88. For Francis’ broader 
unhappiness with the result of the Imperial election and the instability in Germany in its wake that was, at times, 
blamed on French interference, see for example LPIIIi, 352 (4 July 1519, Boleyn to [HVIII], Poissy), 363 (8 July 
1519, [Pace] to Wolsey, Cologne), 392 (22 July 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Antwerp).  
98 R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.77. 
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may have been initial confidence in England that the new emperor had too many immediate 
issues to deal with before he could make any such expedition, including the need to be 
rowned king of the Romans at Aachen, it was understood that Charles did intend to cross the 
 them.100 Indeed, 
worryin
                                                
c
Alps.99 It was also perceived in England during subsequent months that Francis I did fear 
Imperial actions in this area and was prepared to take measures to oppose
g intelligence that a Franco-Imperial war was about to be sparked emanated from de 
Giglis during November 1519, when he claimed that Charles had diverted his forces from 
North Africa to Sicily for the winter, since Francis had raised a small fleet in the peninsula.101 
The pope for his part also feared the prospect of Franco-Imperial interference in Italy, 
although he focused particularly on Charles. Commenting a few days after hearing of the 
election, Leo exclaimed ‘What shall I do if the Hapsburg comes to Italy now? All Germany 
 
Italian expedition, as they were committed to the amity with France. Pace apparently reiterated this electoral 
Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). Also see , 498 (6 November 1519, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, 
London). Charles’ presence in Italy would also serve to strengthen his hold over Naples and stifle Francis’ 
ambition to ‘recover’ the kingdom. It ought to be emphasised that the ‘threat’ to Italy was not imminent, as 
Charles needed to return to the Low Countries for his coronation as king of the Romans at Aachen first. This did 
 England and Henry announced it on All Saints’ 
029 (20 October 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Mastricke’), 1044 (7 November 1520, 
had been sent to England 
29 March 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
99 During July, Campeggio certainly argued that an Italian enterprise by Charles was unlikely given that the pro-
French Chièvres was in power, that Charles was low on funds following the election, that he was not yet 
established in Spain and that one of the clauses imposed by the electors was that he could not undertake an 
expedition without their consent. Campeggio also claimed that Charles would get no aid from England for any 
stipulation by mid-August; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, 287-290 (Ven.ii, 1253; LPIIIi, 384; 15 July 1519, 
LPIIIi
[Cologne]); Ven.ii, 1270 (17 August 1519, Sebastian Giustinian and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Melun), 
1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1290 (15 September 1519, Surian to the Signory, 
not occur until 23 October 1520. Reports of this were relayed to
Day (1 November); LPIIIi, 964 (29 August 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 978 (15 September 1520, 
Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1018 (12 October 1520, Tunstal to [Henry], ‘Luke’), 1028 (19 October 1520, 
[Spinelly] to Wolsey), 1
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Cologne); Ven.iii, 134 (9 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London); M.F. Alvarez, 
Charles V, p.38. 
100 Towards the beginning of September, Francis’ concern was reported to be such that he intended to spend the 
winter at Lyons, near Charles, the Swiss, the pope, Venice and Milan; LPIIIi, 446 (6 September 1519, Boleyn to 
Wolsey, Blois). Also see ibid., 530 (calendared beginning December 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey). 
101 Campeggio updated this information on 28 November, stating that the Spanish(-Imperial) fleet was actually 
going to Naples; ibid., 516 (17 November 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 533 (4 December 1519, 
Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). Rumours of a French fleet being equipped at Genoa 
back in March 1519; ibid., 149 (
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will back him up!’ and went on to deem English backing as vital in resisting this.102 Equally, 
however, he did not want the French in Italy.103 
In light of this refocused French threat to Italy the papacy, the English identified the 
opportunity to forestall this within the context of the Treaty of London. Henry and Wolsey 
encouraged continued commitment to the universal peace accord by assuming a mediating 
role between these two powers. By this means, England would become the ‘balance’ between 
Charles and Francis and, thereby, be in a position to affect any Italian enterprise intended by 
either power.104 In the short-term, they envisaged this through the resumption and expansion 
of one of the articles of the Treaty of London, the personal interview. Negotiations resumed 
towards a meeting between Henry and Francis.105 In recognition of the new dynamic 
                                                 
102 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, vii, pp.289-290; Ven.ii, 1250 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
Similarly, when asked by the Venetian ambassador about whether Charles had mentioned anything about coming 
to Italy to be crowned or whether Francis had said anything about sending or refusing to send the Imperial crown 
to Germany, Leo replied that it had not been raised and added, ‘I will tell you the truth; at this present we would 
beseech him to have it sent, to prevent his coming into Italy in person’; ibid., 1260 (23 July 1519, Minio to the 
Signory, Rome). Intelligence of the pope’s opposition to an Imperial descent reached England via its ambassador 
in France during September 1519; LPIIIi, 446 (6 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois). 
103 Minio claimed on 9 July that the Spanish ambassadors were attempting everything they could to ‘captivate’ 
for the Anglo-French summit agreed in the Treaty of London ceased during the election 
ustinian and 
 continued for the rest of the year, 
the pope by forging letters if needed, as well as by intimidation and promises. Leo reportedly admitted that such 
overtures were occurring, but failed to comment on them. The Venetian reiterated this danger on the 18th, 
predicting ‘the ruin of all Italy’ if it did occur and if Francis did not approach the pope differently; Ven.ii, 1251 
(9 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1257 (18 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome). The 
Venetians took this prospect seriously and urged Francis to ensure that the pope remained on their side; ibid., 
1255 (16 July 1519, Doge and Senate to Antonio Giustinian), 1256 (18 July 1519, Doge and Senate to Antonio 
Giustinian). 
104 While Henry VIII previously just intended to block Francis I from interfering in the peninsula, the rise of 
Charles with his own Italian agenda demanded that the English assume some sort of mediating position between 
France and Germany, if Henry was to retain any influence on whether the French crossed the Alps. It was 
imperative that Charles and Francis did not settle their differences without them (particularly as this could mean 
Franco-Imperial hegemony over Italy, to the exclusion of England) and it was also in the English interest that 
these issues were not entirely addressed, as this would prolong their importance in continental politics. Spinelly 
gave an indication of his understanding of this on 28 June 1520, when he warned Wolsey ‘that the concord 
between the Emperor and the French remains firm; though this be not advantageous for England remaining 
arbiter between them both’; LPIIIi, 884 (28 June 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels). This mediating role 
becomes increasing clear from Henry’s interviews with Charles and Francis onwards; see below pp.687 ff. 
105 Negotiations 
campaign. They resumed, however, immediately after and, while Francis sought an August meeting, Wolsey 
believed this to be too soon to be arranged, instead proposing the following May (or before the end of summer at 
the latest); R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.294-295 (Ven.ii, 1262; LPIIIi, 397; 26 July 1519, Gi
Surian to the Signory, London); LPIIIi, 415 (calendared 14 August 1519, [Wolsey] to [Boleyn]), 416 (14 August 
1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Melun), 514 (16 November 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois), 629 (calendared 21 
February 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield); Ven.ii, 1269 (14, 15 August 1519, Antonio Giustinian to 
the Signory, Melun), 1273 (29 July 1519, Surian to the Signory). Negotiations
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involving Charles V, the English crown now also encouraged an interview with Charles as 
well, particularly given the likelihood of him returning to the Low Countries to be crowned at 
Aachen prior to any Italian enterprise.106 Given Franco-Imperial tensions, a tripartite 
conference was further fostered, in which Henry and Wolsey could physically assume a 
central role as mediators.107 In addition to keeping the English crown central to the Italian 
ambitions of both powers and enabling it to discourage these, the meetings would have the 
futher benefit of physically keeping both competing monarchs away from Italy. As long as 
                                                                                                                                                        
as did mutual st ements of good faith about desiring the conference. Boleyn was instructed to arrange this in 
France in early December; LPIIIi, 488 (28 October 1519, Bonnivet to [Wolsey], Amboise), 514 (16 November 
1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois), 530 (calendared beginning December 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey), 531. 
Francis, Hampton Court); Ven.ii, 1298 (12 November 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1300 (October-
November 1519, Surian to the Signory). For the meeting bein settled by early March 1520, see Ven.iii, 24 (10 
at
(calendared beginning December 1519, Wolsey’s instructions to Boleyn), 540 (9 December 1519, [Wolsey] to 
g 
March 1520, Surian to the Signory), 27 (14 March 1520, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Angouleme); LPIIIi, 
673 (Ven.ii, 25; 12 March 1520), 677 (13 March 1520, Francis to [Wolsey], Angoulesme), 678 (13 March 1520, 
ber 1519, Surian to 
enry, Valladolid), 671 (10 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy to Henry, Mechelin), 672 (11 March 
ne of 
[Sir Richard Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Angoulesme). 
106 For negotiations towards a meeting between Henry and Charles, which seems certain by 12 November, see 
LPIIIi, 385 (15 July 1519, [Spinelly] to Wolsey, Barcelona), 419 (16 August 1519, instructions of Charles for his 
ambassadors in England, Barcelona), 548 (11 December 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Moleyn de Rey’), 551 (12 
December 1519, Charles’ instructions to his ambassadors to England, ‘Molin del Rey’), 560 (23 December 1519, 
Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘La Tore de Galdes); Ven.ii, 1277 (19 August 1519, Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, 
Barcelona), 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1290 (15 Septem
the Signory, London), 1298 (12 November 1519, Surian to the Signory, London). By the turn of 1520, an Anglo-
Imperial sumit seems to have been certain, although there was sustained French pressure on Henry to cancel and 
Imperial attempts to delay this (in a bid scupper the meeting with Francis) right up to the last minute; Ven.iii, 2 
(3 January 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 32 (8 April 1520), 34 (11 April 1520), 38 (23 April 1520, 
Francesco Cornaro to the Signory, Corunna), 43 (7 May 1520, Surian to the Signory, London); LPIIIi, 621 (16 
February 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Natzara), 635 (25 February 1520), 636 (calendared 25 February 1520, 
Charles to Wolsey, Burgos), 637 (26 February 1520, Charles to his ambassadors, Burgos), 667 (8 March 1520, 
Charles to H
1520, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions to Jehan de la Sauch, Mechelin), 688 (19 March 1520, Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Pontferrat), 696 (24 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions Charles’ ambassadors to England, 
Mechelin), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 729 (7 April 1520, Imperial ambassadors to 
Margaret of Savoy, London), 732 (8 April 1520), 734 (9 April 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Blois), 
735 (calendared 9-10 April 1520, Wolsey to Sir Richard Wingfield), 740 (11 April 1520), 741 (11 April 1520), 
742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la Sauch sent to the emperor, 
London), 757 (23 April 1520, Charles to Wolsey), 764 (26 April 1520, [Somerset] to Henry, Calais), 765 (26 
April 1520, Somerset to Wolsey), 770 (28 April 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Coruna), 771 (28 April 1520), 773 (29 
April 1520, Charles to Henry, Corunna), 774 (29 April 1520, Charles’ instructions to Jehan de la Sauch, 
Corunna), 775 (29 April 1520, Chièvres to Wolsey, Coruna), 776 (30 April 1520, Charles to Catheri
Aragon, Corunna), 787 (3 May 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘At Le Crounnys’), 788 (4 May 1520, Charles to 
Henry), 789 (4 May 1520, Charles to Wolsey), 798 (8 May 1520), 802 (12 May 1520, Margaret of Savoy to 
Henry, ‘Gand’), 803 (13 May 1520, Coruna), 804 (calendared 13 May 1520), 814 (16 May 1520, Margaret of 
Savoy to Henry, Ghent), 815 (16 May 1520, Margaret of Savoy to Wolsey). 
107 Ven.ii, 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London). Henry and Wolsey apparently 
proposed such a meeting to Charles around January-February 1520, to which Charles replied that he would 
discuss this issue at his interview with Henry; LPIIIi, 635 (25 February 1520), 636 (calendared 25 February 
1520, Charles to Wolsey, Burgos). 
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there was a prospect of a meeting between Henry VIII and one of the parties, the political 
focus would remain on the north of Europe and the uninvolved party was likely to remain in 
the region (just in case anything was concluded to its detriment).108 It should also be noted 
that the English deliberately led Charles and Francis to understand that, underlying their 
mediation was a pro-Imperial and pro-French policy, respectively.109 Nevertheless, it must 
not be forgotten that the underlying anti-French agenda still persisted in English crown 
circles.110  
 
 Given English attempts to re-establish a central political role in order to prevent a 
French descent into Italy by virtue of personal interviews with Charles and Francis, how did 
Henry and Wolsey relate with the papacy on this? The apparent answer is hardly at all; in 
                                                 
108 Vindication of the English crown’s attempts, through the arrangement of these meetings, to prevent the return 
of Francis to Italy would have been felt when a despatch from Boleyn, dated 16 November, was received which 
quoted the French king, who ‘laid his hand on his breast, and said, “By the fai[th] of a gentleman, that, but for 
the very trust he had of the said meetin[g and] entrevieu, he would have been at this day at Myllan”’; LPIIIi, 514 
(16 November 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois). 
109 The king of the Romans was kept on-side with various indications from England that his amity was closer 
than that of Francis. In the run-up to the interviews, Wolsey seems to have responded positively to Imperial 
desires for a closer amity by allowing the renegotiation of existing treaties (although not, it seems, in military 
terms), which culminated in a mercantile agreement that seems to have renewed agreements from 1496, 1506 
and so on; ibid., 635 (25 February 1520), 636 (calendared 25 February 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Burgos), 696 
(24 March 1520, Margaret of Savoy’s instructions Charles’ ambassadors to England, Mechelin), 708 (29 March 
1520, Charles to Wolsey, Compostella), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London), 731 (8 April 
1520), 739 (11 April 1520), 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la 
Sauch sent to the emperor, London), 772 (28 April 1520), 798 (8 May 1520). Among other gestures, Henry sent 
gifts to Francis, in a bid to convince him of his overriding amity with him; ibid., 685 (16 March 1520, [Sir 
Richard Wingfield] to [Henry]), 698 (26 March 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to Henry, ‘Chastelharault’), 749 (18 
April 1520, [Sir Richard Wingfield] to [Wolsey], Blois). 
110 For an indication of the underlying anti-French attitude held by the king (and his ‘inner circle’), one can note 
Henry’s reaction to Richard Pace telling him around 11 August 1519 that two of his orators in Rome 
‘undoubtedly were corruptide bi the Frenche Kyng… Whereunto his Grace sayde thies wurdis formally 
interragotive, “Bi the masse!”’; Ellis, p.78 (LPIIIi, 412; 11 August 1519, Pace to Wolsey, Penshurst). The 
English crown’s anti-Gallic intentions were also perceived by the French ambassador in England in the early part 
of July 1519; fearing an attack by Charles through the Low Countries, to which he believed Henry would 
contribute financially, the diplomat emphasised the need to maintain the English friendship with France, so that 
Francis need not worry if Charles descended into Italy to retrieve the Imperial crown. If England was not on their 
side, however, this would be a worry, given what the English would do in the north. The French orator was 
unsure of Henry both ‘because of the national character of the English, who are hostile to the French’ and on 
account of the queen being Spanish; R. Brown (trans.), Four Years, ii, pp.283-286 (Ven.ii, 1249; LPIIIi, 371; 9 
ssadors in England, Barcelona). 
July 1519, Giustinian and Surian to the Signory, London). Also see Ven.ii, 1278 (24 August 1519, Francesco 
Cornaro to the Signory, Barcelona). The anti-French agenda can be further identified in the English crown 
condoning Charles’ moves to pre-empt Francis in Italy (around August 1519); LPIIIi, 419 (16 August 1519, 
instructions of Charles for his amba
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spite of their concern with the effect that a French incursion would have on papal political 
‘independence’, there seems to have been no attempt to engage Leo X in what was essentially 
a papal role, mediation.111 In one sense, this might have been expected, given Henry and 
Wolsey’s dominance of the Treaty of London from the outset of negotiations.112 Furthermore, 
the English feeling of betrayal following the papacy’s failure to keep its promises during the 
Imperial election campaign would not have encouraged efforts to involve Leo.113 On the other 
hand, the growing Hapsburg-Valois tension and the increasing likelihood of an Italian 
enterprise by either party, probably caused the English to worry about which side of the fence 
Leo would ultimately fall. 
 Central to the apparent English inaction in this direction may have been an uncertainty 
about papal intentions, as Leo entertained overtures from both Francis and Charles. In fact, de 
Giglis conveyed such news to England around the end of July; while Charles sought the 
investiture of Naples in return for a tribute and offered a marriage alliance, Francis claimed to 
understand why Leo switched his support to the Charles, but now warned against his 
‘overgrown power’ and advised that he take ‘measures’ to deal with this, along with himself 
and Henry. Francis further advised Leo to employ to the Swiss, presumably for his defence.114 
In terms of intelligence that the papacy was turning towards France, Boleyn relayed on 14 
August, for example, that Francis was confident of papal support if his relationship with 
Charles deteriorated.115 By 6 September, the same orator suggested that the legate in France, 
Bibbiena, was engaged in regular communications with the French king, perhaps because of 
                                                 
111 See later pp.674-676. For continued English concern with French intentions for Italy, see LPIIIi, 392 (22 July 
1519, Pace to Wolsey, Antwerp). 
112 See above pp.661-662. 
113 See above pp.612 ff. 
114 LPIIIi, 401 (calendared end July 1519, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]). 
115 Ibid., 416 (14 August 1519, Boleyn to [Wolsey], Melun). 
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the belief that Charles intended to go to Rome.116 Further confirmation that Leo was leaning 
towards France would have been received from de’ Giglis’ September account of the pope’s 
response to the kidnapping of a Spaniard from Rome at the behest of Charles’ ambassador; 
Leo threatened to behead the latter. Furthermore, de Giglis warned that this was just the tip of 
the iceberg in terms of the ‘evils’ that would arise as a result of the election.117 Boleyn’s 
concerns from France were warranted, given that Leo concluded a secret alliance with Francis 
I during October 1519, although neither Boleyn nor his crown seem have been aware of 
this.118 Further ominous intelligence was relayed to England from the French Court during 
arly De ecember, however, reporting that Francis was to send Cardinal du Prat ‘to manage the 
Pope’.119 
 At the same time as they received reports of Leo’s pro-French bias, Henry and Wolsey 
also heard of papal negotiations with the emperor elect. By 22 July, for instance, Pace had 
news from Spain that Leo had made some sort of agreement with Charles ‘utterly to forsake 
all French practices’, which was deemed credible given that he had won the election.120 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 446 (6 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, Blois). Also, it was suspected (by the Venetians) that 
15 August 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Melun). The pontiff certainly gave the Venetian ambassador 
against Charles. Such a league was already talked about by Francis; ibid., 1261 (23 July 1519, Minio to the 
Council of Ten, Rome), 1 63 (4 August 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome), 1264 (8 August 1519, Antonio 
Giustinian to the Signory, Poissy); LPIIIi, 401 (calendared end July 1519, [de Giglis] to [Wolsey]).  
117 LPIIIi, 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 445 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, 
118 Leo agreed to defend French interests in Italy, as well as withhold from Charles the Imperial crown and the 
investiture of Naples; M. Creighton, History of the Papacy vi, p.120; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, p.3. 
Francis was using his close amity with Henry as leverage to secure papal adhesion to himself; Ven.ii, 1269 (14, 




119 Du Prat (Cardinal of Bourges) was to intimidate Leo through the Pragmatic Sanction, as the French 
agreement to drop it (made in the concordat arising from Bologna, 1515) was proving unpopular; LPIIIi, 541 (9 
o Wolsey, Antwerp). Also, the English crown knew that Charles was working 
cking. On 16 August, for instance, Charles instructed his ambassadors going to 
d Wolsey that he had granted all of the pope’s demands and that, as a result, Leo cannot 
 of Charles for his ambassadors in England, 
estiture of Naples, negotiations for which were still 
December 1519, - to -, Amboise). 
120 Ibid., 392 (22 July 1519, Pace t
towards securing papal ba
England to tell Henry an
justify allying against him; ibid., 419 (16 August 1519, instructions
Barcelona). This may have had something to do with the inv
not concluded by mid-November; ibid., 516 (17 November 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Furthermore, 
Henry and Wolsey received reports from Rome about French and Imperial intentions to meddle in Italy; in early 
December, for instance, Wolsey was informed that a Spanish fleet, originally thought to be going to Sicily, was 
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Furthermore, on 12 December 1519, Charles sent Henry a copy of a brief demonstrating 
Leo’s enthusiasm for his election, asserting that he was in accord with Leo on other 
matters.121 Indeed, despite Leo’s October agreement with Francis, his negotiations with 
Charles continued and this remained the case as far as England was concerned.122 The English 
continued to be informed of the progress of Imperial-papal discussions from February 1520 
on, when Charles’ envoy Don Juan Manuel arrived in Rome to facilitate an agreement, 
although the likelihood of any accord may have cooled by early May.123 As a result of these 
contradictory indications, the English crown was probably unable to interpret papal intentions 
in the months after the Imperial election. It could only be sure that Leo feared the prospect of 
French response. 
   
either power crossing the Alps, particularly given that he was taking measures to protect 
himself. Indeed, news reached England at the end of 1519 that the pope had taken measures to 
forestall or minimise this danger; Spinelly informed Wolsey on 23 December that Leo had 
proposed either to send the Imperial crown to Germany or for Charles to go to Rome with a 
small retinue.124 In other words, Leo did not envisage preventing the king of the Romans from 
being crowned emperor, but was trying to avoid a descent en masse, thereby provoking a 
The mixed messages emanating from Rome to England were mirrored in the papal 
misunderstanding of Henry VIII’s political stance immediately after the Imperial election. In 
                                                                                                                                                     
harles’ instructions to his ambassadors to England, ‘Molin del Rey’). 
’). 
in fact sailing to Naples. Such intelligence would have doubtless further shaded English thoughts about papal 
political intentions; ibid., 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey). 
121 Ibid., 551 (12 December 1519, C
122 On 19 December, Campeggio informed Wolsey that an Imperial-papal agreement was close; ibid., 557 (19 
December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). The English crown was also informed by Spinelly of Imperial 
overtures to the pope (and of an answer from Rome still being awaited); ibid., 548 (11 December 1519, Thomas 
Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Moleyn de Rey’). 
123 LPIIii, 3913 (1 February 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); LPIIIi, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to 
[Wolsey], Rome), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]), 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, 
Rome), 688 (19 March 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Pontferrat), 720 (4 April 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 
743 (calendared 11-15 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, 
Rome). 
124 LPIIIi, 560 (23 December 1519, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘La Tore de Galdes
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early July, for instance, Leo understood the Anglo-French amity (the Treaty of London) to be 
worthless and in need of reconfirmation, due to Francis’ pursuit of his own candidacy to 
become emperor.125 In other words, Leo did not think that the agreement would hold and, if 
anything, new negotiations were needed. In addition, towards the end of July 1519, the pontiff 
also envisaged England as part of an offensive league against Charles and had warned Henry 
to beware of the new emperor’s power.126 By mid-August, it seems that the pope had 
presumed that Henry VIII was unhappy with Charles’ election; Leo interpreted this from the 
manner in which the English king proferred his congratulations; not by a personal letter, but 
by an indirect missive to his ambassador in Spain which did not refer to Charles as ‘king of 
the Romans’.127 On the other hand, Campeggio reportedly understood in mid- to late August 
that, in case of French aggression, Henry had offered Charles a sizeable military contingent to 
contribute towards his defence; one would have expected the legate to have conveyed this 
intelligence back to Rome.128 Further papal confusion about English foreign policy may have 
been caused by the French portrayal in Rome of the English as their staunch allies. Indeed, the 
Venetia
 
 In spite of these probable mutual misunderstandings between England and Rome 
ns suspected as early as August 1519 that Francis I was using his close amity with 
Henry as leverage to secure an alliance with Leo.129 Even in mid-March 1520, de Giglis 
reported that the French publicly praised Henry and Wolsey at the Curia (arrangements for the 
Field of Cloth of Gold having then been confirmed).130  
following Charles’ election, Henry VIII took the first steps to re-engage with the papacy 
                                                 
125 Ven.ii, 1250 (9 July 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
126 Leo was quoted as saying that ‘we ought to attack him [Charles] now, and not allow him to draw breath’, in 
1269 (14, 15 August 1519, Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Melun). 
Flanders, Navarre and Austria, ‘and reduce him to such a plight that he would not know what to do’; ibid., 1261 
(23 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1263 (4 August 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
127 Ibid., 1267 (16 August 1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
128 Ibid., 1279 (16, 17, 28 August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London). 
129 Ibid., 
130 LPIIIi, 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome). 
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politically (vis-à-vis France) during August 1519, apparently in a bid to pre-empt any papal 
agreement, presumably with France, that was rumoured to be under negotiation. On the 18th, 
Henry informed the pope that Campeggio (recently recalled) would join Leo’s five year truce 
on condition that the pope issued a brief pledging not to enter any league that was contrary to 
the former agreement.131 Around the same time, Henry pledged himself to a crusade and 
promised to lead it in person, if an heir was born before the expedition. He offered 20,000 
troops and 70 ships, accompanied by the nobility and financed by a tenth from the clergy and 
fifteenth from the laity.132 The motivation for these ‘concessions’ can be seen in the brief 
requested; England feared Leo X taking sides, particularly France. This motivation becomes 
more likely when one considers that de Giglis had recently revealed Francis’ overtures to 
Rome for joint action (along with England, the French king asserted) against Charles.133 It is 
entirely reasonable to suppose, therefore, that these placatory moves by England represented a 
prompt and direct response based on the underlying anti-French agenda, currently represented 
by Henry’s and Wolsey’s attempts to restrain Francis via the Treaty of London. News of this 
approach reached Rome by 1 September 1519, as de Giglis informed the pope of it and 
awaited Campeggio’s arrival.134 Incidentally, on his way back to Rome, Campeggio visited 
e French Court and delivered a letter to Francis on Henry’s behalf (around 21 September). th
While its contents are uncertain, the Italian cardinal subsequently conveyed to Wolsey 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 427 (18 August 1519, Henry to Leo, Greenwich), 431 (19 August 1519, Wolsey to de Giglis, London). 
132 Ibid., 432 (calendared 19-22 August 1519, Henry to Leo). 
y]). For the pope talking of such a prospect (and an 
ion to 
e English ambassador was reporting a 
esponse, as he asked Wolsey to 
27 August 1519, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
133 Ibid., 401 (calendared end July 1519, [de Giglis] to [Wolse
alliance to facilitate this), see Ven.ii, 1261 (23 July 1519, Minio to the Council of Ten, Rome), 1263 (4 August 
1519, Minio to the Signory, Rome). Also, Henry and Wolsey may have remembered that Charles’ candidacy had 
been seen by Leo as a worst-case scenario for most of the election campaign and had feared his intent
descend into Italy; see above pp.654 ff. 
134 LPIIIi, 444 (1 September 1519, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). If th
communication he made a few days before, Leo may have made an immediate r
give credence to the letters of de Giglis on 27 August; ibid., 441 (
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Francis’ friendship and desire for a close amity.135 From this, one could infer that Campeggio 
(thence to be employed as an English diplomat in Rome) was intended to demonstrate 
continued English amity with France when he joined the five year truce on Henry’s behalf; 
this would be consistent with the English crown’s continued public adhesion to the Treaty of 
London. It also suggests that the English did not trust the pope sufficiently to make any 
overtures hostile to France. The Italian cardinal arrived back in Rome on 28 November, at 
which point he relayed Henry’s friendship to the Holy See, as well as his ‘desire for the peace 
of Christendom’. He also presented letters relating to the ‘treaty’, presumably that of London, 
and offered the pope the truce, of which he had sent him previously a copy, and explained his 
commission (alongside de Giglis) to ratify the five year truce.136 In spite of this, there still 
seem to have been some matters to settle, as it was not until 8 December that Henry finally 
consented to joining the truce. He explained that his principal objection had been that it ought 
to have been agreed through a universal league, otherwise it would appear to diminish, one 
interprets, the Treaty of London. Henry continued that he had been persuaded to ratify by 
Wolsey and Campeggio, and that he had also persuaded Francis to do the same.137 Unknown 
to the English, this emphasis on Anglo-French amity would have reinforced the pope’s still 
secret commitment to Francis I. In belated response to correspondence from Henry, the pope 
communicated through Campeggio, on 1 February, that he was pleased with the king’s desire 
for universal peace and recommended that the Englishman side neither with Charles nor 
Francis, but instead remain neutral. In this positive response and in outlining the Turkish 
threat, Leo seems to have taken Henry VIII’s earlier overture (his apparent commitment to the 
                                                 
135 Ibid., 452 (21 September 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey, Blois), 454 (24 September 1519, Boleyn to Wolsey, 
Blois). 
136 Ibid., 533 (4 December 1519, Campeggio to Wolsey). 
137 Ibid., 537 (8 December 1519, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). 
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Treaty of London and pledges to contribute towards the crusade) at face value.138 Notably, 
however, the pontiff does not seem to have responded to the English request for a brief 
promising not to conclude any alliance contrary to the Treaty of London and nor would he be 
expected to, given his secret amity with France.  
 In addition to English demonstrations of support for the ongoing papal crusading 
strategy, albeit to prevent Leo allying with Francis, it is possible that Henry and Wolsey may 
also have issued instructions to Campeggio and de Giglis to cooperate with ongoing Spanish 
attempts to win over Leo X (against France). Certainly, Wolsey wrote to Campeggio on 23 
January 1520 and, on the same date, Charles instructed the bishop of Worcester to co-operate 
with the newly-commissioned Imperial representative (Juan Manuel) when he arrived.139 The 
emperor elect would surely not have issued this instruction if he was not confident of such an 
understanding with Henry VIII. Indeed, it is perhaps revealing that around 9 February 1520, 
the pope reportedly saw through Henry VIII’s purported neutrality and believed that, despite 
his ‘fair promises’, the Englishman leaned towards Charles and would side with him in the 
event of any breach.140 Moreover, both Campeggio and de Giglis were keen observers of 
Imperial-papal negotiations and of the prospective arrival of Manuel during these months, 
which may suggest instructions from England to keep close tabs or even involve themselves 
in these intrigues.141  
 
                                                 
138 LPIIii, 3913 (1 February 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome); LPIIIi, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to 
[Wolsey], Rome). Charles V also seems to have been taken in by Henry VIII’s commitment to crusade around 
this time. In his commission to his ambassadors to arrange his landing in England, the king of the Romans 
ke a new alliance against the Turks, in which case he 
ry 1520, Charles to his ambassadors, Burgos). 
instructed them to discover whether Henry wanted to ma
would send the form of the treaty desired; ibid., 637 (26 Februa
139 The contents of the Campeggio missive are unknown and there is no direct evidence of Wolsey instructing 
either his old co-legate or de Giglis in this way; ibid., 603 (23 January 1520, Charles to de Giglis, ‘In Molendino 
Regio’), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]). 
140 Ven.iii, 14 (9 February 1520, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
141 See above pp.679-680. 
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 At the same time as the English tried to convince Leo X not to side with France, they 
excluded him from their attempts to revive the Treaty of London as a means to restrain 
espondence since August 1519, although Leo claimed to be happy that 
France, this time through mediation and personal interviews.142 On 1 February 1520, for 
instance, Campeggio asked for confirmation about the rumour that an Anglo-French meeting 
would occur in the spring, ‘to quiet men’s minds’.143 Even in early March, it seems that 
Campeggio (and, therefore, Leo) were relying on third parties for news of Anglo-French 
negotiations for an interview; on the 3rd of this month, the pope first seems to have hinted that 
he was ill-informed about such matters when he conveyed his desire for regular 
communication from Wolsey.144 In the event, Leo X seems to have been told by French 
sources on 12 March that an Anglo-French meeting would take place and that Charles sought 
an interview with Henry prior to this.145 Confirming this, de Giglis relayed the pope’s 
displeasure that he had not been consulted and Leo also sought Henry’s approval to send a 
nuncio to the meeting, which itself demonstrated a lack of papal involvement up to that 
point.146 Towards the beginning of April 1520, the English ambassador repeated papal 
complaints about not having been informed about the interview and about having received 
just one piece of corr
                                                 
 This may have been motivated partly by the need to convince Charles and Francis to accept English 
arbitration. In addition to negotiating meetings with them, Henry and Wolsey sent each prince private signals 
French amity was concerned, the English would naturally have been reluctant to disclose this to the pope; see 
above pp.675-676. It ought to be stressed, on the other hand, that the pope wa aware of negotiations towards the 
142
that they actually favoured them over their rival. If this pretence was to be sustained, at least as far as the Anglo-
s 
interviews from other sources. Campeggio, for instance, understood around the time of his departure from 
England (August 1519) that a meeting between Henry and Charles was on the cards. Also, Leo was certainly 
y, Rome); LPIIIi, 614 (1 February 1520, [Campeggio] to 
520, Campeggio to Wolsey), 649 (3 March 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey]). Papal 
aware that an Anglo-French summit was under discussion by mid-December 1519; Ven.ii, 1279 (16, 17, 28 
August 1519, Surian to the Signory, London), 1299 (15 December 1519, Minio to the Signory). 
143 LPIIii, 3913 (1 February 1520, Campeggio to Wolse
[Wolsey], Rome). 
144 LPIIIi, 648 (3 March 1
concern with events can also be interpreted by Leo’s desire for de Giglis to accompany him on a planned trip to 
Florence; ibid., 651 (3 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey). 
145 Ven.iii, 26 (12 March 1520, Minio to the Signory, Rome). 
146 LPIIIi, 680 (14 March 1520, [de Giglis] to Wolsey, Rome). 
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nothing prejducial was intended against the papacy.147 In reply, Wolsey cited illness as an 
excuse for the lack of communication, but this was unconvincing given the alleged lack of 
correspondence since the previous summer.148 Letters from Henry to Campeggio, which 
apparently arrived in Rome around the same time, were read in consistory around 4 May. 
Given Leo X’s apparent satisfaction at the promises contained therein and his previous 
concern with the lack of communication about the forthcoming meetings, it would be 
reasonable that the king sought to reassure the pontiff about his intentions for the meetings 
and that they would not be to the detriment of Rome.149 Also on 4 May, Henry and Wolsey 
wrote to Campeggio in what would have apparently been a swift response to recent papal 
complaints; it must have been carried post, as it arrived in Rome by the 15th. Henry indicated 
his ‘filial respect’, a desire for continued universal peace and the spread of Christianity 
(presubmably via crusade). Leo was presumably reassured that nothing would be negotiated 
‘to the prejudice of the Church’.150 This probably went one step further than the previous 
communication that was despatched in this regard. The sense from this correspondence is that 
the English crown repeated its strategy of 1518 when it did not inform Leo about the true 
intentions for the Treaty of London until the last possible moment. This left the pope thereby 
unable to oppose the hijacking of his crusading initiative and, again in 1520, unable to stop 
Henry and Wolsey becoming the arbitrators of (universal) peace. 
 Perhaps further demonstrating the lack of alignment between England and Rome 
around this point, the pope also prepared to send nuncios to the conferences but did not 
                                                 
147 Ibid., 720 (4 April 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Campeggio reiterated the lack of communication from 
England, particularly concerning the French interview, as well as both his and the pope’s desire for more 
t neither he nor the pope had received any letters; 
sey, Rome), 745 (15 April 1520, [de Giglis] to 
846 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry, Rome), 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, 
frequent correspondence. De Giglis also reminded Wolsey tha
ibid., 743 (calendared 11-15 April 1520, Campeggio to Wol
[Wolsey], Rome). 
148 Ibid., 811 (15 May 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome). 
149 The pope thanked Henry for his promises; ibid., 790 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry). 




apparently consult the English embassy in Rome. On 22 April, Campeggio claimed that his 
knowledge of the pope’s intention to send a nuncio was second-hand and that, as Leo did not 
bring it up, he did not mention it; he had heard, however, that the nuncio would be Petrus de 
Pazzis, a Florentine noble who was related to the pope.151 Leo X notified Henry of his 
decision to send a nuncio to attend the interviews on 2 May, actually Jerome Ghinucci (bishop 
of Ascoli). He was to be one of three intended to be present, the others to accompany Francis 
and Charles.152  
 
Behind a cloak of mediation, Henry VIII becomes more receptive to anti-French 
overtures and forms a league to defend the Church: May 1520 - January 1522 
 After lengthy negotiations, Henry VIII did hold separate interviews with Francis and 
Charles from May 1520, that with the French king, the Field of Cloth of Gold, marked as one 
of the most magnificent diplomatic set-pieces of the era.153 These occasions were officially 
intended to promote ‘peace’ (and the perpetuation of the Treaty of London).154 At these 
                                                 
151 At th
uld no
feel it necessary to despatch his own envoy. Perhaps he felt that this befitted his recent legatine status that he 
this would go some way towards solving the problem; , 756 (22 April 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 
Rome), 792 (5 May 1520, de’ Medici to Wolsey, Rome). For Ghinucci’s journey, ibid., 811 (15 May 1520, 
in England 26-29 May and the second at Gravelines and Calais, 10-14 July; LPIIIi, 824 (calendared 20-21 May 
1520), 828 (23 May 1520, John Herforde, Customer of Plymouth, to Henry), 838 (26 May 1520, More to 
Erasmus); Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, 
), 61 (3 June 1520, 
0, 143; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.187-189. 
e same time, Campeggio declared that he would send his own envoy to be present at the meetings, as he 
co t attend himself; his secretary Florian(-us) left Rome on the 23rd. It is unclear why the cardinal would 
exercised in England, or alternatively, given the complaints about the lack of communication from England, that 
ibid.
784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 811 (15 May 1520, [Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome). 
152 Ghinucci left Rome on 30 April. John Roelaius was to go to Francis and Marinus Caraciolus (Caracciolo) to 
Charles; ibid., 780 (2 May 1520, Leo to Henry, ‘In villa [Manliana]’), 781 (2 May 1520, Leo to Wolsey, ‘In villa 
nostra Manliana’), 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, 
[Campeggio] to [Wolsey], Rome), 833 (24 May 1520, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Montreuil). 
153 The Field of Cloth of Gold was held between Ardres and Guisnes, 7-24 June 1520; D. Hay (ed.), Anglica 
Historia, pp.263, 269-271; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, p.140-142; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, 
pp.189-218. The two interviews between Henry and Charles bookended the French summit. The first took place 
Canterbury), 54 (28 May 1520, Cornaro and Surian to the doge and Signory, Canterbury
Surian to the doge and Signory, Calais), 63 (4 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 64 ([4?] June 1520, 
Surian to the doge and Signory, Boulogne); D. Hay (ed.), Anglica Historia, p.267-269; A.F. Pollard, Henry VIII, 
p.139-14
154 As the regency council back in England understood, the Field of Cloth of Gold aimed ‘for the quiet of 
Christendom’ (among other things); LPIIIi, 896 (calendared 2 July 1520, [Lords of the Council to Henry]). 
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summits, Henry and Wolsey continued in their mediating role, pressing for a tripartite peace 
conference and also tried to compose the differences between these powers.155 In spite of 
great demonstrations of friendship with Francis I, however, the underlying anti-French agenda 
as not far from the surface.156 Indeed, it is from this point that one can detect Henry VIII 
, thereby, 
ade g
with Charles at that point (and break with Francis).157 Nevertheless, a secret treaty arose from 
w
increasingly entertaining overtures from Charles V to combine against France. Until he was 
ready to enact this, however, Henry continued to forward himself as arbitrator and
m reat demonstrations of his amity towards Francis and opposed both French and 
Imperial plans for Italy. 
At both Canterbury and Calais (May and July, respectively), Charles may have 
proposed a closer alliance with England to be directed against Francis I, that would involve 
his marriage to Princess Mary (then betrothed to the dauphin of France) and all indications 
point towards a receptive Henry and Wolsey, although they were not ready to formally align 
                                                 
155 For English moves to invite Charles to the Field of Cloth of Gold and arrange a tripartite meeting shortly 
after, see Ven.iii, 71 (8 June 1520, Surian to the Signory), 73 (8 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at 
rlying English 
thy discussions with Charles and, 
g, in 
the Court of France, to the Marquis of Mantua, Linck?), 75 (10 June 1520, Cornaro to the Signory, Ghent). For 
indications that a tripartite conference was proposed at the second meeting with Charles at least, see LPIIIi, 903 
(6 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Odenborg’), 914 (14 July 1520). For English attempts to mediate between 
France and the Empire, one Venetian despatch claimed that Henry and Wolsey proposed that France have 
Burgundy, while Charles received Milan. If true, this would have been consistent with the unde
aim to have Italy (and the papacy) free from French influence; Ven.iii, 62 (4 June 1520, Antonio Giustinian to 
the Signory, Linck), 71 (8 June 1520, Surian to the Signory), 75 (10 June 1520, Cornaro to the Signory, Ghent), 
84 (14 June 1520, letter from the Court of France to the Magnifico Pietro Montemerlo, Royal Senator), 87 (16-
17 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory, Linck?), 98 (28 June 1520, Surian to the 
Signory, Calais). 
156 Imperial ambassadors, for instance, reported the continued English hatred of the French and their dislike of 
the French interview; LPIIIi, 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperial ambassadors in England to de la 
Sauch sent to the emperor, London). Also see ibid., 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, London).  
157 Wolsey seems to have held talks with Charles’ principal advisor, Chièvres, in the days leading up to the first 
interview. At the meeting itself, Henry and Wolsey were involved in leng
although the subject-matter was said to be secret and was not speculated upon, it is likely that this alliance was 
broached and that the English were receptive. This idea can be interpreted from Charles’ understandin
advance of the second meeting, that its purpose was to increase the Anglo-Imperial amity and Henry’s apparent 
reply that he would ‘always retain his fraternal mind to Charles’. Furthermore, Charles seems to have later 
understood (during June 1521) that, according to the treaties sworn at Canterbury, Henry VIII pledged to declare 
himself against France, presumably once a closer amity was formed, formalised by a marriage agreement; LPIIIi, 
824 (calendared 20-21 May 1520), 863 (7 June 1520, Charles to Henry, Ghent), 887 (calendared end June 1520, 
Charles to Wolsey), 892 (calendared 1 July 1520, [Wolsey] to Lord –, Calais), 1371 (27 June 1521, instructions 
to the Imperial ambassadors in England); Ven.ii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 106 (12 July 1520, Lodovico 
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the second interview (14 July 1520), which pointed in this direction; notably that the English 
pursue Princess Mary’s marriage to the dauphin no further.158 This implies that plans for an 
Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance already existed by this time. Indeed, the July agreement 
marked the beginning of negotiations that were to continue into 1521, although they reached a 
stalemate by February.159 
In spite of England beginning to explore an anti-French alliance with Charles V, 
Henry and Wolsey continued their policy of arbitration. By virtue of the Treaty of London, 
they publicly attempted to mediate between France and the Empire and opposed the Italian 
ambitions of both powers. As will become apparent, Henry and Wolsey did oppose the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Spinelli, secretary of Surian, to his brother Gasparo Spinelli, secretary to Badoer, Calais). Henry later revealed to 
Francis that Charles had proposed such an alliance, but only  the second interview; LPIIIi, 936 (calendared 
(calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1150 (calendared end January 1520, [Henry to Tunstal]), 
 in
beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, ambassadors to Francis), 1149 
1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). In addition, Wolsey continued to negotiate with Imperial 
representatives (particularly de la Roche) from Calais, after the formal summit had ended and Henry had crossed 
reed that deputies from both sides would meet at Calais to arrange disputes and that an 
unt of 
ory, London). 
back to England; ibid., 918 (15 July 1520, Charles to Wolsey, Gravelines), 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche, to 
Wolsey, St Omer); Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Given Charles’ previous track 
record of commitment to alliances with England, it is likely that Henry and Wolsey may have reserved 
judgement at this stage; see for instance pp.536, 542-549. 
158 It was also ag
ambassador would reside in both kingdoms to ensure that lines of communication remained open; LPIIIi, 914 
(14 July 1520). Also see M.F. Alvarez, Charles V, p.37. Concerning the secrecy of the agreement, the Venetian 
ambassador at the English Court reported that no arrangement resulted from this second meeting on acco
Henry being pro-French; Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais). 
159 In September, Tunstal was sent to Charles in accordance with the agreement but, as far as the Venentians 
were concerned, he was intended to maintain peace between the Imperialists, French and Venetians. 
Negotiations in subsequent months seem to have revolved around a renewal of the 1516 league between Henry 
VIII and Maximilian, to which the English raised objections. From September, Charles tried to apply pressure on 
Henry to declare himself against France, also requesting money and troops to support the resistance against 
French moves in Italy, which the English king refused at this stage. Negotiations between December 1520 and 
January 1521 became problematic as they focused on the prospective marriage between Mary and Charles. In 
early 1521, Henry was angry that Charles’ advisors had chainged their mind about this until they had gained a 
papal dispensation from the pope and the English king had agreed to other matters first, including the formation 
of a defensive league with the pope, hiring the Swiss, aid against the Spanish rebels and agreement to another 
meeting. Henry was wary of Imperial commitment and insisted on the marriage alliance before agreeing to 
anything else. While Charles continued to push for another meeting with Henry, negotiations had reached an 
impasse; LPIIIi, 969 (1 September 1520), 984 (20 September 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp), 988 (23 
September 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 992 (26 September 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp), 1098 
(17 December 1520, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, Worms), 1149 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 
1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]), 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to 
Henry), 1181 (26 February 1521, Chièvres to Wolsey, Bruges), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms); 
Ven.iii, 118 (7 September 1520, Surian to the Signory), 135 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, 
London), 136 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 143 (3 December 1520, Surian to the 
Signory, London), 151 (7 January 1521, Surian to the Sign
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emperor elect’s intention to cross the Alps, but more in terms of how this was provocative 
towards France, rather than due to any principled objection. Indeed, they privately entertained 
the possibility of supporting such action if an Anglo-Imperial axis was formed and 
encouraged Charles’ understanding of this.160 In addition, the English crown had a tacit 
agreem
allowed his councillors to convince him ‘to pass by force to his said coronation, that he might 
ent with Charles that it would publicly oppose this prospect, in a bid to convince 
Francis that it truly intended to arbitrate Franco-Imperial differences or even leaned towards 
him. 
 This opposition to Charles V’s Italian ambitions was demonstrated, for example, at a 
banquet thrown by Wolsey during the Field of Cloth of Gold. The cardinal, while lauding the 
Anglo-French amity, publicly declared that ‘the Emperor must not aspire to greater power in 
Italy’.161 More revealingly, intelligence reached France in early July 1520 that Henry, when 
he heard from his queen that Charles intended to cross the Alps, reportedly replied that if he 
cause to repent him, for he should not fail in so doing to constrain his highness to do all the 
aid that the King his good brother would desire of him, for the resisting of his said passage by 
                                                 
160 The prospect of forming a defensive league with the pope and hiring the Swiss were discussed at the Calais 
interview and were subsequently part of Anglo-Imperial negotiations; LPIIIi, 1098 (17 December 1520, 
[Tunstal] to Wolsey, Worms), 1150 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]); also see above pp.688-
689. The extent to which Henry and Wolsey believed that Charles was in a position to launch such an expedition, 
however, is unclear. On the one hand, Henry and Wolsey were informed and, at times, apparently believed that 
the emperor elect had to overcome various obstacles before he could think about being crowned in Rome. 
Spinelly, for instance, reported on 29 August that a lack of money, the current Spanish revolt and a financial 
dependency on the German princes meant that Charles would be unable to cross the Alps until the latter part of 
summer 1521; LPIIIi, 964 (29 August 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1141 (25 January 1521, Bourchier 
to Wolsey, Calais); Ven.iii, 132 (21 October 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 134 (9 November 1520, 
Surian to the Signory, London), 137 (18 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 141 (28 November 
1520, Surian to the Signory , London). There were, on the other hand, increasing reports from the end of 1520 
that parties around Charles (particularly German nobles, Italian exiles and Cardinal Schiner) were winning the 
argument for him go to Italy, although Henry and Wolsey still uttered contradictory opinions about whether this 
would actually take place; LPIIIi, 988 (23 September 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1044 (7 November 
1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Cologne), 1098 (17 December 1520, [Tunstal] to Wolsey, Worms), 1106. 
(calendared end December 1520, Tunstal’s letters), 1155 (2 February 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Worms); 
Ven.iii, 167 (28 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 169 (10 March 1521, Surian to the Signory, 
London), 177 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory), 184 (1 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 195 (23 April 
1521, Surian to the Signory, London). 
161 He also stated that Charles should not harm France or Venice; Ven.iii, 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the 
Signory). 
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force’.162 This attempt to convince France that England opposed an Imperial expedition to 
Italy culminated in Henry and Wolsey’s secret, detailed report to Francis of their second 
conference with Charles, which reiterated the illusion.163 Overall, the ruse appears to have 
unclear, de la Roche agreed with it, suggesting that it could not have been particularly defiant. 
worked and Francis was convinced by English claims to oppose Charles’ going to Italy; at 
one stage, he was even quoted as saying that his English counterpart ‘had taken upon him the 
protection of the Italis [sic] against such as might intend to [disturb] the peace or quiet 
thereof’.164 That Henry VIII’s apparent ‘drawing a line in the sand’ with Charles did not 
actually occur in any real sense is readily apparent (even without taking into account the 
Anglo-Imperial agreement). Although Henry and Wolsey were probably genuine in their 
desire to discourage Charles’ expedition as a measure to prevent any provocation of the 
French, it seems that the emperor elect may have been complicit in this attempt to deceive 
Francis I. Shortly after the Calais-Gravelines meeting, one of Charles’ advisors acknowledged 
Wolsey having advised against such an Italian expedition on the basis that it would cause war 
and perhaps result in a loss of money and honour. While the alternative offered by Wolsey is 
                                                 
162 The French reportedly rejoiced at this; LPIIIi, 905 (9 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, ‘Chantilly’). 
163 In terms of attempting to keep the peace, the information that Wingfield and Jerningham were instructed to 
impart could have caused this to backfire. Henry and Wolsey alleged that the king of the Romans requested aid 
for war with Francis, including support for Charles’ intention to descend into Italy in force. These allegations 
could have caused Francis to retaliate or take pre-emptive action. The king and cardinal went on, however, to 
emphasise their rejection of these overtures, asserting their binding amity with France and their commitment to 
help Francis against invasion if, for example, Charles marched through Milan with an army. It is possible, 
therefore, that the English crown had overegged the pudding somewhat in its bid to convince its French 
counterpart that it opposed the king of the Romans and his planned coronation in Rome; ibid., 936 (calendared 
beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, ambassadors to Francis). For 
other indications that this story was believed, see ibid., 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, 
Poissy); Ven.iii, 107 (14-18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 111 (22 July 1520, inaccurate report made 
to Piero Trono, Bailiff of Brescia, by Jacomo da Cazago, who claimed to have received the intelligence from a 
page of Peter Carmeliano). 
164 LPIIIi, 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]). Around the same date, Wolsey was 
sent credentials for Wingfield to speak on behalf of Francis I; ibid., 911 (13 July 1520, Bonnivet to Wolsey, St 
 meeting with Charles) that Henry would side with him if Charles crossed the Alps; Ven.iii, 109 (21 
n 
Germain). The Venetian ambassador in France also reported the Most Christian King’s conviction (arising from 
the second
July 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Poissy). For other indications (to the French and their Venetia
allies) around the time of the second Anglo-Imperial meeting that Henry was pro-French and would side with 
Francis if Charles went to Italy, see ibid., 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais); LPIIIi, 922 (19 July 
1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy), 923 (19 July 1520, [Sir Richard Wingfield to Henry], Poissy). 
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Given that the sense of the letter suggests that Charles was intent on going to Italy, it is 
probable that Wolsey had lobbied sympathetic Imperial councillors to this end, but with little 
success other than agreeing with Charles to portray Henry as opposing this plan.165 
Furthermore, Spinelly’s first report to Wolsey after the second meeting indicated nothing but 
goodwill from Charles, before the English diplomat outlined the king of the Romans’ itinerary 
for going to Rome.166 Charles’ reported temperament was not that of someone who had been 
presented with an English ultimatum vis-à-vis Italy; neither does Spinelly seem to have been 
at all concerned about the intended expedition. The English continued to pedal the illusion 
that they were opposed to an Imperial expedition to Italy and would side with France for the 
rest of the period.167 
The English bid to convince the French that Henry was genuinely trying to arbitrate or 
was even pro-French is further encapsulated by the English king’s exaggerated 
demonstrations at his second meeting with Charles. Here he was reported by pro-French 
observers to be riding a horse and wearing ‘abillements’ given to him by Francis and his 
‘visage and countenance…appeared not “to be so replenysshyd with joye”’, as it had been at 
the Field of Cloth of Gold.168 If genuine, these gestures would have been a snub to Charles V, 
but it has already been noted that the English and Imperialists conspired to send positive 
messages back to Francis that Henry was neutral, if not pro-French.169 Such signals continued 
to be sent to France in subsequent months.170 
                                                 
165 LPIIIi, 921 (17 July 1520, de la Roche, to Wolsey, St Omer). For Margaret of Savoy’s probable complicity, 
s to 
calendared 6-7 March 1521, Wolsey to 
see ibid., 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy). 
166 Ibid., 925 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey). 
167 Ibid., 1212 (calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam). 
168 Ibid., 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]), 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux 
to Bibbiena, Poissy). 
169 See above pp.690-692. 
170 Ven.iii, 108 (18 July 1520, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 119 (7 September 1520, Surian to the Signory), 123 
(19 September 1520, Surian to the Signory); LPIIIi, 1152 (calendared beginning February 1521, instruction
Fitzwilliam, ambassador to France), 1183 27 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Henry, Armorantyne), 1184 (28 
February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Armorantyne’), 1191 (
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 The English crown’s preoccupation with preventing a French descent into Italy was 
also demonstrated by its opposition to Francis’ declarations in this direction following the 
Field of Cloth of Gold. Firstly, Wolsey seems to have reacted to reports by late August 1520 
that the French king did plan to go by both recommending (through the Venetian orator in 
England at least) that he did not and by instructing the Bailly of Caen to apply pressure in this 
regard in September.171 Further embassies were sent to Francis in subsequent months with the 
same mission, in combination with Wolsey’s own exhortations. During early November, for 
instance, the cardinal argued that Francis ought to refrain from going to Italy, as it would be 
expensive and was unnecessary (presumably given his efforts to also dissuade Charles).172 As 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fizwilliam), 1192 (7 March 1521, Wolsey to [Henry], Hampton Court), 1202 (21 March 1521, Fitzwilliam to 
Wolsey, ‘Nansee’), 1212 (calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam), 1213 (calendared end March 
April 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Worms), 1257 (calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 
171 Francis I seems to have disclosed his intention to launch an autumn expedition to Italy immediately after the 
Field of Cloth of Gold, on 1 July; LPIIIi, 893 (calendared 1 July 1520, [Richard Wingfield to Henry], Abbeville), 
894 (1 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]), 964 (29 August 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 966 
(calendared end August 1520, Hector de Vicquemare to – ); Ven.iii, 117 (6 September 1520, Surian to the 
Signory, Poissy). Also see ibid., 129 (9 October 1520, C
(18 October 1521, Surian to the Signory, Londo ). T
1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1214 (calendared end March 1521, Wolsey to Tunstal, Hampton Court), 1223 (11 
(calendared end April 1521, - to [Francis]), 1268 (7 May 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Mychean Levake’). 
Signory), 118 (7 September 1520, Surian to the Signory), 124 (24 September 1520, Zuan Badoer to the doge and 
ouncil of Ten and Junta to Antonio Badoer, Venice), 130 
n he Bailly of Caen was a French diplomat originally 
mmiss
ain Au
he was used by the English crown to communicate with the French king. It was no great departure, therefore, 
(particularly if they felt that the bailly carried sufficient weight to effect this); , 592 (10 January1520, 
643 (calendared end February 1520, [Bonnivet?] to [Wolsey], Cognac), 685 (16 March 1520, [Richard 
Wingfield to Henry]), 688 (19 March 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey, ‘Pontferrat), 937 (calendared start August 1520, 
ptember 1520, Bonnivet to [Wolsey], St-Germain-en-Laye). 
don). Francis despatched an ambassador to 
lsey was reportedly discouraging, arguing that it might encourage Charles to act as well. 
rently been reassured by his orator about English intentions if (and now when) he did 
0 (2 
co ioned to visit England during January-February 1520 to help arrange the Field of Cloth of Gold and 
ag gust-September of the same year. Both during his stays in England and after his initial return to France, 
when Henry and Wolsey instructed the same diplomat to persuade Francis against his intention to return to Italy 
LPIIIi
‘Leseignaix’), 623 (20 February 1520, Francis to Henry, Cognac), 624 (20 February 1520, Francis to Wolsey, 
Cognac), 625 (20 February 1520, Bonnivet to Wolsey, Cognac), 626 (20 February 1520, - to Mons. -, Cognac), 
Bonnivet to [Wolsey], ‘Rom[orantin’), 960 (23 Se
172 Ven.iii, 135 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, Lon
England in late September (Montmorency) to sound out the English about his intended departure for Italy, in 
response to which Wo
Francis, however, had appa
descend. As reports from France continued to indicate a likely Italian expedition, John Carew was also sent to 
Francis to dissuade him from this course, claiming that he had no need to go, as Henry had persuaded Charles 
from doing the same. Carew was unsuccessful; ibid., 125 (25 September 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, 
Poissy), 126 (28 September 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, [France]), 130 (18 October 1520, Surian to 
the Signory), 131 (21 October 1520, Antonio Badoer to the Signory, Blois), 137 (18 November 1520, Surian to 
the Signory, London), 141 (28 November 1520, Surian to the Signory , London), 142 (28 November 1520, 
Surian to the Signory, London), 143 (3 December 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 144 (8 December 1520, 
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Blois), 145 (9 December 1520, Surian to the Signory, London), 150 (3 January 
1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Blois), 152 (18 January 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 16
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Francis would not be swayed from going to Italy, Fitzwilliam was sent back to France in 
January 1521 to sustain English pressure. This time, however, Francis indicated that he was in 
no hurry to go to Italy and intended to eventually move to Lyons, where he would await 
developments. The English ambassadors, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham interpreted this as an 
unwillingness on the French king’s part to cross the Alps unless absolutely necessary, but 
were not yet convinced that the enterprise had been cancelled.173 Accordingly, Wolsey was 
still wary of an imminent French descent in early February 1521 and even believed this was 
possible the following month.174 
 
 By the end of March 1521, the degree of Franco-Imperial hostility appears to have 
reached some sort of tipping point, whereby the English crown altered its strategy more 
decisively, albeit still secretly, against France.175 On the one hand, Henry VIII continued to 
                                                                                                                                                        
February 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, ‘Celles’); LPIIIi, 1041 (6 November 1520, Jerningham to 
Henry, Amboise), 1057 (13 November 1520, Jerningham to Wolsey, Amboise), 1092 (10 December 1520, 
fragment of instructions to an ambassador), 1126 (8 January 1521, Jerningham and Carew to Wolsey, 
‘Arromatyn’). 
173 It has been posited that Francis I may have changed his plans for Italy as early as late December 1520, due to 
the illness of his mother Louisa, who would have been regent in his absence. It has also been suggested that a 
serious riding accident in early 1521 may also have affected his decision, but Fitzwilliam still believed on 11 
February that Francis would head towards Lyons (via Burgundy) once had had recovered; LPIIIi, 1100 (20 
December 1520, Jerningham to Wolsey, Paris), 1157 (6 February 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to Wolsey, 
‘Amorantyne’), 1161 (11 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1176 (22 February 1521, 
Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1202 (21 March 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Nansee’); Ven.iii, 160 (2 
February 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, ‘Celles’); R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.105. 
174 Ven.iii, 162 (calendared 8-9 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, London); LPIIIi, 1191 (calendared 6-7 
March 1521, Wolsey to Fizwilliam). 
175 Around this time, reports reached England that Francis was behind a number of hostile acts against Charles’ 
territories. He was said to be behind unrest in Spain; LPIIIi, 991 (25 September 1520, Tunstal to [Wolsey, 
Antwerp), 1043 (6 November 1520, Tunstal to [Wolsey]), 1184 (28 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, 
‘Armorantyne’), 1198 (calendared 16-17 March 1521, [Fitzwilliam toWolsey]). He was said to back an attempt 
by the king of Navarre to regain his kingdom (which succeeded briefly in May); ibid., 988 (23 September 1520, 
Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1168 (18 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1176 (22 
February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1183 (27 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Henry, 
Armorantyne), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms), 1304 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and 
Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1305 (24 May 1521, [Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to Henry], Dijon); Ven.iii, 
179 (30 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). Francis was also understood to be aiding Robert de la Marck’s 
attack on Luxembourg from February 1521 on; Ven.iii, 179 (30 March 1521, Surian to the Signory); LPIIIi, 1168 
(18 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’), 1176 (22 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, 
‘Amorantyne’), 1183 27 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Henry, Armorantyne), 1223 (11 April 1521, Spinelly to 
[Wolsey], Worms), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms), 1254 (28 April 1521), 1268 (7 May 1521, 
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publicly condemn Charles V’s transgressions and threatened that he would be forced to side 
with Francis (in accordance with the Treaty of London).176 French hostility in a number of 
quarters, on the other hand, had reached such a level that the English king was even 
suggesting, albeit in couched terms, that he would have to act on the part of the emperor 
lect.177 e
 Given that nothing had been settled with Charles V, however, Henry and Wolsey also 
continued to encourage their role as mediators between France and the Empire, and 
subsequently sought recognition from both princes as arbitrators of their differences. Once 
achieved, it was intended that Wolsey travel to Calais and mediate on the king’s behalf.178 As 
                                                                                                                                                        
Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Mychean Levake’). This escalation has often been cited as the beginning of concerted 
approaches to Henry from Charles and Francis to take their side; M.F. Alvarez, Charles V, pp.45-46; R.J. 
May 1521, Fitzwilliam 
 the same time; Ven.iii, 185 (6 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 189 (19 April 
Knecht, Francis I, pp.105-106. 
176 This again fits in with the idea that the English crown was trying to dupe France into believing its neutral or 
even ‘pro-French’ position. While the English notified France that these threats were strongly worded, that 
which was issued in early May was far milder than was claimed and was, moreover, a plea to Charles to submit 
to Henry’s mediation until an Anglo-Imperial amity could be formed; LPIIIi, 1245 (22 April 1521, Fitzwilliam 
to [Wolsey], ‘Mounte Armyne’), 1246 (23 April 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], Troyes), 1257 (calendared end 
April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam], 1258 (calendared end April 1521), - to [Francis]), 1270 (calendared 7-11 
May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Emperor), 1303 (24 
and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon]), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French 
ambassador to England).  
177 At the end of March 1521, Fitzwilliam was instructed to discourage Francis I from attacking Charles in any 
quarter, so that the French king may avoid ‘the inconvenients that may ensue of mutual succours’. Surian 
reported soon after that this ‘complaint’ was made at the behest of Charles, around 6 April 1521; LPIIIi, 1212 
(calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam); Ven.iii, 185 (6 April 1521, Surian to the Signory). Also see 
ibid., 189 (19 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London); LPIIIi, 
1223 (11 April 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Worms), 1226 (12 April 1521, Spinelly to Tuke, Worms), 1257 
(calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 (calendared end April 1521), - to [Francis]); Ven.iii, 
204 (1 May 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). 
178 The English proposal of a conference at Calais is first referred to as having been put to Francis during May; 
LPIIIi, 1311 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam, ambassador to France). Also see ibid., 
1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1338 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1339 (calendared 9-10 
June 1521), 1340. (calendared 9-10 June 1521, instructions to Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Empire); 
Ven.iii, 234 (8 June 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon). The seeds for this conference may have come 
from Charles’ pressure on Henry for another meeting. Indeed, Wolsey had told Henry during March 1521 that he 
wished to avoid an Anglo-Imperial interview because it would raise French suspicions; LPIIIi, 1213 (calendared 
end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). An offer to arbitrate was made to the French by 19 April and was possibly 
made to the Imperialists around
1521, Surian to the Signory); LPIIIi, 1212 (calendared end March 1521, Henry to Fitzwilliam), 1254 (28 April 
1521, protest by Charles against the actions of Francis). For comments that Henry and Wolsey intended to 
mediate, see for instance Ven.iii, 205 (6 May 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, ‘Musi’), 219 (21 May 1521, 
Surian to the Signory), 220 (22 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms), 228 (3 June 1521, Contarini to the 
Signory, Mainz). The English crown was already mediating between the rival powers prior to this, as accusatory 
articles and defences were despatched between Francis, Charles and Henry from late April 1521 on. The idea to 
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far as the French were concerned, they had to be convinced that this was a genuine attempt to 
arrange universal peace and Francis’ scepticism is perhaps betrayed by his initial reluctance to 
agree to it.179 In terms of the emperor elect, on the other hand, it was presented as a ‘blind’ 
behind which a closer amity would be arranged with England against the French. Given that 
an Anglo-Imperial understanding already existed, Charles quickly signed up to English 
arbitration.180 In spite of their anti-French inclination, Henry and Wolsey appear not to have 
                                                                                                                                                        
hold a conference at Calais may well have arisen from this de facto role already fulfilled by England. The 
correspondence cited below gives the impression of Charles and Francis bickering as to who was to blame for 
ifferences); see, for instance, LPIIIi, 1245 (22 April 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], 
(calendared 1-3 June 1521); Ven.iii, 204 (1 May 1521, Surian 
ly with him and break with ‘their common enemy’. At the same time, however, he 
the hostilities and seeking Henry to come down on their side. As Henry and Wolsey were unable to affect or 
control this form of mediation, a more formal forum was a logical idea (regardless of whether the English really 
intended to compose the d
‘Mounte Armyne’, 1257 (calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 (calendared end April 1521, 
- to [Francis]), 1271 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, memorial of Jerningham to [Francis]), 1278 (14 May 1521, 
Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Chatillion), 1283 (calendared 15 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam and Jerningham 
to be declared to Francis), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1304 (24 May 
1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, Francis’ instructions 
to de la Batye), 1311 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam to declare to Francis), 1315 (29 
May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1322 (calendared end May 1521, Francis to 
[Wolsey]), 1323 (calendared end May 1521), 1327 
to the Signory, London). 
179 Francis resisted until mid-June; Ven.iii, 189 (19 April 1521, Surian to the Signory), 215 (17 May 1521, 
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 233 (1-6 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 234 (8 June 1521, 
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 236 (13 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 237 (14 June 1521, 
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory), 238 (18 June 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 243 (29 June 1521, 
Giovanni Badoer to the Signory); LPIIIi, 1293 (20 May 1521, Wolsey to Jerningham and 
[Fitzwilliam],Westminster), 1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon]), 1310 
(calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England), 1315 (29 May 1521, 
Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1318 (29 May 1521, Wingfield to [Fitzwilliam and 
Jerningham], Worms), 1328 (3 June 1521, [Richard Wingfield] to Wolsey, Mainz), 1329 (calendared 3-4 June 
1521, [Wolsey to Richard Wingfield and Spinelly]), 1331 (6 June 1521, [Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to 
Wolsey]), 1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1338 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1339 
(calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1347 (13 June 1521, [Wolsey to Richard] Wingfield), 1350 (15 June 1521, Richard 
Wingfield to [Jerningham], Brussels). Knecht links Francis’ change of heart with de la Marck’s expulsion from 
Luxembourg; R.J. Knecht, Francis I (1984), p.106. 
180 Wolsey knew of Charles’ commitment to the English plan by 20 May. The emperor elect’s agreement was 
probably eased by Sir Richard Wingfield, who was instructed in early June to tell him that Wolsey intended to 
cross to Calais ‘under colour of this mediation’, so that a ‘stricter amity’ could be concluded between them; 
Charles was to be assured that Henry would be ‘a fast friend’. In the meantime, however, Charles V was asked to 
fully support the peace conference under the auspices of English arbitration; LPIIIi, 1293 (20 May 1521, Wolsey 
to Jerningham and [Fitzwilliam], Westminster), 1317 (29 May 1521, Charles to Henry, Worms), 1318 (29 May 
1521, Wingfield to [Fitzwilliam and Jerningham], Worms), 1329 (calendared 3-4 June 15/21, [Wolsey to 
Richard Wingfield and Spinelly]), 1340. (calendared 9-10 June 1521, instructions to Richard Wingfield, 
ambassador to the Empire); Ven.iii, 221 (22 May 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 239 (19 June 
1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels). Once Francis had also agreed to English arbitration, Henry and 
Wolsey sought a truce and the discharge of armies during negotiations, to which Charles was reluctant to sign 
up. News of the French-sponsored attack upon and loss of Navarre had made him increasingly hesitant to play 
along with the English ruse and issued demands that England declare itself, perhaps doubting that Henry and 
Wolsey would ultimately al
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entirely trusted Charles and so sought some assurances before they committed. This English 
intention to join the Empire against France was also supposed to remain secret in the short-
term.181 Nevertheless, rumours of Anglo-Imperial intrigues circulated, possibly leaked 
deliberately by Imperial sources, forcing the English crown to issue denials between the latter 
part of April and the end of May 1521.182 
While Henry’s and Wolsey’s intentions for the Calais Conference may not have been 
set in stone, the contention here is that, having identified that the universal peace policy was 
unlikely to restrain Francis from Italy much longer, they were looking to resume an 
aggressive strategy to this same end, although they were yet to be convinced that the emperor-
elect’s anti-Gallic overtures were genuine. Given this uncertainty, the favoured outcome 
would be an alliance with Charles and some sort of truce between France and the Empire, so 
                                                                                                                                                        
was inclined to meet Wolsey to facilitate this, on account of English assurances that this was one big con; LPIIIi, 
1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1341 (10 June 1521, Bonnivet to Henry, ‘à la Margelle, prés 
Dijon’), 1344 (12 June 1521, Richard Wingfield to Fitzwilliam and Jerningham, ‘Mastrike’), 1347 (13 June 
1521, [Wolsey to Richard] Wingfield), 1350 (15 June 1521, Richard Wingfield to [Jerningham], Brussels), 1352 
(16 June 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1357 (19 June 1521, Richard Wingfield 
and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Brussels), 1361 (22 June 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], 
Brussels), 1362 (22 June 1521, Brussels), 1367 (26 June1521, Spinelly to Wolsey, Brussels), 1371 (27 June 
rms), 224 (28 May 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Worms). 
1521, Charles’ instructions to Philip Haneton and the Bishop of Badajoz and Elna, ambassadors to England, 
Brussels). For Spinelly’s reassurrances to Charles that Henry was anti-French, see Ven.iii, 220 (22 May 1521, 
Contarini to the Signory, Worms). 
181 They did not want to raise French suspicions, particularly as this would affect the French pensions; LPIIIi, 
1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Emperor), 1340 
(calendared 9-10 June 1521, instructions to Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the Empire). Also see ibid., 1371 
(27 June 1521, Charles’ instructions to Philip Haneton and the Bishop of Badajoz and Elna, ambassadors to 
England, Brussels). 
182 Towards the end of April 1521, Henry rejected reports reaching Francis that he intended to side with Charles, 
conclude a marriage alliance and hold a new interview with him. The English believed that these leaked from the 
emperor elect and the English king even considered reproaching the king of the Romans on his indiscretion, 
recommending that he get his house in order, particularly as these matters were yet to be concluded. In the event, 
a decision seems to have been made to refrain from such an accusation and the relevant paragraph omitted. 
Nevertheless, such an indiscretion was repeated around mid-June 1521, when Gattinara revealed to the Venetian 
orator that his master was likely to meet with Wolsey. The English crown may also have sought to avoid raising 
French suspicions about Charles’ intention to reside near Calais during the summit by approaching Francis to do 
the same; ibid., 1257 (calendared end April 1521, [Henry to Fitzwilliam]), 1258 (calendared end April 1521), - 
to [Francis]), 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the 
Emperor), 1283 (calendared 15 May 1521, instructions to Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to be declared to Francis), 
1303 (24 May 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey, Dijon]); Ven.iii, 215 (17 May 1521, Giovanni 
Badoer to the Signory, Dijon), 239 (19 June 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels), 240 (23 June 1521, Surian 
to the Signory, London). Also see ibid., 241 (24 June 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Brussels). For Venetian 
suspicions about English intentions, see ibid., 195 (23 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, London), 222 (24 May 
1521, Contarini to the Signory, Wo
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that the Anglo-Imperial axis could prepare for war. A closer amity with Francis I was not 
ruled out, however, if negotiations with Charles failed.183 From early July, therefore, Henry 
and Wolsey increasingly indicated to Charles V that they were prepared to agree a ‘a 
straighter conjunction’, so that they could go to war with France. The Calais Conference was 
to be employed as a ruse to facilitate this. In addition, Wolsey reportedly envisaged a broad 
coalition against France before any attack took place.184 At the same time, there is evidence 
                                                 
183 The lack of clarity can be best demonstrated by the wide range of commissions issued to Wolsey for his visits 
to Calais and Bruges. The cardinal-legate was commissioned variously to settle Imperial-French differences, to 
treat for closer amity with France, to treat for an Anglo-papal-Franco-Imperial confederacy and to arrange the 
marriage of Mary to Charles. Perhaps more revealing is the range of six commissions for possible treaties to be 
conference. The tamest of these provided for universal peace and a defensive alliance against France, while the 
most aggressive sought the recovery of Milan. If Charles V would not agree, Wolsey was to seek a closer 
relationship with France which, among other things, provided for the defence of Milan (against the Empire); 
LPIIIii, 1443 (29 July 1521), 2333 (19 June 1522); P. Gwyn, ‘Wo sey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.764. The 
concluded with the Empire that Gwyn convincingly argues were issued to Wolsey around the time of the 
l
interpretation of Wolsey’s intentions at the Calais conference are subject to historical debate and a flavour of this 
can be gained from Scarisbrick’s argument (supported by Wooding) that Wolsey sought peace throughout 
England’s foreign policy and this meeting in particular, while Gwyn, on the other hand, challenges this, 
nt with the earlier impasse reached in Anglo-Imperial negotiations when he insisted that no 
, 1421 (19 July 
believing that the cardinal set out in 1521 to align England with the Empire (against France); P. Gwyn, 
‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.755; J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.49, 87; L. Wooding, Henry VIII, 
pp.112-113. 
184 In reply to an Imperial embassy that arrived at the beginning of July, demanding military aid against France, 
Wolsey was consiste
aid would be forthcoming until a closer alliance was agreed. He intended to conclude such an agreement within 
three months of his arrival at Calais. Henry argued that he could not declare yet against France because he was 
not prepared for war, but agreed that Wolsey should go to Calais ‘under colour of hearing the grievances of both 
parties’, only to ally with the emperor elect when he conveniently could not settle them. Around the same time, 
Henry also pledged to assist Charles V once a ‘straighter conjunction’ had been made although, in the meantime, 
he asked that the emperor keep this a secret; LPIIIii, 1381 (1 July 1521, [de Mesa] to Wolsey, London), 1383 
(calendared beginning of July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster), 1395 (6 July 1521, de Mesa and Haneton to 
Charles), 1432 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent), 1440 (28 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, 
Windsor), 1448 (calendared end July 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1453 (1 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Dover), 
1455 (1 August 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor). Another indication of the veracity of the English intention to 
join with Charles against Francis can be seen in the positive response to the emperor elect’s request in mid-July 
for several thousand archers to support him in current hostilities. While Henry was willing to send them, he 
initially admitted that he could not comply until the conference had ended. By 28 July, however, he agreed with 
Wolsey’s advice that a contingent be readied for when the cardinal had concluded with Charles; ibid., 1414 (13 
July 1521, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Antwerp), 1417 (14 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to 
Wolsey, Antwerp), 1419 (16 July 1521, Sir Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp)
1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 1429 (21 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1433 
(22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent), 1440 (28 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1448 
(calendared end July 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1453 (1 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Dover), 1454 
(calendared 1 August 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1459 (3 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor), 1462 
(calendared 3-4 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okin]ge’), 1474 
(calendared 7 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), and passim. For Scarisbrick’s belief that this was a dispute 
betweeen Henry and Wolsey, see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.86-87. Finally, Henry VIII, around 28 July, 
proposed a pre-emptive strike against the French navy, once the closer alliance with the emperor had been 
concluded. While Wolsey was cautiously enthusiastic, he advised that this initiative should not proceed until 
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that Wolsey also wanted to facilitate a truce or peace, presumably to give any anti-French 
league time to prepare for hostilities. The cardinal indicated both of these aims when writing 
to Henry on 20 July; he stated his continued intention to travel to Calais, both to arrange the 
differences between the Empire and France, as well as to conclude ‘a straight conjunction 
with the Emperor’.185 To this end, it was also important to keep Francis convinced of 
England’s neutrality, although the French king was increasingly suspicious of reports of 
Henry’s pro-Imperial intentions.186 
 Reaching Calais on 2 August, Wolsey immediately opened negotiations with the 
Imperialists towards a closer alliance with Charles, while still claiming to be in pursuit of 
187peace to the French and their confederates.  By 14 August, Wolsey had postponed ‘peace’ 
negotiations to visit Charles in Bruges, negotiating over the next week or so.188 He had told 
the French ambassadors, however, that he had gone to urge the emperor elect towards 
peace.189 The Treaty of Bruges, concluded on 25 August, committed both Henry and Charles 
                                                                                                                                                        
after the Anglo-Imperial alliance had been concluded; LPIIIii, 1440 (28 July 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 
1448 (calendared end July 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1454 (calendared 1 August 1521, Pace to Wolsey, 
Windsor); J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, p.87.  
185 LPIIIii, 1426 (20 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster). For Gwyn’s agreement that a truce was intended 
by England so that preparations could be made for war, see P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, pp.766-
769. A possible reason for England’s wish for delay was money; Henry did not have the reserves to call upon 
that he did up to 1513. In any case, breaking with France at this stage would cause Francis to cease paying the 
French pensions earlier than necessary; Ven.iii, 278 (3 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais); LPIIIii, 1507 
(calendared 24-25 August 1521). 
186 LPIIIii, 1456 (2 August 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], ‘A le Ch[ateau] de Vyleneff’), 1457 (2 August 1521, 
Fitzwilliam to [Henry], ‘Vyleneff’). For contradictory rumours about English intentions as noted by the Venetian 
ambassador in the Low Countries, see Ven.iii, 274 (29 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Ghent).  
187 Among the terms being hammered out, according to Wolsey, was a marriage agreement between Charles and 
Princess Mary, as well as the emperor’s paying Henry the French pension that he would inevitably lose when 
England came out against France. Wolsey also began discussing a date for England’s entry into the war; LPIIIii, 
1462 (calendared 3-4 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1473 (7 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], ‘[Okin]ge’), 
1479 (calendared 8-9 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.765. 
188 LPIIIii 1491 (16 August 1521), 1493 (calendared 18-19 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry]), 1495 (calendared 
18-19 August 1521). For Wolsey’s entry to Bruges, see Ven.iii, 298 (16 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, 
Bruges). 
189 By 5 August, Wolsey had already suggested to the French delegation that he may need to go to Bruges. He 
reportedly told them that ‘he would visit in person Francis and the King Catholic, and even go on foot to Rome, 
if necessary,’ to achieve his desire of peace. The ambassadors, however, were not fooled and that this may be 
just an excuse to go to Charles; LPIIIii, 1467 (5 August 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis). Wolsey 
deliberately deceived the French embassy, around 8-9 August, about the reasons for his intention to go to Bruges 
and also rejected rumours that an Anglo-Imperial marriage agreement was imminent, see LPIIIii, 1479 
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to a marriage alliance and war with France in 1523, the latter including the expulsion of 
French interests from Italy.190 The agreement was supposed to remain secret, apart from to 
‘the secret councillors of the contracting parties’, but rumours of it escaped.191 Despite this, 
Wolsey’s efforts were unsuccessful and he eventually left Calais on 27 November. The 
cardinal’s overtures to this end continued up to and beyond the end of this period.193 Just 
Wolsey felt triumphant; the anti-French agenda looked to be succeeding. Writing in his own 
hand to Henry, he recommended that he rejoice that he is ‘not only the ruler of this your 
realm, which is an angle of the world, but also, by your wisdom and counsel, Spain, Italy, 
Almayne and these Low Countries, which is the greatest part of Christendom, shall be ruled 
and governed. France will not now dare to resist him’.192 Following the treaty’s conclusion, 
Wolsey returned to Calais (by the end of August) and revived his efforts towards a Franco-
Imperial truce. By this means, England would have time to prepare for the envisaged war. The 
fluctuating progress of the conflicts between France and the Empire, however, meant that 
                                                                                                                                                        
(calendared 8-9 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1480 (calendared 8-9 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]); 
Ven.iii, 283 (7 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Also see J.J. Scarisbrick, Henry VIII, pp.88-89. 
190 A meeting was also planned between Henry and Charles for the spring; LPIIIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, 
Bruges). For the emperor elect finally conceding that an immediate English declaration against France would not 
521, Surian 
ust 
 of a truce over the next few months at Calais. In late October, Wolsey urged Charles in this direction, 
lsey 
ept the truce before he left, but this 
occur, see ibid., 1493 (calendared 18-19 August 1521, Wolsey to [Henry]). 
191 Ibid., 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). Surian reported the arrival of a messenger riding post from Bruges to 
Henry, who revealed that an Anglo-Imperial arrangement.had been made; Ven.iii, 309 (22 August 1
to the Signory, Calais). Given that Charles continued to want the English to publicly declare against France, he 
and his advisors were probably not models of discretion. See, for example ibid., 277 (3 August 1521, Contarini 
to the Signory, Ghent). 
192 LPIIIii, 1515 (28 August 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Gravelines). 
193 For Wolsey’s return to Calais; Ven.iii, 318 (27 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 319 (28 Aug
1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 320 (29 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais). While Wolsey 
envisaged returning to England around 24 August, he notified Henry shortly after of his intention to explore the 
possibility
emphasising the ‘urgent causes for truce’: that the campaigning season was over, that they needed time to 
finance and prepare an expedition, as well as to fortify the country; LPIIIii, 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to 
[Henry], Bruges), 1518 (calendared 28-29 August 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]), 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, 
Wolsey to Charles); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, pp.767-769. For these negotiations and 
Wolsey’s continued assertions to Charles that England needed time to prepare before it declared against France, 
see LPIIIii, 1538 (3 September 1521, Wolsey to [Henry], [Calais]), 1748 (8 November 1521, Imperial 
ambassadors at Calais to Charles); Ven.iii, 342 (28 September 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Towards the 
end of October, it seems that Henry VIII had little idea about the progress of negotiations and asked if Wo
intended returning soon. By the 27th, he had become impatient and instructed the cardinal to leave if there was 
any delay or possibility that the truce would not occur, as he was needed in England. By 8 November, Wolsey 
brought things to a head by giving the delegations a few more days to acc
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before he crossed the Channel, however, Wolsey confirmed an extended version of the Treaty 
of Bruges that now included Leo X.194 
 
 Given that the English crown’s inclination towards an aggressive anti-French strategy 
grew from around the time of Henry’s meetings with Charles and Francis during 1520, how 
did this develop in relation to the papacy that it envisaged defending? It has already been 
suggested that Henry and Wolsey largely excluded Leo X from negotiations leading up to 
these summits, particularly as they assumed the ‘mediating’ role in this process and did not 
really know where the pope stood politically.195 
 That this papal exclusion continued on account of the English adoption of what was 
traditionally (although not exclusively) a papal role, arbitration, can be implied by the clear 
invocation of ‘papal’ authority in the meetings. Wolsey clearly asserted this in proceedings, as 
was his right accorded by his status. By virtue of his being a legate a latere, in addition to his 
office as the king’s principal minister, chancellor and arcbishop of York, his role in the 
meetings was imbued with pontifical authority which, it will be seen, Henry and himself did 
not fail to capitalise upon.  Wolsey’s deliberate precedence can be seen clearly during the 
planning stages; for the Field of Cloth of Gold for example, the cardinal’s prominence was 
indicated by his having been appointed proctor to arrange the conference by both Henry and 
                                                                                                                                                        
196
failed by the 16th; LPIIIii, 1691 (20 October 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Windsor), 1709 (27 October 1521, Pace to 
[Wolsey], Windsor), 1748 (8 November 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1751 (calendared 10-
11 November 1521, [Wolsey to Docwra, Boleyn and others, Tournai), 1752 (calendared 10-11 November 1521, 
[Wolsey to Richard Wingfield]), 1760 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]), 1770 (16 
November 1521, Charles’ instructions to his delegation in Calais, Oudenarde). For Wolsey’s intention to 
continue truce talks in England, see for instance ibid., 1776 (18 November 1521, Somerset, West and Fitzwilliam 
to Wolsey, Amiens), 1777 (18 November 1521, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Oudenarde). 
194 LPIIIii, 1802 (24 November 1521, Calais). 
195 See above pp.684-687. 
196 It is unlikely that Wolsey would have emphasised his legatine authority to the degree that he did without the 
full support of Henry. 
 701
Francis.197 Also, it was agreed in advance that Wolsey was to be the most senior official at the 
meeting (on the English side at least), other than the kings themselves; while the legate was to 
e accompanied by 300 servants, the next largest retinues were to be taken by the archbishop b
of Canterbury (Warham) and the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, who were to be escorted by 
70 attendants apiece.198 In addition, the intention that Wolsey’s function had a ‘papal’ flavour 
can be identified in the rewards that he was offered by Francis and Charles, in recognition of 
his service in arranging the meetings. Both appealed to his perceived ecclesiastical ambition; 
Francis may have offered the cardinal his support in the next conclave,199 while the emperor 
elect bestowed upon him the see of Badajoz.200 
 The English crown’s employment of ‘papal’ dignity embodied in Wolsey can be seen 
even more clearly at the meetings themselves, where Wolsey’s precedence and legatine 
authority is explicit throughout. It can be seen vividly, for instance, in Wolsey’s visit to the 
French King at Ardres on 1 June 1520, both to announce Henry’s arrival at Calais and to 
make final arrangements for the meeting of the two kings. Firstly, the cardinal’s legatine and, 
therefore, papal status was emphasised by the magnificence of the procession which took him 
to Francis; Wolsey (‘humbly’ riding a mule) was accompanied by a substantial retinue, 
largely clad in crimson velvet and gold chains that was clearly intended to emphasise this 
ecclesiastical dignity. Preceding Wolsey was his crossbearer (‘in a scarlet robe, and a crimson 
velvet hood…’), who carried two crosses, that of York and that denoting his legatine status, 
the former of which was left when he passed outside English territory; he therefore entered 
France primarily as legate a latere.201 This ‘quasi-papal’ authority was subsequently 
                                                 
197 LPIIIi, 592 (10 January 1520, ‘Leseignaix’), 633 (23 February 1520, Cognac), 645 (2 March 1520). 
0, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Cognac), 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to 
 1520). 
e Knights 
198 Ibid., 702 (26 March 1520). 
199 Ibid., 666 (8 March 152
Chièvres, London), 894 (1 July 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Abevyle’). 
200 Ibid., 709 (29 March
201 To further reinforce this spectacle, Wolsey was followed by five or six bishops, the grand prior of th
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recognised by the French when Wolsey reached Ardres; in broad accordance with protocols 
governing meetings with legates, Francis sent a retinue to receive Wolsey outside of Ardres; 
he met the legate himself outside the gates of the town (on a mule, like Wolsey) and they then 
went in procession to the king’s lodgings; once there, Wolsey dismounted and Francis, 
bareheaded, embraced him, before leading him inside to conduct discussions.202 
 The English stress on Wolsey’s legatine status can also be seen clearly at the 
celebratory mass of 23 June 1520 that signified the culmination of the Field of Cloth of Gold. 
Held in a specially built chapel, Wolsey officiated, assisted by the French legate. Their 
legatine status was indicated by the provision of raised chairs for them (beneath a canopy), 
although Wolsey’s was positioned slightly above that of his counterpart. Furthermore, the 
other three French cardinals were seated one step below that and the bishops (of whom 21 
were present) lower still. During the service, Wolsey was dressed by English bishops and 
offered water for his hands by English nobles. Finally, following an oration made by Richard 
                                                                                                                                                        
chains; ibid., 870 (calendared June 1520). For the symbolic importance of a legate a latere’s dress (including the 
colour), as well as of that of his retinue, visualising ‘papal’ power, see N. Vincent (ed.), The Letters and 
Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legate in England 1216-1218, Canterbury and York Society 
(1996), p.xlvi; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 
Canterbury). Similarly, at the Calais meeting with Charles, Wolsey’s escort was also notable compared to other 
of St John (Thomas Docwra) and a number of protonotaries also wearing crimson (and black) velvet and gold 
14, pp.300-302, 315-316. Also see Ven.iIi, 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, 
English dignitaries; he was accompanied by 50 horsemen and 50 foot, while the next in precedence, the 
archbishop of Canterbury (Warham) was attended by 10 of each and the dukes of Buckingham and Suffolk by 
just 10 horse; LPIIIi, 906 (10 July 1520). It was noted by observers, however, that there was less magnificence 
.iii, 106 (12 July 1520, Lodovico Spinelli, secretary of Surian, to his brother 
Antonio Giustinian to the 
d.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.194-195. For the protocol surrounding a 
involved in this interview; Ven
Gasparo Spinelli, secretary to Badoer, Calais). 
202 LPIIIi, 869 (11 June 1520), 870 (calendared June 1520); Ven.iii, 58 (1 June 1520, 
Signory, ‘Linx’); C. Whibley (e
legate’s meeting a king, including how the former ought to be treated like a brother by the latter, see again F. 
Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 14, pp.311-314. 
For the indication of subservience (towards a representative of the papacy) suggested by Francis’ uncovering his 
head, see once more M. Scott, Medieval Clothing and Costumes: Displaying Wealth and Class in Medieval 
Times (2004), p.37. Wolsey also went to meet Charles slightly off-shore in accordance apparently with legatine 
protocols (where the legate was to go in person to meet the emperor, rather than send a retinue to do so), 
although adjustments may have been made given that Charles had neither been crowned king of the Romans at 
Aachen nor emperor at Rome. The emperor elect embraced Wolsey when they greeted on-shore; Ven.iii, 50 (21 
May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury), 56 (30 May 
1520, a letter from --, at the Court of France, to his brother, Monteruil). For protocols governing legates meeting 
emperors, see again F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, 
Traditio, 14, pp.311-314. 
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Pace, Wolsey gave a benediction and a plenary indulgence to those present, ‘a privilege 
granted by the pope to the English legate whenever he celebrated mass in pontificalibus’.203 
The Mantuan orator based at the French Court commented that Wolsey ‘observed all such 
ceremonies as could possibly have been used with the Pope’.204 Following the service, 
Wolsey enhanced his precedence further by hosting a banquet for bishops, abbots and foreign 
bassam adors, the latter including papal representatives.205 
 One must not overstress Wolsey’s ‘papal’ authority at the interviews, however; he did 
not try to act instead of the pope and did not have the authority to do so. As will be seen, Leo 
X maintained his own representatives there. There is moreover little doubt that the English 
legate would have been seen by participants and observers alike as Henry’s principal minister, 
first and foremost.206 The most likely explanation for this emphasis of legatine power seems 
to be the English claim to the mediating role in continental politics that Wolsey had usurped 
from Rome back in 1518. Indeed, the English cardinal had originally managed to achieve this 
                                                 
203
14 July 1520), 69 (7-24 June 1520), 78 (10-25 June 1520, Donato to Z.F. Griti), 79 (10-26 June 1520, Venetian 
ambassadors in France to the Signory), 91 (21 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to t  
 LPIIIi, 870 (calendared June 1520). For other accounts of Wolsey’s role in this mass, see Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-
he
Signory, France), 93; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.81; C. Whibley (ed.), Henry VIII by Edward Hall, i, pp.214-215. 
Wolsey participated in a similar mass at Canterbury held on 27 May 1520 to celebrate the visit of Charles. He 
dral but, while the service was performed by William Warham 
eem to have remained to the fore during the Field of Cloth of Gold. At the initial 
led both king and emperor elect into the cathe
(presumably as metropolitan), he concluded the service with the benediction and plenary indulgence; Ven.ii, 50 
(21 May-14 July 1520), 53 (27 May 1520, Francesco Cornaro and Surian to the Signory, Canterbury), 56 (30 
May 1520, a letter from --, at the Court of France, to his brother, Monteruil). For the ceremonial role expected by 
a legate when in the presence of the emperor and a king, see F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the 
Ceremonial of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 14, pp.311-314. 
204 Ven.iii, 93 (25 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at the Court of France, to Marquis of Mantua, 
Ardres). 
205 Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 91 (21 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the 
Signory, Linck?), 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory). The organisation of such a banquet may have been 
deemed by some to be ‘contrary to the dignity of the legate a latere’, although it was not as if popes and 
cardinals in Rome were strangers to hosting such events; F. Wasner, ‘Fifteenth Century Texts on the Ceremonial 
of the Papal ‘Legatus a Latere’, Traditio, 14, p.322. 
206 Apart from the aforementioned preliminary meeting with the French king and the celebratory mass, Wolsey’s 
legatine status does not s
meeting between Henry and Francis on 7 June 1520, the focus was clearly on the coming together of the two 
kings and, although Wolsey preceded both into the pavillion where they met, possibly alongside the Admiral of 
France and remained present while Henry and Francis talked privately, one gets the sense that observers 
envisaged him as Henry’s minister at this event. Subsequently, the focus shifted more towards the sporting arena 
and other festivities; LPIIIi, 869 (11 June 1520), 870 (calendared June 1520); Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 
70 (8 June 1520, Giovanni Badoer and Antonio Giustinian to the Signory). 
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by forcing his commission as a legate a latere.207 Since the universal peace accord had been 
concluded, with Leo X’s begrudging approval, Wolsey had remained central to encouraging 
its Anglo-French axis, England had gained the opportunity to become the ‘balance’ between 
Charles and Francis following the Imperial election and, in light of both of these 
love between their two kings, opined that Charles ‘must not aspire to greater power in 
in Italy on account of this and the intention to crusade. In any case, the English 
developments, the cardinal played a pivotal role in encouraging and arranging the interviews 
of 1520. This centrality continued during the meetings themselves; he went to greet each 
monarch in advance of their meeting with Henry, finalising arrangements if necessary;208 he 
also fostered the idea of a tripartite conference during the meetings, at least formally 
reinforcing the Treaty of London.209 One must also remember what the English crown was 
trying to do around this time; through public and private measures, keep Francis I out of Italy 
and, as far as this study is concerned, away from the papacy. This concern is hinted at on a 
few occasions during the Field of Cloth of Gold. Firstly, during the oration, delivered at the 
celebratory mass of 23 June, Richard Pace bade those present to maintain the Anglo-French 
amity, which would benefit both the Christian faith and ‘the stability of the holy Apostolic 
See’.210 Secondly, at the subsequent banquet hosted by Wolsey, the cardinal, speaking of the 
Italy’.211 In the context of English foreign policy, the crown’s intentions vis-à-vis the papacy 
can be seen; a continuation of the universal peace (Treaty of London) whereby France would 
not act 
suggested that there was no need for Francis I to cross the Alps, given that they were opposed 
                                                 
207 See above pp.631-636. 
208 Immediately before the Field of Cloth of Gold, he conducted long negotiations with Francis and his most 
intimate advisors Ven.iii, 73 (8 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambass at the Court of France, to the Marquis of 
Mantua, Linck?). 
209 See above p.687. 
210 Ven.iii, 93 (25 June 1520, Soardino, Mantuan Ambassador at the Court of France, to Marquis of Mantua, 
Ardres). 
211 Ibid., 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory). 
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to Charles making a similar move.212 In that case, was the emphasis on Wolsey’s legatine 
status a bid by the English crown to assert the veracity of their pacific intentions towards their 
traditional enemy? Given the chivalric code of the day, Henry VIII’s invocation of the 
spiritual sphere in the meeting would have demanded that his friendship be taken at face 
value. 
 
 With such obvious prominence given to a papal legate at these meetings, what did Leo 
X think of this and did he (attempt to) play any role in the interviews? If Leo X was 
unimpressed with Wolsey usurping both his truce initiative and his role as arbitrator back in 
1518, then he was likely to be similarly unhappy with him reprising this role in the 1520 
interviews (particularly when he remained uninformed by the English). He would certainly 
have known of the Imperial recognition given for Wolsey’s services; the bishopric of Badajoz 
and a pension of 2,000 ducats from the see of Palencia.213 He probably did not know, 
however, about the possible offer from Francis to back Wolsey in the next conclave.214 
Formally speaking, however, positive noises emanated from Rome on this issue; he was a 
legate and was encouraging a peace that could not really be opposed.215 De Giglis, writing on 
26 June 1520 when he would have known that the Anglo-French interview was under way, 
relayed how there was a hope in Rome for peace and that Wolsey was much admired in what 
he was doing.216 Later, Giulio de’ Medici conveyed the pope’s praise with Wolsey’s work 
‘for the good of Christendom’. He lauded the cardinal’s ‘dexterity in bringing about a 
                                                 
ove, pp.690-692. 
213 For which Wolsey sought remission from service taxes; LPIIIi, 880 (22 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], 
son for the despatch of legates a latere had always been to foster peace. Indeed, Wolsey was 
ned to be co-legate with Campeggio to help facilitate Leo X’s five year truce initiative, so 
ngland to bring about peace (this time because of civil war), see N. Vincent (ed.), The Letters and 
e in England 1216-1218, p.xlix. 
, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
212 See ab
Rome). Also see ibid., 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome).  
214 See above p.702. 
215 A common rea
originally commissio
that a crusade could be launched against the Ottomans; see above p.314. For an earlier example of a legate being 
sent to E
Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legat
216 LPIIIi, 880 (22 June 1520
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conference between so many princes of influence. This is a thing so rare that it is reputed 
lmost 
                                                
a impossible, as it would have been, but for Wolsey’. The pope’s principal minister 
closed by citing the honour that this brought to both Henry VIII and Leo X.217 
 In spite of Wolsey’s legatine status, Leo X despatched his own representative to attend 
the meetings, Girolamo Ghinucci, who left on 1 May. Leo had apparently delayed the 
nuncio’s departure for a month already, probably waiting for the royal permission he had 
earlier requested for this.218 The bishop of Ascoli was not the only papal representative to 
attend the meetings, however; other nuncios seem to have been present, those resident at the 
French and Imperial Courts attended the meetings involving Francis and Charles, 
respectively.219 Finally, on account of his own inability to attend, Campeggio sent his 
secretary, Florian(-us) to be his proxy at the interviews.220 It is unclear, however, whether the 
secretary had any agenda other than to keep his master informed, such as providing another 
set of eyes and ears for the papacy.221 In terms of the role played by the papal representatives 
at the interviews, it seems that they were treated by the English as little more than window 
dressing for the spectacles; to be conspicuously present at the various set-piece events. At the 
Field of Cloth of Gold, for instance, Ghinucci and probably Stafileo attended the first public 
meeting between Henry and Francis on 7 June 1520; indeed, the former apparently rode in 
 
7 Ibid.,
 Ibid., 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). Ghinucci must have travelled post haste to England, as 
and John Roelaius when Francis did the same; LPIIIi, 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey). Also, an ‘agent 
llege by the Signory’s Governor 
iovanni) Stafileo, resident at the French Court, attended the mass held on 23 June as one of 
s was an expensive practice for the cardinal, who 
21  1006. (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
218
he seems to have been present at Charles’ visit to England; Ven.ii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520). 
219 Campeggio earlier advised Wolsey that Leo intended Marino Caracciolo to attend when Charles met Henry 
of the Cardinal de’ Medici’ resident in France reportedly attended the initial meeting between Henry and 
Francis; Ven.iii, 80 (11 June 1520, letter from the French Court sent to the Co
Triulzi, Linck?). A (G
the two nuncios present. Both also attended the subsequent banquet; Ven.iii, 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 92 (20 
June 1520, Surian to the Signory). 
220 LPIIIi, 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). Florian returned to Rome by 11 November 
1520; ibid. 1054 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome), 1055 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio 
to Henry], Rome). 
221 If Florian was sent just on Campeggio’s whim, then thi
would have had to maintain him over the following five months. 
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procession alongside Archbishop Warham.222 Ghinucci (and, again, his French counterpart) 
also attended Wolsey’s great set-piece mass and banquet on 23 June.223 For the meetings with 
Charles, the bishop of Ascoli was both present at the first and numbered among the English 
king’s retinue for the second on 10 July.224 It is worth noting again that these were occasions 
when Wolsey’s legatine status was prominent. 
 From the conferences, it seems that Ghinucci (and his counterparts) kept tabs on and 
reported what was occurring, and the papacy was apparently happy with this.225 Florian also 
kept Campeggio abreast of events.226 Indeed, accounts of the Field of Cloth of Gold at least 
were eagerly awaited in Rome.227 Despite their presence, however, the nuncios do not seem to 
have been kept in Henry or Wolsey’s confidence and were not privy to any negotiations 
conducted at the interviews.228 Ghinucci, it seems, did not gain an interview with Wolsey 
until the Field of Cloth of Gold was well underway (although de’ Medici claimed to be happy 
with the nuncio’s warm welcome).229 This lack of access bred suspicion in Rome; thus, Leo 
was reported to have speculated that Henry, at the Calais meeting with Charles, would 
negotiate a new alliance.230 In this, he was at least partially correct.231 On the other hand, 
there is suggestion of a secret papal overture that took place also at Guisnes (during the 
                                                 
222 LPIIIi, 870 (calendared June 1520); Ven.iii, 71 (8 June 1520, Surian to the Signory), 80 (11 June 1520, letter 
from the French Court sent to the College by the Signory’s Governor Triulzi, Linck?); J.G. Russell, The Field of 
n, the discussions at the first Anglo-Imperial meeting remained secret, despite 
o the Signory, Calais). 
w the nuncio to disclose his commission; 
s settled, with a view to further negotiations towards an alignment against France; 
Cloth of Gold (1969), p.98. 
223 Ven.iii, 92 (20 June 1520, Surian to the Signory). 
224 Ibid., 50 (21 May-14 July 1520), 61 (3 June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Calais), 106 (12 July 1520, 
Lodovico Spinelli, secretary of Surian, to his brother Gasparo Spinelli, secretary to Badoer, Calais). 
225 Leo X’s principal minister, Giulio de’ Medici, was pleased with Ghinucci’s communication of 13 June from 
Guisnes; LPIIIi, 897 (2 July 1520, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
226 Ibid., 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). 
227 Ibid.. 
228 According to the Venetian Suria
his having recently crossed the Channel with Ghinucci; by implication, therefore, the nuncio probably did not 
know what had been discussed either; Ven.iii, 61 (3 June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Calais), 63 (4 
June 1520, Surian t
229 Cardinal de’ Medici’s response implies that Ghinucci only met with Wolsey around 13 June. The latter’s 
reported demeanour was enough for the pope’s cousin to then allo
LPIIIi, 897 (2 July 1520, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
230 Ibid., 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy). 
231 An interim agreement wa
see above pp.688-689. 
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Anglo-French conference); a nephew of the pope apparently spoke with Wolsey and, 
following the second meeting between Henry and Charles, went to the Imperial Court, where 
attempts to keep both Francis and Charles out of Italy. On the one hand, it was essential to 
keep Francis I convinced of English ‘neutrality’ at least vis-à-vis Charles, as was pushed 
 elect that 
eir true political intentions to 
he was reportedly well received; as a result, Spinelly advised Wolsey that ‘everything must be 
kept secret’.232 It is uncertain to whom the English diplomat is referring, although earlier in 
the missive he writes about a disagreement he had had with Raphael de’ Medici; the latter had 
complained about Wolsey’s questioning Ghinucci about Giulio de’ Medici’s negotiations with 
Charles via Raphael. One suspects, however, that these secret discussions, if they took place, 
achieved little. By 8 August, a worried de Giglis notified Wolsey that he had not received any 
correspondence from England since he last wrote on 15 July. The pope, he wrote, expected to 
be kept informed of what happened at the interviews (or at least that with Charles) and, now 
that Wolsey had returned to London, he hoped at least for a reply to what he wrote on Leo’s 
behalf, lest the pontiff be angry.233 
 
 In the months following the various interviews, the English crown could only send 
mixed messages to Rome about its foreign policy. Its position was based upon its continued 
concentration on the Treaty of London as a means to restrain France and its intertwined 
throughout the Field of Cloth of Gold, and on the other, to suggest to the emperor
Henry was really pro-Imperial. If they were ever to divulge th
Leo X (via Ghinucci or otherwise), the English needed to be extremely sure of the papacy.234 
                                                 
232 LPIIIi, 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]). 
233 Ibid., 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey).  
234 Imperial offers to align against the French, it should be remembered, were still in their early stages and it has 
 him to launch an offensive. The papacy was neither powerful nor close enough to be 
been mentioned earlier that Henry VIII was not prepared to act alone against France; he needed at least one of 
the ‘superpowers’ with
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As will be seen, however, papal foreign policy was just as confusing to the English, as the 
English strategy was to Rome. 
 In terms of confusing the papacy, therefore, the English crown was called upon by 
both Charles and Francis, individually, to indicate their amities to the papacy in some form or 
another, as the rival monarchs sought to secure papal support. 235 In the wake of the Field of 
Cloth of Gold, Francis, for instance, apparently convinced that Henry was committed to ‘the 
protection of the Italis [sic]’ from Charles, recommended to Henry and Wolsey that, between 
them, they ‘should handle the Pope’. His idea was that, if they ‘proferred him assistance at all 
times, as obeisant children of the Church’, he would not, by fear, agree to all of Charles’s 
quests. Francis also believed that it would be far ‘more honourable’ if, in the event that 
                                                                                                     
re
Charles was crowned in Rome, the papacy was in their pocket. To achieve this, the French 
king wanted instructions along these lines to be sent to the English orators in Rome and that, 
henceforward, that the latter should work closely with their French counterparts (so that their 
amity could be observed publicly).236  
 
On the other hand, Charles may well have outlined to Henry his intention for an 
alliance with the pope at one of the two interviews.237 This was probably raised in connection 
with Charles’ proposal to form an amity with England and, given later indications, it is 
                                                   
as eagerly sought as an ally in any coaltion garnered for this reason; see 
above pp.111-113. 
235 The Imperialists believed that a close arrangement with England was necessary to win over the pope. The 
French felt a similar way when, around July 1520, they were apprehensive of a rumour that the English and 
Imperialists were negotiating a league at Calais, as they regarded the pope’s friendship as ‘more valued than 
ish suppport as integral to their winning over the papacy; 
al ambassadors in England to de la Sauch sent to the 
d at least; ibid., 803 (13 May 1520, Coruna). 
relied upon in this way, although it w
ever’. In other words, the French too envisaged Engl
LPIIIi, 742 (14 April 1520, instructions of the Imperi
emperor, London), 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy). 
236 Ibid., 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey]). Around the same date, Wolsey was 
sent credentials for Wingfield to speak on behalf of Francis I; ibid., 911 (13 July 1520, Bonnivet to Wolsey, St 
Germain). 
237 This was intende
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entirely feasible that Henry VIII’s involvement in a papal accord was sought.238 Certainly, at 
the Calais/Gravelines meeting, Wolsey and the emperor elect apparently agreed to write to 
their respective ambassadors in Rome to disclose their discussions and ‘to gain the pope’s 
favour for their realms’.239 There is nothing to suggest, however, that Wolsey (or Henry) did 
so. In response to the French proposal at least, however, Henry assumed his ‘neutral’ role as 
arbiter of the universal peace; he claimed that, while he had no objections, he had also had a 
similar request from the king of the Romans. The Englishman suggested, therefore, that the 
representatives of all three states appear together, while English and French delegates 
cooperated secretly, so that the pope could appreciate their ‘mutual love’.240 At this stage, it is 
entirely feasible that the same response was given to the Imperial approach. 
 Prior to 8 August 1520, de Giglis reported having been visited by the French 
ambassador, the latter citing instructions to act in concert with him. The English ambassador, 
pparently knowing no better, replied in kind and reciprocated by visiting the Frenchman. 
Anothe
                                                
a
r French representative de Morette, who had only just arrived in Rome, may well have 
made the same overtures to de Giglis.241 In the same letter, the bishop of Worcester reported 
the pope having been informed of Francis I’s intention to descend into Italy (with Swiss 
support) but, since Leo did not know Henry and Wolsey’s intentions, he did not know what to 
do.242 In other words, the papacy was implying its susceptibility to French pressure because 
 
238 See below pp.728 ff. 
239 De la Roche informed Wolsey that Charles would follow through with this; LPIIIi, 921 (17 July 1520, de la 
 indicated by the fact that he was yet to arrive on 3 August and the Frenchman wrote himself to 
sey, Rome), 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to 
520, de Morette to Wolsey, Rome). 
Roche, to Wolsey, St Omer). 
240 In addition to showing how the English crown continued to demonstrate its commitment to the Treaty of 
London in public, it also exemplifies another dimension to the English strategy to maintain its pivotal status; by 
privately indicating to Francis I that he would secretly side with him, in this case in Rome to win over the pope; 
ibid., 936 (calendared beginning August 1520, instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield and Jerningham, 
ambassadors to Francis). 
241 Ibid., 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey). 
242 According to the abstract of de Giglis’ letter dated 8 August, de Morette arrived on the 14th; that this is 
incorrect is
Wolsey on the 9th; ibid., 941 (3 August 1520, de Giglis to Wol
Wolsey), 947 (9 August 1
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of the mixed messages coming from England. Also revealingly, on 23 December 1520, 
Campeggio reported secret discussions between himself, two French diplomats, Leo X and 
Cardinal de’ Medici. The Italian cardinal also revealed that the pope was under great pressure 
from Manuel to side with Charles, but it was believed that the pope would try to keep the 
peace and remain neutral.243 
 
 Equally, the confusing messages sent to England from Rome were based on Henry and 
during June 1520). Given that this caused Raphael de’ Medici to later complain to Spinelly 
             
Wolsey’s corresponding uncertainty of papal intentions. Indeed, in the July correspondence 
where Francis proposed a joint Anglo-French approach to ‘handle the Pope’, there is an 
indication of what was probably a shared uncertainty of papal political objectives. The 
Frenchman advised this policy given that they knew Leo ‘to be at some other season the 
fearfullest creature of the world, and at some other to be as brave’.244 Henry and Wolsey 
clearly understood that the pontiff was in negotiation with both sides; both Charles and 
Francis advertised the English that they had the better chance of aligning with Leo. By June 
1520, for instance, the English would have been informed of Imperial negotiations with 
Rome; the emperor instructed his ambassadors in England to advertise Henry of these, in a 
bid to win him over prior to the interviews.245 Wolsey seems to have questioned Ghinucci and 
an unnamed nephew of the pope about these discussions apparently while at Guisnes (also 
about disclosing his role to, it seems that the English legate had tried to discover what Leo X 
intended politically, but had met with resistance, as he was not supposed to know about these 
                                    
olsey, Rome). 
13 May 1520, Coruna). 
243 Ibid., 1101 (23 December 1520, [Campeggio] to W
244 Ibid., 913 (calendared 13-14 July 1520, Sir Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], Poissy).  
245 Charles seems to have been eager to demonstrate the lengths he was going to to secure papal support. The 
Imperial ambassadors in England were instructed in mid-May to show how their master intended to relate with 
the pope (as well as with the Venetians and Swiss); ibid., 803 (
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intrigues.246 Spinelly further painted a confusing picture of papal foreign policy on 27 July 
1520; despite Leo’s positive noises towards France, he also ‘gives fair words and promises to 
e Emperor’. Spinelly suggested that the pope was leaning towards Charles, despite 
                                                
th
indications to the contrary, on account of Raphael de’ Medici, resident there, being the 
‘conduytte of the Cardinal de Medicis’ and the arrival of Caracciolo as resident nuncio. As a 
result, the English representative advised that Leo X’s intentions were not as clear as he 
claimed. He considered that the pontiff may have been prevaricating until he felt confident to 
side with the stronger party but, even if he did, his support would amount to little, as Leo had 
no money.247 In a separate missive of the same date, Spinelly claimed that he cited Raphael 
de’ Medici’s role, so that Wolsey understood that he could negotiate with him rather than 
Ghinucci.248 In spite of this apparent confusion, the English continued to be informed of 
Imperial-papal negotiations.249 
 In terms of being au fait with French pressure on the papacy, Francis’ approach to 
Henry and Wolsey concerning a bilateral approach towards Leo has already been 
mentioned.250 The French king followed this up in the wake of the interviews by sending de 
Morette to Rome to secure his alliance with the papacy, to emphasise his amity with England 
 
 Ibid., 925 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey), 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]). The English crown 
potential friendship if the interview/s with Henry was/were not conducted appropriately. The Imperial 
ambassador also believed that, if they had arranged the meeting some months earlier (thus preventing the French 
interview), ‘the pope would have been more tractable’; ibid., 728 (7 April 1520, de la Sauch to Chièvres, 
mediary with Giulio de’ 
520). 
246 Ibid., 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]). 
247
also received later indications that the papacy was sympathetic to the emperor elect, such as from Spinelly again 
during October 1520; ibid., 1028 (19 October 1520, [Spinelly] to Wolsey). Furthermore, Henry VIII was not the 
only monarch to find difficulty in interpreting the papacy’s political intentions. During April 1520, the Imperial 
orator in England, de la Sauch, suggested that Charles was similarly confused and that they risked losing Leo’s 
London). 
248 Raphael de’ Medici complained to Spinelly about his description of him as the inter
Medici. In addition to the English diplomat’s aforementioned reason for this, he also claimed that it was to 
demonstrate Raphael’s influence with his relatives; ibid., 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]). 
249 Ibid., 1028 (19 October 1520, [Spinelly] to Wolsey),1045 (calendared 7 November 1
250 See above pp.710-712. 
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(which would assist with the former aim) and to urge a red hat for one or two Frenchmen.251 
De Morette arrived in Rome perhaps on 4 August and praised Henry and Wolsey (and their 
role in the meeting and alliance) to the pope. He may also have approached de Giglis about 
working together. In the same letter, the English ambassador reported the pope having been 
informed of Francis I’s intention to descend into Italy (with Swiss support) but, since Leo did 
not know Henry and Wolsey’s intentions, he did not know what to do 252 The papacy was 
indicating its vulnerability to French pressure on account of the mixed messages from 
England. It must be noted, however, that given the public image displayed by the English 
crown, it would have been risky for the king or his cardinal to contradict French assertions of 
Wolsey. Contacting Wolsey through a third party, he explained that the pope was confused 
their amity to Leo. While no answer to the papal approach apparently emanated from 
England, Henry and Wolsey continued to be aware of French negotiations in Rome.253 
 
 Following papal complaints about not being notified about the conferences in early 
May, Cardinal de’ Medici may have attempted to tackle the lack of communication towards 
the end of the month, perhaps in response to recent English reassurances about the 
forthcoming meetings with Charles and Francis and possibly in reply to an offer from 
about England’s true foreign policy intentions both on account of the correspondent’s 
                                                 
251 Morette was originally to be sent after the Field of Cloth of Gold, but his departure was delayed until the end 
of the second Anglo-Imperial interview on account, it seems, that the French suspected an alliance was being 
negotiated; LPIIIi, 922 (19 July 1520, bishop of Bayeux to Bibbiena, Poissy), 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to 
Wolsey), 958 (22 August 1520, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). 
252 Accord thing to the abstract of de Giglis’ letter dated 8 August, de Morette arrived on the 14 ; that this is 
h ears indicated a 
f communications between France and Rome. Campeggio also reported the arrival 
incorrect is indicated by the fact that he was yet to arrive on 3 August and the Frenchman wrote himself to 
Wolsey on the 9th; ibid., 941 (3 August 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 945 (8 August 1520, de Giglis to 
Wolsey), 947 (9 August 1520, de Morette to Wolsey, Rome). 
253 Another piece of correspondence, dated August 1520, that seems to have reached Englis
continual to’ing and fro’ing o
of a new French messenger in early December; ibid., 966 (calendared end August 1520, Hector de Vicquemare 
to –), 1089 (6 December 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey). On 26 September, de Giglis wrote of the French 
rejoicing in Rome seemingly as a result of the rebellion against Charles in Spain; ibid., 994 (26 September 1520, 
de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
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contradictory actions with respect to Imperial-papal negotiations and because both Charles 
and Francis claimed to have England on their side. Leo was, therefore, eager to know the 
‘real’ English course and emphasised the need for a new ambassador (as the pope had lost 
confidence in de Giglis) and, given de’ Medici’s previous ‘secret intelligence’ with the 
English cardinal, that they establish a new line of communication with each other through the 
recipient of this letter. De’ Medici further recommended that communication be made not 
merely in writing, but also ‘viva voce’, presumably through messengers. As something of a 
lure to Wolsey, de’ Medici suggested that the intermediary would be able to discuss matters 
f his legatine commission in this manner.254 It is likely that this go-between was Girolamo o
Ghinucci, given his recent despatch to England and his subsequent correspondence to de’ 
Medici on Wolsey’s behalf.255 When de’ Medici discovered that Wolsey would employ 
Ghinucci in this manner, he instructed the latter, on 2 July, to disclose his commission.256 It 
could have been in response to this that Wolsey later requested a ‘mandate and instruction’ to 
act on the pope’s behalf and protect his interests. In reply at the beginning of October, de’ 
Medici suggested that he was unclear what the English cardinal meant. If Wolsey was seeking 
just a general commission to secure papal support against France, the Italian argued that he 
(and Henry) already had sufficient power ‘in these conventions’ to achieve this. If, on the 
other hand, Wolsey sought papal backing ‘for extraordinary matters’, Leo claimed to already 
be on amicable terms with Charles and there was no reason to conclude any treaty, ‘unless 
anything should arise to require it’. Moreover, Ghinucci was to reassure Wolsey that the pope 
held him in the greatest confidence and that he would not make an agreement with any prince 
                                                 
254 Ibid., 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome), 853 (calendared end May 1520; [‘de Medici to --]). 
255 Ibid., 897 (2 July 1520, de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). 
256 Ibid..
., 994 26 September 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
 An indication that Wolsey grasped the opportunity to communicate with de’ Medici through the nuncio 
is suggested through his continued hosting of Ghinucci. That the latter was treated well is suggested by the 
nuncio’s report back to the pope’s cousin, perhaps at the beginning of September 1520 about his ‘munificent 
entertainment’ in England; ibid
 715
without consulting him first.257 This was effectively a papal snub to Wolsey’s tentative 
gambit to see whether Leo would be prepared to turn against the French. Furthermore, de’ 
Medici may not have believed that Anglo-papal communications had improved by this time, 
as at the end of November, he repeated his request for Wolsey to send a new ambassador.258 
 A further hint that the English crown may have tentatively approached the papacy with 
a view to turning against France came from Thomas Spinelly, based at the Imperial Court, in 
his letter of 27 July. His reference to Raphael de’ Medici as the ‘conduytte of the Cardinal de 
Medicis’ was perhaps made to highlight his authority with the papacy and to advise Wolsey to 
negotiate with him rather than Ghinucci in England.259 The implication is, therefore, that 
Wolsey was looking for an opening to begin discussions with Rome (against France) and that, 
while Ghinucci was thought to be a possible intermediary for this, he was evidently instructed 
not to disclose his commission until told to do so by de’ Medici.260 In light of this, therefore, 
Spinelly’s identification of Raphael de’ Medici as the best line of communication was quite 
natural. 
The English also took more direct measures to discourage Francis from his declared 
intention to launch an Italian expedition and to meet with the pope at Bologna. Several 
embassies and repeated correspondence were sent to discourage Francis against this course. 
By all accounts, Ghinucci in England was unaware of at least one diplomatic mission, thus 
suggesting that Wolsey had not involved the papacy.261 Another (also sent to persuade the 
French king from going to Italy), Carew also questioned Francis about his intention to meet 
with Leo X around the beginning of 1521, to which the king replied that he would perhaps do 
                                                 
257 Ibid., 1006 (calendared beginning October 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
258 Ibid., 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
259 Ibid., 925 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to Wolsey), 926 (27 July 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey]). 
-694. 
260 See above pp.714-716. 
261 Ven.iii, 117 (6 September 1520, Surian to the Signory); see above pp.693
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so at Bologna.262 It is not known whether the English lobbied Rome against this prospect as 
well, but it was probably deemed unlikely that Leo would have welcomed another interview 
and that, if it did take place, it would be both an indication of existing French leverage over 
the papacy and (as with the previous interview of 1515) of future dominance over the Holy 
See. 
 
 Beyond the uncertainty on both sides of the other’s ‘real’ foreign policy intentions, the 
only meaningful interaction between the English crown and papacy around this time resulted 
from Henry VIII’s earlier declared intention to support the papal crusading initiative. 
Concerning this, the crown and papacy may have still been talking at cross-purposes, as Leo 
X’s rea
                                                
l intention may have been to use it as a means to prevent expeditions to Italy by 
Francis or Charles. Prior to the conferences, in early May, the pope requested aid from 
England to resist a perceived Turkish threat against Rhodes.263 Perhaps reacting to this, 
Wolsey, in conversation with the Venetian ambassador (circa 18 May), claimed that Henry 
would write to Leo to urge the Christian powers to resist the danger, the English king being 
ready to act, and the king would raise this at his meeting with Francis I.264 By the 28th, 
however, de Giglis dutifully declared that the Turkish fleet (cited by the papacy) was intended 
neither against Rhodes nor Italy.265 Nevertheless, papal requests for aid against the Turks in 
the Balkans were subsequently forwarded to England.266 It is possible that Ghinucci’s 
commission partly intended to broach this issue (‘the common welfare of Christendom’), 
although he may not have been permitted to disclose it until de’ Medici instructed him to do 
 
.iii, 150 (3 January 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Blois). 
 IIi, 784 (2 May 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome), 785 (calendared 2 May 1520, Campeggio to 
[Wolsey]), 790 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Henry), 791 (4 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
264 Ven.iii, 49 (18 May 1520, Surian to the Signory, London). 
’ (presumably Veszprém, Hungary) had been killed in battle with the Ottomans; ibid., 
, [Hieronymus Pothelinus to --
262 Ven
263 LPI
265 LPIIIi, 847 (28 May 1520, de Giglis to Wolsey, Rome). 
266 The bishop of ‘Vesprim
850 (30 May 1520, [Hieronymus Pothelinus] to [Leo], Seguia), 867 (10 June 1520
]). 
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so on 2 July, having been notified of Wolsey’s positive demeanour.267 On 3 June, Leo made 
another direct appeal to Henry to act against the Turkish threat to Rhodes.268 Campeggio and 
de Giglis reiterated this, apparently at the pope’s request, the following day.269 In a separate 
letter (also dated the 4th), the bishop of Worcester shed doubt on papal claims, however; he 
referred Henry VIII to his previous missive on Turkish affairs that suggested the Ottomans 
intended no offensive against Christendom and that it was only when they had given up any 
fear of Turkish action that year, that ‘the old rumour suddenly springs up of great preparations 
being made by the Turks’. De Giglis also stressed that he requested assistance from England 
only in accordance with promises made by Campeggio.270 The clear implication is, therefore, 
that the English ambassador was sceptical of the Ottoman threat and warned his English 
employers of this. De Giglis’ scepticism perhaps reached England by 16 June 1520, on which 
date Wolsey seemed to indicate his response to the papal crusade appeal; in reply to Turkish 
news presented by the Venetian ambassador (while at the Field of Cloth of Gold), he 
answered that, whenever Venice wanted something, it produced intelligence about the 
Ottoman threat.271 Nevertheless, in early July, the king’s apparent response to the pope was 
positive; Henry had reportedly agreed to supply 1,000 infantry to support Rhodes for six 
                                                 
267 Cardinal de’ Medici’s response suggests that the pope was interested in the universal peace and that this, or 
moreover the crusading element, may have been what Ghinucci was now permitted to lobby the English crown; 
ibid., 897 (2 July 1520, Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey, Florence). That Ghinucci was intended to discuss the 
Turkish threat is also suggested by the Venetian Surian, who understood that a papal representative in France 
(probably there to attend the Field of Cloth of Gold) had claimed that this was part of his remit; Ven.iii, 64 ([4?] 
June 1520, Surian to the doge and Signory, Boulogne). 
y, Rome). 
ey, Rome). 
gland was for 1,000 troops and payment for their 
 June 1520, de Giglis to [Wolsey], Rome). 
268 According to the pope, he had already advertised Henry that the Turks had crossed the Bosphorus and was 
now notifying him that they had gathered a fleet near Rhodes; LPIIIi, 856 (3 June 1520, Leo to Henr
269 Ibid., 858 (4 June 1520, Campeggio [and de Giglis] to Wols
270 The request that de Giglis was obliged to relay to En
transport; ibid., 857 (4 June 1520, [de Giglis] to Henry, Rome). The orator conveyed similar intelligence from 
Rome on 22 June that, according to notices from Constantinople, the Turkish fleet had not yet sailed; ibid., 880 
(22
271 Ven.iii, 86 (16 June 1520, Surian to the Signory, Guisnes?). Here, Wolsey seems to have been echoing a 
sentiment issued by his Imperial counterpart, Chièvres, at the Canterbury meeting between Henry and Charles, 
when the Venetian orators received some Turkish news from home. Notably, however, Charles’ advisor tarred 
all from the peninsula with the same brush, not just those from the maritime republic; ‘whenever the Italians 
wanted anything they mentioned the Turk’, he reportedly opined; ibid., 55 (29 May 1520, Cornaro and Surian to 
the Signory, Canterbury). 
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months.272 There is nothing to suggest, however, that the pledge was actually fulfilled and one 
ought to note the timing of the statement. Around 6 July, Henry VIII had just concluded the 
Field of Cloth of Gold with Francis and was about to meet Charles at Calais. Diplomatically, 
the spotlight was on him as the ‘balance’ between two fractious monarchs, still advocating 
universal peace (publicly at least). He could not be seen, therefore, to reject a papal request 
for aid against the Ottomans; if he did, he would be effectively pulling the rug of justification 
from beneath himself. The perceived ‘need’ for a crusade changed by 11 November, as 
Campeggio advertised the English crown that Selim I had died, to be succeeded by 
Soliman.273 By the end of the month, Wolsey knew of this and was concerned about the 
accession of the new sultan who, he believed, would behave as his father had done.274 
Campeggio notified Wolsey of further Turkish news on 19 January and of how the pope had 
sent troops in apprehension of a fleet which attacked ‘Zerbe’.275 
 
 As rumours of Francis’ decision to go to Italy intensified towards the end of 1520, so 
would have Henry VIII’s fear for the implications of Franco-papal negotiations. He would 
have dreaded both the prospect of an alignment between the two powers and the possibility 
that Leo would back Francis against Charles, if the former crossed the Alps. These two fears 
were inter-related; if the pontiff did support the French king in Italy, then an alliance between 
them was confirmed. The first indication that one of these fears was manifesting itself came 
 
he face of an Imperial complaint around mid- to late 
around October-November 1520, when intelligence began to be received about Leo X
recruiting troops among the Swiss for actions in Italy. Indeed, the cardinal reportedly 
defended the pope’s hiring 6,000 in t
                                                 
272 Ibid., 99 ([6 July?] 1520, Surian to the Signory). 
273 LPIIIi, 1054 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome). 
274 Ven.iii, 141 (28 November 1520, Surian to the Signory , London). 
olsey, Rome). 275 LPIIIi, 1132 (19 January 1521, [Campeggio] to W
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October.276 It is unlikely, however, that Wolsey would have been entirely confident of the 
pope’s intentions for these troops. Indeed, he was notified of such uncertainty by Tunstal, 
then based at the Imperial Court, in a despatch of 6 November. However, the English 
diplomat reported a claim by the papal ambassador that the pope had made a pre-emptive 
move to retain the mercenaries, as Leo expected a French descent to begin within a month. 
This was his last chance, therefore, to hire them ‘for the maintenance [of his] estate’. Charles’ 
Council, on the other hand (Tunstal continued), did not know whether Leo really sought the 
troops because of a fear for the duke of Urbino, the ‘Peruse’ faction, or France, or even to 
support France; in any case, they did not fear a winter expedition by the French, as Charles 
as not travelling any further into Germany. They speculated that the Swiss troops would 
                                                
w
cost Leo a lot and that when they passed through the Milanese, the pope’s intention would 
become clear; if allowed free passage, he had an understanding with Francis; if they were 
impeded, he did not. The general thinking, according to Tunstal, was that Leo X was more 
afraid than he needed to be.277 Alarm bells would have started ringing when a 
contemporaneous communication from Francis was received, outlining how the pope was 
mobilising to resist a contingent of disgruntled Spanish believed to be marching towards the 
Papal States; Francis notified Henry and Wolsey that he had lent the pope 500 men (under the 
command of Lautrec) to assist.278 Further ominous news would have been received from 
Campeggio around the end of November that French troops had been ordered to muster at 
Milan.279 Around the same time, Wolsey claimed to understand that the pope’s Swiss 
 
276 Ibid., 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]), Wolsey would already have heard 
e end of August 1520, but it is unknown 
iglis to Wolsey). 
from Rome of French intentions to use the Swiss in Italy, towards th
whether he connected this intelligence; ibid., 945 (8 August 1520, de G
277 Ibid., 1043 (6 November 1520, Tunstal to [Wolsey], Cologne). 
278 This could easily have been seen as a pretext for war (although one must bear in mind that there was an 
uprising in Spain at this time); ibid., 1045 (calendared 7 November 1520). 
279 Ibid., 1054 (11 November 1520, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome). 
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mercenaries were intended for an assault on Ferrara.280 While he may have believed this (Leo 
being known to covet the duchy), the English cardinal may have only been telling part of the 
story; the information that he was receiving pointed towards a Franco-papal alignment that 
was heading towards war with the emperor elect. 
As far as the English crown was concerned, this confusing deterioration of the 
political situation in Italy continued. During December 1520, Wolsey would have been 
informed of de’ Medici’s claim that the Swiss contingent was a direct response to the Imperial 
troops amassed on the borders of the Papal States.281 In the context of English opposition to a 
French descent into Italy, the crown also had reason to oppose the prospect of an Imperial 
enterprise in the peninsula, as such a move would provoke war. Charles’ movement of 
Spanish troops into southern Italy, therefore, would have been greeted warily in England, 
despite of the Imperial ambassador earlier claiming that were intended to defend the 
papacy.282 While one would generally have expected Henry and Wolsey to welcome such 
action, they knew that Leo and Charles were not yet aligned. They were probably alarmed to 
hear during February 1521, therefore, of Spanish troops marching from Naples (and Calabria) 
northwards and of the pope’s intention to move his own forces to face them.283 Leo 
apparently complained to Henry about the Spanish contingent perhaps in January or February, 
in response to which the king questioned Charles about them; the emperor reiterated that they 
                                                 
November 1520, Surian to the Signory , London), 169 (10 March 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Francis 
reportedly told the Venetian ambassador that he could only think that the pope was raising the Swiss to stop him 
descending into Italy, but that this would not stop him. This was surely disingenuous, given that Francis had 
(8 December 1520, Giovanni Badoer to the 
a letter that he had handwritten to the 
ch king realised this when he received a 
280 Wolsey can also be seen voicing the same belief to the same Venetian on 10 March 1521; Ven.iii, 141 (28 
confirmed his agreement with the pope in October; Ven.iii, 144 
Signory, Blois). That Wolsey apparently raised the subject of Ferrara with the nuncio in England is suggested on 
8 January 1521, when Francis seems to have registered his displeasure that 
cardinal concerning the duke of Ferrara had made public The Fren
missive from Rome containing the same words used in the aforementioned communication, which demonstrates 
that Wolsey had been indiscrete with the papal ambassador; LPIIIi, 1126 (8 January 1521, Jerningham and 
Carew to Wolsey, ‘Arromatyn’). 
281 LPIIIi, 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
282 Ibid.. 
283 In essence, Venice was asking for England to intervene and prevent a war; Ven.iii, 155 (26 January 1521, 
Council of Ten and Junta to Surian). 
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were intended for the pope’s benefit. Wolsey questioned, therefore, Leo X’s bringing of the 
Swiss to Italy.284 Furthermore, towards the end of March 1521, the English crown was 
informed that these Swiss were partly subsidised by the French, prompting the belief that it 
was intended for the recovery of Naples (for Francis I), as well as of Ferrara. Henry, assuming 
his role as arbiter of the universal peace, reportedly disapproved of this ‘discord among the 
Christian powers’.285 ‘Bad’ news continued to reach England, however; by 4 March 1521, 
Campeggio notified Wolsey of the Spanish troops having crossed into the Papal States, 
although they failed in their attack on the town of Ripae and had retreated.286 By 15 April 
1521, the English had been notified of Francis’ justifications for allowing the Swiss safe 
passage through his territories; he had done it for the security of the pope. 287 Indications of 
which side of the fence the papacy intended to fall were not particularly promising for the 
English 
In terms of the prospect of a Franco-papal amity, while the secret alliance of late 1519 
apparently went unnoticed in England, that of 1521 did not. Rumour of such an agreement 
circulated in England towards the beginning of 1521 although, as the Venetian orator 
understood, the English were supposedly included (given that Henry was still publicly the 
‘friend’ of Francis, one presumes). Surian speculated that a Mass, celebrated unusually by 
Wolsey and attended by the nuncio Ghinucci (among others) gave credence to this. The 
Italian also reported that such a league had been concluded between Francis, Leo and 
                                                 
284 Ibid., 177 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). 
285 Ibid., 176 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory), 177 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). The king and 
cardinal’s opinion may have been shaped by a despatch from the English ambassador in France, Fitzwilliam, 
 Swiss for an attack on Ferrara and 
cis did not intend to defend the latter. The resident papal ambassador claimed no knowledge of this, 
peggio] to Wolsey, Rome). 
ondon). 
sent in mid-March, reporting intelligence that the pope was assembling 10,000
that Fran
however; LPIIIi, 1198 (calendared 16-17 March 1521, [Fitzwilliam to Wolsey]). 
286 LPIIIi, 1187 (4 March 1521, [Cam
287 Ven.iii, 187 (15 April 1521, Surian to the Signory, L
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Venice.288 It would not have taken much to raise English suspicions around this time, 
particularly given that Fitzwilliam, their ambassador in France, found it noteworthy to 
comment that Francis never spoke to him about the pope.289 The French orator in England, 
Marigny, notified Henry and Wolsey of this agreement by 24 March 1521, as well as of joint 
Franco-papal funding of the Swiss, the latter being interpreted as confirmation of the intended 
seizure of Naples and Ferrara by Francis and Leo, respectively (although it was denied).290 
 
 In consequence of the increasing prospect of a French descent into Italy, the English 
crown engaged with Leo X from November 1520. At this point, Wolsey approached Leo X 
directly, to forestall what was believed to be an imminent French expedition. He apparently 
asked the pontiff to urge Francis against this course, perhaps emphasising its potential cost.291 
Here, the cardinal was probably revealing his fear that this threat might force a vulnerable 
pope to conclude with Francis.292 In doing this, however, one ought to note that Wolsey did 
                                                 
288
allowed French forces to pass unhindered through the Papal States in return for a small portion of Naples once it 
was subsequently conquered; L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.15-16. There is no reason to believe, 
however, that the mass had anything to do with the Franco-papal agreement and certainly did not relate to 
English membership thereof; indeed, Francis I complained about the treatment of his ambassadors at the event 
‘Amorantyne’). 
289 LPIIIi
Fitzwilliam revealingly notified Wolsey that ‘Sayne Marshawe’ had returned from the pope and all was said to 
be well (possibly concerning a dispute over a legatine commission). Furthermore, he advised, the pope had 
 Ibid., 151 (7 January 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Such a ‘secret’ agreement had been made, which 
compared with those of Charles; LPIIIi, 1157 (6 February 1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to Wolsey, 
 , 1176 (22 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’). Indeed, a few days before this, 
agreed not to bestow a red hat on a candidate to whom Francis I objected. Revealingly, Fitzwilliam noted that he 
had heard nothing on these matters from the Most Christian King himself or his influential mother Louisa; ibid., 
ve been told this by his French 
Wolsey had just disclosed that he had written 
ult of this request via Rome and France; Ven.iii, 
t of Francis I’s opposition to the candidate. This intelligence would have been of great concern 
1168 (18 February 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Amorantyne’). 
290 Ven.iii, 176 (24 March 1521, Surian to the Signory). The Venetian orator in France reported home, around 
mid-April 1521, Francis’ claim that he had gained papal agreement to join a league (against Charles) and had 
Leo’s power for its conclusion; ibid., 188 (18 April 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Dijon). 
291 The date of this request is unclear, as the Venetian ambassador claimed to ha
counterpart circa 10 November. It is unknown, however, whether 
to Leo or whether the French diplomat had just heard of the res
135 (10 November 1520, Surian to the Signory, London). Alternatively, Wolsey could have been reacting to 
Spinelly’s news (of 23 September) that French troops were already active in Italy, although the English diplomat 
was sceptical about this; LPIIIi, 988 (23 September 1520, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Antwerp). 
292 On 10 October, for instance, Campeggio, reported increasingly frequent news that Francis intends to spend 
Christmas in Italy. He also reiterated information that he had originally conveyed to England on 26 September, 
that two French candidates had been elevated to the Sacred College and that the pope was likely to block a third 
red hat on accoun
 723
not beseech Leo to act aggressively; indeed, it could be argued that he was being consistent 
with England’s role in the Treaty of London, safeguarding universal peace. In other words, 
even if Wolsey did envisage an Anglo-Imperial alignment against France at this stage, this 
was merely a preliminary overture, as he was still unclear as to papal intentions. At this time, 
e cardinal was aware of the pontiff having engaged the services of Swiss troops for an, as 
reportedly confident that, given time, ‘the holy expedition will take effect, of which the 
                              
th
yet, unknown purpose.293  
 From Wolsey’s approach or by other information, the papacy may have been 
suspicious about English foreign policy, hitherto publicly committed to the Treaty of London, 
around the turn of 1521. In early January, Campeggio conveyed to Wolsey the pope’s desire 
that Henry continue his promotion of peace between the two parties and side with neither 
Charles nor Francis; he recommended that the English king ‘make himself an arbiter between 
them, whose counsel his Holiness will follow’. Campeggio and de Giglis assured both Leo 
and Giulio de’ Medici that this was indeed the English intention and, as a result, the pope was 
King’s piety first raised his hopes’.294 Here, Leo was clearly citing the English king’s earlier 
commitment to the crusade, as manifested in his support of the universal peace accord 
ensconced in the Treaty of London, since which the pontiff had actively courted Henry’s 
295support.  Towards the end of January, perhaps in immediate response to this, Henry notified 
Leo that he had spoken with Ghinucci ‘upon certain matters of great importance’ conveyed by 
                                                                                                                          
in England, as it smacked of a ‘French’ papacy; LPIIIi, 1016 (10 October 1520, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
This concern is also suggested by Nicholas Carew who, on 8 January 1521, while on a mission to France to 
discourage the Most Christian King from Italy, claimed that Henry VIII had persuaded the pope (and others) to 
maintain their amity with France, so that Francis had no need to go to the peninsula. Prior to this, Carew had also 
questioned the Most Christian King about his intention to meet with Leo X at Bologna, which would similarly 
indicate French dominance over the papacy; ibid., 1126 (8 January 1521, Jerningham and Carew to Wolsey, 
‘Arromatyn’); Ven.iii, 150 (3 January 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, Blois). 
293 See above pp.719-723. 
294 De Giglis was reportedly instructed to pass on the same message; LPIIIi, 1123 (calendared 2-6 January 1521, 
[Campeggio to Wolsey]). 
295 See above p.606. 
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de Giglis on the pope’s behalf. Wolsey would reply in detail via his orator.296 In response to 
Ghinucci’s subsequent report, Leo X thanked Wolsey ‘for his attachment to the Holy See’ and 
begged his credence for the nuncio on further unknown matters.297  
 By the end of February 1521, some sort of watershed had been reached with the 
papacy, as far as the English crown was concerned when a new ambassador, John Clerk was 
commissioned for Rome.298 Henry and Wolsey had finally responded to Giulio de’ Medici’s 
repeated requests for de Giglis to be replaced. Given that Leo’s chief advisor had been 
pressing for this since May 1520, one would surmise that the timing was politically 
significant.299 Firstly, the English apparently put great store by the papal recommendation that 
Henry act as ‘arbiter’ of the Franco-Imperial dissensions; indeed, they communicated through 
Ghinucci on perhaps 25 February, that Henry was attempting to settle these grievances 
amicably.300 Secondly, the English were concurrently negotiating with Charles V towards an 
alliance against France and Clerk may have been intended to broach this.301 
 The mood of the papacy was changing, however, and de’ Medici indicated this to the 
English in a despatch, perhaps dated 27 February, asserting that ‘the French had proceeded to 
their dishonest craft’ and had tried to take the papal city of Reggio, under pretext of arresting 
                                                 
296 LPIIIi, 1137 (21 January 1521, Henry to Leo, Greenwich). The ‘matters’ to which He y referred are not nr
specified but, given that de Giglis had hitherto been out of favour as a diplomatic conduit between England and 
Rome, and that Campeggio had recently referred to both himself and the bishop of Worcester as present when 
ge Henry to become ‘arbiter’ of Franco-Imperial differences, this is what was 
eply that is implied. On the other hand, Campeggio’s acknowledgement of his receipt 
 Wolsey, dated 21 January, does not suggest anything along these lines, merely ‘lesser’ 
the pope lobbied them to ur
probably meant. Indeed, this subject was significant enough to be described ‘of great importance’ and would 
have warranted the swift r
of correspondence from
matters, such as de Giglis’ desire to gain a red hat and Wolsey being provided to the Spanish see of Badajoz. 
That is not to say, however, that the corresponding missive to de Giglis did not contain anything about the papal 
proposal for English arbitration; ibid., 1187 (4 March 1521, [Campeggio] to Wolsey, Rome). 
297 Ibid., 1178 (25 February 1521, Leo to Wolsey, Rome). 
298 Clerk was to leave for Rome on 1 March 1521; Ven.iii, 167 (28 February 1521, Surian to the Signory, 
London). 
299 At the end of November 1520, de’ Medici asked for a second time for a new (‘well-informed’) English orator 
to be sent to Rome; LPIIIi, 1080 (calendared end November 1520, [de’ Medici to Ghinucci]). 
300 Ibid., 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]). 
301 See below pp.728-732. 
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Milanese exiles there, but had failed. 302 This may have been intended by the Italian as a 
tentative approach to gauge Henry’s willingness to turn against France. Writing more strongly 
this new foreign 
reached Rome by 20 April and was received 
at the end of March, the papal nipote stated that, as the French could not negotiate an 
alignment with the pope, they tried to achieve this through intimidation instead; ‘this 
insolence must be chastised’, he opined. Also, de’ Medici conveyed the pope’s warning about 
Henry’s attempts to mediate ‘inter Caesarem et G[allum]’, as they will ‘only encourage 
Francis, who ought to be restrained, as he has often disturbed the peace of Christendom’. The 
Italian further claimed that he had tried to speak with Leo on this matter but, as they could not 
find a suitable place, he has not said a word. De’ Medici then explicitly outlined papal 
intentions; Leo ‘has resolved to liberate himself at all hazards from this intolerable slavery’ 
and hoped for Henry’s support, as the latter had done on previous occasions, as well as of 
Wolsey’s. Furthermore, Ghinucci was instructed to inform Wolsey that 
policy was intended ‘not merely for the liberation of the Holy See, but of Italy, from the fangs 
of the wolf’.303 This back channel overture could not be a clearer appeal for Henry to step in 
and ‘defend the faith’ 
Clerk, unaware of the direct papal approach, arrived with de’ Medici at Florence by 15 
April 1521 and apparently discussed his mission freely. He delivered a handwritten letter to 
the cardinal protector after which, the latter claimed, it was ‘as if he had been speaking to 
Wolsey himself’. De’ Medici replied that he ‘entirely surrenders his wishes and thoughts to 
Wolsey’ and wanted this known to Leo and Henry.304 Given the gushing response from the 
pope’s chief advisor, one presumes that the English representative arrived with the ‘right’ 
message; the desire to turn against France. Clerk 
                                                 
302 LPIIIi, 1209 (calendared 30-31 March 1521, [de’ Medici to -]). 
303 Ibid.. 
304 Ibid., 1228 (15 April 1521, [Giulio de’ Medici to Wolsey], Florence). He passed through the French Court 
william to Wolsey]). during mid-March; ibid., 1198 (calendared 16-17 March 1521, [Fitz
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by the retinues of Campeggio and de’ Medici.305 It seems that Clerk did not make a beeline to 
Campeggio, only delivering the Italian letters from Henry and Wolsey by 3 May; these 
instructed the cardinal to fully support the new orator, which Campeggio agreed to do 
(doubtless motivated by his hope of gaining the vacant see of Worcester). Coincidentally, Leo 
concluded a secret alliance with Charles V shortly after (at the end of May). This may well 
have been encouraged by Clerk’s reassurances of English support.306 The Spanish 
ambassador in Rome had certainly been circulating rumours that this was the case.307 
 Wolsey, doubtless having received de’ Medici’s overture to combine against France, 
assured the pope on 21 May that he was regularly conferring with Ghinucci and also referred 
him to Clerk.308 At the turn of May-June, Clerk and Campeggio apparently met with Leo and 
de’ Medici, and voiced their doubt whether the pope would persist in his anti-French 
sentiments. The pontiff replied that he would be offended if this opinion had emanated from 
Henry or Wolsey. Writing to Ghinucci, the cardinal protector stated categorically that ‘none 
are so offensive to him [Leo] as the French, and he can never trust them more, or ever become 
their friend’. The nuncio was instructed to discover whether this opinion did come from the 
king or his cardinal, so that they could counter it. Wolsey was to be further assured of de’ 
Medici’s friendship. 309 Around 7-8 June, de’ Medici, conveying the pope’s satisfaction with 
the English response to the Lutheran heresy, also rejoiced at hearing that Henry would defend 
Christendom ‘with his pen as well as with his sword’.310 The implication is again, therefore, 
                                                 
305 The issue of Clerk’s replacing de Giglis was easily solved, given that the bishop of Worcester had died on the 
18th; ibid., 1247 (23 April 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). 
306 L. Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, p.35. 
307 De Giglis refuted these to the pope; LPIIIi, 1278 (14 May 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Chatillion), 1303 (24 
, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to 
p of Ascoli]). 
May 1521
de la Batye, French ambassador to England). 
308 Ibid., 1299 (21 May 1521, Wolsey to Leo, London). 
309 Ibid., 1325 (calendared beginning June 1521, [de’ Medici to -]). 
310 Ibid., 1333 (calendared 7-8 June 1521, [de’ Medici to the bisho
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that the papacy had already received an assurance from the king that he would support Rome 
against France. 
 
 The impression during early 1521, therefore, is of the English crown wanting to 
believe the pope’s anti-French overtures, but not entirely trusting that he would follow 
through with his commitment. This sentiment also featured prominently during negotiations 
towards an Anglo-Imperial alignment against France, particularly through Tunstal, December 
1520-June 1521. The first indication of this occurred towards the end of January, when Henry 
acknowledged his ambassador’s reservations concerning the oath that Charles would give to 
him upon ratifying such an agreement; that it would not have any force if mention were not 
made of a papal dispensation for his marriage to Princess Mary due to their consanguinity. 
Having consulted his Council, Henry decided that, while this was important, ‘to have the oath 
made dependent on the Pope’s arbitrement…might lead hereafter to influence being used with 
the Pope by the Emperor, the French King, or others, to refuse the dispensation altogether’. It 
would, therefore, be ‘inexpedient’ to mention this in the oath ‘before they were sure of the 
Pope’. If, on the other hand, Tunstal could not avoid any mention of such a dispensation, 
enry instructed that a bull or brief be gained immediately from the pope, for them ‘to 
conditions, which included the precursory conclusion of a defensive league with Rome, and 
H
contract matrimony, whensoever they should mind and determine so to do, the said 
impediment notwithstanding’.311 
Around the same time, Henry conveyed to Tunstal his anger that Charles’ Council had 
moved the goalposts about forming an Anglo-Imperial alliance. He objected to their new 
refused to meet these before establishing a closer amity with Charles. Concerning the need for 
                                                 
311 Ibid., 1149 (calendared end January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]). 
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a papal dispensation to validate the marriage and seal the alliance, the king insisted upon this 
being issued secretly ‘under lead’ and that, in their alliance, there would be an article binding 
both parties not to conclude a defensive union with the papacy until this had been granted. 
Henry speculated that Leo would not then object to the demand, as if he did he would not be 
offered the protection of such a league. Henry further explained his firm stance about not 
concluding a league with the pope before an alliance with the emperor in terms of his not 
having any need to do so; if he did concede to Charles’ demands, he argued, the Imperialists 
‘might demand unreasonable things of us, which would lead us into war and intolerable 
charges, bring us into suspicion with the other confederates, and help them to play their game, 
leaving us alone’. If, on the other hand, an Anglo-Imperial axis existed, Henry claimed that 
they would both be forced to act in good faith towards each other. Henry also advised Charles 
against war in the short-term because of the instability in Spain, his ministers’ motivation by 
personal advantage and because the pope was ‘so brittle, and variable, to be led into wars for 
the sake of one or other’.312  
 In reply, circa 11-12 February 1521, Charles’ advisors continued to insist on the 
formation of a league with the pope (and retaining Swiss) arguing that, if they had not 
instructed the Viceroy of Naples to raise 4,000 foot to aid the pope, he would have joined the 
French already. Concerning their stipulation for a marriage dispensation, it was said that the 
emperor could not negotiate ‘with his honour’ unless this was gained. Indeed, the papal 
ambassador in Germany, it was claimed, possessed such a grant, but was commanded not to 
deliver it unless Charles first met the papacy’s demands. It was presented to Henry, in other 
                                                 
312 The other conditions now insisted upon by Charles’ Council prior to any conclusion of an Anglo-Imperial 
alliance were the hiring of the Swiss, the provision of aid against the Spanish rebels and agreement to a new 
interview between Henry and Charles. Concerning Henry’s desire to establish a concrete alliance with Charles 
before committing to anything else and his suspicions about being left high and dry if he did not insist on this, 
his previous experience with Charles bore witness to the validity of his caution; ibid., 1150 (calendared end 
January 1521, [Henry to Tunstal]). 
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words, as a catch-22 situation. Furthermore, Tunstal advised, the Imperialists ‘stakke moche’ 
to the need for papal favour, particularly concerning their possession of Naples, a papal fief; 
they must, therefore, ‘entertain him [for the] good that he may do unto them’. Tunstal also 
stated that he had passed on Henry’s insistence on an article for the alliance that no defensive 
league be made until the aforementioned dispensation be gained; it was promised that this 
would be referred to Charles. The English ambassador also reported his being questioned 
about Henry’s failure to reveal the aid he intended for the pope and to hire the Swiss, to which 
he replied that his king would do so when he knew what support was required. Tunstal was 
then told that Leo wanted a garrison around him immediately and expected England and the 
Empire to contribute pro rata. With regard to the Swiss, Henry was expected to convey 
20,000 ducats at least, given that the pope and emperor were to contribute 30,000 apiece. In 
response, Tunstal commented that it was a large amount of money, given that Henry would 
not gain much from its purpose; nevertheless, he told the Imperialists that it might be 
negoiated once the Anglo-Imperial alliance had been settled. Finally, the Chancellor told 
Tunstal that they had already applied to Leo X for a commission to conclude a defensive 
league, although this had not yet arrived.313 At the end of March 1521, Wolsey instructed 
Tunstal to reiterate the English position to the Imperial Council; that Henry has expressly 
ordered that no discussion of a defensive league with the pope would be held until the Anglo-
Imperial marriage alliance was settled.314 As will be seen, however, this was partly untrue; the 
English crown was exploring negotiations with Rome, unbeknown to the emperor. As to the 
marital dispensation, Wolsey described this to Henry as a ‘new invention’, a matter which the 
                                                 
313 Ibid., 1162 (calendared 11-12 February 1521, Tunstal to Henry). 
314 Nor were Tunstal and Spinelly to broach the retaining of the Swiss, the provision of aid against the Spanish 
rebellion or another interview with Charles; ibid., 1214 (calendared end March 1521, Wolsey to Tunstal, 
Hampton Court). 
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Imperialists insisted upon neither during the negotiations at Canterbury nor Calais.315 By 
April/May 1521, the English continued to insist that they would not ally with Rome until the 
amity with the emperor had been settled. In early May, Henry wrote that the delay emanated 
from Charles and that, had their alliance been agreed, he ‘might have declared himself more 
frankly’ concerning the coalition with the pope.316 
 Regardless of England’s reluctance to join with the papacy against France yet, Charles 
V pursued his own agenda in Rome, to induce papal support for his planned coalition. By 
April 1521, his ambassador in Rome was claiming that Henry VIII would side with him, 
causing Henry to warn Charles to ‘look to the close keeping of his secrets’.317 These rumours 
seriously undermined England’s continued claim to be arbitrating Franco-Imperial 
differences; Juan Manuel was claiming that Henry would join an offensive league (also 
comprising the pope) to expel the French from Milan (and, presumably, Italy). Possibly 
without instruction from England, de Giglis took steps to reassure Leo X that no such project 
existed and this news made its way back to France.318 At the end of June 1521, Charles V re-
engaged the English crown on the subject of a league with the papacy (albeit an Imperial-
papal alignment had already been concluded, unbeknown to Henry and Wolsey). The 
emperor-elect was prepared to concede that an Anglo-Imperial alliance be settled first; if 
Henry and Wolsey showed themselves prepared to conclude under cover of a Calais 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 
6 The l
this was contained had been crossed out; ibid., 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, instructions to Sir Richard 
Wingfield, ambassador to the emperor), 1278 (14 May 1521, Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, Chatillion), 1303 (24 May 
ared 25-27 May 1521, instructions to de la 
les, followed by an offensive arrangement whereby the French would be ousted from Milan 
n told that Charles would marry Mary on his 
31 1213 (calendared end March 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). 
31 eague was also to include the Swiss Confederacy and Spain; ibid., 1270 (calendared 7-11 May 1521, 
instructions to Sir Richard Wingfield, ambassador to the emperor). 
317 This rebuttal may not have reached Charles V, as in the copy of the instructions found, the paragraph in which 
1521, Fitzwilliam and Jerningham to [Wolsey], Dijon), 1310 (calend
Batye, French ambassador to England). 
318 As Francis understood, the emperor elect planned an initially defensive league with the pope, to gain the 
investiture of Nap
and Leo X would gain Parma and Piacenza. The pontiff had bee
return to Flanders, at which point England would join the offensive alliance; ibid., 1310 (calendared 25-27 May 
1521, instructions to de la Batye, French ambassador to England). 
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conference, he instructed his ambassadors going to England to demonstrate his commitment 
to securing papal support and to promise that Henry would be notified of this quickly. If the 
king and cardinal were unimpressed with this, the orators were to consult each other about 
how much more they could disclose about the Imperial-papal relationship and to assure the 
English that, once united, they could easily attract the Swiss.319 
 
 The English crown also moved to take control of the broader anti-French initiative 
from April-May 1521 by offering to arbitrate Franco-Imperial differences at a summit to be 
held at Calais. It was apparently hoped that Wolsey would be able to use it as cover to 
compose an Anglo-Imperial alliance, in addition to arranging a truce so that England could 
prepare for war, although this policy was not yet concrete.320 That this move came shortly 
after Henry and Wolsey learnt of a Franco-papal agreement suggests that they may have felt it 
necessary, once again, to pre-empt Leo X offering himself as ‘arbitrator’ and potentially 
mediating any peace with a pro-French bias.321 Just as in 1518 and 1520, however, the papacy 
was excluded from this process until the last moment. Wolsey only instructed Clerk to 
disclose this ‘peace’ initiative to Leo on 20 June 1521. At that point, he claimed to have 
rancis on-side, but not yet Charles, although he envisaged winning over the latter. Henry and 
                                                
F
Wolsey desired papal representation at the conference, perhaps even a legate a latere.322 He 
 
s bound not to make any agreements without 
319 Charles also wanted his diplomats to declare that an offensive to oust the French from Milan would more 
surely be achieved with papal backing (although he was careful to emphasise that he would be able to do it 
without Leo); ibid., 1371 (27 June 1521, Charles’ instructions two ambassadors going to England). 
320 See above pp.697-700. 
321 See above pp.722-723. 
322 This information is rehearsed in Clerk’s reply to Wolsey. The desire for a(-nother) legate to attend is not 
explicit; while, Clerk mentions ‘some notable person’ being desired by the English, he implies later in the letter 
that the preferred choice of the English was Cardinal de’ Medici; LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], 
Rome), 1404 (9 July 1521, Campeggio to [Wolsey], Rome). When Francis agreed to Wolsey presiding over the 
Calais conference (around 9 June 1521), he claimed that, as he wa
Leo X’s consent, he wanted permission for the pope to send envoys to oversee their interests. Henry accepted 
this proposal; ibid., 1337 (9 June 1521, Jerningham to Wolsey, Dijon), 1338 (calendared 9-10 June 1521), 1339 
(calendared 9-10 June 1521). 
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further sought to consult the pontiff on ‘the ways of arbitrament’ and may also have requested 
broader legatine powers to enhance his status at this summit.323 Just as in 1518 and 1520, 
therefore, Henry and Wolsey intended to invest the occasion with ‘quasi-papal’ authority. The 
presence of a legate sent from Rome would lend direct papal support to Wolsey’s actions and 
one imagines that the English cardinal envisaged himself as the senior of the two.324 In reply, 
Leo argued as someone who had recently allied (secretly) against France; Henry, he argued, 
‘knew little “what presumption and insolency the Frenchmen had us[ed] with his Holiness 
lately”’ and disclosed that, recently, Francis requested a brief from him, promising not to 
engage in any arbitration with the emperor-elect. The pope condemned Francis’ inability to 
observe treaties as a reason why he would not consent to the negotiations. Leo’s political 
intentions were explicit: ‘it is high time to punish the insolence of France, he will spend his 
blood to drive them out of Italy’, and he further sought English assistance in restraining 
Francis. In reply to the request for a delegate to attend the conference, Leo initially refused 
but, when he heard that Henry VIII awaited papal as well as Imperial and French approval to 
act as arbitrator, appeared to soften on this; the pontiff said that he would send a cardinal, if 
he had time, but was unable to release de’ Medici from his current role, governing Florence. 
Clerk subsequently doubted that Leo would despatch anyone although, if he did, it would be 
Campeggio.325 By 21 July, the papacy’s position, vis-à-vis the Calais Conference became 
                                                 
323 Bulls facilitating this were sent on the same date as Clerk’s reply to Wolsey’s desire for a papal representative 
to be present. The new commission contained powers, ‘the like of which have not been seen in England for many 
years’, believed by the Venetian ambassador in London to include the ability to confer English benefices and to 
receive annates (other than those of bishoprics), although he later confirmed that they excluded the latter power. 
LPIIIii, 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome); Ven.iii, 263, 272 (25 July 1521, Surian to the Signory). 
324 Just as he had done when Campeggio was his co-legate in 1518; see above pp.637-643. 
325 LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Clerk later acknowledged receipt of Wolsey’s 25 June 
1, 
missive on 8 July; ibid., 1477 (8 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Campeggio, listening to rumours in 
Rome, assumed that he would be the legate sent and asked for Clerk to be instructed to urge that he be 
commissioned; ibid., 1404 (9 July 1521, Campeggio to [Wolsey]). The pope also resisted French pressure to 
send a new delegate to the conference, arguing that he already had nuncios in England and France, one of whom 
would suffice. The French interpreted this to mean that Leo had sided with Charles; ibid., 1366 (25 June 152
Count de Carpi to Francis, Rome). 
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clearer. Despite repeated English approaches to have a papal representative despatched, Clerk 
reported Leo to be indifferent. Such was his enmity against France that Leo dismissed the 
conference, believing that the matters in dispute would be solved imminently ‘by dint of 
sword’. Indeed, Clerk reiterated the pope’s friendship with the emperor-elect, his enmity of 
the French and desire to expel the latter from Italy; he also outlined the papacy’s military 
movements (and preparations). To emphasise his belief that this was a firm papal policy, 
Clerk stressed that ‘his Hol[iness is] set, nor it availeth not to reason with his Holiness to the 
contrary’. The Englishman also reported sustained papal pressure for him to request English 
aid against Francis I, but he had discouraged the pontiff, claiming that Henry would not agree 
to such a war at present. Leo disagreed, however, and told the orator ‘that I [Clerk] could not 
tell what mind the King’s highness and your Grace would be of, where he should see the 
likelihood and possibility that should be against the Frenchmen’.326 
 
 The pope began to publicly express his enmity against France from the end of June 
and at a consistory, perhaps on the 27th, revealed his alliance with Charles, including to 
England.327 Around the same time, Campeggio advised that a Franco-Imperial conflict in 
Italy was deemed inevitable.328 On the other hand, the papacy may not have divulged this 
                                                 
 Ibid., 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). It seems that the papacy was also subject to Imperial 
pressure to be uncooperative with the English peace initiative. In mid-July, the Venetian orator at the Imperial 
VIII did not have enough power to secure a peace or truce (at Calais) and that, were the English monarch forced 
to choose sides, he would turn against France; Ven.iii, 262 (16 July 1521, Contarini to the Council of Ten, 
Antwerp). 
327 While Pastor claims that the alliance was effectively revealed in Consistory on the 27th, Knecht suggests that 
326
Court claimed to have seen correspondence from Caracciolo to Rome, conveying Charles’ assurance that Henry 
it was the 29th; R.J. Knecht, Francis I, p.107; L.Pastor, History of the Popes, viii, pp.35-36, 42-43. The French 
ambassador in Rome sensed a volte-face by the papacy by 20 June 1521 (which France had hitherto considered 
., 1369 (27 June 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). 
an ally, albeit a secret one); Count Carpi reported the imminent (and, as far as he was concerned, ominous) 
arrival of the condottiero Prospero Colonna, as well as a lack of alarm from the pope about the presence of 
Spanish troops on the border of the Papal States. Overall, the orator opined, the recent death of the emperor 
elect’s principal minister, the francophile Chièvres, marked a change in policy which would see Charles draw 
closer to Rome; LPIIIi, 1366 (25 June 1521, Count de Carpi to Francis, Rome). 
328 Campeggio notified Wolsey that the Spanish, then at the River Tronto, intended to launch an assault on Milan 
at the first possible opportunity; ibid
 734
information to the English just yet; as at 9 July, while the English ambassador Clerk 
understood that Leo had allied with Charles (due to Francis’ attack on Reggio) and wished to 
expel the French from Italy, the pope was still denying the former, but admitting the latter.329 
Despite earlier secrecy surrounding this agreement, Wolsey seems to have been 
 
Charles
rule the universe,’ he added.332 Leo X appears, therefore, to have been attempting to induce 
confident that the pope would adhere to any anti-French actions decided upon by England and 
the Empire as early as 6 July.330 He had perhaps heard of Leo X’s attacks on French interests 
up to this point. The first official news of the papacy’s new anti-French alignment appears to 
have reached England after 8 July.331 Spinelly was then present at an audience given by the 
emperor to the papal nuncio in the Low Countries on the 9th. Here, the nuncio formally 
requested the emperor’s aid against France and declared his intention to communicate this to 
other princes, in particular Henry ‘who had ever been most closely linked with the Church’.
 agreed to support the pontiff and then asked Spinelly to relay this request to Henry, so 
that he could declare himself in favour of Rome. Spinelly’s reply was said to be ‘very 
violent’, stating that Henry would react to this within a few days. ‘These Frenchmen want to 
                                                 
329 To indicate Leo being pro-Charles, Clerk observed that Charles have been given the investiture of Naples 
and, on last St Peter’s Day, the pope had received the annual homage gift of a white horse. As a result, Clerk 
believed he would act in tandem with the emperor elect; LPIIIii, 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome), 
1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
lish king about a ‘stir made 
d that the pope had 
 account of a French offensive on Reggio, on 23 June. In respect 
330 Reporting their audience with Henry and Wolsey, at which the latter were reportedly enthusiastic to align 
with Charles V against Francis, the Imperial diplomats further conveyed the cardinal’s wish to, apparently, form 
a broader league against France, including the pope, of whose mind Wolsey claimed to be sure; ibid., 1395 (6 
July 1521, bishop of Elna and Haneton to Charles). 
331 On this date, Spinelly reported hearing that Leo X had declared in favour of the emperor and that he had 
approached the Swiss with a view to attacking the French at Milan; ibid., 1398 (calendared 6-8 July 1521, 
Spinelly to Wolsey). According to a Venetian source at the French court, Henry VIII may have heard about the 
papacy’s actions even earlier, as prior to 6 July, Francis I reportedly wrote to the Eng
against him by the Pope’. Leo, it was claimed, had bestowed Charles V with the investiture of Naples, in return 
for troops, galleys, an annual financial tribute, as well as a number of cities. Francis claime
done this because he had not gained Ferrara. In addition, the French king had promised to restore to Leo Modena 
and Reggio ‘and this was not enough for him’; Ven.iii, 253 (6 July 1521, Giovanni Badoer to the Signory, 
‘Argilly’). 
332 The pope approached Charles, allegedly on
of Spinelly’s comments, the Venetian author of this letter conveyed that they could be largely dismissed, as the 
English diplomat did not carry much weight in crown circles; Ven.iii, 254 (9 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, 
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Henry VIII into resuming his role of ‘defending the faith’, by following Charles V’s lead. The 
emperor repeated his pledge to aid the pope and his request for Henry VIII to do the same, to 
Richard Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly during an audience around 13 July, in which Charles 
described Henry ‘as one who had been a special defender of the Holy Church’. These envoys 
also forwarded news of the consistory in which the pope publicly declared himself against 
France at this point, along with the pope’s request before all ambassadors in Rome that their 
princes support him.333 The emperor, impatient for a reply concerning the pope’s request for 
aid, instructed Wingfield and Spinelly to write to England again in this regard on the 14th. 
Wingfield, perhaps trying to toe the ‘party line’ (his commission being to secure the 
emperor’s support for the Calais conference), tried to reason with Charles that the offence 
committed against the pope ‘was rather in demonstration than in deeds’, but to little avail.334  
 In England, before 16 July, Ghinucci and the Imperial ambassador presented letters to 
Wolsey from their masters, the nuncio declaring Leo’s intention to join with Charles against 
France and, presumably, requesting England’s participation. Wolsey was said to be still 
committed to going to Calais, however.335 Henry and Wolsey must have given their reply to 
the papal proposal promptly, as the emperor acknowledged it on 20th. The response appears to 
have been positive, expressing goodwill to both pope and emperor, Charles expecting Wolsey 
to repair from Calais to his presence, ‘to bring the matter [presumably an anti-French alliance] 
cannot have been a coincidence that at this stage, to a speedy conclusion’.336 Furthermore, it 
as Richard Wingfield revealed on 22 July, Henry promised to assist Charles once this 
                                                                                                                                                        
Brussels). Also see intelligence that seems to have reached England regarding the pope’s approach to the 
emperor; LPIIIii, 1405 (calendared 9-10 July 1521, extract of news). 
333 The audience was intended for Wingfield to gain the emperor’s agreement to a truce with France, thereby 
facilitating the Conference of Calalis; LPIIIii, 1415 (13 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, 
Antwerp). 
334 Ibid., 1417 (14 July 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp). 
335 Ibid., 1419 (16 July 1521, Sir Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp), 1422 (20 July 1521, 
Charles to [Henry], Ghent); Ven.iii, 263 (18 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). 
336 LPIIIii, 1422 (20 July 1521, Charles to [Henry], Ghent), 1423 (20 July 1521, Charles to Wolsey, Ghent). Also 
see ibid., 1428 (21 July 1521, Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent). 
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‘straighter conjunction’ had been made. He also told the emperor to keep it secret for now.337 
Intelligence from the Low Countries also arrived around this time; Wingfield and Spinelly 
reported having seen intercepted letters that revealed a planned Franco-papal expedition 
against Naples and Francis’ promise of Ferrara to the pope. When the latter was slow to 
materialise, they reported, the pope went over to Charles, ‘thus Wolsey will see his Holiness’ 
arrange Franco-Imperial differences and to conclude ‘a straight conjunction with the 
                                                
devotion to peace’.338 
 English enthusiasm for an anti-French alliance with the emperor increased somewhat 
following news of the pope’s public emergence from the shadow of France.339 On 19 July, 
Henry was said to have defended the pope’s behaviour against complaints by a pair of French 
of envoys who came to protest against papal actions. They claimed that Leo had made 
military preparations against Genoa long before Francis moved against Reggio (which was 
correct). The English king replied that this may well have been the case, but Francis had 
previously put the pope ‘in such fear and extreme subjection, that he was compelled to do as 
he had done’. In reply to their assertion that Francis no longer intended sending delegates to 
Calais, Henry replied that Francis ‘might lose much reputation, especially in Italy, for it 
would appear to all men that the Pope, the Emperor, and England would join against him’.340 
The following day, Wolsey praised the king’s statements and claimed to have independently 
told the Frenchmen the same things. He also displayed his continued intention to go to Calais, 
 
337 Ibid., 1432 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent). 
338 Ibid., 1419 (16 July 1521, Sir Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Antwerp). 
which each threatened the republic that, as it had acted with France at Reggio, England would be 
aimed to have placated both 
o the Signory), 273 (27 
 July; LPIIIii, 1425 (20 July 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], 
 London). 
339 Ibid., 1432 (22 July 1521, Richard Wingfield to Wolsey, Ghent), 1466 (5 August 1521, Wolsey to Charles, 
Calais). Also, on 25 July, the Venetian ambassador in England reported separate audiences with Henry and 
Wolsey, at 
bound to attack Venice (in accordance with the Treaty of London). While Suriano cl
king and minister, this provides an indication of England’s anti-French and pro-papal credentials merely days 
before Wolsey was supposed to arbitrate at Calais; Ven.iii, 272 (25 July 1521, Surian t
July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). 
340 Richard Pace reported these exchanges to Wolsey on 20
Windsor). Also see Ven.iii, 268 (22 July 1521, Surian to the Signory,
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Emperor’.341 Wolsey was observed to have been aware of some sort of ‘capitulations’ 
between the pope and emperor, ‘which as yet be kept to theym selfes secrete’, on 25 July.342  
 
 England’s representatives in Rome, on the other hand, were slow to react to this news, 
taking a few weeks to even include this in their despatches. Campeggio wrote of the pope’s 
open favour of the emperor on 8 July.343 Clerk reported the same on the 9th and claimed to 
have protested at the lack of consultation with England as promised by Leo, to which the 
latter replied, ‘What will you that we should do, these Frenchmen be so proud? They be of 
such power, and we be so nigh their danger…. Wherefore high necessity compelleth us now 
to fall in with these Spaniards, and to grant unto them many things’. Clerk further denied 
rumours of an imminent Anglo-Imperial accord. While Clerk maintained England’s public 
policy of non-partisan arbitration, he was revealing in his assessment of papal intentions. He 
believed that Leo X would not remain neutral; ‘as the Emperor and the King’s highness do, he 
will be ready always to do the same’.344 This again supports the idea that Clerk may have 
known of England’s ‘secret’ anti-French strategy. By 21 July, Clerk conveyed the pope’s 
repeated requests to aid him against the French. While the orator advised Leo that he didn’t 
think that Henry would agree (officially, keeping to the ‘party line’), the pontiff dismissed 
this.345 
                                                 
341 LPIIIii, 1426 (20 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster). 
342 The Imperial embassy in England had been instructed only to disclose the alliance, if Henry and Wolsey 
would not agree to a closer alliance. As this had already been indicated to them, it seems that this information 
was not revealed; ibid., 1439 (25 July 1521, Wolsey to Henry, Westminster); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign 
ii, 278. 
Policy’, HJ, 24, p.770, n.78. For the Venetian ambassador embedded with the English crown talking of ‘some 
secret understanding between the Pope and the Emperor’ on 3 August, see Ven.i
343 LPIIIii, 1400 (8 July 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
344 Ibid., 1403 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Also see ibid., 1402 (9 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], 
Rome). Clerk repeated this news on 21 July, also asserting at this point that French support of Ferrara and ‘other 
rebels of the Church’ also contributed to Leo X’s change in foreign policy; ibid., 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to 
[Wolsey], Rome). 
345 Ibid., 1430 (21 July 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
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 In spite of ‘positive’ papal signals for the anti-French agenda, Wolsey still determined 
to follow-through with the Calais Conference. England was not yet allied with either Charles 
or Leo and experience would have told him that it was far too early to count on their 
commitment.346 By this ‘arbitration’, therefore, Wolsey could secretly ally England to the 
Empire, thereby taking the first step towards the breach with France. That he demanded that 
this be a precursor to alliance with Rome has already been mentioned. He also did not wish to 
provoke France until England was ready for war, hence his complementary desire for a truce 
in the meantime, to prepare for conflict.347 
By 5 August, Campeggio spoke of the ‘great expectation’ felt in Rome about Wolsey 
crossing to Calais, apparently on account of the underlying anti-French plans. In consequence 
of papal military preparations and the progress of Imperial forces, he advised that ‘all now 
rests with England to augment these victories, or demand peace from the French on any 
condition’.348 Meanwhile, in England, towards the end of July, the crown still anticipated 
papal compliance to its request to send a delegate to Calais.349 Despite the lack of arrival of 
any special papal representative before the beginning of the conference, Wolsey sought to 
volve the English-based Ghinucci at least. He held a secret meeting with the nuncio around 
                                                
in
the end of July, ‘concerning his Holiness’ affairs against the Frenchmen’. One can only 




August 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome). In a similar way, Clerk reported news having reached Rome of 
Wolsey’s arrival in Calais on the 8th; ibid., 1477 (8 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
at the pope would send someone for the congress; 
iven that he would arrive on 2 August, and therefore would not be worthy of note. For this 
ouncillor anticipated the arrival of another legate, to 
tiations; LPIIIii, 1446 (30 July 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Dunkirk). 
346 See above pp.536-549. 
347 See above pp 28-732. 
 Given that Wolsey only crossed the Channel on 2 August, it is unlikely that Campeggio would have received 
accurate news of this yet. The former’s trip had been delayed, however, on several occasions; LPIIIii, 1468 (5 
349 The Venetian ambassador in England, Surian, understood th
Ven.iii, 273 (27 July 1521, Surian to the Signory, London). Also, on 30 July, Charles’ chancellor (and one of the 
emperor elect’s delegates for the meeting), de Gattinara, reported that lodgings had been arranged for a ‘papal 
legate’ at Calais. While this could refer to Wolsey’s imminent residence there, this could, arguably, have been 
taken for granted, g
particular observation, it is feasible that the Imperial c
represent Rome at the nego
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intention for Calais, as Leo later took ‘comfort’ from this news ‘and instantly desireth your 
grace to continue in that good manner and purpose’.350 Ghinucci subsequently attended a 
meeting at Calais on 5 August (possibly the first of the conference), along with the French 
and Imperial delegates; the nuncio lauded the congress but stated that he had no commission 
from Leo X to represent him, although he was confident of gaining such power and wrote to 
Rome for this.351 By this, papal involvement in the truce negotiations was effectively 
suspended until notification from Rome. 
 
 Initially, at Calais, Wolsey seems not to have involved the papal representatives in his 
‘secret’ negotiations with the Imperialists towards an anti-French alliance.352 During 
discussions at Bruges on 19 August, it was reported that the nuncios present, Ghinucci and 
Caracciolo, were finding it difficult to gain audience with Wolsey (even being turned away 
from his residence). Nevertheless, the cardinal apparently held a lengthy discussion with them 
that same afternoon.353 It seems likely that the cardinal-legate at least hinted at his intentions 
                                                 
350 LPIIIii, 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Acco ding to Contarini, the Venetian ambassador 
with Charles, his papal counterpart in Ghent was fully briefed by Ghinucci in England, the latter ‘who takes part 
in all the present consultations and is acquainted with everything’. Caracciolo also understood that negotiations 
r
were afoot for an Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance, although it is unclear whether he received this intelligence 
from Ghinucci. This nuncio also revealed the papal hope that the peace conference fail and that Henry 
subsequently ally with the papacy; Ven.iii, 274 (29 July 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Ghent). 
dent at the Imperial Court refers to more than one papal ambassador present at a 
 Calais to Francis, 
een the King of 
to gain access to 
351 The Venetian diplomat resi
similar meeting on the 6th, while the French delegates reported negotiations on the 7th, at which a nuncio 
(presumably Ghinucci) made a speech. Finally, Peter Martyr wrote on the 13th of Ghinucci attending the 
conference on behalf of Leo X; Ven.iii, 280 (5 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais), 285 (8 August 1521, 
Contarini to the Signory, Bruges); LPIIIii, 1478 (8 August 1521, French ambassadors at
Calais), 1487 (13 August 1521, Peter Martyr to Marq. A.M., Valladolid). 
352 While the nuncio at the Imperial Court, Caracciolo, seems to have been aware of a rumour at least that an 
Anglo-Imperial marriage alliance was in the offing from at least mid-August 1521, there was no indication that 
he was involved in discussions at this stage. In conversation with the Venetian ambassador Contarini, the nuncio 
reportedly opined on the 17th that Wolsey would not be successful in arranging a Franco-Imperial peace. By the 
19th, Caracciolo commented that ‘these Imperialists have assuredly concluded the business’, and asked Contarini, 
‘did I not tell you at Ghent that an agreement and marriage were in course of negotiation betw
England and the Emperor?’ Finally, the nuncio added, ‘I am of opinion that the treaty is now ratified, and 
thus…the French will find themselves without a leg to stand on’; Ven.iii, 299 (17 August 1521, Contarini to the 
Signory, Bruges), 302 (19 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges). For a comment on the secrecy 
surrounding these negotiations, see ibid., 312 (24 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges). 
353 Contarini was informed on the morning of the19th that his own appointment with Wolsey had been ‘bumped’ 
because of the meeting with the nuncios. Simultaneously, Ghinucci and Caracciolo also began 
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at this point. Indeed, around the 22nd, Caracciolo reportedly suggested to his Venetian 
counterpart that Henry VIII would eventually declare himself on the emperor’s side.354 
Furthermore, by the 24th, Contarini conveyed intelligence that, over several days, the nature of 
the negotiations had been communicated to the two papal representatives and for the previous 
o days, they had actually been present at them. The Venetian was sure that the nuncios had 
ly
presentation of the king’s book against Luther, the Assertio Septem Sacramentorum. The 
tw
copies of the articles of agreement and would send them straight to Rome.355 
 The Treaty of Bruges, concluded by Wolsey with the emperor-elect on 25 August 
1521, effectively committed England to join the Empire in the conflict against France. The 
papacy was central to the alliance and, most significantly, both Henry and Charles undertook 
to be ‘protectors’ both of the papacy and of the Medici. In addition, papal representatives 
would be expected to attend a planned meeting between Henry and Charles in the spring. 
Furthermore, when they launched a joint offensive in 1523, Leo was expected to use ‘the 
spiritual arm only’. Finally, the treaty would be approved by the king and emperor elect on  
once the pope had ratified its articles.356 On the same day, Wolsey issued instructions to John 
Clerk to inform the pontiff of the ‘real’ English foreign policy and combined this with the 
orator was instructed to bestow the latter on Leo X, ‘declaring the King’s resolution to 
support the Church, and extinguish heresy by the sword and pen’. Reinforcing this role (and 
angling for an honorary title), Wolsey also directed him, when given the chance to present an 
                                                                                                                                                        
Charles V; ibid., 302 (19 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges), 310 (22 August 1521, Contarini to the 
Signory, Bruges). 
354 Ibid., 310 (22 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges). 
355 Caracciolo had told the Venetian that Charles had rejected Wolsey’s truce initiative on account of the pope 
doing the same; ibid., 312 (24 August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges). 
356 In terms of Leo’s wielding of ecclesiastical censures, it was stipulated that he ‘lay the whole of France under 
ule and govern most of Christendom, including Italy; ibid., 1515 (28 August 1521, Wolsey to 
interdict, and withdraw all the honours and prerogatives which the French have hitherto held of the Church of 
Rome’; LPIIIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). Wolsey also implied to Henry that he could ‘defend’ the papacy 
by controlling the balance of power in a letter of 28 August, suggesting that England was now ‘an angle of the 
world’ and could r
Henry, Gravelines). 
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oration during the presentation ceremony, to advise ‘that the King has therein styled himself 
the very Defender of the Catholic Faith [of] Christ’s Church, which he has truly deserved of 
the See Apostolic’. In the context of the papacy’s contemporary enmity with France, the 
political implications of these statements were unambiguous. Furthermore, Clerk was to 
reveal to the pontiff in private, first binding him to secrecy, that Henry had decided to ally 
with him and Charles against Francis because of the latter’s attacks on the Empire and the 
Papal States, as well as due to the papal and Imperial requests for support. At this point, Leo 
was to be informed that, to gain time to prepare for the conflict, Henry had ordered Wolsey to 
conduct the Calais peace negotiations and that a marriage alliance had been agreed under 
cover of these. Leo was to be asked to send a messenger to Wolsey, who intended to remain at 
Calais until the start of October (in a bid to protract the talks).357 By the end of August 1521, 
therefore, Wolsey clearly indicated the English crown’s anti-French plans and the ‘price’ that 
he expected from the papacy as a result; an honorary title, recognising Henry’s ‘defence’ of 
the papacy.358 
The secrecy surrounding the anti-French agenda was entirely understandable, not least 
because the Treaty of Bruges provided for no-one to know about it apart from ‘the secret 
councillors of the contracting parties’.359 As papal ratification of treaty and participation in 
the planned offensive was expected, and the papal nuncios at Bruges already seem to have 
been informed of the agreement, Leo X was perhaps far more knowledgeable about this than 
Clerk and Campeggio. While the pope was apparently informed of England’s anti-French 
actions by 12 August, via the diplomatic back-channel provided by Ghinucci, the English 
                                                 
357 Ibid., 1510 (25 August 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk], Bruges). Also see ibid., 1502 (24 August 1521, Wolsey to 
[Henry]), 1519 (29 August 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Guildford). The timing of this was evidently stage-managed 
by Wolsey, as he had reminded Henry to sign and send him the relevant letters to the pope concerning the book 
shortly before he crossed for Calais; ibid., 1449 (calendared end July 1521, Wolsey to Henry). 
358 See above pp.164-167. 
359 LPIIIii, 1508 (25 August 1521, Bruges). 
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representatives in Rome remained in the dark.360 Campeggio, hearing of Wolsey’s arrival in 
Bruges, wrote to the cardinal on 30 August, expecting ‘to hear of some glorious deed as the 
result of this journey,’ also reporting that ‘many say it was undertaken to reconcile the Kings 
and to provide for peace; others, to assist Charles in avenging a broken treaty’.361 Similarly, 
Clerk was no better informed; on 3 September, he acknowledged a letter from Tuke, dated 8 
August, apparently describing Wolsey’s arrival at Calais and the accompanying ceremonies. 
In the same post, moreover, Clerk was aware of the arrival of an encrypted letter presumably 
from Ghinucci. While Clerk probed Leo X on this correspondence, the pontiff was reluctant 
to disclose its contents, stating merely that ‘Nos speramus quod D. Cardinalis Eboracensis 
om[nia] tractabit bene’. As far as the orator was concerned, it was widely anticipated that 
Wolsey was going to ‘secure peace among all Christians’.362 It can be reasonably surmised 
that the Ghinucci letter revealed to the pope Wolsey’s good intentions towards him, indicated 
to the nuncio shortly before their departure for Calais, if not his speculation of what was 
expected to pass at Bruges in the near future.363 Clerk only became au fait with the Treaty of 
Bruges (and the details of the anti-French strategy) by Wolsey’s notification which reached 
him by 14 September. Binding the pope to secrecy, he revealed that Henry VIII had decided 
to join the pope and emperor ‘in defence of the Church’. In spite of this, Henry and his 
council had identified some short-term difficulties in pursuing this policy: firstly, they did not 
have enough time to raise the troops needed; secondly, the campaigning season would be over 
before English forces could be transported; thirdly, the expense involved. As a result, Clerk 
continued, Henry’s Council determined that he should act as arbitrator between the Empire 
                                                 
360 Ibid., 1486 (12 August 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
361 Ibid., 1522 (30 August 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
362 Ibid., 1540 (3 September 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). Clerk still had no idea of what was going on at 
eptember; ibid., 1545 (5 September 1521, [Clerk to Wolsey], Rome). For Clerk’s 
 strategy was planned, although he may have been unaware of its 
Calais and Bruges on 5 S
probable understanding that an anti-French
details, see p.738. 
363 See above pp.739-740. 
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and Rome, on the one part, and France on the other, to enable a sufficient English invasion to 
be launched at a suitable time. Furthermore, Henry wished for ‘some sure knot of alliance’ 
with Charles V and, so, the Calais conference in pursuit of a truce ‘was only a colour to 
deceive the French King’. Leo thanked Henry and Wolsey ‘for attending to the interests of the 
Church’.364 
 
 When Wolsey returned to Calais to resume ‘peace’ talks in late August, he 
concentrated on his desire for an interim truce, while England could ready itself for war. 
Ghinucci represented Leo X at these talks.365 Even with papal involvement, however, a 
cessation of hostilities (even temporary) looked practically impossible. One must remember 
that the papacy’s presence was as a partisan power, allied with the emperor against France, 
and that its involvement raised political obstacles for the progress of the conference towards 
its public aims. Firstly, the nuncio was not empowered to treat on Leo X’s behalf and such 
power did not arrive until at least 5 October, when papal agreement to a truce was apparently 
conditional on the inclusion of Florence, the marquis of Mantua and Milanese exiles.366  
                                                 
364 LPIIIii, 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). Also see Sp.ii, 359 (26 September 1521, Juan 
Manuel to Charles, Rome). 
 ‘The nuncio is always with us,’ reported Gattinara on 12 September. One or more papal attendees were 




reportedly ill for the eighth session on 29 September; Ven.iii, 321 (30 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, 
i, 1525 (31 August 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1534 (1 September 1521, 
b rs at Calais to Charles), 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis), 
549 (6 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1553 (7 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais 
 Charles), 1568 (12 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1626 (2 October 1521), 1816 (calendared 
end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais Conference). 
366 On 1 September, when the French diplomats reportedly asserted that they were not empowered to negotiate 
, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1568 (12 September 1521, Gattinara to Charles, 
21, French ambassadors in Calais to Francis), 1816 (calendared end November 1521; 
an to the Signory, Calais), 330 (9 September 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais). 
1
to
with their papal counterpart(s), Ghinucci agreed that it would not become the pope for him to enter into such 
discussions with the French when the latter lacked such authority. Wolsey told French delegates on 5 October 
that he had received letters from Rome indicating that the pope was prepared to treat with France; LPIIIii, 1534 
(1 September 1521
Calais), 1638 (6 October 15
Imperial account of the Calais Conference). For the belief among observers that Leo X opposed a truce; Ven.iii, 
325 (5 September 1521, Suri
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 Wolsey had instructed Clerk to have the pope issue such a commission on the same 
date that he notified him of the Treaty of Bruges. The cardinal stressed the need for speed, but 
Clerk encountered procrastination around 14 September. The orator does seem to have 
succeeded shortly after, however.367 The delay may have arisen from papal suspicions about 
Wolsey’s motives; towards the end of September, Leo voiced his fears to the Imperial orator 
that the English cardinal might be deceiving them and advised that someone ought to warn 
Henry about him. 368 This lack of papal commission encouraged Imperial obstruction, as 
Charles’ delegates insisted that, by virtue of the Anglo-Imperial alliance, they could not come 
to any type of agreement without papal consent and, as Ghinucci was not appropriately 
mmi
intransigence on the basis that the need to seek papal agreement was not in the delegates’ 
commission. Gattinara dismissed this and also revealed that he had to continue with such 
co ssioned, the Empire could not, therefore, adhere to any peace or truce. In the first 
meeting of 30 August, Wolsey said that the difficulties that he experienced in Bruges (in 
gaining Charles’ agreement to peace) were caused by an oath that the emperor had made to 
Leo that he would not negotiate any agreement with Francis. Despite this, Wolsey tried to 
invoke his quasi-papal legatine authority by claiming, in the name of the pope, that all parties 
would ratify some agreement.369 In subsequent days, Wolsey tried to challenge Imperial 
delaying tactics to avoid raising French suspicions, with which he claimed Wolsey was 
happy.370 The English cardinal continued to lobby Gattinara in this regard, however. Towards 
the end of September, Wolsey may have been confident of papal agreement on account of 
                                                 
367 LPIIIii, 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome), 1618 (calendared at 30 September 1521, [Clerk 
to Wolsey]). 
368 Sp.ii, 359 (26 September 1521, Juan Manuel to Charles, Rome). 
369 Ven.iii, 321 (30 August 1521, Surian to the Signory, Calais). Also see LPIIIii, 1535 (1 September 1521, 
French ambassadors at Calais to Francis), 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the Calais 
Conference). 
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of the same powers given to the Imperial delegates, see ibid., 1553 (7 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at 
Calais to Cha
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papal financial difficulties and proposed that they arrange a truce that the pope could agree to 
afterwards. The Imperial chancellor believed that this would offend the pope and instead 
suggested that the truce apply only to ultramontane areas, but Wolsey feared that this would 
encourage Francis to focus his forces against Leo X.371 The lack of papal power was still a 
concern for Wolsey and, despite assuring the French that it was on its way on 29 September, 
within days he was visibly worried, questioning Surian whether Venice had intercepted it.372 
The Imperial objection was removed by 5 October when Wolsey claimed that Ghinucci’s 
power to treat had arrived. Around the same time, Charles understood that its arrival was 
imminent and stepped in to support Wolsey’s proposal for a general truce, although still on 
condition that he gained papal approval (or act as security for Leo’s agreement).373 
 In terms of bringing the French to a truce, Francis’ delegates argued on a similar basis 
to their Imperial counterparts that they were not sufficiently empowered to conclude. They 
argued that they could not negotiate with papal representatives, as they were only expecting to 
treat with Imperial delegates. 374 Just as Gattinara had proposed an ultramontane truce in late 
September, Wolsey came under similar pressure from the French. Wolsey replied angrily that 
Francis was not prepared to cease the war in Italy.375 
 The actual papal commission to join the truce arrived at the Imperial court at 
Valenciennes on 14 October, in the hands of Jeronimo Adorno, who had travelled post from 
                                                 
371 Ibid., 1595 (20 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1606 (24 September 1521, 
Gattinara to Charles, Calais), 1612 (29 September 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1624 (1 
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alais Conference); Ven.iii, 351 (28 
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 the Signory, Calais). 
372 Ibid., 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial account of the C
October 1521, doge and senate to Surian). 
373 LPIIIii, 1638 (6 October 1521, French ambassadors in Calais to Francis). Gattinara was reined in by Charles, 
dismissing this id
September 1521, Charles to Gattinara, ‘Bins’), 1616 (30 September 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais, 
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(calendared 7 Octob
374 They did say, however, that they would apply to Francis for this power; ibid., 1534 (1 September 1521, 
Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles), 1535 (1 September 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis). 
375 Ven.iii, 342 (28 September 1521, Surian to
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Rome. He was said to outrank Ghinnuci and had reportedly been instructed to wait for the 
result of current operations in Italy before acting; either pressing for an advantageous truce if 
this was favourable, or to have Wolsey force a truce if it was not.376 The commission itself 
provided for a number of demands from the pope, including those already known by Wolsey 
concerning the inclusion of Florence, Siena, Mantua and other papal confederates.377 It may 
 same parties, but would admit Florence 
this 
                                                
also have demanded the exclusion of papal ‘rebels’, such as Francesco Maria della Rovere.378 
This commission was not forwarded to Calais.379 
 Negotiations subsequently slowed on Leo X’s conditions. On 9 October, for instance, 
Francis admitted that he was happy to incorporate the pope and Florence, but not the marquis 
of Mantua and Milanese rebels.380 To his delegates in Calais, on the other hand, Francis wrote 
on 12 October, that he was not prepared to include the
if was insisted upon.381 On the 16th, the French delegates attempted to negotiate these 
conditions (and their own) with Wolsey, but the cardinal insisted on the inclusion of all those 
stipulated by Leo. The legate further challenged the French to show him what Francis had 
written, as he claimed to know that they had ‘double letters’ that permitted the inclusion of 
Florence and the marquis of Mantua. Wolsey then proceeded to threaten them, suggesting that 
if Francis did not listen to him, all Christendom would turn against him. Concerning the 
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ber 1521, Francis’ instructions to his ambassadors at Calais). 
376 LPIIIii, 1676 (14 October 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Valenciennes); Ven.iii, 348 (15 
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Charles to Gattinara). 
377 LPIIIii, 1678 (calendared 14-15 October 1521, extract of letters). When the nuncios Ghinucci and Caracciolo 
were brought into Anglo-Imperial negotiations around 22 August, they explained to Wolsey the pope’s rejection 
of the truce initiative on account of Leo’s reluctance to desert anti-French elements in Milan; Ven.iii, 312 (24 
August 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Bruges). 
378 LPIIIii, 1640 (7 October 1521, Charles to -). This particular condition was summarised in the eventual 
Imperial summary of the conference as the insistence on the parties becoming ‘friends of friends, and enemies of
enemies’; ibid., 1816 (calendared end November 1521; Imperial acc
379 See pp.748-749. 
380 Ibid., 1651 (9 October 1521, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey], Mortaigne). 
381 Ibid., 1670 (12 Octo
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Milanese exiles, however, Wolsey reportedly conceded that their status should remain as it 
was before the start of the war between France and Rome. 382 
 Shortly after the arrival of the papal commission/s, Wolsey moved to force a truce by 
t Adorno’s ‘colleague’ ventured 
commission, but pretended to wait for it. In addition, they reported Adorno’s belief that the 
truce would not occur, on account of the French.385 
despatching embassies to both Charles and Francis. In his message to Charles, he urged the 
emperor-elect ‘not to r[egard] matters of Italy and the Pope so greatly as to damage the rest of 
his dominions for their advancement’.383 In other words, the emperor ought not to reject the 
truce on account of difficulties in obtaining papal agreement. A problem arose, however, 
when Docwra and Boleyn arrived at the Imperial court to discover that the papal commission 
was apparently limited. They further reported that the pope’s ambassadors there had offered 
to remain in prison until sufficient powers arrived. The English diplomats did admit, however, 
that they had not yet spoken to Adorno about his commission to treat for a truce.384 They did 
visit Adorno on the 27th and, according to Wolsey’s instructions, confronted him on this issue. 
The papal envoy replied that he had ‘a universal commission to consent to all that the King 
and Wolsey thought good for the Pope’s honour’. In response, Adorno was urged to send this 
power straight to Wolsey, so that there would be no delay, bu
that they ought to see the articles of the truce before they consented to it on the pope’s behalf. 
At this point, a number of papal conditions were raised for Wolsey to include. The English 
ambassadors interpreted this to mean that their papal equivalents did have sufficient 
                                                 
382 Ibid., 1683 (16 October 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis). 
383 Ibid., 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles). Wolsey’s instructions for the earl of Worcester 
tober 1521, Docwra, Boleyn and Richard Wingfield to [Wolsey], ‘Curtraye’). 
ield to [Wolsey], Oudenarde). Francis was 
ibid., 1720 (calendared end 
and bishop of Ely, sent to Francis I, on the other hand, do not mention the pope, but do emphasise the need for 
the truce on account of, among other reasons, ‘the victory of the Turk’ and ‘the peril of Hungary’; ibid., 1696 
(calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Francis). 
384 Ibid., 1706 (26 Oc
385 Ibid., 1714 (29 October 1521, Docwra, Boleyn and Richard Wingf
also becoming impatient that his own orators had not seen the papal commission; 
October 1521, memorandum from Francis). 
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 Despite the arrival (albeit non-disclosure) of the papal commission and Wolsey’s more 
forward approach in pursuit of a truce, success was no closer. Indeed, Henry VIII had 
summoned his cardinal home on 27 October and Wolsey tried to wrap things up soon after.386 
Charles’ stance was much the same as it had been at the beginning; he still sought papal 
agreement, the incorporation of Florence and any other place/person stipulated by Leo.387 The 
French position, on the other hand, was shifting, but not sufficiently for the other parties. 
Francis I instructed his negotiators on 2 November to concede the pope’s demands that the 
Milanese exiles be included, but only as long as papal ‘rebels’, such as Francesco Maria della 
Rovere were similarly comprised. Wolsey rejected this on the pope’s behalf, however.388 In 
subsequent days, there was some retrenchment by the French, as the offer to comprise the 
Milanese exiles was withdrawn and another condition added that Cardinal Schiner was not to 
join the pope’s army.389 By around 12-13 November, however, Francis had heeded Wolsey’s 
final ultimatum, then proposing a truce to Charles that provided for the inclusion of any 
parties on either side, except the Milanese exiles. 390 This was too late, however, as the 
emperor-elect was unwilling to agree and Wolsey had conceded defeat, returning to England 
the region. Furthermore, he believed that the pope would never consent to such a truce until 
this had occurred. While the nuncio with Charles possessed power to agree a truce, Wolsey 
shortly after.391 
 As to the unlikelihood of papal involvement, Wolsey admitted to Henry that Leo (and 
Charles) would be unwise to cease hostilities while the conflict in Italy looked as if it would 
expel the French from Milan, particularly as this would increase papal and Imperial power in 
                                                 
386 See n.193. 
387 LPIIIii, 1729 (1 November 1521, [Imperial propositions for a truce]). 
 not agree to a truce, see ibid., 1760 (calendared 13-14 November 
 to Clerk]). Also see above pp.699-701. 
388 Ibid., 1746 (6 November 1521, French ambassadors at Calais to Francis). 
389 Ibid., 1742 (5 November 1521, Somerset, West and Fitzwilliam to Wolsey, ‘Dourlens’). 
390 Ibid., 1758 (calendared 12-13 November 1521, Francis to Charles). 
391 For Wolsey’s opinion that Charles would
1521, [Wolsey
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believed that Adorno was instructions not to act until the aforementioned events had 
occurred.392 As Spinelly reiterated a few days later, ‘the Pope’s power “to entend to the true” 
[sic.] was sent thither, I think only for show, coming out of season’.393  
 
Contemporary to Wolsey’s attempts to negotiate a Franco-Imperial-papal truce, he 
also sought papal membership of the Treaty of Bruges. Wolsey asked Clerk to gain 
commissions ‘ad tractandum et concludendum’ in late August, when he notified Leo of the 
Anglo-Imperial alliance, but the ambassador encountered delay initially.394 The appropriate 
power for this seems to have arrived at the Imperial Court at the same time as that 
commissioning Ghinucci and Adorno to discuss the truce.395 On this understanding, Charles 
instructed Gattinara to show Ghinucci the articles of the proposed league and to agree to the 
minor alterations insisted upon by the pope.396 While Wolsey had heard of its arrival by 
around the 20th, he appears to have recognised the need for direct papal consent and 
                                                 
 LPIIIii, 1762 (calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Henry]). Wolsey’s belief is confirmed by 
Contarini, who on 19 November wrote of his hearing from Imperial insiders that Charles was reluctant to 
Imperial court encouraged him in this; Ven.iii, 365 (19 November 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Oudenarde). 
send it to Calais without being sure that the truce conditions were agreeable to the pope and, at present, they 
were not; ibid., 1765 (calendared 14-15 November 1521, Charles to his ambassadors at Calais). 
 LPIIIii, 1787 (20 November 1521, Spinelly to [Wolsey], Oudenarde). 
394 Ibid., 1574 (14 September 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). 
395
the Imperial court along with Jeronimo Adorno on 14 October, although news of it preced
October 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Valenciennes), 1694 (cal
392
conclude a truce while he believed Milan would be won from the French and that the papal nuncios at the 
Charles’ understanding, around the same time, was that while Adorno had this power, he was instructed not to 
393
 Ibid., 1666 (calendared 11 October 1521, Charles to Gattinara). This second commission probably arrived at 
ed him; ibid., 1676 (14 
endared 20 October 1521, 
Wolsey to Charles); Ven.iii, 348 (15 October 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Valenciennes). If Leo X’s reported 
reaction to the Treaty of Bruges was true, then territorial concerns dictated his desire to join the Anglo-Imperial 
lity towards the Church out of their 
 made at Bruges they should show 
riate to request this 
 and their own consciences’, although 
axis. The pope reportedly desired both parties to ‘show some libera
acquisitions from the French’ and, further, ‘that in the conclusion of the truce
some gratitude to God, by some increase of his patrimony’. As the pope felt it inapprop
himself, ‘he thought it best to leave it to the inspiration of God
correspondence to Charles, Henry and Wolsey was planned; LPIIIii. 1723 (calendared end October 1521, extract 
from letters). 
396 LPIIIii, 1666 (calendared 11 October 1521, Charles to Gattinara). For negotiations with Ghinucci, see P. 
Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy: the Conferences at Calais and Bruges Reconsidered’, The Historical Journal, 
24 (4), (1980), p.769. 
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recommended this to Charles.397 Presumably having received a supportive reply, Wolsey 
contact
agreeing to this.401 Indeed, Wolsey kept Henry informed with Italian news and the king does 
.  The most 
ed Clerk in mid-November to seek Leo X’s ratification of the coalition.398 Despite this, 
an extension to the Treaty of Bruges, including papal membership, was concluded at Calais 
on 24 November 1521. Again it envisaged the defence of the Church, providing for the 
restoration of lands recovered from the French to papal jurisdiction and war to be made on all 
enemies of the Christian faith.399 In short, it was similar to all previous agreements concluded 
whereby England pledged to protect Rome against France. Shortly before this Wolsey 
revealed why he had been so insistent on an Anglo-Imperial axis before incorporating Rome. 
As Gattinara reported, ‘he does not think his master and Charles ought to be led by the Pope;- 
they ought rather to lead him to their own advantage’.400  
 
 Throughout the Calais Conference, Franco-Imperial forces were at war (both directly 
and by proxy) in Italy. Part of the reason for procrastination by both sides concerning 
Wolsey’s truce proposal was that they awaited a decisive moment in the peninsula before 
not seem have shared his cardinal’s desire for a truce. In mid-October, for instance, Pace 
reported that ‘the King expects great tidings’ if Schiner joins the papal army 402
significant news, as far as the anti-French agenda and papal ‘independence’ was concerned, 
                                                 
397 LPIIIii, 1694 (calendared 20 October 1521, Wolsey to Charles). 
398 Ibid., 1760 (Ellis, pp.282-284; calendared 13-14 November 1521, [Wolsey to Clerk]). For rumours of this 
reaching Venetian ears, see Ven.iii, 364 (17 November 1521, Contarini to the Signory, Oudenarde). 
399 It also expected Leo X to lay France under interdict and named Cardinal de’ Medici to be protected under the 
treaty’s terms. Ghinucci concluded on Leo’s behalf; LPIIIii, 1796 (22 November 1521), 1802 (24 November 
1521, Calais); P. Gwyn, ‘Wolsey’s Foreign Policy’, HJ, 24, p.769. Sicca also believed that this revised treaty 
provided for Wolsey to be the joint Anglo-Imperial candidate for the next conclave, with de’ Medici to be 
ovember 1521, Imperial ambassadors at Calais to Charles). 
field and Spinelly to [Wolsey], ‘Mons, in 
second choice, although nothing has been found to support this; C.M. Sicca, ‘Consumption and Trade of Art 
between Italy and England in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century’, Renaissance Studies, 16, p.173. 
400 LPIIIii, 1789 (20 N
401 See, for instance, ibid., 1632 (4 October 1521, Richard Wing
Hennego’). 
402 Ibid., 1680 (15 October 1521, Pace to [Wolsey], Windsor). 
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was the fall of Milan to papal-Imperial forces on 19 November.403 English diplomats in Rome 
quickly notified the crown of this.404 News of this began to filter into England by the 
beginning of December.405 By the 12th, Imperial sources reported much rejoicing of this news 
in England, including the singing of songs in the streets and at court. Henry promised to write 
to Charles but, in the meantime instructed the bishop to convey his congratulations.406  
 The celebrations were genuine, as it looked as if the French would be expelled from 
aly and the papacy would be ‘defended’, without any tangible English actions. The political It
sands shifted quickly, however, as Leo X died on the night of 1-2 December. While John 
Clerk immediately notified the crown,407 the first news of this seems to have arrived in 
England by 16 December, in letters from Francis I. Their reaction was probably politically 
focused. Worryingly, this French correspondence also claimed that the papal and Imperial 
armies had disbanded as a result and that the French were gaining ground again in Italy.408 
The king and cardinal spoke with de Mesa, outlining their (and hopefully Charles’) reaction. 
In the first place, Wolsey recommended that Charles maintain his army in Italy, overtly to 
defend Naples, but really, one would venture, to ‘secure’ the papacy. Secondly, Henry 
reportedly wanted Wolsey or, failing that, de’ Medici, to become pope, the former particularly 
                                                 
403 History of the Po s L. Pastor, pe , viii, pp.54-55. 
404 Campeggio notified Wolsey of this on the 26th. He also conveyed news of the surrender of Cremona and of all 
other places, bar Parma. Clerk waited until he was convinced of its veracity, on the 28th; LPIIIii, 1809 (26 
ber 1521, 
 Wolsey, Oudenarde), 1831 (3 
s ambassador in England, ‘Compiegne’). 
; LPIIIii, 1858 (12 December 1521, de Mesa to 
er 1521, 
November 1521, [Campeggio to Wolsey], Rome), 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome). 
405 Spinelly and Wingfield reported it on the 1st, immediately sending Lancaster herald, at midnight, to convey 
the news. They forwarded an apparently firsthand Imperial account of the event on the 3rd. Charles V notified 
Henry, Katherine and Wolsey of this event on 2nd, while Francis I apparently despatched two envoys on the 3rd to 
inform the English crown of the same; ibid., 1819 (1 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to 
[Wolsey], Oudenarde), 1827 (2 December 1521, Charles to [Henry], Oudenarde), 1828 (2 Decem
Charles to Catherine of Aragon, Oudenarde), 1829 (2 December 1521, Charles to
December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Oudenarde); Ven.iii, 373 (3 December 1521, 
Francis to hi
406 An Imperial victory at Tournai was also being celebrated
Charles, London). 
407 Clerk first announced that Leo X was gravely ill and unlikely to survive on 1 December. He confirmed that 
the pope had died on the 2nd, explaining that the latter fell ill while celebrating the fall of Milan on a hunt; 
LPIIIii, 1824 (1 December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey], Rome); Ellis, pp.278-281 (LPIIIii, 1825; 2 Decemb
Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). 
408 LPIIIii, 1891 (23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
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so ‘that both your majesties [Henry and Charles] might so dispose of the Cardinal’s authority 
as if the Holy See were your own possession’. Charles’ support was sought and Richard Pace 
was to be despatched to Rome to facilitate this.409 In the event, the Imperialists pre-empted 
this request, Margaret of Savoy apparently offering to speak to her nephew on Wolsey’s 
behalf on the 15th and Charles pledging to honour his promise to Wolsey in communications 
to the Imperial ambassador and the cardinal himself, on 16 and 17 December, respectively.410 
Henry VIII was also quick to confirm his anti-French commitment to Charles in light of the 
pope’s death. On 19 December, the king replied to the emperor, pledging his continued 
commitment against France.411 The English message, therefore, was ‘business as usual’, in 
the short-term at least. 
 The wisdom of Henry and Wolsey’s actions would have been confirmed in the 
following days and weeks, as news of the prevailing political situation in Italy filtered back to 
England, mainly through their ambassadors at the Imperial court. On 18 December, Richard 
Wingfield and Thomas Spinelly notified Wolsey of worrying reports, in particular fears for 
the future of the anti-French forces in Italy, as they had been financed by the pope, and the 
likely consequences for a number of cities in the Papal States and beyond; ‘this might force 
the Pope to yield to the French. The only safety is to provide supplies with all celerity’.412 By 
23 December, Wingfield and Spinelly reported the positive actions of two leading cardinals 
accompanying the coalition forces, de’ Medici and Schiner, having assembled the various 
captains and assured them of continued Imperial support, making provision for the defence of 
                                                 
409 In the ambassador’s opinion, however, Wolsey felt that his election was unlikely, although he did not 
tified Wolsey on the 15 . Charles V instructed his ambassador in England on this 
 December 1521, Margaret of 
ly to [Wolsey], Ghent). 
completely dismiss it; ibid., 1884 (19 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). The Venetian ambassador 
in England, Surian, commented on the breadth of Pace’s commission on 6 January 1522; Ven.iii, 384 ([6] 
January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). 
410 Margaret of Savoy no th
subject on the 16th and wrote directly to Wolsey on the 17th; LPIIIii, 1868 (15
Savoy to Wolsey, Oudenarde), 1876 (16 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent), 1877. Also see ibid., 1891 
(23 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
411 Ibid., 1882 (19 December 1521, Henry to Charles, Richmond). 
412 Ibid., 1881 (18 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinel
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Milan before they left to attend conclave.413 Furthermore, Charles V himself, conveyed Italian 
news through one of his representatives in England, in particular refuting earlier French 
reports that the Imperial-papal army had disbanded on account of the pope’s death and 
assuring the English that it would continue its anti-French offensive.414 In correspondence of 
the 26th, Henry and Wolsey would have been reassurred to hear that the Sacred College had 
confirmed the Church’s membership of the league against France, which ensured a 
continuation of ‘papal’ policy, at least during the interregnum. 415 Despite this, worrying 
intelligence continued to be received about the movements of French troops in Italy. 416 
 
 While the English crown, in the short-term, had no apparent intention of altering its 
foreign policy course, probably adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitude, Charles V, on the other 
hand, envisaged adjustments to his position by 20 December. Firstly, he wished to drop 
Wolsey’s truce idea and, secondly, sought an English contribution to the maintenance of his 
Italian forces, the pope’s death having put the whole financial burden onto him.417 By the 
23rd, Charles sought English assistance to gain the Swiss as allies, through a substantial loan 
to him and by sending a representative to the Swiss diet. He also implied that his army in Italy 
would be used to ensure that Wolsey became pope.418 Wolsey, it seems, had already 
envisaged the latter; according to de Mesa, the cardinal wanted Charles to move his troops to 
Rome, so that, if he could not be elected, that the cardinals ‘should be prevented by force 
                                                 
 Ibid., 1890 (23 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). 
414 Ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). 
413
415 It was further confirmed that the cardinals had sent money to Milan towards the army’s expenses; ibid., 1901 
 [Wolsey], Ghent), 1965 (16 January 1522, Surian 
on 20 December; ibid., 
lso see ibid. 1905 (27 December 1521). 
(26 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent). For further positive news of continued 
papal commitment, see ibid., 1918 (31 December 1521, Pace to Wolsey, Speyer). 
416 Ibid., 1941 (Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent), 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, 
Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]), 1964 (15 January 1522, Spinelly to
to Wolsey, London). 
417 Charles issued these instructions to his ambassador in England, the bishop of Badajoz, 
1887 (20 December 1521, Charles to de Mesa, Ghent). 
418 Ibid., 1891 (23 December 1521, de Mesa to Charles, London). A
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from electing an adherent of the French party, to the destruction of Naples and Sicily, and 
consequently of all Christendom’.419 According to the same Imperial source, writing on 24th, 
Wolsey was reportedly grateful to discover the emperor’s continued commitment to his 
andidacy and believed that it was feasible. He also outlined Pace’s broad commission, to c
obtain this by whatever means possible. Wolsey’s manifesto, if one can call it that, was to 
crown Charles emperor, ‘exalt his own King’, and organise an expedition to be launched 
against France and then the Ottomans, which he would lead personally (along with Henry and 
Charles).420 
 Despite Charles’ demands, the English were in no rush to act. Once Pace had left for 
Rome, it appears that Henry and Wolsey would wait until they knew who would be elected 
pontiff or, rather, what their political sympathies were.421 While they had some hope for 
Wolsey’s candidacy, they were probably quite realistic about his chances.422 Third party news 
of the conclave began arriving in England in late December and, despite being politically 
shaded, would have led Henry and Wolsey to speculate about both the potential success of the 
Pace mission and the chances of the ‘French’ party.423 They probably placed most faith, 
however, in despatches from English diplomats in Rome.424 These were not much help, 
however. Clerk, writing immediately on hearing of the pope’s death, was unable to venture a 
                                                 
419 Ibid., 1892 (24 December 1521, bishop of Badajoz to Charles, London). 
420 Ibid.. 
421 By 27 December, Charles was under the impression that Pace, having just met him, would go to the Swiss on 
his way back from Rome, which the emperor thought was too late; LPIIIii, 1905. For further English 
1941 (Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent), 1946 (9 January 1522, 
22, [Surian] to Wolsey). 
lsey, 
procrastination, particularly the continued intention to allow the French to believe that a truce was still intended, 
see ibid., 1913 (29 December). 
422 See above pp.260, 275-279. 
423 LPIIIii, 1885 (19 December 1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent), 1901 (26 December 
1521, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly to Wolsey, Ghent), 1933 (4 January 1522, Richard Wingfield and Spinelly 
to Wolsey, Ghent), 
[Fitzwilliam to Wolsey], St Germain’s), 1947 (calendared 9 January 1522, Fitzwilliam to [Wolsey]), 1958 (12 
January 1522, [Surian] to Wolsey), 1965 (12 January 15
424 For notification about the postponement of conclave; ibid., 1869 (15 December 1521, Campeggio to Wo
Rome), 1879 (17 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
 755
guess as to the outcome of the conclave; ‘heer is hard choise’ he reported.425 Campeggio 
reiterated this on 15 December, given the number of candidates and voters.426 Towards the 
                                   
end of December, Clerk, had been diligent in visiting many of the cardinals, but reported great 
dissension among them. At length, he chose to back Giulio de’ Medici on behalf of England, 
having failed to induce Campeggio’s candidacy. In pledging his support to de’ Medici, his 
motive was clearly political. Clerk advised the cardinal that Henry VIII was in a politically 
difficult position. He was committed to a league to defend the Church, for which reason he 
joined the Treaty of Bruges, but this was now ‘in evil case’, unless ‘God should provide us of 
a new Pope of like mind and affection [as Leo X]; wherefore I exhorted him to look 
substantially thereunto’.427 News of an election was thought imminent by mid-January.428 
Wolsey’s frustration was displayed on the 17th, when he reportedly berated the Imperial 
ambassador, having heard that the Pace mission would fail because Juan Manuel was 
lobbying for de’ Medici. De Mesa replied that, if true, his counterpart in Rome would change 
his policy on Pace’s arrival.429 Pace did not reach Rome in time, however, and the uncertainty 
was lifted from around 20-21 January 1522 on when news arrived in England of Adrian VI’s 
election.430 Initial reactions from the English representatives indicated surprise and implied 
discontent. Campeggio claimed that the cardinals had elected the Imperial minister on the 
basis of his ‘integrity’, while Clerk reported those in Rome to be ‘marvellously abashed and 
              
 Spinelly to [Wolsey], Ghent). 
, de Mesa to Charles). Around the same time, he might have received Clerk’s 
974 (20 January 1522, Margaret of Savoy to 
ls); Ven.iii, 395 (22 January 1522, 
425 Ellis, p.281 (LPIIIii, 1825; 2 December 1521, Clerk to Wolsey, Rome). 
426 LPIIIii, 1869 (15 December 1521, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
427 Ibid., 1895 (calendared end December 1521, Clerk to [Wolsey]). 
428 Ibid., 1964 (15 January 1522,
429 Ibid., 1968 (17 January 1522
report that his name had been mentioned as a nominee at one point; ibid., 1932 (4 January 1522, [Clerk to 
Wolsey]). Also see Ven.iii, 396 (27 January 1522, Venetian ambassador in England to the Signory). After news 
of the election was known, Charles justified this report, explaining that his orator in Rome was expected to use 
his initiative in backing a candidate until a commission arrived instructing him otherwise; ibid., 2024 (5 
February 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brussels). 
430 On the 20th, Margaret of Savoy forwarded the rumour that Adrian had been elected, which she claimed not to 
believe. Charles informed de Mesa the following day; LPIIIii, 1
Wolsey, Brussels), 1977 (21 January 1522, Charles to de Mesa, Brusse
Venetian ambassador in the Empire to the Signory). 
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evil contented’. 431 This may have been shaded, however, by Campeggio’s receipt of 
Wolsey’s instructions to forward his candidacy.432 While Wolsey’s nomination had failed, the 
identity of the new pope was probably received positively, in a political sense; as the ex-tutor 
and now minister of Charles V, a distinctly Imperial candidate had been selected, which 
augured well for the anti-French agenda.433 
                                                 
431 LPIIIii, 1944 (9 January 1522, Clerk to Wolsey), 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome). 
432 Campeggio only seems to have acknowledged Wolsey’s correspondence on 10 January (the day after 
conclave ended). He probably knew of the Englishman’s instructions on the 9th, however, as he claimed on both 
this and the following day that he had regularly backed Wolsey; LPIIIii, 1945 (9 January 1522, Campeggio to 
Wolsey, Rome), 1952 (10 January 1522, Campeggio to Wolsey, Rome).  
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